Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A02-1507-CR-784| May 4, 2016 Page 1 of 18

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael B. Troemel

Lafayette, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Reginald Lee Robinson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

12A02-1507-CR-784

Appeal from the Clinton Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable Bradley K. 

Mohler, Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

12C01-1311-FA-1067

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 12A02-1507-CR-784| May 4, 2016 Page 2 of 18

[1] Reginald Lee Robinson appeals his convictions for two counts of attempted 

murder. Robinson raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether there 

is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense. We 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 8, 2013, Robinson spent several hours writing at a desk in the 

lower level of the Frankfort Library, which was his custom. At some point, 

Gladys Brewer and her four-year-old great granddaughter M.L. exited the 

library, and Robinson exited the library as well. Robinson attacked M.L., 

stabbing her repeatedly in the face and hand with a screwdriver that was 

sharpened to a point. Brewer, who had never seen Robinson before, ran over to 

M.L., and Robinson struck Brewer in the face, stabbing her “in the head and 

dragging” the screwdriver. Transcript at 335. Robinson’s screwdriver became 

caught in Brewer’s book bag, and Brewer was able to pick up M.L. and carry 

her to a bench. 

[3] Andrea Slipher, the gardener for the library, saw that Robinson was walking in 

circles and was “just crying - kind of wailing.” Id. at 348. She heard him state 

“[t]hey wouldn’t leave me alone” over and over. Id. Slipher walked toward 

him and observed him lean against the side of the building and slide down until 

he was sitting. Robinson looked up at Slipher, said “[c]all the police and the 

ambulance,” and then dropped the screwdriver between his legs, and Slipher 

reached down and picked it up. Id. at 349. 
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[4] Frankfort Police Sergeant Thomas Dillingham responded to a dispatch 

reporting that there were two females bleeding at the front of the library. 

Sergeant Dillingham approached Robinson, who was sitting on the sidewalk 

leaning against the building, and Robinson immediately told him that “they 

wouldn’t leave him alone and he couldn’t take it anymore and so he snapped” 

and then continued to mutter as Sergeant Dillingham was standing there that “I 

went berserk and I snapped.” Id. at 373. M.L. was sent by helicopter to Riley 

Children’s Hospital in Indianapolis, has undergone multiple surgeries, and may 

need additional surgeries. M.L. sustained numerous puncture wounds to her 

face, other wounds to her hand, and trauma to her left eye resulting in the loss 

of her sight in that eye. Brewer sustained puncture wounds on the left side of 

her head. 

[5] The State charged Robinson with two counts of attempted murder, aggravated 

battery as a class B felony, two counts of criminal confinement as class B 

felonies, battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a person less than fourteen 

years of age as a class B felony, and two counts of battery by means of a deadly 

weapon as class C felonies. Robinson filed a notice that he intended to assert 

the defense of mental disease or defect, and the court appointed Dr. Vernon 

Little, M.D., and Dr. Jeffrey Wendt, Ph.D., to evaluate him. 

[6] At Robinson’s trial, the jury heard testimony from, among others, Dr. Little, 

Dr. Wendt, Slipher, Sergeant Dillingham, Robinson’s brother Geoff, and 

Sharon Hayden, who had given Robinson a ride to the library the day of the 

attacks. Slipher testified that the words “[t]hey wouldn’t leave me alone” were 
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the first words she heard Robinson say, although not to her in particular, and 

that the words “[c]all the police and the ambulance” were the first words that 

Robinson said directly to her. Id. at 365. Sergeant Dillingham testified that, 

upon his arrival at the library, Robinson immediately informed him that he had 

snapped. Robinson’s brother Geoff testified that Robinson had “snapped a few 

times in his temper” but that it was verbal and he did not observe violence by 

Robinson. Id. at 667. 

[7] Dr. Little testified regarding his educational and professional background and 

his experience working with the mentally ill. He testified that he had personally 

met with and evaluated Robinson and he concluded that Robinson suffered 

from a mental disease and substantial defect but that he could appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his actions. On cross-examination, Dr. Little indicated that 

Robinson had been transported to his office for the interview, that at some point 

there was a fire alarm that caused everyone to evacuate the building, and that 

he did not continue the interview after the evacuation.1 Dr. Little further 

indicated he was familiar with the details of the stabbing, and, when asked what 

information he drew upon to familiarize himself with those details, he stated 

that most of it came from other records that were made available to him. He

stated that his belief from the records was that Robinson was not acquainted 

 

1 Dr. Little stated he had met with Robinson for approximately one and one-half hours, Robinson’s counsel 

stated that Robinson disputes that time, Dr. Little indicated he was not sure about the time and that the time 

he gave was approximate, and, when asked if he recalled being interrupted after less than an hour because of 

a fire alarm, Dr. Little replied that there was a fire alarm. Dr. Little later testified: “I think it was more than 

the uh hour. But it could have been certainly less than that.” Transcript at 881. 
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with the victims, that he was aware the crime took place in public during the 

day, that he was aware Robinson had been in the library prior to the offense, 

and that he did not remember the name of a bystander. When asked if he was 

aware of what Robinson said to the bystander, Dr. Little responded that he 

recalled that Robinson said to call the police. Dr. Little indicated that he did 

not have any notes from his meeting with Robinson and, when asked if he 

prepared his report three months after he had met with him, replied that was 

approximately when he filed his report. Dr. Little agreed that he had said in his 

report that Robinson is chronically mentally ill, testified that he believed that 

the diagnosis of schizophrenia was the most likely diagnosis, and acknowledged 

that he had written in his report that Robinson’s actions of attacking the victims 

certainly related to his mental illness. 

[8] On questioning by the deputy prosecutor, Dr. Little stated that his report 

indicated that Robinson’s persecutory delusions involved a preoccupation and 

sensitivity to what he perceived to be loud and disruptive noises. He testified 

that Robinson did not give him many specifics about the attacks, that he did 

indicate that he could not control himself at that point, and that he did not go 

into details about what he was thinking. Dr. Little testified that Robinson 

indicated he was startled by a loud noise which caused his loss of control, that 

Robinson would have been able to understand that what he was doing was 

wrongful, that being startled by its nature is a transient event, and that after the 

initial startle Robinson would, based on his records, be able to refrain from 

doing anything. Dr. Little agreed that repeatedly stabbing was a more 
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protracted response rather than a simple startled reflex, and that sixty to seventy 

percent of his case load involves people with schizophrenia. When asked the 

significance in his opinion of the fact Robinson said to call the police, Dr. Little 

testified that the statement suggests some awareness that he was doing 

something criminal. 

[9] Dr. Wendt testified regarding his educational and professional background, that 

he had personally met with and evaluated Robinson, and that he concluded that 

Robinson suffered from a severe mental illness that interfered with his 

perception of reality during the time in question and his appreciation of the 

wrongfulness. He testified regarding his methodology and that he was provided 

with materials related to the case, including police reports, and Robinson’s prior 

treatment records. He testified that Robinson believed there was a conspiracy 

against him, that he had described how he had noticed M.L. and her 

grandmother leave the library immediately before him, that he crossed paths 

with M.L., who was making noises, that he perceived this to be part of the 

conspiracy and was overwhelmed by his paranoid delusions, and that he 

spontaneously attacked her. Dr. Wendt testified that, based on his interview, 

Robinson’s statement “they won’t leave me alone” was not referring to the 

victims in this case but to the people who he believed had been after him for 

years. Id. at 920. He testified that, when he asked Robinson why he did not 

run after the attacks, Robinson said that he did not see any point in it, that 

everybody knew him and knew what was happening, and that he “was hoping 

this would force them to show their hand.” Id. at 921. 
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[10] Additionally, Sharon Hayden testified that she worked at a clinic which was 

about a block from the library, that she regularly gave Robinson a ride from his 

home to the clinic and he would often spend a portion of his day at the library, 

and that she had given him a ride the day of the attacks. She testified that 

Robinson was very intelligent and he was lucid and oriented. She stated that, at 

some time, she and her husband offered to give him a television, that he replied 

that he did not think he was “in the right frame of mind . . . for a TV,” and that,

in 2010 or 2011 when talking to him about applying for assistance, she 

understood him to say that he was hearing voices, that she believed he made 

that statement because it could help him obtain the assistance, and that 

Robinson never made any other similar statements to her. Transcript at 586. 

Hayden testified that, when she gave Robinson a ride, they would talk about 

things that happened in town and things he had read at the library, and that 

nothing about their conversations suggested that Robinson was mentally ill or 

dangerous in any way. She stated she never observed Robinson in a situation 

she thought was dangerous to himself or others, that he has a good moral 

compass, and that he knows right from wrong. She also testified that, on the 

morning of the attacks, she gave him a ride, that he said that some guys in a 

black Camaro had harassed him when he had been out in his yard the previous 

day, but that everything seemed fine and he was joking and laughing. 

[11] The jury found Robinson guilty but mentally ill on all counts as charged. The 

court sentenced him to thirty-five years for the attempted murder of M.L. and 
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thirty years for the attempted murder of Brewer, ordered that the sentences be 

served consecutively, and vacated the other counts. 

Discussion

[12] The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s rejection of 

Robinson’s insanity defense. When reviewing a jury’s verdict which rejected 

the defense of insanity, we will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness 

credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact. Myers v. 

State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1074 (Ind. 2015) (citing Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 

699, 709 (Ind. 2010) (citing Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-1150 

(Ind. 2004)), reh’g denied), reh’g denied. “[A] finding that a defendant was not 

insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference from reviewing 

courts.” Id. (citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (citing Barany v. State, 658 

N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ind. 1995))). Thus, when a defendant claims that an insanity 

defense should have been successful, the conviction will be set aside only

“when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the 

defendant was insane when the crime was committed.” Id. (quoting Galloway,

938 N.E.2d at 710 (quoting Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149)). 

[13] Robinson contends that the verdicts of guilty but mentally ill are contrary to law 

and the jury should have found him not responsible by reason of insanity. He 

argues that the basis of Dr. Little’s opinion was almost non-existent, that Dr. 

Little saw him for less than an hour, that he took no notes and prepared his 

report three months after the meeting, and that he relied upon other records 

available to him. Robinson argues that Dr. Little believed that the first thing he 
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said after the stabbing was “call the police” when in fact the testimony shows 

that he said “call the police” well after he was walking around in circles stating 

“they won’t leave me alone.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Robinson asserts Dr. 

Little’s opinion does not qualify as credible and contends his convictions must 

be reversed. 

[14] The State maintains that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s 

decision and that Dr. Little based his opinion that Robinson was able to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense on the fact 

Robinson was able to control himself after an initial startle and the stabbing was 

a protracted response, and that his first words directed to another person were 

“call the police.” Appellee’s Brief at 11. The State argues that Robinson’s 

challenges to Dr. Little’s testimony were placed before the jury and the jury still 

credited his testimony. The State also contends that other lay testimony 

supports the conclusion that Robinson was sane at the time of his offense, and

that Robinson’s argument is an inappropriate invitation “to re-assess the ‘battle 

of the experts’ that played out before the jury.” Id. at 13. 

[15] To be convicted of a criminal offense, the State must prove each element of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1074-1075 (citing Ind.

Code § 35-41-4-1(a)). Criminal responsibility can be avoided if the defendant 

can successfully raise and establish the “insanity defense.” Id. at 1075 (citing 

Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 708; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-6(a)). To successfully assert 

this defense, an individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) 

that he or she suffers from a mental illness and (2) that the mental illness 
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rendered him or her unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct 

at the time of the offense.” Id. (citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 708). Thus, 

proof of mental illness alone is insufficient. Id. (citations omitted). 

[16] Robinson asserted an insanity defense, and the jury found him guilty but 

mentally ill. The parties do not dispute that Robinson suffered from a mental 

illness, and the question for purposes of his insanity defense is whether his 

mental illness prevented him from understanding the wrongfulness of his 

conduct at the time of the offense. See id. (noting it was not disputed that Myers 

suffered from a mental illness and that therefore the only remaining question for 

the purposes of his insanity defense was whether his mental illness prevented 

him from understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the 

offense). “It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant 

appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.” Id.

(citing Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149). The defendant is in the position of 

having to appeal a negative judgment. Id. A reviewing court will reverse only 

when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the 

defendant was insane when the crime was committed. Id. The reviewing court 

will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses but will 

consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable 

and logical inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. 

[17] In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court has noted that Indiana precedent has 

clearly established that unanimous expert testimony alone is not determinative 

where there is conflicting lay opinion testimony or demeanor evidence also 
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presented at trial. See id. (citing Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. 1994) 

(explaining that this Court has “never held expert testimony to be conclusive”)). 

The Court observed that, in previous cases where insanity defenses were 

unsuccessful even in light of non-conflicting expert testimony that the 

defendants were insane at the time of the offense, it had upheld the convictions 

“because the evidence as to the defendant’s insanity was in conflict and thus 

sufficient to sustain the trier of fact’s determination of sanity.” Id. at 1075-1076 

(citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710 (citing Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1150; 

Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 672 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied; Barany, 658 

N.E.2d at 64; Cate, 644 N.E.2d at 548; Rogers v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 

(Ind. 1987); Green v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind. 1984))). The Court 

noted that, in each instance, “there has been other sufficient probative evidence 

from which a conflicting inference of sanity reasonably could be drawn.” Id. at 

1076 (citing Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710). The Court further noted that, for 

example, demeanor evidence, “when considered in light of the other evidence” 

can permit a jury to draw a reasonable inference of sanity. Id. (citing Galloway,

938 N.E.2d at 712 (citing Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149)). The Court held this 

is true because “testimony regarding behavior before, during, and after a crime 

may be more indicative of actual mental health at [the] time of the crime than 

mental exams conducted weeks or months later.” Id. (citing Thompson, 804 

N.E.2d at 1149 (citing Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 64)).

[18] Dr. Little’s testimony is probative evidence that Robinson was not insane when 

he committed the attacks, despite its conflict with Dr. Wendt’s testimony, and 
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the jury was free to find Dr. Little’s opinion persuasive. See Lawson v. State, 966 

N.E.2d 1273, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that one expert’s testimony was 

probative evidence that the defendant was sane when she committed the crimes, 

despite its conflict with the testimony of another expert, and that the jury was 

free to credit the first expert’s opinion over the second expert’s opinion), trans. 

denied. The jury, in assessing the weight of Dr. Little’s conclusions, was able to 

consider his testimony regarding the length of his interview of Robinson, the 

fact he drew upon other records available to him to familiarize himself with the 

details of the stabbing, and the fact he did not have any notes from his meeting 

with Robinson. Further, Robinson’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined Dr. 

Little in an attempt to point out the possible shortcomings or weaknesses of his 

evaluation of Robinson and his conclusion regarding Robinson’s sanity at the 

time of the attacks. We acknowledge that the interviews by Dr. Little and Dr. 

Wendt occurred well after the stabbings and, as Judge Mathias notes in his 

concurring opinion, that our criminal justice system would be better served if 

psychiatric examinations of defendants occurred shortly after arrest and before 

the administration of medication. This would greatly assist the trier of fact in 

determining whether a defendant’s mental illness rendered him or her unable to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense. 

Even so, the trier of fact may take into account the delay between the time of an 

offense and an examination of the defendant in assessing the weight of the 

examiner’s testimony or a report prepared by the examiner. 
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[19] Moreover, as reiterated by the Indiana Supreme Court, even unanimous expert 

testimony is not determinative where there is conflicting lay opinion testimony 

or demeanor evidence, and testimony regarding behavior before, during, and 

after a crime may be more indicative of actual mental health than the 

subsequent mental exams. See Myers, 27 N.E.3d at 1075-1076. Here, the record 

shows that, in addition to the testimony of Dr. Little and Dr. Wendt, the jury 

heard significant lay testimony and other evidence regarding Robinson’s 

behavior before, at the time of, and after his attacks on Brewer and M.L., 

including from the responding officers and from Hayden regarding her previous 

interactions with him and his behavior the morning of the stabbings. To the 

extent reasonable minds could interpret a conflict in the evidence regarding 

Robinson’s sanity at the time of the offense, a jury could nevertheless 

determine, based on the expert and lay testimony presented, that Robinson 

demonstrated an understanding that stabbing people is wrong, and it is not the 

role of the court on appeal to reweigh the evidence presented at trial and make a 

determination as to which of those inferences the jury should have made. See

id. at 1078. 

[20] Based upon the record, we conclude it was possible for the jury to have made a 

reasonable inference that Robinson, while mentally ill, was able to appreciate 

the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense and to reject his 

insanity defense. See id. at 1077-1078 (holding that, based upon the 

circumstantial evidence provided, it was possible for a reasonable jury to 

conclude that Myers was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at 
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the time of the offense and that, although there was evidence that could also 

support the conclusion that Myers was insane at the time of the crime, it need 

only be demonstrated that inferences may reasonably be drawn which support 

the finding of guilt and it is not within the purview of the court on appeal to 

reverse the jury’s verdict simply because a “more reasonable” inference could 

be made, and affirming Myers’ convictions on four counts of attempted 

murder); Lawson, 966 N.E.2d at 1278-1283 (noting the jury was free to credit 

the opinion of one expert over the other and that there was independent lay 

witness testimony tending to corroborate the expert’s opinion that the 

defendant was sane, and holding there was sufficient evidence to support the 

jury’s rejection of the defendant’s insanity defense). 

Conclusion

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Robinson’s convictions for two counts of 

attempted murder. 

[22] Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., concurs.

Mathias, J., concurs with separate opinion.
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I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Reginald L. Robinson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

12A02-1507-CR-784

Mathias, Judge, concurring. 

[23] I concur with my colleagues.

[24] However, I write separately to point out yet again the inadequacy of our 

criminal justice system when confronted with defendants who are mentally ill. 

Psychiatric examinations of a defendant who likely suffers from serious mental 

illness should occur shortly after arrest and before any administration of 

psychotropic medication in jail to more accurately determine whether the 
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defendant could have possibly had the requisite scienter or mens rea at the time of 

the crime. As I have previously stated:

Our criminal justice system needs an earlier and intervening 

procedure to determine competency retroactively to the time of 

the alleged crime. Perhaps we as a society need to consider the 

concept of a defendant being unchargeable because of mental 

illness under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-6, and not just guilty 

but mentally ill under Indiana Code section 35-36-2-1, et seq. In 

either case, the commitment proceedings provided for in Indiana 

Code section 35-36-2-4 would both protect society and best care 

for the defendant involved.

Whether such a procedure is promulgated by the Indiana 

Supreme Court through its rule-making process or by the Indiana 

General Assembly through statute, it is time for the truly longterm, incompetent criminal defendant to have an earlier and

intervening opportunity for a determination of his or her 

competency at the time of the crime alleged. Such a procedure 

convened soon after arrest, rather than years later when stale 

evidence and dim or non-existent memories are all that are left, 

or never, would best serve society and the defendant.

Habibzadah v. State, 904 N.E.2d 367, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (Mathias, J., 

concurring). 

[25] In this case, the stabbings occurred on November 8, 2013, and Robinson was 

charged on November 12, 2013. It was more than six months before the trial 

court issued its order appointing Dr. Wendt and Dr. Little. Dr. Little 

interviewed Robinson on August 4, 2014, for approximately one hour. Dr. 

Wendt interviewed Robinson on August 6, 2014, for approximately two-and-
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one-half hours. These two interviews took place almost nine months after the 

acts that led to Robinson’s arrest and charges, when a delay of even nine days 

might well have caused inaccurate assessment. 

[26] The doctors agreed that Robinson suffers from chronic mental illness, but only 

Dr. Little believed that Robinson was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 

conduct. Also, “[o]ur cases have consistently held that conflicting credible expert 

testimony is sufficiently probative of sanity.” See Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 

699, 710 (Ind. 2010) (emphasis added). 

[27] I believe that the trial court should have concluded that Dr. Little’s testimony 

lacked credibility, as a matter of law, under its gatekeeping authority regarding 

expert testimony Ind. Evid. Rule 702; Halterman v. Adams County Bd. of Com’rs, 

991 N.E.2d 987, 989-90(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Burp v. State, 612 N.E.2d 

169, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)). After his brief interview with Robinson, Dr. 

Little reviewed his medical records and the police reports but did not review the 

video of the stabbing. He did not take any notes during his interview with 

Robinson. Three months later, without any notes of that interview, he prepared 

and filed his report with the trial court. At trial, Dr. Little also testified that he 

was not aware that immediately after the stabbing, Robinson was walking 

around in circles “wailing” and stating over and over ,“[t]hey wouldn’t leave 

me alone.” Tr. pp. 348, 880-81. Refusing to admit Dr. Little’s opinion because 

of these serious inadequacies would have left the jury with Dr. Wendt’s 

testimony which found that Robinson was incapable of forming the requisite 

scienter at the time of the criminal act.
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[28] Yet, in Indiana, juries are empowered to ignore expert testimony, in favor of 

the testimony of the lay witnesses. With such a horrendous sequence of events, 

the jury chose to do so at Robinson’s trial. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069 

(Ind. 2015). When faced with acts such as those committed by Robinson, I can 

understand the jury’s emotion and its desire to protect society by placing a 

defendant like Robinson behind bars for the rest of his life, rather than 

considering the logic of a lifetime of treatment in a secure mental health facility. 

It is a difficult decision for a judge to overturn such a verdict. “Indiana 

precedent has clearly established that unanimous expert testimony alone is not 

determinative where there is conflicting lay opinion testimony or demeanor 

evidence also presented at trial” See id. at 1075. I am therefore constrained to 

concur.