the north, to isolate Gorazde, or to harass commercial flow to Sarajevo. Participants
agreed that battlefield superiority was clearly achieved when Croat artillery and
units based in the Krajina reinforced the Bosniac offensive against the Serbs in a
continuation of the Croatian war in the summer of 1995.

These differing assessments are critical to the debate on the Train and Equip
program. If parity between Bosniac and Serb forces existed before Dayton, then the
resources and training provided by Train and Equip create a power imbalance in
favor of the Federation. Some estimate a 1 to 2 disadvantage for the Serbs in artil-
lery, and a growing advantage for the Bosniacs in war fighting capabilities as a result
of superior training. Some believe that by mid-1998 the Bosniacs are likely to have
a clear advantage, and by mid-1999 they will have the ability to inflict a decisive
defeat over the Serbs. According to this assessment, parity will simply cease to exist.
If, however, the Bosniacs achieved the pre-Dayton stalemate due primarily to Croat
support, and if their continued alliance is not certain, then Train and Equip is sim-
ply ensuring an equitable RS-Federation military balance of power. Proponents of
this view believe that the RS has a current documented advantage of 2 to 1 over the
Bosniacs in tanks, a 5 to 1 advantage in artillery, and minimal compliance with the
arms control agreement at this time.

Further working group discussion revealed the difficulty in calculating the bal-
ance of power, which is open to various interpretations of the current data and the
future political situation in Bosnia. Some participants felt that military assessments
based on Bosniac superiority in numbers versus Serb advantages in heavy weapons
was a false and rather dangerous correlation—manpower simply cannot equal tanks.
Subscribing to this analysis implicitly accepts an inhumane attrition of Bosniac sol-
diers. For its supporters, Train and Equip, in conjunction with Dayton arms control
requirements, offers the best prospects for military balance based on (1) a reduction
in Bosniac troops to 45,000, (2) equipping the Federation with defensive (anti-tank
and anti-aircraft) weapons, and (3) reducing Serb superiority in heavy weapons.
This would achieve equivalent defensive forces for both sides, and it is part of what
was agreed to at Dayton and in the subsequent arms control agreement.

Unfortunately, the uncertain political situation in Bosnia also makes it difficult to
calculate balance of power accurately. For example, the RS appears on the verge of
economic collapse, which would make the maintenance of military parity impos-
sible to monitor in the future. And in the past the Pale leadership has relied on
support from Belgrade—support which is no longer certain. Some participants felt
that RS vulnerabilities combined with the confidence instilled by Train and Equip
might encourage a Federation offensive against the RS for territorial gain.

Yet similar uncertainties also exist for the Bosniacs, who may not ultimately de-
pend politically or militarily on either the Bosnian Croats or the international com-
munity. In fact, participants felt that a Bosniac-inspired attack on the RS is some-
what improbable, given the possibility of Bosnian Croat defection from the Federation
and the likely isolation by the international community. Others also doubted that
the Federation would launch a high- risk operation, given Serbia’s geographic ad-
vantage and the uncertainty of external support to Sarajevo. Despite FRY claims
that support to Pale has ended, supply lines might be quickly reconstituted in the
event ofa conflict with the Federation, even if the FRY is economically “on its knees.”
The Bosniacs do not and would not enjoy the same advantages in ready external
logistics support. The Federation must also incorporate into calculations of national
security the possibility of RS noncompliance with Dayton arms control provisions,

If parity between Bosniac and
Serb forces existed before
Dayton, then the resources and
training provided by Train and
Equip create a power imbalance
in favor of the Federation.

If, however, the Bosniacs
achieved the pre-Dayton
stalemate due primarily to
Croat support, and if their
continued alliance is not certain,
then Train and Equip is simply
ensuring an equitable RS-
Federation military balance of
power.


The program is central to the
peace process and, therefore,
must also be judged by its ability
to build stable institutions
within the Federation, ensure
arms control compliance,
eliminate de-stabilizing
external influences, and
encourage participation in the
Federation. The long-term
effects on Bosnian social and
economic development must also
be considered.

discussion on the military balance of power demonstrates the difficulty of answer-
ing such a question when one person's definition of “security” may constitute a
“threat” for others. The same difficulties apply when it comes to understanding the
intentions of the parties. Would the Bosniacs misuse Train and Equip to pursue
territorial gain, even if it meant risking international isolation and the possible col-
lapse of the Federation? Are the leaders of the Republika Srpska likely, given the
current economic and political situation, to resume shelling cities and harassing com-
mercial flows in order to prevent Dayton implementation, intimidate local popula-
tions, and possibly gain small swaths of strategic land? The situation suggests con-
tinuous evaluation of the military and security situations in the region, dialogue with
the parties on these issues, and the modification of international programs if and
when necessary.

Itis evident, however, that the effects of Train and Equip are not limited to issues
of defense and security. The program is central to the peace process and, therefore,
must also be judged by its ability to build stable institutions within the Federation,
ensure arms control compliance, eliminate de-stabilizing external influences, and
encourage participation in the Federation. The long-term effects on Bosnian social
and economic development must also be considered. Participants agreed that there
will be efforts to train and equip the Federation, and most thought that these efforts
are best led by the United States. At the same time, it is important to monitor Train
and Equip to ensure that it does not have unanticipated side effects, as well as to
understand the many ways in which the program upholds the Dayton peace pro-
cess and U.S. strategic interests in the region.


Furthermore, a number of

working group participants
noted that the training and
equipping of Bosniac forces
would occur regardless.
Advocates of the policy argue
that it is appropriate for the
United States to manage this
process, rather than countries
that do not necessarily support
the interests of the West.

from NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) before it can begin work. Administration
officials working with the leadership of the Federation forces note that “slow” progress
is nonetheless real progress —the working environment today among military lead-
ers is fundamentally better than it was one year ago. At the lowest levels of the
military, among the Croat and Bosniac troops, there is a noticeable absence of ten-
sion. While the Federation Army will not be integrated below the corps level for at
least three years, soldiers do currently train together. To date there have been no
incidents between Croat and Bosnian personnel involved in this program.

The Train and Equip program has also been used as a lever with the Bosnian
government to remove foreign mujahideen fighters and to terminate the military
and intelligence relationship with Iran. The arms flow from Iran to Bosnia has
stopped. Hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards were deployed to Bosnia; they
are no longer there, nor are the mujahideen. A high-level Bosnian official in the
Ministry of Defense with direct links to Iran was removed from his post asa result of
pressure from the United States and the promise of Train and Equip resources once
he resigned. Furthermore, a number of working group participants noted that the
training and equipping of Bosniac forces would occur regardless. Advocates of the
policy argue that itis appropriate for the United States to manage this process, rather
than countries that do not necessarily support the interests of the West. Train and
Equip ensures that the Federation Army adopts civilian control, military profes-
sionalism, and Western-oriented defense institutions.

Train and Equip, according to some participants, is also the only way to encour-
age Bosniac compliance with the arms control agreement, as long as the govern-
ment of the RS continues to violate the arms control provisions of Dayton. The
Federation is currently in full compliance with the reporting and destruction re-
quirements of Dayton. In Phase 1, which ended in December 1996, the Federation
destroyed the requisite 776 weapons. It has also begun to reduce troop levels to
45,000, as required by Federation and international agreements. The Serbs, on the
other hand, have not adhered to all arms control requirements, destroying only 45
weapons in Phase I and thereby preserving their offensive capabilities. Finally, Train
and Equip not only promotes compliance with the arms control component of Day-
ton but also rewards Federation support for all aspects of the agreement.

How Is Train and Equip Affecting Peace Implementation?
Working group discussion on Train and Equip yielded very different views regard-
ing the program’s impact on the military balance between the Federation and the
RS. Some participants felt strongly that Train and Equip was radically altering the
balance of power and increasing the likelihood of a Federation-directed offensive.
Others were certain that the program ensures Federation parity with the RS, deter-
ring aggressive acts by Pale. The disparity in views stemmed in part from differing
assessments of pre-Dayton military capabilities and future war-fighting scenarios.
Working group perceptions of the military situation in the former Yugoslavia
prior to the Dayton agreement were varied. Some believed that the Bosniacs were
winning a World War I-style war of attrition based on superiority in manpower,
which over time would overwhelm the Serb advantage in equipment and supplies.
Others did not believe that Bosnian manpower alone would offset Bosnian Serb
heavy weapons, and they also made the point that the 1992-95 war in Bosnia was a
war of terror and intimidation of the civilian population. They believe that the Bosnian
Serbs retain the capability to shell cities, to seize territory such as a wider corridor in


There was general agreement
by the working group that
Train and Equip has done
much to encourage Federation
institution building. Although
progress in this area has been
difficult, there is no doubt that
the promise of military
training and equipment helps
keep the Bosnian Croats in the
Federation.

leaving the RS with significant offensive arms even as the Federation draws down its
military manpower.

As noted above, Train and Equip is an integral part of Dayton and, therefore,
must also be judged by its ability to further the agreement's broader political objec-
tives. How successful has the program been in achieving the policy goals described
above? There was general agreement by the working group that Train and Equip
has done much to encourage Federation institution building. Although progress in
this area has been difficult, there is no doubt that the promise of military training
and equipment helps keep the Bosnian Croats in the Federation. In terms of un-
wanted external influences, participants agreed that Iran was no longer playing a
role in Bosnian defense and intelligence, although it was noted that Iranian influ-
ence has not been eliminated but simply shifted to culture and religion. Opinions
regarding Train and Equip’s ability to leverage compliance with Dayton were mixed.
The view was expressed that the program causes Serb obstruction on issues of free-
dom of movement, refugee returns, and arms control, and ensures that Pale hard-
liners rather than the Banja Luka “moderates” dominate the political process. Oth-
ers felt that the RS’s lack of compliance with Dayton was neither directly nor entirely
caused by Train and Equip; other, more important factors were involved. Further-
more, the Serbs have been invited to visit the Federation training center and partici-
pate in Train and Equip in order to offset Dayton-required disarmament and en-
sure military parity with the Federation. Their participation, however, is highly
unlikely, given that it hinges on complete compliance with Dayton and participa-
tion in a joint command structure.

The Consequences of Train and Equip for the Social and Economic
Development of the Federation

When evaluated from a more comprehensive point of view, it is evident that the
implications of the Train and Equip program are not limited to deterrence, arms
control compliance, and the military balance of power between the Federation and
the RS. Since it consolidates federal structures and prevents external influences,
the long-term consequences of the Train and Equip program in the economic, po-
litical, and social spheres require closer scrutiny.

The main areas of concern associated with Train and Equip are (1) its direct
budgetary implications and (2) its long-term consequences for the social and eco-
nomic development of the Federation. Participants cautioned that Train and Equip
might have the unintended consequence of reproducing a defense-oriented economy
similar to the largely discredited “socialist unemployment” system that contributed
to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Programs like Train and Equip might
emphasize defense over economic development, reconstructing the Yugoslav “iron
triangle,” where ties between military, government, and economic leaders at the
highest levels of the state dominated the system. From a monetary perspective, Train
and Equip might create long-term budgetary burdens on the Federation in order to
maintain defense forces established by the program. Such an emphasis on defense
might undermine the economic reconstruction plan envisioned by Dayton. Dayton
supports the creation of a market economy in Bosnia, with a specialization in light
manufacturing and raw materials for domestic consumption and export to Europe,
rather than a defense-based economy. Furthermore, budgetary strains might pre-
vent the emergence of a stable Bosniac economy and perpetuate the Federation’s
current economic dependence on Croatia.


Asour THE Rerorr

On June 6, 1997, the United States Institute of
Peace convened the first session of its Dayton
Implementation Working Group to discuss the
NATO mandate in Bosnia and the
administration’s recent policy review of the
Bosnian peace process. The Dayton Imple-
mentation Working Group project envisions
meetings on the Train and Equip program, the
apprehension of war criminals, the return of
refugees, and Brcko as amodel for peace imple-
mentation. The purpose of this working group
is to encourage dialogue among representatives
from the administration and Capitol Hill and
policy analysts on how best to implement these
critical elements of the Dayton peace agree-
ment. John Menzies, former ambassador to
Bosnia-Herzegovina and currently a senior fel-
low at the Institute, chairs the working group
sessions. Participants include officials from the
Department of State, Department of Defense
and other federal agencies, as well as represen-
tatives of non governmental organizations
(NGOs) and scholars. The Institute's objec-
tive is not to reach a consensus within the group
on how best to manage Dayton implementa-
tion, but to explore the issues and options. This
report, written by program officer Lauren Van
Metre with the assistance of research assistant
Burcu Akan, summarizes points made by
working group participants attending the ses-
sion on Train and Equip—that component of
the overall Dayton settlement which calls for
the arming and training of a Bosnian army to
defend against and deter aggressors,

‘The views expressed in this report do not nec-
essarily reflect views of the United States In-
stitute of Peace, which does not advocate par-
ticular policies.

September 1997

Dayton Implementation:
The Train and Equip Program

Key Points

About the Working Group

@ Atatime when the U.S. governmentis reaffirming its commitment to the Bosnian
peace process, the United States Institute of Peace is conducting an intensive
review of four critical aspects of Dayton—the Train and Equip program, the
apprehension and prosecution of war criminals, Brcko as a model for ‘peace imple-
mentation, and refugee returns—to discuss ‘ways to support and further the
implementation process.

This report focuses on the Train and Equip program, which is the
source of considerable debate regarding the Program’s impact on Dayton imple-
mentation.

What is the Train and Equip Program?

@ Train and Equip is that component of the Dayton process which calls for the
establishment of professional unified (Croat-Bosniac) Federation armed forces
in order to defend against and deter aggressors.

@ Train and Equip is a U.S.-managed program that provides to the Federation
$400 million in military equipment and training pledged by the US. and other
countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Malaysia, Brunei, Turkey, Germany, and others.

Why Are We Implementing the Train and Equip Program?

@ The purpose of Train and Equip is to support fundamental military and security
aspects of Dayton. Supporters of the policy regard it as vital to accomplishing
broader political objectives such as joint institution building within the Federa-
tion, the elimination of destabilizing external influences such as Iran in Bosnia,
compliance with arms control aspects of Dayton, and general leverage in sup-
Port of peace implementation.

1550 M Street Nw, Suite 700 * Washington, pc 20005-1708 * PHONE 202/457-1700 * FAX 202/429-6063


Some participants noted, however, that Train and Equip has and could continue
to have a positive impact on the Bosnian economy, which has been greatly hurt by the
demobilization of military forces and the high level of unemployment, primarily among
the young. Small, local defense industries, supplying equipment such as helmets and
ammunition in support of Train and Equip, are an important and viable means of
employment for the Federation. These industries’ size and output, however, does not
represent a fundamental reorientation of the economy toward remilitarization but
only provision for the most basic requirements of a strictly defensive force. Others
pointed out that security for citizens is a fundamental function of the government. As
long as security in Bosnia remains a matter of national survival, resource allocation
will inevitably favor the defense establishment, but defense will certainly be less fa-
vored in peace. Economic priorities can and should shift away from defense and mili-
tary security when and if the crisis in Bosnia is resolved. Proponents of Train and
Equip also noted that economic recovery in general is impossible in an unstable or
insecure environment. Therefore, the security provided by programs such as Train
and Equip directly supports economic development, which will only take place when
citizens and foreign investors feel that the environment is conducive to long-term
investment.

Also of concern was the political impact of Train and Equip on domestic alliances
between elites, as well as the social and economic consequences for the parties of
emphasizing defense expenditures. Some participants argued that Train and Equip
might justify the position of the hard-liners concerning threats to Serbian security,
hindering whatever political sway the moderates might have. The emphasis on de-
fense could lead to a fundamental shift among the Muslim Bosniac elite towards a
militaristic, defense-based social and economic development program. Such a shift
in priorities arguably might reinforce the rural base of the Party of Democratic Ac-
tion (SDA) at the expense of an urban, cosmopolitan, and multiethnic Bosniac com-
munity, Yet some participants pointed out that, regardless of Train and Equip , when
the very survival of the country is at stake, the political situation is conducive to the
rise of a military elite.

Some participants raised concerns that the principles of Train and Equip rein-
forced a country-based, military-dominated security system that was at odds with
the current trends in Europe toward arms control, regionally based defense pro-
grams, and a more complex view of security that includes economic, political, and
military components. Others argued, however, that it is other factors that seriously
inhibit Bosnian integration into Europe, suchas the general exclusion of Balkan coun-
tries from regional security arrangements and the ongoing European arms embargo
of the region, despite the UN decision to lift it. Europeans should recognize the le-
gitimate security interests of the Federation and help bring Bosnia toward the West.
Furthermore, the general trend in Europe is not away from nationally based defense
forces but towards the incorporation of national militaries into regional defense ar-
rangements based on principles of civilian control, defense transparency, and respect
for neighbors’ rights and territory. Therefore, a Federation army based on these prin-
ciples might not be an impediment to regional and European integration but instead
serve as an important bridge to these communities.

Conclusion

Participants acknowledged in the end that the question central to the debate on Train
and Equip is, How much security does the Federation need? The working group’s

Participants acknowledged in
the end that the question
central to the debate on Train
and Equip is, How much
security does the Federation
need?


Unrrep States INsTIruTE OF PEACE

‘The United States Institute of Peace is an
independent, nonpartisan federal institution
created by Congress to promote research,
education, and training on the peaceful reso-
lution of international conflicts. Established
in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional
mandate through an array of programs, in-
cluding research grants, fellowships, profes-
sional training programs, conferences and
workshops, library services, publications,
and other educational activities. The
Institute's Board of Directors is appointed
by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the Senate.

Boarp or Dmecrors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research
Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman),
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson,
Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Insti-
tution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford
University

‘Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus,
University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of
Public Policy, George Mason University

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of Interna-
tional Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for De-
mocracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, Ameri-
can Israel Public Affairs Committee, Wash-
ington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State
Richard A. Chilcoat, Lieutenant General, U.S.
Army; President, National Defense Univer-
sity

Ralph Earle Il, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of De-
fense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States
Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

How Is Train and Equip Affecting Peace Implementation?

@ Assessments of Train and Equip’s impact on the military balance of power be-
tween the Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS) differ greatly and are based
on varying perceptions of the military situation pre- and post-Dayton and future
political scenarios for the Federation, the RS, and the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (FRY).

@ Participants disagreed on whether Train and Equip was critical to preventing
future conflict by ensuring a military balance of power between the Federation
and the RS, or whether Train and Equip would encourage the resort to arms.

@ There was consensus that Train and Equip should also be assessed in terms of
institution building, including the establishment of both a ministry of defense
and a joint military command, and arms control compliance by the Federation.

What is The Impact of Train and Equip on Bosnian Social and Economic
Development?

@ The long-term social, economic, and political consequences of the Train and
Equip program need to be incorporated into a comprehensive evaluation of the
program. Train and Equip presents budgetary challenges to the growth of a mar-
ket economy by emphasizing expenditures on defense. Furthermore, Train and
Equip may encourage a militaristic posture that may exclude the Federation from
European regional security programs. Conversely, Train and Equip fosters a West-
ern defense orientation that could bring Sarajevo closer to Western institutional
models,

@ Further, Train and Equip may provide a security environment conducive to the
development of a sustainable economy and a stable social structure. Train and
Equip also offers much-needed opportunities for employment in small, local fac-
tories, producing basic equipment such as helmets and ammunition. This sup-
port by Train and Equip for community-level economic development does not
reach levels that could lead to the re-militarization of the economy in general.

Conclusion

@ The questions central to the debate on Train and Equip are: How much security
does the Federation need? What are and what will be the intentions of the par-
ties? As the working group discussion shows, there are no easy answers to these
questions, suggesting the need to continuously evaluate the military security situ-
ation and adjust policies if and when necessary.

@ Train and Equip must also be evaluated according to its ability to support other
elements of the Dayton Accords and its long-term impact on Bosnian social and
economic development. It is, therefore, important to monitor Train and Equip
to ensure that it does not have serious unintended side effects and to understand
the many ways in which the program upholds the Dayton peace process and U.S.
interests in the region.


Introduction: What is The Train and Equip Program?

The purpose of Train and Equip is to help the Federation establish a professional
unified Croatian-Bosniac military under the civilian control of the recently estab-
lished joint Federation government. Under the terms of Dayton, this force should
have sufficient strength to deter aggression and to defend the Federation in the event
of aggression. To that effect, the United States and other international donors—
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, UAE, Malaysia, Turkey, Germany (training only), and
Brunei—have together pledged over $400 million in equipment and training to the
Federation. Train and Equip is part of a comprehensive approach to military stabi-
lization, which includes an arms control agreement on equipment ceilings.

Formally initiated in July 1996, the U.S.-managed Train and Equip program has
disbursed the bulk of the U.S. contribution—approximately $100 million in de-
fense equipment, including rifles, machine guns, radios and tactical telephones, tanks,
heavy artillery, armored personnel carriers, light anti-tank ‘weapons, and utility he-
licopters.

Training for Federation forces is provided by international donors, whose $147
million in pledged funding support also goes toward additional military equipment.
Other donors are providing free equipment and training for the Federation. Federa-
tion soldiers receive their training from a U.S. commercial contractor, Military Pro-
fessional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI), which has already conducted programs
in Sarajevo and throughout the Federation. A recently established Federation mili-
tary training facility run by MPRI is fully integrated—Bosniac and Croat instruc-
tors and soldiers live, work, and train together. A training center for local units in the
Livno valley is scheduled to open in September, and a tank range for maneuver
training has a November start date.

While progress to date has been significant, more remains to be done. In the ten
months since its inception, its supporters believe Train and Equip has not yet estab-
lished for the Federation a European-class army or one that is capable of providing
security in this precarious area of the world. The Federation military’s primary weak-
nesses include: (1) a weak officer corps, (2) a tenuous logistics support structure,
and (3) little expertise in strategic and operational planning. The administration
estimates that by June 1998, with planned levels of support, the Federation Army
will be in a better position to accomplish the goals laid out for it at Dayton.

Train and Equip: The Debate

Why Are We Implementing The Train and Equip Program?

While the nature of the Train and Equip program is military —deterrence, and de-
fense if deterrence fails—supporters believe that its implementation reinforces fun-
damental political tenets of the Dayton Accord. Train and Equip has encouraged
much-needed institution building among the Croats and Bosniacs by mandating
the establishment of a single Federation defense ministry and joint command. Co-
operation has not been easy, but it grows incrementally. Parallel defense organiza-
tions in Mostar (Croat) and Sarajevo (Bosniac) have been united, although the op-
erations of the joint Ministry of Defense have been characterized as “sputtering.”
Passage of the common defense law was extremely difficult, but, in the end, was
accomplished. A joint command has been established, but is in need of support

The purpose of Train and
Equip is to help the Federation
establish a professional unified
Croatian-Bosniac military
under the civilian control of the
recently established joint
Federation government. Under
the terms of Dayton, this force
should have sufficient strength
to deter aggression and to
defend the Federation in the
event of aggression.