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Filed 12/20/23 P. v. Walton CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

GREGORY WAYNE WALTON II,

Defendant and Appellant.

C097696 

(Super. Ct. No. 22FE011065)

A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon is available to certain felons who have 

successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an additional period of 

rehabilitation. (Pen. Code, §§ 4852.01 et seq.; all further section references are to the 

Penal Code.) Here, defendant Gregory Wayne Walton II was convicted of human 

trafficking, an offense requiring registration as a sex offender. (§ 236.1, subd. (b); § 290, 

subd. (c)(1).) Just over five years later, he filed a petition for a certificate of 

rehabilitation. The trial court denied the petition because defendant was subject to a 10-

year rehabilitation period that had not yet elapsed. The trial court also rejected 

defendant’s assertion that he qualified for relief from the sex offender registration 
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requirement. Defendant argues the trial court erred. We affirm because we conclude the 

trial court correctly applied the relevant statutes.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant pled no contest to human trafficking (§ 36.1, subd. (b)) on March 13, 

2017, and was sentenced to three years probation on the same day. He completed 

probation on March 13, 2020. Three months later, he got a dismissal of his conviction

pursuant to section 1203.4. 

A little over five years after he was sentenced, defendant filed a petition for 

certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The prosecutor asked the court to drop the 

petition as premature. In attempting to counter the prosecutor’s request, defendant said 

he was going to request relief from sex offender registration. 

The trial court denied defendant’s petition as premature and noted defendant’s 

ineligibility to have his registration requirement terminated. Defendant timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the trial court erred in two ways: (1) in denying his petition 

for a certificate of rehabilitation; and (2) in concluding he is ineligible for section 290 

registration relief under section 290.5. Neither contention has merit. 

I

The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition

A certificate of rehabilitation is an intermediate step toward securing a full pardon 

and allows the superior court to investigate and recommend pardon applicants to the 

governor. (People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 875-876.) A certificate of 

rehabilitation procedure is available to felons, with certain exceptions, who have 

successfully completed their sentences and have undergone an additional and sustained 

period of rehabilitation in California. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a); see §§ 4852.01, subds. (a)-

(c), 4852.06; Ansell at p. 875.) The length of the rehabilitation period is a base five years

plus an additional period determined by the petitioner’s conviction. (See § 4852.03, 

subd. (a).) A person is not eligible to file a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation until 

this period has elapsed. (§ 4852.03, subd. (b).) 
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Defendant contends he was subject to only the base five-year period. Defendant is 

mistaken. An additional two-year period is added to the base five years regardless of the 

nature of the conviction. (§ 4852.03, subd. (a)(3).) That additional period increases to 

five years, for a total rehabilitation period of 10 years, in the case of a person convicted 

of committing any offense requiring sex offender registration. (§ 4852.03, subd. 

(a)(2)(A); see § 4852.22 [providing discretionary exemption from rehabilitation period

except for offenses requiring section 290 registration].) Defendant was convicted of 

human trafficking and that crime requires registration. (§ 290, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, based 

on section 4852.03, a 10-year rehabilitation period applies to defendant. There is no 

dispute this 10-year period had not elapsed when defendant filed his petition. 

Defendant claims that a 10-year rehabilitation period cannot apply because his 

underlying conviction was dismissed. He appears to rely on section 4852.01, subdivision 

(b) within the chapter governing certificates of rehabilitation. But his focus on this 

section is too narrow. Section 4852.01 identifies the persons who are eligible to file a 

petition. Those persons include persons convicted of a felony violation of a sex offense 

who are granted probation, the accusatory pleading of which has been dismissed pursuant 

to section 1203.4. (§ 4852.01, subd. (b).) While this section does not set forth 

rehabilitation periods, it specifies that the person can file a petition “pursuant to the 

provisions of this chapter.” The chapter includes section 4852.03. We cannot read 

section 4852.01, subdivision (b) in isolation while ignoring eligibility requirements found 

elsewhere in the chapter. (People v. Miller (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 973, 982.) 

Defendant also makes the conclusory assertion that the denial of his petition is 

unconstitutional. Because this assertion was not raised in the trial court and lacks

analysis or citation to authority, we consider it forfeited. (Allen v. City of Sacramento

(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped 

claims]; People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 628 [constitutional objections must 

be interposed before the trial judge to be preserved for appeal].)

In sum, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition. 
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II

Section 290.5 does not provide defendant relief from registration as a sex offender

Senate Bill No. 384 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the sex offender 

registration requirements by establishing three tiers of registration. (See § 290, 

subd. (d).) Offenders falling in the third tier are subject to lifetime registration. (§ 290,

subd. (d)(3).) Tier three includes persons “convicted of a felony offense described in 

subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 236.1” (conviction-based tier three offenders). (§ 290,

subd. (d)(3)(I).) It also includes persons who committed a tier one or tier two offense 

whose risk level is well above average, as specified (risk-based tier three offenders). 

(§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(D).) 

Because defendant was convicted under subdivision (b) of Section 236.1, he is a 

conviction-based tier three offender and subject to lifetime registration.1 Defendant’s 

contention that he was statutorily entitled to a risk-based assessment before being placed 

in this tier lacks merit. And he fails to develop any claim that the United States 

Constitution entitles him to such an assessment or that the entire registration process is 

unconstitutional. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)

Because of defendant’s status as a conviction-based tier three offender, there is no 

merit to his claim that he is eligible for relief from registration under section 290.5. 

Section 290.5 provides such relief to three groups: (1) tier one offenders; (2) tier two 

offenders; and (3) risk-based tier three offenders. (§ 290.5, subds. (a)-(b).) Defendant 

does not fall within those groups, so he is not eligible for registration relief under

section 290.5.

1 Defendant vaguely questions his no contest plea based on coercion and a lack of 

disclosure of a lifetime registration requirement. But defendant does not appeal from a 

timely motion to withdraw his plea. (§ 1018.) Also, defendant does not sufficiently 

develop this contention or provide a record to support it. (People v. Zaidi (2007) 

147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1481 [defendant must show by evidence in record that he would 

not have entered plea].)
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Defendant contends he should be eligible for relief because his conviction was 

dismissed under section 1203.4. Not so. “Section 1203.4 dismissal . . . does not affect 

sex offender registration.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 287.) Defendant 

also appears to rely on section 290.46 as providing relief from the registration 

requirement. But that section is inapposite. It requires the Department of Justice to 

maintain a public Internet Web site that provides information about registered sex 

offenders. (§ 290.46, subd. (a).) A person may apply for exclusion from the Web site 

through the department. (§ 290.46, subd. (d).) The Web site and the exclusion 

application are separate from the general sex offender registration requirement and the 

relief provided by section 290.5 that defendant seeks. (See People v. Brandao (2012) 

203 Cal.App.4th 436, 441 fn. 5 [persons excluded from section 290.46 Internet Web site 

must continue to register as sex offenders]). 

For these reasons, the trial court correctly found defendant ineligible for 

registration relief under section 290.5. 
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DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is affirmed. 

 

MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 

HULL, Acting P. J.

 

MAURO, J.