In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-3107 

KIMBERLY BILINSKY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 16 C 4253 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 27, 2019 — DECIDED JUNE 26, 2019 

AMENDED AUGUST 9, 2019 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges. 

KANNE, Circuit Judge. American Airlines employed Kimberly Bilinsky for more than two decades. That employment 

continued without issue after Bilinsky contracted multiple 

sclerosis (“MS”) in the late 1990s. American provided a “Work 

from Home Arrangement” (“WFHA”), which permitted 

Bilinsky to do her job from her home in Chicago, even though 
2 No. 18-3107 

her colleagues operated out of the company headquarters in 

Dallas. But after a 2013 merger, American restructured its operations and informally repurposed Bilinsky’s department. 

The executives determined that the new duties required the 

in-person involvement of the employees, so the company rescinded the arrangement and demanded that Bilinsky relocate to Texas to work face-to-face. Once negotiations collapsed, American terminated Bilinsky. 

This lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) followed. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. The district court 

granted summary judgment to American, finding that Bilinsky was no longer qualified for the position in light of the 

changes in her responsibilities. Because Bilinsky’s evidence 

does not counter that assertion, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

American hired Bilinsky in 1991. She served in several positions, taking on a role in 2007 as a communications specialist 

in the Flight Service Department, located in Dallas at the company’s headquarters. But according to Bilinsky’s medical records, excessive heat aggravates her MS symptoms and causes 

her discomfort and reduced functioning. Under the WFHA, 

American permitted Bilinsky to work from Chicago, where 

hot weather is less of a concern. She usually traveled to Dallas 

one day per week to meet with colleagues and perform tasks 

that required a physical presence. 

Bilinsky’s duties included participating in conference 

calls, administering an internal website used to distribute information to flight attendants, publishing articles intended for 

consumption by flight attendants, producing e-mail communications to employees, and preparing remarks for her boss’s 
No. 18-3107 3

weekly internal video announcement. The position had no 

formal, written job description. Bilinsky performed successfully for several years, and there is no record of complaints or 

disciplinary action against her. 

American merged with US Airways in 2013. The resulting 

company (still American Airlines) had to integrate the operations of both airlines into a single entity with common policies 

and procedures. Hector Adler, the Flight Service Department’s Vice President at that time, testified that “[i]t was a 

very extensive and significant task that involved nearly every 

person in the department.” As the process dragged on, Adler 

felt that existing work arrangements were insufficient to meet 

the demand. The department expanded its workload, transitioning from primarily producing written communications to 

putting on live events and performing crisis management 

functions. The additional work caused the Dallas employees 

to feel “spread very thin at times.” 

Under the circumstances, Adler unilaterally decided to require all employees to be physically present at headquarters. 

This decision affected two employees other than Bilinsky: one 

relocated to Dallas, but the other refused and was terminated. 

Upon learning of the impending changes, Bilinsky spoke with 

her immediate supervisor, Cathy Scheu, on May 20, 2014. 

Bilinsky emphasized that her WFHA was a necessary accommodation for her disability and that relocating to Dallas was 

not an option. Scheu communicated the information to Adler, 

but Adler indicated his intent to deny the request. 

Later that year, Scheu and Human Resources representative Rhonda Nicol-Perrin approached Bilinsky to determine 

whether the company could make alternative accommodations that would permit Bilinsky to relocate. Bilinsky 
4 No. 18-3107 

responded that the company would need to provide “a tube 

of air conditioning around [her] at all times.” She stressed that 

working at American’s Dallas office was not a problem, but 

living in a hot part of the country year-round and trying to 

engage in activities outside the office would create a concern. 

Scheu and Nicol-Perrin then looked for other positions for 

Bilinsky. They identified a few jobs in Chicago, but Bilinsky 

was either not qualified for them or not interested in them. 

Bilinsky separately applied for a technical writer job in the 

Flight Service Department. That job was also located in Dallas, but the incumbent had worked remotely. Although the 

interviewer indicated that she wanted to hire Bilinsky for the 

position, the company declined to allow Bilinsky to work remotely in the new capacity. The position was vacant precisely 

because the incumbent had been working from home and was 

affected by the same policy shift that affected Bilinsky. 

Throughout 2014 and early 2015, Bilinsky continued to 

work as before. Linda Carlson took over as Bilinsky’s immediate supervisor after Scheu was promoted. Carlson expressed no complaints about Bilinsky’s performance. The issue came to a head in February 2015, when the department 

helped to produce the American Airlines Leadership Conference in Dallas. Bilinsky was not asked to attend the event or 

assist with preparations, but Carlson otherwise called upon 

“anybody who was a warm body” to help with the event. 

Carlson acknowledged that “if you asked [Bilinsky] to pick 

up the slack or to do a project, she was always willing.” But 

she immediately qualified that statement: “She just wasn’t 

able to do things that you needed to do to support an event. 

You can’t drive to the hotel that’s in Dallas if you’re in Chicago.” One month after the conference, Scheu and Nicol-
No. 18-3107 5

Perrin informed Bilinsky that she would need to complete her 

relocation or leave her job. On May 1, 2015, American terminated Bilinsky’s employment. 

Bilinsky filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission and received a “right to sue” letter. 

She then filed this suit in the federal district court in Chicago. 

Her complaint alleged three counts: (I) that American failed 

to accommodate her disability under the ADA; (II) that American retaliated against her for insisting on an accommodation 

by denying her the technical writer position; and (III) that 

American failed to accommodate her disability under the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5 § 1-

102 et seq. After discovery, the district court granted summary 

judgment to American on all three counts, finding that Bilinsky was not a “qualified individual” for the position in light 

of the changes in her responsibilities, and was therefore ineligible for the ADA’s protection. Bilinsky appealed the award 

of summary judgment on counts I and III. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review summary judgment de novo, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Bilinsky and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in her favor. Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of 

Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 192 (7th Cir. 2011). Illinois courts “have 

looked to the standards applicable to analogous federal 

claims” when evaluating IHRA claims, so we consolidate our 

analysis of both counts. Sangamon Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ill. Human Rights Comm’n, 908 N.E.2d 39, 50 (Ill. 2009); Teruggi v. CIT 

Grp./Capital Fin., Inc., 709 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013). 

Bilinsky believes the district court erred in finding that she 

was not a “qualified individual” under the statute and 
6 No. 18-3107 

therefore not entitled to protection. The ADA prohibits a covered employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... the ... discharge of employees ... .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination 

includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the 

known physical ... limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an ... employee, unless [the 

employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would 

impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of 

[the employer].” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A “qualified individual” 

is one who “can perform the essential functions of the employment position.” Id. § 12111(8). The statute directs that 

courts shall give “consideration ... to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.” Id. 

The EEOC has defined “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the employment position”; they do not 

include “marginal functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In interpretive guidance, the EEOC has noted that, when assessing 

the essential functions of a job, “the inquiry will then center 

around whether removing the function would fundamentally 

alter that position.” Id. § 1630 App. “To determine whether a 

job function is essential, we look to the employer’s judgment, 

written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the experience of those who previously or currently 

hold the position.” Rooney v. Koch Air, LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 

(7th Cir. 2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)). We also consider “[t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to 

perform the function.” Miller, 643 F.3d at 198. 

The district court’s judgment rested on its conclusion that 

Bilinsky was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA. 

“[A] worker has no claim under the ADA if she, even with a 
No. 18-3107 7

reasonable accommodation, cannot do the job for which she 

was hired.” DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 

1998) (citing Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 

1194, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997)). When defining a job’s essential 

functions, “consideration shall be given to the employer’s 

judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 

employer has prepared a written description ... for the job, 

this description shall be considered evidence of the essential 

functions of the job.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). “Although we look 

to see if the employer actually requires all employees in a particular position to perform the allegedly essential functions, 

we do not otherwise second-guess the employer’s judgment 

in describing the essential requirements for the job.” DePaoli,

140 F.3d at 674 (citing, among other sources, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12111(8) and 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(n)). But we’ve 

also cautioned that although “the employer’s judgment is an 

important factor, ... it is not controlling.” Miller, 643 F.3d at 

198. “The ADA does not give employers unfettered discretion 

to decide what is reasonable.” Id. at 199. 

“The essential-function inquiry is a factual question, not a 

question of law.” Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 

2016). The plaintiff “bears the initial burden of establishing 

that she was a qualified individual who could perform the essential functions of her position.” Taylor-Navotny v. Health All. 

Med. Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014). Both parties 

agree that Bilinsky’s MS is a qualifying disability under the 

statute, and American concedes that Bilinsky was qualified to 

do the job with her accommodation prior to the 2013 merger. 

But it argues that the merger fundamentally changed the position’s nature and that consistent, physical presence on site 

became an essential function of the position at some point after 2013. Because Bilinsky could not perform that function 
8 No. 18-3107 

from her home in Chicago, and because she was unable to relocate to establish a physical presence, American contends 

that she was not qualified for the transformed position. 

In Miller, a highway worker suffered a panic attack while 

working on a bridge suspended high above a river. 643 F.3d 

at 193. Diagnosed with acrophobia, he requested an accommodation that he not be assigned to any jobs requiring him to 

work more than 25 feet in the air. Id. The employer determined that such work was an essential function of his job and 

terminated him. Id. at 193–94. The district court agreed and 

granted summary judgment. But we reversed, believing that 

there was a genuine dispute of material fact over whether 

such work was truly essential to Miller’s job. Applying the 

EEOC regulations, we thought it important to “look to evidence of the employer’s actual practices in the workplace.” Id.

at 198. Because the bridge crew had a history of divvying up 

tasks to crew members based on their “individual abilities, 

preferences, and limitations,” “Miller’s request for reasonable 

accommodation did not ask [the employer] to do anything it 

was not already doing.” Id. at 200. There was a genuine dispute over whether conducting work high in the air was essential, and it should have been left to a jury to resolve. 

But we came to the opposite conclusion in Taylor-Navotny. 

There, an employee’s MS symptoms kept her from maintaining a regular schedule. 772 F.3d at 483. She came into the office 

at varied hours and could not plan her schedule in advance. 

Id. She requested a work-from-home arrangement, but even 

then, she failed to sign online at regular hours or attend meetings by phone consistently. Id. at 486–87. The employer let her 

go, and the district court granted summary judgment to the 

employer because Taylor-Navotny could not perform the 
No. 18-3107 9

job’s essential functions, such as regular attendance. We affirmed. Although we had sometimes observed that regular attendance and punctuality are not essential functions of every 

job, we stressed that “an employer is generally permitted to 

treat regular attendance as an essential job requirement and 

need not accommodate erratic or unreliable attendance.” Id.

at 489 (quoting Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 

(7th Cir. 2013)). Working from home was not the issue; instead, wherever the employee might be, she needed to be 

available and participating during normal working hours. Id.

at 490. We affirmed summary judgment. Id.

This case falls somewhere between those two poles. Bilinsky makes the same claim as the plaintiff in Miller: she was 

able to do the job successfully for years, and her termination 

resulted merely from a change in her boss’s preferences about 

working arrangements that did not accurately state the position’s essential functions. Although American acknowledges 

that Bilinsky was once able to perform the essential functions 

with a reasonable accommodation prior to the 2013 merger, it 

contends that those functions changed upon restructuring. 

The nature of her team’s work evolved from independent activities (curating content on a website, responding to written 

questions from employees, etc.) to team-centered crisis management activities, involving frequent face-to-face meetings 

with team members on short notice to coordinate work. 

Those facts distinguish this case from Miller. There, the 

highway construction crew’s work continued as it had before; 

there were no changes in their duties due to intervening 

events. The plaintiff’s medical condition was the only factor 

that changed over time. We reversed a grant of summary 

judgment because the plaintiff produced evidence showing 
10 No. 18-3107 

that his request for an accommodation “did not ask [his employer] to do anything it was not already doing.” 643 F.3d at 

200. The accommodation he requested was already something 

that occurred in “the normal course” of the crew’s duties. Id. 

See also EEOC v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876 (4th Cir. 

2019) (reversing summary judgment for employer where 

there was no evidence of a change in the plaintiff’s job duties, 

but only a possible deterioration in her medical condition). 

Bilinsky faces a different problem: evidence of a change in 

job responsibilities for everyone in her department. The district court determined that “[d]eference to American’s judgment as the employer is required in the absence of an adequate factual legal basis to abandon that deference.” Bilinsky 

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 16-c-4253, 2018 WL 4181481 at *7 

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2018) (citing Gratzl v. Office of Chief Judges, 

601 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010); DePaoli, 140 F.3d at 674). 

American produced testimony from several employees stating that the nature of the work slowly evolved after the merger and changed the essential functions of Bilinsky’s job. 

Those employees included Adler (VP of Flight Service), Scheu 

(Bilinsky’s first supervisor), and Carlson (Bilinsky’s subsequent supervisor). They all uniformly testified about the 

unique stress the merger caused, the changing day-to-day responsibilities of employees in the department, and the increased demand for services that only local employees could 

provide. Those with personal knowledge of Bilinsky’s circumstances testified that she performed as well as she could 

given her accommodation, but that there remained a gap that 

Bilinsky (and the other remote employees) could not fill. 

To counter American’s assertions, Bilinsky points primarily to her experience in the position prior to the merger, as 
No. 18-3107 11

well as her continued success after the merger occurred. 

Those are important considerations in the EEOC’s list of factors, but as the district court correctly noted, Bilinsky’s success prior to the merger does not address whether the essential functions of her job changed some time after the merger. 

Similarly, while evidence that Bilinsky performed successfully post-merger would be probative of her qualification for 

the updated position, testimony from her co-workers did not 

support that proposition. Bilinsky’s best evidence is testimony from Linda Carlson, her manager after Cathy Scheu departed in late 2014. Carlson testified that Bilinsky willingly 

agreed to take on extra work for other employees when live 

events were taking place and they could not be at their desks: 

“If you asked Kimberly to pick up the slack or to do a project, 

she was always willing. I don’t recall her ever not being willing to help or pick up slack.” But in the same breath Carlson 

gave testimony that undermines Bilinsky’s case: “[Bilinsky] 

just wasn’t able to do things that you needed to do to support 

an event. You can’t drive to the hotel that’s in Dallas if you’re 

in Chicago. You can’t go check out [AV] equipment in Chicago. You can’t meet with subject matter experts to directly, 

you know, get photographs.” “[Other employees] would be 

frustrated they didn’t have another set of hands to divide and 

conquer work that had to be done there. ... And I[,] like the 

team[,] felt spread very thin at times.” The testimony establishes Bilinsky’s willingness to perform, but it does not create 

a genuine dispute over her ability to fill the gap. 

At best, Bilinsky’s evidence shows that the job responsibilities evolved slowly. That partially distinguishes this case 

from Gratzl. There, a court reporter suffered from incontinence and required frequent, unplanned bathroom breaks. 
12 No. 18-3107 

601 F.3d at 676–77. That made her ill-suited to working in a 

courtroom, so she worked in a central control room in a specialist position. Id. at 677. But the state later eliminated the 

specialist position and put all court reporters in the same job 

category. Id. The county’s chief judge determined that all 

court reporters would henceforth participate in a rotation 

through all courtrooms, an arrangement that did not accommodate Gratzl’s needs. Id. After negotiations broke down, 

Gratzl sued. Id. at 678. The district court granted summary 

judgment to the employer, and we affirmed. We determined 

that Gratzl could not “prove that she [was] qualified for her 

current job simply by citing evidence that she was qualified 

for a previous job, with different essential functions, that 

ha[d] been eliminated.” Id. at 680. 

Bilinsky’s case is not quite so black-and-white, as American never eliminated her position and did not have a written 

job description that it updated to reflect new circumstances. 

But the fact that American transitioned the department to new 

responsibilities slowly rather than all at once does not mean 

that the job’s essential functions didn’t change at some point 

after the merger. To that extent, the rule in Gratzl applies 

equally to this case: “Just as an employer is not required to 

create a new position or strip a current job of its essential functions [under the ADA], an employer is not required to maintain an existing position or structure that, for legitimate reasons, it no longer believes is appropriate.” Id. 

Bilinsky’s remaining challenges focus on the sufficiency of 

American’s evidence. But at the summary judgment stage, the 

district court’s job was not to weigh the evidence but merely 
No. 18-3107 13

to determine whether there was a genuine dispute of fact.1

American’s witnesses specifically identified only one major 

event for which Bilinsky was absent: the 2015 Leadership 

Conference. Bilinsky argues that a single event is not enough 

to establish a pattern, but she offered no countervailing evidence to show that the conference was an isolated event rather 

than one example of a regular occurrence. 

We stress that our holding today is confined to the unique 

facts of this case. The ADA’s purpose is “to provide a clear 

and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 

discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The statute “does not give employers unfettered discretion to decide what is reasonable.” Miller, 643 

F.3d at 199. Absent some change in circumstance, an employer may not rescind an accommodation simply because it 

is inconvenient or burdensome—the statute requires the employer to make reasonable sacrifices to keep disabled persons 

in the work force. But American faced a unique intervening 

event: a major merger between two large corporations. The 

process of synchronizing their former policies and procedures 

would necessarily lead to some evolution in individual responsibilities, and an employee cannot create a dispute of fact 

merely by pointing to her ability to perform in the job before 

the merger occurred (or as the changes evolved). That’s 

 1 The district court did briefly discuss weighing the evidence between 

the two parties. See Bilinsky, 2018 WL 4181481 at *6 (“But these facts do not 

sufficiently outweigh American’s judgment and so Bilinsky does not provide the Court with an adequate factual dispute.”) (emphasis added). But 

the court seems to have used the term while determining whether Bilinsky 

had enough evidence to overcome the presumption that an employer’s 

understanding of the essential factors of a job is correct. See Basith v. Cook 

Cty., 241 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001). The district court did not err. 
14 No. 18-3107 

especially true when the revocation of WFHAs applied to all 

remote employees, not only to the disabled plaintiff.2

Finally, we offer a note of caution to future ADA litigants. 

We once said that “[a]n employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home, where their productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced. ... [I]t would take a very 

extraordinary case for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the employer’s failure to allow the employee to 

work at home.” Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 

F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995). But we also acknowledged that 

“[t]his will no doubt change as communications technology 

advances.” Id. at 544. Technological development and the expansion of telecommuting in the twenty-four years since 

Vande Zande likely mean that such an accommodation is not 

quite as extraordinary as it was then. That inquiry is contextspecific; a work-from-home arrangement might be reasonable 

for a software engineer but not for a construction worker. 

“[T]here is a general consensus among courts ... that regular work-site attendance is an essential function of most 

jobs.” Credeur v. Louisiana, 860 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(collecting cases). The position’s nature will often require 

face-to-face collaboration. EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 

F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc). But not in every instance. See, e.g., Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water 

Div., 883 F.3d 595, 603–05 (6th Cir. 2018). Here, the parties 

agree that telecommuting was reasonable for years before 

 2 Bilinsky produced evidence that some employees were permitted to 

remain in Arizona after the new policy went into effect. The record shows 

that those employees’ positions were not based out of Dallas (as was Bilinsky’s) and that they were using legacy operating systems that had not yet 

been imported to the Dallas facility. 
No. 18-3107 15

intervening events transformed Bilinsky’s duties so that 

physical presence became an essential function of her job. Litigants (and courts) in ADA cases would do well to assess 

what’s reasonable under the statute under current technological capabilities, not what was possible years ago. 

Because it based summary judgment on the finding that 

Bilinsky was not a qualified individual, the district court did 

not reach the issue of whether American engaged in the interactive process to afford Bilinsky an alternative accommodation. We do not reach that issue, either. 

III. CONCLUSION

Bilinsky’s condition prevented her from living in Texas. 

American accommodated that disability for several years by 

permitting her to work from her home in Illinois. But after a 

major merger, her employer determined that its remote arrangements were insufficient to meet business demands, and 

it uniformly rescinded those arrangements with all its employees, disabled and non-disabled alike. For the foregoing 

reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
16    No. 18‐3107

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case raises the

kind of issue about flexible working arrangements under the

Americans with Disabilities Act that we are likely to see more

often. I agree with a good deal of the majority’s opinion but

respectfully dissent on the bottom line in this case. Whether

working five days a week in American Airlines’ Dallas head‐

quarters was an “essential function” of plaintiff  Kimberly

Bilinsky’s job may well present a close question for a jury. It

is not a close call on summary judgment. We should reverse

the district court’s grant of summary judgment and let a jury

decide the issue.

First, though, the points of agreement: the majority cor‐

rectly points out that the ADA’s affirmative duty of reasona‐

ble accommodation requires employers to make an effort to

hire and retain employees with disabilities. Courts do not and

should not merely take at face value an employer’s claims

about a job’s essential functions. Ante at 13–14. This caution

is consistent with our case law, which shows, as the majority

also acknowledges, how fact‐sensitive these questions about

essential functions and reasonable accommodations can be.

See Brown v. Smith, 827 F.3d 609, 613–14 (7th Cir. 2016) (af‐

firming jury verdict for plaintiff who could not obtain com‐

mercial driver’s license even where written job description

said such license was required for job; evidence of actual du‐

ties undermined claim of essential function); Taylor‐Navotny v.

Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 489 (7th Cir.

2014) (affirming summary judgment for employer, who was

not required to tolerate “erratic or unreliable attendance”);

Miller v. Illinois Dep’t of Transportation, 643 F.3d 190, 198–99

(7th Cir. 2011) (reversing summary judgment for employer

where evidence of actual work practices indicated accommo‐

dations plaintiff needed were reasonable).
No. 18‐3107 17

Further, the majority opinion correctly and helpfully

warns that our comments in Vande Zande about working from

home as a reasonable accommodation require a fresh look to‐

day, almost a quarter of a century later, as technology and

working patterns have changed. Ante at 14–15, quoting Vande

Zande v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Administration, 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th

Cir. 1995).

Butreturning to the specifics of this case, this record shows

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether working in Dal‐

las five days a week was actually an essential function of Kim‐

berly Bilinsky’s job. Her job had no written job description.

Viewed through what should be the plaintiff‐friendly lens of

summary judgment, the thrust of defendant’s evidence is

simply that the vice president of Bilinsky’s department pre‐

ferred to have all employees work at the Dallas headquarters

five days a week. I assume that arrangement would be easiest

for him and other managers, but that’s not the standard under

the ADA.

Bilinsky has presented substantial evidence that working

from home four days a week, with a weekly trip to spend the

day in the Dallas office, let her perform the essential functions

of herjob both before and afterthe merger. Bilinsky continued

her work‐from‐home arrangement for fifteen months follow‐

ing the merger. She received good evaluations and no criti‐

cism. The only specific evidence American managed to offer

was a claim that Bilinsky’s work‐from‐home arrangement

prevented her from helping the team organize and manage

one special event, a leadership conference in Dallas in
18 No. 18‐3107

February 2015. Bilinsky counters that American never even

asked her to help with the event.1  

The unusual absence of a written job description here

should raise our eyebrows about this grant of summary judg‐

ment. I agree with the majority that the absence of a job de‐

scription distinguishes Bilinsky’s case from Gratzl v. Office of

Chief Judges, where a position was eliminated and we held that

the plaintiff could not prove she was qualified for her current

job simply because she was qualified for a previous job. 601

F.3d 674, 679–80 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. Brown, 827 F.3d at 613–14

(affirming jury verdict for plaintiff despite written job descrip‐

tion identifying as essential one qualification he could not

meet; evidence showed qualification was for marginal, not es‐

sential, job functions). Bilinsky had performed successfully

for years. There is no new position or new job description that

American can point to as evidence that the essential functions

of her job changed. American’s evidence of management pref‐

erences simply does not distinguish between job functions that

are essential and those that are only marginal. Its evidence

does not show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

While the merger may have posed new challenges for the

department, the ADA requires employers to make reasonable

sacrifices to keep disabled persons in the workforce. I view

Bilinsky’s situation as much more in line with the plaintiff in

Miller v. Illinois Department of Transportation. Bilinsky worked

on a team, and according to her immediate supervisor, Linda

Carlson, Bilinsky was “always willing” to “pick up the slack

                                                 

1 We should not assume that Bilinsky would have refused a request

or order to work in Dallas for a few days to help with that conference.

Dallas in February is unlikely to be hotter than Chicago in the summer.
No. 18‐3107 19

or to do a project.” The only qualification Carlson offered was

that Bilinsky’s work‐from‐home arrangement meant she

“wasn’t able to do things that you needed to do to support an

event,” referring to the one conference that American, we

must assume, did not even ask Bilinsky to help with. Ameri‐

can did not offer conclusive evidence of essential functions

that were inconsistent with Bilinsky’s successful work‐from‐

home arrangement.

As the Sixth Circuit recently explained, “full‐time pres‐

ence at work is not an essential function of a job simply be‐

cause an employer says that it is.” Hostettler v. College of

Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 857 (6th Cir. 2018) (reversing summary

judgment for employer; facts disputed as to whether em‐

ployee could do job’s essential functions on modified work

schedule). As in Hostettler, American may have preferred that

Bilinsky

be in the office 40 hours a week. And it may have

been more efficient and easier on the depart‐

ment if she were. But those are not the concerns

of the ADA: Congress decided that the benefits

of gainful employment for individuals with dis‐

abilities—dignity, financial independence, and

self‐sufficiency, among others—outweigh sim‐

ple calculations of ease or efficiency. To that

end, the ADA requires that employers reasona‐

bly accommodate employees with disabilities,

including allowing modified work schedules.

Id. at 857.

Bilinsky’s situation is much like that of the employee in

EEOC v. McLeod Health, Inc., 914 F.3d 876, 881–82 (4th Cir.
20 No. 18‐3107

2019), where the Fourth Circuit reversed summary judgment

for the employer, finding among other points a genuine issue

of material fact concerning whether it was an essential func‐

tion of the employee’s job to travel around to different job

sites. Like Bilinsky, the employee in McLeod Health wrote and

edited an internal newsletter. The employer there at least had

a written job description, but it did not mention traveling to

and from company events or conducting in‐person inter‐

views. Id. at 881. In reversing summary judgment for the em‐

ployer, the Fourth Circuit explained that, while the record

contained evidence supporting the employer’s position, the

written job description’s silence on the supposedly essential

function provided substantial evidence that it was not in fact

an essential function. Id. at 881–82.

In this case, the majority sidesteps delicately around the

district judge’s erroneous reference to “weighing” the evi‐

dence on summary judgment, ante at 13 n.1, but the majority

then makes essentially the same mistake. On summary judg‐

ment, it is not ourjob to decide which party’s evidence is more

persuasive. A jury should weigh the evidence and determine

whether working from Dallas five days a week was actually

an essential function of Bilinsky’s job after the merger.