Filed 11/14/13 In re X.Z. CA2/4 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FOUR 

In re X.Z., A Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

JASMIN S., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B247449 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK86090) 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Marguerite Downing, Judge. Diane Reyes, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. 

Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. 

 Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, Office of the County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant 

County Counsel and William D. Thetford, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent. 
2 

 Appellant Jasmin S. (Mother) filed this appeal after the juvenile court’s 

December 4, 2012 order terminated her parental rights over her infant daughter 

X.Z. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1

 Mother seeks to revive 

issues arising out of the court’s decision to terminate her reunification services at 

the September 12, 2011 six-month review hearing based on its understanding that 

Mother would be incarcerated for a period that exceeded the maximum 

reunification time permitted by statute. She contends reasonable reunification 

services were not provided prior to September 2011, that the caseworker misled the 

court about when she was likely to be released from prison, and that the court 

failed to make statutorily-mandated findings. 

 Mother does not dispute that orders terminating reunification services are 

ordinarily reviewable solely by way of writ, or that the court provided notice at the 

September 2011 hearing of the writ review requirement. She contends she is 

entitled to raise issues related to the reunification period in this proceeding because 

the notice the court provided did not inform her of the deadline to file a notice of 

intent to seek a writ. We conclude that Mother received sufficient notice of the 

writ requirement to preclude her from raising issues pertaining to the September 

2011 order at this late date, and that, in any event, she raises no issues with respect 

to the September 2011 order requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In January 2011, the family home was raided by police and a large quantity 

of methamphetamine and chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine 

 1

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3 

were found.2 X.Z., then two months old, was detained by the Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS), along with her two half-siblings.3

 After a 

brief period in foster care, X.Z. was placed with Mother’s sister, Conseulo M. A 

few days after the detention hearing, Mother was arrested and charged with 

possession of methamphetamine and child endangerment. 

 On February 16, 2011, the caseworker reported that Mother’s case was about 

to be submitted to the district attorney’s office for felony filing consideration. The 

court ordered a supplemental report to address the status of both parents’ criminal 

cases before the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, but the caseworker was unable 

to obtain further information. 

 At the March 14, 2011, jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the court found 

that Mother and Father “created a detrimental and endangering home environment 

for the children” by (1) “possess[ing] toxic, flammable, hazardous chemicals, used 

in the manufacture of methamphetamine in the children’s home, within access of 

the children” and exposing the children to such chemicals; (2) keeping eight and 

one-half pounds of methamphetamine in the children’s home, within access of the 

children; and (3) exposing the children to illicit drug trafficking in the home and in 

their presence. At the same hearing, the court addressed disposition for Mother 

and ordered reunification services. Mother’s plan required her to participate in a 

parenting class and individual counseling to address case issues and drug 

awareness. 

 2

 Hector A., the girl’s father, was arrested and charged with possession of 

methamphetamine for sale, transportation of a controlled substance, manufacture of 

methamphetamine, and manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of a child. He 

is not a party to this appeal. 

3

 X.Z.’s half-siblings, a 13-year old boy and a nine-year old girl, were ultimately 

placed with their father and are not the subjects of this appeal. 
4 

 On April 20, 2011, a new caseworker met with Mother, then incarcerated at 

Twin Towers. Mother advised her that the facility did not offer any programs for 

parents, and that she would be unable to make progress on the reunification plan 

until she was transferred to a state prison. Mother further reported that she 

anticipated receiving a four-year sentence and serving half or less. On June 8, the 

caseworker talked to Mother’s probation officer, who reported he was working on 

the probation report and that Mother was likely to face a sentence of three to six 

years.

4

 A few days later, on June 17, Consuelo told the caseworker she had spoken 

with Mother and that Mother had said she was going to serve 14 months in state 

prison and would enroll in classes once she arrived at the prison.5

 In mid-July, 

Mother was transferred to the California Institute for Women. In August, the 

caseworker left a message with Mother’s correctional counselor asking for 

Mother’s release date, but received no return call. 

 The September 2011 report, filed in advance of the six-month review 

hearing, stated that in June, Mother had been convicted of possession of a 

controlled substance for sale and child endangerment and that the court had 

imposed sentences of three years for the former crime and four years for the latter. 

The report did not indicate whether the sentences were to run consecutively or 

concurrently and gave no estimate of Mother’s release date. It described the 

caseworker’s unsuccessful effort to obtain Mother’s precise release date from the 

correctional counselor. The report stated that maternal relatives were bringing 

X.Z. for prison visits, but that due to her incarceration, Mother had been unable to 

 4

 At the time of her arrest, Mother was on probation for taking drugs into a prison 

facility. 

5

 Reports of these three conversations were in the delivered service log, which was 

not before the court at the six-month review hearing. The log was not filed until October 

19, 2011. 
5 

participate in court-ordered programs. The report said it was “highly unlikely” 

Mother would be able to reunify with her children, even if additional reunification 

services were ordered. Therefore, it was recommended that reunification services 

be terminated. 

 At the September 12, 2011 six-month review hearing, the court stated it was 

inclined to terminate reunification services with respect to X.Z. due to her age (less 

than a year old).6

 Counsel for Mother stated: “I understand Mother will be 

incarcerated longer than the statutory period of reunification; however, I’m going 

to enter an objection today to terminating her services.” The court expressed its 

understanding that both parents objected, but found that “since both parents will be 

incarcerated longer than the reunification period . . . [¶] . . . there is not a 

substantial probability that [X.Z.] may be returned to her parents by the 12-month 

permanency hearing.” The court further found that the parents were unable to 

“complete any of the disposition case plan” due to their incarceration or to 

“demonstrate[] the capacity or ability to complete the objectives of the treatment 

plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional 

health.” The court terminated services and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 

9, 2012. The minute order stated that the court found by a preponderance of the 

evidence that return of the minors to the physical custody of the parents would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to their physical or emotional well-being, that 

DCFS had complied with the case plan, that Mother was not in compliance with 

the case plan, and that reasonable services had been provided to meet the needs of 

the minors. 

 After terminating reunification services and setting the section 366.26 

hearing, the court provided the following advisement: “[T]he court advises all 

 6

 The parties stipulated to Diane Reyes acting as a temporary judge at this hearing. 
6 

parties present and directs the clerk of the court to forward written advisement to 

parties not present that to preserve any right to review on appeal of the court’s 

order setting a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan under 366.26, the 

party must seek an extraordinary writ by filing a notice of intent to file writ petition 

and request for record, or other notice of intent to file writ petition and request for 

record, and a writ petition-juvenile form, or other petition for extraordinary writ. 

[¶] I would advise you to speak to your attorney.” 

 Mother did not seek writ review of the September 2011 order. After 

multiple continuances, the section 366.26 hearing was held on December 4, 2012. 

Mother presented no evidence, but objected to termination of her parental rights.7

 

The evidence presented established that Consuelo, Mother’s sister and X.Z.’s 

guardian since shortly after the detention, had repeatedly expressed her desire to 

adopt X.Z., and that X.Z. was thriving in Consuelo’s care. The adoption home 

study was completed in August 2012. On December 4, the court found by clear 

and convincing evidence that X.Z. was adoptable, and that no exception to 

adoption applied. The court issued an order terminating parental rights over X.Z. 

Mother filed a notice of appeal from the order. Mother was released from prison in 

January 2013. 

 7

 In the interim between the September 12, 2011 hearing and the December 4, 2012 

hearing, Mother provided evidence of having participated in various programs in prison, 

including Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous, a behavioral transformation program 

and a parenting program. From the evidence presented, it appears her participation in 

such programs began in October 2011. In addition, the evidence indicated Mother had 

monthly visits with X.Z., until October 2012, when prison officials objected to contact 

visitation and Mother stated she did not wish to visit her daughter behind glass. 
7 

DISCUSSION 

 An order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 

hearing is “not appealable” unless “(1) A petition for extraordinary writ review 

was filed in a timely manner.[8

] [¶] (B) The petition substantively addressed the 

specific issues to be challenged and supported that challenge by an adequate 

record. [¶] (C) The petition for extraordinary writ review was summarily denied 

or otherwise not decided on the merits.” (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); see § 366.26, 

subd. (l)(2); In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 719.) Section 366.26, 

subdivision (l) and the court rules implementing it are intended to ensure that 

resolution of challenges to setting orders are resolved before the section 366.26 

hearing. (Karl S. v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402-1403.) The 

provision supports “‘the state’s interest in expedition and finality’” and the child’s 

interest in “‘securing a stable, “normal,” home,’” which goals would be 

compromised if the validity of issues addressed in the order terminating 

reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing remained undecided 

until after the court’s adoption of a permanent plan. (In re Anthony B. (1999) 72 

Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022-1023; see In re Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 447 

[“In adopting section 366.26, subdivision (l), ‘ . . . the Legislature has 

unequivocally expressed its intent that [setting] orders be challenged by writ before 

the section 366.26 hearing.’”].) 

 8

 Rule 8.450(e)(4) of the California Rules of Court sets out the various time limits 

for those seeking writ review. The shortest time limit applies to a party “present at the 

hearing when the court ordered [the] section 366.26 [hearing]”: such party must filed a 

notice of intent to file a writ petition and a request for the record within seven days of the 

order. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(A).) It is undisputed that Mother was present at the September 

2011 hearing when the court set the section 366.26 hearing for January 9, 2012. 
8 

 Section 366.26, subdivision (l) requires the court, after terminating 

reunification and issuing an order setting a section 366.26 hearing, to “advise all 

parties of the requirement of filing a petition for extraordinary writ review as set 

forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.” 

(§ 366.26, subd. (l)(3)(A).) The notice must be “made orally to a party if the party 

is present at the time of the making of the order or by first-class mail by the clerk 

of the court to the last known address of the party not present at the time of the 

making of the order.” (Ibid.) Rule 5.590(b) of the California Rules of Court 

similarly provides: “When the court orders a hearing under . . . section 366.26, the 

court must advise all parties and if present, the child’s parent, guardian, or adult 

relative, that if the party wishes to preserve any right to review on appeal of the 

order setting the hearing under . . . section 366.26, the party is required to seek an 

extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and Request for 

Record . . . (form JV-820) or other notice of intent to file a writ petition and 

request for record and a Petition for Extraordinary Writ . . . (form JV-835) or other 

petition for extraordinary writ. [¶] (1) the advisement must be given orally to those 

present when the court orders the hearing under . . . section 366.26. [¶] (2) Within 

one day after the court orders the hearing under . . . section 366.26, the advisement 

must be sent by first-class mail by the clerk of the court to the last known address 

of a party who is not present when the court orders the hearing under . . . section 

366.26.” (Italics omitted.) 

 Rule 5.590(b) of the California Rules of Court goes on to state that “[t]he 

advisement must include the time for filing a notice of intent to file a writ petition” 

and that “[c]opies of Petition for Extraordinary Writ . . . (form JV-825) and Notice 

of Intent to File Writ petition and Request for Record . . . (form JV-820) must be 

available in the courtroom and must accompany all mailed notices informing the 
9 

parties of their rights.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(3) & (4), italics 

omitted.) 

 Mother contends the oral notice provided was defective because the court 

failed to indicate the time for filing a notice of intent.9

 Citing cases in which the 

juvenile court failed to advise the parent of his or her right to writ review of the 

order setting the section 366.26 hearing, she contends she must be permitted to 

raise issues related to a hearing that took place two years ago. For the reasons 

discussed, we conclude otherwise. 

 9

 Although the minute order stated that the court directed the clerk to send written 

information about writ procedures to the parents by first class mail to their last known 

address and that the clerk mailed the information, there is no proof of service in the 

record indicating that the information was actually mailed, and respondent does not 

suggest it was. In a separate motion to dismiss the appeal, respondent contended that we 

must presume the forms required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(4) -- 

“Petition for Extraordinary Writ” and “Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and Request 

for Record” -- were available in the courtroom. (See Evid. Code, § 664.) We do 

presume they were available and take judicial notice that the Notice of Intent, form JV820, states on its face “[i]n most cases, you have only 7 days from the court’s decision to 

file a Notice of Intent” and adds on the reverse side: “If you were present when the court 

set the hearing to make a permanent plan, you must file the Notice of Intent within 7 days 

from the date the court set the hearing.” However, there is no indication in the record 

that the presence of such forms was made clear to Mother or that Mother was actually 

provided a form. 

 While this appeal was pending, Mother’s counsel brought to our attention the 

recent decision in Maggie S. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662. There, the 

record indicated that the mother, who was present in the courtroom when the juvenile 

court denied reunification services, was provided a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition 

form. The clerk also mailed her a written advisement of rights. The Court of Appeal 

concluded the failure to give an oral advisement at the hearing as required by section 

366.26 and the Rules of Court excused Mother’s failure to file a timely petition for 

extraordinary writ and construed her appeal of the order terminating parental rights as 

such petition. (220 Cal.App.4th at p. 671.) Here, unlike in Maggie S., Mother was orally 

advised of the need to file a writ petition. 
10 

 Courts have held that where the juvenile court fails entirely to advise a 

parent of his or her right to seek writ review of an order terminating reunification 

services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, claims of error relating to provision 

of reunification services are cognizable on appeal from the order terminating 

parental rights. (In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539; In re Lauren Z. 

(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110; In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 

831; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038; In re Rashad B., supra, 76 

Cal.App.4th at p. 450; In re Cathina W., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-724.) 

We find those cases inapposite. Here, the court did advise Mother that “to 

preserve any right to review on appeal” of the September 2011 order, she “must 

seek an extraordinary writ by filing a notice of intent to file writ petition and 

request for record, or other notice of intent to file writ petition and request for 

record, and a writ petition-juvenile form, or other petition for extraordinary writ.” 

In the presence of counsel, the court expressly advised Mother to “speak to your 

attorney.” The court’s only fault was in failing to mention the deadline for filing 

the notice of intent and request for record. But Mother did not merely miss the 

deadline for filing a notice of intent and request for record. She failed to file a writ 

petition, notice of intent or request for record at any time, ignoring the court’s 

advisement that this was the sole method to preserve her right to review its 

September 2011 order. 

 No case of which we are aware has held that failure to inform a party of the 

deadline, standing alone, justifies disregarding section 366.26, subdivision (l) and 

permitting a parent to re-open reunification issues by an appeal filed after the 

permanent plan has been implemented. Nor do we believe such a rule would be 

wise. It is not at all unusual for dependency proceedings to move slowly after 

termination of reunification services, as the focus shifts to determining a child’s 

adoptability and considering potential permanent homes. A year or more may pass 
11 

before the necessary investigations and paperwork are completed and the final plan 

approved by the court, during which time the child becomes increasingly 

accustomed to a new environment and new caregivers. Any rule allowing a parent 

to belatedly raise issues relating to the reunification phase should be drawn as 

narrowly as possible. Where no information about the writ review requirement 

was provided by the court, such a rule is a necessary evil required to protect 

fundamental due process despite its detrimental impact on the goals of expedition, 

finality and stability. (See In re Frank R., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) But 

where the parent has been advised of the necessity of seeking review by way of a 

writ proceeding with no information about the deadline, he or she has the option of 

filing a writ petition or notice of intent within any reasonable time and asking the 

Court of Appeal to grant relief from default for a late filing. (See Jonathan M. v. 

Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [petitioner who files notice of 

intent late may obtain relief from default on showing of good cause]; Karl S. v. 

Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404 [same].) Mother could have 

obtained review of the court’s September 2011 order by filing a late writ petition 

or notice of intent, and presenting evidence that she had been misled or confused 

by the court’s advisement. Instead, having been advised of the need to seek writ 

review, she sought none at any time during the nearly 15 months between the 

September 2011 hearing terminating reunification services and the December 2012 

section 366.26 hearing. On this record, we see no basis to apply the rule applicable 

to parents who were not advised of their right to seek writ review of an order 

terminating reunification services. Accordingly, we conclude the issues raised in 

Mother’s appeal pertaining to the September 2011 order are not reviewable at this 

time. 

 Moreover, even were we to reach the merits, we would not reverse the 

September 2011 order. Pointing out that the statutory provision governing six-
12 

month review hearings for children under the age of three (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) 

requires the court to continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing if it 

finds that “reasonable services have not been provided [to a parent],” Mother 

contends that she was provided no services prior to the six-month review hearing 

and that no reunification plan was ever developed. Preliminarily, we note that 

Mother did not raise these issues at the September 11 hearing. “A parent’s failure 

to raise an issue in the juvenile court prevents him or her from presenting the issue 

to the appellate court.” (In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582.) 

Moreover, the record reflects that reasonable services were provided to the extent 

possible under the circumstances. (See Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 

Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 [“The adequacy of reunification plans and the 

reasonableness of [DCFS’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of 

each case.”]; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“The standard is not 

whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal 

world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.”].) At 

the dispositional hearing, the court ordered a straightforward plan for Mother, a 

parenting course and individual counseling to address case issues and drug 

awareness. The caseworker met with Mother in April 2011, shortly after the 

dispositional hearing, when Mother was still incarcerated at Twin Towers, to 

discuss the plan. Mother informed the caseworker that no services were available 

there, but would be available when she was transferred to a state prison. She was 

transferred to the California Institute for Women in mid-July 2011. She informed 

her sister Consuelo that she going to enroll in the programs available there, and 

Consuelo so advised the caseworker.10 However, the record indicates Mother did 

 10 At no point, did Mother indicate she was meeting any resistance from prison 

officials or ask the caseworker for assistance. 
13 

not begin to participate in prison programs until late 2011, after the hearing 

terminating reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s 

failure to make progress in the programs assigned her within the six months 

following the dispositional hearing was not the fault of the caseworker, but was a 

consequence of Mother’s criminal conduct -- resulting in her incarceration for the 

first four months in a facility with no services -- and of her failure even to begin 

the programs available following her transfer in July. (See In re Lauren Z., supra,

158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111 [mother placed herself out of reach of any meaningful 

rehabilitative services Department could have provided when she engaged in 

conduct that resulted in her imprisonment out of state].) 

 Mother also contends that the caseworker misled the court by indicating in 

the September 2011 report that she would be imprisoned longer than was expected. 

The record indicates that when Mother and the caseworker met in April 2011, 

Mother anticipated being incarcerated for a total of two years. The probation 

officer had estimated three to six years. The caseworker attempted to determine 

the precise date Mother was scheduled to be released, but was unable to reach the 

appropriate prison official. In the meantime, the caseworker heard from Consuelo 

that Mother believed she would serve 14 months, but did not include this 

information in the September 2011 report. The caseworker was not required to 

report secondhand speculation which, in any event, proved to be incorrect. The 

caseworker included in the September 2011 report the only concrete information 

she had: the length of the two sentences imposed for the two offenses Mother 

committed. Based on the information provided, the court presumed -- correctly -- 

that Mother would be incarcerated longer than the one-year period of reunification 

generally applicable to children under the age of three. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1).) 

Mother was present in court, with her counsel, and could have corrected any 

misapprehension on the court’s part. Instead, Mother’s counsel agreed she would 
14 

be “incarcerated longer than the statutory period of reunification.” In fact, Mother 

was not released until January 2013 and would not have been in a position to 

reunify with X.Z., even if the court had waited to terminate services and set a 

section 366.26 hearing until the 12-month or 18-month review dates. Under these 

circumstances, any misinformation in the September 2011 report about Mother’s 

period of incarceration did not prejudice her. 

 Mother contends the court failed to make statutorily-mandated findings at 

the September 2011 hearing, specifically, a finding that reasonable services were 

provided to Mother or a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother 

“‘failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered 

treatment plan.’” The last paragraph of section 366.21, subdivision (e) provides 

that if the child is not returned to his or her parent or legal guardian, “the court 

shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or 

legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the 

continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal 

guardian.”11 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.708(e)(1).) Although not 

articulated at the hearing, the minute order reflects that the court made this finding. 

(See In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 249 [conflicts between 

reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript may be resolved in favor of clerk’s 

transcript where particular circumstances dictate]; In re Byron B. (2004) 119 

Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018 [reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript are to be 

 11 The first paragraph of section 366.21, subdivision (e) provides that the court shall, 

at the six-month review hearing, “order the return of the child to the physical custody of 

his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being 

of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) There is no dispute that the court made this finding. 
15 

harmonized if possible and clerk’s transcript may be viewed as clarifying point 

reporter’s transcript left ambiguous]; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 

[“‘[T]hat part of the record will prevail, which because of its origin and nature or 

otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation].’”]; People v. Malabag (1997) 

51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1423 [“Absent a conflict between the transcripts, the clerk’s 

transcript can establish a valid waiver where the reporter’s transcript is silent on 

the matter.”].) For the reasons already discussed, we have concluded that 

substantial evidence supports that the services provided were reasonable under the 

circumstances.12 

 The court must also find “by clear and convincing evidence that the parent 

failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered 

treatment plan” if it terminates reunification services and sets a section 366.26 

hearing, as it did here. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Although the court found that Mother 

was not in compliance with the case plan, it erroneously made the finding under 

the preponderance of the evidence standard. We do not, however, believe this 

constitutes ground for reversal. The evidence was undisputed that Mother had 

made no progress and Mother offered no excuse for her lack of progress or failure 

to enroll in the programs available. Accordingly, assuming Mother had not 

 12 Mother contends that DCFS’s alleged failure to provide reasonable services during 

the six-month post-disposition period and the court’s alleged failure to find that 

reasonable services were provided at the September 2011 hearing precluded the court 

from terminating parental rights over X.Z. at the December 4, 2012 section 366.26 

hearing. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A); In re T.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1173.) 

The court’s minute order included the findings that “reasonable services [were] provided 

to meet the needs of the minors” and that “DCFS . . . complied with the case plan.” 

These findings were sufficient to establish that the court believed reasonable services had 

been provided to Mother. For the reasons discussed, substantial evidence supported that 

finding. Accordingly, we reject this contention. 
16 

forfeited her right to appellate examination of these issues by failing to seek writ 

review, we would find no basis for reversing the September 2011 order terminating 

services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. 
17 

DISPOSITION 

 The order terminating parental rights is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 MANELLA, J. 

We concur: 

EPSTEIN, P. J. 

WILLHITE, J.