Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations, House 

Committee on Government Reform 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, September 23, 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

USAID Needs to Improve Its 

Workforce Planning and 

Operating Expense 

Accounting 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-03-1171T 
USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly 

implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-hire staff oversee 

the activities of contractors and grantees. Since 1992, the number of USAID U.S. 

direct-hire staff declined by 37 percent, but the number of countries with USAID 

programs doubled and, over the last 2 years, program funding increased more 

than 78 percent. As a result of these and other changes in its workforce and its 

mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce planning, USAID faces several human 

capital vulnerabilities. For example, attrition of experienced foreign service 

officers and inadequate training and mentoring have sometimes led to the 

deployment of staff who lack essential skills and experience. The agency also 

lacks a “surge capacity” to respond to evolving foreign policy priorities and 

emerging crises. With fewer and less experienced staff managing more 

programs in more countries, USAID’s ability to oversee the delivery of foreign 

assistance is becoming increasingly difficult. USAID has taken steps toward 

developing a workforce planning and human capital management system that 

should enable the agency to meet its challenges and achieve its mission, but it 

needs to do more, such as conducting a comprehensive skills assessment and 

including its civil service and contracted employees in its workforce planning 

efforts. 

USAID’s reported that operating expenses do not always reflect the full costs of 

administering foreign assistance because the agency pays for some support and 

oversight activities done by contractors with program funds. As a result, the 

amount of program funds directly benefiting foreign recipients is likely 

overstated. 

 USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 

USAID U.S. direct hires 

Fiscal year

1992

Fiscal year 

2002 

Percentage 

change 

Total number 3,163 1,985 (37) 

Number assigned overseas 1,082 631 (42) 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with U.S. direct-hire 

presence 66 71 7 

Number of countries receiving USAID 

assistance with no U.S. direct-hire 

presence 16 88 450 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID data. 

USAID oversees humanitarian and 

economic assistance—an integral 

part of the U.S. global security 

strategy—to more than 160 

countries. GAO recommended in 

1993 that USAID develop a 

comprehensive workforce plan; 

however, human capital 

management continues to be a 

high-risk area for the agency. 

GAO was asked to testify on how 

changes in USAID’s workforce over 

the past 10 years have affected its 

ability to deliver foreign aid, the 

agency’s progress in implementing 

a strategic workforce planning 

system, and whether its reported 

operating expenses reflect the full 

costs of delivering foreign aid. 

To help USAID plan for changes in 

its workforce and continue 

operations in an uncertain 

environment, we recommended 

that the USAID Administrator 

institutionalize a strategic 

workforce planning and 

management system that takes 

advantage of strategic workforce 

planning principles. 

USAID agreed with our findings 

and recommendation and noted it 

has recently undertaken some 

efforts to improve management of 

its workforce. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1171T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-1171T, a report to 

Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, House Committee on 

Government Reform 

September 23, 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

USAID Needs to Improve ITS Workforce 

Planning and Operating Expense 

Accounting 
Page 1 GAO-03-1171T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on USAID’s workforce 

planning1

 and highlight the preliminary findings from our ongoing review 

of USAID’s operating expense account. The workforce report is being 

released today. Humanitarian and economic development assistance is an 

integral part of U.S. global security strategy, particularly as the United 

States seeks to diminish the underlying conditions of poverty and 

corruption that may be linked to instability and terrorism. In fiscal year 

2003, USAID expects to obligate about $13 billion and manage programs in 

about 160 countries. Agency staff often work in difficult environments and 

under evolving program demands. More will be demanded of USAID’s staff 

as they implement large-scale relief and reconstruction programs in 

Afghanistan and Iraq while continuing traditional long-term development 

assistance programs. 

As a result, it is essential that USAID develop a strategic approach to its 

workforce planning so that it can identify and attain the essentials skills it 

needs to accomplish its goals. It is also important that USAID identify and 

report accurate costs on administering its foreign aid programs. My 

statement today will cover these two broad areas. 

I will focus most of my statement on our review of USAID’s workforce 

planning. I will discuss some of USAID’s human capital challenges, 

including its recent efforts to staff missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 

the status of its efforts to develop a strategic workforce planning system. 

Regarding USAID’s operating expense account, I will focus on how the 

agency’s reporting of operating expenses does not always capture the full 

cost of administering foreign assistance. 

USAID’s workforce has undergone many changes over the years. For 

example, the number of U.S. direct-hire staff, including foreign service 

officers, has dropped 37 percent from 3,163 in 1992 to 1,985 in December 

2002; and the agency has increasingly relied on personal services and 

institutional contractors to implement its humanitarian and development 

assistance projects and manage the day-to-day activities of overseas 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce Planning Can 

Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO-03-946 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 22, 2003). 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-03-1171T 

missions. At the same time, while the number of countries with USAID 

activities has almost doubled, program funding levels have remained 

relatively level, with significant increases in 2003. 

However, as we reported in 1993 and still find today, USAID has not 

developed a comprehensive, strategic workforce planning system that 

would help it manage these changes. As a result, the agency faces a 

number of human capital challenges, such as difficulties in filling overseas 

positions, a lack of mentoring and training opportunities for new staff, and 

the lack of a “surge capacity” to quickly respond to post-emergency and 

disaster situations. These vulnerabilities are reflected in the agency’s 

difficulties in staffing the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of early 

September, the Kabul mission had 61 vacancies, including 5 for direct-hire 

foreign service officers, and the Baghdad mission had 13 vacancies that 

will most likely be filled by contract staff. 

Recently, and particularly in response to the President’s Management 

Agenda, USAID has taken a number of preliminary steps to determine the 

workforce it needs now and in the future and devise strategies for 

achieving these goals. However, in comparing USAID’s efforts to proven 

principles for strategic workforce planning, more work needs to be done. 

Accordingly, we recommend that USAID develop and implement a 

strategic workforce planning system to help it manage the changes in its 

workforce and overseas environment. 

USAID’s operating expenses are a separate line-item appropriation 

intended to clearly identify the agency’s “cost of doing business.” In fiscal 

year 2003, USAID expects to obligate about $668 million for operating 

expenses. However, USAID’s reported operating expense obligations do 

not always reflect all the costs associated with managing its foreign aid 

program primarily because missions sometimes pay contractors 

performing administrative or oversight duties with program funds. 

Distinguishing between funds spent on operating expenses and funds 

benefiting foreign recipients is not always clear; and, as a result, the 

amount spent for program funds is likely overstated. 

In 1993, we reported that USAID had not adequately managed changes in 

its overseas workforce and recommended that USAID develop a 

comprehensive workforce planning system to better identify staffing needs 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-03-1171T 

and requirements.2 In the mid-1990s, USAID reorganized its activities 

around strategic objectives and began reporting in a results-oriented 

format but had made little progress in personnel reforms.3

 In July 2002, we 

reported that USAID could not quickly relocate or hire the staff needed to 

implement a large-scale reconstruction and recovery program in Latin 

America, and we recommended actions to help improve USAID’s staffing 

flexibility for future disaster recovery requirements.4

Studies by several organizations, including GAO, have shown that highly 

successful service organizations use strategic management approaches to 

prepare their workforces to meet present and future mission requirements. 

We define strategic workforce planning as focusing on long-term strategies 

for acquiring, developing, and retaining an organization’s workforce and 

aligning human capital approaches that are clearly linked to achieving 

programmatic goals. Based on work with the Office of Personnel 

Management and other entities, we identified strategic workforce planning 

principles used by leading organizations. According to these principles, a 

strategic workforce planning and management system should (1) involve 

senior management, employees, and stakeholders in developing, 

communicating, and implementing the workforce plan; (2) determine the 

agency’s current critical skills and competencies and those needed to 

achieve program results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in critical 

skills and competencies; and (4) monitor and evaluate progress and the 

contribution of strategic workforce planning efforts in achieving program 

goals. 

Until the mid-1970s, about two thirds of USAID’s operating expenses were 

funded from appropriations to program accounts, and the rest were 

funded from a separate administrative expenses account.5

 In 1976, 

Congress began providing a line-item appropriation for operating expenses 

 2

GAO/NSIAD-93-106. 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of USAID’s Reforms, GAONSIAD-241-BR (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 1996); Foreign Assistance: USAID’s 

Reengineering at Overseas Missions, GAO/NSIAD-97-194 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 

1997). 

4

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Disaster Recovery Program 

Addressed Intended Purposes, but USAID Needs Greater Flexibility to Improve Its 

Response Capability, GAO-02-787 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002). 

5

The administration’s budget request for fiscal year 1975 identified 11 separate funding 

accounts from which administrative expenses would be funded. 
Page 4 GAO-03-1171T 

separate from USAID’s humanitarian and economic development 

assistance programs.6

 The accompanying Senate report noted that USAID’s 

“cost of doing business” would be better managed if these funds were 

separately appropriated.7

 Congress authorized USAID’s separate operating 

expense account the following year.8

 USAID’s criteria for determining the 

expenses to be paid from operating expense funds are based on guidance 

it has received from Congress as well as its assessment of who benefits 

from a particular activity—the agency or the intended program recipient. 

For example, congressional reports in the late 1970s directed USAID to 

fund the costs of all full-time staff in permanent positions from the 

operating expense account. 9

USAID faces a number of challenges in developing and implementing a 

strategic workforce plan. Its overseas missions operate in a changing 

foreign policy environment often under very difficult conditions. USAID’s 

workforce, particularly its U.S. direct-hire foreign service officers, has 

decreased over the years; but in recent years program dollars and the 

number of countries with USAID activities have increased. These factors 

have combined to produce certain human capital vulnerabilities that have 

implications for the agency’s ability to effectively carry out and oversee 

foreign assistance. A strategic approach to workforce planning and 

management can help USAID identify the workforce it needs and develop 

strategies for attaining this workforce that will last throughout successive 

administrations. 

Since 1990, USAID has continued to evolve from an agency in which U.S. 

direct-hire foreign service employees directly implemented development 

projects to one with a declining number of direct-hire staff who oversee 

the contractors and grantees carrying out most of its day-to-day activities. 

As numbers of U.S. direct-hire staff declined, mission directors began 

relying on other types of employees, primarily foreign national personal 

services contractors, to manage mission operations and oversee 

development activities implemented by third parties. In December 2002, 

 6

P.L. 94-330. 

7

S. Rept. 94-704. 

8

P.L. 95-88, Sec. 129, 22 U.S.C. 2427. 

9

H. Rept. 95-701 and S. Rept. 95-1194. 

Strategic Workforce 

Planning Can Help 

USAID Address 

Current and Future 

Challenges 

USAID Faces Challenges in 

Workforce Planning 
Page 5 GAO-03-1171T 

according to USAID’s staffing report, the agency’s workforce totaled 7,741, 

including 1,985 U.S. direct-hires.10 Personal services contractors made up 

more than two-thirds of USAID’s total workforce, including 4,653 foreign 

national contractors. Of the 1,985 U.S. direct-hires, 974 were foreign 

service officers, about 65 percent of whom were posted overseas. Other 

individuals not directly employed by USAID also perform a wide range of 

services in support of the agency’s programs. These individuals include 

employees of institutional or services contractors, private voluntary 

organizations, and grantees.11

In addition to having reduced the number of U.S. direct hires, USAID now 

manages programs in more countries with no USAID direct-hire presence, 

and its overseas structure has become more regional. Table 1 illustrates 

the changes in USAID’s U.S. direct-hire overseas presence between fiscal 

years 1992 and 2002. In fiscal year 2002, USAID managed activities in 88 

countries with no U.S. direct-hire presence. According to USAID, in some 

cases, activities in these countries are very small and require little 

management by USAID staff. However, in 45 of these countries USAID 

manages programs of $1 million or more, representing a more significant 

burden on the agency. USAID also increasingly provides administrative 

and program support to countries from regional service platforms, which 

have increased from 2 to 26 between fiscal years 1992 and 2002.12 Program 

funding also recently increased about 78 percent—from $7.3 billion in 

fiscal year 2001 to about $13 billion in fiscal year 2003. 

 10All figures exclude the staff of USAID’s Office of the Inspector General, which includes 95 

foreign service officers (51 posted overseas) and 76 civil service staff in Washington, D.C. 

11In 1990, USAID estimated this extended workforce was approximately 10,000 individuals. 

For this report, USAID was unable to provide an estimate. 

12Services include legal, executive office, financial/controller, procurement, and program 

and project development support services. Services vary among the 26 platforms due to 

security, ease of travel, and other local concerns. For example, the regional office in Kenya 

provides all services to up to 14 countries, while the Honduras mission simply shares a 

contracts officer with Nicaragua. 
Page 6 GAO-03-1171T 

Table 1: USAID U.S. Direct-Hire Presence, Fiscal Years 1992 and 2002 

USAID U.S. direct hires Fiscal year 1992 Fiscal year 2002

Percentage 

change 

Total number 3,163a 1,985b(37) 

Number assigned overseas 1,082a 631b(42) 

Number of countries receiving 

USAID assistance with U.S. 

direct-hire presence 66c

 71d7 

Number of countries receiving 

USAID assistance with no 

U.S. direct-hire presence 16c

 88d450 

Sources: 

a

USAID’s Monthly Workforce Profile Report, data as of September 30, 1992. 

b

USAID’s Quarterly Worldwide Staffing Pattern Report, data as of December 31, 2002. 

c

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: A Profile of the Agency for International Development, GAO/NSIAD-92-148 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 1992). 

d

USAID’s Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination data provided in May 2003. USAID staff cautioned that this information was 

gathered in 2002 and may not be up to date. 

As a result of the decreases in U.S. direct-hire foreign service staff levels, 

increasing program demands, and a mostly ad-hoc approach to workforce 

planning, USAID now faces several human capital vulnerabilities. For 

example, the attrition of its more experienced foreign service officers, its 

difficulties in filling overseas positions, and limited opportunities for 

training and mentoring have sometimes led to the deployment of directhire staff who do not have essential skills and experience and the reliance 

on contractors to perform many functions. In addition, USAID lacks a 

“surge capacity” to enable it to respond quickly to emerging crises and 

changing strategic priorities. As a result, according to USAID officials and 

a recent overseas staffing assessment, the agency is finding it increasingly 

difficult to manage the delivery of foreign assistance. 

In addition, USAID works in an overseas environment that presents unique 

challenges to workforce planning. Mission officials noted the difficulties in 

adhering to a formal workforce plan linked to country strategies in an 

uncertain foreign policy environment. For example, following the events 

of September 11, 2001, the Middle East and sub-Saharan African missions 

we visited—Egypt, Mali, and Senegal—received additional work that was 

not anticipated when they developed their country development strategies 

and work plans. Also, the mission in Ecuador had been scheduled to close 

in fiscal year 2003. However, this decision was reversed due to political 

and economic events in Ecuador, including a coup in 2000, the collapse of 

the financial system, and rampant inflation. Program funding for Ecuador 
Page 7 GAO-03-1171T 

tripled from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2000, while staffing was reduced 

from 110 to 30 personnel; and the budget for the mission’s operating 

expenses was reduced from $2.7 million to $1.37 million. During our field 

work, we found that other factors unique to USAID’s overseas work 

environment can affect its ability to conduct workforce planning and 

attract and retain top staff. These factors vary from country to country and 

among regions and include difficulties in attracting staff to hardship posts, 

inadequate salaries and benefits for attracting the top host country 

professionals, and lengthy clearance processes for locally contracted staff. 

USAID’s workforce challenges are illustrated by its difficulties in staffing 

hardship posts like Afghanistan and Iraq. As of September 4, 2003, 

according to USAID’s new personnel data system, the mission in Kabul 

had 42 full-time staff—7 foreign service officers and 35 personal service 

contractors, mostly local hires. However, the mission had 61 vacancies, 

including 5 vacancies for foreign service officers.13 In Iraq, as of September 

15, 2003, the mission had 13 USAID direct-hire staff; 3 additional U.S. 

government employees; and about 60 personal services and institutional 

contractors. The mission had 13 vacancies that will most likely be filled by 

contract staff. 

USAID’s human resource office is in its annual bidding process for foreign 

service positions. When that process is complete, the office expects to 

have a better picture of replacements for current staff in Afghanistan and 

Iraq as well as additional placements. According to USAID staff, the 

agency is having trouble attracting foreign service officers to these posts 

because in-country conditions are difficult and tours are unaccompanied. 

USAID’s average staff age is in the late forties, and this age group is 

generally attracted to posts that can accommodate families. Both posts are 

responsible for huge amounts of foreign aid—in fiscal year 2003 alone, 

USAID’s assistance for Afghanistan and Iraq is expected to 

total $817 million and $1.6 billion, respectively. USAID faces serious 

accountability and quality of life issues as it attempts to manage and 

oversee large-scale, expensive reconstruction programs in countries with 

difficult conditions and inadequate numbers of both foreign service and 

local hire staff. 

 13The foreign service vacancies included a supervisory program officer, a supervisory 

general development officer, two general development officers in the rural sector 

development office, and an economic development officer. The vacancies of contractor 

staff ranged from professionals with technical program or financial management skills to 

numerous support positions, such as secretaries, clerks, drivers, and maintenance workers. 
Page 8 GAO-03-1171T 

In response to the President’s Management Agenda, USAID has taken 

steps toward developing a comprehensive workforce planning and human 

capital management system that should enable the agency to meet its 

challenges and achieve its mission, but progress so far is limited. In 

evaluating USAID’s efforts in terms of proven strategic workforce planning 

principles, USAID has more to do. For example: 

• The involvement of USAID leadership, employees, and stakeholders in 

developing and communicating a strategic workforce plan has been 

mixed. USAID’s human resource office is drafting a human capital 

strategy, but at the time of our review it had not yet been finalized or 

approved by such stakeholders as OMB and the Office of Personnel 

Management. As a result, we cannot comment on whether USAID 

employees and other stakeholders will have an active role in 

developing and communicating the agency’s workforce strategies. 

• USAID has begun identifying the core competencies its future 

workforce will need, and a working group is conducting a 

comprehensive workforce analysis and planning pilot at three 

headquarters units that will include an analysis of current skills. 

However, it has not yet conducted a comprehensive assessment of the 

critical skills and competencies of its current workforce. USAID hopes 

to have a contractor in place by the end of September, 2003, to assist 

the working group in identifying critical competencies and devising 

strategies to close skill gaps. USAID is also in the process of 

determining the appropriate information technology instrument and 

methodology that will permit the assessment of its current workforce 

skills and competencies. 

• USAID’s strategies to address critical skill gaps are not comprehensive 

and have not been based on a critical analysis of current capabilities 

matched with future requirements. USAID has begun hiring foreign 

service officers and Presidential Management Interns to replace staff 

lost through attrition. However, the agency has not completed its civil 

service recruitment plan and has not yet included personal services 

contractors—the largest segment of its workforce—in its agencywide 

workforce analysis and planning efforts. According to USAID human 

resource staff, the civil service recruitment plan will be completed after 

conducting the competency analysis for civil service staff. 

• USAID has not created a system to monitor and evaluate its progress 

toward reaching its human capital goals and ensuring that its efforts 

continue under the leadership of successive administrators. 

USAID’s Workforce 

Planning Efforts 
Page 9 GAO-03-1171T 

• Because it does not have a comprehensive workforce planning and 

management system, USAID cannot ensure that it has the essential 

skills needed to carry out its ongoing and future programs. To help 

USAID plan for changes in its workforce and continue operations in an 

uncertain environment, our report recommends that the USAID 

Administrator develop and institutionalize a strategic workforce 

planning and management system that takes advantage of strategic 

workforce planning principles. 

USAID’s operating expense account does not fully reflect the agency’s cost 

of delivering foreign assistance, primarily because the agency pays for 

some administrative activities done by contractors with program funds. As 

we noted in our recent report, USAID’s overseas missions have 

increasingly hired personal services contractors to manage USAID’s 

development activities due to declining numbers of U.S. direct-hire staff.14

According to USAID guidance, contractor salaries and related support can 

be paid from program funds when the expenses are benefiting a particular 

program or project. In some cases, however, the duties performed by 

contractors, especially personal services contractors, are indistinguishable 

from those done by U.S. direct-hire staff. One senior level USAID program 

planning officer told us that 10 to 15 percent of program funds may be a 

more realistic estimate of USAID’s cost of doing business, as opposed to 

the 8.5 percent average since fiscal year 1995 that we calculated based on 

our analysis of USAID reported data. 

• A recent USAID internal study identified about 160 personal services 

contractors who were performing inherently governmental duties,15 but 

these costs are not always reported as operating expenses. 

• Recent data collection efforts by USAID indicate that the agency will 

likely obligate approximately $350 million in program funds for 

operating expenses incurred during fiscal year 2003. 

Because USAID’s cost of doing business is not always separated from its 

humanitarian and development programs—the original intent behind 

 14GAO-03-946. 

15U.S. Agency for International Development, Report of the Overseas Working Group, May 

2003. USAID guidance states that salaries and support for nondirect-hire staff performing 

inherently governmental functions should be funded from the operating expenses account 

(ADS 601.5.7). 

USAID’s Operating 

Expense Account Does 

Not Reflect the Full Cost 

of Delivering Foreign 

Assistance 
Page 10 GAO-03-1171T 

establishing the separate operating expense account, the amount of 

program funds that directly benefits a foreign recipient is likely overstated. 

Overall, to accomplish our objectives, we analyzed personnel data, 

workforce planning documents, and obligations data reported by USAID in 

its annual budget justification documents. We did not verify the accuracy 

of USAID’s reported data. We also interviewed cognizant USAID officials 

representing the agency’s regional, technical, and management bureaus in 

Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at seven overseas missions—

the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Mali, Peru, Senegal, and the 

West Africa Regional Program in Mali. 

• To examine USAID’s progress in developing and implementing a 

strategic workforce planning system, we evaluated the agency’s efforts 

in terms of workforce planning principles used by leading 

organizations: ensuring the involvement of agency leadership, 

employees, and stakeholders; determining current skills and 

competencies and those needed; implementing strategies to address 

critical staffing needs; and evaluating progress in achieving human 

capital goals. 

• To determine whether USAID’s operating expenses reflect its cost of 

doing business, we reviewed USAID reports and obligations data and 

discussed the matter with cognizant officials at USAID, the Department 

of State, and the Office of Management and Budget. We also reviewed 

mission staffing reports to determine whether staff were funded from 

the operating expense account or program funds and discussed staff 

duties with cognizant mission officials. 

We obtained written comments on a draft of our report on USAID’s 

workforce planning and discussed our preliminary findings from our 

review of USAID’s operating expense account with cognizant USAID 

officials. Overall, USAID agreed with our findings and concurred with our 

recommendation to implement a strategic workforce planning system. 

Our review was conducted between July 2002 and September 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 11 GAO-03-1171T 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202) 

512-4268 or Al Huntington at (202) 512-4140. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony included Kimberly Ebner, Jeanette 

Espinola, Emily Gupta, Rhonda Horried, and Audrey Solis. Mark Dowling, 

Reid Lowe, and Jose Pena provided technical assistance. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320225) 
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