*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
RICHELLE KAYE v. DOUGLAS HOUSMAN

(AC 40187)

Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord sought to recover damages from the defendant tenant

for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with the defendant’s

failure to pay rent. Thereafter, the defendant filed an answer, twelve

special defenses and right of recoupment, and the plaintiff filed a request

to revise eight of the defendant’s special defenses and right of recoupment. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for default for failure

to plead, claiming that thirty days had passed since she filed the request

to revise and that the defendant had not responded. The trial court

granted the plaintiff’s motion for default and the plaintiff filed a certificate of closed pleadings and claimed the matter for a hearing in damages.

Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to strike the matter from the

hearing in damages that was denied by the court, which held a hearing

in damages and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to this

court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his

motion to strike the case from the hearing in damages because he timely

filed an answer and four special defenses. Specifically, he claimed that

the trial court, by denying his motion to strike, deprived him of the

opportunity to contest liability that timely was put in issue by virtue of

his answer and special defenses, which thereby denied him the right to

due process. Held that the trial court was without authority to grant

the motion for default against the defendant and, thus, should have

granted his motion to strike the matter from the hearing in damages

list: the defendant filed an answer and four special defenses, which the

plaintiff did not ask him to revise, before the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for default, and the plaintiff’s claim that, under the applicable

rule of practice (§ 10-6 [5]), the special defenses were part of the answer

and, therefore, that the defendant was in default on the entire complaint

for failing to revise eight of his special defenses and recoupment was

unavailing, as § 10-6 (5) does not define a special defense as part of

an answer and merely provides that when a defendant responds to a

complaint, the answer and special defenses are to be filed at the same

time in the order of pleadings, other rules of practice make clear that

an answer and a special defense have legally distinct functions, and, in

the order of pleadings, a plaintiff is required to file a reply to any special

defense and no rule of practice requires a plaintiff to file any response

to a defendant’s answer; moreover, pursuant to the relevant statute

(§ 52-119) and rule of practice (§ 10-18), which govern the penalty for

failing to plead, a party failing to plead according to the rules may be

nonsuited or defaulted, there is support for the proposition that a trial

court commits plain error if, prior to rendering a judgment upon default,

the court fails to accept for filing a defaulted party’s pleading solely on

the ground that the pleading was untimely, and our Supreme Court has

expressed a policy to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute

whenever possible to secure a litigant’s day in court.

Argued April 16—officially released September 18, 2018

Procedural History

Action to recover unpaid rent, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield, where the matter was transferred to the

Housing Session at Bridgeport; thereafter, the defendant was defaulted for failure to plead; subsequently,

the trial court, Rodriguez, J., denied the defendant’s

motion to strike the matter from the hearing in damages

list; thereafter, the court, after a hearing in damages,

rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which
the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.

Sabato P. Fiano, with whom, on the brief, was Carolyn A. Trotta, for the appellant (defendant).

Anthony Musto, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. In this housing court matter, the defendant, Douglas Housman, appeals from the judgment of

the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Richelle

Kaye, following a hearing in damages. On appeal, the

defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly held

a hearing in damages in view of his operative answer

and four special defenses and (2) denied him the right

to due process because the court did not adjudicate

fully his timely filed answer and four special defenses.1

We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following procedural history.

In April, 2016, the plaintiff served the defendant with

a four count complaint alleging breach of contract,

anticipatory breach of contract, quantum meruit, and

unjust enrichment. The plaintiff alleged in part that she

is the owner of property at 100 Stone Ridge Way in

Fairfield and that she had leased the premises to the

defendant pursuant to a written agreement from August

1, 2012 through July 31, 2016. She also alleged that the

defendant was to pay her rent of $3400 per month, but

he failed to pay rent for the months of August, 2015

through April, 2016. The plaintiff evicted the defendant

from the premises. The plaintiff further alleged that

she incurred expenses related to the eviction and will

continue to incur expenses as a result of the defendant’s default.

The complaint was returnable to court on May 24,

2016. Counsel for the defendant filed an appearance on

the return day. On June 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed a

motion for default for failure to plead. On July 5, 2016,

the court, Bellis, J., transferred the case from the Fairfield civil docket to the Bridgeport housing docket. On

July 22, 2015, the plaintiff filed a second motion for

default for failure to plead claiming that more than

thirty days had passed since the complaint was filed

and the defendant had not filed a responsive pleading.

On August 18, 2016, the defendant filed an answer,

twelve special defenses and right of recoupment. On

August 22, 2016, the plaintiff filed a request to revise

asking the defendant to revise eight of his special

defenses and right of recoupment. On September 22,

2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for default claiming

that thirty days had passed since she filed a request to

revise and that the defendant had not responded.2 On

October 3, 2014, the court, Rodriguez, J., granted the

motion for default for failure to plead. On October 25,

2016, the plaintiff filed a certificate of closed pleadings

and claimed the matter for a hearing in damages.

On November 17, 2016, the defendant filed a motion

to set aside the default.3 On that same day, the defendant

also filed a request to amend his special defenses, and

revised and amended special defenses and recoupment.

On November 23, 2016, the plaintiff filed objections to
the defendant’s request to amend and his motion to

open the default. She also filed a motion for a continuance to enable the court to rule on the defendant’s

pending motion to open the default. Judge Rodriguez

granted the plaintiff’s request for a continuance on

November 28, 2016. On December 29, 2016, the court

denied the defendant’s motion to open the default and

sustained the plaintiff’s objection.

On January 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for

continuance because her counsel was unavailable until

February 10, 2017. The court granted the motion for

continuance. On January 31, 2017, the defendant filed

a motion to strike the matter from the hearing in damages list. In the motion to strike, the defendant represented that he had filed an answer, twelve special

defenses, and right of recoupment on August 18, 2016,

and that the plaintiff had filed requests to revise eight

of his special defenses and right of recoupment. The

defendant specifically pointed out that the plaintiff had

not filed a request to revise the answer or his first,

second, tenth or twelfth special defenses. He argued

that the default affected only the eight special defenses

and right of recoupment which he did not revise. In

support of his motion to strike, the defendant cited

Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. St. John, 80 Conn.

App. 767, 837 A.2d 841 (2004), noting that the entry of

a default was improper with respect to the complaint

because ‘‘[t]he court had no authority to default the

defendants for failure to plead on a complaint that they

had properly answered.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 775.

The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike

on February 2, 2017, and attempted to distinguish Connecticut Light & Power Co. procedurally because the

request to revise in that case was directed to a counterclaim, not special defenses, which are part of an answer.

The plaintiff, however, stated that if the court agreed

with the defendant’s argument pursuant to Connecticut

Light & Power Co., it should nonetheless find the defendant in default on those portions of his answer that he

did not revise.

The parties appeared in court on February 15, 2017.

The court heard argument on the defendant’s motion

to strike the case from the hearing in damages list. The

court denied the motion to strike, held a hearing in

damages, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff

in the amount of $43,696.30.

The defendant appealed and filed a motion for articulation. See Practice Book § 66-5. The defendant asked

the court to articulate the reason it denied his motion

to strike the case from the hearing in damages list. The

trial court denied the motion for articulation, and the

defendant filed a motion for review in this court. See

Practice Book § 66-7. This court granted the motion for

review, but denied the relief requested.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly denied his motion to strike the case from

the hearing in damages list because he timely filed an

answer and his first, second, tenth, and twelfth special

defenses.4 The defendant claims that the court, by denying his motion to strike, deprived him of the opportunity

to contest liability that timely was put in issue by virtue

of his answer and special defenses. The defendant also

argues that Practice Book § 10-37 (a) contains no provision for granting a default or nonsuit for failure to

comply with a request to revise.5

The plaintiff counters the defendant’s claim on the

basis of Practice Book § 10-6 (5), arguing that special

defenses are part of an answer and therefore the defendant was in default on the entire complaint for failing

to revise eight of his special defenses and recoupment.

She also argues that the defendant’s motion to strike

merely was a second bite at the apple after the court

denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the default.

In his reply brief, the defendant disagrees that he was

seeking a second bite at the apple. He states that the

relief he was seeking from his motion to set aside the

default was resurrection of eight of his special defenses.

The relief he sought in his motion to strike the case

from the hearing in damages list was a trial on the

merits of the case in view of his answer and four special

defenses that the plaintiff did not request that he revise.

Our statutes and rules of practice provide penalties

for failing to comply with the timely pleading requirements of Practice Book § 10-8. ‘‘General Statutes § 52-

119 provides that [p]arties failing to plead according to

the rules and orders of the court may be . . . defaulted

. . . . Section 10-18 of our rules of practice essentially

mirrors that language. We read the plain and unambiguous language of both § 52-119 and Practice Book § 10-

18 as empowering the court with the discretionary

authority to impose a default as a penalty whenever a

defendant has failed to comply with our rules regarding

pleadings, including the timely advancement of such

pleadings. Such authority is in accord with the court’s

broad, general authority to act to maintain the orderly

procedure of the court docket, and to prevent any interference with the fair administration of justice.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) People’s

United Bank v. Bok, 143 Conn. App. 263, 268, 70 A.3d

1074 (2013).

‘‘A default is an interlocutory ruling that establishes

that a plaintiff is entitled to judgment, but requires further proceedings to determine the amount of money

due to the plaintiff if the action is one for monetary

damages.’’ CAS Construction Co. v. Dainty Rubbish

Service, Inc., 60 Conn. App. 294, 299, 759 A.2d 555

(2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 928, 767 A.2d 101 (2001).

‘‘[A] default admits the material facts that constitute

a cause of action . . . and entry of a default, when
appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co.

v. St. John, supra, 80 Conn. App. 775.

The parties’ positions with respect to what constitutes an answer require us to construe the relevant

rules of practice. ‘‘We interpret provisions of the Practice Book according to the same well settled principles

of construction that we apply to the General Statutes.

. . . In determining the meaning of a statute, [it] must

be considered as a whole, with a view toward reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable

overall interpretation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilson v. Troxler, 91 Conn. App.

864, 871, 883 A.2d 18, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928, 929,

889 A.2d 819, 820 (2005). ‘‘Statutory construction . . .

presents a question of law over which our review is

plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Byars v.

FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 101 Conn. App.

44, 48, 920 A.2d 352 (2007).

The rules of practice regarding pleading are found

in Chapter 10 of the Practice Book. Practice Book § 10-

8, titled ‘‘Time to Plead,’’ provides in relevant part:

‘‘Commencing on the return day of the writ, summons

and complaint in civil actions, pleadings . . . shall

advance within thirty days from the return day, and any

subsequent pleadings . . . shall advance at least one

step within each successive period of thirty days from

the preceding pleading . . . .’’ The steps referred to

in § 10-8 are set forth in Practice Book § 10-6, titled

‘‘Pleadings Allowed and Their Order,’’ which provides in

relevant part: ‘‘The order of pleading shall be as follows:

‘‘(1) The plaintiff’s complaint.

‘‘(2) The defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

‘‘(3) The defendant’s request to revise the complaint.

‘‘(4) The defendant’s motion to strike the complaint.

‘‘(5) The defendant’s answer (including any special

defenses) to the complaint.

‘‘(6) The plaintiff’s request to revise the defendant’s answer.

‘‘(7) The plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s

answer.

‘‘(8) The plaintiff’s reply to any special defenses.’’

The plaintiff relies on the language of Practice Book

§ 10-6 (5) to support her contention that special

defenses are defined as part of an answer. We do not

construe § 10-6 (5) as defining a special defense as part

of an answer. Section 10-6 (5) does no more than state

that when a defendant responds to a complaint, the

answer and special defenses are to be filed at the same

time in the order of pleadings.6 An answer and a special

defense have legally distinct functions as other rules
of practice make clear.

Practice Book § 10-46 titled ‘‘The Answer; General

and Special Denial,’’ prescribes the manner in which a

defendant shall answer the allegations of a complaint

and provides in relevant part: ‘‘The defendant in an

answer shall specially deny such allegations of the complaint as the defendant intends to controvert, admitting

the truth of the other allegations . . . .’’

Practice Book § 10-50 defines the purpose of a special

defense. That section, titled, ‘‘Denials; Special

Defenses,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘No facts may be

proved under either a general or special denial except

such as show that the plaintiff’s statement of facts are

untrue. Facts which are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has

no cause of action, must be specially alleged.’’ Practice

Book § 10-50. ‘‘Where several matters of defense are

pleaded, each must refer to the cause of action which

it is intended to answer, and be separately stated and

designated as a separate defense . . . . Where the

complaint or counterclaim is for more than one cause

of action, set forth in several counts, each separate

matter of defense should be preceded by a designation

of the cause of action which it is designed to meet

. . . .’’ Practice Book § 10-51. Section 10-50 highlights

the interrelationship between a cause of action and a

special defense. In that regard, it is important to point

out that a plaintiff bears the burden of proof on his or

her complaint; see Rivera v. Meriden, 72 Conn. App.

766, 772, 806 A.2d 585 (2002); and the defendant bears

the burden of proof on his or her special defense(s).

See Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Scully, 3

Conn. App. 240, 245 n.5, 486 A.2d 1141 (1985).

The final step in the order of pleadings requires a

plaintiff to file a reply to any special defense. See Practice Book § 10-6 (8). No rule of practice requires the

plaintiff to file any response to the defendant’s answer.

Our courts repeatedly have pointed out the purpose

of a special defense. ‘‘The purpose of a special defense

is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations

of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the

plaintiff has no cause of action.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers,

177 Conn. App. 622, 631, 172 A.3d 837 (2017), cert.

granted on other grounds, 328 Conn. 904, 177 A.3d 1160

(2018); accord Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249

Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999) (purpose of special

defense); Grant v. Bassman, 221 Conn. 465, 472–73,

604 A.2d 814 (1992) (same); see also Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 501, 853 A.2d 460 (2004); Moran v.

Morneau, 100 Conn. App. 169, 173, 917 A.2d 1003 (2007),

cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953, 961 A.2d 420 (2008).

In the present case, the defendant claims that he

timely filed an answer and four special defenses, which
the plaintiff did not ask him to revise, and, therefore,

the default entered by the court on the plaintiff’s complaint was improper. In support of his claim, the defendant relies on Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. St.

John, supra, 80 Conn. App. 767. In Connecticut Light &

Power Co., ‘‘this court concluded that a trial court was

required to set aside a default judgment as a matter of

law when the default had been rendered improperly.’’

People’s United Bank v. Bok, supra, 143 Conn. App.

269–70.

In Connecticut Light & Power Co., after the defendants had filed answers and counterclaims in response

to the plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff filed a request

to revise the defendants’ counterclaim. Connecticut

Light & Power Co. v. St. John, supra, 80 Conn. App.

769–70. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a motion for default

for failure to plead when the defendants did not respond

to its request to revise the counterclaim. Id., 770. The

clerk of the court granted the motion, defaulting the

defendants on both the complaint and their counterclaim. Id., 770, 773. The defendants filed a motion to

open the default, but the trial court denied it. Id., 770.

When this court reversed the trial court’s denial of the

defendant’s motion to open the default judgment on

the plaintiff’s complaint, it concluded that the entry of

default by the clerk was improper with respect to the

plaintiff’s complaint because ‘‘[t]he court had no authority to default the defendants for failure to plead on a

complaint that they had properly answered.’’ Id., 775.

The plaintiff rejects the teaching of Connecticut

Light & Power Co. and contends that Connecticut

National Bank v. Marland, 45 Conn. App. 354, 696 A.2d

374, cert. denied, 243 Conn. 907, 701 A.2d 328 (1997),

is squarely on point with the procedural posture of the

present case. We do not agree. Although this court

agreed that the trial court inConnecticut National Bank

properly nonsuited the defendant on his special

defenses and counterclaim, it did not conclude that

the defendant was in in default on his answer. The

defendant in Connecticut National Bank filed a motion

to strike the case from the trial list, which the trial

court denied and this court affirmed. The important

distinction between Connecticut National Bank and

the present case is that in Connecticut National Bank

the defendant had filed a timely answer, but was nonsuited for failure to revise his special defenses and

counterclaim. Id., 354. Because the defendant was not

defaulted, the case was claimed to the trial list, not

the hearing in damages list. In the present case, the

defendant, despite having filed a timely answer and four

special defenses, was defaulted and his liability was

conclusively determined. See Connecticut Light &

Power Co. v. St. John, supra, 80 Conn. App. 775. The

case was placed on the hearing in damages list where

only the amount of money the defendant allegedly owed

the plaintiff was to be decided. In fact, a close reading
of Connecticut National Bank demonstrates support

for the defendant’s position that the court improperly

denied his motion to strike the case from the hearing

in damages list and thus denied him the opportunity to

contest liability.

Regardless of whether special defenses are an intricate part of an answer, this case turns not on the technical definitions of an answer but on what the sound

principles of procedure require. At various times in the

trial court and on appeal, each of the parties suggested

an alternative to the defendant’s default, i.e., that the

defendant should not be permitted to rely on the special

defenses that he did not revise, but that the case proceed

to trial on his answer and four remaining special

defenses. There is legal precedent for such a solution.

See McCarthy v. Thames Dyeing & Bleaching Co., 130

Conn. 652, 36 A.2d 739 (1944). In McCarthy, the plaintiff

was nonsuited on ‘‘the ground that [he] had failed to

comply in certain respects with an order for a more

specific statement.’’ Id., 653. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that he had lent the

plaintiff, his employer, many thousands of dollars for

materials, wages, and other things in order to continue

operations. Id. ‘‘The defendant made a motion for a

more particular statement as to the items [the plaintiff

had paid for], which was granted in part.’’ Id. The plaintiff filed ‘‘a bill of particulars’’; id.; that complied in part

with the court’s order. Because the plaintiff failed to

file a specific statement as to certain items as required

by the court, he was nonsuited. Id.

Our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘[o]n the face of the

record, the situation is that, because the plaintiff has

failed to file a specific statement as to certain general

claims in his complaint, and has not fully complied with

the order for the more specific statement as to another

general claim, his action is thrown out of court, although

he as well pleaded claimed items of indebtedness by

the defendant amounting to almost $7000. The mere

statement of this proposition is enough to suggest that

the action of the trial court was wrong. It is axiomatic

in modern pleading that, because a plaintiff cannot substantiate a separable part of the claim in his complaint,

he is not to be barred of recovery as regards that portion

of it he can establish. Where the failure to file a bill of

particulars as ordered goes to the entire cause of action,

a judgment of nonsuit may be proper. . . . Even when

the failure to file the bill goes only to a part of the cause

of action, it may be that the circumstances would justify

such an order. . . . In the situation before us, the

proper remedy of the defendant was not a motion for

a nonsuit but one to expunge from the complaint the

general allegations as to which specific statements as

ordered by the court were not filed, or objection at

the trial to any evidence offered in support of those

allegations.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 653–54.
Our Supreme Court noted that the General Statutes

and rules of practice ‘‘provide only that, where a party

fails to comply with a rule or order of the court as to

pleadings, the court ‘may’ grant a nonsuit; they do not

require that one be granted where to do so would run

counter to sound principles of procedure.’’ Id., 654.

Although McCarthy was decided approximately seventy years ago, the present day statute and rule governing the penalty for failing to plead state that a party

failing to plead according to the rules ‘‘may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.’’ (Emphasis

added.) General Statutes § 52-119; Practice Book

§ 10-18.

In the present case, the defendant filed an answer

and four special defenses, which the plaintiff did not

ask him to revise, before the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for default. ‘‘[T]here is . . . support for the

proposition that a court commits plain error if, prior

to rendering a judgment upon default, the court fails

to accept for filing a defaulted party’s pleading solely

on the ground that the pleading is untimely. . . . General Statutes § 52-121 (a) provides in relevant part: Any

pleading in any civil action may be filed after the expiration of the time fixed by statute or by any rule of the

court until the court has heard any motion for judgment

by default . . . for failure to plead which has been filed

in writing with the court in which the action is pending.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People’s United

Bank v. Bok, supra, 143 Conn. App. 268. ‘‘Moreover,

‘[o]ur Supreme Court has expressed a policy to bring

about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible to secure for the litigant his day in court.’ ’’ Id.,

quoting Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. St. John,

supra, 80 Conn. App. 775. The court, therefore, was

without authority to grant the motion for default against

the defendant and, thus, should have granted his motion

to strike the matter from the hearing in damages list.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Because we conclude that it was improper for the trial court to deny

the defendant’s motion to strike the case from the hearing in damages list,

we do not reach his due process claim.

2 The defendant did not object to the plaintiff’s requests to revise or

otherwise timely respond to the plaintiff’s request to revise.

3

In the motion to set aside the default, counsel for the defendant represented that he had made diligent efforts to communicate with the defendant

in order to obtain information needed to respond to the plaintiff’s request

to revise. He argued that the case was in its ‘‘infancy,’’ discovery had not

yet been conducted, and that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced by setting

aside the default.

4 The defendant’s relevant special defenses alleged:

‘‘First special defense: plaintiff’s action is barred, in whole or in part, in

that the plaintiff, as landlord, failed to deliver to the defendant tenant a

habitable and safe premises in accordance with the lease and Connecticut law;

‘‘Second special defense: plaintiff’s action is barred, in whole or in part,

in that the plaintiff unlawfully interfered with the defendant’s tenancy by

unlawfully entering the premises without permission or notice in violation
of [General Statutes §§] 47a-16 and 47a-18a. . . .

‘‘Tenth special defense: The plaintiff’s action is barred, in whole or in

part, by virtue of payment. . . .

‘‘Twelfth special defense: plaintiff[’s] action is barred, in whole or in part,

by virtue of plaintiff[’s] failure to mitigate [her] damages.’’

5 Practice Book § 10-37 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any such request

. . . shall be filed with the clerk of the court . . . and such request shall

be deemed to have been automatically granted by the judicial authority on

the date of filing . . . unless within thirty days of such filing the party to

whom it is directed shall file objection thereto.’’

6 A defendant, however, may file a request to amend and add special

defenses pursuant Practice Book § 10-60.