COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

GLENN EDWARD WISDOM 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0368-97-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JANUARY 13, 1998 

FAITH WISDOM (HYLER) 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Robert P. Dwoskin for appellant. 

 Stacey W. Moreau (Williams, Stilwell, 

Morrison, Williams and Light, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Glenn Wisdom (husband) appeals a qualified domestic 

relations order (QDRO), entered pursuant to Code 

§ 20-107.3(K)(4), interpreting his divorce decree to create a 

property right in his military retirement pension in favor of 

Faith Wisdom (Hyler) (wife). Husband contends on appeal that 1) 

the QDRO effected a substantive change to the decree, which is 

barred by Rule 1:1 and 2) even if it wasn't a substantive change, 

the trial court's interpretation of the decree is plainly wrong.1

 Because we find that the QDRO was not a substantive change and 

the trial court's interpretation of the decree is supported by 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

1

Husband also included in the "Questions Presented" portion 

of his brief the issue of whether the wife's action was "time 

barred." Because he failed to brief either the facts or the law 

regarding this issue, we will not consider it on appeal. Rule 

5A:20. 
 2 

both law and fact, we affirm the decision. 

 On January 2, 1992 the circuit court entered a divorce 

decree incorporating the couple's separation agreement which set 

forth a payment scheme by which husband would pay wife fifty 

percent of husband's military retirement pension starting 

December 31, 1993. The language of the agreement, however, did 

not specifically label this split as either spousal support or a 

property division. On March 18, 1996 wife filed a petition to 

reopen the decree and requested a QDRO issue enforcing the 

agreement because husband had not made the agreed payments. 

Husband argued in the trial court that because wife had remarried 

and the payments were spousal support, he was relieved from 

further obligation by Code § 20-109 which requires cessation of 

spousal support payments upon remarriage of the recipient spouse. 

 The trial court found the agreement to unambiguously reflect the 

intent of the parties to create a property division and issued a 

QDRO requiring husband to make the appropriate payments. Husband 

appealed arguing that the order effected an impermissible 

substantive change and even if it did not, the trial court's 

interpretation of the agreement was incorrect. 

 We address each argument in turn. Husband is correct that 

Rule 1:1 prohibits "all final judgments, orders, and decrees" 

from being modified after 21 days. However, because husband's 

divorce decree also divided his pension, Code § 20-107.3(K)(4) 

allows courts to issue qualified domestic relations orders to 
 3 

"effectuate the expressed intent of the [decree]." The QDRO may 

not "modify a final divorce decree simply to adjust its terms in 

light of the parties' changed circumstances" but must be 

"consistent with the substantive provisions of the original 

decree." Caudle v. Caudle, 18 Va. App. 795, 798, 447 S.E.2d 247, 

249 (1994); see also Fahey v. Fahey, 24 Va. App. 254, 256-57, 481 

S.E.2d 496, 497 (1997) (en banc). 

 It is clear that orders which alter critical terms of the 

contract, such as timing or amount of payments, exceed the 

authority granted under Code § 20-107.3(K)(4). See, e.g., Fahey, 

24 Va. App. at 256, 481 S.E.2d at 497 (dividing the actual value 

of a Keogh account rather than the agreed value was a substantive 

change); Decker v. Decker, 22 Va. App. 486, 495, 471 S.E.2d 775, 

779 (1996) (reducing spousal support by amount of mortgage 

payments on recipient spouse's house was a substantive change). 

In the instant case, however, the QDRO did not alter any 

critical, substantive provision. It merely clarified the 

intention of the parties at the time they agreed to the divorce. 

 While we recognize that this interpretation will determine 

whether husband must continue to make payments, the substantive 

terms of their agreement will not have changed by one iota. 

Therefore, the trial court's decision to reopen the decree to 

interpret its meaning was proper. See Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 

510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). 

 We also conclude that the trial court's interpretation was 
 4 

correct. "On review, we are not bound by the trial court's 

construction of the contract provision here in issue. We have an 

equal opportunity to consider the words within the four corners 

of the disputed provisions." Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 

187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984) (citations omitted). "When the 

terms of a disputed provision are clear and definite, it is 

axiomatic that they are to be applied according to their ordinary 

meaning." Smith, 3 Va. App. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 595. 

 Here, the language of the document as well as common sense 

supports the conclusion that the parties intended to create a 

property division rather than support payments. When describing 

the payment scheme, the parties used the word "divide," which is 

language used to describe property, not payments. Additionally, 

spousal support payments are usually expressed in terms of hard 

dollar amounts, rather than as a percentage of a fixed amount, 

such as a pension check. Further, in Paragraph 9 of the 

agreement, wife waived all claims to spousal support. Husband 

would have us interpret the agreement to provide for both spousal 

support and the immediate waiver of that support. We refuse to 

make such a ludicrous conclusion. Indeed, a logical reading of 

the agreement indicates that wife traded spousal support in 

exchange for a fifty percent interest in husband's pension. 

 Because we hold that the trial court properly issued the 

QDRO to effect the intent of the parties and that intent was to 

create a property interest in favor of wife equal to fifty 
 5 

percent of husband's pension, we affirm the decision of the trial 

court. 

 Affirmed.