" 

RICHARD HORN, 

Plaintiff, 

. v. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

Civil Action No. 94~1756 (ReL) 

(UNDER SEAL) 

FRANKLIN HUDDLE, JR.~ et al., 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Now before the Court is plaintiff Horn's motion [157] for relief from judgment. Upon 

consideration of the motion, the opposition ofmovants United States of America (159] and 

ArthUl' Brown [160], the plaintiff s reply I 162}, the ,entire record herem, and applicable law, the 

<;ourt will GRANT plaintiff s motion in part for the reasons set forth below. . 

t. BACKGROUND 

In 1993~ plaintiffH~rn was stationed in Rangoon, Bunna, as the country attache for the 

United States Dl'Ug Enforcement Agency.l Honi's complaint is a Bivens action that alleges that 

Franldin "Pancho" Huddle, Jr., an employee of the State Department, and Arthur Brown, an 

employee ofthe CIA, illegally engaged in electronic eavesdropping of Hom's telephone calls in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Hom alleges that Huddle and Brown eavesdropped on a call 

that Hom made to his subordinate in order to obtain information that Huddle. and Brown could 

IA more extensive discussion of the underlying facts can be found in a recent declassified 

opinion by the D.C. Circuit, In re Sealed Case.:494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Crr.2007). 

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use to justify Hom's transfer out of Burma. In 1994, when Horn filed his .complaint, defendant 

Brown's identity was classified. As a result, Brown is referred to in previous Court documents 

a.s "Defendant IT." 

On July 28,2004, tIns Court grant~d the government's motion to dismiss Hom's 

complaint as to all defendants. The Court of Appeals affll111ed as to ''Defendant IT" (Brown) but· 

reversed as to defendant Huddle, holding that Hom should be given an opportunity to "establish . 

. a prima facie case withnut using the privileged (state secret] information." 494 F.3d 139. 141 

(D.C. Cu. 2007). With respect to "Defendant IT/' the Circuit a.ffi.rmed this Court's dismissal 

because "nothing about this person would be admissible in evidence at trial." 494 F.3d at 147. 

Following remand to this Court~ the government revealed that "Defendant II" could 

actually be referred to as Arthur Brown and that he could have been referred to by his name since 

2002. This Court learned this through the government's filing [156] on January 31, 2008, in 

which Department of Justice attorney Paul Freebomez stated that: "Counsel for the l,Jnited States 

recently learned that in 2002, Defendant IT's cover was "lifted" and "rolled back" to his entrance 

on duty date with the Central Intelligence Agency." 

After the government's dlsclosure, the plaintiff filed the present motion asking the Court 

to reinstate Brown as a defendant because of "fraud on the court." 

II. ~AJL1{SIS 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 governs relief from ajudgment or order. Rule 

4!Mr. Freeborne began working on this case following remand to this Court. He should be 

commel1ded for hisintegrlty in bringing this matter to the Court's attention. 

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60(b)(3) states that a court may relieve: a party from a final judgment for "fraud (whether 

previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misc.onduet by an opposing party." 

Rule 60(c) states that a motion under Rule 60(b)(3) must be made "no more than a year after the 

entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." However, Ru1e 60(d)(3) states that 

the above rules "do not limit a court's power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the COurt.,,3 In 

other words, the one-year statute of limitations does not apply when there was a fraud on the 

COUlt. See Baltia Air Lines, Inc., v. Transaction Mgmt., Inc., 98 F.3d 640,642 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

In this case, much of the alleged fraud occurred more than one year before the plaintiff 

filed his Rule 60 motion. Accordingly, the Court must detennine whether the fraud, if it 

occurred, was a "fraud on the court" under Rule 60(d)(3). 

In making the distit}.ction between fraud and fraud on the court, courts have noted that 

"fraud on the court is 'fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud 

between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury." Bahia Air Lines, 98 

F.3d at 642. Examples offraud on the court "include the bribery ofajudge or the knowing 

participation of an attorney in the presentation of perjured testimony." Baltia, 98 F.3d at 643. 

The test for frau,", on the court has als~ been formulated as requiring conduct: I) on the part of an 

3There was considerable confusion in the pleadings about whether the plaintiff s "fraud 

on the court" motion was a Rule 60(b) motion or a Rule 60(d) motion. This confusion was likely 

due in part to the fact that Rule 60 was stylistically amended in 2008. Before 2008, the language 

about a court's ability to modify ajudgroent because offraud on the court was found under Rule 

60(b)(6). In 2008, that language was moved to a newly crea~ed Rule 60(d)(3). The fact that the 

plaintiff styled his motion as one'under Rule 60(b) is of no moment because both parties 

addressed the plaintiff s claim that there was a "fraud on the court." Moreover, there are no 

fonnal requirements for bringing a cla:im for fraud on the court (and the court can do so on its 

own motion); misstyling the plea for relief is not grounds for denying the motion. United States 

v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1342 (10th Cir. 2002). 

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. " 

officer of the court; 2) that is directed to the judicial machinery itself; 3) that is .intentionally 

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false, wilfully blind to the truth, or is iJ? reckless disregard for the truth; 4) tha:t is a positive 

averment or a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; 5) that deceives the court. 

Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331, 336 (6th Cir. 2000). 

In making the deterrtlination about whether fraud on the 'court occurred in this case, tIie 

Court must examine the facts that gave rise to the allegation. In 2000, the government filed an 

affidavit of the then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George J. Tenet, in support of its 

motion to dismiss. In the affidavit, Tenet stated that BroWJ.l was a "covert CIA employee." cPL's I , 

Mot. 4.) Indeed, in 2000. Tenet's statement was accurate. As stated above, however, the CIA 

"lifted" Brown's cover in 2002. The CIA also "rolled back" his cover to February 19, 1980 

(which means that Brown can publicly admit he was employed by the CIA from that date 

forward). (Gov't Opp'n 5.) Accordingly. because amotion to dismiss the case was pen~g in· 

2002, in which the government argued that Brown was a covert CIA operative, the government . . 

should have informed the Court of Brown's changed circumstances. Nevertheless, a failure to 

communicate within the CIA and between the CIA and the Department of Justice resulted in this 

Court nat being informed of the change in Brown's status prior to its July 28,2004 ruling. 

Specifically, the office of general counsel within the CIA-which was involved in this 

litigation-was nat infonnedofthe change in Brown's status until 2005. (See Gov't Opp'nEx. 

1, Rizzo Aff. ~ 5.) Bto'WD. himself, who was af'that paint represented by the United States 

Department of Justice, also failed to notify the Department, of Justice and this Cour:t ofms 

changed circumstances prior 'to the 2004 'ruling. While ruling an the case in 2004,.therefore, this 

'. 

Court was operating under the mistaken belief that Brown's identity was covert. 

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At that point~ however, while the submissions of the United States were inaccurate and 

misleading~ the facts probably did not give rise to' fraud on the court because the false submission 

was not "directed to the judicial ~achinery itself." BaZtia Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d at 642 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). Even if Brown's failure to correct the Court's mistaken assumption that his identity 

was covert could be considered "perjury," it would not give rise to relief. No officer of the court 

had yet been involved in intentional actions to mislead the Court. However, the conduct of an 

attorney within the CIA's office of general counsel in 200S escalated this case from one of 

simple misrepresentation to fraud on the court. 

b,. 2005, this case was pending 'all appeal before the D.C. Circuit. Mr. Brown was the 

Chief of East Asia, a division \Vithin NCS. (Rizzo Aff. ~ 26.) The East Asia Division has an 

OGC attorney assigned to it who serves as its legal advisor. (Id.) Mr. Brown and the OGC legal 

advisor reviewed the govemment' s dr¢ motion for summary affirinance of this Court's ruling 

granting the government's motion to dismiss. (Id.) The OGe legal a.dvisor and Bro'WIl noted 

that the motion was inaccurate because it misstated that Brown's status was still under cover_ 

(Id.) The OGC legal advisor then brought these inaccuracies to the attention of the OGC 

Litigation Division attorney who was ~andling the case in January 2005. CId.) 

Thereafter, that litigation division attorney reviewed the draft ofilie motion with the 

Chief of the Litigation Division and the Assistant United States Attorney to discuss the 

classification status of specific facts iIi the draft motion,. (ld. at ~ 27.) The litiga.tion division 

attorney "did not notify his OGe supe;visors or the Department of Justice attorney handling tills 

case of this change in cover status." (See Gov't Opp'n Ex. l~ Rizzo Aff. ~ 5.) As a result, the 

government submitted a draft motion for summary affinnance that falsely stated that Mr. Brown 

- s 
was still under cover. (ld. at' 27.) "Subsequent government pleadings on a.ppea.l consequently 

perpetuated the inaccurate information regarding Mr. Brown's cover status." (ld.) The D.C. 

Circuit affIrmed this Court's ruling dismissing "Defendant IT' on the basis tbat "nothing about 

this person would be admissible in evidence at trial." 494 F.3d at 147. 

As acknowledged by Mr. Rizz~, the conduct of the CIA '·s aGC in this case was 

unacceptable. The "DGC did not perform up to the standards of [the] office and the standards of 

performance the Court has every reason to expect from government attorneys." (Rizzo Aff. at~ 

31.) The OGe also engaged in fra.ud on the court. 

~e OGC was put on "actual notice" that Brown's identity was no longer covert prior to 

submitting briefs to the D.C. Circuit on appeal. (Rizzo Aff. ~ 30.) Nevertheless, the OGC failed 

to COlTect the false submission that Brown's identity was covert and thereafter submitted false 

documents to the D.C. Circuit. Not only was the false submission intentionaV it was also 

material; the belief that Brown's identity was covert was so central to the litigation that it lil<ely . . . 

would have changed the Court of Appeals' ruling affirming this Court as to defendant Brown. 

As a result, the OGC's conduct was tantamOl.Ult to the "lmowing participation oian attorney in 

the presentation ofpeIjured testimony," Baltia, 98 F.3d at 643, which the D.C. Circuit 

specifically noted was a type of fraud on the court. . , 

Defendant Brown and the government's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive: 

4The government makes the assertion that "Hom has offered no evidence that anyone 

acted with intent to deceive or defraud the court." (Gov't's Opp'n 10.) As explained below, 

based on the govemment's own admissions there is no plausible way to read the facts but that the 

actions of the OGe lawyer who failed to correct the false statement were intentional. In addition, 

it is lU1clear whether "intent" is a required element offraud on the court; reckless disregard for 

the truth may suffice., Workman v. Bell, 227 F.3d 331,336 (6th. Crr. 2000). . 

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Defendant Brown, now represented by, new counsel, S argues (1) that the failure to notify the 

, , 

Court that Defendant IT's cover was rolled back in 2002 was hannless error; and (2) that the 

judgment against Brown cannot be disturbed because Hom's motion was m.ade more than one 

year following final judgment. 

First, the failure to notify the Court that defendant Brown's cover was rolled back was not 

harmless error. Brown argues that "although he, can now identify himself as a. CIA officer 

working in Burma at the time in question. he still may not divulge anything about his 

employment in his position." (Brown Opp'n 6.) While this may be true, and this Court may still 

have ruled in his favor in 2004, the fact that his identity is not covert more than likely would 

have changed the Court of Appeals' ruling in his favor. In that opinion, the Circuit agreed with 

the dismissal ofBrovm as a defendant because "[n]othing about this person would be admissible 

at tliaL" 494 FJd at 142. The Circuit states that as to Huddle, however, the plaintiff could 

establish a prima facie c~se merely by relying on unclassified evidence. For example, the Circuit 

stated that Horn could rely on the highly suspicious cable that Huddle sent to. his colleagues in 

which he transcribed a conversation that Honl had by using quotation marks and elli~ses, the 

seeming impossibility that Huddle would have learned the conversation by lawful means, and the 

iIlconsistencies lmderlying Huddle~s explanation about how he learned of the conversation. 494 

F.3d at 147. Similarly, it appears that bad the Circuit known that Brovm's identity was not· 

covert, it would have6 required this Court to give the plaintiff a chance to pursue his claim if he 

SBrown is now represented by Morrison & Foerster LLP . 

. 60f course, it is impossible to ~ow precisely ,what the Circuit would have thought had 

the government presented the accurate facts about Bl'Own'S status on appeal. This Court must 

hazard its best guess because of the fraud on the court that prevented the Circuit from reviewing 

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can do so without using "evidence rel~ting to covert operatives, organizational stnlcture and 

functions, and intelligence-gathering sources, methods, and capabilities" that would qualify as 

state secrets.' ld. at 148. 

Brown's second argument, based on the statute of limitations, is easily rejected .. As noted 

above, the actions by CIA counsel in this case constituted a. fraud on the court. Therefore, the . ' 

plaintiff is entitled to relief under Rule oO(d)(3) which does not have a one-year limitation, 

The government also opposes the plaintiffs motion. Although the govemmentadmits 

that misconduct occurred, it argues thf!.t the misconduct did not rise to the level of fraud on the 

court. First, tile goverrunentargues that granting the defendant's motion would be futile because 

he has not shown that it would advance his case. In so arguing) the government attempts to place 

the burden on Hom to establish that his claim against BroWn would be potentially meritorious 

before Brown can be reinstated as a defendant. However, absent the government's fraud on the . , 

court, Browllli1<ely would still be a defendant in this case. Therefore, lil<e the claim against 

Huddle) Hom would be given a chance to present his claim against Brown using unprivileged 

. materials. The burden would then be on the government and Brown to show that he should be 

dismissed as a defendant. It would be ,unjust for the Court to place an additional procedural 

this Court l s ruling as to Defendant Brown in light of the a~curate facts in the case. 

'The' Circujt held that this Court must at least give the plaintiff a chance to pursue his case 

absent privileged material The case still may be dismissed ifthe defendants can show that they 

have a "valid defensen-as defined by the Circuit in that opinion-that they cannot present 

because the defense is a state secret. The case can also be dismissed if the Court detenniries that 

the "subject matter of [the] case is so sensitive that there is no way it can be litigated without 

risking national secrets," !nother words, the government and Brown can still argue that there is 

uno way" the plaintiff can pursue a case against him without risking national secrets; however, 

the Circuit has mandated that the plaintiff must at least be given an opportunity to show how he 

can pursue his claim using unprivileged materials. 

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hurdle on Horn at this stage merely because of the government's fraud on the court. 

Next. the government argues that Brown has failed to esta.blish fraud on the court. The 

government, citing cases, states that fraud on the court must be attributable to "counsel," it must 

be "directed to the judicial machinery itself," and there must be an "intent to deceive or defraud 

the court." (Gov't Opp'n 9-10.) In contrast to the government's claim, that burden was met in 

this case. The government has acknowledged that counsel within the OGe was aware of the 

inaccuracy and failed to bring it to the attention ofms supervisors or the Court. Brown himself 

was clearly aware of·his changed status beginning in 2002. When the aGe attorney reviewed 

the' draft appellate pleadings8 knowing that they contained· a false submission, and knowing that 

the infonnation was critical to the government's argument and would be helpful to the 

defendant's case, the Court has no choice but to conclude that the failure to correct the falsity 

was intentional.9 And, of course, the false statement about Brown's cover was contained in a 

, . 

briefIng submitted to the court itself Therefore, the fraud in this case was attributable to counsel 

and directed to the judicial machinery with an intent to deceive the court. 

The government argues that Department of Justice counsel, who had entered. an 

appearance and submitted the pleadings in the case, was not aware of the change in Brown' s 

status because Brown and the attorney within the OGe did not inform her of the change in his 

8The gove~ent does not argue that the proper place for this motion would ha.ve been in 

the Court of Appeals. Even ifi! did, the fraud was ongoing in this Court following remand until· 

January 31,2008, when the new Department of Justice attorney informed the Court of the change 

in Bro\VIl's status. . 

9The fact that the OGC attorney who was handling the case before the Circuit did not 

correct the Circuit's impression that Brown's cover was covert after it issued its opinion also 

indicates that the fraud was intentionaL 

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status I (ld. 10.) Therefore; the governmdnt argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 

because the attorney who signed the pleadings was not involved in the fraud. The government's 

argument fails because attomeys cannot escape ethical obligations merely by attributing false 

statements to another attorney who is unaware of the truth. Although Ms. Goldfuss at the 

Department of Justice may have been unaware of the change'in Brown's status, that did not 

absolve the OGe, which was very involved in the Brown's defense, from fulfilling its ethical 

responsibilities. The OGe la'W)'er who was involved in preparing and reviewing the appellate 

briefs and learned that the draft contained false information was obligated to notifyDOJ and this 

Court of the change in Brown's cover status-that obligation remains even if the attorney has not 

entered an appearance. 

An argument similar to the one advanced by the government in this case was rejected by 

the Ninth Circuit in Pumphrey v. K. W. Thompson Tool Co .• 62 F.3d 1128 (9th Crr. 1995). In that 

case, the defendant's ill-house counsel participated in a fraud on the court by failing to tum. over 

a critical video that would have supported plaintiff's case. ld. at 1130. The in-house counsel 

"did not enter an appearance ... was not admitted pro hac vice, and did not sign any documents 

filed with the court." ld. at 1131. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that·the in-house 

counsel's attendance at trial, participation in gathering information, and participation in 

. producing the omitted video was sufficient to render him an officer of the court, ld. In so 

holding, the court noted that the i~-house counsel, as a licensed attorney, was "aware of the 

necessity for compliance with the rules of discovery and the rules pfprofessional responsibility. 

He [was] aware of the damage failure·to abide by these rules can wreck in the specific case. at 

hand and the larger framework of confidence in the adversary system." ld. at 1133. , 

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·';-. 

The OGC attorney in this case was also sufficiently involved to be an officer of the Court. 

Rizzo's declar~tion indicates that the attorney who was' notified that Brown's cover status had 

been lifted reviewed the draft appellate brief and failed to correct the inaccuracy. The declaration 

also reveals that the attorney who failed to correct the inaccuracy was .the OGC "Litigation 

Division attorney who was handling the case in Jalluary 2005." (Rizzo's Aff. ,26-27.) 

Therefore, not only was the attorney involved in the case, he or .she appears to have had primary 

responsibility for the case within the CIA at the time that the first knowingly false document was 

submitted-he Ol' she was "handling" it. Like the attorney in Pumphrey, this attorney's 

I 

involvement was sufficient to render him or her an officer of the court. As a result, his or her 

involvement in the presentation of false testimony is enough to entitle the plaintiff to relief 

because of "fraud on the court." 

The government next argues that Hom cannot challenge the ruling dismissillg Brown as a 

defendant because he failed to originally appeal the fact that Brown's identity was privileged. 

The govenunent makes the ludicrous argument that "Hom never challenged the government's 

assertion of privilege)) before the D.C. Circuit. (GOY't Opp'n 11.) lfthe governm.ent had not 

falsely asserted the fact that Brown's identity was covert, Hom would haYe had no need to appeal 

the ruling that Brown's identity was privileged. Hom may not have appealed this Court's ruling 

that Brown's identity was covert because he reasonably believed the government's assertion that 

Brown's identity was, in fact} covert. The plaintiff cannot be denied relief because he failed to 

. discern that the government had submitted a false statement in its pleadings. As the government 

notes, much of the potential evidence against Brown still may be subject to the state secret 

privilege. (Gov't Opp'n 13.) However, the Circuit has mandated that the plaintiff must be given 

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an opportunity to pursue his claim using unprivileged information. 

Finally, the government argues that the plaintiff's motion should be denied because he 

failed to comply with Local Rule 7(m) and confer with the movant before filing the present 

motion. While the Court does encourage counsel to confer prior to the filing of all motions, 

consulting the defendant in this case would have been futile because the parties could not have 

reinstated the defendant in the case by agreement-that action requires Court involvement. 

Accordingly, the plaintiffs failure to comply with Local Rule 7m (even if the plaintiffs motion 

can be considered "nondispositive") is not grolll1ds for denying relief in this case. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Defendant Brown's cover was lifted and rolled back in 2002. However, tlus Court was 

. not il1fonned of the change in Brown's status until20Q8. Moreover, the attorney "handling" the 

case within the CIA's office of general counsel in 2005 was put on actual notice of the change in 

Brown's status in January 2005. Nevertheless, he or she reviewed drafts of appellate pleadings 

arguing that Brown' s identity was covert and failed to correct the fal~e -statement or report it to 

his or her superiors. The Court of ApP,eals ruled in favor of Brown. relying on the fact that 

"nothing about 'Defendant IT' would be admissible at trial." The attorney and Brown also failed 

to report the change in Brown's status following the Circuit's issuance of its opinion and the 

remand to this Court. Because the misrepresentation was material, intentional, involved an 

officer of the court, and was direct~d at the jUc:llcial machin~ itself, this Court cOllcludes that 

the goverrunent's actions constitute a fraud on the court. The plaintiff is entitled to relief and 

defendaht Brown will be reinstated as a defendant in this case. The pl~tiff will be given an 

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opportunity to present how he can proceed using unprivileged material ~ to both defendant 

Brown and defendant Huddle. 

The plaintiff' 5 motion also requests various other sanctions and/or contempt proceedings. 

Those requests win be denied. Instead, the govenunent will be directed to provide Sheldon 

Snook, the Administrative Assistant to t?-e Chief Judge, who is also the Clerk to the Committee , 

on Grievances for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the name of the 

CIA attorney who was put on actual notice of the change in Brown's cover status in 2005 and 

failed to report it. Because the fraud occurred in front of this Court, this Court's committee on 

grievances will conduct an investigation and, if discipline is i;mposed, report the results to the 

. Court and the licensing authorities in any state in which that attorney is licensed. 

Finally, the Court will grant the plaintiffs motion for a status conference so that it can be 

determined how to next proceed in this case. 

A separate order shall issue this date. 

SO ORDERED. 

~,e./~ Chief Judge Royce C~ Lamberth Date 

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