a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2003 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE

Lack of Strategic 

Focus and Obstacles 

to Agricultural 

Recovery Threaten 

Afghanistan’s Stability

GAO-03-607
The emergency food assistance that the United States and the international 

community provided from January 1999 through December 2002 helped avert 

famine by supplying millions of beneficiaries with about 1.6 million tons of food. 

However, the inadequacy of the international community’s financial and in-kind 

support of the World Food Program’s (WFP) appeal for assistance disrupted the 

provision of food assistance throughout 2002. Because of a lack of resources, 

WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to returning refugees from 

150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a result of the statutory 

requirement that U.S. agencies providing food assistance purchase U.S.-origin 

commodities and ship them on U.S.-flag vessels, assistance costs and delivery 

times were higher by $35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United 

States had provided WFP with cash or regionally produced commodities. Had 

the U.S. assistance been purchased regionally, an additional 685,000 people 

could have been fed for 1 year. 

U.S.- provided vegetable oil distributed by WFP in Hirat, Afghanistan 

The livelihood of 85 percent of Afghanistan’s approximately 26 million people 

depends on agriculture. Over 50 percent of the gross domestic product and 80 

percent of export earnings have historically come from agriculture. Over the 4-

year period, because of continued conflict and drought, the international 

community provided primarily short-term agricultural assistance such as tools 

and seed. As a result, the assistance did not significantly contribute to the 

reconstruction of the agricultural sector. In 2002, agricultural assistance was not 

adequately coordinated with the Afghan government; a new coordination 

mechanism was established in December 2002, but it is too early to determine its 

effectiveness. As a result of the weak coordination, the Afghan government and 

the international community have not developed a joint strategy to direct the 

overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Meanwhile, inadequate assistance 

funding, continuing terrorist attacks, warlords’ control of much of the country, 

and the growth of opium production threaten the recovery of the agricultural 

sector and the U.S. goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan.

After the events of September 11, 

2001 led to the defeat of the 

Taliban, the United States and the 

international community developed 

an assistance program to support 

Afghanistan’s new government and 

its people. Key components of this 

effort include food and agricultural 

assistance. GAO was asked to 

assess (1) the impact, management, 

and support of food assistance to 

Afghanistan and (2) the impact and 

management of agricultural 

assistance to Afghanistan, as well 

as obstacles to achieving food 

security and political stability. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of State and the 

Administrator of USAID take an 

active role in an international–

Afghan effort to develop an 

agricultural rehabilitation strategy. 

GAO suggests that Congress 

consider amending the Agriculture 

Trade Development and Assistance 

Act of 1954, as amended, and the 

Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as 

amended, to allow the purchase of 

commodities overseas and waive 

the U.S.-flag vessel requirement 

under certain circumstances. 

The agencies agree with the need to 

develop a strategy, but USAID does 

not think it should lead the effort. In 

terms of providing flexibility, WFP 

agrees, but U.S. agencies disagree 

with the need to amend legislation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-607.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Loren Yager 

(202) 512-4347 or yagerl@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-607, a report to 

congressional requesters 

June 2003

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to 

Agricultural Recovery Threaten 

Afghanistan's Stability 
Page i GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

U.S. and International Food Assistance Had Significant Impact and 

Was Well Managed, but Donor Support Was Problematic 13

Agricultural Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Lacks 

Coordination, and Major Obstacles Jeopardize Food Security and 

Political Stability 30

Conclusions 46

Matter for Congressional Consideration 47

Recommendations for Executive Action 47

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 48

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 52

Appendix II: World Food Program Projects in Afghanistan, 2002 56

Appendix III: Description of WFP Food Assistance Monitoring 

Mechanisms 57

Appendix IV: Donor Contributions to World Food Program Emergency 

Operation 10155 as of May 12, 2003 59

Appendix V: Cost Data for U.S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan Provided 

to the UN World Food Program, Fiscal Years 1999–2002 60

Appendix VI: International Donor Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in 

Afghanistan 61

Appendix VII: Major Donors’ Pledges and Contributions as of December 31, 

2002 (as reported by the 

U.S. Department of State) 66

Appendix VIII: Comments from the World Food Program 68

GAO Comments 70

Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of State 71

GAO Comments 73

Appendix X: Comments from the United States Agency for International 

Development 74

GAO Comments 77

Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Agriculture 79

GAO Comments 82
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense 85

GAO Comments 86

Appendix XIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 87

GAO Contacts 87

Staff Acknowledgments 87

Tables Table 1: WFP Operations: Cash Donations, Food Donations, 

Number of Beneficiaries, and Percentage of U.S. 

Contribution, 1999–2002 15

Table 2: Projected Cumulative Funding Requirements for the 

Reconstruction of Afghanistan 42

Table 3: Major Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in 

Afghanistan in 2002 62

Table 4: Comparison of Implementation Group and Consultative 

Group Processes 65

Figures Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major 

Roads 7

Figure 2: Drought-Affected Areas in Afghanistan as of October 

2001 10

Figure 3: WFP Distribution of U.S. -Provided Food in 

Afghanistan 12

Figure 4: Road Conditions Faced by WFP Truckers in 

Afghanistan 18

Figure 5: Use of Donkeys to Deliver Food to Remote Areas 19

Figure 6: Resource Requirements vs. Actual Deliveries for WFP 

Emergency Food Assistance Operation in Afghanistan, 

April 2002–January 2003 22

Figure 7: Costs for U.S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan, Fiscal 

Years 1999–2002 25

Figure 8: Humanitarian Daily Rations 29

Figure 9: FAO Irrigation Rehabilitation Project 32

Figure 10: Hierarchy of Strategies for Agricultural Sector 

Reconstruction 39

Figure 11: Organizations Responsible for Coordinating International 

Assistance in Afghanistan, 1998–2003 63
Contents

Page iii GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Abbreviations

ACTED Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

HDR humanitarian daily ration

ITSH Internal Transport, Storage, and Handling

NDF National Development Framework

UN United Nations

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNDP United Nations Development Program

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

WFP World Food Program

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Page 1 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 30, 2003 Lret

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf

Chairman

Subcommittee Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Afghanistan is a country devastated by 23 years of war and destructive 

domestic policies and more than 4 years of drought. The livelihood of 85 

percent of Afghanistan’s approximately 26 million inhabitants depends on 

agriculture, yet the food and agricultural sector has been severely 

damaged.1

 Since 1978, the country has required international food aid to 

help meet the shortfall between food supply and demand. Since 1999, the 

United States has been the largest donor of food and agricultural assistance 

to Afghanistan. The U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to create a stable 

Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others and is not a base for 

terrorism; U.S. food and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan is intended 

not only to provide emergency relief but also to help achieve this long-term 

goal. The United States has provided short-term, emergency food 

assistance to feed Afghanistan’s vulnerable populations, as well as longerterm agricultural development assistance to help Afghanistan improve its 

food security2

 and political stability. The majority of U.S. assistance has 

been given through the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the United 

Nations (UN) World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Food and 

Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as nongovernmental organizations. 

1

Estimates on total population vary between 24 and 28 million.

2

FAO defines food security as ensuring that sufficient food is available, that supplies are 

relatively stable, and that those in need of food can obtain it. The World Bank defines food 

security as the condition whereby everyone, at all times, has access to and control over 

high-quality food sufficient for an active and healthy life.
Page 2 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Nongovernmental organizations and contractors distribute most of the 

assistance provided through the UN organizations in Afghanistan. 

Because of concerns about the United States’ and UN’s ability to deliver 

assistance in such a complex environment, and recognizing the 

interrelationship of short-term emergency food assistance and longer-term 

agricultural assistance, you asked that we examine the food and 

agricultural assistance provided to date. We assessed, for 1999–2002, (1) 

the impact, management, and U.S. and international support of short-term, 

emergency food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and 

management of long-term, agricultural development assistance to 

Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political 

stability.

To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the 

U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and State; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development; the UN World Food Program, Food and 

Agriculture Organization, and Development Program; the World Bank; the 

Asian Development Bank; and the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture and 

Animal Husbandry and Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources. This 

effort included an analysis of the cost data for U.S. food assistance 

provided through these agencies and organizations. In addition, we 

contacted 14 nongovernmental organizations, responsible for delivering 

WFP and FAO assistance in Afghanistan, to obtain their views on a range of 

issues including the management of donated commodities and 

coordination. Finally, we traveled to Afghanistan to examine the WFP’s 

operations in country. Our presence in Afghanistan was limited due to 

security precautions imposed by the Department of State. While in 

Afghanistan, we spoke with officials from U.S., UN, and nongovernmental 

organizations and the Afghan government. (For further details of the scope 

and methodology of our study, see app. I.) 

Results in Brief The emergency food assistance provided by the United States and the 

international community from January 1999 through December 2002 

helped avert famine by providing approximately 1.6 million tons of food.3

The WFP managed the assistance efforts effectively, overcoming significant 

obstacles and employing monitoring mechanisms such as a real-time 

3

In this report, “international community” is defined as the collective grouping of bilateral, 

multilateral, and international assistance agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
Page 3 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

automated tracking system and periodic site visits. We observed organized 

and efficient food distribution operations at WFP sites, and available 

program data showed that less than 1 percent of the assistance was lost. 

However, the inadequacy of the international community’s financial and inkind support of the WFP’s appeal for assistance disrupted the provision of 

food assistance throughout 2002. For example, because of lack of 

resources, the WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to 

returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a 

result of the statutory requirement that U.S. agencies providing food 

assistance purchase U.S.-origin commodities and ship 75 percent of them 

on U.S.-flagged vessels, assistance costs and delivery times were higher by 

$35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United States had 

provided cash or regionally produced commodities to international 

assistance agencies. 

The agricultural assistance provided by the international community had a 

limited impact, from 1999 to 2002, because of continued conflict and 

drought. During this period, FAO, nongovernmental organizations, and 

others provided primarily short-term agricultural assistance such as 

distributing tools and seed and, as a result, the assistance did not 

significantly contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s agricultural 

sector. In addition, in 2002, international agricultural assistance was not 

adequately coordinated with the Afghan government, contrary to 

established guidelines. A new coordination mechanism was established in 

December 2002, but it is too early to determine its effectiveness. Because of 

the lack of coordination, the Afghan government and the international 

community have not developed a joint strategy to integrate the numerous 

disparate assistance projects and manage the overall agricultural 

rehabilitation effort. Finally, obstacles to future rehabilitation efforts 

include inadequate funding to meet the U.S. and international community’s 

goal of rehabilitating the agricultural sector. The international community 

plans to spend approximately $230 million on agricultural assistance in 

2003. However, FAO officials said that the agricultural rehabilitation effort 

will cost billions of dollars and take at least a decade to complete. 

Meanwhile, the unstable security situation, the control by warlords of 

much of the country, and the growth of opium production create additional 

obstacles to achieving food security and political stability in Afghanistan.

To increase the United States’ flexibility in responding to complex 

emergencies where U.S. national security interests are involved, such as 

that in Afghanistan, Congress may wish to consider amending existing food 

aid legislation to allow, in the event of such emergencies, the provision of 
Page 4 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

non-U.S.-produced commodities and the provision of cash to international 

assistance agencies to purchase non-U.S.-produced commodities and 

amending cargo shipping legislation to allow waiver of the requirement to 

ship food assistance on U.S. flag vessels. In addition, we are recommending 

that the Department of State (State) and USAID take an active role in a 

joint international–Afghan government effort to develop an operational 

agricultural sector rehabilitation strategy that contains measurable goals, 

defines resource levels, delineates responsibilities, identifies external 

factors that affect the achievement of goals, and requires program 

evaluations.

We presented a draft of this report to WFP, State, USDA, USAID, and the 

Department of Defense. WFP agreed with our recommendation that the 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 be amended, 

but State, USDA, and USAID did not. State thought that more cost-benefit 

studies were needed, and USAID and USDA stated that other existing 

legislation allows USAID and State the resources and flexibility necessary 

to respond to humanitarian crises. USDA also observed that changes in 

cargo preference regulations would help reduce overall U.S. assistance 

costs while not negatively affecting the provision of U.S. commodities. In 

addition, USDA asserted that if the United States had provided greater 

levels of commodities as a result of purchasing regionally produced 

commodities, WFP’s logistical system would have been overstrained and 

savings in cost and time would have been marginal. We maintain that 

amending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 

would provide greater flexibility than the provisions contained in other 

existing legislation. The act is the principal authority for providing food 

assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations. In both 2002 and 

2003 over $2 billion in food assistance, the preponderant amount of this 

type of assistance, was dispersed under this authority. Amending the act 

will provide a permanent provision in the principal authority for providing 

U.S. food assistance, allowing the United States to respond rapidly and in a 

cost effective manner to events that affect U.S. national security. Further, in 

the event that U.S. commodities are not available, amending the act will 

provide the United States with the flexibility to respond in a timely and cost 

effective manner. However, we agree with USDA that the cargo preference 

requirement adds additional cost to food assistance and should be waived 

in specific situations, and we have adjusted the matter for congressional 

consideration to reflect this point. We disagree with USDA’s claim that 

additional commodities would have overburdened WFP and that the 

savings from purchasing regional commodities would have been 

insignificant. WFP moved record-levels of commodities through its 
Page 5 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

extensive logistics system in Afghanistan. Further, purchasing commodities 

regionally could have reduced delivery time by 120 days and increased the 

amount of commodities purchased by 103,000 metric tons.

WFP, State, USDA, and USAID all agreed with our recommendation that a 

joint Afghan–international donor strategy for the rehabilitation of 

Afghanistan’s agriculture sector is needed. However, USAID stated that 

FAO, not USAID, should lead such an effort. We maintain that USAID 

should lead the effort because the United States is the largest donor to 

Afghanistan, agricultural rehabilitation is the cornerstone of USAID’s 

efforts in Afghanistan, and the success of U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan is 

tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. 

The Department of Defense limited its comments to issues pertaining to its 

humanitarian daily ration program. The Department of Defense stated that 

(1) we incorrectly characterized the ration program as strictly a food aid 

program, (2) its informal evaluations of the program indicated that it 

alleviated hunger and generated goodwill among the Afghan people, and 

(3) although the funds used to purchase rations could have been used to 

purchase bulk food, the bulk food could not have been delivered to remote 

areas. The report discusses the food assistance and nonfood assistance 

aspects of the rations program, and we have added information about the 

goodwill generated by the rations to the report. As described in the report, 

WFP’s well established logistics system was capable of delivering food to 

all parts of Afghanistan throughout 2001, including the months of October 

through December when the rations were being delivered.

Background Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked Central Asian country with 

limited natural resources. At 647,500 square kilometers, it is slightly smaller 

than the state of Texas. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan to the east and 

south; Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and 

Iran to the west (see fig. 1). Its population, currently estimated at 26
Page 6 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly uneducated. Life 

expectancy in Afghanistan is among the lowest in the world, with some of 

the highest rates of infant and child mortality.4

4

According to the 2002 UN World Development Indicators, as of 2000 (the latest year for 

which figures are available), the infant mortality rate in Afghanistan was 165 per 1,000 live 

births, and the mortality rate for children younger than 5 years was 257 per 1,000 live births. 

Approximately 10 percent of children younger than 5 suffer from acute malnutrition, and 50 

percent suffer from chronic malnutrition. This condition renders children particularly 

vulnerable to disease, especially pneumonia, tuberculosis, and diarrheal diseases. In 

addition, malnutrition is believed to affect about 10 percent of Afghan women of 

childbearing age.
Page 7 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan, Including Provinces and Major Roads

Political conflicts have ravaged Afghanistan for years, limiting 

development within the country. Conflict broke out in 1978 when a 

communist-backed coup led to a change in government. One year later, the 

Soviet Union began its occupation of Afghanistan, initiating more than two 

decades of conflict. Over the course of the 10-year occupation, various 
Page 8 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts. 

The protracted conflict led to the flight of a large number of refugees into 

Pakistan and Iran. In 1989, the Soviet forces withdrew, and in 1992, the 

communist regime fell to the Afghan resistance. Unrest continued, 

however, fueled by factions and warlords fighting for control. 

The Taliban movement emerged in the mid 1990s, and by 1998 it controlled 

approximately 90 percent of the country. Although it provided some 

political stability, the Taliban regime did not make significant 

improvements to the country’s food security. Furthermore, the Taliban’s 

continuing war with the Northern Alliance and the Taliban’s destructive 

policies, highlighted in its treatment of women, further impeded aid and 

development. Coalition forces removed the regime in late 2001, responding 

to its protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States. In 

December 2001, an international summit in Bonn, Germany, established a 

framework for the new Afghan government, known as the Bonn 

Agreement.5

Agriculture is essential to Afghanistan. Despite the fact that only 11.5 

percent (7.5 million hectares) of Afghanistan’s total area is cultivable,6

 85 

percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, and 80 

percent of export earnings and more than 50 percent of the gross domestic 

product have historically come from agriculture.7

 However, Afghanistan’s 

agricultural sector continues to suffer from the effects of prolonged 

drought, war, and neglect. It lacks high-quality seed, draft animals, and 

fertilizer, as well as adequate veterinary services, modern technology, 

advanced farming methods, and a credit system for farmers. Further, 

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and its

5

The Bonn Agreement, signed by numerous stakeholders on December 5, 2001, in Bonn, 

Germany, established provisional arrangements concerning the governing of Afghanistan 

pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions within the country. The 

UN Security Council endorsed the Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001, through UN 

Resolution 1383.

6

One hectare is equivalent to 10,000 square meters, 2.471 acres, or 11,959.64 square yards.

7

Historical percentage based on UN data from the 1970s and early 1990s.
Page 9 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources lack the infrastructure and 

resources to assist farmers.8

Because Afghanistan experiences limited rainfall, its agricultural sector is 

highly dependent on irrigation—85 percent of its agricultural products 

derives from irrigated areas. Thus, the conservation and efficient use of 

water is the foundation of the agricultural sector. The severe drought that 

has gripped the country since 1998 has resulted in drastic decreases in 

domestic production of livestock and agricultural supplies including seed, 

fertilizer, and feed (see fig. 2). Several earthquakes and the worst locust 

infestation in 30 years exacerbated this crisis in 2002. Without adequate 

supplies and repairs to irrigation systems, even if the drought breaks, 

farmers will be unable to produce the food that the country needs to feed 

itself.

8

These ministries are referred to as the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation throughout 

the remainder of this report.
Page 10 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 2: Drought-Affected Areas in Afghanistan as of October 2001
Page 11 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Since 1965, the WFP9 has been the major provider of food assistance to 

Afghanistan. Partnering with nongovernmental organizations,10 it delivers 

assistance through emergency operations that provide short-term relief to 

populations affected by a specific crisis such as war or drought. It also 

conducts protracted relief and recovery operations designed to shift 

assistance toward longer-term reconstruction efforts. Because of its policy 

to target assistance at specific populations, WFP does not attempt to 

provide food for all of the vulnerable people within a country or affected 

area. Instead, it focuses on specific vulnerable populations such as 

internally displaced people or widows (see fig. 3). Further, it does not try to 

meet all of the daily requirements of the targeted populations. WFP’s 2002 

emergency operation in Afghanistan targeted internally displaced people, 

people affected by drought, and children, among others. The assistance 

programs designed to assist these populations provide between 46 and 79 

percent, or 970 to 1671 kilocalories, of the recommended minimum daily 

requirement of 2100 kilocalories. WFP assumes that beneficiaries will 

obtain the remainder of their food through subsistence farming or the 

market.

9

WFP was established in 1963. Since its inception, it has provided food for development 

projects, and it has also provided increasingly greater shares of assistance to emergency 

operations around the world. WFP devoted 28 percent of its resources to development in 

1997, 18 percent in 1999, 13 percent in 2000, and 10 percent in 2001. The program obtains all 

of its resources through voluntary contributions from donor nations.

10In Afghanistan, WFP partners with UN organizations like the UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees and local and international nongovernmental organizations, including CARE, 

Oxfam, and World Vision.
Page 12 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 3: WFP Distribution of U.S. -Provided Food in Afghanistan

FAO has provided much of the agricultural assistance11 to Afghanistan. 

FAO has been involved in agricultural development and natural resource 

management in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. FAO was founded in 

1945 with a mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to 

improve agricultural productivity, and to better the condition of rural 

populations. Today, FAO is one of the largest specialized agencies in the UN 

system and the lead agency for agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and rural 

11Agricultural assistance includes distribution of inputs (seed, planting materials, fertilizer, 

tools, livestock); irrigation repair; water resource management; hydrologic and climate 

monitoring/watershed management; agriculture product market, supply, and distribution 

systems development; rehabilitation and development of agriculture infrastructure, 

including fertilizer plants, seed farms, nurseries, product production and processing 

facilities, and government facilities (offices, labs); veterinary services/artificial insemination 

(supplies, training); pest control and capacity building/training in related subjects 

(horticulture, irrigation, animal husbandry); and development of agriculture policies, 

regulations, and laws.
Page 13 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

development. An intergovernmental organization, FAO has 183 member 

countries plus one member organization, the European Community. FAO 

has traditionally carried out reconstruction efforts in relatively stable 

environments. Although FAO is increasingly implementing its programs in 

unstable postconflict situations such as Afghanistan, the agency and its 

staff are still adjusting to operating in such environments. FAO's regular 

program budget provides funding for the organization's normative work 

and, to a limited extent, for advice to member states on policy and planning 

in the agricultural sector. FAO's regular budget can also fund limited 

technical assistance projects through its Technical Cooperation Program. 

Apart from this, extrabudgetary resources, through trust funds provided by 

donors or other funding arrangements, fund all emergency and 

development assistance provided by FAO. Thus, extrabudgetary resources 

fund FAO’s field program, the major part of its assistance to member 

countries.

U.S. and International 

Food Assistance Had 

Significant Impact and 

Was Well Managed, but 

Donor Support Was 

Problematic

The emergency food assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United 

States and the international community from January 1999 through 

December 2002 benefited millions and was well managed, but donor 

support was inadequate. WFP delivered food to millions of people in each 

of the 4 years, helping avert widespread famine. In addition, WFP managed 

the distribution of U.S. and international food assistance effectively, 

overcoming significant obstacles and using its logistics system and a 

variety of monitoring mechanisms to ensure that food reached the intended 

beneficiaries. However, inadequate and untimely donor support in 2002 

disrupted some WFP assistance efforts and could cause further disruptions 

in 2003. Further, WFP could have provided assistance to an additional 

685,000 people and reduced its delivery times if the United States had 

donated cash or regionally purchased commodities instead of shipping 

U.S.-produced commodities. Additionally, if the United States had donated 

the $50.9 million that it spent on approximately 2.5 million daily rations airdropped by the Department of Defense, WFP could have purchased enough 

regionally produced commodities to provide food assistance for an 

estimated 1.0 million people for a year. 
Page 14 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Food Assistance Had 

Important Impact

The emergency food assistance that the United States and other bilateral 

donors provided in Afghanistan through WFP from 1999 through 2002 met a 

portion of the food needs of millions of vulnerable Afghans. Over the 4-year 

period, WFP delivered approximately 1.6 million metric tons of food that 

helped avert famine and stabilize the Afghan people, both in Afghanistan 

and in refugee camps in neighboring countries.12 The food assistance also 

furthered the country’s reconstruction through projects, among others, that 

exchanged food for work. WFP delivered the assistance as part of seven 

protracted relief–recovery and emergency operations (see table 1).13 The 

types of operations and their duration and objectives varied in response to 

changing conditions within Afghanistan. These objectives included, but 

were not limited to, providing relief to the most severely affected 

populations in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees in neighboring countries 

and preventing mass movements of populations.

12During the period 1999–2001, WFP and other agencies believed that without food 

assistance to Afghanistan, a famine could occur. In remote areas, prefamine conditions, 

including severe malnutrition, were observed.

13WFP has provided assistance to Afghanistan for most of the 36 years prior to 2002; 

consequently, it had significant experience in the country, and its logistics infrastructure 

was well established. The assistance delivered from 1999 through 2001 was not tightly 

coordinated with the Taliban owing to the UN’s policy of not working with this particular 

government. The assistance delivered in 2002 was coordinated with the new Afghan 

government through memorandums of understanding.
Page 15 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Table 1: WFP Operations: Cash Donations, Food Donations, Number of Beneficiaries, and Percentage of U.S. Contribution, 

1999–2002

Legend 

N/A = not applicable

Source: WFP.

a

Protracted relief and recovery operation 6064.

b

Protracted relief and recovery operation 6064.01. Operation suspended, activities integrated into 

emergency operation 10046.0.

c

Emergency operation 6259.0.

d

Emergency operation 10046.0. Operation terminated and replaced with emergency operation 

10126.0.

e

Emergency operation 10098. Operation terminated and replaced with emergency operation 10126.0.

f

Emergency operation 10126.0. Covered beneficiaries in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan.

g

Emergency operation 10155.0.

h

As of March 31, 2003.

I

The cumulative total of beneficiaries cannot be calculated since the same beneficiaries may have 

been served multiple times during the 4-year period.

Duration 

Total cash

donations

(millions of

dollars)

Percentage of

cash contributed

by U.S.

Food donations

(metric tons)

Percentage of food

contributed by U.S.

Targeted

beneficiaries

(millions)

1/99–12/99a $49.5 87.3 111,502 89.7 1.2

1/00–12/01b 54.3 61.0 121,989 61.5 1.0

8/00–3/01c 47.9 78.4 114,694 78.5 1.6

4/01–10/01d 82.2 86.7 184,462 82.8 3.8

11/01–10/02e 43.8 100.0 100,000 100.0 5.6

10/01–3/02f 225.4 61.2 500,624 58.8 7.5

4/02–6/03g 242.3 64.5h 516,394 60.0h 9.9

Total $745.4 N/A 1,649,665 N/A N/AI

Average percentage of 

contributions from U.S.

N/A 68.0 N/A 67.0 N/A
Page 16 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

WFP implemented a number of different types of food assistance projects, 

including free food distribution; institutional feeding programs; bakeries; 

food-for-work, -seed, -education, -training, and -asset-creation projects; and 

projects targeted at refugees, internally displaced people, and civil 

servants. (See app. II for a list and description of WFP’s projects.) Food-forwork and food-for-asset-creation projects provided essential food 

assistance to the most vulnerable members of Afghanistan’s population 

while enabling the beneficiaries to help rehabilitate local infrastructure and 

rebuild productive assets such as roads and schools. Between July and 

September 2002, these projects employed 1 million laborers per month, 

paying them in food commodities.14 

U.S. food assistance to Afghanistan, provided by USAID and USDA, 

accounted for approximately 68 percent of the cash contributions and 67 

percent of the commodities delivered by WFP from 1999 through 2002 (see 

table 1). The U.S. provides cash to WFP to cover transportation and 

administrative costs associated with its in-kind contributions of 

commodities.15 USAID’s authority to donate to WFP operations derives 

from Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 

1954 (P.L. 480). Title II authorizes the agency to donate agricultural 

commodities to meet international emergency relief requirements and 

carry out nonemergency feeding programs overseas. USDA also provides 

surplus commodities to WFP under section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act 

of 1949. U.S. contributions consisted of in-kind donations of commodities 

such as white wheat and cash donations to cover the cost of transporting 

the commodities from the United States to Afghanistan.

Food Assistance 

Distribution Was Well 

Managed 

WFP managed the distribution of U.S. and international food assistance to 

Afghanistan effectively despite significant obstacles, including harsh 

weather and a lack of infrastructure to deliver food to beneficiaries. To 

accomplish this, WFP appointed a special envoy to direct operations and 

employed a dedicated staff of local nationals. It also used various 

monitoring and reporting mechanisms to track the delivery of food. 

14For example, food-for-work participants earn 7 kilograms of wheat per day, valued at 

$1.00. Wage rates across Afghanistan range from $1.50 to $3.40 per day. 

15WFP requires donors to provide funding to cover transportation and administrative costs 

for in-kind contributions of commodities. The cash that the U.S. contributes for this purpose 

cannot be used by WFP to purchase commodities.
Page 17 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

WFP’s Management Overcame 

Many Obstacles

In distributing the food assistance, WFP faced significant obstacles related 

to political and security disturbances in Afghanistan as well as physical and 

environmental conditions. These obstacles included limited mobility due to 

continued fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and 

coalition forces; religious edicts issued by the Taliban limiting the 

employment of women by international organizations; difficult transport 

routes created by geography, climate, and lack of infrastructure (see fig. 4); 

and attempts by Afghan trucking cartels to dramatically increase trucking 

fees. To overcome these obstacles, WFP negotiated with the Taliban to 

allow the movement of food to areas occupied by the Northern Alliance; it 

also threatened to cancel certain projects unless women were allowed to 

continue to work for WFP. Further, WFP found ways to deliver food to 

remote areas, including airlifting food and hiring donkeys (see fig. 5). In 

addition, it purchased trucks to supplement a fleet of contracted trucks. 

Using these trucks as leverage against the Afghan trucking cartel, WFP 

forced the cartel to negotiate when the cartel attempted to dramatically 

increase transport fees.
Page 18 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 4: Road Conditions Faced by WFP Truckers in Afghanistan
Page 19 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 5: Use of Donkeys to Deliver Food to Remote Areas

Special Envoy and Staff Ensured 

Effective Delivery

WFP created the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for 

the Afghan Region to lead and direct all WFP operations in Afghanistan and 

neighboring countries during the winter of 2001–2002, when it was believed 

that the combination of winter weather and conflict would increase the 

need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate the control of 

all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate the 
Page 20 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

movement of assistance.16 WFP points to the creation of the position as one 

of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into 

Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001 

alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest 

monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP’s 

history. 

WFP also credits its quick response to its national staff and the Afghan 

truck drivers it contracted. WFP employed approximately 400 full-time 

national staff during 1999–2002. These staff established and operated an 

extensive logistics system and continued operations throughout 

Afghanistan, including areas that international staff could not reach owing 

to security concerns, and during periods when international staff were 

evacuated from the country. The truckers who moved the food around the 

country continued working even during the harshest weather and in areas 

that were unsafe because of ongoing fighting and banditry. 

WFP Monitoring Shows Effective 

Distribution and Negligible 

Losses

WFP uses a number of real-time monitoring mechanisms to track the 

distribution of commodities in Afghanistan, and the data we reviewed 

suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses minimal. 

(For a description of WFP’s monitoring procedures, see app. III.) During 

our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan, we observed 

orderly and efficient storage, handling, and distribution of food 

assistance.17 WFP’s internal auditor reviewed WFP Afghanistan’s 

monitoring operations in August of 2002 and found no material 

weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of WFP 

activities without finding any major flaws in WFP’s operations. In addition, 

most of the implementing partners we contacted were familiar with WFP 

reporting requirements. However, 10 of the 14 implementing partners we 

contacted commented unfavorably on WFP’s project monitoring efforts, 

stating that monitoring visits were too infrequent. Finally, WFP’s loss 

reporting data indicated that only 0.4 percent of the commodities was lost 

owing to theft, spoilage, mishandling, or other causes. 

16The special envoy’s term ran from November 2001 to May 2002. A second envoy was not 

appointed.

17Owing to security restrictions, we were able to conduct only limited site visits in 

Afghanistan.
Page 21 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Inadequate International 

Support Disrupted Food 

Assistance; U.S. 

Contributions Costly and 

Slow

Inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP’s food assistance 

efforts in 2002 and could disrupt efforts in 2003; in addition, U.S. assistance 

to Afghanistan, both through WFP and the Department of Defense, was 

costly. In 2002, interruptions in support forced WFP to delay payments of 

food, curtail the implementation of new projects, and reduce the level of 

rations provided to repatriating refugees. WFP expressed concern that 

donor support in 2003 may be similarly affected, as a growing number of 

international emergencies and budgetary constraints could reduce the total 

funding available for food assistance to Afghanistan.18 In addition, WFP 

could have delivered more food and reduced delivery times if the United 

States had provided either cash or regionally purchased commodities 

instead of shipping U.S.-produced commodities and airdropping 

humanitarian daily rations.

Limited International Donor 

Support Disrupted Food 

Assistance in 2002, Could 

Disrupt Efforts in 2003

Obtaining donor support for the emergency food assistance operation for 

the April 2002 through December 2002 period was difficult owing to the 

donor community’s inadequate response to WFP’s appeal for contributions. 

WFP made its initial appeal in February 2002 for the operation and it made 

subsequent appeals for donor support throughout the operation. The 

operation was designed to benefit 9,885,000 Afghans over a 9-month period, 

through the provision of 543,837 metric tons of food at a cost of over $295 

million.19 It was also intended to allow WFP to begin to shift from 

emergency to recovery operations with particular emphasis on education, 

health, and the agricultural sector. When the operation began in April 2002, 

WFP’s Kabul office warned that it might have to stop or slow projects if 

donors did not provide more support. At that time, WFP had received only 

$63.9 million, or 22 percent of the required resources. The United States 

provided most of this funding. (See app. IV for a list of donors and their 

contributions for the operation.) From April through June—the preharvest 

period when Afghan food supplies are traditionally at their lowest point—

WFP was able to meet only 51 percent of the planned requirement for 

18According to WFP, approximately 44.6 million people needed food assistance in Africa and 

North Korea in 2002. Meanwhile, declining global food production and donor food 

assistance contributions are expected to reduce aid levels worldwide in 2003. As of May 

2003, based on donor pledges received, WFP estimates that donor contributions to 

Afghanistan will be adequate to meet projected requirements. 

19Emergency Operation 10155.0 “Emergency Assistance to Afghanistan.” The period of the 

operation was originally 9 months but was extended to 15 months to ensure a continued 

pipeline of food and a smooth transition between this operation and the subsequent 

operation.
Page 22 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

assistance. WFP’s actual deliveries were, on average, 33 percent below 

actual requirements for the 10-month period April 2002–January 2003. 

Figure 6 illustrates the gaps in the operation’s resources for the 10-month 

period.

Figure 6: Resource Requirements vs. Actual Deliveries for WFP Emergency Food 

Assistance Operation in Afghanistan, April 2002–January 2003

Note: The large drop in requirements from July through August resulted from the suspension of free 

food distribution during the harvest period. WFP suspended this program in an effort to prevent its 

assistance from negatively affecting the price of domestically produced wheat in Afghanistan. The 

increase in requirements from October through December resulted from the need to stockpile food for 

vulnerable populations during the winter.
Page 23 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Lack of timely donor contributions and an increase in the number of 

returning refugees forced WFP and its implementing partner, the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees, to reduce from 150 to 50 kilograms the rations 

provided to help returning refugees and internally displaced persons 

reestablish themselves in their places of origin. The rations are intended to 

enable these groups to sustain themselves long enough to reestablish their 

lives; reducing the rations may have compromised efforts to stabilize 

population movements within Afghanistan. The lack of donor support also 

forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay for up to 10 weeks, in 

some cases, the compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the 

food-for-work and food-for-asset-creation projects, resulting in a loss of 

credibility in the eyes of the Afghans and nongovernmental organizations. 

Similarly, because of resource shortages, WFP had to delay for up to 8 

weeks in-kind payments of food in its civil service support program, 

intended to help the new government establish itself, and it never received 

enough contributions to provide civil servants with the allocation of tea 

they were to be given as part of their support package. In addition, WFP 

was forced to reduce the number of new projects it initiated, thus limiting 

the level of reconstruction efforts it completed. 

In January 2003, WFP expressed concern that the problems it encountered 

with donor support in 2002 could recur in 2003. Despite the expansion of 

agricultural production in 2002 because of increased rainfall, 6 million 

Afghans will require food assistance in 2003. Although the United States 

was the largest donor of food assistance to Afghanistan in 2002, the U.S. 

contribution may be smaller in 2003 than in previous years owing to 

reduced surpluses of commodities, higher commodity prices, and 

competing crises in Africa, North Korea, and Iraq.20 The UN forecasts 

Afghan cereal production for July 2002 through June 2003 at 3.59 million 

metric tons, a cereal import requirement of 1.38 million metric tons, and 

Afghan commercial food imports at 911,000 metric tons. Thus, an estimated 

total deficit of 469,000 metric tons remains to be covered in the 12-month 

period by international food assistance. 

20Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 provides a permanent authority for USDA to 

donate surplus commodities in Commodity Credit Corporation inventories to carry out 

programs of assistance in developing and other foreign countries. The administration has 

decided to sharply reduce reliance on this program. The administration expects to use only 

$50 million in 416(b) commodities worldwide in 2003, compared with $360 million in 2002 

and $634 million in 2001. It has increased P.L. 480 Title II funding by approximately $800 

million in fiscal year 2003 in part to offset the decrease.
Page 24 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

U.S. Food Assistance 

Contributions Were Costly and 

Inefficient

The U.S.-produced commodities and humanitarian daily rations provided 

by the United States to Afghanistan resulted in lower volumes of food than 

if the United States had provided regionally purchased commodities or 

cash donations. If it had provided WFP with cash or commodities from 

countries in the Central Asia region, the United States could have 

eliminated ocean freight costs. We estimated that the savings in freight 

costs would have enabled WFP to provide food assistance to 

approximately 685,000 additional people for 1 year. In addition, we 

estimated that if the United States had donated cash or regionally 

purchased commodities instead of air-dropping rations, WFP could have 

provided food assistance for another 1.0 million people for a year.

U.S.-Produced Commodities Raised Costs and Slowed Delivery

Most of the food assistance that the United States donated to Afghanistan 

in 1999–2002 was provided through WFP as in-kind donations of U.S. 

agricultural products as well as cash to cover shipping and freight costs. 

Since the commodities were purchased in the United States, much of the 

cost of the assistance represented shipping and freight costs rather than 

the price of the commodities. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of the costs 

associated with U.S. food assistance to Afghanistan from 1999 through 

2002. (See app. V for additional cost data.)
Page 25 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 7: Costs for U.S. Food Assistance to Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 1999–2002

Legend

Admin. and misc. = administrative and miscellaneous. Includes administrative costs associated with 

the delivery of assistance

ITSH= internal transport, storage, and handling within Afghanistan

Inland freight = freight costs from port of arrival to Afghan border

Ocean freight = freight costs from U.S. port to port of arrival
Page 26 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

We estimated that if the United States had provided cash or regionally 

purchased commodities instead of U.S.-produced commodities in 2002, 

WFP could have purchased approximately 103,000 additional metric tons 

of commodities and saved 120 days in delivery time. WFP officials in Rome 

and Cairo21 stated that cash was greatly preferable to in-kind donations 

because it allows for flexibility and for local and regional purchases. Other 

contributors to WFP efforts in Afghanistan have provided cash, allowing 

WFP to make the purchases it deemed most expedient, including 

purchases from Central Asian countries that produced large surpluses in 

2002.22 Ninety-three percent of the commodities WFP purchased for the 

emergency operation that began in April 2002 (157,128 metric tons) were 

from Kazakhstan and Pakistan.23 WFP also stated that it could have saved 

approximately 120 days in delivery time if it had received U.S. 

contributions in cash that it could have used for regional purchases.

21WFP’s Regional Bureau for the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Central Asia is located in 

Cairo, Egypt, and is responsible for operations in Afghanistan.

22In March 2002 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the 

Administrator of USAID stated, “The countries surrounding Afghanistan had plenty of 

surplus food available, thus ensuring price stability, to meet the needs of the Afghan people. 

However, the tools did not exist for the U.S. government to respond more effectively and, 

possibly, at lower cost to the taxpayer.” In 2002, Kazakhstan exported 6 million metric tons 

of wheat and Pakistan exported 1.6 metric tons. 

23In 2002, WFP purchased approximately 33 percent of all commodities it distributed in 

Afghanistan and received the other 67 percent from donor nations.
Page 27 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Although the commodity costs and some of the freight costs for regional 

purchases are lower, the largest portion of the savings from regional 

purchases comes from eliminating ocean freight costs. In 2002, USDA spent 

$5.6 million on ocean freight, or 31 percent of the value of the aid it 

provided to Afghanistan. USAID spent $29.4 million on ocean freight, or 

18.3 percent of the value of the aid it provided to Afghanistan. Overall, 

USDA and USAID spent approximately $35.0 million on ocean freight and 

commissions, or 19.6 percent of the total value ($178,068,786) of the food 

aid they provided through WFP to Afghanistan. Had this money been spent 

on regional purchases instead of on ocean freight, it could have paid for 

103,000 additional metric tons of commodities, or enough to provide food 

assistance for approximately 685,000 people for 1 year. 24 However, the laws 

governing the main food assistance programs under which most of the U.S. 

assistance was provided to Afghanistan through WFP do not provide for 

USAID and USDA to purchase food assistance commodities regionally or 

provide cash to WFP to make regional purchases. All of the assistance must 

be provided in the form of U.S. commodities, and 75 percent of the 

commodities by weight must be shipped on U.S.-flag vessels.25 According to 

USDA, this requirement referred to as “cargo preference” accounts for 9 

percent of the cost of U.S. food assistance shipments worldwide. In this 

case, it accounted for approximately $16 million of the $35 million in ocean 

freight. In prior reports we reported that the most significant impact of the 

cargo preference requirement on U.S. food assistance programs is the 

additional costs incurred.26 Using U.S.-flag vessels reduces funds available 

for purchasing commodities, thus the amount of food delivered to 

vulnerable populations is decreased. In its 2002 annual assessment of 

management performance, the Office of Management and Budget 

concluded that U.S. food assistance programs would be more cost effective 

24Estimate based on the ration provided to refugees in Afghanistan: 12.5 kilograms (27.5 

pounds) of wheat per person per month and regional commodity and transportation costs of 

$340 per metric ton.

25The Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (P.L. 74-835), as amended by the Cargo Preference Act of 

1954 (P.L. 83-664), generally requires that at least 50 percent of any U.S. governmentcontrolled cargo shipped by sea be carried on privately owned U.S.-flag vessels. In 1985, the 

Merchant Marine Act, 1936 was amended to require that 75 percent of certain foreign food 

aid be shipped on privately owned U.S. flag vessels.

26For further information on impact of shipping U.S. commodities on U.S. flagged cargo 

vessels see Cargo Preference Requirements: Objectives Not Significantly Advanced When 

Used in U.S. Food Aid Programs, GAO/GGD-94-215 (Washington, D.C.: September 1994). 

Cargo Preference Requirements: Their Impact on U.S. Food Aid Programs and the U.S. 

Merchant Marine, GAO/NSIAD-90-174 (Washington, D.C.: June 1990).
Page 28 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

and flexible if the requirement to ship U.S. food assistance on U.S.-flag 

vessels was eliminated. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA 

stated that consideration should be given to waiving cargo preference 

requirements in specific food aid situations. 

In February 2003, the President announced a new humanitarian $200 

million Famine Fund. Use of the fund will be subject to presidential 

decision and will draw upon the broad disaster assistance authorities in the 

Foreign Assistance Act. According to USAID, these authorities allow the 

U.S. government to purchase commodities overseas to meet emergency 

food assistance needs. However, this authority does not extend to the 

United States’ fiscal year 2003 $2.6 billion food assistance programs under 

existing food assistance legislation.

Humanitarian Daily Rations Were Expensive and Inefficient

The U.S. Department of Defense’s humanitarian daily ration program was a 

largely ineffective and expensive component of the U.S. food assistance 

effort. The program was initiated to alleviate suffering and convey that the 

United States was waging war against the Taliban, not the Afghan people. 

However, the program’s public relations and military impact have not been 

formally evaluated. Airdrops of the humanitarian daily rations were 

intended to disperse the packets over a wide area, avoiding the dangers of 

heavy pallet drops or having concentrations of food fall into the hands of a 

few. On October 8, 2001, U.S. Air Force C-17s began dropping rations on 

various areas within Afghanistan. Drops averaged 35,000 packets per night 

(two planeloads) and ended on December 21, 2001. In 198 missions over 74 

days, the Air Force dropped 2,489,880 rations (see fig. 8).27

27In addition to dropping the rations, the Air Force dropped 21,000 55-pound sacks of wheat 

and 42,000 blankets. 
Page 29 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 8: Humanitarian Daily Rations

Note: A ration packet measures 8.5 by 12.5 inches, weighs about 2.2 pounds, and contains a complete 

set of meals for 1 day for one person, totaling approximately 2,200 calories. The contents are chosen 

to meet strict dietary considerations and as such are completely vegetarian.

According to WFP, one of the major problems with the ration program was 

the lack of any assessment to identify the needs of the target populations or 

their locations. WFP representatives were part of the coordination team 

located at Central Command in late 2001 when the airdrops were made. 

These representatives provided the Defense Department with general 

information on drought-affected areas but were not asked to provide 

information on specific areas to target. According to Department of 

Defense officials, the drop areas were selected based on consultations with 

USAID staff familiar with the situation in Afghanistan. 

Defense officials told us that the rations are an expensive and inefficient 

means of delivering food assistance and were designed to relieve 

temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural disasters—

not, as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people affected by a longterm food shortage. Defense officials responsible for the ration program 

stated that the humanitarian, public relations, and military impact of the 
Page 30 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

effort in Afghanistan had not been evaluated. According to these officials, 

anecdotal reports from Special Forces soldiers indicated that vulnerable 

populations did receive the food and that the rations helped to generate 

goodwill among the Afghan people. However, reports from 

nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan indicated that often the 

rations went to the healthiest, since they were able to access the drop zone 

most quickly, and were hoarded by a few rather than distributed among the 

population. 

The cost of the rations was $4.25 per unit, or $10,581,990 for the 

approximately 2.5 million dropped. The total cost of the program was 

$50,897,769, or $20.44 per daily ration. Delivery cost is estimated at $16.19 

per unit, based on the difference in the ration cost and the department’s 

total expenditure. The rations accounted for only 2,835 metric tons out of 

the total of 365,170 metric tons, or .78 percent of the total weight of food 

aid delivered in fiscal year 2002. However, the cost of the rations equals 

28.6 percent of the $178,068,786 that USAID and USDA spent on emergency 

assistance to Afghanistan from October 2001 through September 2002. If 

the United States had bought traditional food assistance commodities 

regionally instead of dropping the 2,835 metric tons of rations, it could have 

purchased approximately 118,000 metric tons of food, enough to provide 

food assistance to 1.0 million people for 1 year.

Agricultural Assistance 

Has Had Limited 

Impact and Lacks 

Coordination, and 

Major Obstacles 

Jeopardize Food 

Security and Political 

Stability

The U.S. and international community’s agricultural reconstruction efforts 

in Afghanistan have had limited impact, coordination of the assistance has 

been fragmented, and significant obstacles jeopardize Afghanistan’s longterm food security and political stability. Because of drought and adverse 

political conditions, agricultural assistance provided by the international 

community has not measurably improved Afghanistan’s long-term food 

security. In 2002, collective efforts to coordinate reconstruction assistance, 

especially with the Afghan government, were ineffectual and, as a result, no 

single operational strategy has been developed to manage and integrate 

international agricultural assistance projects. Finally, the inadequacy of 

proposed agricultural assistance, and the increase in domestic terrorism, 

warlords’ control of much of the country, and opium production all present 

obstacles to the international community’s goal of achieving food security 

and political stability in Afghanistan. 
Page 31 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Impact of Agricultural 

Assistance Limited by 

Drought and Political 

Factors

For most of the period 1999–2002, because of war and drought, FAO, 

bilateral donors, and more than 50 nongovernmental organizations in 

Afghanistan focused resources primarily on short-term, humanitarian 

relief; consequently, the impact of this effort on the agricultural sector’s 

long-term rehabilitation was limited. The assistance was provided in an 

effort to increase short-term food security and decrease Afghanistan’s 

dependence on emergency food assistance. During most of the 4-year 

period, FAO provided $28 million in assistance to Afghanistan partly under 

the UN Development Program’s (UNDP) Poverty Eradication and 

Community Empowerment program and partly as donor-funded response 

to the drought.28 The poverty eradication program ended in 2002, but FAO 

continues its projects in Afghanistan. FAO’s short-term activities focus on 

efforts to enable war- and drought-affected populations to resume food 

production activities. These activities include providing agricultural inputs 

such as tools, seed, and fertilizer; controlling locusts; and making repairs to 

small-scale irrigation systems (see fig. 9). Its longer-term activities include, 

among other things, the establishment of veterinary clinics, assistance in 

the production of high-quality seed through 5,000 contracted Afghan 

farmers, and horticulture development. From 1999 to 2002, bilateral efforts 

focused on the distribution of agricultural inputs and the repair of irrigation 

systems. USAID activities currently include developing a market-based 

distribution system for agricultural inputs as well as distributing highquality seed.29 As of March 2002, at least 50 of the approximately 400 

national and international nongovernmental organizations working in 

Afghanistan were involved in agriculture-related assistance, including 

providing agricultural inputs, farmer training, microcredit, and the 

construction of wells. 

28During the 1990s, FAO’s emergency and longer-term development efforts were conducted 

under strategies and programs managed by UNDP. 

29USAID spent approximately $23 million on agriculture assistance in Afghanistan in 2002.
Page 32 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 9: FAO Irrigation Rehabilitation Project

For most of the 4-year period, the rise of the Taliban, the continuing 

conflict with the Northern Alliance, and the ongoing drought prevented the 

international community from shifting from short-term relief projects to 

longer-term agricultural rehabilitation projects and reversed earlier 

advancements in agricultural production. For example, by 1997, agriculture 

in some areas had returned to prewar levels, and Afghanistan as a whole 

had reached 70 percent self-sufficiency in the production of cereals. At the 

time, assistance agencies were planning to implement longer-term 

assistance activities but were unable to do so owing to drought and 

conflict. These same factors resulted in decreases in cereal production and 

livestock herds of 48 percent and 60 percent, respectively, from 1998 

through 2001. In 2002, a number of longer-term agricultural rehabilitation 

efforts were started, including efforts by USAID to reestablish agricultural 

input and product markets. However, these efforts have not been 

evaluated, and it is too early to determine their sustainability after donor 

assistance ends or their long-term impact.
Page 33 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Weak Assistance 

Coordination in 2002 

Hindered Afghan 

Government’s Involvement 

and Development of 

Operational Strategy

International assistance, including agricultural assistance, was not well 

coordinated in 2002, and, as a result, the Afghan government was not 

substantively integrated into the agricultural recovery effort and lacks an 

effective operational strategy. In December 2002, the Afghan government 

and the international community instituted a new mechanism, the 

Consultative Group, to improve coordination. However, the Consultative 

Group is similar in purpose and structure to a mechanism used earlier in 

2002, the Implementation Group, and does not surmount the obstacles that 

prevented the Implementation Group’s success. Because of the lack of 

coordination, the Afghan government and the international community 

have not developed a single operational strategy to direct the agricultural 

rehabilitation effort; instead, all of the major assistance organizations have 

independent strategies. Although documents prepared by the Afghan 

government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some of the 

components of an effective operational strategy, these components have 

not been combined in a coherent strategy. The lack of an operational 

strategy hinders efforts to integrate projects, focus resources, empower 

Afghan government ministries, and make the international community 

more accountable.

Assistance Coordination 

Was Weak in 2002

Despite efforts to synchronize multiple donors’ initiatives in a complex and 

changing environment, coordination of international assistance in general, 

and agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. According to 

the UN, assistance coordination refers to a recipient government’s 

integration of donor assistance into national development goals and 

strategies. From the beginning of the assistance effort in 2002, donors were 

urged to defer responsibility for assistance coordination to the Afghan 

government as stipulated in the Bonn Agreement.30 According to the UN, 

coordination rests with the Afghan government, efforts by the aid 

community should reinforce national authorities, and the international 

community should operate, and relate to the Afghan government, in a 

coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate relationships.31

30Annex III of the Bonn Agreement states that the participants in the UN Talks on 

Afghanistan hereby urge the UN, the international community, particularly donor countries 

and multilateral institutions, to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to 

assist with rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in coordination with 

the Afghan government.

31Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People, January 17, 2002.
Page 34 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The Security Council resolution that established the UN Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan goes further; it states that reconstruction assistance should 

be provided through the Afghan government and urges the international 

community to coordinate closely with the government.32

In April 2002, the Afghan government attempted to exert leadership over 

the highly fragmented reconstruction process. To accomplish this task, the 

government published its National Development Framework. The 

framework provides a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly 

establishes national goals and policy directions.33 The framework is not 

intended to serve as a detailed operational plan with specific objectives and 

tasks that must be pursued to accomplish national goals. Also, in 2002, the 

Afghan government established a government-led coordination 

mechanism, the Implementation Group (see app. VI for detailed 

descriptions and a comparison of the coordinating mechanisms). The 

intent of the Implementation Group was to bring coherence to the 

international community’s independent efforts and broad political 

objectives, such as ensuring Afghanistan does not become a harbor for 

terrorists. The mechanism’s structure was based on the National 

Development Framework. Individual coordination groups, led by Afghan 

ministers and composed of assistance organizations, were established for 

each of the 12 programs contained in the framework. 

The Implementation Group mechanism proved to be largely ineffective. 

Officials from the Afghan government, the UN, the Department of State, 

and USAID, as well as a number of nongovernmental bodies, expressed 

concern over the lack of meaningful and effective coordination of 

assistance in Afghanistan in 2002. For example, a high-ranking WFP official 

in Afghanistan said that coordination efforts since September 11, 2002, paid 

only “lip-service” to collaboration, integration, and consensus. In August 

2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Rural Reconstruction and 

Development, Irrigation, and Agriculture stated that the donor community’s 

effort to coordinate with the government was poor to nonexistent. A 

USAID official characterized the coordination of reconstruction in 2002 as 

32Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002), S/RES/1401, March 28, 2002.

33The framework is organized around three “pillars”: (1) humanitarian assistance and human 

social capital, (2) physical reconstruction and natural resources, and (3) private sector 

development. Under the three pillars there are 12 programs supported by a number of 

subprograms. Subprograms for agriculture and irrigation fall under “Pillar 2, Physical 

Reconstruction and Natural Resources, program for Natural Resources Management.” 
Page 35 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

an “ugly evolution” and “the most complex post-conflict management 

system” he had ever seen. 

The ineffectiveness of the Implementation Group mechanism resulted from 

its inability to overcome several impediments. First, each bilateral, 

multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance agency has its own mandate, 

established by implementing legislation or charter, and sources of funding, 

and each agency pursues development efforts in Afghanistan 

independently. Second, the international community asserts that the 

Afghan government lacks the capacity and resources to effectively assume 

the role of coordinator and, hence, these responsibilities cannot be 

delegated to the government. Third, no single entity within the 

international community has the authority and mandate to direct the 

efforts of the myriad bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental 

organizations providing agricultural assistance to Afghanistan.34 Finally, 

efforts to coordinate agricultural assistance were further complicated 

because the Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Rehabilitation and 

Rural Development share responsibility for agriculture development. 

Efforts to Improve Coordination 

Have Been Implemented

In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination 

system, the Consultative Group mechanism.35 The overall objective of the 

Consultative Group in Afghanistan is to increase the effectiveness and 

efficiency of assistance coordination in support of goals and objectives 

contained in the National Development Framework.36 According to the 

Afghan government, the program-level consultative groups established 

34Donor nations have taken the lead in other sectors. Specifically, the United States leads in 

training the national army, Germany in training the police, Italy in rebuilding the judicial 

system, and the United Kingdom in drug control. These donor nations, in consultation with 

the Afghan government and the international community, have developed strategies for 

reconstructing their respective sectors.

35Consultative group is a World Bank term used to describe a process of consultations 

between the government of a recipient developing nation and the international assistance 

community. Typically, the process involves monthly group meetings in country on sectoral 

or thematic issues. Such working groups bring together interested parties, including 

ministry representatives, donors, nongovernmental organizations, and UN agencies, to 

discuss strategic planning and improve coordination.

36There are 12 program area–based consultative groups that correspond to the 12 program 

areas contained in the Afghan government’s National Development Framework. Two 

additional consultative groups deal with national security issues (national army and national 

police). The groups report to a consultative group standing committee during an annual 

national consultative group meeting.
Page 36 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

under this mechanism provide a means by which the government can 

engage donors, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to 

promote specific national programs and objectives presented in the 

government’s National Development Framework and the projects 

articulated in the Afghan National Development Budget.37 According to 

advisors to the Afghan government, the Consultative Group mechanism 

provides a real opportunity for donors to provide focused support for 

policy development, project preparation, implementation, monitoring, and 

evaluation.

The Consultative Group mechanism in Afghanistan evolved out of the 

Implementation Group and is similar in its National Development 

Framework–based hierarchal structure, the role of the Afghan government, 

the membership and leadership of sector specific groups, and stated goals 

(see app. VI). One difference between the Implementation and Consultative 

Group mechanisms is that, since the establishment of the latter, the Afghan 

government has asked donor government and assistance organizations to 

categorize their assistance projects under the subprograms in the National 

Development Framework and to direct funding toward the projects in the 

Afghan National Development Budget. 

Despite the effort to develop a more effective coordination mechanism, the 

Consultative Group mechanism has not surmounted the conditions that 

prevented the Implementation Group from effectively coordinating 

assistance. For example, in 2003, donor governments and assistance 

agencies have continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund 

and implement projects outside the Afghan government’s national budget. 

In addition, agricultural assistance is divided up among several 

consultative groups including the groups for natural resources 

management and livelihoods. Further, unlike food assistance where donors 

primarily use one agency, WFP, for channeling resources, donors continue 

to use a variety of channels for their agriculture assistance. Although the 

Afghan government asserts that it is assuming a greater level of leadership 

over the coordination effort, as of May 2003, we could not determine 

whether the new coordination mechanism would be more successful than 

earlier efforts.

37The budget contains three types of prioritized projects: (1) projects designed primarily by 

the Afghan government and funded through the national budget, (2) projects primarily 

designed by donors and funded and implemented by donors, and (3) conceptual projects for 

which funding and implementation arrangements have not been determined.
Page 37 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Lack of Coordination Prevented 

Development of Operational 

Strategy

Because of the inadequate coordination of agricultural assistance, the 

Afghan government and the international community have not developed 

an operational agricultural sector strategy. Each assistance agency has 

published its own development strategy that addresses agriculture and 

numerous other sectors. The Consultative Group mechanism and the 

National Development Framework, as well as other documents prepared 

by the Afghan government and others to manage assistance efforts, contain 

some of the components of an effective operational strategy, such as 

measurable goals and impediments to their achievement. However, these 

components have not been incorporated in a single strategy. Without an 

integrated operational strategy, jointly developed by the Afghan 

government and the international community, the Afghan government lacks 

a mechanism to manage the agricultural rehabilitation effort, focus limited 

resources, assert its leadership, and hold the international donor 

community accountable.38

Assistance Agencies Have Developed Separate Strategies

No donor has taken the lead in the agricultural sector; consequently, 

multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental organizations, including the 

UN, FAO, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, USAID, and 

others, have prepared individual strategies that address, to varying degrees, 

agricultural reconstruction and food security.39 However, these strategies 

lack measurable national goals for the sector and have not been developed 

jointly with the Afghan government. For example, in August 2002, the 

Minister of Agriculture stated, “The ministry does not know the priorities of 

the international community for the agricultural sector, how much money 

will be spent, and where the projects will be implemented.” FAO claimed 

that the Ministry of Agriculture had endorsed FAO’s agricultural 

rehabilitation strategy. However, no letter of agreement or memorandum of 

understanding between the FAO and the ministry documents the 

acceptance of the strategy. The Minister of Agriculture told us, in 

December 2002, that the ministry had not endorsed FAO’s latest strategy. 

Further, the Ministry of Agriculture presented a list of more than 100 

prioritized rehabilitation projects to the international community. As of late 

38According to the UN, “assistance management” refers to the effective implementation of 

donor-funded development programs.

39Assistance proposed in these strategies includes technical assistance, inputs such as seeds 

and fertilizer, capacity building for government staff, irrigation repair, water resource 

management, livestock rehabilitation, and credit to small farmers, among other things.
Page 38 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

December 2002, the international community had not responded regarding 

the ministry’s proposed projects.

Components of an Operational Strategy Have Not Been Integrated 

into a Single Document

Although Consultative Group mechanism–related documents, the Afghan 

National Development Framework, and other documents prepared by the 

Afghan government and others to manage assistance efforts contain some 

of the components of an effective operational strategy, these components 

have not been incorporated in a single strategy. For an operational 

agricultural strategy to be effective, all relevant stakeholders must 

participate in its formulation. In this case, stakeholders include the Afghan 

Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation and key nongovernmental, 

multilateral, and bilateral development organizations. Further, such 

strategies must establish measurable goals, set specific time frames, 

determine resource levels, and delineate responsibilities. For example, in 

Afghanistan, one such goal might be to increase the percentage of irrigated 

land by 25 percent by 2004 through the implementation of $100 million in 

FAO-led irrigation projects in specific provinces. In addition, an operational 

strategy should identify external factors that could significantly affect the 

achievement of goals and include a schedule for future program 

evaluations.40 Stakeholders should implement the strategy through projects 

that support the measurable goals of the strategy and broader policy 

objectives, such as those contained in the Afghan Government’s National 

Development Framework (see fig. 10). 

40Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 P.L.103-62. U.S. General Accounting 

Office Congressional Review of Agency Strategic Plans, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 1995). Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-11, Part 6—

Preparation and Submission of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans, and Annual 

Program Performance Results (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
Page 39 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 10: Hierarchy of Strategies for Agricultural Sector Reconstruction

The Implementation Group and its successor, the Consultative Group, as 

well as the National Development Framework and other documents, 

contain some of the essential elements of an operational strategy. These 

elements include the involvement of key stakeholders, the development of 

some measurable objectives, and the identification of external factors that 

could affect the achievement of goals. However, since the National 

Development Framework is a general national strategy and not a detailed 

operational strategy, it is sufficiently broad that any assistance to the 

agricultural sector could be considered supportive of the framework, even 

if the assistance were not well targeted or made no significant impact. In 

addition, the various elements of an effective operational strategy that are 

contained in the National Development Framework and other documents 

have not been effectively applied, nor has a single agricultural sector 

strategy incorporating all of these elements been developed. 

The UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan’s management plan endorses 

the formulation of joint strategies for reconstruction. In late December 

2002, Afghanistan’s Minister of Agriculture told us that he would welcome 

the development of a joint Afghan–international agricultural sector strategy 

containing clear objectives, measurable goals, concrete funding levels, and 

clearly delineated responsibilities. In January 2003, FAO’s Assistant 

Director-General of Technical Cooperation stated that FAO would welcome 
Page 40 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

the opportunity to assist the Ministry of Agriculture in preparing a strategy. 

The Consultative Group mechanism could serve as a vehicle to support the 

development of such a strategy. In March 2003, Afghan government 

advisors told us that consultative groups could develop strategies based on 

the subprograms contained in the National Development Framework and 

National Development Budget. Proposals for the development of strategies 

pertaining to natural resources management, including agriculture, have 

been drafted, and support for these proposals is being sought from the 

international community.

Lack of Operational Agricultural Sector Strategy Limits Integration 

and Oversight 

The lack of an operational agricultural sector strategy hinders efforts to 

integrate disparate projects, focus limited assistance resources, place 

Afghan government ministries in a leadership role, and make the 

international community more accountable to the Afghan government. In 

its October 2002 National Development Budget, the Afghan government 

cited the lack of a strategic framework for the natural resources 

management sector, including agriculture, as an impediment to 

rehabilitation. Absent an operational strategy, the Afghan government lacks 

a mechanism to 

• integrate disparate projects into an effective agricultural rehabilitation 

program,

• manage finite resources so as to ensure the greatest return on 

agricultural investment, and 

• guide the efforts of the international community and assert the Afghan 

government’s leadership in agricultural reconstruction.

Finally, an operational agricultural sector strategy that includes measurable 

goals and the means to assess progress against those goals could increase 

accountability.41 Because no comprehensive integrated strategy exists, the 

Afghan government lacks the means to hold the international assistance 

community accountable for implementing the agricultural sector 

reconstruction effort and achieving measurable results.

41Government Performance and Results Act.
Page 41 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Limited Funding and 

Security Problems Present 

Obstacles to Food Security 

and Political Stability

Major obstacles to the goal of a food-secure and politically stable Afghan 

state include inadequate assistance funding, as well as a volatile security 

situation, long-standing power struggles among warlords, and the rapid 

increase in opium production. Donor support has not met Afghanistan’s 

recovery and reconstruction needs, and future funding levels for 

agricultural assistance may be inadequate to achieve the goal of food 

security and political stability, primarily because assistance levels are 

based on what the international community is willing to provide rather than 

on Afghanistan’s needs. Meanwhile, the continued deterioration of the 

security situation, exacerbated by a rising incidence of terrorism, the 

resurgence of warlords, and near-record levels of opium production, are 

impeding reconstruction and threaten to destabilize the nascent Afghan 

government.

International Assistance May Be 

Insufficient to Meet Needs

Total assistance levels, including those for agricultural reconstruction, 

proposed at the Tokyo donors’ conference in January 2002 do not provide 

Afghanistan with enough assistance to meet its estimated needs.42 The 

preliminary needs assessment prepared for the January 2002 donor’s 

conference in Tokyo estimated that, in addition to humanitarian assistance 

such as food and shelter assistance, between $11.4 and $18.1 billion over 10 

years would be needed to reconstruct Afghanistan (see table 2). Others 

have estimated that much more is required. For example, the Afghan 

government estimated that it would need $15 billion for reconstruction 

from 2003 through 2007. 

42UNDP, Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, Preliminary Needs Assessment for 

Recovery and Reconstruction (Tokyo: 2002). The assessment was prepared by UNDP, the 

Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank to help determine the requirement of 

external assistance to support Afghanistan’s economic and social recovery and 

reconstruction over the short and medium terms. During the January 2002 conference, the 

Afghan government identified agricultural and rural development, including food security, 

water management, and revitalizing irrigation, as one of six areas essential for 

reconstruction.
Page 42 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Table 2: Projected Cumulative Funding Requirements for the Reconstruction of 

Afghanistan

Sources: Asian Development Bank, UNDP, and the World Bank.

Note: Afghanistan Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and Reconstruction (Tokyo: January 

2002).

In January 2002, donors pledged $5.2 billion for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan for 2002–2006, or slightly more than half of the base-case 

estimate for 5 years.43 For the period January 2002–March 2003, the donors 

pledged $2.1 billion (see app. VII for donor pledges and donations).44 As of 

March 2003, approximately 88 percent of the 2002 grant funding had been 

disbursed. However, only 27 percent, or $499 million, was spent on major 

reconstruction projects such as roads and bridges, which are essential for 

the export of Afghan agricultural commodities and the import of foreign 

agricultural supplies. Despite the importance that the United States and the 

international community attach to the Afghan reconstruction effort, 

Afghanistan is receiving less assistance than was provided for other recent 

postconflict, complex emergencies. For example, per capita assistance 

levels have ranged from $193 in Rwanda to $326 in Bosnia, compared with 

$57 for Afghanistan. Given that the livelihood of 22 million Afghans 

depends on agriculture, we estimated that if all of the assistance had been 

provided only to people engaged in agriculture, each person would have 

received $67 annually or about 18 cents per day for their daily subsistence 

and agriculture production efforts in 2002. If Afghanistan were to receive 

per capita aid consistent with the average amounts provided for other 

recent postconflict reconstruction efforts, in 2002 it would have received 

(Billions of dollars)

Level 1 year 2.5 years 5 years 10 years

Low case $1.4 $4.2 $8.3 $11.4

Base case 1.7 4.9 10.2 14.6

High case $2.1 $5.5 $12.2 $18.1

43This figure was revised from $4.5 billion because of increases in pledges. This total 

included $3.8 billion in grants and $1.4 billion in loans. The initial pledge of $1.8 billion for 

2002 was revised to $2.1 billion.

44Overall U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 totaled $717 million, or 6.2 percent of 

worldwide U.S. bilateral assistance obligations in that year. Most of this amount was not for 

reconstruction but for humanitarian assistance, including food aid.
Page 43 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

$6 billion in international assistance, and from 2002 to 2006 it would 

receive $30 billion, or nearly three times the base-case estimate. 

Funding May Be Inadequate to 

Rehabilitate Agricultural Sector

The funding proposed by donors for food security–related issues is limited 

and may be insufficient to achieve the long-term goals of the Afghan 

government and the international community. Despite the Afghan 

government’s estimated annual need of $500 million for agricultural 

rehabilitation, agricultural assistance for Afghanistan in 2003 may total 

approximately $230 million.45 Afghanistan’s President has emphasized that 

the goal of food security and political stability is the Afghan government’s 

overarching priority, and the United States and other donor governments 

recognize the strong link between stability and food security. According to 

the U.S. Department of State, reconstruction is an integral part of the 

campaign against terrorism: the U.S. policy goal in Afghanistan is to create 

a stable Afghan society that is not a threat to itself or others and is not a 

base for terrorism. Because the agricultural sector forms the core of the 

Afghan economy, the pace of the sector’s recovery will largely determine 

the rate of overall economic recovery. Sustained investment in the 

agricultural sector, particularly the rehabilitation, upgrading, and 

maintenance of the nation’s irrigation infrastructure, is essential for the 

recovery of the Afghan economy and the country’s long-term food 

security.46 Despite improvements in agricultural production in 2002, owing 

primarily to increased precipitation, the fundamental weakness of 

Afghanistan’s agricultural infrastructure continues to threaten overall 

recovery efforts. 

45The international community has not published a figure for total agricultural assistance to 

Afghanistan. This estimate is derived from available Asian Development Bank, European 

Union, European Commission, UN, U.S., and World Bank data. 

46FAO estimates that it will take at least 10 years to rebuild the agricultural sector.
Page 44 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The Ministry of Agriculture estimates that it needs $5 billion over 10 years 

to complete 117 key projects and other efforts important for the recovery 

of the sector. Despite these costs, the 2003 Afghan development budget for 

natural resource management, including agriculture, is only $155 million. 

Since the budget is funded almost entirely by the donor community, the 

budget reflects what the government expects to receive from the 

international community, not the Afghan government’s actual need. Afghan 

government budget estimates indicate that the natural resources 

management budget will increase to $298 million in 2004 and $432 million 

in 2005. International donors have budgeted approximately $230 million for 

agriculture-related assistance in 2003. USAID considers adequate funding a 

prerequisite for the success of the assistance effort and plans to spend 

approximately $50 million on agriculture in 2003 and similar amounts in 

2004 and 2005. USAID funding covers 32 percent of the Afghan 

government’s 2003 natural resources management program budget of $155 

million but only 10 percent of the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture’s 

estimated annual needs of $500 million.47

Increased Terrorism, Warlords, 

and Opium Production Are Major 

Obstacles to Food Security and 

Political Stability

The goal of a stable Afghan state is threatened by the rise in domestic 

terrorism, long-standing rivalries among warlords, and the rapid increase in 

opium production. In March 2002, in a report to the UN Security Council, 

the UN Secretary General stated that security will remain the essential 

requirement for the protection of the peace process in Afghanistan. One 

year later, in a report to the council, he stated that “security remains the 

most serious challenge facing the peace process in Afghanistan.” Others in 

the international community, including USAID, consider security as a 

prerequisite for the implementation of reconstruction efforts. In 2002 and 

early 2003, the deteriorating security situation was marked by terrorist 

attacks against the Afghan government, the Afghan people, and the 

international community.48 These incidents have forced the international 

community to periodically suspend agricultural assistance activities, 

disrupting the agricultural recovery effort. 

47The level of USAID’s agricultural assistance will remain the same in 2004 and 2005, 

accounting for about 16 percent of the Afghan government’s natural resources and 

management budget in 2004 and 11 percent in 2005.

48Incidents included the attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the 

President; the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross staff member; rocket 

attacks on U.S. and international military installations; and bombings in the center of Kabul, 

at the International Security Assistance Force headquarters, and at UN compounds. There 

are approximately 4,900 International Security Assistance Force troops located in Kabul. 

These troops provide security only for the city of Kabul and the immediate vicinity.
Page 45 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Meanwhile, clashes between the warlords’ private armies continue to 

destabilize the country and reduce the Afghan government’s ability to fund 

agricultural reconstruction. The warlords foster an illegitimate economy 

fueled by smuggling of arms, drugs, and other goods. They also illegally 

withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs duties collected at 

border points in the regions they control, depriving the central government 

of revenues needed to fund the country’s agricultural reconstruction. The 

warlords control private armies of tens of thousands of armed men. Across 

Afghanistan, approximately 700,000 Afghan men are armed, and half of 

these are combat trained. USAID considers the demobilization and 

integration of these armed men a prerequisite for the success of the 

international recovery effort.49 Currently, the unemployment rate in 

Afghanistan is estimated at 50 percent. Without a revitalization of the 

agricultural sector—the engine of the Afghan economy and the main 

source of employment—it is likely that these men will remain in the employ 

of the warlords. 

Another destabilizing force that affects agriculture is the illicit international 

trade in Afghan opiates. The drug trade was the primary income source of 

the Taliban and continues to provide income for terrorists and warlords.50

On January 17, 2002, the President of Afghanistan issued a decree stating 

that the existence of an opium-based economy was a matter of national 

security and should be fought by all means. During the 1990s, Afghanistan 

became the world’s leading opium producer accounting for approximately 

70 percent of opium production worldwide. Despite being a central focus 

of a number of international donors engaged in Afghanistan, opium poppy 

eradication efforts implemented by the Afghan government and the 

international community in 2002 failed. In July 2002, one of Afghanistan’s 

vice presidents and leader of the Afghan government’s poppy eradication 

campaign, Haji Qadir, was assassinated. In October 2002, the UN Office for 

Drug Control and Crime Prevention estimated that, in 2002, Afghan farmers 

produced 3,400 metric tons of opium.51 This level of production equals or 

exceeds levels achieved in 9 of the last 10 years. Total 2002 revenue from 

opium production totaled $1.2 billion, an amount equivalent to 70 percent 

49USAID plans to spend $30 million in 2003 on demobilization efforts.

50In 2001, the United States estimated that the Taliban collected at least $40 million in taxes 

on opium.

51UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Geneva, October 2002.
Page 46 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

of total assistance to Afghanistan pledged for 2002, or nearly 220 percent 

more than the Afghan government’s 2003 operating budget.52

The UN Drug Control Program also estimated that the average poppy 

farmer earned $4,000 dollars from growing poppies in 2002. Owing to 

continuing drought, a poor agricultural marketing structure, and 

widespread poverty, farmers have turned to poppy cultivation to avoid 

destitution.53 Since the fall of the Taliban, irrigated acreage dedicated to 

wheat production has fallen by 10 percent, supplanted by opium poppies. 

In addition, it is estimated that 30 to 50 percent of Afghans are involved in 

opium cultivation. Many of the farmers continue to grow opium poppies 

because they lack the seed and fertilizer needed to grow alternative crops 

that generate revenues comparable to those from opium.54 

Conclusions The establishment of a new government in Afghanistan has provided the 

Afghan people, the international community, and the United States an 

opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan and create a stable country that is 

neither a threat to itself or its neighbors nor a harbor for terrorists. In 2002, 

U.S. and international food assistance averted famine, assisted the return 

of refugees, and helped to implement reconstruction efforts. However, U.S. 

food assistance and cargo shipping legislation limited the United States’ 

flexibility in responding quickly to the emergency and providing support to 

WFP; the legislation does not provide for purchasing commodities 

regionally or donating cash to the UN for procuring commodities and 

requires that U.S. commodities be shipped on U.S. flag vessels. 

Consequently, the costs of food assistance were higher and delivery times 

were greater, fewer commodities were purchased, and a smaller number of 

people received food assistance. In addition, a lack of timely and adequate 

overall donor support disrupted WFP’s food assistance efforts. Meanwhile, 

in 2003, six million people will require food assistance in Afghanistan. 

52The value of Afghanistan’s 2002 opium crops was equivalent to 17 percent of its gross 

domestic product.

53Although some poppy farmers are wealthy, many are poor farmers with just enough land 

and water for poppies but not enough resources to plant traditional or alternative crops. For 

many of these poor farmers, the decision to cultivate poppies causes moral anguish, as they 

regard its cultivation to be highly un-Islamic.

54Prices paid to farmers range from $350 to $400 per kilogram. One kilogram equals 2.2 

pounds.
Page 47 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Because the economy remains overwhelmingly agricultural, the pace of 

recovery in the agricultural sector will largely determine the rate of 

Afghanistan’s overall recovery. Food assistance alone cannot provide food 

security; Afghanistan’s agricultural sector must be rehabilitated. 

Environmental and political problems have limited the impact of the 

international community’s agricultural assistance efforts. In addition, in 

2002, the assistance efforts were not coordinated with each other or with 

the Afghan government. A new coordination mechanism established in 

December 2002 is largely similar to earlier mechanisms, and it is too recent 

for us to determine its effectiveness. Further, whereas U.S. and UN 

agencies, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental organizations have 

drafted numerous overlapping recovery strategies, no single Afghan 

government–supported strategy is directed toward the effort to rehabilitate 

the sector. Meanwhile, funding for the agricultural assistance effort is 

insufficient and the nascent Afghan government is plagued with problems 

stemming from domestic terrorism, the resurgence of warlords, and nearrecord levels of opium production. These obstacles threaten the recovery 

of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of achieving food security and 

political stability in Afghanistan. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

To increase the United States’ ability to respond quickly to complex 

emergencies involving U.S. national security interests, such as that in 

Afghanistan, Congress may wish to consider amending the Agricultural 

Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480), as amended, 

to provide the flexibility, in such emergencies, to purchase commodities 

outside the United States when necessary and provide cash to assistance 

agencies for the procurement of non-U.S.-produced commodities. In 

addition, Congress may wish to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as 

amended, to allow waiver of cargo preference requirements in emergencies 

involving national security. These amendments would enable the United 

States to reduce assistance costs and speed the delivery of assistance, thus 

better supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To increase the effectiveness of the agricultural assistance effort in 

Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the 

Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development work 

through the Consultative Group mechanism to develop a comprehensive 

international–Afghan operational strategy for the rehabilitation of the 

agricultural sector. The strategy should (1) contain measurable goals and 
Page 48 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

specific time frames and resource levels, (2) delineate responsibilities, (3) 

identify external factors that could significantly affect the achievement of 

goals, and (4) include a schedule for program evaluations that assess 

progress against the strategy’s goals. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to WFP, Department of State, USDA, 

USAID, and Department of Defense and received written comments from 

each agency (see app. VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII respectively). We also received 

technical comments from USDA, the Departments of Defense and State, 

USAID, FAO, and the World Bank, and incorporated information as 

appropriate.

Department of State, USDA, and USAID all commented on our matter for 

congressional consideration related to amending food assistance 

legislation. WFP supported our suggestion that Congress consider 

amending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 

to allow the provision of non-U.S. commodities when such action supports 

U.S. national security. However, State, USDA, and USAID did not support 

the recommendation. Specifically, although State accepted our evidence 

that purchasing commodities from the United States is not the most costeffective method of providing assistance, it believes that further study of 

potential variables, such as regional customs fees, taxes, and trucking 

costs, that may negate cost-benefit savings is needed before the act is 

amended. USAID stated that an amendment is not necessary because other 

authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act allow the provision of cash, 

and the proposed $200 million Famine Fund announced by the President in 

February 2003 would also increase the flexibility of U.S. assistance 

programs. USDA stated that the flexibility to quickly respond to 

humanitarian crises can be achieved through means, such as amending 

cargo shipping legislation, that would not adversely affect the provision of 

U.S. commodities. Specifically, USDA suggested adding a national security 

waiver to the U.S. regulations that govern how U.S. assistance is 

transported to eliminate the requirement to use U.S. flag vessels in certain 

circumstances. 

We do not disagree that under broad disaster assistance legislation U.S. 

agencies may provide cash or purchase food aid commodities outside the 

United States. However, we maintain that amending the Agricultural Trade 

Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the provision of cash or 

food commodities outside the United States will greatly improve U.S. 

flexibility in responding to crises that affect U.S. national security and 
Page 49 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

foreign policy interests. The act is the principal authority for providing food 

assistance in emergency situations. In both 2002 and 2003 over $2 billion in 

food assistance, the preponderant amount of this type of assistance, was 

dispersed under this authority. Amending the act will provide the United 

States with more flexibility to respond rapidly and at lower cost to events 

that affect U.S. national security; this is particularly important given the 

number and magnitude of crises requiring food assistance and decreasing 

surpluses of U.S. commodities. We also agree with USDA that the cargo 

preference requirement adds additional cost to food assistance and should 

be waived in specific situations, and we have adjusted the matter for 

congressional consideration contained in the report on this issue. 

In its comments, USDA stated that the report did not provide enough 

evidence about the existence of surpluses in 2002 in the Central Asia 

region. It also stated that if the U.S. had procured greater levels of 

commodities with the savings accrued by purchasing regional versus U.S. -

origin commodities, the additional commodities would have over burdened 

WFP’s logistics system while generating only “marginal savings in time and 

money.” 

We have added additional information on the 7.6 million metric ton 2002 

grain surplus in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. We disagree with USDA’s 

assertions that additional regionally procured commodities would have 

taxed WFP’s logistics system and brought only marginal gains. In 

December 2002, while fighting between coalition forces, the Northern 

Alliance, and the Taliban was still occurring, and winter weather was 

complicating food deliveries, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to 

Afghan beneficiaries, in the single largest movement of food by WFP in a 1-

month period. According to WFP, its Afghanistan logistics system was 

capable of routinely moving more than 50,000 metric tons of food per 

month. Further, we disagree with USDA’s statement that the potential 

savings in cost and time by purchasing commodities regionally are 

marginal. Savings from the elimination of ocean freight costs could have 

fed 685,000 people for 1 year, and commodities purchased regionally are 

delivered to beneficiaries within weeks of being purchased, compared with 

the 4 months that it can take for commodities purchased in the United 

States.

WFP, the Department of State, USDA, and USAID all agreed with the 

report’s conclusion and recommendation pertaining to assistance 

coordination and the need to develop a joint international-Afghan 

agricultural rehabilitation strategy. WFP pointed out that although the 
Page 50 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

international assistance effort may have been aided by better coordination 

in 2002, the overall level of assistance might have been too small in 2002 to 

have any long-term impact on the agricultural sector. Although USAID 

agreed with our recommendation, it stated it did not want to lead the 

strategy development effort. We believe that USAID should take an active 

and aggressive role in the development of a joint international–Afghan 

government strategy, because the United States is the largest donor to 

Afghanistan, agriculture rehabilitation is the focus of USAID’s assistance 

effort in Afghanistan, and the achievement of U.S. goals in Afghanistan is 

tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the country’s agricultural sector. 

According to USAID’s assistance strategy for Afghanistan, restoring food 

security is USAID’s highest priority. 

Finally, the Department of Defense focused its comments on the report’s 

discussion of the humanitarian daily ration program. Specifically, the 

Department of Defense stated that (1) the report incorrectly characterized 

the ration program as a food assistance program, (2) informal evaluations 

of the program indicated that the program alleviated hunger and generated 

goodwill from the Afghan people toward U.S. soldiers, and (3) although the 

funds used to purchase rations could have been used to purchase bulk 

food, the bulk food could not have been delivered to remote areas. The 

report discusses both the food assistance and nonfood assistance aspects 

of the rations program, and we have added information on page 30 about 

the goodwill generated by the rations to the report. Finally, as discussed on 

page 20 of the report, bulk food could have been delivered to remote areas 

during the period of time (October-December 2001) when the ration 

program was implemented. During the month of December 2001, WFP 

delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan, a level of food 

assistance that exceeds any 1-month total for any emergency operation in 

WFP’s history.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Richard J. Durbin, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government 

Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, and to the Honorable Frank R. Wolf, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives. We also will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 51 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4347. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix XIII.

Loren Yager, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 52 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenendxIdeisi

To examine the management, cost, and sufficiency of U.S. and international 

food assistance since 1999, we reviewed documents obtained from the 

World Food Program (WFP) and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). Specifically, we reviewed program documentation 

for recent emergency and special operations; WFP Afghanistan Country 

Office quarterly and annual reports; WFP’s Emergency Field Operations 

Manual and Food Aid in Emergencies Redbook; country office monitoring 

guidelines; Afghanistan area office strategies; memorandums of 

understanding and letters of agreement signed by WFP and United Nations 

(UN) agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the Afghan 

government; and monitoring reports prepared by USAID staff. 

In addition, we analyzed project monitoring and loss data to determine the 

frequency of monitoring visits, the experience and education level of 

monitors, and the level of commodities lost versus those delivered. We did 

not verify the statistical data provided by WFP. We also reviewed donor 

resource contribution data for recent emergency and special operations. 

We contacted by e-mail, or spoke with, 14 Afghan and international 

nongovernmental organizations1

 to obtain their views on the delivery of 

assistance, WFP monitoring and reporting, and overall assistance 

coordination issues. We interviewed WFP management and staff at WFP 

headquarters in Rome, Italy; at the Regional Bureau for the Mediterranean, 

Middle East, and Central Asia, in Cairo, Egypt; at the Country Office in 

Kabul, Afghanistan; and at the Area Office in Hirat, Afghanistan. We also 

interviewed USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S. 

Department of State staff in Washington, D.C., and Kabul; U.S. Department 

of Defense Staff in Washington; the International Security Afghanistan 

Force, UN Development Program (UNDP), and UN Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan (UNAMA) staff in Kabul; and UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees staff in Kabul and Hirat. Finally, we visited WFP project sites and 

warehouses in Kabul and Hirat. The number of sites visited was limited 

because of constraints placed on our movement within Afghanistan by the 

U.S. Embassy because of security considerations.

We also examined cost data provided by USDA and USAID. The data 

included commodity costs; total ocean freight charges; inland freight; 

1

We contacted the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), Action 

Contre la Faim, Afghanaid, Canadian Relief Foundation, CARE International, Focus, Goal, 

International Rescue Committee, Islamic Relief, Madera, Norwegian Assistance Committee, 

Save the Children, Solidarte, and World Vision.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 53 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

internal transport, storage, and handling charges; and administrative 

support costs. We used the data to calculate two additional expenses, per 

USDA statements about the composition of costs and additional costs that 

are not stated on the data sheets. First, the "freight forwarder" fees 

represent 2.5 percent of the total cost of ocean freight. Thus, ocean freight 

charges were divided between freight forwarder fees (total freight minus 

total freight divided by 1.025) and actual freight costs (total freight minus 

freight forwarder fees). This was true for both USDA and USAID 

assistance. In the final analysis, the freight forwarder fee was included in 

the ocean freight cost because it is an expense that would not have been 

incurred if ocean shipping had not been used. Second, with each donation 

to WFP, USDA provides an administrative support grant at the rate of 7.5 

percent of the total value of the donated commodities. We calculated these 

data accordingly.

We checked all USAID and USDA data for validity, where possible to the 

level of individual shipment. We cross-checked USAID data with USDA 

data. (USAID typically provided only estimated costs for commodities for 

the period 1999–2002. Because USDA conducts almost all commodity 

purchases for USAID, USAID estimates the commodity costs at the time it 

places its order with USDA, based on the current market cost. However, 

because USDA provided actual costs for USAID purchases in 1999, 2000, 

and 2001, the USAID commodity costs we cited for 2002 are based on 

USAID's estimate.) We then compared the cost of the U.S.-purchased 

commodities with the cost of commodities purchased in the Central Asia 

region to determine whether any savings could have been realized by 

purchasing commodities regionally versus buying U.S. commodities. 

Finally, using the level of rations that WFP provides to returning refugees, 

12.5 kilograms per month, we calculated the amount of food assistance that 

the United States could have purchased and the number of people that 

could have received food assistance if it had purchased commodities in the 

Central Asia region.

Further, we examined the costs associated with the Department of 

Defense’s Afghan humanitarian daily ration program, implemented from 

October 2001 through December 2001. Using the level of rations that WFP 

provides to returning refugees, 12.5 kilograms per month, we calculated the 

amount of food assistance that the United States could have purchased and 

the number of people that could have received food assistance if it had 

purchased commodities in the Central Asia region.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 54 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

In addition, we reviewed relevant food assistance legislation including the 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-480) to 

determine whether provisions in the law allowed the U.S. government to 

purchase commodities outside the United States or provide cash transfers 

to assistance agencies for the provision of commodities from sources other 

than U.S. suppliers.

To assess U.S. and international agricultural assistance, coordination, 

strategies, and funding intended to help Afghanistan maintain stability and 

achieve long-term food security, we reviewed documentation provided by 

FAO, UNDP, and UNAMA; the World Bank; the Asian Development Bank; 

USAID; and the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, 

and Irrigation and Water Resources. We reviewed information pertaining to 

past and current coordination mechanisms in the Afghan government’s 

National Development Framework and National Development Budget. We 

examined the structure and content of the assistance strategies published 

by FAO, UNDP, UNAMA, the European Commission, the World Bank, Asian 

Development Bank, and USAID, and we examined the proposed funding 

levels contained in each strategy. Using the criteria contained in the U.S. 

Government Performance and Results Act, we examined the strategies to 

determine whether each contained the basic elements of an operational 

strategy articulated in the act. Further, we examined the overall assistance 

funding requirements contained in the January 2002 UNDP, World Bank, 

and Asian Development Bank Comprehensive Needs Assessment, which 

served as a guideline for international donor contributions for Afghanistan. 

We interpolated the funding projection data to construct annual aid flows, 

so that the cumulative totals were equal to those contained in the 

assessment. Assuming that the first year of data referred to 2002, we 

applied the U.S. gross domestic product deflator to convert the assumed 

current dollar figures into constant 2003 dollars. 

Further, we examined security reports produced by the Department of 

Defense and the UN, as well as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime report on 

opium production in Afghanistan, to determine the impact of warlords and 

opium production on food security and political stability. In addition, we 

discussed U.S. and international agricultural assistance efforts and food 

security issues with officials from USAID in Washington and Kabul; FAO in 

Rome and Kabul; UNDP and the Afghan Ministries of Communication, 

Foreign Affairs, Interior, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and 

Irrigation and Water Resources in Kabul; and the Afghan Ministry of 

Agriculture in Kabul and Washington.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 55 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

We conducted our review from April 2002 through May 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 56 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix II

World Food Program Projects in Afghanistan, 

2002 ApenIdxi

Source: WFP. 

Type of project Description

Free food distribution Free food is delivered to the most vulnerable populations. 

Supplementary feeding Malnourished children, pregnant and nursing mothers, and people undergoing 

treatment for tuberculosis and leprosy are provided with a blended mix of either milled 

corn and soy or wheat and soy, in addition to sugar and oil, through feeding centers, 

hospitals, clinics, and orphanages. 

Food for work Returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and people involved in the poppy 

industry, among others, reconstruct and rehabilitate irrigation canals, roads, and other 

infrastructure. The program provides wages in the form of food and tools.

Food for asset creation Men and women of the community decide which families should receive food. Ablebodied households contribute their labor to construct or rehabilitate an asset, such as 

an irrigation canal, that benefits the entire community. Those who cannot contribute 

labor also receive food, and they benefit from the community asset.

Food for education and support to teachers Food is distributed to students in school to encourage families to send their children to 

school. To encourage families to support the education of females, additional food is 

provided to female students. Food is also provided to teachers to supplement their low 

salaries.

Food for training Food is provided to women who participate in informal education activities including 

technical skills and literacy training.

Food for seed Food is exchanged for improved seed grown by contract farmers. The seed is then sold 

to other farmers.

Urban and women’s bakeries Daily rations of bread are provided to more than 250,000 people. Women operate 41 of 

the 100 bakeries.

Civil servant support Approximately 270,000 civil servants were provided with pulses and oil to supplement 

their salaries and help the Afghan government reestablish itself.

Refugee and 

internally displaced person support

Food assistance is provided as part of a resettlement package to help people 

reestablish themselves in their home areas or chosen community.
Page 57 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix III

Description of WFP Food Assistance 

Monitoring Mechanisms ApenIdxi

The World Food Program uses a number of mechanisms to minimize losses 

and ensure that its commodities are well managed. The mechanisms 

include real-time automated tracking, periodic monitoring visits to project 

sites, required periodic reports from implementing partners, and end-ofproject evaluations. The program’s global automated tracking system, the 

Commodity Movement and Progress Analysis System, is intended to record 

and report all commodity movement, loss, and damage. Each WFP 

suboffice in Afghanistan has access to the system and employs a clerk 

dedicated to managing it. The system produces a number of reports, 

including stock, damage, and loss reports. 

WFP guidelines state that monitoring and reporting are essential parts of 

effective project management in the field, and it is WFP’s policy not to 

support any project that cannot be monitored. Monitoring activities are 

intended to assess the status of projects by comparing the actual 

implementation of activities to the project’s work plan. The responsibility 

for monitoring projects rests with the program’s country office in Kabul 

and five Afghan suboffices located in other cities. Each office employs 

between 6 and 24 local Afghan project monitors,1

 and WFP has 22 program 

staff in Afghanistan who also monitor projects, in addition to their other 

duties. WFP’s Afghan country office has developed monitoring guidelines 

for its monitors and monitoring checklists for each type of activity (e.g., 

food-for-work, food-for-seed, food-for-asset-creation, food-for-education). 

According to WFP, monitoring visits include an examination of project 

inputs, current operations, outputs, and immediate effects. Specific 

monitoring activities include an examination of food stocks held by 

implementing partners. The monitors spot-check the weight of randomly 

selected bags in storage and compare the total stock held with WFP stock 

balance reports. The monitors also survey local markets to determine 

whether any WFP food is being resold rather than used by beneficiaries. 

Projects are monitored on a periodic basis. WFP tries to visit each project 

when it starts, during its implementation, and when it is completed. The 

WFP data that we examined indicated that, on average, 2.4 monitoring 

visits were conducted on all projects implemented between April 2002 and 

November 2002 in Afghanistan. 

1

WFP employs a total of 78 local monitors with an average of 3 years of WFP experience. 

Approximately 90 percent of these monitors have a college degree. In addition to the 

monitors, implementing partners make monitoring visits in areas where WFP staff cannot 

travel owing to security concerns.
Appendix III

Description of WFP Food Assistance 

Monitoring Mechanisms

Page 58 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

In addition to requiring the project monitoring visits, WFP requires its 

implementing partners to report on the status of projects on a monthly 

basis. WFP project proposals and the letters of agreement signed by WFP 

and its implementing partners stipulate that monthly and end-of-project 

reports must be submitted to WFP. The end-of-project reports include an 

assessment of the achievement of project objectives and a breakdown of 

budget expenditures.
Page 59 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix IV

Donor Contributions to World Food Program 

Emergency Operation 10155 as of May 12, 

2003 ApenVIdxi

Legend 

EC = European Community

WFP = World Food Program 

TBD = to be determined

Source: WFP.

Donor U.S. dollars

Percentage

of total Tons

Percentage

of total

Total (appeal) 287,943,598 100.00% 550,171 100.00%

Australia 4,087,975 1.42% 9,567 1.74%

Belgium 985,222 0.34% 2,847 0.52%

Canada 1,610,097 0.56% 4,662 0.85%

Denmark 3,199,194 1.11% 6,648 1.21%

EC—EuropeAid 21,897,321 7.60% 63,834 11.60%

Faroe Islands 329,412 0.11% 897 0.16%

Finland 437,445 0.15% 1,303 0.24%

Germany 1,985,560 0.69% 6,497 1.18%

India 7,444,108 2.59% 9,526 1.73%

Ireland 469,484 0.16% 1,512 0.27%

Italy 8,127,321 2.82% 16,091 2.92%

Japan—private 442,881 0.15% 1,320 0.24%

Japan 17,818,002 6.19% 45,436 8.26%

Korea, Republic of 40,000 0.01% 109 0.02%

Luxembourg 490,678 0.17% 1,466 0.27%

Netherlands 4,374,453 1.52% 13,288 2.42%

Norway 1,262,626 0.44% 3,809 0.69%

Private 37,582 0.01% 61 0.01%

Switzerland 4,039,157 1.40% 8,918 1.62%

United Kingdom 5,633,701 1.96% 12,547 2.28%

United Nations 185,000 0.06% TBD

United States 156,385,885 54.31% 309,770 56.30%

U.S. friends of WFP 172,020 0.06% 195 0.04%

Multilateral funds 832,005 0.29% 1,035 0.19%

Total (received) 242,287,129 84.14% 521,338 94.76%

Shortfall 45,656,469 15.86% 28,833 5.24%
Page 60 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix V

Cost Data for U.S. Food Assistance to 

Afghanistan Provided to the UN World Food 

Program, Fiscal Years 1999–2002 ApenVdxi

Legend 

ITSH = Internal Transport, Storage, and Handling

Sources: GAO analysis of U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Agency for International Development data.

Commodity

cost Ocean freight Inland freight ITSH freight

Administrative

and

miscellaneous Total cost

1999 $15,069,555 $10,521,204 $815,200 $756,800 $1,016,705 $28,179,464

53.48% 37.34% 2.89% 2.69% 3.61%

2000 $18,282,825 $12,234,100 $2,905,600 $3,874,400 $1,131,903 $38,428,828

47.58% 31.84% 7.56% 10.08% 2.95%

2001 $46,866,434 $20,639,750 $3,313,900 $8,738,300 $3,294,616 $82,853,000

56.57% 24.91% 4.00% 10.55% 3.98%

2002 $75,770,144 $34,920,586 $25,987,600 $39,896,400 $1,494,056 $178,068,786

42.55% 19.61% 14.59% 22.40% 0.84%

Total $155,988,958 $78,315,640 $33,022,300 $53,265,900 $6,937,280 $327,530,078

Annual average 

percentage

50.04% 28.43% 7.26% 11.43% 2.85% 100%

Percentage of total 47.63% 23.91% 10.08% 16.26% 2.12% 100%
Page 61 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VI

International Donor Assistance Coordination 

Mechanisms in Afghanistan ApenVdxiI

Between 1998 and 2003, as circumstances in Afghanistan changed, the 

coordination processes utilized by the international community and the 

Afghan government evolved (see table 3 and figure 11). Beginning in 1998, 

the international community employed a strategy of Principled Common 

Programming among United Nations agency, nongovernmental, and 

bilateral donor programs. The international community’s aim was to 

establish priorities and projects based on agreed upon goals and principles 

that would form the UN’s annual consolidated appeal for assistance. To 

implement Principled Common Programming, a number of coordination 

mechanisms were established, including the Afghan Programming Body. 

The programming body consisted of the Afghan Support Group, 15 UN 

Representatives, and 15 nongovernmental organizations and was 

responsible for making policy recommendations on issues of common 

concern, supporting the UN’s annual consolidated appeal for donor 

assistance, and promoting coordination of assistance efforts.1

 The Taliban 

government had no role in the programming body. The programming body 

was supported by a secretariat; working level operations were conducted 

by a standing committee and thematic groups responsible for analyzing 

needs, developing strategies and policies, and setting assistance priorities 

within their thematic areas (e.g., the provision of basic social services). The 

Afghan Programming Body and its standing committee were incorporated 

into the Implementation Group/Program Group process established in 

2002. Table 3 describes the Afghan assistance coordination mechanisms in 

place in 2002.

1

In 1988 the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief was established to coordinate 

the efforts of national and international nongovernmental organizations conducting work in 

Afghanistan. The agency’s membership included 68 Afghan and international 

nongovernmental organizations. The Afghan Support Group formed in 1997 was a donor 

coordination group composed of 16 donor nations.
Appendix VI

International Donor Assistance 

Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan

Page 62 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Table 3: Major Assistance Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan in 2002

Sources: UN and Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

a

The G-8 is comprised of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 

United States.

b

The Afghan Support Group was founded in 1997 by the 16 largest donor nations providing assistance 

to Afghanistan and the European Union. In January 2003, the group was dissolved and the Afghan 

government assumed responsibility for assistance coordination. 

Organization/

suborganization Responsibility Members

Date of formation/

comment

Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Steering 

Group

Coordinate and mobilize international 

reconstruction funds.

More than 60 countries, the 

European Union, the members of 

the G-8,a the United Nations (UN), 

and the World Bank. Cochaired by 

the United States, the European 

Union, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. 

November 2001

Replaced by the Consultative 

Group (December 2002) and 

Afghanistan High-level 

Strategic Forum (March 2003).

Implementation Group Implement the strategy and policy of 

the Afghan Reconstruction Steering 

Group by facilitating coordination 

among the Afghan government, 

bilateral, multilateral, and 

nongovernmental organizations 

implementing projects in Afghanistan.

The Afghan government, World 

Bank, UN Development Program, 

Asian Development Bank, Islamic 

Development Bank, and the 

Afghan Support Groupb

January 2002

Transformed into Consultative 

Group (December 2002).

 Implementation Standing 

Committee

Local working level coordination Afghan Assistance Coordinating 

Authority, UN Assistance Mission 

in Afghanistan, donor 

governments, international 

financial institutions, 

nongovernmental organizations 

April 2002

Transformed into the 

Consultative Group Standing 

Committee (December 2002)

Program Groups/

Program Secretariats

Further develop the 12 programs 

outlined in the Afghan government’s 

National Development Framework. A 

lead ministry guides each program 

group. Technical support is provided by 

a program secretariat led by a UN, 

multilateral, or nongovernmental 

organization.

Afghan government and UN, 

bilateral, multilateral, and 

nongovernmental organizations 

April 2002

The Consultative Groups 

replaced the existing Program 

Groups, and the Program 

Secretariats were replaced by 

the Consultative Groups’ Focal 

Points in December 2002.

Afghan Assistance 

Coordination Authority 

(Afghan government 

agency)

Coordinate the flow of international 

assistance in Afghanistan.

Afghan government February 2002

UN Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan

Coordinate all UN programs in 

Afghanistan.

All UN agencies working in 

Afghanistan

March 2002

Regional/

Provincial 

Coordination Bodies

UN aid coordination organizations in 

major regions of Afghanistan/UN aid 

coordination organizations at the 

provincial level in Afghanistan

All UN agencies working in 

Afghanistan

Late 1990s/May 2002

In 2002, the Afghan 

government asked that the 

bodies realign along provincial 

lines.
Appendix VI

International Donor Assistance 

Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan

Page 63 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Figure 11: Organizations Responsible for Coordinating International Assistance in 

Afghanistan, 1998–2003

In December 2002, the Afghan government instituted the Consultative 

Group coordination process in Afghanistan. The process evolved out of the 

previous Implementation/Program group processes. (Table 4 compares the 

two processes.) The Consultative Group process retains the same basic 

hierarchical structure that was established under the Implementation 

Group process.2

 For example, the new process includes 12 groups, each 

2

Terms of reference prepared by the lead ministry and presented to the group members for 

further discussion and agreement will outline both specific and general responsibilities of 

group members as well as set clear benchmarks for preparing and implementing national 

programs. The terms of reference will also specify clear submission deadlines for the 

national budget and programs and address reporting, including monthly updates of 

indicators of progress in the program area and monitoring of benchmarks.
Appendix VI

International Donor Assistance 

Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan

Page 64 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

lead by an Afghan government minister, organized around the 12 programs 

contained in the Afghan government’s National Development Framework. 

In addition to the 12 groups, 2 consultative groups covering national 

security programs (i.e., the national army and police); and 3 national 

working groups on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; 

counternarcotics; and demining were established. Further, 5 advisory 

groups were also established to ensure that cross-cutting issues, such as 

human rights, are mainstreamed effectively in the work of the 12 

consultative groups and reflected in the policy framework and budget. 

Each consultative group will assist in policy management, as well as 

monitoring the implementation of activities envisaged under the Afghan 

government’s national budget. The groups will assist in preparing the 

budget, provide a forum for general policy dialogue, monitor the 

implementation of the budget, report on indicators of progress for each 

development program, and elaborate detailed national programs. The 

groups, with assistance from the standing committee, will also focus on 

monitoring performance against benchmarks established by each group. 

Each lead ministry will select a focal point, or secretariat, organization 

from among donors and UN agencies. Each year, in March, the Afghanistan 

Development Forum, or national consultative group meeting, will be held 

to discuss the budget for the next fiscal year, review national priorities, and 

assess progress. At that time, the consultative groups will report to the 

Consultative Group Standing Committee.
Appendix VI

International Donor Assistance 

Coordination Mechanisms in Afghanistan

Page 65 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Table 4: Comparison of Implementation Group and Consultative Group Processes

Sources: GAO analysis of UN and Afghan government data.

Implementation Group Consultative Group

Structure

Based on Afghan National 

Development Framework

Yes Yes

Hierarchy • Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group

• Implementation Group

• Implementation Group Standing Committee

• 12 Program groups

• Additional subgroups

• 1 Lead ministry per program group

• 12 Program group secretariats led by a donor 

agency 

• Afghanistan high-level Strategic Forum

• National Consultative Group/Afghanistan 

Development forum

• Consultative Group Standing committees

• 12 Program Consultative Groups

• 1 Lead ministry per program group

• 12 Program group secretariats led by a donor 

agency

• 2 National Security Consultative Groups

• 3 working groups

• 5 advisory groups

Leadership Afghan ministry leads each group. Afghan ministry leads each group.

Membership Ministries, UN agencies, development banks, donor 

agencies/governments, and NGOs

Ministries, UN agencies, development banks, 

donor agencies/governments, and NGOs

Stated goals

Assist in budget preparation Yes Yes

Monitor performance of 

programs and subprograms

Yes Yes

Promote better coordination 

between all parties

Yes Yes

Formulate policy Not stated Yes

Develop projects/programs Yes Yes

Prepare annual development 

plan 

Yes Not stated

Set program 

benchmarks/targets 

Yes Yes
Page 66 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VII

Major Donors’ Pledges and Contributions as 

of December 31, 2002 (as reported by the 

U.S. Department of State) ApenVdxiI

Dollars in millions

Country

Tokyo conference

pledgea Additional pledges

Total disbursed

for 2002 Time frame

Canada 62.8 31.3 15 months

France 24 32 Unspecified

Germany 285 43 112 4 years

Italy 43 43.9 1 year

Japan 500 282 2.5 years

United Kingdom 288 55 77.5 5 years

United States 297 600 Unspecified

Russiab 30 Unspecified

Austria 11.6 2.4 10.7 1 year

Belgium 30.7 11.5 Unspecified

Denmark 59 16.5 31.9 Unspecified

Finland 28 10 12.1 4 years

Greece 4.5 1 1.7

Ireland 12.3 9.8 4 years

Luxembourg 4.5 .1 3.6 2.5 years

Netherlands 63 5 78.9 2.5 years

Norway 46.6 10 47 2.5 years

Portugal .8 Unspecified

Spain 104 6.4 77 Unspecified

Sweden 90 31 4 years

Switzerland 20 6.7 Unspecified

European 

Commission

864 78.4 133 5 years

Bahrain

Kuwait 30 5 Unspecified

Oman

Qatar .1 Unspecified

Saudi Arabia 220 72.5 4 years

United Arab Emirates 36 80 69.8 Unspecified

Iran 560 32.7 6 years

Australia 8.8 14.6 19 1 year

South Korea 45 5 2.5 years

Republic of China 

(Taiwan)

29 3 years
Appendix VII

Major Donors’ Pledges and Contributions as 

of December 31, 2002 (as reported by the U.S. 

Department of State)

Page 67 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Source: Department of State.

a

Pledges and disbursements do not include those of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 

other international nongovernmental organizations.

b

Russia did not pledge at Tokyo – Russian assistance has been primarily in-kind donations.

Turkey 5 1.8 2.9 5 years

China 1 150 30 Unspecified

India 100 31.7 One year

Pakistan 100 17.7 Unspecified

Total 3,972.8 475 1,949.95

(Continued From Previous Page)

Dollars in millions

Country

Tokyo conference

pledgea Additional pledges

Total disbursed

for 2002 Time frame
Page 68 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix VIII

Comments from the World Food Program ApenVdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.
Appendix VIII

Comments from the World Food Program

Page 69 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance
Appendix VIII

Comments from the World Food Program

Page 70 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the United Nations 

World Food Program dated June 2, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. Although changes in the coordination mechanism utilized in 

Afghanistan were introduced in 2003, the Afghan government and the 

international community still lack a common, jointly developed 

strategy for rehabilitating the agricultural sector. We believe that such a 

strategy, including measurable goals and a means to evaluate progress 

toward achieving the goals, is needed to focus limited resources and 

hold the international community accountable for the assistance it 

delivers.
Page 71 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix IX

Comments from the Department of State ApenXIdxi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix IX

Comments from the Department of State

Page 72 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.
Appendix IX

Comments from the Department of State

Page 73 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of 

State dated June 3, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) currently 

purchases limited amounts of regional food commodities in an effort to 

respond quickly to humanitarian emergencies. Commodities purchased 

in the United States by U.S. agencies must travel the same logistics 

networks as commodities purchased regionally. For example, U.S. 

commodities destined for Afghanistan in 2002 were shipped from the 

United States to the Pakistani port at Karachi and moved to their final 

destination via roads in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Commodities 

purchased in Pakistan followed the same transit routes. Hence, the 

overland shipping costs, such as for trucking, were the same for U.S. 

origin commodities and Pakistani commodities. Further, regional cash 

purchases of food would be made by U.S. government officials or World 

Food Program (WFP) officials, the same officials that currently handle 

hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance funds and millions of 

metric tons of commodities; we are not suggesting that cash be 

provided to local governments. Any purchases would be subject to U.S. 

and UN accountability procedures, as such purchases are currently; 

increasing the amount of commodities purchased locally would not by 

itself create an opportunity for corruption. 
Page 74 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix X

Comments from the United States Agency for 

International Development ApenXdxi

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix X

Comments from the United States Agency for 

International Development

Page 75 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix X

Comments from the United States Agency for 

International Development

Page 76 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance
Appendix X

Comments from the United States Agency for 

International Development

Page 77 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the United States 

Agency for International Development dated June 6, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. We believe that the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) should take an active and aggressive role in the cooperative 

development of a joint international–Afghan government strategy 

because the United States is the largest donor to Afghanistan, 

agricultural rehabilitation is the cornerstone of USAID’s efforts in 

Afghanistan, and the success of U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan is 

tightly linked to the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector. According 

to USAID’s assistance strategy for Afghanistan, restoring food security 

is USAID’s highest priority. Consequently, agriculture assistance is one 

of USAID’s main strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Further, according 

to USAID’s Afghan assistance strategy documents, USAID’s overall 

assistance program is based on several critical assumptions about 

conditions in Afghanistan, one condition being that agricultural 

conditions do not deteriorate further. The document states that if these 

conditions do not prevail, USAID may not achieve its goals. We also 

recognize the importance of the Food and Agriculture Organization’s 

(FAO’s) involvement in the cooperative strategy development effort. 

However, donor support for FAO’s Afghanistan program has been 

limited. 

2. We agree that developing a broad-based agricultural rehabilitation 

strategy would have been difficult in early 2002, given the nascent 

nature of the Afghan government and the assistance coordination 

mechanism then in use. However, the government has been in place 

since June 2002, and the Consultative Group coordination mechanism 

was introduced in December 2002. Hence, we believe that the 

conditions now exist for the development of such a strategy. In 

addition, we have discussed the development of a joint Afghan–

international community agriculture rehabilitation strategy with the 

Afghan Minister of Agriculture and FAO. Both support the idea and 

welcome the opportunity to develop such a strategy.

3. No change to the title of the report is necessary. As stated in the report, 

agriculture is of central importance to Afghanistan’s economy and the 

livelihood of 85 percent of its citizens. Further, the link between food 

security and political stability is recognized by the international 

community not only in Afghanistan but also in other areas such as 

southern Africa. In addition, as stated above, USAID’s assistance 
Appendix X

Comments from the United States Agency for 

International Development

Page 78 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

strategy recognizes the importance of agriculture sector rehabilitation 

to the achievement of the U.S. policy goals in Afghanistan, including a 

politically stable state that is not a harbor for terrorists.

4. We agree that other authorities allow USAID to provide cash or 

purchase assistance commodities outside the United States. However, 

we believe that amending the Agricultural Trade Development and 

Assistance Act of 1954 to allow the provision of cash or food 

commodities outside the United States will greatly improve U.S. 

flexibility in responding to crises affecting U.S. national security and 

foreign policy interests. The act is the principal authority for providing 

food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations. Amending 

the act will provide a permanent provision in this authority allowing the 

United States to respond rapidly and in a cost-effective manner to 

events that affect U.S. national security. 

USAID cites the recently proposed $200 million Famine Fund as 

providing the flexibility that the United States needs to address 

humanitarian crises. However, the fund proposal indicates that the fund 

will target dire unforeseen circumstances related to famine; thus, the 

fund does not appear to be designed to respond to nonfamine crises 

involving large amounts of food aid or national security. The fund 

amounts to less than 10 percent of the $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion 

appropriated for U.S. food aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, a period 

marked by an increasing number of humanitarian food crises—for 

example, in Afghanistan, southern Africa, and North Korea—that did 

not entail famine but that did, in some cases, affect U.S. national 

security. The Famine Fund is inadequate to respond to the increasing 

number and size of such crises. Meanwhile, the availability of 

commodities in the United States for food assistance has declined in 

2003. Therefore, the need to procure commodities overseas in close 

proximity to affected countries has become more critical while also 

being more cost effective.
Page 79 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture ApenXdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture

Page 80 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture

Page 81 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

See comment 1.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture

Page 82 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of 

Agriculture dated June 10, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. Although other legislation allows for the provision of cash or assistance 

commodities from non-U.S. sources, we believe that amending the 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 to allow 

the provision of cash or food commodities outside the United States 

will greatly improve U.S. flexibility in responding to crises that affect 

U.S. national security interests. The act is the principal authority for 

providing food assistance in emergency and nonemergency situations. 

Amending the act will provide a permanent provision in this authority 

allowing the United States to respond rapidly and in a cost effective 

manner to events that affect U.S. national security. 

In addition, although the proposed $200 million Famine Fund may 

provide some additional flexibility for responding to humanitarian 

crises, the fund proposal indicates that the fund will target dire 

unforeseen circumstances related to famine. Thus, the fund does not 

appear to be designed to respond to nonfamine crises involving large 

amounts of food aid or national security. The fund amounts to less than 

10 percent of the $2.2 billion and $2.6 billion appropriated for U.S. food 

aid in 2002 and 2003, respectively, a period marked by an increasing 

number of humanitarian food crises—for example, in Afghanistan, 

southern Africa, and North Korea—that did not entail famine but that 

did, in some cases, affect U.S. national security. 

2. We agree with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that the 

cargo preference requirement adds additional cost to food assistance 

and should be waived in specific situations, and we have adjusted the 

matter for congressional consideration to reflect this. As stated in the 

report, 19.6 percent of total food assistance costs in fiscal year 2002 

were for ocean freight. These costs were incurred because of the 

requirement that assistance commodities must be purchased in the 

United States, and 75 percent of the purchased commodities by weight 

must be shipped on U.S.-flagged carriers. In previous reports, we 

analyzed the costs of cargo preference requirements on food assistance 

and demonstrated the negative impact of these costs on U.S. food aid 

programs. 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture

Page 83 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

3. Additional information has been added to the report describing the 

commodity surpluses available in the region in 2002. For example, in 

2002, Kazakhstan harvested 16 million metric tons of wheat, a record 

harvest for that nation. Approximately 6 million metric tons of the 2002 

harvest was available for export. Similarly, Pakistan exported 

approximately 1.6 million metric tons of wheat in 2002. Consequently, 

these countries had nearly 7.6 million metric tons available for export, 

20 times the requirement for World Food Program’s (WFP’s) 2002 

emergency operation or 68 times the amount that WFP purchased from 

these two countries in 2002.

4. All of the obstacles cited by USDA, including road closures due to 

snow, were concerns for WFP in 2002. We describe many of these 

obstacles in the report and also demonstrate that WFP was able to 

overcome the obstacles. The same transportation routes were used to 

move both regionally procured commodities and U.S. origin 

commodities. As noted in the report, in December 2002, while fighting 

between coalition forces, the Northern Alliance, and the Taliban was 

still occurring and winter weather was complicating food deliveries, 

WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghan beneficiaries, in 

the single largest movement of food by WFP anywhere in a 1-month 

period. Further, according to WFP, its Afghanistan logistics system was 

capable of routinely moving over 50,000 metric tons of food per month. 

Consequently, adding 103,000 metric tons or 8,600 metric tons per 

month to the total food moved over the course of 2002 would not have 

overburdened WFP’s logistics system. Further, the cost and time saved 

by purchasing commodities regionally are not marginal. As indicated in 

the report, purchasing commodities regionally could have substantially 

reduced the delivery time and the increased level of purchased 

commodities could have fed 685,000 people for 1 year. 

5. Although all commodities may not be available regionally in all cases, in 

2002, Afghanistan’s greatest need was wheat, which constituted the 

bulk of the commodities delivered to Afghanistan that year. As stated in 

the report, if the United States had purchased wheat regionally, or 

provided WFP with cash to make regional purchases, the United States 

could have saved approximately $35 million in 2002. While our analysis 

describes how much wheat could have been purchased regionally with 

the savings, higher-value, consumer-ready commodities such as cornsoy blend from U.S. companies could have been purchased instead of 

additional regionally produced wheat. In either case, the United States 

could have provided a greater volume of commodities to Afghanistan if 
Appendix XI

Comments from the Department of 

Agriculture

Page 84 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

it had used the savings realized through the purchase of regional 

commodities versus U.S. commodities to procure additional 

commodities. Further, WFP has commodity quality control standards 

and would not purchase commodities with donor funds that were 

objectionable to the donor providing the funds. Finally, much of the 

wheat that was purchased in the United States was shipped in bulk to 

ports in Pakistan where it was bagged for final distribution in bags 

clearly marked “USA.” Wheat purchased regionally with U.S. funds was 

packaged in Pakistan in the same type of bags. Thus, any regional 

purchases could be packaged in appropriately marked bags in the 

country of origin or at a bagging facility in a transit country. WFP uses 

this practice in other regions, such as southern Africa.

6. WFP made regional purchases during late 2001, but it also made 

regional purchases during 2002. As stated in the report, the amount of 

food available for food assistance in 2003 is less than in 2002, while the 

need for food aid continues to grow around the world, most notably in 

southern Africa. In addition, even if the U.S. grain infrastructure system 

is able to respond to ongoing demands for food aid, purchasing U.S. 

origin commodities and shipping the commodities via expensive ocean 

freight is not the most cost effective or quickest means either of 

supplying food to hungry people or of achieving U.S. national security 

and foreign policy objectives, such as stability in Afghanistan.

7. We agree that the donor community faced challenges in engaging the 

Afghan government in 2002. We believe that the mechanisms currently 

in place, including the Consultative Group coordination mechanism, 

provide an environment where the international community and the 

Afghan government can engage in a joint strategy development effort.

8. The report’s description of Afghanistan’s agriculture sector is based on 

discussions with and documents obtained from FAO, Asian 

Development Bank, USAID, and Afghan government officials. We have 

adjusted the language in the report in response to USDA’s comments.
Page 85 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XII

Comments from the Department of Defense ApenXdxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix XII

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 86 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

The following are GAO’s comments on the letter from the Department of 

Defense dated June 10, 2003.

GAO Comments 1. The report discusses both food assistance and nonfood assistance 

aspects of the Humanitarian Daily Ration program. On page 30 of the 

report, we state that the HDR program was initiated to alleviate 

suffering and convey that the United States waged war against the 

Taliban, not the Afghan people. Also, the HDR program is included with 

the U.S. Agency for International Development’s humanitarian 

programs in U.S. government tallies of total humanitarian assistance 

provided to Afghanistan.

2. Department of Defense officials responsible for the administration of 

the HDR program stated that no formal evaluation of the HDR program 

in Afghanistan has been conducted. In the report, we cite the informal 

reporting that provided the Department of Defense with some 

information about how the program was received by the Afghan people. 

We have added information about the goodwill that the HDRs 

generated according to the informal reports cited by the Department of 

Defense in its comments on the draft report.

3. The report describes how HDRs are designed to be used—to relieve 

temporary food shortages resulting from manmade or natural 

disasters—not, as in Afghanistan, to feed a large number of people 

affected by a long-term food shortage. Further, as discussed in the 

report, the World Food Program (WFP) has worked in Afghanistan for 

many years, and during that period it developed an extensive logistics 

system for delivering food throughout the country. Even during the rule 

of the Taliban, WFP was able to deliver food to remote areas including 

those controlled by the Northern Alliance. During the month of 

December 2001, while Department of Defense was delivering HDRs, 

WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food to Afghanistan, a level of 

food assistance that exceeds any 1-month total for any emergency 

operation in WFP’s history. As stated in the report, WFP’s logistics 

system was capable of delivering commodities to remote populations 

both by air or by donkey if necessary.
Page 87 GAO-03-607 Foreign Assistance

Appendix XIII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApenXdxiI

GAO Contacts Phil Thomas (202) 512-9892

David M. Bruno (202) 512-7280

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individuals named above, Jeffery T. Goebel, Paul Hodges, 

and Reid L. Lowe made key contributions to this report.

(320108)
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