Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

April 2004 OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

Long-standing 

Problems Hampering 

Mail Delivery Need to 

Be Resolved 

GAO-04-484 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-484.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Neal P. Curtin, 

(757) 552-8100, curtinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-484, a report to the 

Senate and House Committees on Armed 

Services and the Subcommittees on 

Defense, Senate and House Committees 

on Appropriations 

April 2004

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

Long-standing Problems Hampering Mail 

Delivery Need to Be Resolved 

The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DOD) 

does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. In 

general, DOD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell 

within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the 

methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual 

delivery times. In the absence of reliable data, GAO conducted discussion 

groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served 

in-theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, 

underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale. 

Despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal 

planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into 

planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the 

same problems: difficulty with conducting joint-service mail operations; 

postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce owing to 

late deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and 

transportation. The operations plan created for joint-service mail delivery 

contained certain assumptions key to its success but led to unforeseen 

consequences or did not occur. Also, plans for a Joint Postal Center were 

not fully put in place. One lesson learned from 1991 was carried out with 

success during Operation Iraqi Freedom: mail was transported overseas by 

dedicated contractor airlifts rather than by military. 

DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal 

problems experienced during contingency operations. Moreover, the Military 

Postal Service Agency does not have the authority to ensure that these 

problems are addressed jointly. This agency and the military services, 

however, have taken some steps toward tackling these issues. 

Mail is a morale booster for troops 

fighting overseas and for their 

families at home. More than 65 

million pounds of letters and 

parcels were delivered to troops 

serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

in 2003 and problems with prompt 

and reliable mail delivery surfaced 

early in the conflict. Congress and 

the White House forwarded more 

than 300 inquiries about mail 

delivery problems to military postal 

officials. 

GAO was directed to review mail 

delivery to troops stationed in the 

Middle East. In this report, GAO 

assesses (1) the timeliness of mail 

delivery to and from troops in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how 

mail delivery issues and problems 

during this operation compared 

with those experienced during 

Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 

1991, and (3) efforts to identify 

actions to resolve problems in 

establishing mail operations for 

future contingencies. 

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense (1) implement 

a new system to accurately track, 

calculate, and report postal transit 

times and (2) consolidate lessons 

learned from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and develop and 

implement a specific course of 

action to resolve them. DOD, in its 

formal review of this report, fully 

concurs with GAO’s 

recommendations and has begun 

taking steps to implement them. 
Page i GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined 9

Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm 

Continued to Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom 17

Various Military Postal Units Have Identified Solutions to Postal 

Problems, but No Mechanism Is in Place to Ensure Their 

Consolidation and Resolution 27

Conclusions 28

Recommendations for Executive Action 29

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 32 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Tables 

Table 1: Example of How Methodology Is Used 12

Table 2: Planning Assumptions, Actions and Their Effects 18

Figures 

Figure 1: Mail Flow into Iraqi Theater 7

Figure 2: Mail Handlers at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in 

Kuwait 8

Figure 3: Truck Convoy Carrying Mail outside of Kuwait City 9

Figure 4: Average Transit Times for Parcels and Letters, as 

Reported by the Transit Time Information Standard 

System for Military Mail, from February through 

September 2003 11

Figure 5: Test Letter Average Monthly Transit Times 14

Figure 6: Damaged Parcels at Camp Pendleton, California 16

Figure 7: Number of Days Army Reserve Postal Units Spent at 

Mobilization Stations 23

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 8: Rough Terrain Container Handler (left) and Rough 

Terrain Fork Lift (right) at the Joint Military Mail 

Terminal in Kuwait, December 2003 25

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO General Accounting Office 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

April 14, 2004 

Congressional Committees 

On March 19, 2003, coalition forces led by the United States began 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. The operation required a high level of 

coordination and planning, especially in the area of support for the war 

fighting troops. One such area of support—and a necessary component in 

the maintenance of service members’ morale—was postal operations. 

Effective postal operations are important to both the troops stationed in 

theater and for their families and friends at home. Even though alternative 

methods of communicating, such as the Internet and mobile phones, 

became available to some troops and their families for the first time during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the mail remained the main form of 

communication and the delivery of goods. 

More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. 

Central Command’s contingency area of responsibility during calendar 

year 2003. U.S. Central Command is the combatant command for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. The largest amount moved in a single month was 

April 2003, when over 11 million pounds of mail was delivered. This 

represents an average of just over 377,000 pounds per day−the equivalent 

of about forty 40-foot-long trailers full of mail. 

Problems with the prompt and reliable delivery of mail to troops during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom surfaced during the first months of the conflict 

and continued throughout. From February 23, 2003, through November 3, 

2003, Congress and the White House forwarded to military postal officials 

more than 300 inquiries concerned with the delivery of mail to and from 

troops stationed in theater. The majority of these inquiries dealt with the 

failure of troops to receive mail sent by their families and friends and with 

other criticisms of the postal operations. The volume of inquiries served as 

an indication that postal operations serving Operation Iraqi Freedom were 

experiencing problems. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations Act, 2004, and also the 

Senate Report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2004, directed that we review mail delivery to troops stationed in the 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Middle East and compare delivery efficiency issues from Operation Desert 

Storm with those of Operation Iraqi Freedom.1

 As agreed with your offices, 

in this report we assess (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from 

troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery issues and 

problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom compare with 

those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts to identify 

actions to resolve problems for future contingencies. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed DOD guidance for 

military postal operations. We collected, analyzed, and assessed the 

reliability of transit time data. We interviewed DOD and Joint Staff 

officials in charge of developing policy for postal operations and key 

postal officials stationed at various postal agencies in the United States, 

Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain about their views on the implementation of 

postal operations. We conducted discussion groups with a 

non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines serving in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom to obtain their opinions on the quality of mail 

service during the conflict. We conducted our review from August 2003 

through March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Further information on our scope and methodology 

appears in appendix I. 

The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a 

reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Transit time data 

reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military 

Mail show that average transit times for letter and parcels into the theater 

consistently fell within the 11- to 14-day range—well within the current 

wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, we determined that the 

method used to calculate these averages consistently masks the actual 

times by using weighted averages that result in a significant understating 

of transit times. A second source of datatest letters that were sent to 

individual service members at military post offices by the Military Postal 

Service Agency from February through September 2003—indicate that 

mail delivery, on average, met the wartime standard during all but 

1 month. However, we found that a significant number of test letters were 

never returned and that test letters do not accurately measure transit time 

to the individual service member because they are sent only to individuals 

 1

Pub. L. No. 108-87, 117 Stat. 1054 (2003); Sen. Rep. No. 108-46, at 308 (2003). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

located at military post offices. It could take several more days for mail to 

get to forward-deployed troops. Even though the data show otherwise, 

military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. Therefore, in the absence of 

reliable data to describe timeliness, we conducted discussion groups with 

a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served 

in theater. While their responses cannot be projected, more than half said 

they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, many waiting 4 weeks or longer 

to get mail. Moreover, some troops received certain pieces of mail only 

after they returned home to their stateside installations. According to this 

group of soldiers, one of the issues that hampered mail delivery was that 

postal information was not able to keep up with changing deployment 

information. Furthermore, these soldiers stated that these problems and 

delays had a negative impact on the morale of deployed troops, as mail 

was often their only link with family and friends at home. 

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners 

to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into the 

planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were 

encountered. These problems include (1) difficulty in conducting 

joint-service postal operations; (2) inadequately trained and initially scarce 

postal personnel owing to late deployments; and (3) inadequate postal 

facilities, heavy material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to 

handle the initial mail surge. U.S. Central Command created an operations 

plan for joint mail delivery, but some of the planning assumptions were 

flawed and the plan was not fully implemented. This plan included several 

assumptions that were key to its success, but certain assumptions 

produced unforeseen negative consequences and others were not 

implemented or were unrealistic. For example, the elimination of mail 

addressed to “any service member” increased the number of parcels 

because senders found ways around the restriction. In addition, plans to 

restrict the size and weight of letters and parcels until adequate postal 

facilities had been established were never enacted; and the initial surge of 

mail exceeded the planned estimate, overburdening the developing mail 

system. The plan also directed that a Joint Postal Center—comprising 

postal officials from all services—manage and coordinate joint postal 

operations in theater. However, this effort was not fully implemented, and 

joint mail delivery suffered as a result. The Military Postal Service Agency 

did implement one strategy that proved to be successful as a result of 

lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Dedicated 

contractor airlift of mail into the contingency area was employed, avoiding 

the necessity of competing for military air cargo capacity, which greatly 

improved the regularity of mail service to the theater. 
Page 4 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing 

postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Military 

postal officials have begun to identify solutions to some of these issues. 

However, despite early efforts made by the Military Postal Service Agency 

to consolidate problems and identify solutions, this agency does not have 

the authority to ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and 

resolved prior to the next military contingency. During our meetings with 

dozens of key military postal officials serving during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, we collected memoranda, after action reports, and their 

comments regarding the postal issues and problems that should be 

addressed to avoid a repetition of the same postal problems in future 

contingencies. These issues include: improving joint postal planning and 

ensuring joint execution of that plan; early deployment of postal troops; 

preparing updated tables of organization and equipment for postal units; 

improving peacetime training for postal units; and reviewing the command 

and control of postal units in a joint theater. The Military Postal Service 

Agency hosted a joint postal conference in October 2003 to discuss postal 

problems with dozens of key postal participants in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom and is currently in the process of consolidating these issues into 

a single document with the intent of developing plans to resolve the issues. 

In addition, the service components and the Military Postal Service Agency 

have taken some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and 

tracking systems. 

We are making several recommendations aimed at (1) establishing a 

system that will accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times 

and (2) designating responsibility and providing sufficient authority within 

the department to address and fix long-standing postal problems identified 

in this report. In written comments on a draft of this report, the 

Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our 

recommendations and has directed the Military Postal Service Agency to 

(1) implement a more accurate system to track and report postal transit 

times and (2) facilitate and track corrective actions taken by DOD entities 

specified in the Joint Services After Action Report following the Joint 

Service Postal Conference held in October 2003. 

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 created the independent U.S. Postal 

Service and authorized it to make arrangements with DOD regarding the 

performance of military postal services.2

 Each military service managed its 

 2

Pub. L. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, 724 (1970), codified at title 39 of the U.S. Code. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

own mail program until 1980, when DOD and the U.S. Postal Service 

entered into an agreement for the joint provision of postal services for all 

branches of the armed forces. The agreement created the Military Postal 

Service Agency, which acts as an extension of the U.S. Postal Service 

beyond the boundaries of U.S. sovereignty and must provide full postal 

services, as nearly as practicable, for all DOD personnel overseas where 

there is no U.S. Postal Service available.3

 The Military Postal Service 

Agency is DOD’s single manager for military postal functions. Although 

this joint service agency is organizationally located under the Army 

Adjutant General and depends on the Army for funding and staffing, the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics) is 

responsible for the agency’s policies and oversight. 

In October 2002, several months prior to U.S. and coalition troops crossing 

the border into Iraq, a joint planning conference was held at U.S. Central 

Command—the designated combatant command for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. The U.S. Central Command hosted the conference, bringing 

together postal officials from all four military components, as well as the 

U.S. Postal Service and the Military Postal Service Agency. The conference 

led to the creation of a U.S. Central Command postal operating plan that 

assigned roles and responsibilities for all joint postal operations during the 

impending contingency. 

The DOD doctrine for joint military operations states that postal support 

for any contingency is coordinated by the combatant command in the 

region. The combatant commander appoints a single-service postal 

manager to direct, implement, and manage all postal operations in the 

joint theater. Since the Gulf War in 1991, the single-service manager for 

postal operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility has 

been the Air Force’s 82nd Computer Support Squadron, currently assigned 

to the Air Force’s Air Combat Command. However, U.S. Central Command 

has the overriding responsibility for all operations in theater, including 

postal operations. 

The movement of mail from the Unites States to troops in the Iraqi theater 

follows several complex logistical steps. Letters and parcels with military 

addresses destined to Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain are sent to one of four 

International Mail GatewaysNew York, San Francisco, Chicago and 

 3

See Single Manager for Military Postal Service, DOD Directive 4525.6 (May 5, 1980) 

enclosure 2, section E 3.1.1. 
Page 6 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Miamifor processing. According to Military Postal Service Agency data, 

90 percent of all letters and parcels for Operation Iraqi Freedom were 

processed through New York. The U.S. Postal Service delivers letters to 

the International Service Center at John F. Kennedy Airport, in New York; 

parcels are delivered to the Postal Service’s International and Bulk Mail 

Center in New Jersey. After the letters and parcels are sorted, they are 

then packaged, placed into containers, and then transferred to Newark 

International Airport in New Jersey where they are loaded onto airplanes 

for transport to the Iraqi theater.4

 Unlike during Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, where military planes operated by the Military Airlift 

Command transported much of the mail, a dedicated contractor aircraft 

carried mail during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

During the next stage of mail movement, the mail planes fly to aerial mail 

terminals colocated at the international airports in Kuwait and Bahrain. 

Once landed, local airport ground handlers offload the mail containers 

from the planes and take them to an Air Force Mail Control Activity 

located at the airport, where the mail is staged for ground transportation. 

In Bahrain, mail for service members stationed in Iraq is processed at the 

U.S. Air Force Mail Control Activity; mail for service members located in 

Bahrain or aboard ships is processed at the U.S. Fleet Mail Center. For 

troops stationed in Iraq, mail is transferred onto a contracted cargo plane 

and flown directly into Iraq.5

 In Kuwait, all mail is processed at the Joint 

Military Mail Terminal. Figure 1 illustrates two different examples of how 

military mail flows from the Newark International Airport into the Iraqi 

theater. 

 4

Military mail also flies out of John F. Kennedy Airport. However, most mail to ground 

troops serving in the Operation Iraqi Freedom theater flew on the dedicated contract 

carrier out of Newark International Airport. 

5

DOD contracted with DHL to provide planes to fly cargo and mail into Iraq beginning in 

May 2003, when the Joint Military Mail Terminal was established there. Before then, all 

mail was flown to Kuwait and taken by mail truck convoys into Iraq. 
Page 7 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 1: Mail Flow into Iraqi Theater 

The Joint Military Mail Terminal, which handles the bulk of the letters and 

parcels entering the Iraqi theater, sorts the mail and arranges for its 

transportation—either by land or by air—to the various regions occupied 

by U.S. troops. Mail must be delivered to the unit level, designated by ZIP 

codes provided by the Military Postal Service Agency, before it can be 

distributed to individual service members. Figure 2 illustrates postal 

operations and a backlog of mail in February 2003 at the Joint Military 

Mail Terminal in Kuwait. 
Page 8 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 2: Mail Handlers at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait 

According to the Military Postal Service Agency, more than 65 million 

pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. Central Command’s 

contingency area of responsibility during calendar year 2003 at a cost of 

nearly $150 million. The largest amount moved in a single month was April 

2003, when over 11 million pounds of mail were delivered. This represents 

an average of just over 377,000 pounds per daythe equivalent of about 

forty 40-foot-long trailers full of mail. Figure 3 illustrates a convoy of 

trucks carrying 40-foot trailers of mail leaving the Kuwait Joint Military 

Mail Terminal. 
Page 9 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 3: Truck Convoy Carrying Mail outside of Kuwait City 

The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a 

reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Data collected by 

military postal units using the Transit Time Information Standard System 

for Military Mail indicate that average delivery times met the Army 

wartime standard of 12 to 18 days.6

 However, the methodology used to 

calculate and report these times consistently masks the actual time it 

takes for service members to receive mail, thus significantly understating 

actual delivery times. Test letters sent to individuals at military post 

offices also have produced unreliable data because many test letters were 

never returned, and letters were sent only to individuals located at military 

post offices. Military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to 

troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. In addition, 

more than half of the 127 soldiers and marines we talked with during 

informal meetings at their home bases in the United States said they were 

 6

Army Field Manual 12-6 states, “the standard of service for first class mail is 12 to 18 days 

from the point of origin to individual soldiers worldwide.” 

Timeliness of Mail 

Delivery Cannot 

Be Accurately 

Determined 
Page 10 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

dissatisfied with the timeliness of mail delivery while they were deployed. 

Morale suffered, as mail from home was many service members’ only link 

with friends and families. 

The Army’s wartime standard for first class mail delivery is 12 to 18 days 

from the point of origin to the individual service member. According to our 

analysis of data reported by the Transit Time Information Standard System 

for Military Mail,7

 average postal transit times for letters and parcels sent 

to the Iraqi theater ranged from 11 to 14 days from February through 

September 2003. (See fig. 4.) These times represent the time it takes for a 

letter or parcel to go from its point of origin (a stateside post office) to a 

service member’s designated military post office, where he or she picks up 

mail. 

 7

The Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail is the official DOD 

measurement system used to collect, compute, analyze, and report mail transit time 

performance data. The Military Postal Service Agency selects the activities to provide mail 

statistics into the system. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army’s 3rd Personnel 

Command is collecting the data in theater and in turn providing the statistics to the Military 

Postal Service Agency. 

DOD Reported That 

Average Postal Transit 

Times Met Wartime 

Standard, but Methodology 

to Calculate It Is Flawed 
Page 11 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 4: Average Transit Times for Parcels and Letters, as Reported by the Transit 

Time Information Standard System for Military Mail, from February through 

September 2003 

However, on the basis of our analysis, we found that the methodology 

used to calculate and report transit times significantly understates the 

actual time it takes for a service member to receive mail. According to 

Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail guidance, 

transit times should be reported by postal units in theater on the basis of a 

random sample of all incoming letters and all incoming packages arriving 

at military post offices in the Iraqi theater. The samples are then divided 

into three categories according to the date of the U.S. postmark: postmark 

less than 10 days old, postmark 11 to 15 days old, and postmark over 16 

days old. Each of these three categories is given a weight value of 10, 15, 

and 16, respectively, which represent the break points of each category. 

The sample size (number of letters or packages sampled) in each category 

is then multiplied by the weight value and averaged to get the reported 

transit time. Consequently, regardless of the sample size or the actual 

number of days the items spent in transit, the resulting average will always 

be from 10 to 16 days. For example, a piece of mail that spent 100 days in 
Page 12 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

transit would be counted in the same category and weighted the same as 

one that only took 16 days. Similarly, a piece of mail that spent 4 days in 

transit would be counted in the same category as one that took 10, and 

again weighted the same. (See table 1 for an example of how this 

methodology is used to calculate transit times.) 

Table 1: Example of How Methodology Is Used 

Category Number in sample Weight value 

(sample size) x 

(weight)

10 days or less 100 10 1,000

11 to 15 days 100 15 1,500

16 days or greater 100 16 1,600

Total 300 4,100

Average (4,100)/(300) = 13.67 days

Source: GAO. 

This methodology is even less viable when one considers that during the 

peak of wartime operations, all mail destined for Iraq was held at the joint 

military mail terminal in Kuwait for 23 days (late March through mid-April) 

because of the rapid pace of troop movements.8

 However, this 23-day hold 

on mail is not reflected in the transit time data, as the “weighted average” 

methodology masks the calculation, thus significantly understating actual 

transit time. 

Officials at the Military Postal Service Agency and at the Army’s 3rd 

Personnel Commandthe Army entity providing in-theater postal support 

during Operation Iraqi Freedomcould not provide documentation that 

described this methodology. We reviewed the Transit Time Information 

Standard System for Military Mail guidance, the standard that explains and 

prescribes how military postal activities collect mail transit time data, and 

could not find any mention of this particular methodology. Only 3rd 

Personnel Command, the source of the transit time data, was aware that 

the transit times were being reported in this manner. According to a 3rd 

Personnel Command official, it had always been done this way. We 

discussed the methodology with Military Postal Service Agency officials. 

While they acknowledge that the Transit Time Information Standard 

System is the official tracking system, they were not aware that this 

 8

This 23-day hold was not specifically a part of the operating plan. 
Page 13 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

particular methodology was being employed, and moreover could not tell 

us why it was being used. 

In order to collect transit times on retrograde mail (which the Transit Time 

Information Standard System for Military Mail does not collect) as well as 

prograde mail,9

 the Military Postal Service Agency sent test letters to 

individuals located at military post offices within the contingency area of 

responsibility. The letters contained instructions asking the recipient to 

mark the date received and then return them through the military postal 

system. The test letter data—derived from letters sent by the Military 

Postal Service Agency from February through September 2003—indicate 

that, on average, prograde transit times met the Army standard of 12 to 

18 days during all but 1 month. The only exception was April 2003, when 

average transit time peaked at 19 days. (See fig. 5.) However, this average 

obscures the fact that nearly 25 percent of the test letters took more than 

18 days to be delivered to the Iraqi theater. Retrograde test letters were 

not as timely, failing to meet the 12- to 18-day standard during 2 months. 

 9

Those articles mailed from the continental United States to service members in the Iraqi 

theater are referred to as “prograde.” Letters and parcels mailed from the Iraqi theater to 

the continental United States are referred to as “retrograde.” 

Test Letter Data Showed 

Mail Delivery Met 

Standard, but Information 

Is Incomplete 
Page 14 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 5: Test Letter Average Monthly Transit Times 

In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency initially only sent test 

letters to individuals at military post offices in Kuwait and Bahrain. It was 

not until August 2003 that test letters were sent to locations in Iraq as well. 

Therefore, the aforementioned 23-day hold on mail bound for units in Iraq 

would not have affected transit time data as reported by test letters. 

Information based on test letters sent to individuals located at military 

post offices is not a complete measure of transit times because many 

letters were never returned. Between February and September 2003, the 

Military Postal Service Agency sent more than 1,700 test letters to service 

members at military post offices in various locations in Kuwait, Bahrain, 

and Iraq. Based on our analysis of the agency’s data, we found that only 59 

percent (1,028) of the letters were returned. In addition, of the more than 
Page 15 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

700 letters that failed to return, we determined that 25 percent had been 

sent to individuals located at post offices in or near the northern Iraqi 

cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. However, only one letter from each of these 

locations was ever returned out of about 180 letters mailed. Unfortunately, 

there is no way of telling whether or not these or any of the other 

unreturned test letters were ever actually received. 

There are other drawbacks with this test letters approach. For example, it 

does not accurately measure the transit time from point of origin to the 

individual service member. Test letters were addressed only to individuals 

located at military post offices, and not to service members located in 

forward-deployed combat units. It could take several additional days for 

service members deployed elsewhere to receive mail from such locations. 

Also, this approach used only letters, not parcels, and parcels comprised 

the bulk of mail sent into the theater. 

In the absence of reliable data to describe timeliness, we held discussions 

with a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served 

in theater, and who were selected prior to our visits to Fort Stewart, 

Georgia, and Camp Pendleton, California. Almost 60 percent of these 

service members indicated that they were dissatisfied with the timeliness 

of mail delivery. Nearly half said that, after arriving in theater, they waited 

more than 4 weeks to get their mail, and many commented that some mail 

took as long as 4 months to work its way through the system. When asked, 

about half the troops we interviewed also indicated that they were not 

aware of command decisions to purposefully halt mail service. In addition, 

nearly 80 percent said that they were aware of mail that was sent to them 

but that they did not receive while they were deployed. In many cases, this 

mail was finally received after the service members returned to their home 

stations. Clearly, the non-receipt of mail became a concern for friends and 

family back home. 

Many service members told us that they did not receive certain pieces of 

mail until they returned to their stateside home installations. For example, 

starting in June 2003, Camp Pendleton, California, received about 100,000 

pounds of military mail that had been returned undelivered and unopened 

to the U.S. Postal Service gateway in New Yorkat a cost of about 

$93,000. Upon receipt in New York, the mail was sent by rail to the U.S. 

Postal Service gateway in San Francisco and then put in trailers and 

trucked to Camp Pendleton. Extra space considerations were needed in 

order to accommodate the returned mail, including two tents staged 

outside of the main post office for overflow. Many of the returned 

Service Members Express 

Dissatisfaction with Mail 

Service 
Page 16 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

packages were damaged and rewrap procedures had to be established in 

order to try and control packages that were all but destroyed from being 

mishandled or handled too often. (See fig. 6.) Postal officials at Camp 

Pendleton did not clear out and deliver all of this returned mail for the 

better part of 3 months, or until the latter part of August 2003. 

Figure 6: Damaged Parcels at Camp Pendleton, California 

According to soldiers we interviewed, one of the issues that hampered 

mail delivery was changing deployment information. Mail delivery to the 

Army’s 3rd Infantry Division was stopped when word was received that 

the division was about to redeploy. When this plan changed and the 

division did not redeploy, mail started to flow again. The division was told 

several times that it would be redeployed and then it did not; each time, 

when deployment was thought to be imminent, mail delivery was stopped. 

This created a backlog. When the 3rd Infantry Division finally did 

redeploy, the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division stayed behind and 

was assigned to the 1st Armored Division. But this information was not 

disseminated, and the 1st Brigade received no more mail while in theater. 
Page 17 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners 

to consider experiences from Operations Desert Shield/Storm in planning 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems continued to 

hamper postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These 

problems include (1) difficulty with implementing joint-service postal 

operations, (2) postal personnel who were inadequately trained and 

initially scarce because of late deployments, and (3) inadequate postal 

facilities, material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to handle 

mail surge. 

During January 1991, at the height of Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 

more than 500,000 U.S. troops supported a ground war that lasted a little 

more than 4 days. These troops were concentrated in camps located in 

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia near the borders of Kuwait and Iraq. In contrast, 

Operation Iraqi Freedom involved about half the number of troops (about 

250,000), dispersed over a larger geographical area (all of Kuwait and 

Iraq), and involved a ground war that lasted about 42 days. This greater 

dispersion of troops for a longer period of time increased the logistical 

requirements for delivering the mail. Additionally, although the ground 

war for Operation Iraqi Freedom is officially over, there is an ongoing 

requirement to provide timely and efficient postal support for a large 

number of personnel still in theater, fighting the global war on terrorism. 

Several key planning assumptions used in the creation of U.S. Central 

Command’s postal plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom proved problematic. 

The embargo on Any Service Member mail10 produced unintended negative 

results; mail restrictions for the first 30 days in theater were never 

enacted; and the volume of mail was grossly underestimated. Table 2 

summarizes these key assumptions, the actions taken, and the 

consequences of those actions. 

 10“Any Service Member” mail refers to mail that can be sent to any service member serving 

in a contingency operation overseas. This mail can be held and delivered when deemed 

appropriate by ground commanders to boost the morale of soldiers. 

Many Problems 

Identified in 

Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm 

Continued to Hamper 

Mail Delivery in 

Operation Iraqi 

Freedom 

Implementation of Joint 

Postal Operations Fell 

Short 
Page 18 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Table 2: Planning Assumptions, Actions and Their Effects 

Assumption Action Effect 

Any Service Member mail would be 

discontinued. 

Any Service Member mail was 

discontinued. 

Persons and organizations sent multiple 

packages to individual service members to 

work around the restriction. Parcel volume 

increased as a result. 

Mail into theater would be restricted to 

letters for at least the first 30 days of the 

operation or until the proper infrastructure 

was in place to handle increased volumes; 

however, even letters would be stopped if 

conditions (lack of facilities, transportation, 

or personnel) warranted. 

Mail was never restricted. The mail flowed into theater unrestricted, 

overtaxing the limited mail handlers and 

facilities in place and creating huge 

backlogs of mail. 

Mail volume would amount to about 

0.5 pounds of mail per service member per 

day if restrictions were in place, or 

1.5 pounds per service member per day if 

they were not. 

Early mail surges reached about 

5 pounds per service member per day. 

Only limited facilities were in place; huge 

backlogs of mail were created owing to lack 

of manpower, facilities, and equipment. 

Source: GAO. 

Because Any Service Member mail caused delays in the delivery of other 

personal mail and stressed the logistical system during Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, postal plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom placed an embargo 

on this type of mail. Defense officials also discontinued Any Service 

Member mail for security reasons following the Anthrax scares of 2001. 

During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Any Service Member mail acted as 

a morale booster because it provided mail to troops who might not have 

received mail otherwise. From an operations standpoint, this mail could 

be separated and set aside until individually addressed mail had been 

processed. However, the volume of Any Service Member mail taxed 

transportation and storage capabilities. In order to prevent similar 

problems during Operation Iraqi Freedom, planners placed an embargo on 

Any Service Member mail. Despite this, individuals and organizations 

sending mail developed “workarounds” that overwhelmed the postal 

system and contributed to a slowdown in service. Instead of addressing 

mail to “Any Service Member,” senders addressed their letters and parcels 

to specific individuals, enclosing a request that they share the mail with 

other troops. Because this mail was addressed to specific individuals, 

postal personnel had to treat it as regular mail and could not separate it 

and set it aside for later processing. These “workarounds” added to the 

workload at every stage in the mail delivery process. For example, when 

we visited the Joint Military Postal Activity in San Francisco, California, 

we observed one of these “workaround” shipments. It consisted of 

approximately 40 boxes, each weighing about 8 to10 pounds. They were all 

addressed to the same recipient and came from a charitable service 
Page 19 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

organization. This one shipment required its own handcart and almost onequarter of an airline-shipping container. 

A second key assumption that did not have the intended result involved 

mail restrictions. Drawing from the lessons learned from Operations 

Desert Shield/Storm, postal planners for Operation Iraqi Freedom assumed 

that mail would be restricted to personal first-class letters or sound/video 

recordings that weighed 13 ounces or less for the first 30 days of 

operations. At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Military Postal 

Service Agency and Army postal officials in theater asked that these 

restrictions be imposed. However, U.S. Central Command officials did not 

approve the request because, according the U.S. Central Command postal 

planner, they believed that a sufficient appropriate postal infrastructure 

was in place to handle the mail. As a result, the mail continued to flow into 

theater, overtaxing the limited mail handlers and facilities in place and 

creating huge backlogs of mail. 

Underestimating the volume of mail was the third planning assumption 

that created problems for the mail system. Postal planners in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom assumed that the volume of mail per person would be less 

than it actually was. They estimated that there would be from 0.5 and 1.5 

pounds of first class mail per person per day based on data from previous 

contingency operations. Instead, military officials estimate that the initial 

surge of mail averaged closer to 5 pounds per day, overburdening the 

developing mail system. According to the Military Postal Service Agency 

and Air Force Postal Policy and Operations officials we interviewed, of the 

total volume of mail shipped, more than 80 percent consisted of parcels 

and the rest consisted of flat mail. The mail volume per soldier was much 

higher than that seen in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. For example, 

mail volume reached a monthly peak of 10 million pounds in Operations 

Desert Shield/Storm for about 500,000 troops compared with a monthly 

peak of 11 million pounds in Operation Iraqi Freedom for half as many 

troops. Consequently, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the necessary 

facilities and manpower needed to move this higher volume of mail were 

not initially available in theater. 

In addition to problematic postal planning assumptions, the single service 

manager concept was not enacted to ensure the management of joint 

postal operations. In both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, the single-service manager concept did not perform as 

Coordination of Joint Postal 

Operations Fell Short 
Page 20 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

planned. The single-service manager is assigned by the combatant 

commander to be the manager and point of contact on all postal issues in 

the area of responsibility.11 The single-service manager is normally 

appointed from one of the military components, generally the component 

with the most postal resources in theater. During Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, the single-service manager was the same for both the 

peacetime and the contingency areas of responsibility. According to 

lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the use of the 

peacetime single-service manager was unsuccessful because of a lack of 

coordination and cooperation between the components. 

To overcome this problem, U.S. Central Command, through its operations 

plan, directed the establishment of a Joint Postal Center−to be manned by 

representatives from all components−to oversee all mail operations in the 

contingency area and assume the duties and responsibilities of the singleservice manager. The operations plan states that a Joint Postal Center be 

established and that the peacetime single-service manager for the area of 

responsibility 

• provide postal personnel, resources, and equipment to support the Joint 

Postal Center as required; 

• continue to oversee military postal operations in the area of responsibility 

not in the contingency area; and 

• relinquish policy and oversight responsibilities of postal operations in the 

contingency area of responsibility to the Joint Postal Center once it is 

operational. 

U.S. Central Command postal officials told us that neither the Joint Postal 

Center nor the single-service manager performed according to the 

approved plan or as expected. The Joint Postal Center did not fully assume 

the role of the in-theater single-service manager, as it arrived late in 

theater, was not supported by all of the components, and was 

undermanned. In the interim, the peacetime single-service manager for 

U.S. Central Command did not have adequate personnel to assume the role 

for the contingency area of responsibility. According to representatives 

from the designated single-service manager, they were unable to provide 

 11Department of Defense Postal Manual 4525.6-M (Aug. 15, 2002) provides planners with 

guidance on what needs to be included in the postal appendix to all contingency plans, 

including a requirement to appoint a single-service manager. Joint Publication 1-0 states 

that one component command will normally be appointed as single-service manager and 

serve as point of contact on all postal issues in the area of responsibility. 
Page 21 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

full-time staff in theater and could not adequately manage operations from 

their home station in the United States.12 By the time the Joint Postal 

Center’s personnel began arriving in theater in February 2003, the different 

components had already been receiving large quantities of mail and had 

established their own postal operations. In January 2003 the Commander 

of the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command assumed responsibility for postal 

operations supporting the combined land forces (Army and Marines) and 

was making decisions that affected the flow of mail for the theater, a 

responsibility the Army was not resourced to assume. 

In both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

postal units lacked sufficient training. According to lessons learned from 

Operations Desert Shield/Storm military postal operations need to be 

staffed with trained personnel who are familiar with postal operations and 

the movement of mail. Similar problems surfaced during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. Military postal officials told us that Army postal personnel 

arriving in theater were largely untrained in establishing and managing 

military postal operations, as they are traditionally not tasked for this type 

of duty. Usually, Army postal personnel are tasked to support the daily 

operations of military post offices. 

However, even this type of training was lacking. Officials attributed this 

lack of training to a number of different factors. One factor is that most of 

the Army’s postal units are made up of Army Reserve soldiers, who do not 

have an opportunity to train in postal facilities during peacetime. This is 

because there are no military post offices in the United States. 

Subsequently, if a reserve unit wants to train in a military post office they 

have to deploy overseas for their annual training. The second factor is that 

active duty Army postal personnel do not have an opportunity to conduct 

realistic postal operations during routine training exercises. The third 

factor is that, unlike the other services, the active duty Army does not have 

a postal career track. This means that, even if active duty soldiers have 

attended postal training, they may never work in a postal position. 

Moreover, during both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, postal units were initially scarce because of late deployments. 

 12The postal flight of the Air Force’s 82nd Computer Support Squadron under the Air 

Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is currently the designated singleservice manager for all military operations for U.S. Central Command, U.S. Northern 

Command, and U.S. Southern Command. 

Postal Personnel 

Inadequately Trained and 

Initially Scarce Owing to 

Late Deployments 
Page 22 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Units should have deployed early enough to establish an adequate postal 

infrastructure in advance of the mail. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

despite plans to deploy Army postal units early, they arrived in theater 

after most combat troops. Military postal officials told us that other units 

had a higher priority for airlift into the Iraqi theater. The Operations Plan 

specified that postal personnel needed to handle mail would deploy within 

the first 10 days of the build-up for the contingency. Even though some 

troops mobilized according to the original plan, our analysis of data 

received from the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command shows that some of 

these troops were delayed at their mobilization stations up to 130 days 

(with the average delay being 69 days) before deploying. (See fig. 7.) 

Postal units did not begin arriving into theater until March 2003. 

Consequently, early mail operations were conducted with insufficient 

postal troops to carry out the mission. This decision ultimately affected 

the timely establishment of postal operations. 
Page 23 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 7: Number of Days Army Reserve Postal Units Spent at Mobilization Stations 

Inadequate postal facilities hampered postal operations in theater during 

both Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As the 

theater grew during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, the facilities proved 

to be inadequate, and additional aerial mail terminals had to be established 

in various parts of Saudi Arabia to handle the increasing volume of mail. 

Although some military postal facilities set up to serve troops during and 

after Operations Desert Shield/Storm were still in operation in Kuwait and 

Bahrain, these facilities were inadequate to service the influx of 250,000 

troops, which began arriving in January 2003. Key postal infrastructure 

elements were needed to receive the increased volume of mail and 

establish a joint mail terminal in Kuwait. 

Postal Operations 

Hampered by Inadequate 

Facilities, Equipment, and 

Transportation 
Page 24 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

At the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Fleet Mail Center in 

Bahrain processed mail for all the services even though it did not have the 

staff or equipment to handle the surge in volume. Because of the increased 

workload, it took about 5 to 7 extra days for the mail to be delivered. As 

the theater matured, a joint military mail terminal had to be established in 

Kuwait to relieve the Fleet Mail Center of Army and Air Force mail and to 

augment existing postal facilities at Camp Doha in Kuwait. Postal officials 

told us that even with this additional facility, the biggest hindrance to 

processing mail was a lack of sufficient workspace. In addition, as troops 

began to occupy parts of Iraq in the spring of 2003, additional mail 

facilities and transportation assets were set up to handle incoming and 

outgoing mail in Baghdad and other cities and towns in Iraq. 

The lack of heavy material-handling equipment during the early stages of 

both conflicts also hampered the processing of mail. Lessons learned from 

Operations Desert Shield/Storm recommended that modern materialhandling equipment be provided to postal units. Operation Iraqi Freedom 

postal officials also underscored the need to have modern and varied types 

of material-handling equipment, such as fork lifts and rough terrain cargo 

handlers available to support postal facilities. (See fig. 8.) Postal workers 

did not have such equipment in the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

so they had to manually break down the containers and sort thousands of 

pounds of mail per day by hand, adding to the time it took to process the 

mail for delivery. According to military postal officials, units did not have 

these types of heavy equipment because either their tables of organization 

and equipment were not updated to reflect the need, or if updated, were 

not properly resourced. 
Page 25 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Figure 8: Rough Terrain Container Handler (left) and Rough Terrain Fork Lift (right) at the Joint Military Mail Terminal in 

Kuwait, December 2003 

In addition to a lack of heavy material-handling equipment, postal units did 

not have the appropriate postal equipment and supplies to perform routine 

operations. In lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield/Storm, postal 

officials recommended that postal units regularly review their equipment 

and supply needs and assemble prepackaged “kits” for contingency postal 

operations. They also recommended that, at the earliest indication of a 

contingency, an advance team of postal experts deploy into theater to 

determine what postal equipment and supplies are required. Despite these 

recommendations, postal units continued to arrive in theater inadequately 

equipped to conduct postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Postal officials at all levels told us that the lists of authorized postal 

equipment, such as meters and scales, were outdated and did not reflect 

the correct types or quantities of equipment needed for modern postal 

operations. In addition, many deployed units did not have access to the 

full suite of communications equipment, such as secure radios, cellular 

and satellite telephones, and “landlines” for their facilities. As a result, 

postal units were unable to coordinate mail pick-up and truck mail 

convoys, and communicate with other units. 

Moving mail once it got into theater was a challenge because postal units 

were not equipped with vehicles to transport the mail. The operations plan 
Page 26 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom made no special provisions for ground 

transportation of mail. It assumed that mail would use existing 

commercial trucks supplemented by military trucks as needed. Postal 

units at all levels of command (e.g., company through corps) had to 

compete with other units for vehicles or contract for trucks through local 

sources. Military postal officials stated that, during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, trucks were scarce in theater and carrying mostly ammunition, 

water, and food. In order to minimize delays in mail delivery, postal 

officials in January 2003 arranged with a U.S. government contractor to 

provide 72 trucks and drivers to deliver the mail from the Joint Military 

Mail Terminal to military post offices in Kuwait and Iraq. Although it took 

the contractor several more months to obtain all the trucks, this action 

was a great help, according to U.S. Central Command postal units serving 

in theater at that time. 

As a result of lessons learned from the first Gulf conflict, the Military 

Postal Service Agency did implement one strategy during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom that proved to be successful. At the beginning of Operations 

Desert Shield/Storm, mail was initially transported overseas by 

commercial airlines. Because commercial U.S. carriers reduced the 

number of flights into Saudi Arabia, postal officials decided to switch 

exclusively to dedicated military flights to transport mail from the United 

States to the theater. Similarly, at the beginning of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, mail backlogs occurred with existing commercial air service. 

However, in contrast to Operations Desert Shield/Storm, military postal 

officials decided to continue using commercial airlines but arranged with 

the U.S. Postal Service to contract for dedicated postal flights from the 

United States to Bahrain and Kuwait. According to Military Postal Service 

Agency officials, this resulted in much more reliable air delivery of mail to 

the theater. 

Air Transportation Was 

Improved Based on 

Lessons Learned 
Page 27 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Although military postal officials and others have begun to identify 

solutions to some of the long-standing postal problems seen again during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, no single entity has been officially tasked to 

resolve these issues. Despite early efforts made by the Military Postal 

Service Agency in this regard, this agency does not have the authority to 

ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and resolved prior to the 

next military contingency. 

The identification of solutions to long-standing postal problems has begun 

in a piecemeal fashion. At this time, no single entity has officially been 

designated to collect and consolidate solutions to long-standing mail 

delivery problems. After past contingencies, the Joint Staff’s Joint Center 

for Lessons Learned gathered and consolidated the lessons learned and 

made them available to the field. We spoke to representatives of the 

military Joint Center for Operational Analysis, formerly the Joint Center 

for Lessons Learned, to determine if this process would apply to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom and they informed us that military postal operations have 

not been identified as an issue area for lessons learned and they do not 

anticipate that postal operations will become one. Several individual 

members of entities such as the U.S. Army Reserve Command, U.S. Central 

Command, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command have 

prepared memoranda outlining issues and lessons learned for postal 

operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

We summarized the memoranda, after action reports and comments 

regarding solutions to postal problems that we collected during our 

meetings with dozens of key military postal officials. Key military postal 

officials emphasized that these postal issues must be addressed to avoid a 

repetition of the same postal problems in future contingencies. These 

issues represent many long-standing problems that can be directly traced 

back to Operations Desert Shield/Storm. The issues identified include the 

following: 

• improve joint postal planning and ensure the execution of the postal 

operations plan; 

• anticipate the levels of support and types of activities needed, and deploy 

postal units early to reduce or eliminate backlogs during the build-up; 

• update tables of organization and equipment for postal units to reflect 

what they actually need in terms of people and equipment to conduct 

postal operations; 

• develop peacetime training programs to prepare postal units for the 

missions they will be required to perform during contingency operations; 

and 

Various Military 

Postal Units Have 

Identified Solutions to 

Postal Problems, but 

No Mechanism Is in 

Place to Ensure Their 

Consolidation and 

Resolution 
Page 28 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

• review the command and control of postal units to determine if the postal 

function is in the right place and whether one organization should be 

responsible to both develop and execute policy. 

In October 2003 the Military Postal Service Agency hosted a joint postal 

conference to discuss postal problems with dozens of key postal 

participants in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is currently in the process of 

developing a final report that will outline plans to resolve issues in the 

areas of organization, supplies, planning, training, transportation, “Any 

Service Member” mail, routing and labeling, and transit time data 

collection. Although the agency has taken this initiative, it has limited 

authority and cannot direct the services to jointly address the problems, 

according to the Executive Director of the Military Postal Service Agency. 

Military Postal Service Agency officials describe their role as primarily the 

single point of contact between the military and the U.S. Postal Service. 

Service components and the Military Postal Service Agency have taken 

some initial steps in employing alternative mail delivery and tracking 

systems. For example, the Marine Corps is currently testing an electronic 

mail system for getting mail delivered to forward deployed troops. In 

addition, the Military Postal Service Agency has taken steps to solve a 

long-standing problem regarding transit time data. The agency has 

developed a mail bar-coding system that could be used to more accurately 

track the transit time, but it has not yet been successfully deployed for use 

by ground troops because of connectivity problems. The Military Origin 

Destination Information System, modeled after the system that the U.S. 

Postal Service employs, can be used to track transit times of bags of letters 

and small packages as well as larger parcels. By bar coding these items 

and scanning them prior to mailing, and then scanning them once they 

reach their destination, transit times can be easily calculated. According to 

officials from the Military Postal Service Agency, the Navy is currently 

using this system with some success. However, the system requires a 

certain level of connectivity with the Internet, which troops in the field 

lacked during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Wireless networks may be 

necessary in order to connect all military post offices to the Internet, 

which has not been practical on the battlefield. In addition, this system 

shares a shortcoming with the test letters in that transit times are not 

tracked to the level of the individual service member. 

The timely delivery of mail to troops overseas involved in contingency 

operations is an important mechanism to boost morale among service 

members and their families and friends. Without taking action to resolve 

Conclusions 
Page 29 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

the identified issues in planning, building, and operating a joint postal 

system, mail delivery will continue to suffer in future contingency 

operations as witnessed by the repetition of delayed mail delivery from 

one Gulf war to the next. Emphasis needs to be placed on establishing 

joint postal responsibilities and the subsequent execution of those duties. 

Past experience has shown that postal operations have not received 

command attention or been designated a priority. Establishing the needs 

for postal operations early in the process and dedicating the appropriate 

resources is crucial for providing the timely and efficient delivery of mail. 

While our work focused only on Operation Iraqi Freedom, we believe 

many of these same lessons apply to other combatant commands and 

theaters of operation as well. 

Without clear and accurate data to measure the timeliness of mail to U.S. 

troops overseas during contingency operations, no meaningful assessment 

can be made on the quality of mail service. Therefore, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to work with the Army Adjutant 

General to improve the quality of transit time data for postal operations by 

implementing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report 

postal transit times. 

In the absence of a clear plan for resolving recurring postal problems 

during contingency operations, we recommend that the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) designate, direct, and 

authorize an appropriate DOD agency, unit, or command to determine 

what long-standing postal issues need to be resolved, and to develop a 

specific course of action and timetable for their resolution, including 

appropriate follow-up to ensure that the problems have been fixed. 

Specifically, these actions should address the issues highlighted in this 

report, such as the following: 

• strengthen the joint postal planning function and specify a body to ensure 

the implementation of postal operations in theater; 

• deploy properly trained and equipped postal troops into theater prior to 

the mail build-up; and 

• dedicate adequate postal facilities, heavy equipment, and transportation 

assets for postal operations. 

An important part of addressing these long-standing problems is to share 

the results of these lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom with all 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 30 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

of the combatant commands to ensure that future contingencies do not 

repeat these problems. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it fully 

concurred with our recommendations and has already initiated certain 

actions. In response to our first recommendation, DOD has directed the 

Military Postal Service Agency to implement an automated system that will 

accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times all the way to 

troop delivery. In addition, the Military Postal Service Agency is also 

reviewing manual transit time collection and reporting methods for use 

when automated collection is not possible. In response to our second 

recommendation, the Military Postal Service Agency will facilitate and 

track the corrective actions taken by the Unified Commands, services, 

service components, and the Military Postal Service Agency, itself, in 

response to the recommendations developed in the Joint Services After 

Action Report produced at the Joint Service Postal Conference held in 

October 2003. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix 

II. DOD also provided a number of technical and clarifying comments, 

which we have incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Executive Director of the 

Military Postal Service Agency; and the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (757) 552-8100. 

Key contributors to this report were Laura Durland, Karen Kemper, David 

Keefer, Timothy Burke, Ann Borseth, Madelon Savaides, and Nancy 

Benco. 

Neal P. Curtin 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

 and Management 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 31 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 32 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

To address overall issues of military mail delivery to and from the Gulf 

region and determine responsibilities for mail service, we obtained and 

reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and operations plans for 

mail delivery to troops serving in a contingency area, and specifically 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We then met with officials from the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics); Joint Staff for Manpower and Personnel; and U.S. Central 

Command to discuss these policies. Our review focused on postal 

operations as they applied to U.S. troops deployed to the countries of 

Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq during the buildup for Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

the operation itself, and the ongoing military operations in Iraq (January 

through December 2003). 

To address the issue of the timeliness of mail service to and from troops 

serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we collected, analyzed, and assessed 

the reliability of transit time data from the Army’s 3rd Personnel 

Command and the Military Postal Service Agency. We discussed the data 

with military postal officials to ensure that we were interpreting it 

correctly, especially the methodology used to report transit times from the 

Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail. Within our 

analysis, we determined that the majority of transit time data we received 

was for Army mail. Some data were from the Air Force and Marine Corps, 

but they were not separated out. We did not collect transit time data from 

the Navy, as their postal operations run separate from and independent of 

the others.1

 Some data required sorting in order to eliminate irrelevant 

data elements and to be able to display them on a monthly basis. To 

determine the effect that the timeliness of mail service had on troops 

serving in the contingency area, we designed a data collection instrument 

and then conducted discussion groups with and collected data from a nonrepresentative sample of 127 officers and enlisted personnel—91 from the 

Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia) and 36 

from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (stationed at Camp Pendleton, 

California). The data collected from this non-representative sample cannot 

be projected for the entire universe of troops deployed. At each location, 

the GAO “point of contact” selected a non-representative sample of 

 1

The Navy postal system operates separate from the Army system since most of the Navy’s 

mail follows established procedures for delivery of mail to sailors aboard ships. By 

contrast, the Army must establish and use ground-based transportation networks and 

routing systems. In addition, Navy postal operations had long been established for the Gulf 

region and did not need the level of build up required for the Army during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

military personnel who had recently returned from a deployment in 

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The sample size (127) is simply the 

total number of the soldiers and marines who were available to meet with 

us during our visits. We summarized the data we collected from the 

soldiers and marines, determined percentages of individual responses for 

each question, and gathered their personal accounts regarding mail 

delivery problems. 

To address how mail issues and problems experienced during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom compare with those experienced during Operations Desert 

Shield/Storm, we obtained and analyzed lessons learned from the first 

Persian Gulf War and compared these with any available reports prepared 

by the various offices and commands we visited regarding the postal 

problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom. We met with 

numerous officials and personnel from the U.S. Army Reserve Command, 

the Military Postal Service Agency, the U.S. Postal Service, U.S. Central 

Command, the Army’s 3rd Personnel Command, U.S. Army Central 

Command, Air Force Air Combat Command, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint 

Military Mail Terminal in Kuwait, Fleet Mail Center in Bahrain, and Joint 

Military Mail Terminal in Iraq to discuss the similarities and differences of 

the postal problems still being encountered and what actions had been 

taken to resolve any previously identified problems. 

To assess efforts to resolve military postal problems for future 

contingencies, we collected any available after action reports and plans for 

addressing military postal problems. We attended the Joint Postal 

Conference—hosted by the Military Postal Service Agency in October 

2003—which addressed postal problems encountered during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. During the conference, we spoke with military postal 

officials who had direct responsibility for various aspects of mail delivery 

to and from the Iraqi theater, and collected pertinent documentation. We 

summarized information regarding key postal issues that must be 

addressed to avoid their repetition in the future. We spoke with officials at 

the Joint Forces Command who are in charge of collecting lessons learned 

for Operation Iraqi Freedom. We also spoke with the Army Adjutant 

General in charge of the Military Postal Service Agency to assess the 

agency’s plans for taking actions to mitigate those problems. We then met 

with a key official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)the responsible body for 

military postal policy and oversightto discuss our findings and to 

determine what entity is accountable for resolving these issues. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 34 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

We conducted our review from August 2003 through March 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-04-484 Operation Iraqi Freedom (350429) 
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