CASE STUDIES IN EMERGENCY ELECTION LITIGATION

Federal Judicial Center 9/11/2023 1

More Signatures Required to Get on a Local 

Ballot Than to Get on a Statewide Ballot 

Acevedo v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board 

(Elaine E. Bucklo, 1:18-cv-293) and Kowalski McDonald 

v. Cook County Officers’ Electoral Board 

(John J. Tharp, Jr., 1:18-cv-1277) (N.D. Ill.) 

Two cases challenged the larger number of signatures required to get 

on a primary-election ballot in Cook County than would be required 

to get on a primary-election ballot for statewide office. Both district 

judges and the court of appeals ruled against the plaintiffs. 

Subject: Getting on the ballot. Topics: Getting on the ballot; pro 

se party; case assignment. 

Is it proper to require more signatures to get on a ballot for a local election 

than to get on a ballot for statewide office? Perhaps, if the burden is not severe, 

according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 

First Case 

A January 15, 2018, federal complaint filed in the Northern District of Illinois 

alleged, 

This Civil Rights case challenges as unconstitutional the Illinois Election 

Code’s ballot access requirement that 2018 Democratic Primary Candidates 

for Countywide offices in the Cook County submit 8,236 valid signatures . . . 

and that Candidates for Commissioner of the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago submit 8,075 valid signatures . . . while Democratic Primary candidates for Illinois Statewide office such as Governor only 

need to submit 5,000 signatures for access to the ballot.1

The reason for the discrepancy was that primary-election ballot petitions 

for statewide office required 5,000 signatures, but primary-election ballot petitions for local offices required signatures totaling 0.5% of the number of votes 

received by a candidate of the party in the most recent general election.2 Seven 

would-be candidates—five for water commissioner, one for county sheriff, 

and one for county assessor—filed the federal complaint.3

With their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order,4

 set for hearing on the following day.5 At the hearing, Judge Elaine 

1. Complaint at 1, Acevedo v. Cook Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., No. 1:18-cv-293 (N.D. Ill. 

Jan. 15, 2018), D.E. 1 [hereinafter Acevedo Complaint]. 

2. 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7–10(a), (d)(1), (g). 

3. Acevedo Complaint, supra note 1. 

4. Temporary-Restraining-Order Motion, Acevedo, No. 1:18-cv-293 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 

2018), D.E. 2. 

5. Notice, id. (Jan. 15, 2018), D.E. 3; Acevedo v. Cook Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 286 F. 

Supp. 3d 929, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
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2 Federal Judicial Center 9/11/2023 

E. Bucklo ordered defense responses by January 22 and set the case for another 

hearing on January 23.6

In 1979, the Supreme Court found an equal-protection violation in Illinois 

because new political parties and independent candidates needed 25,000 signatures to get on a statewide ballot but over 35,000 signatures to get on a local 

ballot, measured as 5% of the total votes in the locality’s previous election.7

On January 24, 2018, Judge Bucklo ruled against the plaintiffs in light of 

decisions by the Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 

Circuit clarifying application of the Supreme Court’s 1979 case and the considerably smaller number of signatures required in the case before her.8

Second Case 

A similar case was filed in February 2018. A candidate for the office of county 

clerk filed her pro se federal complaint in the Northern District on February 

20, challenging her exclusion from the March 20 primary-election ballot.9

 The 

plaintiff attributed the high requirement for Cook County to a candidate in 

the plaintiff’s party running unopposed in the last county general election, 

which was also a presidential election.10

One day after the complaint was filed, Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow exercised her prerogative as a senior judge and declined assignment of the case, 

which was reassigned to Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.11 A week after filing her complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion for an expedited status conference,12 which 

Judge Tharp granted a day later by setting one for the morning of March 2.13

At the status conference, Judge Tharp set a deadline of that day for a temporary-restraining-order motion, to be fully briefed for a March 13 hearing by 

March 9.14 The plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing.15 On the 

next day, Judge Tharp announced that he would deny immediate relief with 

an opinion to follow one day later.16

Judge Tharp ruled against the defendants on their request for abstention 

pursuant to Younger v. Harris, because “the defendants have not and cannot 

show that the [Cook County Officers Electoral] Board’s review of [the plaintiff’s] petition implicates the state’s interests in investigating, enforcing, and 

6. Minutes, Acevedo, No. 1:18-cv-293 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2018), D.E. 8; see Acevedo, 286 F. 

Supp. 3d at 930; Minutes, Acevedo, No. 1:18-cv-293 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2018), D.E. 15. 

7. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). 

8. Acevedo, 286 F. Supp. 3d at 929; see Acevedo v. Cook Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 

F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir. 2019). 

9. Complaint, Kowalski McDonald v. Cook Cty. Officers’ Electoral Bd., No. 1:18-cv-1277 

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2018), D.E. 1. 

10. Id. at 4–5. 

11. Transfer, id. (Feb. 21, 2018), D.E. 6; Docket Sheet, id. (Feb. 20, 2018). 

12. Motion, id. (Feb. 27, 2018), D.E. 8. 

13. Minutes, id. (Feb. 28, 2018), D.E. 10. 

14. Minutes, id. (Mar. 2, 2018), D.E. 17. 

15. Transcript at 2, id. (Mar. 13, 2018, filed June 11, 2018), D.E. 40; Appearance, id. (Mar. 

13, 2018), D.E. 23. 

16. Minutes, id. (Mar. 14, 2018), D.E. 25. 
More Signatures Required to Get on a Local Ballot than to Get on a Statewide Ballot 

Federal Judicial Center 9/11/2023 3

sanctioning violations of its laws.”17 Judge Tharp decided that a judgment in 

the defendant’s favor in the state courts did not preclude the plaintiff’s claims 

as res judicata, because the state-court judgment was still on appeal.18 But 

Judge Tharp ruled against the plaintiff on the merits, because she could show 

no intention to disfranchise women and minorities.19 The fact that the higher 

requirement for county offices than for state offices that election cycle was an 

anomaly further weighed against the plaintiff’s merits.20

Affirmance by the Court of Appeals 

On June 5, 2019, the court of appeals affirmed Judge Bucklo’s dismissal of the 

first case because the plaintiffs “have not alleged any facts supporting an inference that the burden imposed by [the signature] requirement is severe.”21

Strict scrutiny is not triggered by the existence of a less burdensome restriction—it is triggered only when the challenged regulation itself imposes a 

severe burden. Because Acevedo has not alleged that the burden imposed by 

the Cook County signature requirement is severe, the defendants need not 

show any justification for it beyond Illinois’s interest in orderly and fair elections. That interest easily justifies the signature requirement here.22

An appeal in the second case was dismissed as moot on January 2.23 Judge 

Tharp dismissed the case on July 10 following a scheduled hearing at which 

neither party appeared.24

17. Opinion at 5, id. (Mar. 25, 2018), D.E. 26, 2018 WL 1334931. 

18. Id. at 5–7. 

19. Id. at 10. 

20. Id. at 9–10. 

21. Acevedo v. Cook Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 2019). 

22. Id. at 946–47; see id. at 947–48 (“Though the election is over, [the] claim is not moot 

because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”). 

23. McDonald v. Cook Cty. Officers Electoral Bd., 758 F. App’x 527 (7th Cir. 2019). 

24. Notification, Kowalski McDonald, No. 1:18-cv-1277 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2019), D.E. 50.