MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2018 ME	23

Docket: Fra-17-275

Submitted

On	Briefs: November	29,	2017

Decided: February	6,	2018

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

STACY	B.	(GREENLEAF)	MOOAR

v.

TERRY	L.	GREENLEAF

HUMPHREY,	J.

[¶1]	 	 Terry	 L.	 Greenleaf appeals	 from a judgment	 of	 divorce	 from	

Stacy B. (Greenleaf)	 Mooar entered	 by	 the	 District Court	 (Farmington,	

Carlson, J.). In	this	appeal,	Greenleaf contends that	the	court	erred	by	failing	to	

classify	 the	 increase	 in	 value	 to	 the	 property	 in	 Jay,	 Maine	 as	 marital	 or	

nonmarital	and	that	it	abused	its	discretion	in	its	award	of	spousal	support.		We	

vacate	the	judgment	in	part	and	remand	for	further	proceedings.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 On	 January	 6,	 2016,	 Mooar filed a	 complaint for	 divorce	 from	

Greenleaf after	over	nineteen	years	of	marriage. The	parties	have	five	minor	

children,	including	three	adopted	children,	and	one	adult	child	who	lives	with	

Greenleaf. The	 adult	 son	 neither	 attends	 school	 nor	 works.	 	 Greenleaf has	
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worked	 for	 the	 Town	 of	 Jay	 for	 the	 past	 thirty	 years,	 earning	 $51,104.80

annually.		Mooar is a	stay-at-home	parent	and	receives	 $26,097.50 in	annual	

adoption	subsidies.

[¶3]		During	 the	marriage,	 the	parties	lived	in	 Jay on	land	conveyed to	

Greenleaf by	his	parents	prior	to	the	parties’ marriage.		Greenleaf purchased	a	

mobile	home	before	 the	marriage	 for	 $18,500,	providing a	down	payment	of	

$10,000	and	financing	$8,500.		At	the	time	of	the	divorce,	there	was	a	mortgage	

on	 the	 property	 with	 a balance	 owed	 of	 $28,594.57.

1 The	 value	 of	 the	 real	

estate,	including	the	home,	was	$44,930.

[¶4]	 	 The	 court	 held	 a	 contested	 hearing	 on	 March	 17,	 2017.2	 	 In	 its	

divorce	 judgment,	 the	 court	 awarded	 the	 real	 estate in	 Jay and	 the	 debt	

associated	with	it to	Greenleaf and	ordered Greenleaf to	pay	Mooar (1) child	

support	arrearages	of	$12,408;	(2)	ongoing	child	support	pursuant	to	the	child	

support	guidelines;	and	(3)	spousal	support	of $350	per	week	for	9.75	years.		

The	court	also	ordered	Greenleaf’s	retirement	account,	worth	$132,799.64	and	

 1		Although	the	court	does	not	articulate	this	in	its	judgment,	this amount is	the undisputed balance	

owed	on	a	home	equity	loan	that	the	parties	 took	out	in	2005 in	Greenleaf’s	name	 to	pay	 off	 the	

remainder	of	the	loan	on	the	mobile	home	and to	pay	for	home	improvements.

2	 	 Before	 the	 hearing,	 the	 parties	 engaged	 in	 mediation	 and	 agreed	 to	 parental	 rights	 and	

responsibilities	and	primary	residence	of	the minor children.		Mooarwas	awarded	primary	residence	

for	the	four	youngest	children	and	Greenleaf was	awarded	primary	residence	for	the	parties’	oldest	

minor	son.
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subject	to	a	loan	of	$19,050.68,	to	be	liquidated	to	pay off the	outstanding	loan	

as	 well	 as	 the	 child	 support	 arrearage,	 and	 ordered	 that	 the	 remainder be	

divided	between	 the	parties,	with	 sixty	 percent	awarded	 to	Mooar and	 forty	

percent	to	Greenleaf.		Mooar was	allocated	any	and	all	debts	solely	in	her	name	

and	Greenleaf was	allocated	any	and	all	debts	solely	in	his	name	as	well	as	any	

and	all	joint	marital	debts.

[¶5]		Greenleaf filed	a	timely	motion	to	amend	the	court’s	findings,	make	

additional	 findings,	and	amend	 the	divorce	judgment	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	

52(b)	and	59(e), or,	in	the	alternative, for	a	new	trial	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	

59(b). The	court	granted	the	motion	in	part,	amending	its	judgment	to	reduce	

Greenleaf’s	 weekly	 child	 support	 obligation to	 account	 for	 the	 cost	 of	 the	

children’s	 health	 insurance,	 but	 summarily	 denied	 the	 other	 relief	 sought.		

Greenleaf timely	appealed.		See	19-A	M.R.S.	§ 104	(2017);	M.R.	App.	P.	2(b)(3)

(Tower	2016).3

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶6]	 Before	 addressing Greenleaf’s	 arguments regarding	 the	 court’s	

failure	to	classify	the	real	estate	in	Jay as	marital	or	nonmarital and	its	award	of	

 3		This	appeal	was	commenced	before	September	1,	2017,	and	therefore	the	restyled	Maine	Rules	

of	Appellate	Procedure	do	not	apply.		See	M.R.	App.	P.	1.		
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spousal	support,	we	must first consider	how	Greenleaf’s	Rule	52	motion	affects	

the standard	 of	 appellate	 review.	 	 See Ehret	 v.	 Ehret,	 2016	 ME	 43,	 ¶	 8,	

135 A.3d 101.

[¶7]		After	the	entry	of	a	judgment,	if	a	party	moves	for	findings	pursuant	

to	 Rule	 52,	 “the	 trial	 court	 must	 ensure	 that	 the	 judgment	 is	 supported	 by	

express	 factual	 findings	 that	 are	 based	 on	 record	 evidence,	 are	 sufficient	 to	

support	the	result,	and	are	sufficient	to	inform	the	parties	and	any	reviewing	

court	of	the	basis	for	the	decision.”		Id. ¶	9.	 Although	we	ordinarily	assume	that	

a	trial	court	found	all	the	facts	necessary	to	support	its	judgment,	when,	as	here,	

“a	motion	for	findings	has	been	filed	and	denied,	we	cannot	infer	findings	from

the evidence	in	the	record.		Instead,	the	court’s	decision	must	include	sufficient	

findings	to	support	its	result	or	the	order	must	be	vacated.”		Douglas	v.	Douglas,	

2012	ME	67,	¶	27,	43	A.3d	965 (citation	 omitted).		We	 review	a	trial	court’s	

denial	 of	 a	 Rule	 52	 motion	 for	 abuse	 of	 discretion.	 	 See Dalton	 v.	 Dalton,	

2014 ME 108,	¶	21,	99	A.3d	723.		

[¶8]	 Because	the	court	denied	Greenleaf’s Rule	52 motion	as	it	pertained

to	 the	 property	 classification and	 spousal	 support,	 we	 cannot	 infer	 findings	

from	the	record.		See	Douglas,	2012	ME	67,	¶	27,	43	A.3d	965.		If	we	conclude	

that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	when	it	denied	Greenleaf’s	Rule	52	motion	
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regarding	the	property	classification	or	spousal	support	award,	we	must	vacate

the	 denial	 of	Greenleaf’s	 motion	 and	 must	 also	 vacate	those	 portions	 of	 the	

judgment and	 remand	 for	 further	 findings.		See	id.;	Ehret,	2016	ME	43,	¶	16,	

135 A.3d	101.

A. Property	Classification

[¶9]		Greenleaf contends that	the	court	erred when	it	failed	to	classify	the	

real	 estate	 in	 Jay	 as	 marital	 or	 nonmarital	 property and	 that	 it	 abused	 its	

discretion	 when	 it	 denied	 his	 Rule	 52	 motion	 regarding the	 property	

distribution.		See Dalton,	2014	ME	108,	¶	21,	99	A.3d	723.	In	his	Rule	52	motion	

and	 on	 appeal,	 Greenleaf argues that	 the	 real	 estate	 should	 have	 been	

designated	as	nonmarital.

[¶10]	 	 In	 its	 judgment,	 the	 court	 discussed the	 real	 estate in	 Jay,	

explaining	that	Greenleaf had	received the	land by	gift and	had	purchased	the	

mobile	home	prior	to	the	parties’	marriage	by	providing a	down	payment	and	

financing	the	balance	of	the	purchase	price,	with	the	majority	of	the	payments	

on	 the	 mortgage	 made	 during	 the	 marriage.	 	 The	 judgment referenced	 the	

outstanding	mortgage	and	present	property	value,	which	had	increased	over	

the	years of	the	marriage.		It	did	not,	however,	classify	the	property	as	marital	

or	nonmarital	before	awarding	it	and	the	associated	debt	to	Greenleaf.
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[¶11]	 	We	 have	 “long	 recognized	 a	 three-step	 process	 for	 distributing	

property	in	a	divorce.”		Laqualia	v.	Laqualia,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838;	

see	 also	 19-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 953(1)	 (2017).	 	 First,	 the	 trial	 court	 must	 distinguish	

marital	 from	 nonmarital	 property.	 	 See	 Laqualia,	 2011	 ME	 114,	 ¶	 13,	

30 A.3d 838.	 	 Property	 acquired	 by	 one	 party	 before	 marriage	 is	 typically	

designated	 as	 nonmarital. See	 Miliano	 v.	 Miliano,	 2012	 ME	 100,	 ¶¶ 16,	 23,	

50 A.3d	 534.	 	The	other	 party	 must	 then	 demonstrate	that	 the	property	 has	

marital	components	before the	burden	shifts	to	the	first	party	to	show	which	

portion	of	the	property	is	nonmarital.		See	id. ¶	23; see also Violette	v.	Violette,	

2015	ME	97,	¶	23,	120	A.3d	667 (explaining	that	when	a	spouse	obtains	real	

property	before	marriage,	but	the	parties	make	mortgage	payments	during	the	

marriage,	 the property	 will	 have	 both	 marital	 and	 nonmarital	 components).		

Second,	the	 court	 must	 set	 apart	the	 nonmarital	 property to	 its	 owner.	 	 See	

Laqualia,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838;	see	also Miliano,	2012	ME	100,	¶ 16,	

50	A.3d	534 (stating	that	the	court	has	no	discretion	to	distribute	nonmarital	

property	because	 “such	 property	is	 simply	not	 subject	 to	 the	court’s	general	

equitable	 powers	 of	 distribution” (alteration	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted)).		“Finally,	the	court	must	divide	marital	property	in	such	proportion	
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as	the	court	deems	just.”		Laqualia,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838 (quotation	

marks	omitted).

[¶12]		Although	the	court’s	findings	suggest	that the	real	estate in	Jay	has	

both	marital	 and	 nonmarital	 components,	 the	 court	did	 not determine	what	

portion	 of	 it is	 nonmarital	 to	 be	 set	 aside to Greenleaf and thus	 missed an	

integral	 part of the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 property	 distribution	 process	 outlined	

above.4		See	Laqualia,	2011	ME	114,	¶	13,	30	A.3d	838.		Because	the	court	denied	

Greenleaf’s	 Rule	 52	 motion,	 we	 cannot	 infer	 whether	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	

property	 division,	 including	 the	 division	 of	 Greenleaf’s retirement	 account,	

would	have	been	affected	by	a	classification	of	the	Jay	real	estate,	or	portions	of	

it, as marital	or	nonmarital.		See Douglas,	2012	ME	67,	¶ 27,	43	A.3d	965.		

[¶13]		In	its	judgment,	 the	court neither set	 forth	adequate	 findings	on	

this	contested	issue nor	made findings	on	the	issues	raised	by	Greenleaf in	his	

Rule	 52	 motion,	 thus	 preventing effective	 appellate	 review.	 	 See	 Finucan	 v.	

Williams,	2013	ME	75,	¶	15,	73	A.3d	1056. Accordingly,	the denial	of	Greenleaf’s	

motion regarding	the	property	classification constitutes	an	abuse	of	discretion.		

We must	 vacate	 this	 portion	 of	 the	 judgment	 and	 remand	 for	 the	 court	 to	

 4	 	Nor	 did	 the	 court	 indicate	 that	 the	 parties	 had	 presented	 insufficient	 evidence	 to	 shift	 the	

burdens.	 See	Miliano	v.	Miliano,	2012	ME	100,	¶	23,	50	A.3d	534.		
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classify	the	real	estate in	Jay,	or	portions	of	it,	as	marital	or	nonmarital and	to	

reevaluate	the	entire	property	distribution,	if	necessary.

B. Spousal	Support

[¶14]		Greenleaf	also	contends	that	the	court	abused	its	discretion	in	its	

determination	of	spousal	support	and	asserts	that	he	does	not	have	the	ability	

to	pay	 the	required	amount.		 In	his	Rule	52	motion	and	on	appeal,	Greenleaf	

highlights the	 judgment’s	 silence	 on	 his	 ability	 to	 pay.	 	We	 review	 a	 court’s	

decision	 regarding	 spousal	 support for	 abuse	 of	 discretion.	 	 See	 Jandreau	 v.	

LaChance,	2015	ME	66,	¶	14,	116	A.3d	1273.

[¶15]		Section	951-A(5)	of	title	19-A	outlines	the	factors	that	a	court	must	

consider	when	determining	an	award	of	spousal	support.		Included	in	the	list	of	

factors	is	the	“ability	of	each	party	to	pay.”		19-A	M.R.S.	§	951-A(5)(B)	(2017).		

The	statute	requires	the	court	to	make	a	statement	accompanying	its	award	of	

spousal	 support,	 referencing	 the	 factors	 on	 which	 it	 relied.	 	 19-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 951-A(1)(D) (2017).		

[¶16]	 	 In	 its	 order	 granting	 spousal	 support,	 the	 court	 made	 such	 a	

statement,	discussing	the	length	of	the	marriage,	the health	of	the	parties,	the	

parties’	 contributions	 to	 homemaking,	 and	 the	 divergent	 employment	 and	

income	histories	of	 the	parties.		Absent	 from	 that	list	is	Greenleaf’s	ability	 to	
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pay.	 	 Although	 the	 court	 may	 rely	 on	 some	 of	 the	 factors	 listed	 in	 section	

951-A(5)	to	the	exclusion	of	others,	Jandreau,	2015	ME	66,	¶	16,	116	A.3d	1273,	

and	 “the	 court	 need	 not	 detail	 its	 rationale,	 it	 has	 a	 duty	 to	 make	 sufficient	

findings	to	inform	the	parties	of	the	reasons	for	its	conclusions,	and	to	allow	for	

effective	appellate	review,”	Finucan,	2013	ME	75,	¶	15,	73	A.3d	1056 (alteration	

omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).

[¶17]		According	to	Greenleaf,	he	would	be	left	with	$18	each	week	after	

weekly	 deductions,	 expenses,	 and	 the	 spousal	 support	 payment.	 	 Mooar

disputes	Greenleaf’s	calculation.		Further,	a	calculation	using	 the	information	

provided	by	Greenleaf	in	his	financial	statement	does	not	support	the	amount	

calculated	by	either	party	in	their	briefs.5		Nevertheless,	given	the	small	amount	

of	money	that	Greenleaf	alleges	he	will	have	left	over	each	week,	Greenleaf’s	

ability	to	pay	is	a	relevant	factor	that	the	court	should	have	considered—and	

explained	 how	 it	 considered—in	 its	 spousal	 support	 award.	 	 See	 Ehret,	

2016 ME 43,	¶	17,	135	A.3d	101.	Because	we	cannot	infer	findings	after	a	denial	

of	 a	 Rule	 52	 motion,	 the	 court’s	 failure	 to	 address	 Greenleaf’s	 ability	 to	 pay	

precludes	 effective	 appellate	 review.	 	 See	 Finucan,	 2013	 ME	 75,	 ¶ 15,	

 5	 	 This	 calculation	 uses	 the	 amended	 child	 support	 payment	 and	 removes	 the	 loan	 payment	

because	 the	 court	 ordered	 the	 loan	 to	 be	 paid	 off	with	 the	 proceeds	 from	Greenleaf’s	liquidated	

retirement	account.
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73 A.3d 1056.	 	 Accordingly,	 we	 conclude	 that	 the	 court	 also	 abused	 its	

discretion	 when	 it	 denied	 Greenleaf’s	 Rule	 52	 motion	 as	 it	 pertained	 to	 the	

spousal	 support	 award.	 	 We	 therefore	 vacate	 this portion	 of	 the	 divorce	

judgment	and	remand	for	the	court	to	consider,	and	explain	how	it	considered,	

Greenleaf’s	ability	to	pay.		See	id.	¶	18.

The	entry	is:

Order	denying	motion	 for	 further	 findings	with	

regard	 to	 the property	 distribution	 and	 the	

spousal	 support	 vacated.	 	 Divorce	 judgment	

vacated	 only	 as	 to	 property	 distribution	 and	

spousal	 support.	 	 Remainder	 of	 judgment	 is	

affirmed.	 	 Remanded	 for	 further	 proceedings	

consistent	with	this	opinion.

Patrick	R.	Nickerson,	Esq.,	Paradie,	Sherman,	Walker	&	Worden,	Lewiston,	for	

appellant	Terry	L.	Greenleaf

Caroline	Y.	Jova,	Esq.,	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance,	Portland,	for	appellee	Stacy	B.	

(Greenleaf)	Mooar

Farmington	District	Court	docket	number	FM-2016-03

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY