(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2023 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ET AL. v. 

FIKRE 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22–1178. Argued January 8, 2024—Decided March 19, 2024 

Respondent Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen and Sudanese emigree, brought 

suit alleging that the government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. In his complaint, Mr. Fikre alleged that he traveled from his 

home in Portland, Oregon to Sudan in 2009 to pursue business opportunities there. At a visit to the U. S. embassy, two FBI agents informed Mr. Fikre that he could not return to the United States because 

the government had placed him on the No Fly List. The agents questioned him extensively about the Portland mosque he attended, and 

they offered to take steps to remove him from the No Fly List if he 

agreed to become an FBI informant and to report on other members of

his religious community. Mr. Fikre refused. He then traveled to the 

United Arab Emirates, where he alleges authorities interrogated and

detained him for 106 days at the behest of the FBI. Unable to fly back 

to the United States, he ended up in Sweden, where he remained until 

February 2015. While there, he filed this suit, alleging that the government had violated his rights to procedural due process by failing to

provide either meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List or

any appropriate way to secure redress. He further alleged that the 

government had placed him on the list for constitutionally impermissible reasons related to his race, national origin, and religious beliefs.

Mr. Fikre sought, among other things, an injunction prohibiting the

government from keeping him on the No Fly List and a declaratory

judgment confirming the government had violated his rights. In May 

2016, the government notified Mr. Fikre that he had been removed 

from the No Fly List and sought dismissal of his suit in district court,

arguing that its administrative action had rendered the case moot. 

The district court agreed with the government, but the Ninth Circuit 
 

 

 

 

 

 

2 FBI v. FIKRE 

Syllabus 

reversed, holding that a party seeking to moot a case based on its own

voluntary cessation of challenged conduct must show that the conduct 

cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” 904 F. 3d 1033, 1039. On 

remand, the government submitted a declaration asserting that, based

on the currently available information, Mr. Fikre would not be placed

on the No Fly List in the future, and the district court again dismissed 

Mr. Fikre’s claim as moot. The Ninth Circuit once again reversed,

holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because the

declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Mr. Fikre on the 

No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the 

list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future. 35 F. 4th 

762, 770–772. 

Held: The government has failed to demonstrate that this case is moot. 

A court with jurisdiction has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear 

and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976). But the 

converse is also true as a federal court must dismiss a case that is 

moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013). The limited 

authority vested in federal courts by Article III of the U. S. Constitution to decide cases and controversies means that federal courts may 

no more pronounce on past actions that have no “continuing effect” in 

the world than they may neglect their obligation to hear and resolve 

questions properly before them. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18. 

This does not imply that a defendant may “automatically moot a case”

by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it 

is sued. Instead, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of a challenged

practice” will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot “reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 

Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189. 

This standard holds for governmental defendants no less than for private ones. Applying these principles to the uncontested factual allegations here, this case is not moot. While the government’s representation that it will not relist Mr. Fikre may mean that his past conduct is 

not enough to warrant relisting, that does not speak to whether the 

government might relist him if he engages in the same or similar conduct in the future. The government contends that because Mr. Fikre

has been delisted since 2016 and has presumably interacted freely 

with his co-religionists during that time, it is unlikely he will face relisting in the future. This too is insufficient to warrant dismissal. A 

defendant’s speculation about a plaintiff’s actions cannot make up for 

a lack of assurance about its own. The burden here is on the defendant 

to establish that it cannot reasonably be expected to resume its challenged conduct, see West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 719, and nothing the government offers here satisfies that formidable standard. The 
 

Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 3 

Syllabus 

government claims the Ninth Circuit erred by requiring it to repudiate 

its past conduct to prove mootness, but what matters is not whether a

defendant repudiates its past actions, but what the defendant can

prove about its future conduct. Coming as this case does in a preliminary posture, the Court’s judgment is a necessarily provisional one. As 

the complaint’s allegations are tested, different facts may emerge that 

may call for a different result. But adhering to traditional mootness 

principles, the government has so far failed to meet its burden. Pp. 5– 

10. 

35 F. 4th 762, affirmed. 

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J., 

filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined. 
 

_________________ 

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Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of 

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–1178 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. YONAS FIKRE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[March 19, 2024]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Yonas Fikre, a U. S. citizen, brought suit alleging that the

government placed him on the No Fly List unlawfully. 

Later, the government removed him from the list. The only

question we are asked to decide is whether the government’s action suffices to render Mr. Fikre’s claims moot. 

I 

A 

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the federal government rapidly expanded its No Fly 

List. By 2016, the government forbade approximately 

81,000 individuals from flying into, out of, within, or over

the United States. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union 

et al. as Amici Curiae 5. Many of the details surrounding 

the No Fly List are not publicly available. Some are classified, and it appears no statute or publicly promulgated regulation describes the standards the government employs 

when adding individuals to, or removing them from, the 

list. Id., at 6. 

In his complaint, Mr. Fikre challenged his placement on 

the No Fly List. In support of his suit, he pleaded a number 
 

 

2 FBI v. FIKRE 

Opinion of the Court 

of facts. Those as-yet uncontested factual allegations, the 

truth of which we do not pass upon, aver as follows:*

When he was a child and war broke out in his home country of Eritrea, Mr. Fikre and his family moved to Sudan before eventually immigrating to the United States. App. to

Pet. for Cert. 126a, Seventh Amended Complaint ¶4; id., at 

137a, ¶51. In time, Mr. Fikre became a U. S. citizen, and 

as an adult he lived in Portland, Oregon. Id., at 137a–138a, 

¶¶51–52. After working for an American cell phone company, he decided to start his own business involving the distribution and retail sale of consumer electronic products in

his native East Africa. Id., at 138a, ¶52. In pursuit of this 

new venture, he traveled to Sudan in late 2009 where some 

of his extended family still lived. Ibid. 

On arrival, Mr. Fikre informed U. S. officials of his interest in pursuing business opportunities in the country. Ibid. 

Eventually, he received an invitation to the U. S. embassy—ostensibly for a luncheon. Id., at 138a–139a, ¶¶53–

55. But, once there, Fikre was whisked instead to a small 

meeting room with two FBI agents. Id., at 139a, ¶¶55–56.

The agents told him that the government had placed him 

on the No Fly List, so he “could not return to the United 

States.” Ibid., ¶57. The agents then questioned him “extensively about the events, activities, and leadership” of the

Portland mosque he attended. Ibid., ¶58. They asked him

to serve as an FBI informant and report on other members

of his religious community, offering to “take steps to remove

[him] from the No Fly List” if he agreed. Id., at 140a, ¶59. 

Mr. Fikre refused and eventually departed. Ibid. The next 

—————— 

*Responding to Mr. Fikre’s complaint with a motion to dismiss for lack

of jurisdiction, the government did not contest his factual allegations,

and the courts below thus assumed their truth. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 

U. S. 66, 72 (1939); 5C C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1363, p. 107 (3d ed. 2004) (“The general rule” for Rule 12(b)(1) 

motions challenging subject-matter jurisdiction is to take allegations “as

true unless denied or controverted by the movant”). We do the same. 
 

 

 

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day, an agent told him over the phone that, “‘[w]henever

you want to go home[,] you come to the embassy.’” Id., at 

140a–141a, ¶62. Mr. Fikre took this to mean that he “would 

not be removed from the No Fly List and he could not travel 

to the United States unless he became” an FBI informant. 

Id., at 141a, ¶62. 

Several weeks later, Mr. Fikre traveled to the United 

Arab Emirates to advance his business plans. Id., at 142a, 

¶68. Eventually, however, authorities there “arrested, imprisoned, and tortured him.” 35 F. 4th 762, 766 (CA9 2022);

App. to Pet. for Cert. 142a–143a, Seventh Amended Complaint ¶¶69–71. They interrogated him, too, about his Portland mosque, its events, leader, and fundraising activities. 

Id., at 143a, ¶72. One interrogator told Mr. Fikre that the 

FBI had solicited his interrogation and detention. Id., at 

147a, ¶88. After holding him for 106 days, authorities arranged to have Mr. Fikre flown to Sweden where he had a 

relative. Id., at 147a, ¶86, 148a, ¶90. He remained there 

until February 2015, when the Swedish government returned him to Portland by private jet. Id., at 152a, ¶105. 

B 

While still in Sweden, Mr. Fikre filed this suit. In his 

complaint, he alleged that the government had violated his 

rights to procedural due process by failing to provide any

meaningful notice of his addition to the No Fly List, any 

information about the factual basis for his listing, and any

appropriate way to secure redress. Id., at 165a, ¶164. Further, he claimed, the government had placed him on the list 

for constitutionally impermissible reasons, including his

race, national origin, and religious beliefs. Id., at 168a, 

¶176. By way of relief, he sought a declaratory judgment

confirming that the government had violated his rights, as

well as an injunction prohibiting it from keeping him on the 

No Fly List. Id., at 169a–170a. 

Eventually, in May 2016, the government notified Mr. 
 

4 FBI v. FIKRE 

Opinion of the Court 

Fikre that it had removed him from the No Fly List. No 

explanation accompanied the decision. See Notice Regarding Plaintiff ’s Status in No. 3:13–cv–899 (D Ore.), ECF Doc.

98, p. 1. But, in court, the government argued that its administrative action rendered his lawsuit moot; even accepting all his allegations as true, the government said, dismissal had to follow as a matter of law. Supp. Memorandum 

Regarding Plaintiff ’s Removal From the No Fly List, ECF 

Doc. 104, pp. 2–4.

The district court agreed with the government’s assessment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 904 F. 3d 1033 

(2018). When a party seeks to moot a case based on its own 

voluntary cessation of challenged conduct, the Ninth Circuit held, it must show that its “‘allegedly wrongful behavior’” cannot “‘reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id., at 

1039. And, the court continued, the government’s “mere

announcement that Fikre was removed” from the No Fly 

List fell short of satisfying this standard. Ibid. 

On remand, the government tried again. Once more, it 

did not contest the truth of Mr. Fikre’s allegations concerning his experiences. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss in No. 3:13–cv–899 (D Ore.), 

ECF Doc. 146, pp. 21–23. But, this time, the government 

relied on a declaration from Christopher R. Courtright, the 

Acting Deputy Director for Operations of the Terrorist 

Screening Center. The declaration represented that Mr.

Fikre “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future

based on the currently available information.” App. to Pet. 

for Cert. 118a, ¶5. Persuaded by the government’s latest

motion, the district court again dismissed Mr. Fikre’s 

claims as moot. 35 F. 4th, at 769. 

Again, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The government’s declaration might mean that Mr. Fikre “will not be 

placed on the No Fly List now based on what he did in the 

past.” Id., at 772. But, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the declaration does not disclose what conduct landed Mr. Fikre on 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

the No Fly List, and it does not ensure that he will “not be

placed on the List if . . . he . . . engag[es] in the same or similar conduct” in the future. Ibid. As a result, the court concluded, the government had still failed to meet its burden 

of establishing that its allegedly unlawful conduct cannot 

“‘reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id., at 770. 

Shortly after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision, the

Fourth Circuit held that a similar declaration was sufficient to moot another American citizen’s lawsuit challenging his placement on the No Fly List. See Long v. Pekoske, 

38 F. 4th 417, 427 (CA4 2022). To resolve this conflict in 

lower court authority, the government asked us to hear Mr. 

Fikre’s case, and we agreed to do so. 600 U. S. ___ (2023). 

II 

The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction to decide “Cases” or “Controversies.” Art. III, §§1, 2. A court 

with jurisdiction has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to 

hear and resolve questions properly before it. Colorado 

River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 

800, 817 (1976). But the converse also holds true. Sometimes, events in the world overtake those in the courtroom, 

and a complaining party manages to secure outside of litigation all the relief he might have won in it. When that 

happens, a federal court must dismiss the case as moot. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. 85, 91 (2013). It must 

because federal judges are not counselors or academics;

they are not free to take up hypothetical questions that 

pique a party’s curiosity or their own. The limited authority

vested in federal courts to decide cases and controversies 

means that they may no more pronounce on past actions 

that do not have any “continuing effect” in the world than

they may shirk decision on those that do. Spencer v. 

Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18 (1998).

None of this implies that a defendant may “automatically 
 

 

 

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moot a case” by the simple expedient of suspending its challenged conduct after it is sued. Already, 568 U. S., at 91. 

Instead, our precedents hold, a defendant’s “‘voluntary cessation of a challenged practice’” will moot a case only if the

defendant can show that the practice cannot “‘reasonably 

be expected to recur.’” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 

(2000); see United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 

632–633 (1953).

We have described this as a “formidable burden.” Friends 

of the Earth, 528 U. S., at 190. And the reason for it is simple: “The Constitution deals with substance,” not strategies. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867). Were 

the rule more forgiving, a defendant might suspend its challenged conduct after being sued, win dismissal, and later

pick up where it left off; it might even repeat “this cycle” as 

necessary until it achieves all of its allegedly “unlawful

ends.” Already, 568 U. S., at 91. A live case or controversy 

cannot be so easily disguised, and a federal court’s constitutional authority cannot be so readily manipulated. To 

show that a case is truly moot, a defendant must prove “‘no 

reasonable expectation’” remains that it will “return to [its] 

old ways.” W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S., at 632–633. That 

much holds for governmental defendants no less than for

private ones. See., e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 

719 (2022); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 

Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 457, n. 1 (2017); Parents Involved in 

Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 

701, 719–720 (2007). 

The parties dispute none of these principles; the only 

question we face concerns their application. Proceeding as

the courts below did, we accept Mr. Fikre’s uncontested factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. See supra, at 2, n.*. As the lower courts did, too, we 

accept as true the supplemental evidence the government

offered: its declaration representing that Mr. Fikre “will 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the

currently available information.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

118a, ¶5.

Viewed in that light, this case is not moot. To appreciate

why, it is enough to consider one aspect of Mr. Fikre’s complaint. He contends that the government placed him on the

No Fly List for constitutionally impermissible reasons, including his religious beliefs. In support of his claim, Mr.

Fikre alleges (among other things) that FBI agents interrogated him about a mosque in Portland he once attended and 

threatened to keep him on the No Fly List unless he agreed 

to serve as an informant against his co-religionists. Accepting these as-yet uncontested allegations, the government’s

representation that it will not relist Mr. Fikre based on 

“currently available information” may mean that his past 

actions are not enough to warrant his relisting. But, as the 

court of appeals observed, none of that speaks to whether 

the government might relist him if he does the same or similar things in the future—say, attend a particular mosque

or refuse renewed overtures to serve as an informant. Put 

simply, the government’s sparse declaration falls short of

demonstrating that it cannot reasonably be expected to do 

again in the future what it is alleged to have done in the 

past. Friends of the Earth, 528 U. S., at 190. 

If its declaration alone will not do, the government asks

us to consider two further things. First, it points to the fact

that it removed Mr. Fikre from the No Fly List in 2016. The 

government acknowledges that it took this action only after 

he filed suit. But, it stresses, the parties have now sparred

in court for some years since his delisting. Second, the government surmises that, during this period, Mr. Fikre “presumably has joined religious organizations” and interacted 

freely with his co-religionists. Reply Brief 9. Together, the

government submits, these points make it unlikely he will

face relisting in the future.

That, too, is insufficient to warrant dismissal. A case 
 

8 FBI v. FIKRE 

Opinion of the Court 

does not automatically become moot when a defendant suspends its challenged conduct and then carries on litigating 

for some specified period. Nor can a defendant’s speculation

about a plaintiff ’s actions make up for a lack of assurance 

about its own. (For that matter, given what little we know

at this stage in the proceedings, Mr. Fikre may have done

none of the things the government presumes he has, perhaps wishing to but refraining for fear of finding himself

relisted.) In all cases, it is the defendant’s “burden to establish” that it cannot reasonably be expected to resume its 

challenged conduct—whether the suit happens to be new or 

long lingering, and whether the challenged conduct might 

recur immediately or later at some more propitious moment. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 719. Nothing the government offers here satisfies that formidable standard. See 

Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 719 (declining to dismiss a

case as moot five years after the defendant voluntarily 

ceased its challenged conduct); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s 

Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 288–289 (1982) (similar). 

Aiming now in a different direction, the government contends that the Ninth Circuit erred by conflating mootness

with the merits. The government reads portions of that

court’s decisions as suggesting that, to win dismissal, it had 

to admit it lacked any lawful basis for including Mr. Fikre

on the No Fly List in the first place. For his part, Mr. Fikre

disputes this characterization of the Ninth Circuit’s work;

never, he says, did that court require the government to repudiate its past conduct to prove mootness.

Rather than resolve who has the better reading of another court’s decisions, it is enough to underline the reason

for our own. Yes, a party’s repudiation of its past conduct

may sometimes help demonstrate that conduct is unlikely 

to recur. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U. S. 

625, 632–633 (1979). But often a case will become moot 

even when a defendant “vehemently” insists on the propriety of “the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit.” Already, 
Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

568 U. S., at 91. What matters is not whether a defendant 

repudiates its past actions, but what repudiation can prove

about its future conduct. It is on that consideration alone— 

the potential for a defendant’s future conduct—that we rest

our judgment. 

Necessarily, our judgment is a provisional one. Just because the government has not yet demonstrated that Mr.

Fikre’s case is moot does not mean it will never be able to 

do so. This case comes to us in a preliminary posture,

framed only by uncontested factual allegations and a terse 

declaration. As the case unfolds, the complaint’s allegations will be tested rather than taken as true, and different 

facts may emerge that may call for a different conclusion. 

That is a possibility courts must be alive to in this (and any) 

case, for a federal court’s duty to ensure itself of Article III

jurisdiction may begin at the inception of a lawsuit, but it

persists throughout the life of the proceedings. Spencer, 

523 U. S., at 7. 

To be sure, litigating disputes that potentially touch on

matters of national security beyond the motion-to-dismiss 

stage can present evidentiary challenges for parties and

courts alike. Careful attention must be paid to the handling 

of classified or privileged information. For our present purposes, however, it is enough to know both sides agree that

“[a]dhering to traditional mootness principles is especially 

important in this national-security context.” Reply Brief 18; 

see Brief for Petitioners 34; Brief for Respondent 45. And 

adhering to those principles here, “it is impossible to conclude” the government has so far “borne [its] burden” of 

proving that this dispute is moot. Adarand Constructors, 

Inc. v. Slater, 528 U. S. 216, 224 (2000) (per curiam). 

* 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 

Affirmed. 
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Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 22–1178 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS v. YONAS FIKRE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[March 19, 2024]

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins,

concurring. 

I join the Court’s opinion, but write to clarify my understanding that our decision does not suggest that the Government must disclose classified information to Mr. Fikre, 

his attorney, or a court to show that this case is moot. In at 

least some instances, requiring the Government to disclose 

sensitive information regarding its grounds for placing or 

removing a person from the No-Fly List could undermine

the Government’s significant interests in airline safety and

the prevention of terrorist attacks. Indeed, some of the Nation’s 600-plus district courts are poorly positioned to handle classified documents, and most court personnel lack security clearance. Recognizing such limitations, I do not

understand the Court’s opinion to require the Government

to disclose classified information as a matter of course. On 

the contrary, non-classified information or information obtained in discovery from the plaintiff in this and other cases 

may be sufficient to show that the allegedly unlawful listing 

is unlikely to recur, thereby proving mootness.