CAPITOL VISITOR 

CENTER 

Current Status of Schedule 

and Estimated Cost 

Statement of David M. Walker, 

Comptroller General of the United States 

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Legislative, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, July 15, 2003 

GAO-03-1014T 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Recognizing the need for a new facility to provide greater security for all 

persons working in or visiting the United States Capitol and to enhance the 

educational experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress 

and the Capitol building, Congress authorized the Architect of the Capitol 

(AOC) to build a new Capitol Visitor Center. The three-story, underground 

facility, located on the East side of the Capitol, is designed to be a seamless 

addition to the Capitol complex when completed without detracting from 

the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. 

Earlier this spring, GAO and the AOC determined that the estimated budget 

amount of $303.5 million for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) “base project” 

was no longer current. Based on GAO’s recommendation, the AOC hired a 

contractor to help analyze and update the cost estimate for completion of 

the base project. GAO’s review of the contractor’s “base cost” estimate 

analysis identified $7 million in adjustments, therefore increasing the 

contractor’s $344.3 million estimate to $351.3 million. GAO also conducted a 

supplemental analysis to identify potential future costs due to additional 

risks and uncertainties not included in the updated estimates. The result of 

this supplemental analysis disclosed that these risks and uncertainties could 

raise the estimated cost to between $380 million and $395 million. These 

potential additional costs do not need to be added to the base project budget 

now; however, a number of actions need to be taken to mitigate known 

risks. 

The AOC’s May 2003 status report indicates the project is on schedule for 

substantial completion of the plaza deck in January 2005, substantial 

completion of the CVC in September 2005, and final completion and opening 

to the public in December 2005. However, the project is currently 

experiencing delays and until the AOC compiles a fully integrated schedule, 

there will not be adequate information to determine whether the estimated 

completion dates are likely to be met. 

GAO has been providing ongoing 

assistance to the Capitol 

Preservation Commission and the 

Senate and House Appropriations 

Committees in their monitoring and 

oversight of the Capitol Visitor 

Center construction project. 

Given the current decisions facing 

the Congress, this testimony covers 

(1) management of the project, 

(2) the estimated cost for the 

project, (3) the status of the 

project’s schedule, and (4) actions 

that Congress and the AOC should 

consider taking to address funding 

gaps and other current project 

issues and risks. 

We propose that the Architect of 

the Capitol and Congress consider 

taking actions to 

• address the gap between the 

$303.5 million current funding 

for the “base project” and the 

updated estimates; 

• consider how best to address 

costs associated with risks and 

uncertainties not included in 

updated “base cost” estimates; 

• continue to resolve scope, 

requirements, estimated costs, 

and funding sources for 

unresolved items; 

• implement controls for the 

approval of changes and use of 

contingency funds; 

• continue to resolve 

contingency tracking and 

reporting issues; and 

• expeditiously develop a 

comprehensive, integrated 

master project schedule. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1014T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jeanette 

Franzel (202) 512-9471 or franzelj@gao.gov 

or Bernard L. Ungar at (202) 512-4232. 

Highlights of GAO-03-1014T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Legislative, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives. 

July 15, 2003 

CAPITOL VISITOR CENTER 

Current Status of Schedule and 

Estimated Cost 
1 GAO-03-1014T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Recognizing the need for a new facility to provide greater security for all persons 

working in or visiting the United States Capitol and to enhance the educational 

experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress and the Capitol building, 

Congress authorized the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) to build a new visitor center for 

the Capitol. The three-story, underground facility, located on the East side of the 

Capitol, is designed to be a seamless addition to the Capitol complex when completed 

without detracting from the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. It is 

the largest project on the Capitol grounds in over 140 years. According to current plans, 

when complete it will include theaters, an auditorium, exhibit space, a service tunnel for 

truck loading and deliveries, storage, and space for use by the House and Senate. 

In response to requests from members of the Capitol Preservation Commission (CPC) 

and the conference report to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations 

Act, 1999 (House Conference Report 105-825), GAO has been providing ongoing 

assistance to the CPC and the Senate and House appropriations committees in their 

monitoring and oversight of the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) project. While we have 

provided a wide range of assistance as the project has evolved, today, given the current 

decisions facing the Congress, I will focus on (1) management of the project, (2) the 

estimated cost for the project, (3) the status of the project’s schedule, and (4) actions 

that Congress and the AOC should consider taking to address funding gaps and other 

current project issues and risks. 

Management of the Project 

Shortly after we began to monitor progress on the CVC project, we made a number of 

suggestions to the AOC aimed at ensuring effective management of the project based on 

our previous work reviewing construction projects in all three branches of government. 

AOC generally agreed with our suggestions and took the following actions. 

The AOC hired a construction management firm, Gilbane, for day-to-day detailed 

management of the project. Gilbane has provided project management, including 

supervision of contractors’ work, schedule and cost monitoring, procurement of general 

conditions construction work, and monitoring and protection of the Capitol building 

from potential impact of construction. Recently, Gilbane has been working to implement 

a cost tracking system that conforms to the AOC’s approved budget line items for the 

CVC. 

Recognizing the impact that construction of the CVC would have on day-to-day 

congressional operations, AOC established a communication/outreach effort specifically 

dedicated to meeting the ongoing need of providing Congress with information regarding 

the project’s impact on congressional operations, as well as progress toward completion 

of the CVC. 

To supplement its in-house capability, AOC also entered into an agreement with the 

General Services Administration (GSA) to provide services related to management of the 
2 GAO-03-1014T 

Sequence 1 and 2 procurements. Under the agreement, GSA managed the procurement 

process, while the AOC (the source selection authority) awarded and now administers 

the contracts. 

While these positive steps have been taken, there are a number of other actions needed 

to strengthen project management that are outlined in the following sections, including 

developing risk mitigation strategies and improving tracking and reporting. 

Estimated Cost for the Project

Earlier this spring, we and the AOC determined that the estimated budget amount of 

$303.5 million for the CVC “base project”1

 was no longer current. The estimate was 

limited due to uncertainties related to the preliminary nature of the design work, 

unknown scope of pre-construction requirements, and security adjustments to the design 

after the events of September 11, 2001. In addition, it was already evident that the 

expected cost of a number of line items in the estimate, such as utility relocation, tree 

preservation, temporary visitor screening facilities, and historic preservation, would be 

exceeded. 

Based on GAO’s recommendation, the AOC and Gilbane updated the project cost 

estimates as of March 20, 2003. The AOC then contracted with Tishman Construction 

Corporation (Tishman) to review the March 20, 2003 estimate and perform a cost 

analysis based on information currently available. We reviewed the methodology, 

assumptions, and support for the analysis, dated May 16, 2003, including contingencies, 

scope items not included in the estimates, and risks and uncertainties.2

 We also 

conducted a supplemental analysis to identify potential future costs due to additional 

risks and uncertainties not included in the updated estimates. 

While we identified limitations to Tishman’s analysis, our review found that Tishman’s 

analysis was generally reasonable given the scope and assumptions provided by the AOC 

to Tishman. However, based on information available to us as of June 16, 2003, we 

identified cost adjustments to Tishman’s analysis of the base project, totaling $7 million, 

that we believe need to be made. These adjustments would increase Tishman’s 

estimated cost at completion for the base project from $344.3 million to $351.3 million. 

Due to the nature of the uncertainties still surrounding the project’s estimated cost to 

complete and the limitations of information available at this time, there will likely be 

events occurring in the future that could further materially affect the project’s cost at 

completion. For example, additional risks and uncertainties, which cannot be predicted 

with certainty at this time, were not priced as part of Tishman’s analysis or as part of our 

 

1

 The base project includes a finished visitor center shell and core, an extended loading dock service 

tunnel, exterior finishes, improvements to the East Plaza, construction of unfinished House and Senate 

expansion space, exhibits, technical security systems, and a connecting tunnel to the Library of Congress. 

The base project does not include other items funded by other sources, such as finishing the House and 

Senate expansion space and certain security-related enhancements. 

2

 Although we performed procedures to review the methodology, assumptions, and support behind the 

latest cost analysis for the CVC project, we did not conduct an audit. 
3 GAO-03-1014T 

adjusted figure. The result of this supplemental analysis disclosed that these additional 

risks and uncertainties could potentially raise the estimated cost at completion of the 

base project to between $380 million and $395 million. (See the list of additional risks 

and uncertainties below.) These potential additional costs of between $30 million and 

$45 million do not need to be added to the base project budget at this time; however, a 

number of actions need to be taken to mitigate known risks. 

In order to arrive at the potential estimated cost of $380 million to $395 million, which 

includes the additional risks and uncertainties, we used the CVC project team’s lowest, 

most likely, and highest cost estimates for 37 project elements (e.g., structure/site, East 

Front structure, Library of Congress tunnel) and a simulation analysis to calculate 

different combinations of the project team’s estimates that factored in risks and 

uncertainties. Some of the larger risks and uncertainties include unforeseen conditions 

(including potential underground obstructions); building settlement; contractor 

coordination issues, especially as they relate to any delays experienced; and the lack of 

an approved design program in some areas. 

While it is not possible to eliminate all risks and uncertainties, certain steps can and 

should be taken to lessen their potential impact on the final cost of the project. Research 

by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) shows project scope is the major 

Additional Risks and Uncertainties That Could Affect 

Project Cost or Utilization

• Unforeseen conditions, including potential underground complications 

• Potential for scope creep due to lack of a finalized and approved design 

program in some areas 

• Cost overruns on “design-to-budget” scope, e.g., exhibitions and technical 

security 

• Cost and schedule impacts due to contractor coordination issues 

• Project delays and subsequent contractor claims 

• Delays due to unique situations—e.g., government functions, terrorist 

alerts, state funerals 

• Unanticipated client requests 

• Inaugural support 

• Unknown operator requirements (gift shop, kitchen, theater, exhibitions) 

• Capitol Building settlement or other damage 

• Impact of cost allocations to the House and Senate expansion space on 

the CVC base budget
4 GAO-03-1014T 

determinant of the cost of a project.3 Tishman noted that the reasonableness of AOC’s 

and Gilbane’s March 20, 2003, estimate could not be determined for several items 

because detailed requirements for those items have not been fully determined or 

approved by the CPC. CII research also shows that the lack of scope definition is the 

root cause of cost overruns, late completion dates, excessive rework, unnecessary 

disputes among project participants, and other problems associated with construction 

projects.4

 While we did not identify any scope or quality changes to date that have not 

been brought to the CPC’s attention, we are concerned that allowances for the “design to 

budget” items (for example, the exhibition space and technical security) may not be 

sufficient to cover the expected scope and quality. We believe there is a continual need 

for the AOC to align customer expectations with the project’s scope, quality, and cost 

considerations. The Tishman analysis noted that the percentage of pending changes to 

date compared to the Sequence 1 contract cost is already above industry norms and that 

there is the potential for scope creep. As a result, it will be important for the AOC to 

implement controls for the advance and formal approval of any scope changes. 

It is general practice when performing budget estimates for construction projects to 

carry a contingency allowance to cover such issues as unforeseen field conditions and 

design and price changes. The Tishman analysis evaluated the adequacy of the estimated 

contingency amounts and increased the amounts in several areas. Based on the 

information we gathered, we also increased the estimates for contingencies in certain 

areas. As the project moves forward, it is important that the AOC implement controls for 

using these contingency funds. Furthermore, we understand that the method to be used 

for tracking and reporting on contingency balances remains unresolved. 

There are also items not in the base project that need to be resolved. For example, the 

requirements, estimated costs, and funding sources for wayfinding signage,5 additional 

furniture, fixtures, and equipment, and artwork have not been fully determined. In 

addition, the method for operating and maintaining the CVC has not yet been 

determined. Consequently, neither the updated estimates nor our supplemental analysis 

include provisions for these items. 

Although not considered part of the base project, the $70 million already appropriated 

for the House and Senate expansion space may not be sufficient to make the space fully 

functional. Our review noted that substantial funds have already been allocated from the 

House and Senate expansion space budgets. Also, substantial risk exists because the 

design for the House and Senate expansion space is not complete, and it is assumed that 

the expansion space will be “designed to budget.” However, to the extent that the future 

design and requirements exceed the remaining budget amounts, additional funds may be 

needed. 

 

3

Construction Industry Institute, Project Change Management, Special Publication 43-1 (Austin, Tex.: 

November 1994). 

4

Construction Industry Institute, Improving Early Estimates, Implementation Resource 131-2 (Austin, 

Tex.: September 1998). 

5

Code-required signage is included in the estimated cost of the base project. 
5 GAO-03-1014T 

Status of the Project’s Schedule

To expedite the project schedule and maintain the option for use of some portion of the 

CVC for the inaugural events of January 20, 2005, the AOC divided the project into the 

following stages, rather than bid the total project after completion of all design work: 

Pre-construction (largely complete) 

• Pre-construction work includes utility relocations, historic preservation efforts, tree 

care, and temporary visitor facilities. These efforts were conducted in advance of 

building construction to expedite the start of the construction contractor work. The 

work is basically completed, with the exception of ongoing tree preservation. 

Construction (in process) 

• The construction contract for structural/foundation work, referred to as Sequence 1, 

was awarded to Centex Construction in June 2002 and, assuming no delays, is 

scheduled to be substantially complete in Spring 2004. As discussed below, the 

Sequence 1 contractor has experienced delays and the AOC is working with the 

contractor to determine the impact of these delays to the project. 

• The construction contract for the project interface with the East Front of the Capitol, 

known as Sequence 1C, was awarded on July 11, 2003. Assuming no delays, this work 

is scheduled to be complete in Summer 2004. 

• The construction contract for mechanical, electrical, plumbing and interior finishes 

work, referred to as Sequence 2, was awarded on April 18, 2003 to Manhattan 

Construction. Assuming no delays, completion of the construction work is scheduled 

for December 2005. However, as discussed below, current delays in Sequence 1 

could impact the Sequence 2 schedule. 

 

Senate and House Expansion Space (in design phase) 

• The design of these spaces is scheduled to be completed late in 2003. The 

construction of these spaces is scheduled to begin in the summer of 2004, with 

completion in 2006. 

Exhibits (in design phase) 

• The final phase of the project will involve the fabrication and installation of the 

exhibits. Because installation involves climate requirements only available in 

completed space, this contract is scheduled to be awarded and begin in late 2003, 

with projected completion in December 2005. 

The AOC’s May 2003 status report indicates the project is on schedule for substantial 

completion of the plaza deck in January 2005, substantial completion of the CVC in 

September 2005, and final completion and opening to the public in December 2005. The 

project, however, is currently experiencing delays and the AOC is working with Gilbane 

to develop a fully integrated schedule. Until the AOC develops a fully integrated 

schedule, it will be difficult to determine whether the estimated completion dates are 

likely to be met. A fully integrated schedule would combine schedules for all of the 
6 GAO-03-1014T 

interrelated CVC projects, activities, and long-lead-time procurements (e.g. Sequence 1, 

Sequence 2, East Front interface, west refrigeration plant expansion, 2005 inauguration) 

into one coordinated schedule. (The Sequence 2 full schedule is currently not available 

but is due from Manhattan in August.) According to Gilbane’s June 5, 2003, report, the 

Sequence 1 contractor’s May update shows a 134-workday6

 delay to the completion of 

Sequence 1. The AOC and contractor are negotiating the potential impact of any delays 

on the project schedule and budget. The AOC has indicated that current Sequence 1 

delays have possibly led to a 40 workday overlap between the Sequence 1 and Sequence 

2 schedules. Although Gilbane and the AOC are working with Centex and Manhattan to 

mitigate the impact of the 40 workday overlap to the schedule, it is currently unclear 

what the total effect of the current Sequence 1 delays will be to the final project 

completion date or costs. Because the project is still in the early stages of construction, 

there is risk of additional delays. We included an additional $2 million in contingency in 

our adjustments to the Tishman estimated cost-to-complete for possible delay and 

acceleration costs. 

Matters for AOC and Congressional Consideration

Although the AOC has already initiated some actions to address some issues, we 

identified the following specific matters for the AOC’s and your consideration: 

• Expeditiously address the current funding gap between the $303.5 million provided 

for the base project and the updated estimates. 

• Consider how best to address the potential costs associated with the risks and 

uncertainties not specifically included in the updated estimates for the base project. 

• Ask the AOC to develop a plan to mitigate risk factors, to the extent practicable, and 

implement recommendations made by Tishman in the May 16, 2003, report including, 

but not limited to: 

o revalidate the program of requirements for each cost element, 

o identify, contract for, and begin coordination of all operator requirements 

with existing design and construction efforts, 

o identify and involve the exhibit and audio visual equipment operators as 

soon as possible, and 

o institute a proactive schedule management and tracking system related to 

potential contractor delay claims. 

• Determine whether to establish and fund a reserve account for any additional 

amounts above the current estimates to cover future costs due to risks and 

uncertainties that cannot be priced or estimated at the current time and establish 

procedures for timely release of the funds to the CVC project. 

 

6

 The current contractor schedule indicates a 5 day workweek. Therefore, 134 workdays is equivalent to 

187 calendar days, or approximately 6 months. 
7 GAO-03-1014T 

• Continue to resolve the scope, requirements, estimated costs, and funding sources for 

unresolved items in the base project, such as fitout of the CVC administration, guide 

service, first aid and gift shop spaces. 

• Continue to resolve the scope, requirements, estimated costs, and funding sources for 

the items not in the base project, including the House and Senate expansion space. 

• Implement controls for the approval of changes and AOC’s use of contingency funds. 

• Continue to resolve contingency tracking and reporting issues to achieve a single and 

standardized budget and reporting format. 

• Expeditiously develop a comprehensive, integrated master project schedule. 

We will continue our monitoring efforts throughout construction. I will be happy to 

answer any questions at this time. 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Jeanette M. Franzel at 

(202) 512-9471 or Bernard L. Ungar at (202) 512-4232. 

(194320) 
GAO’s Mission The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 

responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the

federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public 

funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good 

government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and 

reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web 

site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO email this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to 

e-mail alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to

a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs