J-A02041-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

SUSAN L. GRAY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

ROBERT C. GRAY, :

:

Appellant : No. 612 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered March 5, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Civil Division

at No(s): 2015-742

BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2016

Appellant, Robert C. Gray (“Husband”), appeals from the order entered 

in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition 

filed by Appellee, Susan L. Gray (“Wife”), pursuant to the Protection from 

Abuse (“PFA”) Act.1 Husband argues the trial court committed error when it 

found sufficient evidence to support a final PFA order, permitted Wife to 

testify, and used an incorrect legal standard. We affirm.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122.
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Husband and Wife were married in 1997 and are the parents of three 

sons. On February 23, 2015,2 Wife filed a PFA petition. Therein, she 

indicated that Husband had “weapons present on the property,” but she did 

not request that Husband relinquish his weapons. PFA Pet. at 1; id. at 

Attach. A. That same day, the trial court granted a temporary PFA order and 

scheduled a hearing on the petition for March 5, 2015. 

Before she testified, the trial court informed Wife, “Mrs. Gray, you can 

testify from counsel table[.]”3 N.T., 3/5/15, at 7. Husband did not object. 

Wife testified that she separated from Husband on February 1, 2015 “based 

on fear of [Husband’s] threats to me.” Id. at 8. She described the most 

recent incident where she felt threatened by Husband:

 On January 23rd around 7 p.m. he was in the 

bedroom sitting in a chair by a computer and I 

brought to his attention that we had spoke[n] about 

his depression, based on me, why he was depressed. 

He said he was depressed about me and his job, and 

then I asked him, I said, I’m very concerned about 

the guns in the house, your safety, and the family’s 

safety, issues that have gone on in the past with 

other people that I know. Could he please remove 

the guns from the home and he said no. It would be 

a cold day in hell, and he looked [sic]. I said, but 

I’m worried about you meaning I’m worried about 

you and depression. He said no, it’s not me that 

 

2 At the time Wife filed the petition, she averred their older son was fifteen 

years old, and their twin sons were thirteen years old. PFA Pet., 2/23/15, 

at 2 (unpaginated).

3 The trial court provided Wife with this accommodation so that she would 

not have to navigate the courtroom, as she has a visual impairment. Trial 

Ct. Op., 6/10/15, at 7 n. 3.
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you’ll have to worry about. He looked at me and he 

said, no, you’ll be the first to know.

Id. at 8-9. 

She explained that she perceived this exchange as a threat because

if someone turns around and looks you in the eye in 

a very close distance at which I can see and makes 

that – I would take that as a threat. You will be the 

first to know and not removing the guns from the 

house. 

Id. at 9. 

Wife’s counsel asked if Husband had made “any statements in the 

past,” and Wife responded:

Yes, exactly about the target. Five weeks before 

that he was at a target range practice, and that’s 

when he had said about – he brought it home to 

show, you know, he had it, that he hit below the 

belt. He hit in the middle of the chest and perhaps 

that could be me, that could be a Susan. It could be 

Susan.

* * *

[H]e left the target in the bedroom for five weeks 

until he acknowledged my behavior that I was 

nervous, anxious. Was I feeling okay. I didn’t know 

what to say, how to address the issue, and the 

Wednesday before February 1st he removed the 

target from the bedroom.

Id. at 10-11. 

Wife also described an incident that occurred the previous July where 

Husband broke her phone while the family was on vacation and then left her 

and their children at a restaurant. Id. at 11-12. She additionally explained 
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that since she separated from Husband, she and her son were in the 

bathroom Husband used in the family home and found “a fully loaded clip 

with bullets in it.” Id. at 14. 

On cross-examination, Husband’s Counsel asked Wife about her 

contact with the Women in Need (“WIN”) organization:

[Husband’s Counsel:] Okay, I’m sorry, one more 

time. When did you contact WIN about [the] 

conversations?

[Wife:] After our target – after the target practice 

and the mention with the guns and the suicide, in 

January I spoke to a Megan, and she . . . started 

counseling me about the particular situation.

There is other emotional issues here that they 

have helped me with in regards to other things that 

have gone on in the home but this is outside this 

situation.

[Husband’s Counsel:] So when was that conversation 

with Megan?

[Wife:] After January 23rd she was not available. I 

contacted her that Monday around 9:00 a.m.

[Husband’s Counsel:] What day would that have 

been? 

[Wife:] Let’s see that was the –

[Husband’s Counsel]: I’m going to object. I would 

like the witness to answer this question from her 

own memory.

[Trial Court]: Okay, well – a calendar – I don’t know 

that a calendar is an improper –

[Wife]: That would be the 25th.
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[Husband’s Counsel]: That’s fine, but I think we’re 

having some issues with some dates here.

Id. at 24-25. 

On re-direct examination, the following occurred:

[Wife’s Counsel]: Can you just address whether you 

were especially concerned of [Husband’s] statements 

to you?

[Husband’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. 

Leading.

[Trial Court]: Well, I don’t – the part about being 

especially concerned.

[Wife’s Counsel]: She’s already testified that she was 

concerned.

[Trial Court]: That may not be it, but what part of –

[Husband’s Counsel]: I believe counsel is coaching 

the witness. I mean, I have no objection. She 

has a disability. It’s fine to testify from counsel 

table, but she’s obviously being coached by 

counsel as to her particular testimony. 

[Trial Court]: Well, give me an example in this 

question what you’re talking about because this is 

the type of proceeding, [Husband’s Counsel], where 

the [c]ourt can probably assume that all parties are 

especially concerned when they walk in the door if 

that’s your objection.

[Husband’s Counsel]: That’s – I’ll let you hear the 

question, but I believe she’s going to try to elicit 

some testimony that’s outside the scope of the 

complaint and certainly outside the scope of crossexamination. 

[Trial Court]: Okay. All right, then do you want to 

alert—since you’re aware of that do you want to alert 
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the [c]ourt to what it might be so we can rule on it 

without hearing it[?]

[Husband’s Counsel]: We saw some issues for the 

first time yesterday afternoon in answer to a custody 

complaint. . . . The testimony about, in this case, 

[Husband’s] alcohol consumption showed up in that.

[Trial Court]: I prohibited [Wife’s Counsel] from 

asking about that. You’re thinking that there’s more 

like that?

[Husband’s Counsel]: I believe that’s where she was 

going.

[Wife’s Counsel]: That was certainly not where my 

question was going.

[Trial Court]: Proceed.

[Husband’s Counsel]: I apologize, Your Honor, I 

withdraw the objection.

Id. at 39-41 (emphases added). Wife continued and testified that Husband 

has “been drinking more beer than normal[.]” Id. at 41. Husband’s 

Counsel did not object to this testimony or during the duration of Wife’s redirect testimony. See id. at 41-43.

Husband testified he never threatened Wife with a gun or threatened 

her life, health, or safety in any way. Id. at 47-48. He acknowledged a 

conversation about the target he used when shooting but denied calling it 

“Susan.” Id. at 53-54. He explained he kept it in the bedroom because he 

intended to reuse it, and he had “slid [it] in between the dresser and the 
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wall . . . standing right up.” Id. at 54. He agreed that he “smashed”4 Wife’s 

phone in July, but he testified he did not threaten her when doing so, and 

that he knew Wife was “fine” because his sons had their phones. Id. at 52.

At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court granted Wife’s petition 

for a final PFA order. Id. at 73; PFA Order, 3/5/15. Husband filed a timely 

notice of appeal on April 6, 2015, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement on May 11, 2015.

Husband raises the following issues for review:

[I]. Whether the evidence in this matter was 

insufficient to support the issuance of a final [PFA] 

order as it failed to meet the definition of abuse as 

defined in the Protection From Abuse Act[?]

[II]. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error 

of law, or committed an abuse of discretion, when it 

permitted [Wife] to testify from counsel table rather 

than the witness stand where she was repeatedly 

counseled by her attorney throughout her 

testimony[?]

[III]. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error 

of law, or committed an abuse of discretion, when it 

allowed [Wife’s] attorney to lead [Wife] by 

suggesting testimony to support the applicable legal 

standard despite [Wife’s] prior contradictory 

testimony, over the objection of [Husband’s] 

counsel[?]

[IV]. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error 

of law, or committed an abuse of discretion, when 

[Wife] was permitted to testify, over the objection of 

 

4 Husband explained that he was upset with Wife for telling their children 

about the divorce during the family trip and for not answering his five phone 

calls when he was looking for her. N.T. at 50-51. 
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[Husband’s] counsel, to matters which were outside 

the scope of the PFA Complaint[?]

[V]. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error 

of law, or committed an abuse of discretion, when it 

used an improper standard to sustain the court’s 

conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence to 

support the issuance of a final [PFA] order[?]

Husband’s Brief at 7. 

For Appellant’s first issue, he argues there was insufficient evidence 

adduced to enter a final PFA order. Id. at 15. He contends the trial court 

failed to consider inconsistencies in Wife’s testimony. Id. Husband also 

opines that Wife could not have been in reasonable fear of imminent bodily 

injury because she did not request that he relinquish his weapons in her 

application for a temporary PFA. Id. at 19. We discern no basis for relief.

We review PFA orders for an abuse of discretion or an error of law. 

Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 920 (Pa. Super. 2013).

When a claim is presented on appeal that the 

evidence is not sufficient to support an order of 

protection from abuse, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the petitioner and granting 

her the benefit of all reasonable inference[s], 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to 

sustain the trial court’s conclusion by a 

preponderance of the evidence. This Court defers 

credibility determinations of the trial court as to 

witnesses who appeared before it. Furthermore, the 

preponderance of the evidence is defined as the 

greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip the scale 

slightly is the criteria or requirement for 

preponderance of the evidence.

Id. at 926-27 (citation omitted). 
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The burden at a PFA hearing is on the petitioner “to prove the 

allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6107(a). Section 6102(a) enumerates several definitions of abuse. The 

relevant definition to this appeal is “[p]lacing another in reasonable fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury.” Id. § 6102(a)(2). “In the context of a PFA 

case, the court’s objective is to determine whether the victim is in 

reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury . . . . Appellant’s intent is 

of no moment.” Raker v. Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 725 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Instantly, Wife testified she separated from Husband because he made 

threats against her. N.T. at 8. She explained Husband’s display of his 

shooting target and his comment that “it could be Susan” put her in fear for 

her life. Id. at 9-10; see also id. at 25 (explaining on cross-examination 

that after the particular conversation with Husband she was “fearful” for her 

life). Husband challenges Wife’s credibility; however, it was for the trial 

court to make credibility determinations. See Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 927. 

His attempt to discredit her testimony is not a challenge to its sufficiency, 

but the weight the trial court placed on it. See id. at 928. We discern no 

abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court in determining the 

greater weight of the evidence supported the issuance of a final PFA order. 

See id. at 927.

Husband’s next three issues involve claims of error during Wife’s 

testimony. For Appellant’s second issue, he argues the trial court erred in 
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permitting Wife to “be counseled by her attorney during her testimony.” 

Husband’s Brief at 26. His position is that “the proximity of [Wife] to her 

counsel” and the “interactions that counsel was having with [Wife]” were 

improper. Id. at 27. He argues the “interaction was especially damaging 

when [Wife] was . . . shown dates on a calendar when opposing counsel was 

questioning her recollection . . . .” Id. For Appellant’s third issue, he 

reiterates, in a two-sentence argument section, that Wife’s Counsel 

improperly coached Wife during her testimony. Id. at 28. Next, Appellant 

argues it was error for the trial court to permit Wife to testify to issues 

outside the scope of the PFA petition. Id. Specifically, he objects to Wife’s 

testimony regarding Husband’s drinking. Id. at 29-30. We hold no relief is 

due. 

Our law is clear that,

[i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate 

review, a party must make a timely and specific 

objection at the appropriate stage of proceedings 

before the trial court. Failure to timely object to a 

basic and fundamental error will result in a waiver 

of that issue. On appeal the Superior Court will 

not consider a claim which was not called to the 

trial court’s attention at a time when any error 

committed could have been corrected. In this 

jurisdiction, . . . one must object to errors, 

improprieties or irregularities at the earliest 

possible stage of the adjudicatory process to 

afford the jurist hearing the case the first 

occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid 

an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter. 
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Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-76 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). “Also, an appellant may not raise a new theory for an 

objection made at trial on his appeal.” Commonwealth v. Duffy, 832 A.2d 

1132, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Instantly, when Wife referenced a calendar to answer a question on 

cross-examination, Husband’s Counsel objected. N.T. at 25. His specific 

objection was that he wanted the witness “to answer from her own 

memory.” Id. After the trial court ruled a calendar was not improper, 

Husband’s Counsel replied, “[t]hat’s fine.” Id. He did not object on the 

basis of Wife’s proximity to her counsel or coaching. See id. Furthermore, 

during Wife’s redirect examination, Husband’s counsel objected on the basis 

of leading. Id. at 39. When asked to clarify the objection, Husband’s 

Counsel noted he had no objection to Wife testifying from counsel table, but 

made a reference to Wife’s Counsel’s coaching. See id. However, when the 

trial court asked for an example, Husband’s Counsel again changed the 

nature of his objection to the scope of the testimony. Id. at 40. Finally, 

when Wife’s Counsel informed the trial court she did not intend to elicit 

testimony outside the scope of the PFA petition, Husband’s Counsel 

withdrew his objection. Id. at 41. Further, Husband did not object to 

Wife’s testimony regarding his alcohol consumption. See id. at 41-43. 
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Therefore, Husband waived5 his second, third, and fourth issues for failure to 

raise timely and specific objections, and he cannot raise a new theory of 

relief on appeal.6 See Thompson, 963 A.2d at 475-76; Duffy, 832 A.2d at 

1136. 

 

5 We note, with disapproval, Husband’s second, third, and fourth issues are 

devoid of any citation to legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). It is wellsettled that “the failure to develop an argument with citation to, and analysis 

of relevant authority waives that issue on review.” Harris v. Toys “R” UsPenn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Had Husband properly preserved these issues, we could conclude he waived 

review of these challenges on this basis. See id.

6 We observe Husband’s Counsel elicited testimony from Husband regarding 

his drinking:

[Husband’s Counsel]: In the conversation that you 

had with her on Sunday or any conversation you had 

with her between January 23rd and January 31st, did 

she indicate to you at any point in time that she felt 

threatened by you?

[Husband]: No.

[Husband’s Counsel]: Did she indicate she was upset 

with you?

[Husband]: Yes.

[Husband’s Counsel]: For what?

[Husband]: She felt I drank too much.

[Husband’s Counsel]: I noticed that came up. How 

much do you drink?

[Husband]: One to three beers, and actually since 

February 1st I haven’t. I’ve had three beers. One 

was last time with my mom at dinner. I know that 
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Finally, Husband purports to challenge the legal standard the trial 

court applied in determining whether petitioner met her burden of proof for a 

final PFA order. Husband’s Brief at 30. However, review of his argument 

reveals he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented and the 

trial court’s findings of fact. See id. at 30-33. For example, Husband 

contends, “it was patently unreasonable to believe that [Wife] was placed in 

actual fear when she could not remember when the conversations occurred, 

or the words that [Husband] used with any indicia of reliability or 

consistency.” Id. at 32. Husband is due no relief.

As discussed supra, our review of the record indicates the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in granting Wife’s petition for a final PFA order. 

See Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 920. The trial court was free to credit Wife’s 

testimony and conclude she was in reasonable fear of imminent bodily 

injury.7 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a); Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 927

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s order.

 

[Wife] specified a number that is totally inaccurate. 

I’m 116 pounds. No one has seen me in the last 20 

years intoxicated. 

Id. at 62-63.

7 Similarly, Husband filed a reply brief wherein he argues, inter alia, that 

Wife “was inconsistent throughout her testimony about whether she was 

afraid, specifically what words placed her in fear, and when conversations 

occurred.” Husband’s Reply Brief at 10. Husband also points to facts that 

are not of record in this case. Id. at 3. We have considered all the 

arguments and the facts that are of record in arriving at our disposition. 
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Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2016