United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 	 Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Aviation, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, 

House of Representatives 

September 2003 AIRPORT 

PASSENGER 

SCREENING 

Preliminary 

Observations on 

Progress Made and 

Challenges Remaining 

GAO-03-1173 

Highlights of GAO-03-1173, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

Passenger screening is critical to 

the security of our nation’s aviation 

system, particularly in the 

aftermath of the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks. The 

Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) is tasked 

with securing all modes of 

transportation, including the 

screening of airline passengers. 

TSA has met numerous 

requirements in this regard, such as 

deploying more than 50,000 federal 

screeners at over 440 commercial 

airports nationwide. To determine 

whether TSA’s passenger screening 

program is achieving its intended 

results, GAO is conducting an 

ongoing evaluation of TSA’s efforts 

to (1) ensure that passenger 

screeners are effectively trained 

and supervised, (2) measure 

screener performance in detecting 

threat objects, and (3) implement 

and evaluate the contract screening 

pilot program. 

Because our evaluation is ongoing 

and our results are preliminary, we 

are not making any 

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1173. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick, (202) 512-8777, or 

Berrickc@gao.gov. 

September 24, 2003 

AIRPORT PASSENGER SCREENING 

Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was tasked with the 

tremendous challenge of building a large federal agency responsible for 

securing all modes of transportation, while simultaneously meeting 

ambitious deadlines to enhance the security of the nation’s aviation system. 

Although TSA has made significant progress related to its passenger 

screening program, challenges remain. 

TSA recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis, and 

effective supervisory training, is critical to maintaining and enhancing skills. 

However, TSA has not fully developed or deployed recurrent or supervisory 

training programs. Although TSA has not yet deployed these programs, it has 

taken steps in establishing recurrent and supervisory training, including 

developing six recurrent training modules that will soon be deployed to all 

airports, as well as working with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

Graduate School to tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course to the specific 

training needs of TSA’s screening supervisors. 

TSA currently collects little information regarding screener performance in 

detecting threat objects. The primary source of information collected on 

screener’s ability to detect threat objects is covert testing conducted by 

TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. However, TSA does not 

consider the results of these tests as a measure of screener performance, but 

rather a “snapshot” of a screener’s ability to detect threat objects at a 

particular point in time. Additionally, TSA does not currently use the Threat 

Image Projection system, which places images of threat objects on x-ray 

screens during actual operations and records whether screeners identify the 

threat. However, TSA plans to fully activate the Threat Image Projection 

system with significantly more threat images than previously used, as well as 

implement an annual screener certification program in October 2003. TSA 

also recently completed a screener performance improvement study and is 

taking steps to address the deficiencies identified during the study. 

As required by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA 

implemented a pilot program using contract screeners in lieu of federal 

screeners at 5 commercial airports. However, TSA has not yet determined 

how to evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports, 

or prepare for airports potentially applying to opt-out of using federal 

screeners, as allowed by the act, beginning in November 2004. Although TSA 

has not begun evaluating the performance of the pilot program airports, it 

plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare the performance of 

pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine the reasons for any 

differences. Numerous airport operators have contacted TSA to express an 

interest in obtaining more information to assist in their decision regarding 

opting-out of using federal screeners. 
Contents 


Letter 


Results in Brief 


Background


Scope and Methodology 


Recurrent and Supervisory Training Programs Not Fully Developed


Little Information Exists to Measure Screeners’ Performance in 


Detecting Threat Objects 


An Assessment of the Contract Screening Pilot Program Has Not 


Yet Begun


TSA Continuing to Work to Identify Appropriate Staffing Levels at 


the Nation’s Airports 


1 

2 

4 

6 

7 

10 

14 

15 

Appendix I 	 Examples of Information Collected and Maintained 

in the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Performance Management Information System 

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 19 


GAO Contacts 19


Staff Acknowledgments 19


Page i GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 

17 
Abbreviations 

AAAE American Association of Airport Executives 


ACI Airports Council International 


ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 


DOT Department of Transportation 


FAA Federal Aviation Administration 


FSD Federal Security Directors 


LMS On-Line Learning Management System 


OIAPR Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review 


OIG Office of Inspector General 


OJT on-the-job training 


PMIS Performance Management Information System


SOP standard operating procedure 


TIP Threat Image Projection


TSA Transportation Security Administration 


USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 


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reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 

September 24, 2003 


The Honorable John Mica 


Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation


Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 


House of Representatives 


Dear Mr. Chairman: 


Passenger screening is a critical component to the security of our nation’s


aviation system. Passenger screeners use metal detectors, X-ray machines, 


explosive trace detection machines, and physical searches to examine 


passengers and their baggage to identify threat objects. On November 19,


2001, prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 


President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 


with a primary goal of strengthening the security of the nation’s aviation 


system. ATSA created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 


and mandated specific improvements to aviation security, including the


federalization of passenger screening at over 440 commercial airports in 


the United States by November 19, 2002. 


TSA was tasked with the tremendous challenge of building a large federal 


agency responsible for securing all modes of transportation, while 


simultaneously meeting ambitious deadlines to federalize aviation security


as mandated by ATSA. TSA has met numerous requirements related to its 


passenger screening program, including deploying more than 50,000 


federal screeners at over 440 commercial airports nationwide, developing


and implementing a basic screener training program, and establishing a 


pilot program at 5 airports where screening of passengers and property 


would be conducted by private screening companies and overseen by TSA. 


To determine whether TSA’s passenger screening program is achieving its 


intended results, the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on 


Transportation and Infrastructure, requested that we review various 


aspects of the program. Specifically, the Subcommittee asked that we 


evaluate TSA’s efforts to (1) ensure that passenger screeners are 


effectively trained and supervised, (2) measure screener performance in 


detecting threat objects, (3) implement and evaluate the contract 


screening pilot program, and (4) address airport-specific staffing needs, 


while reducing the screener workforce. On September 5, 2003, we briefed 


Page 1 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Results in Brief 

the Subcommittee staff on our preliminary observations of TSA’s 

passenger screening program based on our work to date. 

This report summarizes and updates the information presented at that 

briefing. Because our work is still on going, the observations discussed in 

this report are preliminary. 

In conducting our work, we obtained and reviewed TSA documentation 

related to screener training, testing and supervision; the contract 

screening pilot program; screener staffing levels; and airport security 

concerns. We also interviewed relevant officials at TSA headquarters and 

field offices, airports, and several aviation associations. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is contained later in this report. 

TSA has deployed basic and remedial screener training programs, but has 

not fully developed or deployed a recurrent or supervisory training 

program to ensure to ensure that screeners are effectively trained and 

supervised. However, recognizing that training of screeners on a frequent 

basis and effective supervision are critical to screener performance, TSA 

has taken some positive steps in this direction. These steps include 

designing an On-Line Learning Management System (LMS) that will be 

fielded in October 2003, and working with the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture’s (USDA) Graduate School to tailor its off-the-shelf 

supervisory course to the specific training needs of TSA’s screening 

supervisors. 

TSA currently collects little information to measure screener performance 

in detecting threat objects. The primary source of information collected on 

screeners’ ability to detect threat objects is operational testing conducted 

by TSA’s Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review (OIAPR).1 

However, TSA does not consider the results of OIAPR’s covert tests as a 

measure of screener performance, but rather a “snapshot” of a screener’s 

ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time, and as a 

system-wide performance indicator. In addition, the Threat Image 

Projection (TIP) system, which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

deployed in late 1999 to measure and improve screener performance in 

1

TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a screener, conducted by 

TSA, on any screener function to assess the screener’s threat item detection ability and/or 

adherence to TSA-approved procedures. 

Page 2 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
detecting threat objects, was shut down immediately following the 

September 11th terrorist attacks for fear that it would result in screening 

delays and panic.2

 However, TSA officials reported that they have recently 

begun fielding TIP to airports, with significantly more threat images than 

used by the FAA. Further, TSA has not yet implemented an ATSA 

requirement for an annual proficiency review for all screeners, but plans 

to begin implementing an annual screener certification program in 

October 2003. TSA also developed a Performance Management 

Information System (PMIS) to collect and maintain information on the 

performance of TSA’s passenger and baggage screening operations. 

However, PMIS contains little information on screener performance in 

detecting threat objects.3 

Consistent with ATSA, TSA implemented a pilot program using contract 

screeners at 5 commercial airports, but has not yet determined how to 

evaluate and measure the performance of the pilot program airports. 

However, TSA plans to award a contract by October 1, 2003, to compare 

the performance of pilot screeners with federal screeners and determine 

the reasons for any differences. While the purpose of the screener pilot 

program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening 

companies rather than federal screeners, TSA initially required private 

screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures and protocols used 

by federal screeners. However, TSA recently provided the contractors with 

some flexibility, such as allowing them to determine and maintain their 

own staffing levels and to make independent hiring decisions. ATSA also 

gives airport operators the option of applying to transition from using 

federal screeners to private screeners beginning in November 2004; 

however, TSA has not begun to plan for the possible transition of airports 

from a federal system to a private screening company. Numerous airport 

operators have contacted TSA to express an interest in obtaining more 

information to assist in their decision regarding using private screeners. 

To address airport-specific staffing needs and accomplish workforce 

reduction goals, TSA developed a staffing model to determine staffing 

2

TIP places images of threat objects on x-ray screens during actual operations and records 

whether screeners identify the threat. TIP was designed by FAA to help screeners remain 

alert, train them to become more adept at detecting harder to spot threat objects, and 

continuously measure screener performance. 

3

TSA officials recently reported that they plan to modify PMIS to collect data on screener 

performance in the future. 

Page 3 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Background 

levels at each airport, and recently hired an outside consultant to assist the 

agency in determining whether identified staffing levels are appropriate. 

Federal Security Directors (FSD), who are responsible for overseeing 

security at each of the nation’s commercial airports, have expressed 

concern that they have had limited authority to respond to airport specific 

staffing needs, such as reacting to fluctuations in daily and/or seasonal 

passenger flow. TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that their initial 

staffing efforts created imbalances in the screener workforce and have 

taken steps to correct identified imbalances, such as such as authorizing 

the hiring of part-time screeners at over 200 airports—the first of which 

began working on September 15, 2003. 

Because our observations are preliminary and our evaluation is ongoing, 

we are not making recommendations at this time. 

TSA officials reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of Transportation 

(DOT) to ensure security for all modes of transportation, to include 

aviation.4

 ATSA set forth specific enhancements to aviation security for 

TSA to implement and established deadlines for completing many of them. 

These enhancements included federalizing passenger screeners at more 

than 440 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;5

 screening checked 

baggage for explosives by December 31, 2002; enhancing screener training 

standards; and establishing and managing a 2-year pilot program at five 

airports—one in each airport category—where screening of passengers 

and property would be conducted by a private screening company and 

overseen by TSA. Additionally, ATSA included a provision that allows 

airport operators to apply to opt-out of using federal screeners in favor of 

private screeners beginning November 19, 2004. 

Prior to the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for screening 

passengers and most used private security firms to perform this function. 

Longstanding concerns existed regarding screener performance in 

4

The Homeland Security Act, signed into law on November 25, 2002, transferred TSA to the 

new Department of Homeland Security. 

5

The December 31, 2002, deadline was extended to December 31, 2003, in some cases by 

the Homeland Security Act. 

Page 4 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
detecting threat objects. Inadequate training and poor supervision, along 

with rapid turnover and inadequate attention to human factors, were 

historically identified as key contributors to poor screener performance.6 

As early as 1987, we reported that too little attention had been paid to 

(1) individual aptitudes for effectively performing screening duties; (2) the 

sufficiency of screener training and screeners’ ability to comprehend 

training; and (3) the monotony of the job and distractions that reduced 

screeners’ vigilance.

7

 Additional studies have shown that effective training 

can lead to more effective performance and lower turnover rates for 

passenger screeners. 

Concerns have long existed over screeners’ inability to detect threat 

objects during covert tests at passenger screening checkpoints. In 1978, 

screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the potentially dangerous objects 

FAA agents carried through checkpoints during tests—a level that was 

considered “significant and alarming.”

8

 In 1987, screeners did not detect 

20 percent of the objects during the same types of tests.9

 In addition, we 

reported that FAA tests conducted between 1991 and 1999 showed that 

screeners’ ability to detect objects was not improving, and in some cases 

was worsening. In tests conducted in the late 1990s, as the testing objects 

became more realistic and more closely approximated how a terrorist 

might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners’ ability to detect 

dangerous objects declined even further.10 

6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair 

Airport Screeners’ Performance, GAO/RCED-00-75 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2000). 

“Human factors” refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of, and the 

constraints it imposes on, the individuals performing the function. Reports on the human 

factors involved in checkpoint screening date back more than 20 years and include 

repetitive tasks screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to detect 

threat objects, and the stress involved in dealing with the public, who may dislike being 

screened or demand faster action to avoid missing their flights. 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing LongStanding Screener Performance Problems, GAO/T-RCED-00-125 (Washington, D.C.: March 

16, 2000). 

8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the 

Aviation Security System, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-00-142 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2000). 

9

See footnote 8. 

10U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent 

Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports, GAO-01-1162T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

20, 2001). 

Page 5 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Scope and 

Methodology 

Our preliminary observations are based on our review of TSA 

documentation related to screener training, testing, and supervision; the 

contract screening pilot program; screener staffing levels; and airport 

security concerns. We interviewed TSA headquarters’ officials in 

Arlington, Virginia; and interviewed FSDs, their staffs, and screeners at 

12 commercial airports throughout the nation;11 10 airport operators; 

officials at 5 air carriers; and officials from 4 aviation associations— 

American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), Airports Council 

International (ACI), Air Transport Association, and Regional Airline 

Association. We also reviewed our prior reports that addressed issues 

related to the performance of airport passenger screeners. We conducted 

our work from May through September 2003 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Because our review is still 

ongoing, the results presented in this report are preliminary. 

To complete our work, we will continue to collect and review TSA 

documentation related to each of our four objectives, including obtaining 

and analyzing the results of TSA’s operational tests. We will also 

administer a survey to all 158 FSDs to obtain their perspectives on general 

and airport specific information related to each of our four objectives. 

Additionally, we will visit at least 8 additional airports to conduct 

interviews with FSDs, their staffs, members of the screener workforce, 

and airport operators. We will also interview representatives of all 5 pilot 

program airports, as well as airport operators at all category X airports, to 

obtain information on their coordination with TSA and their plans, if any, 

to apply to opt-out of the federal screening program beginning November 

19, 2004. Finally, we will continue to meet with TSA headquarters officials 

to obtain current information related to the issues addressed in this report. 

We anticipate issuing a final report in April 2004. 

11As of September 19, 2003, we have visited the following 12 commercial airports: 

Baltimore-Washington International; Dallas-Ft. Worth International; Dallas Love-Field; 

Kansas City International; Little Rock National; Orlando International; Orlando Sanford; 

Portland International; Seattle-Tacoma International; Tampa International; WashingtonDulles International; and Washington Reagan National. 

Page 6 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Recurrent and 

Supervisory Training 

Programs Not Fully 

Developed 

TSA developed basic and remedial screener training programs, but has not 

fully developed or deployed a recurrent or supervisory training program to 

ensure that screeners are effectively trained and supervised. 

Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger screeners’ ability 

to detect threat objects. Studies have shown that on-going training can 

lead to more effective performance and lower turnover rates for passenger 

screeners. According to TSA, there are three key elements of passenger 

screener training: (1) basic training, (2) remedial training, and 

(3) recurrent training. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic 

screener-training program comprised of 40 hours of classroom instruction 

and 60 hours of on-the-job training (OJT). TSA reported that all of its 

screeners who work independently have completed basic screener 

training and that those who failed an operational test received required 

remedial training.12 

Basic Training TSA requires screeners to complete a minimum of 40 hours of classroom 

instruction and 60 hours of OJT prior to making independent screening 

decisions. This requirement is an increase over FAA’s basic training 

requirements when it oversaw passenger screening, which called for 

12 hours of classroom instruction and 40 hours of OJT. According to TSA 

officials, all screeners who work independently have met the basic 

screener training requirements.13 TSA contractors are responsible for 

delivering and tracking basic screener classroom training, while OJT is 

tracked locally at each airport. TSA encourages, but does not require, 

screening managers, who are responsible for overseeing screening 

functions to participate in classroom training, even if they do not have 

prior screening experience. Nevertheless, 2 of the 12 FSDs we interviewed 

said that they require their screening managers to observe basic screener 

training. 

Remedial Training 	 Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any screener 

who fails an operational test and prohibits screeners from performing the 

screening function related to the test they failed until they successfully 

12The PMIS currently reports the breakdown of those screeners trained for passenger and 

baggage screening as well as the number of cross-trained screeners by airport. 

13We plan to verify whether passenger screeners received basic training as required during 

the remainder of our evaluation. 

Page 7 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
complete the training.14 FSDs must certify that screeners identified as 

requiring remedial training complete the training before they can perform 

the screening function identified as a performance weakness. TSA’s 

Aviation Operations Division is responsible for tracking the completion of 

remedial training following the failure of covert tests. The tracking of 

remedial training initiated for reasons other than failing a covert test is the 

responsibility of the FSDs or their designees. TSA reported that all 

screeners requiring remedial training have received the training.

15 

Recurrent Training TSA has not fully developed or deployed a recurrent training program, but 

has recognized that ongoing training of screeners on a frequent basis is 

critical to maintaining and enhancing screener skills. According to agency 

officials, TSA established a training task force comprised of airport 

Training Coordinators, screeners, and headquarters officials to conduct an 

assessment of training needs. As a result of the task force’s suggestions, 

TSA is developing six recurrent training modules—the first of which TSA 

plans to deploy to all airports beginning in October 2003. TSA plans to 

release each of the remaining five modules as they are finalized, which 

they anticipate will occur throughout 2004. TSA officials also said that 

they designed and are currently pilot testing an On-Line Learning 

Management System (LMS) comprised of 366 various training courses, 

which they expect to field in October 2003. Officials said that they were 

not further along in implementing their recurrent training modules or LMS 

due to budget considerations. 

Fourteen of the 22 passenger screeners and supervisors we interviewed 

expressed the need for recurrent training.16 They were particularly 

interested in receiving additional training related to recognizing x-ray 

images of threat objects. In addition, 10 of the 12 FSDs we interviewed 

reported implementing their own locally developed recurrent training 

courses rather than waiting for the training modules to be deployed by 

14Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to participate in 

corrective action training based on their observations of performance deficiencies, such as 

failure to follow a standard operating procedure. 

15We plan to verify whether identified passenger screeners received 3 hours of remedial 

training as required by TSA during the remainder of our evaluation. 

16 As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners and supervisors to 

interview, the views of those we interviewed should not be considered representative of 

the views of all screeners and supervisors at the airports we visited. 

Page 8 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
headquarters. TSA’s OIAPR found that screeners at airports that 

conducted frequent, on-going training performed better during covert 

tests—TSA’s form of operational testing—than screeners who did not 

receive recurrent training. 

Supervisory Training TSA describes its screening supervisors as the key to a strong defense in 

detecting threat objects. In September 2001, we reported on the results of 

our survey of aviation stakeholders and aviation and terrorism experts 

concerning options for conducting screening. The respondents identified 

better supervision as one of the factors necessary for improving screener 

performance.17 Additionally, DOT’s Office Inspector General (OIG) 

recently reported that screener supervisors are the key to effective 

screening,18 and TSA’s OIAPR identified a lack of supervisory training as a 

cause for screener testing failures. FSDs and TSA headquarters officials 

recognize the need to enhance the skills of screening supervisors through 

supervisory training.TSA is currently working with USDA to tailor its offthe-shelf supervisory course to the specific needs of TSA’s screening 

supervisors. TSA recently reported that it is sending supervisors to the 

basic USDA supervisor’s course until the customized course is fielded, 

which it expects to occur in April 2004. To supplement the classroom 

training, TSA also plans to establish a supervisory training module for 

recurrent training. We plan to review TSA’s training initiatives further 

during the remainder of our evaluation. 

17U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives 

for, Preboard Screening Security Operations, GAO-01-1171T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 

2001). The survey respondents identified compensation and improved training as the 

highest priorities of improving screener performance. In addition to identifying a need for 

better supervision, they also believed that the implementation of performance standards, 

team and image building, awards for exemplary work, and certification of individual 

screeners would improve screener performance. 

18Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, May 22, 2003. 

Page 9 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Little Information 

Exists to Measure 

Screeners’ 

Performance in 

Detecting Threat 

Objects 

Currently, the results of TSA’s OIAPR’s operational, or covert, testing is 

the only indication of screener performance in detecting threat objects. 

However, TSA does not view the results of OIAPR’s covert testing as a 

measure of screener performance, but rather as a “snapshot” of a 

screener’s ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time. 

Although OAIPR conducts fewer covert tests of passenger screeners than 

previously conducted by the FAA, TSA considers its tests more rigorous 

than FAA’s tests because they more closely approximate techniques 

terrorists might use. In addition to conducting operational testing, TSA 

plans to fully activate the Threat Image Projection system and implement a 

screener certification program in October 2003 to collect additional 

information on screener performance. TSA also developed a Performance 

Management Information System to collect and maintain information on 

the performance of its passenger and baggage screening operations. 

However, PMIS contains little data on screener performance in detecting 

threat objects. TSA officials said that they plan to expand PMIS to collect 

some performance information, but did not identify a timeframe for when 

the data will be collected. 

Operational Testing TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a screener, 

conducted by TSA, on any screener function to assess the screener’s threat 

item detection ability and/or adherence to TSA-approved procedures. 

When a screener fails a test, he or she is required to receive immediate 

remedial training, and is prohibited from performing the function related 

to the failed test until he or she satisfactory completes the training. 

Currently, OIAPR’s covert testing is the only source of operational testing 

conducted of passenger screeners. These tests are designed to identify 

systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners in the areas of 

training, policy, and equipment. TSA does not view the results of OIAPR’s 

covert testing as a measure of screener performance, but rather a 

“snapshot” of a screener’s ability to detect threat objects at a particular 

point in time and as an indicator of systemwide screener performance. 

OIAPR testing to date has shown weaknesses in screeners’ ability to detect 

threat objects. Testing conducted by the DOT’s OIG, the Department of 

Homeland Security’s OIG, and GAO have also identified screener 

performance weaknesses. 

Prior to the creation of TSA, FAA conducted thousands of covert tests 

annually of passenger screeners. Most of these tests were compliance tests 

in which FAA agents attempted to get nine test objects, such as guns and 

grenades, past screeners conducting x-ray, metal detector, and physical 

searches at airport checkpoints. The DOT OIG described these tests as 

Page 10 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
unlike the techniques that terrorists would employ.19 In 1997, FAA 

incorporated simulated improvised explosive devices into its compliance 

testing and performed, on average, more than 2,000 of these test each year. 

In addition to compliance tests, FAA’s special headquarters based testing 

unit, often called the Red Team, conducted more realistic tests using 

harder to detect threat objects by agents not known to screeners. 20 

TSA’s OIAPR has conducted fewer covert tests than conducted by FAA, 

but considers its testing methods more rigorous than either of FAA’s 

compliance or Red Team tests because they more closely approximate 

techniques terrorists might use. OIAPR officials further said that their tests 

are intentionally designed to have a high probability of failure in an effort 

to identify vulnerabilities and areas needing improvement. Additionally, 

unlike testing conducted under FAA, OIAPR staff that perform the tests 

reported that they provide immediate feedback to screeners, their 

managers, and the FSDs to explain how they beat the system and provide 

instant remedial training. We plan to review OIAPR’s operational testing in 

more detail during the remainder of our evaluation. 

Based on an anticipated increase in staff from about 100 in fiscal year 2003 

to 200 in fiscal year 2004, OIAPR plans to conduct twice as many covert 

tests next year. In addition, TSA recently established 5 mission support 

centers located throughout the country, which according to TSA, will be 

staffed with OIAPR personnel available to conduct additional covert 

tests.21 These centers will also be staffed with mobile testing teams that 

will work with FSDs in their region to conduct screener training using 

some of the test objects OIAPR uses in its covert tests. 

19At the May 22, 2003, hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, DOT’s IG, described FAA’s standard protocols for testing how well screeners 

performed when using uncluttered carry-on bags with a firearm or simulated bomb inside. 

The IG said that it would be difficult for a screener to miss a test object when undergoing 

such a covert test. 

20Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Serious Problems Detecting Dangerous 

Objects, GAO/RCED-00-159 (Washington, D.C.: June 2000). The tests performed by FAA’s 

Red Team, a special headquarters based unit, were considered their most realistic tests 

because they used weapons and improvise devices, a wider variety of bags with more 

clutter in them, and headquarters-based agents who were not likely to be recognized by the 

screeners. 

21The mission support centers are located in Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, Philadelphia, and San 

Francisco. 

Page 11 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Threat Image Projection 

(TIP) System 

In late 1999, to help screeners remain alert, train them to become more 

adept at detecting harder to spot threat objects, and continuously measure 

screener performance, FAA began deploying TIP. TIP places images of 

threat objects on x-ray screens during actual operations and records 

whether screeners identify the threat object.22 By frequently exposing 

screeners to a variety of images of dangerous objects on the x-ray screens, 

the system provides continuous OJT and allows for immediate supervisory 

feedback, on-the-spot training, and remedial training. 

According to TSA officials, TIP was shut down immediately following the 

September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it would result in 

screening delays and panic, as screeners might think that they were 

actually viewing a threat object. TSA officials recognize that TIP is a key 

tool in maintaining and enhancing screener performance, and said that 

they had begun reactivating TIP with significantly more images than FAA 

had in place. TSA officials said that TIP had not been reactivated sooner 

due to a lack of automated data collection via cellular modems; competing 

priorities; a lack of training; and a lack of resources needed to deploy TIP 

activation teams. 

Annual Screener 

Certification 

ATSA requires that each passenger screener receive an annual proficiency 

review to ensure he or she continues to meet all qualifications and 

standards required to perform the screening function. Although TSA has 

not yet implemented this requirement, it plans to develop an annual 

screener certification program comprised of three components, including 

(1) image recognition test; (2) knowledge of standard operating 

procedures (SOPs); and (3) practical demonstration of skills, to be 

administered by a contractor. TSA has not yet determined the level of 

performance that screeners must achieve to be certified, but officials said 

that they plan to require performance at a high, but reasonable level. 

Officials also said that they plan to remediate and retest screeners who fail 

22TIP is designed to test screeners’ detection capabilities by projecting threat images, 

including guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened, or projecting images of bags 

containing threat objects onto the x-ray screen as live baggage is screened. Screeners are 

responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be 

searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then 

records the screener’s performance in a database that FAA could access to analyze 

performance trends. TIP exposes screeners to threat images on a routine basis to enable 

them to become more adept at recognizing threat objects. The system records the 

screeners’ responses to the projected images and provides a measure of their performance 

while assisting in keeping them alert. 

Page 12 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
any portion of the test, but have not yet determined the number of times a 

screener may retake the test before termination. Certification is scheduled 

to begin in October 2003 and to be completed at all 442 airports by January 

2004, in the order in which the airports began federal screening 

operations. TSA officials recently reported that they awarded a contract to 

conduct the practical demonstration component of the test; however, TSA 

has not developed a schedule for when the program will be fielded to the 

airports. We plan to review TSA’s annual screener certification program 

during the remainder of our evaluation. 

Performance Management 

Information System 

TSA’s Performance Management Information System—PMIS—for 

passenger and baggage screening operations contains little data on 

screener performance in detecting threat objects. PMIS collects 

information on workload, staffing, and equipment and is used to identify 

some performance and policy issues, such as the level of absenteeism, 

average time for equipment repairs, and status of TSA’s efforts to meets 

goals for 100 percent baggage screening.23 (See app. I for examples of 

information collected and contained in PMIS.) Additionally, TSA uses 

PMIS data to identify needed changes to SOPs.24 Officials further reported 

that PMIS has the ability to generate reports that enable TSA to track its 

progress toward meeting its performance goals as well as to generate 

reports by region, FSD, airport, and/or individual screening checkpoint. 

PMIS has been deployed to all airports with federal screeners. FSDs are 

responsible for designating a staff person to enter performance data into 

PMIS on a daily basis. 

TSA officials reported that they are planning to integrate performance 

information from various systems into PMIS to assist the agency in making 

strategic decisions. TSA also recently reported that it is developing a 

screener performance index, which is supposed to include information 

such as the results of TIP tests, training tests, and certification tests. We 

plan to review these plans in more detail during the remainder of our 

evaluation. 

23TSA officials said that PMIS also contains other metrics, including human resources, 

sizing, checkpoint, feedback, and incidents. 

24For example, using PMIS data, TSA determined that passengers were unintentionally 

leaving money at the screening checkpoints when they were divesting themselves of all 

objects that could possibly cause the walkthrough metal detectors to alarm. In response to 

this finding, TSA established a protocol instructing screeners on how to address this issue. 

Page 13 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Screener Performance 

Improvement Study 

TSA is taking steps to improve screener performance. In July 2003, TSA 

completed a Screener Performance Improvement Study, which was 

designed to identify root causes for gaps between current screener 

performance and TSA’s desired performance—defined as 100 percent 

interception of prohibited items coming through the passenger screening 

checkpoints. As part of its study, TSA identified four significant screener 

performance deficiencies. TSA concluded that four key factors 

contributed to the identified deficiencies: (1) lack of skills, knowledge, or 

information; (2) low motivation; (3) ineffective work environment; and 

(4) incorrect or missing incentives. To address the screener performance 

deficiencies identified in the study, TSA developed several key solutions, 

including the need to establish adequate training facilities at airports; staff 

airports adequately to allow time for training; reconfigure checkpoints to 

eliminate distractions; implement TIP at all airports; and enhance 

supervisory skills. According to TSA officials, the appropriate TSA 

components are currently developing action plans for each of the 

deficiencies identified in the Performance Improvement Study. The plans 

are to include action steps, timelines, required resources, and anticipated 

outcomes. We plan to review these plans during the remainder of our 

evaluation. 

An Assessment of the 

Contract Screening 

Pilot Program Has 

Not Yet Begun 

TSA has implemented a pilot program using contract screeners at 

5 airports, but has not determined how to evaluate and measure the 

performance of the pilot program airports. The purpose of the 2-year pilot 

program is to determine the feasibility of using private screening 

companies rather than federal screeners. Initially, TSA required private 

screening companies to adhere to all of the procedures and protocols used 

for federal screeners. However, TSA recently provided the pilot 

contractors with some flexibility, such as allowing them to determine and 

maintain their own staffing levels and make independent hiring decisions. 

While TSA has not yet determined how to evaluate and measure the 

performance of the pilot program airports, it plans to award a contract by 

October 1, 2003, to compare the performance of pilot screeners with 

federal screeners and determine the reasons for any differences. TSA 

officials said that the Office of Management and Budget requested that 

they include in their evaluation ways to allow more innovation by contract 

screening companies. 

Although ATSA allows airports to apply to opt-out of using federal 

screeners beginning in November 2004, TSA has not begun to plan for the 

possible transition of airports from a federal system to a private screening 

company. Airports Council International officials said that numerous 

Page 14 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
TSA Continuing to 

Work to Identify 

Appropriate Staffing 

Levels at the Nation’s 

Airports 

airports have contacted them expressing an interest in obtaining more 

information to assist in their decision regarding opting-out. Six of the 10 

airport operators we interviewed said that they had not made any 

decisions regarding opting-out, and all 10 said they had not received any 

information from TSA regarding the option.25 However, the airport 

operators said that they would like information to assist them in deciding 

whether to opt-out, such as determining who bears responsibility for 

funding the screening contract; airport liability in the event of an incident 

linked to a screener failure; how well the current pilot program airports 

are performing; performance standards to which contract screeners will 

be held; and TSA’s role in overseeing contracted screening. 

Initially, TSA headquarters determined screener-staffing levels for all 

airports without actively seeking input from FSDs. Eight of the 12 FSDs 

we interviewed said that they had limited authority to respond to airport 

specific staffing needs, such as reacting to fluctuations in daily and/or 

seasonal passenger flow. However, TSA headquarters officials said that 

during the second stage of their workforce reduction process, they 

solicited input from FSDs, airport officials, and air carriers. TSA 

headquarters officials acknowledged that their initial staffing efforts 

created imbalances in the screener workforce and have taken steps to 

correct identified imbalances, such as such as authorizing the hiring of 

part-time screeners at over 200 airports—the first of which began working 

on September 15, 2003. 

TSA determined the current screener staffing levels using a computerbased modeling process that took into account the number of screening 

checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers; the number of 

airport workers requiring screening; projected air carrier service increases 

and decreases during calendar year 2003; and hours needed to 

accommodate screener training, leave, and breaks.

26 TSA recently hired an 

25Three of the remaining four airport operators we interviewed said they were not currently 

considering opting out of using federal screeners. At the pilot program airport we visited, 

the airport operator said that the airport plans to continue using contract screeners. 

26TSA’s screener workforce totaled 55,600 on March 31, 2003. Due primarily to budget 

constraints, the agency was directed to cut 3,000 positions to result in a screener 

workforce of 52,600 on June 1, 2003. An additional 3,000 positions were cut for a workforce 

of 49,600 full-time equivalents on September 30, 2003, the end of the fiscal year. TSA 

officials predicted that, based on the fiscal year 2004 budget, the screener staffing level will 

be down to 45,000 full-time equivalents by the end of fiscal year 2004. 

Page 15 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
outside consultant to conduct a study of screener staffing levels at various 

airports. TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the staffing 

allocation provided through the modeling efforts to assess air carrier and 

airport growth patterns, and adjustments will be made as appropriate. We 

plan to review TSA’s efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for 

passenger screeners during the remainder of our evaluation. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 


earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 5 days after its 


issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 


of the Department of Homeland Security and interested congressional 


committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In


addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 


http://www.gao.gov. 


If you have any questions about this report, or wish to discuss it further, 


please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or Jack Schulze, Assistant Director, at 


(202) 512-4390. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. 


Sincerely yours, 


Cathleen A. Berrick 


Acting Director, Homeland Security 


and Justice Issues 

Page 16 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Appendix I: Examples of Information 

Maintained in TSA’s Performance 

Management Information System 

Category of information collected Examples of information collecteda 

Checkpoint 

Number of prohibited items 

b

Number of weapons surrendered at sweep screening 

Number of cleared Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) alarms 

Percent of absenteeism 

Incidents 

Number of incidents 

Number of arrests 

Number of evacuations 

Number of disruptive passengers 

Feedback 

Customer complaints 

Discourteous treatment 

Nonstandard screening 

Lost, stolen, or damaged items 

Human Resources—Employee Census 

Total active authorized screeners 

Number of Screeners on light duty 

Number of Screening managers 

FSD staff 

Number of screeners trained on baggage only/passenger only/crosstrained 

Screener retention 

TSA-wide 

Federalization progress 

Number of airports complete 

Machines not in use 

Percent of airports using the CAPPS II system 

Average wait time at passenger screening checkpoints for federalized 

airports 

Sizing 

Number of gates in use 

Number of checkpoints 

Number of lanes 

Number of ETS, x-ray machines, explosive detection systems (EDS) 

machines 

Number of enplanements 

Page 17 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Appendix I: Examples of Information 

Maintained in TSA’s Performance 

Management Information System 

Category of information collected Examples of information collecteda 

Baggage status 

EDS/ETS shortage 

EDS/ETD inoperable 

Training shortage 

Staffing shortage 

Staff absent 

Baggage metrics 

Explosive materials 

Drugs 

Number of bags opened 

Number of screeners on duty 

Attainment 

Individual airport measures to achieve change in threat level by date and 

time 

Source: TSA. 

a

For each of the data elements for which data are reported, the Performance Management 

Information System also contains several subsets of information. For example, the number of 

prohibited items includes information on the number of weapons (by category of weapon, such as 

deadly/dangerous weapon) surrendered at the checkpoint, at a gate, at a secondary screening point, 

etc. 

b

TSA officials described sweep screening as a method of screening in which screeners randomly stop 

passengers in the airport concourse for additional screening. 

Page 18 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440197) 

Cathy A. Berrick (202) 512-8777 

Jack Schulze (202) 512-4390 

In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Lisa Brown, 

Christopher Jones, Stuart Kaufmann, Thomas Lombardi, Jan Montgomery, 

Edward Stephenson, Maria Strudwick, and Susan Zimmerman were key 

contributors to this report. 

Page 19 GAO-03-1173 Airport Passenger Screening 
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