Report to Congressional Committees 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

July 2003 DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Basing Uncertainties 

Necessitate 

Reevaluation of 

U.S. Construction 

Plans in South Korea 

GAO-03-643 
Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all 

U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to 

resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea. 

Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, 

complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of 

U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan 

area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the 

$5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in 

South Korea over the next 10 years. 

Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements 

could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction 

projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those 

unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned 

construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan 

Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul—areas where 

there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence—has recently been put on 

hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul. 

GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the 

implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects 

throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources, 

including funding realized through land sales from property returned by 

the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be 

required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear. 

Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction 

to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea. 

Ongoing and Planned Construction on U.S. Installations in South Korea, as of March 2003 

The U.S.-South Korean Land 

Partnership Plan (LPP), signed 

in March 2002, was designed to 

consolidate U.S. installations, 

improve combat readiness, 

enhance public safety, and 

strengthen the U.S.-South Korean 

alliance by addressing some of 

the causes of periodic tension 

associated with the U.S. presence 

in South Korea. The Senate 

report on military construction 

appropriations for fiscal year 2003 

directed GAO to review the LPP. 

GAO adjusted its review to also 

address the effect of ongoing 

reassessments of U.S. overseas 

presence upon the LPP and other 

infrastructure needs. 

In this report, GAO assessed 

(1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the 

implications on the LPP and other 

construction projects of proposals 

to change basing in South Korea, 

and (3) implementation challenges 

associated with the LPP that 

could affect future U.S. military 

construction projects in 

South Korea. 

GAO recommends (1) a 

reassessment of construction 

projects planned or under way in 

South Korea as ongoing studies of 

overseas presence and basing are 

finalized and (2) the development 

of a detailed South Korea-wide 

infrastructure master plan to 

guide future construction planning. 

DOD agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations and indicated 

actions it is taking to address them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-643.

To view the full product, including the 

scope and methodology, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact 

Barry W. Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-643, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2003 

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE 

Basing Uncertainties Necessitate 

Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans 

in South Korea 
Page i GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Korea Land Partnership Plan 7

Land Partnership Plan as Originally Approved Addressed a Portion 

of Previously Existing U.S. Military Infrastructure Needs in 

South Korea 14

Ongoing Studies Are Expected to Alter Previously Planned 

LPP Construction Projects 15

Challenges to Completing Land Partnership Plan and Other 

Planned Construction Projects throughout South Korea 17

Conclusions 21

Recommendations for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 24 

Appendix II Summary of the Land Partnership Plan 26 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 34 

Tables 

Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States 29

Table 2: Temporary Grants 30

Table 3: Training Area Easements 30

Table 4: Total Release of U.S. Training Areas 30

Table 5: Partial Release of Grants 31

Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities 

and Areas 31

Table 7: Upper Tier Easements 33

Table 8: Middle Tier Easements 33

Table 9: Lower Tier Easements 33

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figures 

Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves 6

Figure 2: U.S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 7

Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan 9

Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure 

Construction Costs in South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002-2011 10

Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 

2002-2011 11

Figure 6: U.S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under 

the Land Partnership Plan 16

Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land 

Partnership Plan 19

Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land 

Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year 28

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

LPP Land Partnership Plan 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

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Page 1 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

July 15, 2003 

Congressional Committees 

Military officials from the United States and the Republic of Korea 

(hereafter referred to as South Korea) signed an agreement known as the 

Land Partnership Plan (LPP) on March 29, 2002. The LPP was described 

by the parties to the agreement as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean effort 

to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat 

readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean 

alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension and 

discontent among South Koreans regarding the U.S. presence in South 

Korea. The LPP, as originally approved, promised to reduce the number 

of U.S. military troop installations from 41 to 23 and to consolidate many 

U.S. facilities north of Seoul (the capital of South Korea), along with other 

facilities south of Seoul. Under the plan, financing of new construction to 

support consolidations and relocations of U.S. forces in South Korea was 

expected to rely on revenue generated from land sales following U.S. 

return of selected facilities and training lands to South Korea, on host 

nation funding, and on U.S. military construction funding. The LPP was 

predicated on continuing to maintain U.S. bases and facilities north of 

Seoul (near the demilitarized zone that separates North Korea from South 

Korea). Since passage of the LPP by the South Korea National Assembly 

on October 30, 2002, there have been various indications that the United 

States is re-examining how and where it may want to station its forces 

overseas in the future. Prominent among them have been statements by 

U.S. officials that the United States is considering a range of options for its 

troops in South Korea, including repositioning them away from Seoul and 

from areas north of Seoul (near the demilitarized zone). 

The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year 

20031

 directed us to review the LPP to provide the Congress with a better 

understanding of the plan, associated costs, burden-sharing implications, 

and other related factors that the plan may not address. In light of 

ongoing reassessments of the U.S. presence overseas, which could 

affect basing requirements, we adjusted our review to also address the 

effect of potential basing changes upon the LPP and the U.S. military’s 

infrastructure in South Korea. This report assesses (1) the scope and cost 

of the LPP in relation to total infrastructure issues in South Korea, (2) the 

 1

 S. Rpt. No. 107-202, at 26 (2002). 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

implications on the LPP and other construction projects in South Korea 

of recent proposals to reposition U.S. forces in South Korea, and (3) the 

implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect 

future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea. Briefings were 

provided to various congressional defense committee staffs regarding 

our preliminary findings during our review. This report updates that 

information and provides our final analysis. 

In conducting this review, we met with officials responsible for developing 

and managing the LPP and military construction projects throughout 

South Korea, and we analyzed projected costs and funding streams. We 

visited 16 U.S. military installations and facilities in South Korea that 

would be affected by the plan, including sites that will be closed, partially 

closed, or expanded. We also visited land transfer sites that remain 

unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the 

plan, and we met with officials from the Department of Defense and the 

Department of State to identify challenges that could also affect future 

military construction projects throughout South Korea. In addition, we 

interviewed officials and reviewed documents from the Department of 

Defense, which provided perspective on the department’s studies 

concerning a potential change to the role, size, and basing of U.S. forces in 

South Korea. More information on the scope and methodology of our work 

is presented in appendix I. 

Although broad in scope, the Land Partnership Plan, as approved, was 

not designed to entirely resolve U.S. military infrastructure issues, and it 

did not address some of the more challenging land disputes, such as the 

relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area. However, the 

LPP represented a step forward in addressing U.S. military infrastructure 

issues in South Korea related to improving servicemembers’ quality of life, 

combat readiness, and relations between South Korea and U.S. forces. 

From a cost standpoint, the LPP encompassed about $2 billion of the 

$5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to 

improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 

2011. The LPP was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes 

(55 percent) that were pending in South Korea in January 2003. Of the land 

disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, 

and expensive dispute involving the potential relocation of U.S. forces 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area.2

A previous agreement between the United States and South Korea in 

1991 called for the relocation of U.S. troops stationed there and the 

return of garrison lands and facilities to South Korea. The South Korean 

government had agreed to pay for the costs of the relocation; however, 

the relocation did not occur due to its anticipated high cost. 

Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements 

are expected to change U.S. basing in South Korea significantly beyond 

that envisioned under the LPP and would diminish the need for and alter 

the locations of many construction projects, both those associated with 

the plan and those unrelated to it; in addition, costs could increase. The 

Department of Defense is conducting multiple studies related to future 

overseas presence, and available information indicates that at least 

tentative decisions have been made to reposition, over time, U.S. troops 

away from facilities in Seoul and away from areas north of Seoul. The full 

results of these studies and related negotiations may not be available for 

several months; consequently, sufficient information is not currently 

available to determine the full magnitude of modifications to existing 

basing arrangements that will be required. However, we were told that the 

United States would likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though 

larger, installations than were envisioned under the LPP. According to a 

U.S. Forces Korea official, until recently there had been about $1.3 billion 

of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military 

infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located 

north of Seoul—areas where there is uncertainty about the future U.S. 

presence. However, U.S. Forces Korea officials recently announced that 

they were reviewing these projects and that over $1 billion of the ongoing 

and planned construction had been put on hold. Further, the Department 

of Defense recently submitted a budget amendment to the Congress to 

cancel about $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison 

and to redirect $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and 

northern installations to an installation located south of Seoul. 

 2

 Yongsan Army Garrison is surrounded by residential and commercial high-rises. Yongsan 

Army Garrison is the headquarters for the U.S. military presence in South Korea, including 

headquarters facilities for the United Nations Command, the United States-Republic of 

Korea Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea, and the Eighth United 

States Army. Yongsan employs 2,500 U.S. military personnel, 1,000 U.S. civilians, 

6,000 Korean civilians, and more than 1,000 South Korean military personnel. In addition, 

3,500 military and civilian employees reside on the property or live in neighborhoods 

adjacent to the garrison. 
Page 4 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Our review of the LPP identified some key challenges that could have 

adversely affected the implementation of the LPP, as originally approved, 

and which also could affect future U.S. military construction projects 

throughout South Korea with the larger-scale changes now likely. First, 

the plan is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea 

expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United 

States, host-nation-funded construction, and U.S. military construction 

funds. The extent to which these sources of funding would be available 

to support broader infrastructure changes is unclear, particularly the 

relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. While the South Korean 

government is expected to remain responsible for providing funding for 

this relocation, the Yongsan Army Garrison property reportedly would be 

used for municipal purposes and would not be subject to resale to provide 

funding to support relocation of U.S. forces, as is the approach to basing 

changes under the LPP. At this point, insufficient information is available 

to determine precisely how many replacement facilities will be required 

for U.S. troops moving out of Yongsan Army Garrison and facilities north 

of Seoul and any difficulties that might be encountered in obtaining the 

funding. The LPP also relied on using up to 50 percent of South Korea’s 

host nation funding,3

 which would have limited the availability of these 

funds for other uses. To what extent these funds would be used for 

additional troop relocations is not yet clear. Second, implementation of 

the LPP involves a closely knit series of tasks to phase out some facilities 

and installations while phasing in new facilities and expanding other 

facilities and installations. U.S. Forces Korea was developing a master 

plan to manage this complex task and control future changes to guide 

its implementation of the LPP, but in light of the expected broader 

repositioning of forces in South Korea much greater changes in the 

numbers of affected bases and locations are anticipated. These changes, 

not yet finalized, suggest the need for a revised road map to manage and 

guide future facilities requirements and changes in South Korea. 

We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of Defense 

to (1) require a reassessment of planned construction projects in South 

Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence 

and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide 

infrastructure master plan to manage the changing infrastructure plans 

 3

 The host-nation-funded construction program is part of the South Korea burden-sharing 

arrangement covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the United 

States and represents the largest single source of major construction funds for U.S. Forces 

Korea. 
Page 5 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

for South Korea. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department 

of Defense agreed with our recommendations and pointed out that it is 

taking actions to ensure that all planned construction projects support 

decisions regarding global presence and basing strategy and that all master 

plans are adjusted to support these decisions. 

U.S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic, 

and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to 

maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean 

War.4

 Although most of the property that the United States once controlled 

has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about 

37,000 troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across 

41 troop installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites. 

According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there are 

obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the living 

and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the worst in 

the Department of Defense (DOD).5

 We observed many of these conditions 

during our visits to U.S. facilities and installations in South Korea. While 

improvements have been made in recent years, U.S. military personnel still 

use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War-era Quonset huts for housing. 

 4

 In 1954, the United States and South Korea agreed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between 

South Korea and the United States. 

5

 Examples of poor living and working conditions include daily electrical outages; air 

conditioning failures during the summer; inadequate heating during the winter, including 

unheated showers and latrines; and the presence of asbestos in family housing units. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 1: Quonset Hut Used for Barracks at Camp Greaves 

Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will 

require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and 

urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a 

greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by 

U.S. forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U.S. camps and training 

areas that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle 

of large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local 

residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U.S. forces to train 

effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and 

other U.S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul. 
Page 7 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 2: U.S. Installations Located in the Seoul Metropolitan Area 

Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel 

assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1-year hardship tours in 

which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied 

by their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and 

Air Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable 

assignment and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea 

by various means, including retirement and declining to accept command 

assignments. U.S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an 

assignment of choice by improving living and working conditions, 

modifying assignment policies to increase accompanied tours to 

25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-of-pocket expenses for personnel 

to maintain a second household in South Korea. 

To address these problems, military officials from the United States and 

South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP, 

as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean 

effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat 

readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean 

alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under 

the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However, 

U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a 

Korea Land 

Partnership Plan 
Page 8 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that 

approval occurred on October 30, 2002. 

The three components of the plan are as follows: 

• Installations—establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the 

construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan 

calls for the number of U.S. military installations to drop from 41 to 23. 

To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some sites, 

while enlarging or creating other installations. 

• Training areas—returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on 

South Korean ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the 

consolidation and protection of remaining U.S. training areas. 

• Safety easements6—acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of 

injury or death in the event of an explosion of U.S. weapons, provides a 

prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure 

and timeline for enforcing the easements. 

The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and 

South Korea. U.S. funding is provided from the military construction and 

operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds. 

The South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding 

obtained from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United 

States. As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units 

from camps that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation 

of units from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of 

the LPP is shown on figure 3. 

 6

 The LPP defines a safety easement as the distance from an explosive area that personnel 

and structures must be kept and is directly related to the quantity and types of explosives 

and ammunition present. 
Page 9 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 3: Execution of the Land Partnership Plan 

The target date for the completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011, 

although the timetable and the scale could be adjusted by mutual 

agreement. More information on the plan as originally envisioned is 

included in appendix II. 
Page 10 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

U.S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple 

organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United 

States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army 

and Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department 

of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense 

Commissary Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea. 

These organizations provide funding for military construction using 

five different sources of money—U.S. military construction funds, 

U.S. operations and maintenance funds, U.S. nonappropriated funds, 

South Korea-funded construction, and South Korea combined defense 

improvement program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for 

$5.6 billion that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction 

costs for U.S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011 

time frame. 

Figure 4: Sources of Funding for Planned Infrastructure Construction Costs in 

South Korea, Fiscal Years 2002-2011 

Infrastructure Funding 
Page 11 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Most of the approximately $2 billion projected cost of implementing the 

plan was expected to be paid for by the government of South Korea, with 

much of it financed through land sales from property returned by the 

United States. Figure 5 shows all planned funding sources and amounts for 

the plan. 

Figure 5: Land Partnership Plan Funding Sources, Fiscal Years 2002-2011 

More information on funding and sequencing actions associated with the 

LPP, as originally approved, is included in appendix II. 

A wide array of military operations-related facilities (command and 

administrative offices, barracks, and maintenance facilities) and 

dependent-related facilities and services (family housing units; schools; 

base exchanges; morale, welfare, and recreation facilities; child care 

programs; and youth services) have recently been constructed or are 

in the process of being constructed in South Korea. Typically, as U.S. 

installations overseas are vacated and turned over to host governments, 

the status of forces agreements between the United States and host 

governments address any residual value remaining, at the time of release, 

of construction and improvements that were financed by the United 

States. The agreement in South Korea differs from the agreements used in 

some other overseas locations where the United States receives residual 

value for returned property—such as currently in Germany—in that South 
Page 12 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Korea is not obliged to make any compensation to the United States for 

any improvements made in facilities and areas or for the buildings and 

structures left there. 

In recent months, political dynamics in South Korea have been changing 

as DOD has been reassessing future overseas basing requirements. 

According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, there have always been groups in 

South Korea that have criticized the U.S. presence and have claimed that 

the U.S. presence hinders reconciliation between North and South Korea. 

Demonstrations against American military presence increased sharply 

during last year’s South Korean presidential election. South Koreans 

were angered in November 2002 by a U.S. military court’s acquittal of 

two American soldiers charged in association with a tragic training 

accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls in 

June 2002. The South Korean government wanted the two American 

soldiers who had been operating the vehicle involved in the accident 

turned over to South Korean authorities; however, they were tried in a 

U.S. military court. As a result, South Koreans demonstrated against 

U.S. forces in Korea, carried out isolated violence directed at U.S. soldiers, 

and practiced discrimination against Americans (such as businesses 

refusing to serve them). Subsequently, other groups demonstrated in 

support of the U.S. government. At the same time, the United States and 

South Korea were working to strengthen their alliance and to address 

issues involving North Korea’s active nuclear weapons program and the 

proliferation of its missile programs. 

In December 2002, the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of 

South Korea agreed to conduct a Future of the Alliance study to assess the 

roles, missions, capabilities, force structure, and stationing of U.S. forces, 

including having South Korea assume the predominant role in its defense 

and increasing both South Korean and U.S. involvement in regional 

security cooperation. The results of the Future of the Alliance study 

are not expected until later this year. In February 2003, the Secretary 

of Defense testified before the Congress that the United States was 

considering the relocation of U.S. troops now based within and north of 

Seoul, including those near the demilitarized zone. Consideration of such 

a move would be in keeping with a broader reassessment of U.S. presence 

overseas that is now underway. In April 2003, the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs and other U.S. officials 

met with officials of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense to 

discuss redeploying U.S. troops and relocating key military bases in South 

Korea. Following these discussions, the U.S. and Korean press reported 

Stationing of Troops 

in South Korea May 

Be Changing 
Page 13 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

that the United States would relocate from Yongsan Army Garrison in 

Seoul to an area located south of Seoul. According to the U.S. Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, both 

South Korea and the United States have decided that this is an issue that 

cannot wait any longer for resolution. U.S. and South Korean officials 

are expected to hold more discussions to finalize the realignment of 

U.S. troops by fall 2003. 

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense has recently directed acceleration 

on work that began during the development of the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, related to the global positioning of U.S. forces and their 

supporting infrastructure outside the United States. In March 2003, the 

Secretary of Defense requested that the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop a comprehensive 

and integrated presence and basing strategy for the next 10 years. An 

Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will build upon multiple 

DOD studies, including the Overseas Basing and Requirements Study, the 

Overseas Presence Study, and the U.S. Global Posture Study. In addition, 

the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy will use information 

from the combatant commanders to determine the appropriate location 

of the infrastructure necessary to execute U.S. defense strategy. The 

Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy is not expected to be 

completed until the summer of 2003. However, we were recently told by 

DOD officials that the United States will likely concentrate its forces in 

South Korea in far fewer, though larger, installations than were initially 

envisioned under the LPP, and that over time the forces now located 

north of Seoul will be relocated south of Seoul. 
Page 14 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Although the Land Partnership Plan as approved was broad in scope, it 

was designed to address only a portion of the U.S. military’s previously 

existing infrastructure needs in South Korea, and it left unresolved a 

number of significant land disputes. Specifically, the LPP covered about 

37 percent of the construction costs planned at U.S. military installations 

in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2 billion of 

the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to 

improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 

2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or 49, of the 89 separate land 

disputes that were pending in South Korea in January 2003,7

 which was 

considered a significant step forward. One example of a land dispute that 

would be resolved under the LPP involves Camp Hialeah, located on the 

southern tip of the Korean peninsula in the port city of Pusan, South 

Korea’s second largest city. According to press reports, South Korea 

wanted this base returned because of its proximity to the port and the 

impediments it posed to urban redevelopment. However, no relocation 

agreement could be reached until the LPP included an agreement to begin 

relocating Camp Hialeah’s functions to a new site in Noksan, South Korea, 

in 2008 and to close Camp Hialeah in 2011. According to press reports 

attributed to an official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

and Trade, relocating in-city bases like Camp Hialeah would help lessen 

the potential tension between U.S. forces and neighboring communities. 

Although the plan was considered a major step forward, it was not 

designed to resolve a number of significant land disputes. As far back as 

far as 1982, negotiations over some land returns have been deadlocked 

and left unresolved. For example, the relocation of Yongsan Army 

Garrison8

 remained unresolved because of its projected financial cost to 

South Korea. The relocation of the garrison has been and continues to be a 

politically sensitive, complex, and expensive issue for U.S. Forces Korea 

and the South Korean government. In 1991, the governments of the United 

States and South Korea signed an agreement to relocate the garrison by 

1996. In 1993, the plan was suspended, largely because of the anticipated 

 7

 Since 1969, U.S. Forces Korea has reportedly returned 87 percent of the land it once 

controlled. During this time, additional land returns have been attempted, but these were 

stalled when disputes arose involving ownership and future use. 

8

 In addition to traditional military facilities, Yongsan Army Garrison includes support 

facilities associated with a small city, for example, a hospital, a fire station, a police force, 

commissary and exchange facilities, schools, theaters, restaurants, a hotel, sports and 

recreational facilities, and water and sewage treatment plants. 

Land Partnership 

Plan as Originally 

Approved Addressed 

a Portion of 

Previously Existing 

U.S. Military 

Infrastructure Needs 

in South Korea 
Page 15 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

high cost9 and the lack of alternative locations for the garrison. More than 

a decade later, the relocation of Yongsan is an ongoing, contentious 

issue. Since the 1990s, U.S. military and South Korean officials have 

held discussions on moving the military base out of the city, including 

screening various suburb locations. In December 2002, the United States 

and South Korea agreed on the need to find a mutually acceptable way to 

relocate U.S. forces outside the city of Seoul as a result of the Future of 

the Alliance Study. 

DOD has had many construction projects underway in South Korea, both 

within and outside of the LPP. However, DOD-sponsored studies now 

underway examining future overseas presence requirements are likely to 

significantly change the number and locations for U.S. military bases in 

South Korea. As noted, we were recently told that the United States will 

likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger, installations than 

were envisioned under the LPP and that, over time, the forces would be 

relocated south of Seoul.10 Therefore, a number of sites and facilities 

retained under the LPP are likely to be affected. Figure 6 shows the 

locations of U.S. troop installations in South Korea under the LPP, as 

originally approved. 

 9

 There have been various indications that the cost of relocating Yongsan Army Garrison 

could have been from $1.7 billion to $9.5 billion (in 1993 dollars). According to DOD, there 

has never been a detailed or agreed upon cost estimate for the relocation of Yongsan Army 

Garrison. 

10 According to press reports, the relocations would occur in two phases. During phase one, 

U.S. forces located north of Seoul would consolidate on a smaller number of bases. During 

phase two, these forces and forces in the Seoul metropolitan area would move to key hubs 

south of Seoul. 

Ongoing Studies 

Are Expected to Alter 

Previously Planned 

LPP Construction 

Projects 
Page 16 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 6: U.S. Troop Installations Located in South Korea Under the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Except as otherwise provided by the LPP, South Korea is not obliged to 

compensate the United States for any improvements made in facilities 

and areas or for the buildings and structures left behind. This could be 

particularly important because of military infrastructure projects planned 

or underway in areas from which the United States is considering 

relocating its troops, including Seoul’s Yongsan Army Garrison and 

U.S. installations located north of Seoul, which, according to a U.S. Forces 

Korea official, had recently represented $1.3 billion in ongoing or planned 
Page 17 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

construction projects.11 For example, construction projects in Yongsan 

included apartment high-rises for unaccompanied soldiers, a hospital, 

a sports and recreation complex, a mini-mall, and an overpass between 

Yongsan’s main and south posts. We discussed with U.S. Forces Korea 

officials the need to reassess construction projects under way or planned 

in South Korea and to delay the execution of some projects until better 

decision-making information becomes available. Subsequently, 

U.S. Forces Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all 

projects and that over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had 

been put on hold. Further, DOD recently submitted an amendment to 

the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget to the Congress to cancel about 

$5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect 

$212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern 

installations to an installation located south of Seoul. 

During the initial phase of our review we identified funding and other 

management challenges that could adversely affect the implementation 

of the Land Partnership Plan. As we considered these issues in light of the 

potential for even greater basing changes, we recognized that they could 

also affect the associated U.S. military construction projects throughout 

South Korea. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of 

funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from 

property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction, 

and U.S. military construction funds. While U.S. Forces Korea officials 

expect to build on this LPP framework for likely additional basing 

changes, the details have not been finalized for the broader changes. As 

U.S. Forces Korea revises its plans, competition for limited funding for 

other priorities could become an issue. Second, U.S. Forces Korea does 

not have a detailed road map to manage current and future facilities 

requirements in South Korea. 

The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on substantial amounts of 

South Korean funding to be realized through land sales, host-nationfunded construction, and U.S. military construction funds. The extent to 

which these sources of funding would be required and available for 

broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the 

 11 According to a U.S. Forces Korea official, of the $1.3 billion in construction projects, 

$491 million was for ongoing or planned for Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul. 

Challenges to 

Completing Land 

Partnership Plan 

and Other Planned 

Construction 

Projects throughout 

South Korea 

Funding Sources and 

Competition for Funding 

Are Challenges 
Page 18 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. While U.S. officials expect the South 

Korean government to fund much of the cost of these additional basing 

changes, details have not yet been finalized. The South Korean 

government is also expected to remain responsible for providing funding 

for the relocation of forces now based at the Yongsan Army Garrison 

property, although those costs could be reduced by the fact that a residual 

number of U.S. and United Nations personnel are expected to remain at 

Yongsan. It should also be noted that the Yongsan Garrison property is 

expected to be used for municipal purposes and is not subject to resale to 

provide funding to support relocation of U.S. forces. At this point, 

insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many 

replacement facilities will be required for U.S. troops moving out of 

Yongsan Garrison and to anticipate any difficulties that might be 

encountered in obtaining the funding. However, if South Korea encounters 

problems or delays in acquiring needed lands and providing replacement 

facilities, future projects could be delayed. Figure 7 presents the amount 

of funding, as of May 2003, that the United States and South Korean 

governments expected to pay for the LPP—as originally approved—by 

fiscal year. The funding amounts for fiscal year 2004 and beyond are 

subject to revision. 
Page 19 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 7: Estimated Funding Requirements for the Land Partnership Plan 

The LPP, as originally approved, was dependent on designating up to 

50 percent of South Korea’s host nation funding for construction. 

Historically, the stability of host nation funding from South Korea has 

been subject to some uncertainty because international economic factors 

have played a part in determining the level of funding.12 South Korea host 

nation payments are paid in both South Korean won and U.S. dollars; 

consequently, a downturn in the South Korean economy or a sharp 

fluctuation in the South Korean currency could affect the South Korean 

government’s payments. For example, during South Korea’s economic 

downturn in 1998, host nation payments were less than expected (the 

United States received from South Korea $314.2 million of the $399 million 

that had been agreed to). 

 12 The annual level of host-nation-funded construction is determined between the 

U.S. Department of State and the South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is 

negotiated for a 3-year time frame. 
Page 20 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Designating up to 50 percent of host nation funding for the LPP would also 

limit funding for readiness and other needs. Non-LPP readiness-related 

infrastructure funding shortages previously identified in readiness reports 

at the time of our visit to South Korea in November 2002 were estimated 

to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars and represented competing 

requirements for limited funding. Such needs included Air Force facilities 

at Osan and Kunsan ($338.2 million), Navy facilities at Pohang and 

Chinhae ($10.3 million), and Army facilities at Humphreys, Carroll, and 

Tango ($25.2 million). Recently, U.S. Forces Korea officials have also 

expressed the desire to increase from 10 percent to 25 percent the number 

of servicemembers in South Korea who are permitted to be accompanied 

by their families. While these expressions have not been finalized, such an 

increase could be expected to cause a significant increase in the demand 

for housing, schools, and other support services and could result in greater 

competition for U.S. and Korean funding. For example, U.S. Forces Korea 

officials estimated that the increased demand for housing alone would 

cost $900 million in traditional military construction funding and, to 

reduce costs, officials were exploring a build-to-lease program using 

Korean private-sector funding and host-nation-funded construction, 

where possible. 

In the past, funding from U.S. military construction accounts, which 

represent 13 percent of funding for the LPP as originally approved, has 

fluctuated. From 1990 through 1994, U.S. forces in South Korea did not 

receive any military construction funds, resulting in a significant backlog 

of construction projects. 

Implementation of the LPP was expected to involve a closely knit series 

of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in 

new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U.S. Forces 

Korea was developing an implementation plan for each installation 

encompassed by the LPP and, at the time of our visit there, was developing 

a detailed, overarching implementation plan capable of integrating and 

controlling the multiple, sometimes simultaneous, actions needed to 

relocate U.S. forces and support their missions. According to U.S. Forces 

Korea officials, such a master plan is needed to accomplish training, 

maintain readiness, and control future changes. 

During our visits to U.S. installations in South Korea, we found that, in 

the absence of a completed master plan for implementation, installation 

commanders had varying interpretations of what infrastructure changes 

were to occur. U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that this was not 

Managing Current 

and Future Facilities 

Requirements Is Also 

a Challenge 
Page 21 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

unusual, given that detailed implementation plans were still being 

developed. At the same time, these officials emphasized the need for 

a detailed plan to guide future projects and to help minimize the costly 

changes that can occur when subsequent commanders have a different 

vision of the installations’ needs than their predecessors, which could 

lead to new interpretations of the LPP and more changes. In light of the 

potentially broader repositioning of forces in South Korea, the master plan 

under development could be substantially changed; thus, a significantly 

revised road map will be needed to manage future facilities requirements 

and changes in South Korea. 

As approved, the Land Partnership Plan represented an important step 

to reduce the size of the U.S. footprint in South Korea by leveraging the 

return of facilities and land to South Korea in order to obtain replacement 

facilities in consolidated locations. However, subsequent events suggest 

the LPP, as originally outlined, will require significant modification. 

Available data indicate that changes in the U.S. basing structure in 

South Korea are likely; therefore, a significant portion of the $5.6 billion in 

construction projects planned over the next 10 years is being reassessed 

based on currently expected basing changes and may need to be further 

reassessed when the results of ongoing overseas presence and basing 

studies are completed. 

The LPP was to require 10 years of intensive management to ensure 

implementation progressed as planned. The master plan U.S. Forces Korea 

officials are developing to guide its implementation will require significant 

revision to accommodate the more comprehensive changes in basing now 

anticipated and to identify funding requirements and division of funding 

responsibilities between the United States and South Korea. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Commander, 

U.S. Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South 

Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence 

and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide 

infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U.S. military 

facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed, and 

identifying funding requirements and division of funding responsibilities 

between the United States and South Korea. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 22 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs 

provided written comments to a draft of this report. DOD agreed with our 

recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions that address our 

recommendations. In commenting on our recommendation to reassess 

planned construction projects in South Korea, DOD stated that U.S. Forces 

Korea is already reassessing all planned construction in South Korea and 

will ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions 

regarding global presence and basing strategy. In commenting on our 

recommendation for a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master 

plan, DOD stated that U.S. Forces Korea is already developing master 

plans for all enduring installations and, once decisions have been reached 

on global presence and basing strategy, they will ensure that all master 

plans are adjusted to support these decisions. DOD’s comments are 

reprinted in appendix IV. DOD also provided a separate technical 

comment, and we revised the report to reflect it. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, and the Director, Office 

of Management and Budget. The report is also available at no charge on 

GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-5581. Key contributors to this report 

were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Nelsie Alcoser, Susan Woodward, 

and Ken Patton. 

Barry W. Holman 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 23 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John W. Warner, Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison, Chairman 

The Honorable Diane Feinstein 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter, Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis, Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Joe Knollenberg, Chairman 

The Honorable Chet Edwards 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Construction 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 24 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total 

infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the 

Land Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction 

projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP 

construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects 

in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure 

issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U.S. troops from 

Yongsan Army Garrison. We met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy Division); Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific Affairs); Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense (Installations and Environment); U.S. Pacific Command, 

Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, Marine Forces Pacific, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Forces Korea, Eighth U.S. Army and 7th Air Force; 

U.S. Department of State; U.S. Embassy (South Korea); and South Korea’s 

Defense Ministry to document their input to the plan. We visited 16 U.S. 

military installations and facilities in South Korea that are affected by the 

plan. We selected these installations and facilities because they provided a 

cross-section of the activities that are covered by the plan (i.e., some that 

will be closed, some that will be scaled back, some that will be expanded, 

some where new construction will take place, and some possible new 

installation locations). We also visited land transfer sites that remain 

unresolved and military construction projects that are not addressed in the 

plan to gain an understanding and perspective on the wide range of 

infrastructure issues affecting U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. 

To determine the implications of potential basing changes on the plan 

and other construction projects in South Korea, we obtained the views of 

officials from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Logistics Directorate and Strategy 

Division); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Office of Asia-Pacific 

Affairs); and U.S. Forces Korea on the potential impact of changing 

defense policies. We conducted a literature review of U.S. and South 

Korean publications to collect information on the LPP and possible basing 

changes in South Korea. We also attended various congressional hearings, 

which discussed funding for U.S. Forces Korea construction projects and 

potential basing changes. We used this information to identify the costs 

of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving 

military infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future 

U.S. presence—such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations 

located north of Seoul. We did not verify the accuracy and completeness 

of this information. 

To identify implementation challenges associated with the plan that could 

affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea, we met 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 25 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

with officials from the above organizations and reviewed the Status of 

Forces Agreement, an agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense 

Treaty between South Korea and the United States, and other related 

agreements and defense guidance. We discussed challenges that must be 

addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues 

associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects 

throughout South Korea. 

We performed our review from September 2002 through May 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 26 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) provides a comprehensive plan for 

more efficient and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in South Korea. The 

LPP is intended to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance, improve the 

readiness posture of combined forces, reduce the overall amount of land 

granted for U.S. Forces Korea use, and enhance public support for both 

the South Korean government and U.S. Forces Korea, while positioning 

U.S. forces to meet alliance security requirements well into the future. 

According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, LPP imperatives are as follows: 

• The agreement should be based on readiness and security, not the amount 

of land involved. 

• The agreement should be comprehensive, allowing for land issues that 

cannot be resolved independently to be resolved as part of a package and 

ensuring stationing decisions that fit into a comprehensive vision for the 

disposition of U.S. forces. 

• When new land and facilities are ready for use, U.S. Forces Korea can 

release old land and facilities. U.S. Forces Korea needs all existing 

facilities and areas and can only return them when replacement facilities 

are available or the requirement is met in another manner. 

• The agreement should be binding under the Status of Forces Agreement. 

The LPP is not just an “agreement in principle” but also a commitment to 

take action, and it operates within the Status of Forces Agreement—which 

means there are no new rules. 

• The agreement should be self-financing—the costs of the LPP must be 

shared between the United States and South Korea. U.S. funding is 

provided from the military construction account. The South Korean 

government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales 

of property returned to South Korea by the United States. 

As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from 

camps the United States wishes to close, and South Korea funds the 

relocation of units from camps that South Korea has asked the United 

States to close. The execution of the LPP is shown in figure 1. 

The LPP has been negotiated under the authority of the Joint Committee 

under the Status of Forces Agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement 

gives the Joint Committee the authority and responsibility to determine 

the facilities and areas required for U.S. use in support of the United 

States/South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The Joint Committee 

established the Ad-hoc Subcommittee for LPP to develop and manage 

the LPP. The LPP components address installations, training areas, and 

safety easements. 

Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 27 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Installations: The LPP reduces the number of U.S. installations from 

41 to 23 and consolidates U.S. forces onto enduring installations. The LPP 

establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new 

facilities, and the closure of installations. Figure 8 illustrates the sequence 

in which new lands are to be granted to the United States and their 

relationship to facilities that will be returned to South Korea from calendar 

years 2002 through 2011. 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 28 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Figure 8: Installation Grants and Returns under the Land Partnership Plan, by Calendar Year 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 29 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Training Areas: The LPP returns U.S. training areas in exchange for 

guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. To ensure 

the continued readiness of U.S. Forces Korea, the United States agrees 

to return certain granted facilities and areas and to accept the grant of 

joint use of certain South Korea military facilities and areas on a limited 

time-share basis as determined by the Status of Forces Agreement Joint 

Committee. The United States is expected to return approximately 

32,186 acres, or 39,396,618 pyong,1

 of granted training areas. Table 1 

shows the exclusive use of existing grants retained by U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 1: Exclusive Use Grants Retained by the United States 

Facility Acres

Rodriquez Local Training Area #1 1.0 

Story Range 1,756.0 

New Mexico Range 116.0 

Warrior Training Base 19.0 

Warrior Training Base Ammunition Holding Area 1.2 

Dagmar North 1,391.0 

Mike–November 3,008.0

Papa–Oscar–Romeo 3,353.4 

North Star 30.2 

Chaparral Local Training Area 115.1 

Local Training Area 130 63.7 

Local Training Area 140 6.4 

Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #1 17.5 

Rodriquez Gun Local Training Area #2 8.3 

Rodriguez Gun Local Training Area #3 7.6 

Humphreys Range 6.0 

Training Areas 79.0 

Bayonne Signal Training Area 19.8

Rodriguez Watkins Local Training Area 45.1 

Rodriquez Live Fire Complex 3,343.0 

Masan Range 372.0 

Koon-ni 438.3 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

 1

 Korean unit of measure, 1 pyong = 3.3 square meters or 35 square feet. 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 30 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Table 2 shows training areas that will be provided on a temporary basis to 

U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 2: Temporary Grants 

Facility Acres

Local Training Area 320 247.0 

Drop Zone Cory 186.0 

Non Commissioned Officer Academy Training Area 364.0 

Drop Zone Rigger 

Pilsung Strafing Range 

619.8

0 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 3 shows new safety easements to be designated for training areas. 

Table 3: Training Area Easements 

Facility Acres

New Mexico Restrictive Easement 128

Warrior Training Ammunition Holding Area Easement 2619.3

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 4 shows training areas that will be returned to South Korea under 

the LPP. 

Table 4: Total Release of U.S. Training Areas 

Facility Acres

Rodriquez Local Training Area #3 3.0 

Rodriquez Local Training Area #2 100.0 

Rodriquez Local Training Area #4 10.0 

Kansas Range 71.0 

Oklahoma Range 15.0 

North Carolina, Air Mobile, Edwards Local Training Area, TA-504/520 1,302.0

Dagmar & S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma 16,747.0 

River Crossing 16.0 

Camp Page Local Training Area 302.0 

Tango 2,952.0 

KCT-43, Yankee, Whiskey N.(actual) (written record) 8,920.0

2,761.0

Stanton Local Training Area 15.0

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 31 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Table 5 shows training areas where parts of the land will be returned to 

South Korea. 

Table 5: Partial Release of Grants 

Facility Acres

Texas Local Training Area and Zulu LA 1,133.0

Mike-A 480.0

Romeo 120.0

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 6 shows training facilities and areas that the South Korean 

government is expected to grant to the U.S. for joint use for the 

time specified. 

Table 6: Joint Use of South Korean Military Training Facilities and Areas 

Facility Weeks Days 

Typhoon Range 1 week per quarter 24 

Chungyong Range 2 weeks per year 12 

Bisung Range 1.5 weeks per year 9 

St. Barbara Range–MLRS Live Fire 4 weeks per year 24 

St. Barbara Range–Paladin Live Fire 4 weeks per year 24 

Korea Training Area/Twin Bridges Training Area 13 weeks per year 91 

Seung-Jin Nightmare Range 8 weeks per year 48 

Capital Defense Command Bangpae Range 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Jungpyung M16 8 weeks per year 48 

Jungpyung 40MM Grenade Launcher Range 4 weeks per year 24 

Jungpyung Hand Grenade 2 weeks per year 12 

Chochiwon Range 1 week per quarter 24 

Sokung (Seogok) Range 5 weeks per year 30 

Angang Range 1 week per quarter 24 

Kumi Range 4 weeks per year 24 

Susan-ri Range 6 weeks per year 36 

R-222 1 week per quarter 24 

R-227 4 weeks per quarter 96 

R-233 6 weeks per quarter 144 

R-228 6 weeks per quarter 144 

Han River Cross Site 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Training Area Jerry 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Training Area Nightmare 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Training Area Tom 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Saetue Field Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 

TAA No Name (Munmak) 2 weeks per quarter 48 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 32 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Facility Weeks Days 

Kaup Mountain Training Area (H-710) 1 week per quarter 24 

Kumdan Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Puksung Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Sung Mountain Training Area (H-471) 1 week per quarter 24 

Taeki Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Yongmun Mountain Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Hwangyong Park Tactical Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Hampyong Tactical Training Area 1 week per quarter 24 

Jinwon Tank Tactical Training Area 2 weeks per quarter 48 

Mu Juk Training Area 26 weeks per year 182 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Safety Easements: According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, a safety 

easement is a defined distance from an explosive area that personnel and 

structures must be kept away from and is directly related to the quantity 

and types of explosives and ammunition present. The presence of Korean 

citizens in areas requiring explosive safety easements has placed them at 

risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show 

the various tiers of easements established under the LPP at U.S. military 

installations. Upper tier easements are those required at enduring 

installations; middle tier easements are required during armistice, but will 

not be required after a change in the armistice condition; and lower tier 

easements are those required at closing installations. U.S. Forces Korea 

shall enforce safety easements inside U.S. installations, while South Korea 

will enforce safety easements outside U.S. installations. 
Appendix II: Summary of the Land 

Partnership Plan 

Page 33 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Table 7: Upper Tier Easements 

Installation Explosive site 

Osan Air Force Base Munitions storage area (Delta site) 

 Patriot Batteries on Chin Wi River 

 Hot cargo pad easement extension 

Kunsan Air Force Base 2 Munitions storage areas 

 Hot cargo pad and patriot battery 

Camp Humphreys Rearm point 

Camp Casey Ammunition storage area 21 

 Ammunition storage area 25 

Camp Stanley Ammunition storage area 18 (tunnel) 

 Ammunition storage area 9 

Camp Walker Ammunition storage area 

Camp Hovey Ammunition storage area 

Yongsan Ammunition storage area 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 8: Middle Tier Easements 

Installation Explosive site 

Camp Bonifas Ammunition storage area (main post) 

 Ammunition storage area (east) 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 

Table 9: Lower Tier Easements 

Installation Explosive site 

Camp LaGuardia Ammunition storage area 

Camp Howze Ammunition storage area 

Camp Edwards Ammunition storage area 

Camp Essayons Ammunition storage area 

Camp Colbern Ammunition storage area 

Camp Stanton Ammunition storage area 

Camp Greaves Ammunition storage area 

Camp Garry Owen Ammunition storage area 

Camp Eagle Ammunition storage area 

Source: U.S. Forces Korea. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-03-643 Defense Infrastructure (350267) 
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