Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 4:00 p.m. EDT 

Wednesday, May 28, 2003 NUCLEAR WASTE 

Preliminary Observations 

on the Quality Assurance 

Program at the Yucca 

Mountain Repository 

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO-03-826T 
DOE’s track record of correcting problems with its quality assurance 

program is less than favorable. Recurring problems have persisted in the 

program despite DOE’s numerous attempts to correct them. DOE 

evaluations and NRC oversight activities have concluded that the 

program still falls short of expectations. 

DOE’s 2002 quality assurance improvement plan represents the 

department’s most recent attempt to correct quality assurance problems, 

including those involving the scientific models and software codes in the 

computer simulation that DOE will use to demonstrate the safety of the 

repository. Because DOE is still in the process of implementing this plan, 

it is too early to determine whether changes included in the plan will be 

effective. However, notwithstanding these changes, DOE has recently 

identified further quality assurance problems, including recurring 

problems with the data that will be used to support the NRC’s decision 

on whether to authorize DOE to construct the repository. 

Based on previously identified weaknesses and recent indications of new 

problems, we are concerned that DOE’s current efforts to improve its 

quality assurance program may not yield the results it hopes for. Our 

observation is further supported by NRC’s recent comment that DOE’s 

quality assurance program has yet to produce outcomes necessary to 

ensure that this program meets NRC requirements. 

Illustration of Yucca Mountain Repository Waste Package Emplacement 

Source: DOE.

A quality assurance program is 

required by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) to ensure that 

the Department of Energy (DOE) 

can safely construct and operate a 

high-level radioactive waste 

repository. DOE is currently 

preparing an application to NRC 

for authorization to construct the 

repository. The quality assurance 

program includes procedures to 

assure NRC that the information 

DOE provides is verifiable and well 

documented. DOE will use the

results of a computer simulation to 

demonstrate that the repository 

can be safely operated over the 

10,000-year period required by the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

health and safety standards. Some 

of the key elements of this 

simulation are shown in the 

illustration. 

This testimony is based on ongoing 

and published GAO work. The 

testimony provides the history of 

DOE’s actions to correct quality 

assurance problems, the status of 

DOE’s efforts to improve the 

quality assurance program, and 

preliminary observations on the 

effect of quality assurance 

problems on DOE’s ability to 

successfully meet its 2004 

milestone for submitting an 

application to NRC requesting 

authorization to construct the 

repository. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-826T.

To view the product, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro

at (202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-826T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development, Committee on 

Appropriations, U.S. Senate 

May 28, 2003

NUCLEAR WASTE

Preliminary Observations on the Quality 

Assurance Program at the Yucca 

Mountain Repository 
Page 1 GAO-03-826T 

Senators Ensign and Reid: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) quality assurance program for the Yucca Mountain repository 

project. As you know, Yucca Mountain is intended to serve as the nation’s 

permanent repository for high-level nuclear waste. DOE is currently in the 

process of preparing an application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) for authorization to construct the repository, which it expects to 

submit by December 2004. To ensure that DOE can safely construct and 

operate the repository, NRC requires DOE to have a quality assurance 

program. The quality assurance program is designed to include procedures 

to assure NRC that the information submitted to it is verifiable and well 

documented. Audits and management reviews are also built into the 

program to monitor whether workers follow these procedures. In cases 

where they are not followed, DOE must develop and implement corrective 

actions and monitor their effectiveness. An ineffective quality assurance 

program could potentially impede the application process and could 

precipitate potentially adverse health, safety, and environmental effects. 

In this context, you asked us to investigate the effectiveness of DOE’s 

efforts to improve its quality assurance program. Although we are still in 

the early stages of our investigation, we are prepared today to provide 

(1) the history of DOE’s actions to correct quality assurance problems, 

(2) the status of DOE’s efforts to improve the quality assurance program, 

and (3) preliminary observations on the effect of quality assurance 

problems on DOE’s ability to successfully meet its 2004 milestone for 

submitting an application to NRC requesting authorization to construct the 

repository. 

In summary: 

• DOE’s track record of correcting problems with its quality assurance 

program is less than favorable. Recurring problems have persisted in the 

program despite DOE’s numerous attempts to correct them. DOE 

evaluations and NRC oversight activities have concluded that the program 

still falls short of expectations. 

• DOE’s 2002 quality assurance improvement plan represents the 

department’s most recent attempt to correct quality assurance problems, 

including those involving scientific models and software codes that DOE 

will use to demonstrate the safety of the repository. Because DOE is still in 

the process of implementing this plan, it is too early to determine whether 

changes included in the plan will be effective. However, notwithstanding 
Page 2 GAO-03-826T 

these changes, DOE has recently identified further quality assurance 

problems, including recurring problems with the data that will be used to 

support the NRC’s decision on whether to authorize DOE to construct the 

repository. 

• Based on previously identified weaknesses and recent indications of new 

problems, we are concerned that DOE’s current efforts to improve its 

quality assurance program may not yield the results it hopes for. Our 

observation is further supported by NRC’s recent comment that DOE’s 

quality assurance program has yet to produce outcomes necessary to 

ensure that this program meets NRC requirements. 

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 was enacted to establish a 

comprehensive policy and program for the safe, permanent disposal of 

commercial spent fuel and other high-level radioactive wastes. DOE was 

directed in the act to, among other things, investigate potential sites for 

locating a repository. Amendments to the Act in 1987 directed DOE to 

consider only Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a potential site for a repository. 

In 2002, the Congress approved the President’s recommendation of Yucca 

Mountain as a suitable site for the development of a permanent high-level 

waste repository. The next step in the process is for DOE to submit an 

application to NRC for an authorization to construct the repository. 

In order to ensure that the information submitted to NRC is verifiable and 

well documented, NRC requires nuclear facilities to develop a quality 

assurance program that includes a process to identify problems, develop 

corrective actions, and monitor the effectiveness of these actions. Among 

other things, such a quality assurance program is required to (1) train 

personnel in quality assurance; (2) inspect activities that affect quality; 

(3) establish controls over testing programs and test equipment, such as 

ensuring that this equipment is properly calibrated; (4) establish and 

maintain records, including records documenting the qualifications of 

personnel performing repository work; and (5) verify compliance with the 

rules and procedures of the quality assurance program to determine the 

effectiveness of the program. 

In carrying out its responsibility for the Yucca Mountain repository to 

meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) standards for 

protecting public health and safety, as well as its standards, NRC provides 

consultation and advice to DOE in the project’s pre-application period. 

NRC officials are located onsite at the Yucca Mountain project office 

where they conduct daily oversight of project activities, including 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-03-826T 

observing and commenting on DOE’s quality assurance audits and 

preparing bi-monthly reports on the overall status of the program. 

Additionally, DOE and NRC hold quarterly quality assurance meetings and 

conduct exchanges between staff on technical issues. 

DOE’s quality assurance problems at the Yucca Mountain repository site 

date back to the late 1980s. In a 1988 report, we identified significant 

problems with the quality assurance program, noting that it failed to meet 

NRC standards.1

 We found that NRC had identified many specific concerns 

from the oversight activities it had performed at Yucca Mountain. For 

example, NRC noted that DOE’s heavy reliance on contractors and its 

inadequate oversight of quality assurance activities would increase the 

likelihood that DOE might encounter quality-related problems. 

Furthermore, NRC said that the likelihood that the state of Nevada and 

others would contest the licensing proceedings increased the probability 

that DOE would have to defend its quality assurance program and the 

quality of the work performed. NRC noted that DOE’s inability to properly 

defend its work could result in additional expense and time-consuming 

delays as program weaknesses are corrected. NRC also found that DOE 

staff and contractors exhibited negative attitudes toward the function of 

quality assurance, noting that participants appeared to lack a full 

appreciation for what it took to get a facility licensed by NRC. 

DOE was put on notice of these shortcomings, but the problems 

continued. In its 1989 evaluation of DOE’s Site Characterization Plan, NRC 

concluded that DOE and its key contractors had yet to develop and 

implement an acceptable quality assurance program. In March 1992, based 

on progress DOE had made in improving its quality assurance program, 

NRC allowed DOE to proceed with its site characterization work, noting 

that DOE had demonstrated its ability to evaluate and correct quality 

assurance program deficiencies. A year and a half later, however, NRC 

raised concerns with DOE about the acceptability of facility design 

activities requiring quality assurance. NRC reported that it had no 

confidence that DOE’s management plan for resolving quality assurance 

issues related to the design activities would work because of DOE’s and 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Waste: Repository Work Should Not Proceed 

Until Quality Assurance Is Adequate, GAO/RCED-88-159 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 

1988). 

History of Actions 

Taken to Correct 

Quality Assurance 

Problems 
Page 4 GAO-03-826T 

the site contractors’ inability to effectively implement corrective actions in 

the past. 

DOE renewed its efforts to correct problems with its quality assurance 

program starting in the late 1990s when its own audits at Yucca Mountain 

identified quality assurance problems in three areas: data sources, 

validation of scientific models, and software development. First, DOE 

could not ensure that all the data needed to support the scientific models 

could be tracked back to original sources or that the data had been 

properly collected. Second, DOE had no standardized process to develop 

the scientific models needed to simulate geological events. Finally, DOE 

had no process for ensuring that the software being developed to support 

the models would work. In response to the issues raised in the audits, 

DOE issued a management plan in 1999 that prescribed remedies. 

Following implementation of this plan, DOE considered the issues 

resolved. 

Model validation and software development problems, however, 

resurfaced in 2001. New quality assurance audits found that project 

personnel had not followed the required procedures for model 

development and validation or established a timeline for completing the 

models. In addition, these audits identified that project personnel had not 

followed the software development process, prompting a prohibition on 

further software development without prior management approval. 

According to DOE, the significance of these new observations was 

compounded by their similarity to those problems previously identified. 

In July 2002, DOE provided NRC with a revised plan to correct its quality 

assurance problems at Yucca Mountain, including the problems with 

scientific models and software codes. In constructing the plan, DOE 

conducted an in-depth study of Yucca Mountain’s management and work 

environment. The plan outlined five key areas needing improvement. 

Specifically, it noted the need for 

• clarifying roles, responsibilities, accountability, and authority for DOE and 

contractor personnel, 

• improving quality assurance processes and clarifying line management’s 

quality responsibilities, 

• improving DOE and contractor written procedures, 

Status of DOE Efforts 

to Improve Quality 

Assurance 
Page 5 GAO-03-826T 

• implementing more effective and consistent corrective action plans to 

preclude recurring quality problems, and 

• improving the work environment where employees can raise program 

concerns without fear of reprisal. 

To fully address issues raised in the plan, DOE identified a total of 72 

actions needed to correct the quality assurance program—35 to address 

the five key areas, 12 to address model development issues, and 25 to 

address software development issues. DOE recently reported that it had 

completed 41 of the 72 actions. The management plan also included 

performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the actions. DOE 

recently reported, however, that the Yucca Mountain project still lacks 

complete and useful performance measures and stated its intention to 

have the appropriate performance measures in place by September 2003. 

Since DOE began to implement its latest improvement plan, new quality 

issues have emerged. In March 2003, DOE issued a “stop-work” order 

preventing further use of a procedure intended to help improve DOE and 

contractor quality assurance procedures. According to DOE, they 

cancelled the use of the procedure and reverted back to the existing 

procedure. In April 2003, DOE again found data-related problems similar 

to the data verification problems identified in 1998. For example, DOE 

found that, instead of verifying data back to appropriate sources, project 

scientists had been directed to reclassify the unverified data as 

“assumptions” which do not require verification. 

At the April 2003 quality assurance meeting with NRC, DOE highlighted 

several recent improvements to the quality assurance program. These 

improvements included (1) management changes with DOE’s primary 

contractor at the site, including a new president and a new director of 

quality assurance, (2) increased line management involvement in quality 

assurance, and (3) the integration of quality engineers with DOE line 

employees. Despite this reported progress, an NRC official at the same 

meeting commented that the quality assurance program had still not 

produced the outcomes necessary to ensure the program is compliant with 

NRC requirements. 

Whether DOE can correct its quality assurance problems in time to meet 

its milestone for submitting an application that is acceptable to NRC is not 

clear. DOE’s unsuccessful efforts to address recurring quality assurance 

problems, the identification of new problems since the issuance of its 2002 

Preliminary 

Observations 
Page 6 GAO-03-826T 

improvement plan, and NRC’s recent comment that DOE’s quality 

assurance program has yet to produce outcomes necessary to ensure that 

this program meets NRC requirements do not instill much confidence that 

the quality assurance problems will soon be resolved. An ineffective 

quality assurance program could impede the application process, leading 

to time-consuming and expensive delays as weaknesses are corrected, or 

ultimately prevent DOE from receiving authorization to construct a 

repository. Moreover, continued reliance on data that are unverifiable and 

thus could be inaccurate could lead to adverse effects in the course of the 

10,000-year period required by EPA’s health and safety standards. At the 

same time, now that the project has shifted from scientific investigation to 

preparing an application, DOE may now have the proper motivation and 

focus to correct recurring quality assurance problems given the integral 

role that quality assurance plays in the application process. 

As we continue our investigation, we will work to validate our 

observations and further assess the effectiveness of DOE’s efforts to 

improve its quality assurance program. 

Thank you, Senators Reid and Ensign. That concludes my testimony. I 

would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Ms. Robin 

Nazzaro at (202) 512-3841. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Lee Carroll, Daniel Feehan, Thomas Kingham, Thomas 

Laetz, Chalane Lechuga, and Jonathan McMurray. 

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