8 February 2001

Joint Doctrine for

Civil-Military Operations

Joint Publication 3-57
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

The doctrinal concepts contained in this

publication provide guidance for the planning

and conduct of civil-military operations

(CMO) by joint forces. Furthermore, these

concepts should guide joint force commanders

in the use of civil affairs assets and other

specialized forces uniquely capable of

contributing to the execution of CMO,

refining CMO plans, and keeping US

Government agencies informed of

Department of Defense capabilities to support

US objectives through carefully planned and

executed CMO.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under

the direction of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern

the joint activities and performance of the

Armed Forces of the United States in joint

operations and provides the doctrinal basis for

US military involvement in multinational and

interagency operations. It provides military

guidance for the exercise of authority by

combatant commanders and other joint

force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes

doctrine for joint operations and training. It

provides military guidance for use by the

Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate

plans. It is not the intent of this publication to

restrict the authority of the JFC from

organizing the force and executing the mission

in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate

to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment

of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in

this publication apply to the commanders

of combatant commands, subunified

commands, joint task forces, and subordinate

components of these commands. These

principles and guidance also may apply when

significant forces of one Service are attached

to forces of another Service or when

significant forces of one Service support

forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the

commander, exceptional circumstances

dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between

the contents of this publication and the

contents of Service publications, this

publication will take precedence for the

activities of joint forces unless the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in

coordination with the other members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more

current and specific guidance. Commanders

of forces operating as part of a multinational

(alliance or coalition) military command

should follow multinational doctrine and

procedures ratified by the United States. For

doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate

and follow the multinational command’s

doctrine and procedures, where applicable and

consistent with US law and policy.

S. A. FRY

Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Director, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
ii

Preface

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

• General ..................................................................................................................... I-1

• Civil-Military Operations and Levels of War ............................................................. I-4

• Objectives of Civil-Military Operations .................................................................... I-7

• Summary ................................................................................................................ I-23

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS

• General .................................................................................................................... II-1

• Organizations Providing CMO Capabilities.............................................................. II-2

• Special Operations Forces ........................................................................................ II-2

• Engineering............................................................................................................ II-10

• Health Service Support .......................................................................................... II-12

• Transportation ........................................................................................................ II-13

• Military Police and/or Security Police Forces ......................................................... II-16

• Organizing for Civil-Military Operations ............................................................... II-17

CHAPTER III

PLANNING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION A. BASIC PLANNING ........................................................................... III-1

• General .................................................................................................................. III-1

• Planning Factors and Constraints ........................................................................... III-4

• Interagency Coordination ....................................................................................... III-5

• Oversight of CMO Planning and Activities ............................................................ III-6

• Environmental Considerations ............................................................................... III-7

• Operational Considerations .................................................................................... III-8

• Measures of Effectiveness ...................................................................................... III-9

SECTION B. OTHER FUNCTIONAL AREAS ...................................................... III-11

• Public Affairs........................................................................................................ III-11

• Legal..................................................................................................................... III-14

• Logistics ............................................................................................................... III-18

• Financial Management .......................................................................................... III-22

• Information Gathering ........................................................................................... III-22

• Communications ................................................................................................... III-24
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JP 3-57

• Information Operations ......................................................................................... III-27

• Religious Ministry Support ................................................................................... III-28

SECTION C. SPECIALIZED PLANNING ............................................................. III-29

• Multinational Operations....................................................................................... III-29

• Consequence Management Operations .................................................................. III-31

• Termination and Transition Operations (Exit Strategy — POL-MIL Plan,

if developed) ...................................................................................................... III-32

• Complex Contingency Operations......................................................................... III-35

• Planning Civil Affairs Activities ........................................................................... III-37

CHAPTER IV

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

• General .................................................................................................................. IV-1

• Civil-Military Relations ......................................................................................... IV-5

• Organizing for Interagency Operations................................................................... IV-7

• United Nations Operations ................................................................................... IV-19

APPENDIX

A Service Capabilities .......................................................................................... A-1

B Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency

Operations....................................................................................................... B-1

C Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Activities ......................................... C-1

D References ........................................................................................................ D-1

E Administrative Instructions ............................................................................... E-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-6

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ......................................................................... I-2

I-2 Possible Escalation Indicators......................................................................... I-8

I-3 Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and Other

Combat Operations..................................................................................... I-10

I-4 Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix ........................................................... I-21

II-1 Concept of Civil Affairs Employment ........................................................... II-4

II-2 Principles of Civil Affairs Activities.............................................................. II-6

II-3 Specialized Engineering Capabilities........................................................... II-11

II-4 Health Service Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations ................... II-14

II-5 Military Police and/or Security Forces Activities......................................... II-16

II-6 Possible Joint Task Force Subordinates ....................................................... II-18

II-7 Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities........... II-19

II-8 Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force ................................... II-21
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II-9 Possible Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander

Responsibilities ......................................................................................... II-23

III-1 Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations ........................ III-2

III-2 Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations for Military Operations

Other Than War......................................................................................... III-3

III-3 Examples of Force Protection and/or Security Measures of Effectiveness ... III-12

III-4 Legal Issues................................................................................................ III-19

III-5 Information Gathering ................................................................................ III-23

III-6 Planning Factors for Multinational Forces .................................................. III-30

III-7 Sample Checklist for Termination Planning ................................................ III-33

III-8 Transition Criteria Issues ............................................................................ III-34

III-9 Sample Checklist for Transition Planning ................................................... III-36

IV-1 Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center..................... IV-13

IV-2 Civil-Military Operations Center Functions............................................... IV-14

IV-3 Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian

Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center.... IV-15
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JP 3-57

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

•

•

•

•

vii

Provides an Overview of Civil-Military Operations (CMO)

Discusses Organization and Command Relationships for

CMO

Provides an Overview for the Planning of CMO

Discusses Interagency Coordination as it Relates to CivilMilitary Relations

Civil-military operations

(CMO) are an inherent

responsibility of command

to facilitate accomplishment

of the commander’s

mission.

Commanders’ authority

for undertaking CMO

ultimately derives from a

National Command

Authorities decision.

Joint force commanders

(JFCs) plan and conduct

CMO to facilitate military

operations and help

achieve political-military

objectives derived from US

national security interests.

CMO are applicable at the

strategic, operational, and

tactical levels of war.

Civil-military operations (CMO) encompass the activities that

joint force commanders (JFCs) take to establish and maintain

positive relations between their forces, the civil authorities,

and the general population, resources, and institutions in

friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where their forces are

employed in order to facilitate military operations and to

consolidate and achieve US objectives. Civil affairs personnel

bridge the gap between the military and civilian environment.

Factors such as mission, policy determinants, and relationship

between the government, nongovernmental, and private

organizations of the affected country and the United States

also influence the authority to conduct CMO.

Establishing and maintaining military-to-civil relations as part

of the missions tasked to a JFC entails interaction between

US, multinational, and indigenous security forces, as well as

government and nongovernmental organizations. In some

instances, JFCs also may have to interact with civilian

businesses in the operational area that have an influence on

the local government, economy, and/or populace.

The focus at each level of war may differ within the same

operation both in time and activity. Strategic planning is offset

to ensure that the environment is shaped to achieve the

Overview
viii

Executive Summary

JP 3-57

CMO enhance military

effectiveness.

JFCs may conduct

numerous types of CMO:

Foreign humanitarian

assistance

Populace and resource

control

Nation assistance

operations

Military civic action

Emergency services

Civil administration

conditions necessary for the execution of a successful military

exit strategy.

Properly executed CMO can reduce friction between the

civilian population and the military force. The objective is to

minimize interference with military operations by the civilian

population. When possible, a second objective is to reduce

military interference with the civilian populace.

Foreign humanitarian assistance is conducted to relieve or

reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions.

Populace and resource control assists host nation

governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over

their population centers and resources to preclude complicating

problems that may hinder accomplishment of the JFC’s

mission.

Nation assistance operations involve civil or military

assistance rendered to a nation by US forces within that

nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or

war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the

United States and that nation.

Military civic action involves activities intended to win

support of the local population for the foreign nation and its

military. Military civic actions are predominantly conducted

by indigenous military personnel, while US forces provide

advice, supervision, or technical support.

Emergency services are all those activities and measures

designed or undertaken to: minimize the effects upon the

civilian population which would be caused by a disaster; deal

with the immediate emergency conditions which would be

created by any such disaster; and effect emergency repairs to,

or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities

destroyed or damaged by any such disaster.

Civil administration is a unique action undertaken by US

commanders only when directed or approved by the National

Command Authorities (NCA). Civil administration support

consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those

activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that

supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile

territory.
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Executive Summary

Domestic support

operations

The organization and

command relationships for

conduct of CMO are

highly variable.

Every US military

organization has some

capability to perform

CMO.

In most scenarios, joint

task forces will conduct

CMO.

JFCs may establish joint

civil-military operations

task forces (JCMOTFs) or

joint special operations

task forces (JSOTFs)

when the scope of CMO

requires coordination and

activities beyond that

which other representation

on the staff could

accomplish.

A JCMOTF is a means for

JFCs to meet their legal

obligations and moral

considerations to civilians

within an operational

area.

Domestic support operations usually occur after a

Presidential declaration of a major disaster and are designed

to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local

governments and voluntary organizations. The US military

normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of

another agency.

While the principles of effective command and control and

staff operations apply to CMO just as they do for any other

military operation, national objectives (the primary mission

of the joint force), environmental conditions, and availability

of resources will determine the options available to JFCs.

Certain types of organizations are particularly suited to conduct

CMO and will form the nucleus of any CMO effort. These

units are typically civil affairs and psychological operations

units. Others such as (but not limited to) special operations

forces, engineers, health service, transportation, and military

police and security forces act as enablers.

Joint task forces (JTFs) may take many forms and sizes and be

employed across the range of military operations in air, land,

or maritime environments.

Mission needs may require the consolidation of assets capable

of performing unique CMO under one subordinate JTF, a joint

civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF), or a joint

special operations task force (JSOTF).

A JCMOTF is composed of units from more than one Military

Department or US agency and is formed to carry out CMO in

support of a theater campaign or other operations.

The JCMOTF may be developed to meet a specific CMO

contingency mission (e.g., civil administration) or support

humanitarian or nation assistance operations, a theater

campaign of limited duration, or a longer duration CMO

concurrent with or subsequent to regional or general conflict,

depending on NCA or theater guidance.

Organization and Command Relationships
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Executive Summary

JP 3-57

A JSOTF is a joint task

force composed of special

operations units from

more than one Service,

formed to carry out a

specific special operation

or prosecute special

operations in support of a

theater campaign or other

operations.

It is the responsibility of

combatant commanders to

plan and conduct CMO.

Planning and

coordination of CMO

facilitates mission

accomplishment.

To establish centralized

direction and staff

cognizance over planning,

coordinating, and

conducting CMO, the JFC

may establish a distinct

CMO staff element.

JFCs and their

subordinate commanders

must address force

protection during all

phases of deliberate and

crisis action planning.

CMO planners play a

major role in termination

and transition operations.

A JSOTF normally is formed around elements from the theater

special operations command or an existing special operations

forces unit with augmentation from other Service special

operations forces. A JSOTF may be established and deployed

as a complete package from outside the theater.

CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace and supporting

the geographic combatant commander’s theater

engagement plan.

CMO planning will enhance the transition to civilian control

from the outset of an operation.

CMO planning is based on national policy and reflects legal

obligations and constraints found in the US Constitution,

statutory law, judicial decisions, Presidential directives,

departmental regulations, and the rules and principles of

international law, especially those incorporated in treaties and

agreements applicable to areas where US forces are employed.

This may be in the Operations Directorate, a separate CMO

Directorate (J-code), or a member of the commander’s personal

staff. The complex nature and importance of CMO normally

require the direction and oversight of a full-time staff (typically

civil affairs elements).

All aspects of force protection must be considered and threats

minimized to ensure maximum operational success. JFCs

and their subordinate commanders must implement force

protection measures appropriate to anticipated threats

based on threat and vulnerability assessments. They should

then complete a risk assessment with the information obtained,

measured against mission requirements.

In order for CMO planners to accomplish termination and

transition planning, there must be a clearly identifiable end

state and transition or termination criteria for the operation

must be developed.

Planning
xi

Executive Summary

Presidential Decision

Directive-56, Managing

Complex Contingency

Operations.

In CMO, interagency

coordination may be one

of the top priorities.

Interagency operations at

the national level.

Political advisor or

foreign policy advisor.

Chief of Mission

Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, was initiated to integrate the

political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other

dimensions of United States Government (USG) planning for

complex contingencies.

By understanding the interagency process, JFCs will be better

able to appreciate how the skills and resources of the various

USG agencies interact with nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), international organizations, and regional

organizations to assist in mission accomplishment. Civilmilitary relations can create economic, political, and social

stability as they encourage the development of the affected

nation’s materiel and human resources.

The integration of political, economic, civil, and military

objectives and the subsequent translation of these

objectives into demonstrable action have always been

essential to success at all levels of operation.

Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the

military and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and

informational entities of the USG as well as NGOs and

international organizations. Successful interagency

coordination and planning enables these agencies, departments,

and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective

operation — unity of effort must be achieved.

The Department of State assigns geographic combatant

commands a political advisor (POLAD) or foreign policy

advisor (FPA). This person provides diplomatic

considerations and enables informal linkage with embassies

in the area of responsibility and with the Department of State.

The POLAD or FPA supplies information regarding policy

goals and objectives of the Department of State that are

relevant to the geographic combatant commander’s theater

strategy.

The Chief of Mission (i.e., the Ambassador) has authority

over all elements of the USG in country, except forces

assigned to a combatant command. Other key USG

organizations under the Chief of Mission’s cognizance in place

Interagency Coordination

Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries
xii

Executive Summary

JP 3-57

within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office

and a security assistance organization (if present).

The Ambassador is the senior representative of the

President in foreign nations and is responsible for policy

decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country.

The Ambassador integrates the programs and resources of all

USG agencies represented on the Country Team.

The Country Team system provides the foundation for rapid

interagency consultation, coordination, and action on

recommendations from the field and effective execution of

US missions, programs, and policies. The Country Team

typically includes political, economic, administrative, and

consular officers as well as a public affairs officer, regional

security officer, the United States Defense Representative or

Country Representative, and communications staff. Attachés

from the Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture,

and other USG agencies often are represented on the team.

Humanitarian operations center (HOC). The HOC is

primarily an international and interagency policy making and

coordinating body that does not exercise command and control

but seeks to achieve unity of effort among all participants in a

large foreign humanitarian assistance operation.

On-site operations coordination center (OSOCC). The

United Nations may establish a structure called the OSOCC

as a support organization to a HOC. The OSOCC assists in

gathering, evaluating, collating, and disseminating HOC

information. The OSOCC also may provide facilitation

services for HOC meetings.

Humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC). In

a humanitarian assistance operation, the combatant

command’s crisis action organization may organize as a

HACC. The HACC assists with interagency coordination

and planning, providing the critical link between the

combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and

international and regional organizations that may participate

in a humanitarian assistance operation at the strategic level.

Civil-military operations center (CMOC). A CMOC is an

ad hoc organization, normally established by commanders to

assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces

Country Team

Humanitarian operations

center

On-site operations

coordination center

Humanitarian assistance

coordination center

Civil-military operations

center

Organizing for Interagency Operations
xiii

Executive Summary

and other USG agencies, NGOs, and regional and

international organizations.

Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC covers a wide

variety of activities ranging from sustaining life to restoring

government.

CIMIC requires an organization containing three elements: a

staff to plan and advise the commander, a CIMIC group to

conduct the CIMIC operations, and additional resources, which

will be drawn from the force for specific tasks.

This publication provides the guidance for the planning and

conduct of CMO across the range of military operations.

Civil-military cooperation

(CIMIC). CIMIC reflects

the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization’s broad

approach to security.

CONCLUSION
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Executive Summary

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I-1

1. General

The above quotation reflects the importance

of the Armed Forces of the United States

continuing and expanding their involvement

in civil-military operations (CMO). The US

military contributes to shaping the security

environment and addresses threats to US

interests by conducting CMO using a

variety of types of units. Joint force

commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs

(CA) (i.e., those specialized units trained to

plan and conduct CA activities) with other

military forces (e.g., maneuver, health service,

military police, engineering, transportation,

and other special operations forces) and

civilian organizations (both governmental and

nongovernmental) to provide the capabilities

needed for successful CMO. While CA are

the “bedrock” facilitating application of these

selected capabilities, this joint publication (JP)

reflects the transition from a primarily CA

approach to the broader and over-arching

concept of CMO.

For additional information on CA and CA

activities, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine

for Civil Affairs.

a. Civil-Military Operations. “Civilmilitary operations” are the activities of a

commander that establish, maintain, influence,

or exploit relations between military forces,

governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian

populace. CMO can occur in friendly, neutral,

“. . . the fundamental challenge facing the Defense Department, indeed the

Nation, is to continue to meet the challenges of shaping the security

environment and responding to the full range of crises in the near term while

at the same time transforming our forces and capabilities to meet the demands

of an uncertain future.”

William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense

or hostile operational areas to facilitate

military operations and achieve US objectives.

CMO may include performance by military

forces of activities and functions which are

normally the responsibility of local, regional,

or national government. These activities may

occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other

military actions. They may also occur, if

directed, in the absence of other military

operations. CMO may be performed by

designated CA, by other military forces, or

by a combination of CA and other forces.

Figure I-1 shows the wide range of military

operations that CMO need to support.

• CMO are conducted to minimize

civilian interference with military

operations, to maximize support for

operations, and to meet the

commander’s legal responsibilities and

moral obligations to civilian

populations within the commander’s

area of control. CMO are conducted

across the range of military operations

to address root causes of instability and

in a reconstructive manner after conflict

or disaster, or may be conducted in

mitigating circumstances to support US

national security objectives. CMO may

also include psychological operations

(PSYOP) and CA activities.

• All CA activities support CMO. They

are performed or supported by CA and

embrace the relationship of military

forces with civil authorities,
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Chapter I

JP 3-57

nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs), international organizations,

and populations where military forces

are present. CA activities may involve

the application of CA functional

specialty skills in areas normally the

responsibility of the civilian government.

Examples of CA activities supporting

CMO are foreign nation support,

populace and resource control,

humanitarian assistance (HA), military

civil action, emergency services, and

support to civil administration.

For more information on CA activities

and CA, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine

for Civil Affairs.

• CMO occur in virtually every operation

across the range of military operations.

CMO may be conducted to support a

counterinsurgency program, and serve as

a catalyst to affect all foreign internal

defense (FID) programs. The relative

effort and resources devoted to CMO

vary with the nature and type of the joint

force’s primary mission.

•• During war, CMO will be important

for supporting combat operations where

goals include winning quickly with as

few casualties as possible, achieving

national objectives and concluding

hostilities on terms favorable to the US

and its multinational partners.

Accordingly, wartime scenarios are

uniquely challenging for CMO. For

example, while Germany and South

Korea both emphasize “stay-put” policies

for their civilians in the event of war, in

reality tens of millions of civilians will

be in the operational area and many of

them will take to the roads and

countryside to flee the fighting,

generating population and resources

control (PRC) requirements and

concurrently impacting military mobility

and security.

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

Peace Enforcement / NEO

Strikes / Raids / Show of Force

Counterterrorism /

Peacekeeping

Deter War

&

Resolve Conflict

Promote

Peace

Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief

Peacebuilding

Nation Assistance

Civil Support / Counterdrug

NEO

Military

Operations

General

US Goal Examples

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

War

Military

Operations

Other

Than

War

Fight

&

Win

Large-scale Combat Operations:

Attack / Defend / Blockades

C

O

M

B

A

T

N

O

N

C

O

M

B

A

T

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Legend
I-3

Introduction

•• During the onset of combat

operations, resources devoted to CMO

will be small in comparison to those

directed at warfighting. Additionally,

nonmilitary players such as NGOs and

international organizations that may have

been present prior to the conflict will

likely find their capacities exceeded by

the increased need for relief. Military

forces must therefore be prepared to

assume responsibility in organizing the

relief effort and achieving unity of effort

among the myriad of nonmilitary players

likely to be present. CA are specifically

trained and organized to provide the

coordination necessary to facilitate this

mission. In such situations, CMO can

make significant contributions.

•• Conversely, when the joint force’s

primary mission is CMO, resources

devoted to support combat forces may

be minimal in comparison to that of

forces and assets with specific

capabilities to provide relief to the

populace in the operational area. Many

military operations other than war

(MOOTW) will fall between these two

extremes with a balanced effort to

provide stability using both combat

forces to defeat hostile forces and CMO

assets to strengthen the civilian

infrastructure.

b. Authority to Conduct Civil-Military

Operations

• A commander’s authority for

undertaking CMO ultimately derives

from a National Command Authorities

(NCA) decision. Factors such as mission,

policy determinants, and the relationship

between the government of the affected

country and the United States also

influence the authority to conduct CMO.

• The requirement to conduct CMO or

exercise control in a given area or country

may arise as a result of military

operations, an international cooperative

agreement, or an agreement between the

United States Government (USG) and

the governing authorities of the area or

country in which US forces may be

employed.

• International law, including the law of

armed conflict (LOAC), affords military

commanders certain rights and imposes

certain responsibilities. These include

authority to establish civil

administrations and to control or conduct

governmental matters both during and

after hostilities.

c. Liaison. CMO involve liaison and

coordination among US, multinational,

indigenous security forces and other

government agencies as well as NGO or

international organizations. A variety of types

of units, including engineer, health services,

intelligence, security, special forces, PSYOP,

CA, communications, and transportation

provide capabilities to plan and conduct CMO

and achieve political, economic, and

informational military objectives.

• Dedicated CA, by virtue of their area

and linguistic orientation, cultural

awareness, experience in military-to-host

nation (HN) advisory and assistance

activities, as well as in civil-oriented

functions paralleling governmental

functions, are important in CMO.

• These forces are designed to secure

support from the civilian population,

fulfill important civil requirements

consistent with military missions, and

create as positive an effect as possible

on friends, allies, and governing

authorities.

• Achieving unity of effort becomes more

complicated with the increasing number

of nonmilitary players (e.g., NGOs,
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JP 3-57

international organizations, other

government agencies, and United

Nations [UN] agencies) involved in

operations. The problem of integrating

and coordinating their activities and

efforts are further complicated by

divergent organizational cultures and

fields of interest competing with the

military for scarce theater resources.

Coordination and deconfliction must be

managed on a priority basis.

• One of the most difficult problems for

the JFC in CMO is the need to coordinate

the activities of the military units with

multiple civilian organizations each

having their own purpose.

d. Coordination. As a fundamental

precept, CMO must be closely coordinated

with the Country Team and other USG

agencies. Most military responses or efforts,

especially those in MOOTW, require the

military-civil partnership that provides for

successful CMO.

e. Responsibility. CMO are an inherent

responsibility of command in order to

facilitate accomplishment of the

commander’s mission. CMO encompass the

activities that JFCs take to establish and

maintain relations between their forces and

the civil authorities and general population,

resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral,

or hostile areas where their forces are

employed. JFCs plan and conduct CMO to

facilitate military operations and help achieve

politico-military objectives derived from US

national security interests. Establishing and

maintaining military-to-civil relations as part

of the missions tasked to a JFC entails

interaction between US, multinational, and

indigenous security forces, and governmental,

nongovernmental, and international

organizations. In some instances, the JFC also

may have to interact with civilian businesses

in the operational area that have an influence

on the local government, economy, and/or

populace. These activities occur before,

during, subsequent to, or in the absence of

other military actions.

f. During extended combat operations, the

only military forces available to conduct CMO

may be CA. The other military forces that

usually conduct CMO (e.g., maneuver units,

health service, engineers, and transportation)

may not be available due to the requirements

of combat operations. CMO conducted by

CA only will be of limited scope.

Additional discussion of CMO is contained

in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military

Operations Other Than War.

2. Civil-Military Operations

and Levels of War

a. CMO are applicable at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels of war, but

the focus at each level may differ within

the same operation, both in time and

activity. In CMO the distinction between

strategic, operational and tactical levels is

often moot. An infantry private operating at

the tactical level may take actions that have

strategic implications, such as treating

representatives of organizations not

recognized by the US as a member of the local

ruling government. Further, the civilian

organizations that the military works with do

not always distinguish between the various

levels. The NGO worker that talks with the

lieutenant may report the conversation to the

NGO leadership in Washington, who may

then discuss the conversation directly with the

White House the next day. It is the lack of

distinction among the various levels that

makes CMO of command interest to the JFC.

b. To achieve the benefits of multi-tiered

CMO, JFCs promulgate their intent early and

include appropriate CMO guidance to staffs

and subordinate commanders. Planners

develop CMO plans from the top down with
I-5

Introduction

•• Operational commanders allocate and

distribute resources that enable

subordinate commanders to execute

CMO.

• Tactical

•• Tactical-level commanders perform

CMO functions in support of the JFC’s

CMO guidance and to accomplish their

own tactical objectives.

•• Tactical-level CMO normally are

more narrowly focused and have more

immediate effects. These may include

local security operations, processing and

movement of dislocated civilians, and

basic health service support (HSS).

c. It is important that CMO plans and

considerations be incorporated early in the

planning process for any operation. CMO

must be a part of an overall national strategy,

formulated and managed through interagency

and multinational coordination and integrated

with strategic, operational, and tactical-level

plans and operations. Evaluation of the plan

and information from the theater or regional

level will be a continuous part of this process.

d. Active and participatory promotion at

the strategic, operational, and tactical planning

levels ensure effective CMO. Integration of

CMO into theater operation plans in concept

format (CONPLANs), functional plans,

operation plans (OPLANs), and campaign

plans ensures all government activities are

coordinated, and that strategic, operational,

and tactical level CMO are conducted to the

maximum effect.

• During complex contingency operations,

the interagency community must develop

and promulgate a political-military

(POL-MIL) plan in compliance with

Presidential Decision Directive-56

sufficient lead-time to enable subordinate

commands to produce detailed supporting

CMO plans that are in harmony with the JFC’s

overall CMO objectives. While the effort at

each level may be focused on different specific

objectives, the plans are mutually supporting

and synergistic.

“Clearly, future efforts to terminate

small wars will involve extensive civilmilitary operations (CMO). The

experience of Panama shows that

neither of the organizations created by

the military to conduct CMO was fully

capable of achieving interagency unity

of effort. Both COMCMOTF

[commander, civil-military operations

task force] and MSG [military support

group] failed because they were wholly

military. Interagency organization is

required to conduct restoration

operations in the aftermath of a small

war. Such an organizing concept might

be equally useful in other

circumstances, such as

counterinsurgency.”

John T. Fishel

Civil Military Operations

in the New World

• Strategic. At the strategic level, the

CMO focus is on larger and long-term

global or regional issues such as

economic development and stability.

• Operational

•• At the operational level, CMO support

the strategic CMO objectives while

focusing on immediate or near-term

issues such as health service

infrastructure, noncombatant evacuation

operations (NEOs), movement, feeding,

and sheltering of dislocated civilians,

police and security programs,

synchronization of CMO support to

tactical commanders, and integration of

interagency operations with military

operations.
I-6

Chapter I

JP 3-57

(PDD-56), Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, which

designates a lead agency for the mission,

and ensures coordination among the

various agencies of the USG.

• For the PDD-56 POL-MIL plan process,

the Department of Defense (DOD)

participants are the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and the

Joint Staff. Combatant commander and

subordinate JFC participation, if any, in

the POL-MIL plan, will be through the

Joint Staff. Further, the National Security

Council’s (NSC’s) POL-MIL plan

provides guidance on a number of issues

and requires interpretation with regard

to the portions that relate to the military.

Accordingly, the instructions to the

combatant commander and subordinate

JFCs for implementing the POL-MIL

plan will be issued by the NCA through

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

• This POL-MIL plan should be the base

document of a combatant commander’s

plan.

• Planning for the conduct of CMO can

produce the maximum effect when

planned and coordinated at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels.

For further detail concerning complex

contingency operations refer to Chapter

III, “Planning Civil-Military

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PANAMA

1-504th PIR [Parachute Infantry Regiment] D-Day mission called for an air

assault to seize and hold the hilltop garrison at Tinajitas. By nightfall, the

“Red Devils” had accomplished their physically demanding task, and the

following morning combat patrols eliminated remnants of the PDF [Panamanian

Defense Forces] still attempting to harass them from nearby positions.

Geographically isolated from the rest of their brigade, the unit found themselves

in an unexpected position. The civilian population expected them to perform

government functions until the new regime could establish control. Battalion

medics started health care programs while the rifle companies moved out to

distribute MREs [meals, ready to eat] to the needy and help civilian workers

get the local power plant back into operation. The unit won the trust of the

population, leading directly to successful programs to recover weapons and

persuade former PDF soldiers to turn themselves in. The battalion returned

from Panama with a clear sense of the need to train on CMO [civil-military

operations].

As [Operation] JUST CAUSE moved from initial combat to CMO, units became

responsible for running major cities and towns. This follow-on mission for

combat arms commanders required identifying what was important in terms

of rebuilding a local infrastructure, reestablishing law and order, and dedicating

resources to unfamiliar tasks. These unfamiliar tasks included food distribution

and medical treatment of the local population, law enforcement, garbage

collection, and traffic control. Commanders looked for ways to care for the

population and for methods to gain their support and cooperation. Successful

CMO were critical. CMO conducted by SF [special forces] units in conjunction

with conventional forces were extremely effective.

SOURCE: Operations Bulletin No. 90-9

Center for Army Lessons Learned
I-7

Introduction

Operations,” and Appendix B,

“Presidential Decision Directive-56,

Managing Complex Contingency

Operations.”

e. The primary mechanism for

coordinating CMO within an echelon and

between echelons is the CA annex and the

CA unit OPLANs. Since CMO and CA

involves the activities of a number of staff

functions and subordinate units, it is necessary

to have a single document to identify,

consolidate, deconflict, and synergize the

activities of the various sections and units

(e.g., engineers, health service, and

transportation).

f. The successful conclusion of a campaign

or operation is based on more than an

assessment of military factors. An assessment

of all political, military, economic, and

information factors must be conducted to

determine if the required end state has been

achieved.

• Peace operations are increasingly

complex due to the difficulty of

integrating military operations with

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)

programs (United Nations Office of the

High Commissioner for Refugees

[UNHCR], World Food Program, United

Nations Children’s Fund, et al.), the

protection of human rights (United

Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights [UNHCHR]), and economic

rehabilitation (United Nations

Development Programme), in addition to

divergent interests of former warring

factions. The formulation of a coherent

rehabilitation and reconstruction plan is

imperative prior to the start of military

operations. A coherent rehabilitation and

reconstruction plan/strategy also gauges

the level of improvement in the quality

of life of the populace through normality

indicators, which reflect the overall level

of success of the operation.

• Planners must be cognizant that all

missions are dynamic and, therefore,

the relative effort devoted to CMO

may change with planned phases or

unanticipated political or environmental

influences. For example, CMO might

only play a supporting role through the

decisive engagement phase of a war, but

the exit strategy could rely heavily on

successful CMO efforts to establish a

stable environment for the governing

authorities upon the departure of US

combat forces.

• Unforeseen changes or shifts in effort

may arise from failure to anticipate

changes in the military or political

situation or from unexpected change in

the environment such as flooding or other

natural disasters. Unforeseen changes

are most dangerous when the joint

force mission unexpectedly changes

from CMO to combat operations.

Joint force planners in a CMO

environment must identify indicators of

possible escalation as early as possible,

allocate resources for monitoring those

indicators, and anticipate shifts with

sufficient warning to posture the force

for a significant mission change. Such

anticipatory planning and positive action

may in fact prevent the mission change

by identifying the problem early and

allocating forces or designating a specific

response to it, thus defusing the problem

before it escalates. Possible indicators

to monitor include, but are not limited

to, those depicted in Figure I-2.

3. Objectives of Civil-Military

Operations

a. CMO are a continuum of possible

activities that must be considered based on

the desired level of civilian support, the

availability of resources to execute possible

CMO, and the inadvertent interference by the

local population.
I-8

Chapter I

JP 3-57

b. Objectives

• Support National Objectives. The US

national security objective is supported

by CMO through the conduct of various

activities such as nation assistance, FHA,

and military civic action (MCA). These

activities are particularly suited to support

the development of a country’s material

and human resources or to assist the HN

in achieving its political, economic, and

informational objectives.

• Enhance Military Effectiveness.

Support of military operations by the

indigenous civilian population enhances

military effectiveness. Properly executed

CMO can reduce potential friction points

between the civilian population and the

military force. The objective is to reduce

interference with military operations by

the civilian population. Success is

achieved through such activities as

relocating noncombatants away from

areas of combat and through public

information programs that publicize these

activities to the local population as part

of coordinated PSYOP and public affairs

(PA) operations. Properly planned,

coordinated, and executed CMO

activities lead to proactive support of the

military operation by the civilian

population.

• Reduce the Negative Impact of

Military Operations on Civilians.

Often, casualties of war are inflicted not

only on military forces but on the civilian

populace. Casualties, suffering, and

hardship on noncombatants often have

far-reaching effects that may negate or

delay achievement of US national or

coalition objectives. Commanders have

a moral and a legal obligation to prevent

unnecessary suffering of noncombatants.

The fulfillment of these obligations helps

to more effectively achieve long-term

objectives.

c. Types and Nature of Civil-Military

Operations. CMO can be broadly separated

into support to military operations and support

to civil operations, though at times those

become intertwined depending upon the

Figure I-2. Possible Escalation Indicators

POSSIBLE ESCALATION INDICATORS

Political activities and movements

Food or water shortages

Outbreaks of disease

Military setbacks

Natural disasters

Crop failures

Fuel shortages

Onset of seasonal changes (winter may exacerbate fuel and food

shortages, for example)

Police force and corrections system deterioration

Judicial system shortcomings
I-9

Introduction

nature of a particular operation and its

potential to expand from a civil to a military

mission.

• Support to Military Operations

•• CMO include a variety of key roles

that impact mission accomplishment.

Some roles are required by international

law. For example, the need to minimize

the effects of the military operation on

the civilian population. Other roles

originate to facilitate military operations.

•• Conflict in the 21st Century is likely

to involve civil interface more than it

did in previous conflicts. Because the

US has substantial military power,

adversaries may rely upon asynchronous

warfare to avoid direct confrontation with

the US combat power. Their targets and

means may be more civilian than military.

Second, there is less distinction between

civilian and military institutions,

infrastructures, and systems than before

while dual-use is becoming more

prevalent. Thirdly, strategic centers of

gravity and operational decisive points

are population hubs instead of military

forces and remote terrain features. As

more people and power migrate to

densely populated urban centers, the

military force is very likely to be fighting

in densely populated urban centers than

jungles or deserts. Consequently, CMO

will be a critical feature of future

conflicts.

• CMO planners must forecast CMO

requirements by analyzing the mission

to determine specific tasks. This includes

establishing guidance for the specific

CMO mission and developing estimates

of the situation to include staff studies.

Special, functional-oriented studies may

be needed on certain topics. Planners

must consider their knowledge of CMO,

geographic areas of specialization,

language qualifications, civil sector

functional technical expertise, and

contacts with civilian organizations. This

will allow for timely and critical

information on the civilian capabilities

and resources in the operational area and

information and insights gained from

civilian contacts and professional

knowledge that is more extensive than

the information collected from military

intelligence channels.

•• The CMO mission in support of major

regional conflicts and other combat

operations varies with the phases of the

operation, as shown in Figure I-3.

•• Dislocated civilians (DC) can pose

significant problems during combat

operations. CMO is responsible for

planning DC operations and to support

the combat task. In addition, successfully

carried out DC operations minimize the

civilian interference with military

operations, protect civilians from being

combat hazards, prevent the outbreak of

disease, alleviate human suffering and

provide for the centralized control of

DCs.

•• CMO will assist the commander’s

military operations through coordination

with civilian agencies in implementing

measures to locate and identify the

population centers. CMO will also

coordinate with the civilian agencies to

create, restore, and maintain public order.

In additional CMO activities will

coordinate, safeguard, mobilize, and use

civilian resources (such as labor, supplies,

and facilities). CMO will provide the

coordination for the immediate life

sustaining services to civilians in the

immediate battle area and assist with the

planning for the control of diseases that

might endanger the military force. CMO

will also assist with minimizing civilian

movements which would interfere with
I-10

Chapter I

JP 3-57

military operations and ensure the

equitable distribution of humanitarian

supplies and services.

•• CMO is also responsible for analyzing

considerations to eliminate or mitigate

potential adverse effects on the populace

by identifying populated areas to avoid

and developing schemes of maneuver

and fires to minimize contact with

populated areas. CMO assets areas are

also utilized to designate dislocated

civilian routes and facilities to minimize

contact with combat force and the

employment of PSYOP to mitigate

adverse effects of combat on the civilian

populace. CMO involves taking action

to maintain or restore law and order to

protect the control of both public and

private property.

•• CMO can contribute to foreign and

host-nation support (HNS). Logistic

planners identify projected shortfalls and

communicate needs to the CMO

planners. CMO planners then identify

the availability of goods and services

within theater, to include location, lines

of communications (LOCs), quantities

available, and cost. CMO responsibilities

range from identifying resources and

assisting other staff agencies in their

procurement to activating preplanned

requests for wartime support from the

civilian sector.

•• Populace and Resources Control.

PRC assists HN governments or de facto

authorities in retaining control over their

population centers, thus precluding

complicating problems that may hinder

accomplishment of the JFC’s mission.

This includes external support for control

of civil unrest and restoration of basic

public services (security, water, food

supply, shelter, electricity, sanitation, and

Figure I-3. Civil Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts

and Other Combat Operations

CIVIL MILITARY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF

MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS

AND OTHER COMBAT OPERATIONS

PHASES PRE-CRISIS PREPARATION DEPLOYMENT HOSTILITIES POST

CONFLICT

Civil

Military

Functions

Coordinate

with civilian

organizations

Conduct civil

affairs area

assessment,

to include

identifying

potential civil

sector

affecting

military

operations

and relevant

civilian

organizations

Recommend

nonmilitary

Flexible

Deterrent

Options

Minimize

civilian

interference

with military

operations

Limit collateral

damage on

civilian

population,

infrastructure,

and institutions

Support

reestablishment

of effective civil

control by

designated

civilian

organizations

Perform civil

administration

until civil

authorities are

reestablished

Build up civil

resources to

support

hostilities

and post

conflict

Civil operations

Military

Functions
I-11

Introduction

basic health services care), the lack of

which can precipitate civil unrest.

•• PRC may include the use of CA,

military police (MP) and/or security

forces, PSYOP, and logistic support for

the movement, collection, housing,

feeding, and protection of DC. PRC

operations are designed and conducted

to detect, isolate, and neutralize

belligerents. HN police or military

forces normally carry out these

operations, but US forces are frequently

called on to conduct PRC operations until

HN forces are available to relieve them.

•• PRC by the joint force in a joint

operations area (JOA) or area of

responsibility (AOR) is necessary when

civil authorities or agencies are either

unable or unwilling to undertake that

responsibility. In friendly territory, US

forces conduct such operations with the

consent of the local government. In

hostile territory, they are conducted in

accordance with international law and the

LOAC. Successful PRC mobilizes the

population and material resources;

denies the enemy ready access to the

population and to both internal and

external sources of supply; and

provides security for the population.

PRC measures seek to reduce, relocate,

or access population resources that may

impede or otherwise threaten the success

of ongoing and follow-on military and

supporting logistic operations. PRC can

be applied across the range of military

operations and at all levels of war.

•• Populace controls include curfews,

movement restrictions, travel permits,

registration cards, and resettlement.

Resource controls include licensing,

regulations, checkpoints, ration

controls, and inspection of facilities.

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and

combat operations, including complex

contingency operations, require some

type of PRC. Commanders’

responsibilities to respect and protect the

civilian populace and national resources

are prescribed in the international LOAC

and other international human rights law.

Furthermore, commanders will comply

with the LOAC during armed conflict,

and will apply LOAC principles during

operations categorized as MOOTW.

•• Operations involving dislocated

civilians are a special category of PRC.

“Dislocated civilian” is a broad term that

includes a displaced person, an evacuee,

an expellee, or a refugee. The movement

and physical presence of DC, who most

likely require some degree of

humanitarian aid such as food, water,

shelter, clothing, and similar items, can

hinder military operations. DC

operations are conducted to: (1)

minimize local population interference

with military operations by coordinating

with civil authorities or government

ministries and agencies to implement

population and resource controls; (2)

protect civilians from combat operations;

(3) mitigate and control the outbreak of

disease among DC; and (4) centralize the

large populations of DC into selected and

controllable areas.

•• Under the category of support to

military operations, CMO planners will

likely find themselves involved in

MOOTW. Most MOOTW by their very

nature involve the civilian contact with

the military, and therefore require CMO

to some extent. Some MOOTW, such as

nation assistance, are inherently CMO.

Conversely, some MOOTW, such as

raids and strikes, may have limited

impact on the civil sector and

therefore may have limited or no

CMO requirements. Specific CMO

implications for MOOTW are

dependent on the mission, type of
I-12

Chapter I

JP 3-57

operation, desired end state, and the

characteristics of the civil sector in the

operational area. Representative CMO

activities in support of some MOOTW

include, but are not limited to: (1)

Counterinsurgency. CMO involve

decisive and timely employment of

military capabilities to perform

traditionally nonmilitary activities that

assist the HN in depriving insurgents of

their greatest weapon — dissatisfaction

of the populace. CMO activities can

support diplomatic, political, economic

and informational initiatives of the HN

and other USG agencies to foster

stability. The goal of CMO activities is

to isolate the insurgents from the

populace, thus depriving them of recruits,

resources, intelligence, and credibility.

To maximize effectiveness, CMO plans

and actions must be an integral part of

the early counterinsurgency activities.

CMO may include aspects of CA and

HA. CMO to support counterinsurgency

may also include disaster relief, civil

defense, counterdrug operations, and

counterterroism. It is also important to

note that all CMO is enhanced by the

proper use of PSYOP. (2) Security

Assistance (SA). CMO support to SA

can include training foreign military

forces in CMO and civil-military

relations. (3) Peacekeeping Operations.

CMO in peacekeeping operations

maintain a productive relationship

between the military peacekeeping force,

civilian organizations participating in the

peacekeeping operation, and the civilian

governments and population in the

peacekeeping operational area. CMO

activities also interact with PSYOP

activities to ensure an understanding

among the populace of US goals and

actions. (4) NEO. CMO requirements

during a NEO include providing area

experts, civil sector functional experts,

and linguistically-qualified personnel to

augment State Department civilians,

special operations forces (SOF), or

contingency forces conducting the NEO.

CMO activities in support of NEO

include providing liaison with the

embassy on the behalf of military forces

in the operational area and on the behalf

of US civilians in the operational area.

In addition, CMO forces support the

evacuation sites by providing holding

areas for non-US nationals denied

evacuation. CMO elements also

coordinate the nonmilitary assets within

the commanders’ capabilities and

authority.

• Support to Civil Operations

•• Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

Although Department of Defense

Directive (DODD) 5100.46, Foreign

Disaster Relief, calls these activities

“foreign disaster relief,” the equivalent

term “foreign humanitarian assistance”

is used throughout this publication based

on guidance provided in JP 3-07.6, Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

•• The purpose of FHA is to relieve or

reduce the results of natural or manmade

disasters or other endemic conditions

such as disease, hunger, or privation that

might present a serious threat to life or

loss of property. FHA provided by US

forces is generally limited in scope and

duration.

•• The US military has provided rapid

and robust assistance on numerous

occasions. US forces generally

supplement or complement the efforts of

the HN civil authorities or agencies that

may have the primary responsibility for

providing HA by conducting operations

limited in scope and duration. The

primary factor for the conduct of FHA is

the funding available by the lead US

agency.
I-13

Introduction

•• The Office of Foreign Disaster

Assistance (OFDA), within the Bureau

of Humanitarian Response in the United

States Agency for International

Development (USAID) has primary

responsibility for the US response in

FHA operations. US military forces

only participate after direction from the

President, a specific request from the

Secretary of State, or in emergency

situations in order to save human lives

where there is not sufficient time to seek

the prior initial concurrence of the

Secretary of State. (1) If a USAID

Mission is present in a country, it can play

an important role in developing longerterm reconstruction strategies critical to

building the foundation for a country’s

transition to sustainable development.

Numerous activities are key to a

postconflict recovery but may not be

addressed by disaster assistance response

teams (e.g., democracy and/or

governance and economic policy and

market reforms). (2) USAID’s Office of

Transition Initiatives. This relatively

new office provides rapid field response

to complex emergencies, particularly to

priority conflict-prone and postconflict

countries. The Office of Transition

Initiatives staff has experience with both

humanitarian operations and political

development. Typically, the Office of

Transition Initiatives manages field

operations through local and/or

indigenous NGO, and can be a key actor

in demobilization of ex-combatants;

human rights monitoring; promoting

alternative media; training newly elected

officials; peace and reconciliation

message development; quick impact

projects that demonstrate the benefits of

peace; participatory decision making at

the local level; support to civil society

organizations; and building better

relationships between civil and military

organizations.

•• Military forces may assist with relief,

dislocated civilian support (displaced

REPAIRING A RELATIONSHIP

The 353rd Special Operations Group from Kadena Air Base, Japan, flew 19

tons of disaster relief aid across the Pacific Nov. 11, to assist in Vietnam’s

worst flooding in a century. . . . For the US Air Force to come back here on

Veterans Day is pretty sweet, said United States Ambassador Douglas Peterson.

This also signifies how far we’ve come in building our relationship with Vietnam.

We’re looking toward the future as opposed to the past. . . . There was a real

timeliness issue involved in getting this shipment here. Special Operations

Command Pacific saw we were going to be a bit slow going through routine

channels. Understanding the urgency, they offered the services of the 353rd.

. . . The Vietnamese don’t have K-loaders and special ramp services . . . but

they did have something that worked — volunteers. Hundreds of international

Red Cross workers joined Vietnamese soldiers and policemen as they

transferred the goods from pallets to waiting trucks. . . . This is not going to

go unnoticed, said Ambassador Peterson. I’m constantly evaluating how

relations between the United States and Vietnam add up. In some instances,

it seems we haven’t always delivered. Today we delivered. Watching American

C-130s come back in this capacity is a great thing.

SOURCE: Tip of the Spear

Vol. 2, No. 12

December 1999
I-14

Chapter I

JP 3-57

persons, evacuees expellees, or

refugees), and security or technical

assistance. The latter might include such

short-term tasks as communications

restoration, relief supply management,

provision of HSS, humanitarian

demining assistance, and high priority

relief supply delivery. The US military

may conduct humanitarian demining

and mine awareness training to

develop long-term indigenous structures

capable of educating the local populace

to protect themselves from land mines

and unexploded ordnance and to return

the land to more productive uses.

Specific relief programs include the

Excess Property Program, which makes

available nonlethal DOD property; the

program defined by the McCollum

Amendment, which authorizes

transportation and distribution of

humanitarian relief for DC; the Denton

Space Available Transportation Program,

which allows military transport of private

donations; and Title 10 United States

Code, 401, Humanitarian and Civic

Assistance (HCA) provided in

conjunction with military operations.

Assistance under HCA must fulfill unittraining requirements that incidentally

create humanitarian benefits. FHA often

is conducted simultaneously with other

types of operations, such as peace

operations or nation assistance.

•• Commanders at all levels must be

aware of the implications of providing

support to civil authorities and the

civilian population. Despite the urgency

of the situation affecting the local

population, the need to manage scarce

resources may limit the support that can

be provided. Military logistic support in

humanitarian or disaster relief operations

is not inexhaustible nor is it at the

automatic disposal of international

organizations, NGOs, and UN agencies.

Military resources for CMO are

allocated based on a specific mission.

Additional assistance responsibilities

should not be assumed without an

evaluation of the resources involved and

the specific approval of the JFC as these

resources may be required for priority

military tasks. Civil authorities, not in

the chain of command, above the JFC

may direct resources to FHA without

regard to the effect on the military

operation. Planning to minimize this

possibility is a critical element of any

operation. Once approved, FHA must

be coordinated with all organizations and

agencies involved in the operation.

•• The primary responsibility for the

well being of a population rests with

the lawful government or de facto

authorities of the affected state. Where

the government or authorities are unable

or unwilling to protect or support their

populations with the appropriate

assistance (failed state), an international

humanitarian response may take place.

This may take the form of consensual

FHA to a functioning civil infrastructure,

usually with the concurrence of the

government (adequate or fragile states)

or may take the form of humanitarian

action in a civil war situation or complex

emergency situations where consent to

humanitarian operations is incomplete

(e.g., Somalia).

For further detail concerning FHA, refer

to DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster

Relief, and JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance.

•• Nation Assistance Operations.

Nation assistance is civil or military

assistance (other than FHA) rendered to

a nation by US forces within that nation’s

territory during peacetime, crises or

emergencies, or war, based on

agreements mutually concluded between
I-15

Introduction

the United States and that nation. Nation

assistance operations support a HN by

promoting sustainable development and

growth of responsive institutions. The

goal is to promote long-term regional

stability. Nation assistance programs

often include, but are not limited to, SA,

FID, and HCA. All nation assistance

actions are integrated through the US

Ambassador’s Country Plan.

•• Nation assistance operations support

USG efforts to assist and complement the

HN with internal programs to promote

stability, develop sustainability, and

establish institutions responsive to the

needs of the populace. They contribute

to improved or strengthened diplomatic

ties between the United States and the

HN, and further US national security

objectives.

For further detail in regards to nation

assistance, refer to JP 3-07, Joint

Doctrine for Military Operations Other

Than War.

•• Military Civic Action. MCA

involves activities intended to win

support of the local population for the

foreign nation and its military. MCA may

employ indigenous or paramilitary forces

as labor and is planned as a series of shortterm projects with the long-term goal of

fostering national development. Properly

planned, executed, and promulgated in

close cooperation with local authorities,

military, and community leaders, MCA

projects result in popular support.

•• MCA may involve US supervision

and advice but the visible effort will be

conducted by the local military. MCA is

an essential part of military support to a

FID program to assist the local

government develop capabilities to

provide for the security and well-being

of its own population.

•• MCA helps eliminate some of the

causes of civilian unrest by providing

economic and social development

services such as education, training,

public works, transportation,

communications, health, and sanitation.

Some examples are: (1) constructing or

repairing schools, health clinics or

community buildings; (2) providing

health care; (3) repairing and building

roads; or (4) by distributing agricultural

implements and/or tools, seeds, and

providing access to a water source for

cultivation to promote the welfare of the

populace.

•• MCA projects require interagency

cooperation, coordination, controlling,

and monitoring to succeed. The JFC and

staff must be aware of legal and financial

limitations in authorized projects. The

success of MCA is dependent on a close

relationship between civil agencies and

the joint force staff, as well as the synergy

created by the CA, PSYOP, and PA

elements.

•• Provide MCA Assistance. MCA

assistance guides or assists HN forces on

projects useful to the local population.

Such projects contribute to the local

community’s economic and social

development and improve the standing

of the military forces with the population.

These activities could include education,

training, public sanitation, and others.

•• MCA programs offer the FID planner

CMO opportunities to improve the HN

infrastructure and the living conditions

of the local populace while enhancing the

legitimacy of the HN government. These

programs use predominantly indigenous

military forces to enhance the economic

and social development of the nation.

These programs can have excellent longterm benefits for the HN by developing

needed skills and by enhancing the
I-16

Chapter I

JP 3-57

legitimacy of the host government by

showing the people that their government

is capable of meeting the population’s

basic needs. MCA programs also can be

helpful in gaining public acceptance of

the military, which is especially important

in situations requiring a clear, credible

demonstration of improvement in hostmilitary treatment of human rights. MCA

is a tool that combatant commanders and

subordinate JFCs should use whenever

possible to bolster the overall FID plans.

•• MCA Coordination and Control.

Coordination for MCA missions is

slightly less involved than for FHA and

HCA missions. First, the US level of

involvement is generally less than that

required for other types of FID missions.

Second, the program is essentially a US

military to HN military project. If the

US military support to MCA is provided

through SA, normal SA coordination

procedures apply. If it is provided

through a separate combatant

commander’s initiative using operation

and maintenance funds, most of the

coordination will be internal to the

command.

•• MCA Employment Considerations.

Many of the considerations on the use of

US military personnel to conduct other

CMO activities also apply to MCA

support. The essential difference is that

in MCA, HN military and/or government

personnel perform tasks that are visible

to the indigenous population in order to

garner popular support while US

personnel provide training and advice. In

addition to this general point,

commanders also should consider the

following employment guidelines when

planning or executing MCA programs:

(1) Select projects that are simple and

achievable and can be maintained by the

HN. If the HN military is unable to

accomplish the mission, confidence in the

local government and military may be

significantly damaged; (2) HN forces will

do the work required to accomplish the

mission; (3) Because of the nature of

MCA missions, commanders normally

will include CA, PSYOP, other SOF

trainers, and combat support and combat

service support elements to support MCA

missions; (4) Coordinate projects with

the Country Team. The USAID

representative should be consulted for

assistance on any major MCA

developmental project and should be

informed of all MCA efforts.

For further detail relating to MCA, refer

to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Foreign Internal

Defense (FID).

•• Civil Preparedness and/or

Emergency Operations. Civil

preparedness and/or emergency

operations are those activities and

measures designed or undertaken to: (1)

minimize the effects upon the civilian

population caused or which would be

caused by a disaster; (2) deal with the

immediate emergency conditions which

would be created by any such disaster;

and (3) effect emergency repairs to, or

the emergency restoration of, vital

utilities and facilities destroyed or

damaged by any such disaster.

•• Disaster preparedness is primarily

the responsibility of the civilian

government and its agencies. It deals

essentially with preparations for the

immediate emergency conditions created

by a disaster. The effectiveness of

disaster preparedness plans and

organization has a direct impact on

ongoing CMO. Support by the military

of FHA planning and exercises in disaster

preparedness will result in public support

for the military or government in disaster

relief operations. Protocol I to the
I-17

Introduction

Geneva Conventions defines civil

defense as “the performance of some or

all of the undermentioned humanitarian

tasks intended to protect the civilian

population against the dangers, and to

help recover from the immediate effects

of hostilities or disasters and also to

provide the conditions necessary for its

survival.” These tasks apply to domestic

and international environments and

cover: (1) warning, (2) evacuation, (3)

management of shelters, (4) rescue, (5)

health services, (6) firefighting, (7)

detection and marking of danger areas,

(8) decontamination and similar

protective measures, (9) provision of

emergency accommodation and supplies,

(10) emergency assistance in the

restoration and maintenance of order in

distressed areas, and (11) emergency

disposal of the dead.

•• Civil Administration. Civil

administration is an action undertaken by

US commanders when directed or

approved by the NCA. DODD 5530.3,

International Agreements, does not

delegate authority to negotiate and

conclude agreements. When approved

by the NCA, agreements should be

negotiated and concluded in accordance

with DODD 5530.3, International

Agreements. Civil administration

support consists of planning,

coordinating, advising, or assisting those

activities that reinforce or restore a civil

administration that supports US and

multinational objectives in friendly or

hostile territory.

•• CA units are trained and organized to

plan and conduct essential CA activities

to assist commanders in the most

effective policy implementation

concerning reorganizing or reconstituting

government structures.

•• Regardless of the program adopted,

military commanders should be aware

that the manner in which they carry out

established policies has a significant

bearing on subsequent courses of action

(COAs) designed to achieve US national

security objectives.

•• Support to civil administration has

domestic and international

considerations. Support to civil

administration fulfills obligations arising

from domestic laws and jurisdiction

rights as well as HN laws, international

treaties, agreements, memoranda of

understanding as well as obligations

under international law, including the

LOAC.

•• Civil Administration in Friendly

Territory. Civil administration missions

in friendly territory are undertaken

pursuant to an agreement with the

government of the area concerned.

•• Governments of friendly territories

may request military forces to perform

basic government functions across the

range of military operations. As

situations stabilize, the functions

performed by the joint force return to

civilian agencies. Generally, the

transition is gradual and requires detailed,

long-range planning.

•• The JFC, assisted by his or her legal

staff, negotiates a support arrangement

for civil administration with a foreign

nation’s government when authorized by

the NCA. The arrangement to provide

civil administration support outlines the

expected nature, extent, and duration of

the support; defines the limits of authority

and the liability of military personnel; and

defines the civil-military relationships

that will exist.
I-18

Chapter I

JP 3-57

•• Civil Administration in Hostile or

Occupied Territory. In a civil

administration by an occupying power,

also called military government,

international law contains provisions

as to the authorities of the occupying

power and the obligations of the

submitting government. Furthermore,

the exercise of executive, legislative, and

judicial authority by the occupying power

will be determined by policy decisions

at the highest level and may even involve

an international policy making group.

Emphasis on CA activities to implement

long-range plans increasingly influences

or replaces measures intended to satisfy

short-range needs. Consistent with

established policy, a sound local

administration is developed, always

subject to the authority of the occupying

power. An informed populace is fostered

through news media, public discussion,

and the formation of political parties.

•• Nations may be required to conduct

civil administration activities across the

range of military operations, acting on

the authority of a nation, alliance,

coalition of nations, or the UN. The

territory under administration is

effectively under military control. The

occupying force has an obligation under

various treaties, such as the 1949 Geneva

Convention Relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War, and

customary international law to ensure

public order and safety and the just and

effective administration of, and support

to, a hostile or occupied territory.

Specific obligations are laid out in these

conventions and must be complied with

by the occupying force.

•• Within its capabilities, the occupying

force must maintain an orderly

government in the occupied territory and

must have, as its ultimate goal, the

creation of an effective civilian

government. Subject to requirements of

the military situation, the JFC must

analyze military activities likely to

increase tensions in the occupied territory

as well as those likely to facilitate and

accelerate a return to a civil

administration. This is especially

important in multi-ethnic, multi-race, or

multi-cultural environments where a

chosen COA will almost invariably be

seen as partisan by one or more of the

parties to a conflict.

•• Support to Peacetime Theater

Engagement. Geographic combatant

commands need to respond to ongoing

changes in the regional military,

economic, and political situations by

refining their theater peacetime

engagement strategy. The strategy

should seek to integrate the efforts of the

geographic combatant commands with

those of other USG agencies, NGOs, and

other civilian institutions in the region,

to obtain the shared goal of a peaceful,

stable, and prosperous society.

•• The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP)

serves as the blueprint of the command’s

strategy to achieve US goals and

objectives. Theater engagement planning

is a complex and dynamic process. The

goal of the TEP is to develop a

comprehensive and integrated set of

engagement activities that, when

executed, shape the environment and lead

to the accomplishment of theater goals.

The TEP provides a means for integrating

Defense programs to meet geographic

combatant command’s objectives while

also ensuring support and consistency

with other USG programs for countries

in the theater.

•• The TEP is formulated through a

process linking ends, ways, and means,

to create an integrated strategy allowing

the geographic combatant commands to
I-19

Introduction

positively shape the environment and

effectively respond to the demands of a

dynamic environment. It is a broad,

overarching document that describes

specific goals and objectives, integrated

programs, specific projects, engagement

activities, and measures of effectiveness

(MOE). The TEP provides clear

direction and a common vision and also

guides the way we do business every day.

TEP includes operational activities,

exercises, and other foreign military

interaction. Operational activities and

exercises will likely involve CMO in

some form. Other foreign military

interaction often involve military

interaction with the HN civil sector,

usually through the Country Team.

•• Civil support operations may be more

acceptable to both US and the HN than

pure military program. These civil

support programs, therefore, can provide

a means of access to countries that

otherwise may not be open to the US

military.

•• Theater engagement planning is a very

complex process that takes significant

time and resourcing to develop and

execute. It requires a focused, balanced

interagency process to maximize the

return of the investment of scarce

resources. It requires a theater strategy

coordinated between multiple actors. It

requires the integration of various

programs managed by different agencies

with sometimes differing opinions.

Finally, it requires a common vision. No

matter how well the strategy or plan is

developed, its success will be limited

unless all the resources, consistent

policies, and detailed interagency

coordination and cooperation are in

place.

•• Post Conflict Operations. Post

conflict operations are primarily CMO.

When war termination objectives are

achieved, the usual military goal is to

redeploy forces from the operational area.

However, international law, moral

requirements, and national policy may

require the military to restore essential

civilian services and to ensure minimum

civil stability.

•• The JFC will need to assess the post

conflict environment — to include the

governance, civil security, humanitarian,

economic and commerce, social and

cultural and infrastructure components

since all contribute to civil stability.

Usually conflict has destabilized the civil

sector to some extent. It will be necessary

to conduct civil reconstruction to some

degree.

•• The most critical civil component

is governance: who will provide civil

administration of the occupied or

liberated area? The decision on who

the post conflict governing authorities

will be is not usually a military decision.

However, the military will be expected

to support the designated governing

authorities. Options for post conflict

governing authorities may be to return

governance to former authorities, to

install a new government, to establish an

international organization as an interim

governing body, or, as a last resort, to

establish an interim military government

until a civilian government can be

formed.

•• Governance is more than just

identifying the senior policy makers and

administrators. Governance also

includes the need to reestablish the

operations of governmental

organizations. Activities such as

reopening schools and the

reestablishment of garage removal

systems are required by international law

and are essential tasks to the strategy for
I-20

Chapter I

JP 3-57

achieving civil stability. The JFC must

ensure that sufficient resources are

available to monitor the reestablishment

of essential services and, if necessary, to

support the governing authorities

capacity to reestablish such services.

•• While the responsibly is not

necessarily the military’s, often the

military is the only stabilizing force with

sufficient resources in the area

immediately after conflict. Support from

the other USG agencies, international

organizations, NGOs, the commercial

sector, and, most importantly, from local

groups will be needed to stabilize the

society.

•• Planning for post conflict operations

prior to the combat phases will help

ensure that civilian organizations are

mobilized and prepared to assume

responsibility for post conflict operations.

Most civilian organizations focus on their

own specific interests. However, the civil

security requires that the total dimension

be considered. Without a comprehensive,

holistic assessment, gaps could be

created. Further, some civilian

organizations may duplicate efforts.

Figure 1-4 is an example of a Post

Conflict Synchronization Matrix that

could be used to promote unity of effort.

•• One critical factor is that the ultimate

desired end state is transfer of

responsibility to a local government that

is capable of providing for the needs of

its populace. Therefore, post conflict

planning should keep the ultimate desired

end state as their focus. This may require

the JFC to use CA to build up the local

government’s capacity

•• Domestic Support Operations

(DSO). DSO usually occur after a

Presidential declaration of a major

disaster and are designed to supplement

the efforts and resources of other federal

agencies, state and local governments,

and voluntary organizations. The US

military normally responds to domestic

emergencies in support of other federal

agencies, e.g., Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) or the

Department of Justice. On the other

hand, the Department of Defense is the

primary agency or lead federal agency

(LFA), responsible for public works and

engineering under the Federal Response

Plan.

•• When local or state governments are

overwhelmed or do not possess a special

capability (e.g., fire fighters, health

service, chemical defense, explosive

ordnance disposal (EOD), military

working dog, etc.), the local or state

government may submit a request for

assistance from the nearest DOD

installation. This emergency may not

obtain a level to be a Presidentially

declared disaster. Installation

commanders may respond under

immediate response under imminently

serious conditions. DOD installation

commanders may provide support to save

lives, prevent human suffering, or to

mitigate great property loss.

Commanders should notify the DOD

Executive Secretary through the chain of

command, who shall notify the Secretary

of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and any other appropriate

officials, and follow guidance in DODD

3025.1, Military Support to Civil

Authorities, and 3025.15, Military

Assistance to Civil Authorities.

•• The term domestic emergency refers

to emergencies affecting the public

welfare and occurring within the 50

states, District of Columbia,

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the

Virgin Islands, Guam, Mariana Islands,

the Republic of Palau, and the Trust
I-21

Introduction

Territory of the Pacific Islands, or any

political subdivision thereof, as a result

of enemy attack, insurrection, civil

disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or

other public disasters or equivalent

emergencies that endanger life and

property or disrupt the usual process of

government.

•• Types of Emergency Responses.

Types of response to domestic

emergencies include crisis management,

consequence management (CM), and

technical operations. These responses

can occur simultaneously, sequentially,

or independently of each other. (1)

Crisis Management. This response

occurs under the primary jurisdiction of

the federal government. The agency

with primary responsibility or LFA for

response to acts of terrorism, for example,

is the Federal Bureau of Investigation

of the Department of Justice. Crisis

management response in such cases

involves measures to resolve the hostile

situation, and to investigate, and prepare

a criminal case for prosecution under

Federal law. (2) Consequence

Management. This type of response

occurs under the primary jurisdiction of

the affected state and local

government. The Federal government

provides assistance when required.

When situations are beyond the

capability of the state, the governor may

request federal assistance from the

President. The President may direct the

Federal government to provide

supplemental assistance to state and

local governments to alleviate the

suffering and damage resulting from

disasters or emergencies. The agency

Figure I-4. Post Conflict Synchronization Matrix

POST CONFLICT SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

Immediate

Objective

Governance Humanitarian Economic

and

Commerce

Social/

Cultural

Civil Infrastructure Security

Indigenous

(Host)

Government

NGOs

Other

(Foundations,

academic

organizations,

labor unions)

Commercial

Organizations

Other Foreign

Government

Desired

End State

International

Organizations

US Civilians

Military Forces

Potential Involved Governmental Organizations

Potential Involved Organizations Other Than Nongovernmental Organizations
I-22

Chapter I

JP 3-57

with primary responsibility for

coordination of federal assistance to state

and local governments is FEMA. CM

involves measures to alleviate the

damage, loss, hardship, or suffering

caused by emergencies. It includes

measures to restore essential government

services, protect public health and safety,

and provide emergency relief to affected

governments, businesses, and

individuals. (3) Technical Operations.

Technical operations involve measures to

identify and assess the threat posed by

the hazardous material, to provide

consultation to decision makers

concerning the implications of the

hazardous material for crisis and CM, to

neutralize the material, and to provide

decontamination assistance. Technical

operations may be triggered prerelease

in support of the crisis management

response and continue postrelease in

support of the CM response. The LFA

for technical operations depends upon the

material involved and the location of the

incident.

•• DSO are divided into two broad

categories: military support to civil

authorities (MSCA) and military

support to civilian law enforcement

agencies (MSCLEA).

•• Military Support to Civil

Authorities. MSCA are those activities

and measures taken by DOD components

to foster mutual assistance and support

between the DOD and any civil

government agency in planning for, or

in the application of resources for

response to, the consequences of civil

emergencies. In MSCA, the Department

of Defense, in coordination with FEMA,

generally supports Federal agencies

that have primary responsibility. This

coordination is effected between the

Defense Coordinating Officer and the

Federal Coordinating Officer.

•• Military Support to Civilian Law

Enforcement Agencies. MSCLEA

includes military assistance for civil

disturbances and other types of support

to civilian law enforcement agencies

(e.g., key asset protection program,

interagency assistance — training

support to law enforcement agencies,

response to use of weapons of mass

destruction [WMD]). The use of the

military in law enforcement roles is a

sensitive topic and significant

restrictions apply to such use. When

the Department of Defense provides

MSCLEA, the Department of Justice is

generally the LFA.

•• Command arrangements for military

forces conducting most DSO differ from

those for other operations. In most cases,

the forces involved respond to direction

and guidance from the Secretary of the

Army, the DOD executive agent

through the Director of Military

Support, the executive agent’s action

agent to the combatant command (US

Joint Forces Command, US Southern

Command, or US Pacific Command).

However, specific approval authority and

procedures in DODD 3025.15, Military

Assistance to Civil Authorities, apply in

the case of sensitive support requests, acts

or threats of terrorism, and requests for

support from civilian law enforcement

authorities, or when forces involved are

assigned to combatant commands. In the

specific event of a WMD incident or

accident, all federal forces, less joint

special operations task force (JSOTF)

and US Army Corps of Engineers

elements normally will be directed by and
I-23

Introduction

coordinated through the Commander,

Joint Task Force Civil Support, upon

SecDef approval.

For further detail relating to MSCA and

MSCLEA, refer to DODD 3025.1,

Military Support to Civil Authorities

(MSCA), DODD 3025.15, Military

Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA),

DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with

Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, and

JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Domestic Support

Operations.

4. Summary

In summary, the following vignette supports

the importance of the Armed Forces of the

United States continuing and expanding their

involvement in CMO.

CMO NEWS BRIEFING

. . . the 26th MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] has withdrawn from the American

area of operations. They began the change over with the elements of the 1st

Infantry Division out of Germany on about the 5th of July. That process lasted

about five days. We call that a “right seat ride” where we bring in the new unit

and they pair up with the outgoing unit. They patrol together, operate together

so that the new unit gains situational awareness. It’s a very effective technique.

It allows the new unit then to quickly grasp the general area of operations, the

nuances, the peculiarities of the situation and provides a good change over.

The 26th MEU then began the withdrawal and completed that by nightfall on

the 11th of July. They are reconfiguring in Macedonia and soon will head for

the reembarkation upon the ship off the coast of Greece. So that turnover

went exceedingly well.

The 18th Airborne Infantry Battalion from Poland came in at just about the

same time. They are occupying an area formerly occupied by US forces, the

2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Benning. We have

put them in the Kacanik area down near the border with Macedonia. Again,

that change over was a right seat ride, approximately five days, and the Polish

battalion now has assumed their duties in that area. They have control of that

specific area and the area to the west which is the opstina, an opstina being a

county, of Strpce. So they are in place and they are operating at this time. . . .

In terms of operations, again, first priority force protection and the

establishment of a safe and secure environment. Since last we talked I would

tell you that the situation is better. The amount of lawlessness, the amount of

violations of good order, law and order is down, but it is still not to the point

we want it. There are still far too many instances of houses being burned,

vacant houses, throughout the entire area and instances of random shooting.

So we are working hard to clamp down on that. We now have a full military

police battalion in the area and that has been very beneficial in providing that

policing function that they are highly trained for.

We have opened several, I believe at this time four, I guess it’s five today, five

US police stations collocated with information operations offices where

information is provided to all the residents. It’s collocated with a military police
I-24

Chapter I

JP 3-57

desk sergeant, if you will, so there is access to the military police if the residents

have a problem, any resident, Serb or Albanian. They can come in, provide

that information, and then we will go investigate or go fix or correct whatever

the problem is that could be occurring out in any of the small towns or

neighborhoods in these areas. So we’ve still got some work to do, but again

the safe and secure environment here today on D+31 or K+22, K being the day

the undertaking was signed with the UCK [Ushtria Clirimtare E Kosoves/Kosovo

Liberation Army]. I think that we’re farther ahead than I thought we’d be, but

we’ve still got a ways to go.

Turning to the humanitarian aid and the civic administration and reconstruction.

Humanitarian aid — we are now finding that by and large with all the refugees

practically now have returned. There are some isolated cases where food or

water is in short supply and we work closely with the UNHCR [United Nations

Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees] to alleviate that as soon as we

find out. So we have a reasonably good line of communication, an ability to

surge quickly to answer the need for humanitarian support from the returned

refugees.

The civic administration, civic functioning starting to come back on line. It

needs support, it needs help. It is not capable of sustained operation. Most

communities now have at least 12 hours of water turned on a day. Electricity

is still in a brown-out mode, there is not full power anywhere. And there are

spot shortfalls of different requirements for fuel for buses, for example, refuse

removal in some of the towns. We’re having to provide assistance or work

through the various IO [international organizations] and NGO

[nongovernmental organizations] to get that done.

The last component of that civic administration is an assessment of all the

towns in our area, and that’s several hundred that have enough of a population

to need some kind of a civic service. So we can determine what each town’s

status is with regard to those type of utilities and services, and where the

priority lies for immediate work with the United Nations missions in Kosovo

and their various organizations, or if it’s humanitarian, UNHCR. . . .

I would tell you that the Serb enclaves by and large are more withdrawn than

the Albanians. You move through a Serb town or village. They don’t come out

and welcome you like the Albanians do. They are not as friendly. But where

we have made the distinct effort, and we do that, to go in and provide them

with information. We go in with military police, our soldiers, and try to talk to

them and explain we’re there to protect everyone, we’re there to help everyone

if we have to, and if they need it. We’ve sent medical, what we call MEDCAP

[medical civic action program], medical capability, and a DENTCAP [dental

civic action program], dental capability. Move it out, ask if anyone is sick or

anyone needs medical attention, they take advantage of that. So where you

try to make an overt effort as much as you can, they will open up. . . .

The UN Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] is assigned in the civil administration area.

There are four pillars under UNMIK. The pillar of civil administration they have

assigned an individual by the name of Fisher who is a temporary hire. He’ll be

leaving in a couple of weeks and we will get a replacement. So he is located in
I-25

Introduction

Gnjilane. And anything we need to do with civil administration we will

coordinate through him. He is now starting to bring the organizations in that

will support his efforts in that functional area. . . .

In the way of combat engineers, we have one combat engineer battalion, and

essentially they do engineering support tasks for the maneuver battalion. . . .

we have several, a robust construction capability. We have both horizontal

and vertical engineer construction battalions. We’ve got a SeaBee battalion

here that does a lot of vertical construction work, and we’ve got Army engineer

battalions here, construction battalions who have the equipment and capability

to do a lot of horizontal construction road building and building of hard stands

to put buildings or helicopter roads or things like that down. Right now both

of those battalions are on the ground and working. They are working to

construct our base camps, where we will live here in Kosovo.

In addition we have two construction, engineer construction companies that

will be deployed from the continental United States. I believe one from Fort

Lewis and one from Fort Riley. And they bring again a very robust construction

capability to assist in the construction of these base camps. So when all is

said and done there will be about three construction battalions.

We also have in that construction arena a contractor, Brown & Root, that will

provide construction capability also — both horizontal and vertical. Then we’ll

have our top end engineers who will support the units out on the patrols and

the movement in the countryside. With regard to whether our engineers support

any civic reconstruction, we do that on an emergency basis now. We’re not

looking at any long-term plan to do that. We believe that will be done by the

international organization, and the nongovernmentals that will work with

UNMIK. Again, the notion there is whenever you can reinvest locally in the

community, the economy will prosper much more than using military engineers.

SOURCE: Brigadier General John Craddock

Commander, Task Force Falcon

DOD News Briefing 13 July 1999
I-26

Chapter I

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

II-1

1. General

a. The organization and command

relationships for conducting CMO are highly

variable. While the principles of effective

command and control (C2) and staff

operations apply to CMO just as they do for

any other military operation, national

objectives, the primary mission of the joint

force, environmental conditions, and

availability of resources will determine the

options available to the JFC. CMO are

conducted to minimize civilian interference

with military operations, to maximize support

for operations, and to meet the commander’s

legal and moral obligations to civilian

populations within the commander’s area of

control.

b. The JFC organizes the force to optimize

its ability to plan, coordinate, and conduct

CMO. Priorities based on the JFC’s primary

mission present challenges for effective CMO

under various operational environments

throughout the range of military operations.

Other challenges effect balancing organization

for CMO with requirements for force

protection and potential mission change.

c. Traditionally, in a hostile or uncertain

environment, administration, logistics, and

CMO (typically CA) staff elements collocate

in the rear area where the majority of their

“Unified planning, centralized control, and a single point of responsibility are

the very minimum requirements for a unity of effort which will offer success

. . . Unity of effort, however, is extremely difficult to achieve because it

represents the fusion of civil and military functions to fight battles which

have primarily political, objectives . . . All the political, economic, psychological,

and military means must be marshalled as weapons under centralized coordination and direction.”

John J. McCuen

The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

activities take place, while the operations and

intelligence staff elements are positioned

forward where the focus of their interests lie.

In an uncertain to permissive environment,

the logistic and CMO focus is operational

area-wide and looks forward and to the rear.

The activities of these staff sections are the

heart of the operation, and therefore the focus

of the operations staff’s activities and the

intelligence staff’s collection efforts.

• The CMO officer (typically a CA officer)

and staff may be collocated with the

operations and intelligence staff elements

and the information operations (IO) cell

to more efficiently exchange information

and requirements. Additional C2

structures (including a civil-military

operations center [CMOC]) and

communications may be required to

facilitate interagency coordination.

See Chapter IV, “Interagency

Coordination,” for more information on

CMOCs.

• Subordinate organizations structured

toward providing CMO support require

robust communication and liaison

capabilities. They often possess

minimal security and self-sustainment

capabilities. Because CMO are

inherently conducted in unstable
II-2

Chapter II

JP 3-57

environments, this factor is an important

part of the vulnerability and risk

assessments conducted during planning,

and must be monitored on a continuous

basis.

• Whether established as a joint civilmilitary operations task force (JCMOTF)

or a joint task force (JTF) with a CMO

mission, the force must have sufficient

intelligence resources to provide warning

of potential mission shifts. JCMOTFs

will be discussed in further detail

subsequently in this chapter.

2. Organizations Providing

CMO Capabilities

Every US military organization has some

capability to support CMO. Certain types

of organizations are particularly suited to this

mission and will form the nucleus of CMO

efforts. These units are typically CA and

PSYOP units. Others, such as, but not limited

to, other SOF, engineers, HSS, transportation,

and MP and security forces, act as enablers.

3. Special Operations Forces

“US special operations personnel from

Special Operations Command-South

(SOCSOUTH), based in Panama,

rescued more than 500 people using

Zodiac boats to reach flooded areas not

accessible by vehicle. The flood

victims were transported to safety by

UH-60 helicopters.”

News Release

Office of Assistance Secretary of

Defense (Public Affairs)

Number 566-98

a. Unless otherwise directed by the

Secretary of Defense, all SOF based in the

continental United States (CONUS) are under

the combatant command (command authority)

(COCOM) of the Commander in Chief,

United States Special Operations Command

(USCINCSOC). SOF assigned to a theater

are under the COCOM of the geographic

combatant commander. The term “SOF”

specifically includes and is always applied to:

• Army special forces groups

• Army ranger battalions

• Army special operations aviation units

• Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs)

• Navy SEAL delivery vehicle teams

• Navy special boat units

• Air Force special operations wings

“Many of the skills in the special

operations forces inventory are directly

applicable to supporting friendly

democratic regimes. With their

linguistic ability and cross-cultural

sensitivities, SOF [special operations

forces] can quickly establish an

effective working rapport with foreign

military and paramilitary forces and,

when required, government officials. In

this capacity, SOF is a force multiplier

for US ambassadors and country

teams throughout the world.

Specifically, SOF (especially civil

affairs, psychological operations, and

Special Forces) can assess

appropriate host nation projects,

conduct disaster or humanitarian

assistance planning seminars, and

assist interagency coordination, foreign

liaison, and public information

programs. This support for

democratization assists friendly nations

and supports mutual national interests.”

Annual Report to the President

and the Congress 1998

• PSYOP forces of the Army and Air Force

• CA of the Army.

• CA and PSYOP forces play crucial roles

in successful CMO. CA and PSYOP are
II-3

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

mutually supportive within CMO.

During MOOTW, PSYOP support

various CA activities (e.g., establish

populace control measures) to gain

support for the HN government in the

international community, and reduce

support or resources to those

destabilizing forces threatening

legitimate processes of the HN

government. PSYOP maximize these

efforts through information products and

programs. PSYOP publicize the

existence or successes of these CMO to

generate target population confidence in

and positive perception of US and HN

actions.

b. Civil Affairs

• Concept of Employment for US Army

CA

•• CMO staffs at every level, augmented

by periodic and regular deployments of

US Army Civil Affairs Plans, Policy, and

Program Teams; Civil Affairs Planning

Team-As, and Civil Affairs Planning

Team-Bs are continuously reviewing

and, if necessary, updating plans and

orders. The organic CMO staffs,

augmented by CA planning teams as

necessary, maintain situational awareness

by participating in their respective

supported command and staff updates as

well as relevant crisis action exercises.

An important element of this deliberate

or crisis action planning process focuses

on developing a recommended CA task

organization, to include identifying needs

for functional specialists. This

recommendation is validated by the

supported combatant commander who

includes it in the request for deployment

of forces from the Joint Staff. The forces

will be sourced once the United States

Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) validates the request and

the Secretary of Defense orders the

deployment of those forces.

•• USSOCOM validated mission

taskings are received by the United States

Army Special Operations Command

where they again are validated to ensure

they meet SOF mission criteria. If

validated, they are forwarded to the

United States Army Civil Affairs and

Psychological Operations Command

where they are again validated and

resourced. The United States Army Civil

Affairs and Psychological Operations

Command assigns the mission planning

authority to a regional CA command or,

in the case of missions that require rapid

deployment, to the Active Component

(AC) CA battalion. AC CA taskorganize to address specific mission

requirements and deploy to the

operational area or directly to the

supported unit. This rapid response

capability enhances the supported

commander’s efforts to achieve timely

interagency coordination that ultimately

leads to a strong unity of effort.

•• Following the rapid deployment of

AC CA and initial CA assessments that

either validate or invalidate the original

CMO estimate, a long-term plan is

developed that articulates the specific

functional skills required to support the

mission. This plan is formulated with

significant input from CONUS-based

CA functional specialists who are

consulted on a continuous basis (note: the

functional specialists should only deploy

when and/or if there is a specific need

for their expertise). The results of this

assessment and recommended task

organization flow from the geographic

combatant commander to USCINCSOC

for validation, feasibility assessment, and

eventual resourcing. Resourcing will

generally be provided by the regionally

aligned CA command.
II-4

Chapter II

JP 3-57

•• Concurrently, requests for the

Presidential Reserve Callup Authority (if

required) or other authorities for

mobilization, are initiated through the

Joint Staff and the Department of

Defense. When authorized, CA elements

are mobilized and deployed. Mission

hand-over and/or transition occurs when

the Reserve Components (RC) CA

arrive. The AC CA are either redeployed

or reassigned in theater, as needed. See

Figure II-1 for further amplification.

For further detail concerning CA policy

and responsibilities see DODD 2000.13,

Civil Affairs, and JP 3-57.1, Joint

Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

• Civil Affairs Activities. CA activities

are inherently civil-military in nature.

Figure II-1. Concept of Civil Affairs Employment

CONCEPT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS EMPLOYMENT

Receipt and validation of

mission by USACAPOC

Mission assigned to regional CACOM or 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (AC)

Deployment of AC CA

individuals/units

Coordination

Reserve Components

individuals/units

deploy to mobilization

station and begin

mission preparations

Initiation of

TTAD/PSRC requests

Upon completion of

mission preparation,

individuals/teams

deploy to the

operational area.

Informal coordination

with deployed AC CA

forces to determine

force requirements.

Provide CMO staff

augmentation and

begin assessment to

determine CA force

requirements

Conduct transition/mission hand-off.

AC CA forces return to home station

or reassigned in theater.

AC

CA

CACOM

CMO

PSRC

TTAD

USACAPOC

Active Component

Civil Affairs

Civil Affairs Command

Civil-Military Operations

Presidential Selected Reserve

Callup Authority

Temporary Tour of Active Duty

United States Army Civil Affairs

and Psychological Operations

Command
II-5

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

While they may be integral parts of both

MCA and CMO, they are not

synonymous with either.

•• CA activities refer to activities

performed or supported by CA that (1)

embrace the relationship between

military forces and civil authorities in

areas where military forces are present;

and (2) involve the application of CA

functional specialty skills in areas

normally the responsibility of civil

government to enhance conduct of CMO.

Use of dedicated CA and the conduct of

CA activities will enhance planned CMO

by helping to ensure civil or indigenous

understanding of, and compliance with,

controls, regulations, directives, or other

measures taken by commanders to

accomplish the military mission and

attain US objectives.

•• CA activities, however, are

distinguishable from CMO insofar as

the former are characterized by

applications of functional specialties in

areas normally the responsibility of

indigenous government or civil

authority. CA activities may extend to

assumption of governmental functions

required in an occupied territory during

or immediately subsequent to hostilities.

• Policies. The pattern and objectives of

CA activities in friendly, neutral, hostile,

or occupied countries in any given area

will correspond with applicable

international and domestic law and

depend on such variables as US foreign

policy, the requirements of the military

situation, participation of multinational

forces, and other factors. In general, CA

(individuals and units) are used to

implement US foreign policy and achieve

US objectives in the context of military

strategy and force capabilities. Specific

guidance as to policy, plans, procedures,

and doctrine to be followed in any given

country can be modified during the onset

of hostilities or after the outbreak of an

armed conflict as circumstances warrant.

In the absence of guidance, military

commanders take the initiative to request

guidance and be prepared to execute

command CA activities and support US

objectives.

•• Policy Flow. Because of the

POL-MIL nature and sensitivity of CA

activities undertaken by US

commanders, whether in a joint or

multinational context, their conduct is

governed by deliberate policy developed

and promulgated by the NCA. Policy

decisions are generally transmitted to

commanders through command

channels. Guidance for specific policies

concerning the degree of civil-military

interaction to be followed in any

operational area is transmitted from the

NCA through the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

•• US Commanders Serving as

Multinational Commanders. Policies

normally are developed by agreement

between member nations of a

multinational force and provided to

commanders through a council of

ministers or a similar policy making body

of which the United States is a

participant. Should multinational CMO

guidance be in conflict with international

law or specific national instructions,

commanders must immediately request

guidance through US channels.

•• Geographic Combatant Commanders.

Policies concerning the scope of CMO

and procedural guidance normally are

covered in an Executive Order or by a

policy directive originating within the

NSC. Commanders receive guidance

transmitted through the Secretary of

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Commanders provide
II-6

Chapter II

JP 3-57

guidance to subordinate commanders,

including specific instructions regarding

the exercise of authority for CA

activities. Commanders need to maintain

close liaison with US diplomatic

representatives abroad to ensure effective

coordination and delineation of CA

responsibilities and activities.

• Principles. Certain general principles

apply to all CA activities. They are the

basis for initial planning purposes in the

absence of specific guidance. These

principles are listed in Figure II-2 and

described below.

•• Mission. CA activities are conducted

in support of military operations to assist

commanders in fulfilling international

law obligations to civilians, or to further

the national and international policies of

the United States.

•• Command Responsibility.

Responsibility for the conduct of CA

activities, including civil administration

if directed by higher authority, is vested

in the senior military commander, guided

by directive, national policies, military

strategy, and international law, including

applicable agreements.

•• Continuity and Consistency of

Policy. Essential to the success of CA

activities, in light of their inherent

complexity and political sensitivity, is a

comprehensive and clear USG policy

transmitted through command channels.

•• Reciprocal Responsibilities. Under

Article 64 of the Geneva Convention

Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War, the commander

of an occupying force has the legal right

to require the inhabitants within an

Figure II-2. Principles of Civil Affairs Activities

PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Mission

Command Responsibility

Continuity and Consistency of Policy

Reciprocal Responsibilities

Economy of Personnel and Resources

Humanitarian Considerations

Mission

Command Responsibility

Continuity and Consistency of Policy

Reciprocal Responsibilities

Economy of Personnel and Resources

Humanitarian Considerations
II-7

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

operational area to comply with

directives necessary for the security of

the occupying force and proper

administration of a given area. In return,

the inhabitants have the right to freedom

from unnecessary interference with their

property and individual liberties.

•• Economy of Personnel and

Resources. The activities of CA should

be limited, where possible, to those

involving coordination, liaison, and

interface with existing or reestablished

civilian authorities. Maximum use of

local or indigenous resources should be

made consistent with satisfaction of

minimum essential civil requirements.

•• Humanitarian Considerations. The

use of force beyond that required to fulfill

the mission is prohibited. Military

commanders plan operations that strive

to ensure minimum suffering for

noncombatants, and comply with

approved rules of engagement (ROE),

and the LOAC.

• Assets

•• AC or RC CA are organized,

equipped, and trained to carry out specific

CA activities in support of CMO.

•• CA personnel assigned or attached to

geographic combatant commands.

•• Other AC and RC personnel

possessing functional specialty skills

applicable to CA activities across the

range of military operations.

•• Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,”

discusses CA assets in more detail.

This also includes CA assets that do

not belong to USSOCOM.

For further detail concerning Service

capabilities, refer to JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities. See JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine

for Mobilization Planning, for

information relating to mobilization and

demobilization.

• Support to Civil-Military Operations.

CA activities may range from

coordinating for the removal of civilians

from a combat zone, through efforts to

interface between US forces and

multinational forces and HN and other

governmental or nongovernmental

agencies, to the exercise of full military

control over an area or hostile

government or population. The variety

of CA activities to support the

requirements for CMO necessitates

flexibility in CA organization, planning,

and execution.

c. Psychological Operations. PSYOP are

operations planned to convey selected

information and indicators to foreign

audiences to influence their emotions,

motives, and objective reasoning and

ultimately the behavior of foreign

governments, organizations, groups, and

individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to

induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and

behavior favorable to the originator’s

objectives. The general objectives of joint

PSYOP are: reduce efficiency of opposing

forces; further US and/or multinational efforts

by modifying or influencing attitudes and

behavior of selected audiences; counter hostile

propaganda; facilitate reorganization and

control of occupied or liberated areas in

conjunction with CMO; obtain the

cooperation of allies or coalition partners and

neutrals in any PSYOP effort; and support and

enhance FHA, FID, and/or foreign nation

assistance military operations.

• Psychological Operations Activities

•• Strategic PSYOP. Strategic PSYOP

are conducted as part of international

public information activities as defined
II-8

Chapter II

JP 3-57

by PDD-68. This interagency effort is

designed to influence foreign attitudes,

perceptions, and behavior in favor of US

goals and objectives. These programs

are conducted predominantly outside the

military arena but can use DOD assets

and are supported by military PSYOP.

Military PSYOP with potential strategic

impact must be coordinated with national

efforts.

•• Operational PSYOP. Operational

PSYOP are conducted prior to and during

war or conflict, and at the conclusion of

open hostilities in a defined geographic

area to promote the effectiveness of the

area commander’s campaigns and

strategies.

•• Tactical PSYOP. Tactical PSYOP

are conducted in the area assigned to a

tactical commander during conflict and

war to support the tactical mission against

opposing forces.

•• Consolidation PSYOP. Consolidation

PSYOP are conducted in foreign areas

that are inhabited by an enemy or

potentially hostile populace and occupied

by US forces, or in which US forces are

based, to produce behaviors by the

foreign populace that support US

objectives in the area.

• Policies

•• Traditionally, DOD missions and

activities have been established in

Federal statute or, in the absence of

statutory authority, through the broad

constitutional powers of the President as

Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces. The President, using

constitutional and statutory authority,

may issue documents that provide

direction to the Executive Branch. Two

national security directives apply directly

to PSYOP. Additionally, the Department

of Defense promulgated a DODD

pertaining to the conduct of PSYOP.

•• Perfidy vs Ruse. The Hague and

Geneva Conventions prohibit treachery

and perfidy. Perfidy involves injuring

the enemy by using their adherence to

the LOAC. Perfidy degrades the

protections and mutual restraints

developed in the interest of all parties,

combatants, and civilians. Combatants

find it difficult to respect protected

Civil affairs personnel and other representatives discuss resettlement issues

during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
II-9

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

persons and objects if they believe or

suspect that their adversaries are abusing

the LOAC to gain a military advantage.

For example, the broadcasting to the

enemy that an armistice had been agreed

upon, when in fact no such agreement

exists, would be perfidy. In contrast,

ruses are acts that are intended to mislead

an adversary or to induce him to act

recklessly through some means other

than taking advantage of the enemy’s

adherence to the LOAC. The following

are examples of lawful ruses: the use

of camouflage, decoys, mock

operations, and misinformation and/or

disinformation. Bilateral defense treaties

may have agreements concerning the

conduct of PSYOP by the signatories.

Use of PSYOP also may be regulated

under status-of-forces agreements

(SOFAs). A current list of treaties and

other international agreements in force

is found in Department of State Pub 9433,

Treaties In Force.

• Assets. Each Military Service has the

inherent capability to support US foreign

policy objectives with organic assets for

production and/or dissemination of

PSYOP products. Planning guidance is

contained in the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System

(JOPES), and Service doctrine. Plans

should address the use of strategic,

operational, tactical, and consolidation

PSYOP as aspects of the overall strategy

for conducting the war.

For further detail concerning PSYOP

related activities and Service capabilities,

refer to Appendix A, “Service

Capabilities,” JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities, and JP 3-53, Doctrine for

Joint Psychological Operations.

• Support to Civil-Military Operations.

PSYOP can provide key support and

information when effectively integrated

into CMO. PSYOP can provide support

in the following areas.

•• Develop information for CA

concerning the location, state of mind,

and health of civilians and the physical

characteristics of the operational area.

A member of the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes a PSYOP

product to civilians in the city of Odzak, Bosnia to explain why American forces

are in Bosnia during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
II-10

Chapter II

JP 3-57

•• Disseminate information concerning

the safety and welfare of the civilian

population.

•• Influence a civilian population’s

attitude toward US policy and prepare it

for CA involvement in post conflict

activities.

•• Maximize CA efforts in the area of

FHA by exploiting the goodwill created

by US efforts in the area of health services

and veterinary aid, construction, and

public facilities activities.

•• During disaster-relief operations,

PSYOP may foster international support

for US host governments and may

coordinate publicity for US efforts.

•• Conduct assessments before and after

the operation to determine the most

effective application of effort and

document the results.

•• Provide direct support to CA units

conducting emergency relocation

operations of DCs and for operation of

the DC camps.

“Moreover, because of their special

capabilities, forward global presence,

regional orientation, language skills

and cultural awareness, traditional SOF

[special operations forces], civil affairs,

and PSYOP [psychological operations]

units offer an important capability for

facilitating the transition from

peacetime engagement to small-scale

contingencies to major theater war —

and back again.”

Defense Issues

Volume 12, Number 34

•• As a corollary, when conducted within

the framework of a viable CMO concept,

CA activities can contribute significantly

to the overall success of PSYOP activities

(deeds versus words).

d. Other Special Operations (SO)

Support. The principles by which SO are

planned and conducted apply equally to both

war and MOOTW. In war, SO can be

conducted during the preconflict, conflict and,

of increasing importance, post conflict phases

of the campaign. In MOOTW, the

overarching objective often is restoring

stability to a country or region. This can take

the form of FHA after a natural or manmade

disaster, taking care of fleeing refugees, or

some form of peace operation. Small SO units

generally accomplish these objectives

indirectly through operations that assist the

HN authorities, other governmental agencies,

NGO, international organizations, or

multinational partners in restoring peace,

strengthening the infrastructure of the country,

or providing disaster relief assistance. SOF

are regularly employed in mobile training

teams, joint and combined exercises,

professional development program seminars,

and other military-to-military activities that

are a vital part of theater engagement

strategies.

4. Engineering

Engineers have a critical role in CMO, since

military operations typically include the

engineer activities of nonmilitary

organizations as well as military forces. If

the experiences of the Gulf War, Somalia,

Haiti, Hurricane Andrew, and Bosnia are

repeated in future military operations,

engineer operations will include many DOD

civilians as well as the services of NGO,

international organizations, other USG

agencies, and contractors. The total engineer

force of military active and reserve, civilian,

contractor, HN and allies constitute the

primary resources commanders can draw

upon to accomplish the engineer mission.

a. Capabilities. Engineer units support

the JFC through combat engineering,

topographic engineering, and general

engineering, including construction. Each
II-11

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

Service has engineering units and capabilities

to meet specific operational needs. Within

Service limitation, US military engineer units

provide specialized capabilities as depicted in

Figure II-3. In addition, technical engineering

support and contract support are provided by

a variety of supporting organizations within

Service limitations. The HN may also have

certain engineering capabilities specifically

adapted to the local environment. Hired

contractors and multinational military

engineers in an immature theater also can

provide valuable capabilities that may not be

available in US engineer units. This mixture

of capabilities may change during phases of

the operation. Therefore, capabilities must

be managed across Service lines throughout

the course of an operation.

For further detail concerning Service

capabilities and other related engineer

activities, refer to Appendix A, “Service

Capabilities,” JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities, JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for

Joint Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine

for Civil Engineering Support.

b. Support to Civil-Military Operations.

Within a joint force, engineers may operate

with other governmental, nongovernmental,

and international agencies and organizations

participating in the operation. Given the

multitude of organizations and capabilities

involved, it is important that the joint force

engineer coordinate with these organizations

to ensure resources are focused on

accomplishing the mission. Establishing and

Figure II-3. Specialized Engineering Capabilities

SPECIALIZED ENGINEERING CAPABILITIES

Firefighting services

Well-drilling

Underwater construction

Construction and repair of airfields and ports

Maintenance of lines of communication

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (limited)

Environmental assessments

Erection of bare base facilities

Construction of fuels and water supply

Power generation

Facilities engineering and management

Real estate management

Waste Disposal

Firefighting services

Well-drilling

Underwater construction

Construction and repair of airfields and ports

Maintenance of lines of communications

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (limited)

Environmental assessments

Erection of bare base facilities

Construction of fuels and water supply

Power generation

Facilities engineering and management

Real estate management

Waste Disposal
II-12

Chapter II

JP 3-57

maintaining effective liaison with all

participating agencies is critical to achieving

unity of effort. The CMOC can be a focal

point within the joint force for coordination

with these agencies and organizations.

5. Health Service Support

The use of HSS resources has historically

proven to be a valuable low-risk asset in

support of CMO. HSS is generally a

noncontroversial and cost-effective means

of using the military element to support US

national interests in another country. The

focus of HSS initiatives, although possibly

targeted toward the health problems in the

operational area, is not normally curative, but

primarily long-term preventive and

developmental programs that are sustainable

by the HN. HSS operations conducted to

enhance the stability of a HN must be well

coordinated with all concerned agencies and

integrated into the respective US Embassy

plans. Independent, unplanned health service

civic action programs should not be

undertaken.

Refer to JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service

Support in Joint Operations, for more details

on HSS.

a. Health Service Support Activities.

HSS activities in support of CMO include

health services and dental treatment,

veterinarian and preventive medicine services,

health services logistics, and aeromedical

evacuation. However, consideration must

be given to the differences when planning for

CMO, for example, legal and policy issues

regarding the treatment of foreign civilians;

greater focus on preventive medicine and

prevention and treatment of diseases rather

than combat casualties, and significant patient

population differences, (e.g., normal military

population, pediatric, and relative health status

of the local population and environmental/

infrastructure conditions).

b. Policies. Based upon the HSS estimate

of the situation, and in coordination with the

component command surgeons, the joint force

surgeon must plan for health services policies

and procedures that can be best adapted to

the joint operation.

• Geographic combatant commanders are

ultimately accountable for coordinating

and integrating HSS within their theaters.

Medical intelligence can provide the

combatant commander an occupational

and environmental threat analysis to

Army water purification specialist fills a jug for a resident of La Libertad,

Honduras during Hurricane MITCH relief efforts.
II-13

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

ensure force health protection of the

deployed assets during CMO.

• Where practical, dual use of available

health services assets will be

accomplished to support CMO

requirements and military operations.

c. Assets. The Services have organic

health services support capabilities that can

be applied to CMO.

For further detail concerning Service

capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Service

Capabilities,” and JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities.

d. Support to Civil-Military Operations

• There are several HSS activities

appropriate during CMO as illustrated in

Figure II-4. In addition, all HSS activities

listed in the JP 4-02 series should be

considered.

• HSS activities enhance HN stability by:

•• Developing HSS programs tailored

for the HN; (e.g., appropriate and

affordable).

•• Developing sustainable training and

acquisition programs.

•• Increasing the effectiveness of other

USG agency programs such as USAID

and United States Information Agency.

•• Recommending and coordinating

health services education opportunities

for HN personnel.

• Improving the economic well-being

through veterinary medicine and animal

husbandry.

6. Transportation

There are many types of transportation

resources available to the JFC that are used,

activated, and augmented across the range of

military operations. These military and

commercial resources include airlift, sealift,

land surface transportation, overseas

resources (including vehicles), port

operations, pre-positioning programs, and

intermodal resources. The Commander in

Chief, US Transportation Command

(USCINCTRANS) is assigned the mission to

provide common-user air, land, and sea

transportation for the Department of Defense,

A corpsman examines the wounds of a Haitian man during

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.
II-14

Chapter II

JP 3-57

both in times of peace and in times of war. In

this capacity, except for those assets that are

Service-unique or theater-assigned, or HN

transportation support assets the JTF or

geographic combatant commander has

negotiated, USCINCTRANS exercises

COCOM of the strategic transportation assets

of the Military Departments and is the DOD

Single Manager for Transportation.

USCINCTRANS aligns traffic management

and transportation single manager

responsibilities to achieve optimum

responsiveness, effectiveness, and economy

for the supported combatant commander.

Geographic combatant commanders who

have transportation assets assigned to their

commands should ensure the assets are

managed, controlled, and capable of full

integration into the Defense Transportation

System (DTS). Security of transportation

assets at forward locations is a JFC

responsibility.

For further information on the DTS, refer to

JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense

Transportation System.

a. Transportation Activities. Transportation

organizations plan, coordinate, conduct,

monitor, and control inter- and intratheater

movement of personnel and materiel.

b. Policies. The Military Departments

retain the responsibility for organizing,

training, equipping, and providing the logistic

support (including Service-unique

transportation) of their respective forces.

These forces and other Defense agencies

also depend on common-user military

transportation services. In this role, the Army,

Figure II-4. Health Service Support Activities in Civil-Military Operations

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES IN

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

Public health activities, to include preventive medicine

and veterinary care, food sanitation, water quality

monitoring, sanitary facility evaluations, immunizations of

humans and animals, pediatric medical support, and

resuscitation and stabilization of acute illness and injuries

Diagnostic and treatment training

Development of health service support (HSS) logistic

programs

Development of continuing HSS education programs

Development of HSS medical intelligence and threat

analysis

Development of a host nation military field HSS support

system for treatment and evacuation

Assistance in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying logistic

support of existing HSS facilities

Public health activities, to include preventive medicine

and veterinary care, food sanitation, water quality

monitoring, sanitary facility evaluations, immunizations of

humans and animals, pediatric medical support, and

resuscitation and stabilization of acute illness and injuries

Diagnostic and treatment training

Development of health service support (HSS) logistic

programs

Development of continuing HSS education programs

Development of HSS medical intelligence and threat

analysis

Development of a host nation military field HSS support

system for treatment and evacuation

Assistance in the upgrade, staffing, and supplying logistic

support of existing HSS facilities
II-15

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

Navy, Coast Guard, Air Force, Marine Corps,

Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense

agencies are all generically called shipper

services. Each Service is responsible for

establishing transportation policy for the

movement of equipment and supplies funded

by the applicable shipper service and for

administrative support and performance of

transportation operations assigned by

combatant commanders at either their local

shipping installations or throughout the

theater.

c. Assets. The JFC conducting CMO has

available the transportation structure organic

to the components of the joint force as well as

support provided by US Transportation

Command (USTRANSCOM). Organic

transportation varies with force composition

but typically will include trucks, helicopters,

and possibly watercraft.

For further detail concerning Service

transportation assets and capabilities, refer

to Appendix A, “Service Capabilities,” and

JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

In the aftermath of Hurricane MITCH, the devastated nations of Central America

requested helicopter support to distribute relief supplies as well as conduct

search and rescue operations in areas that had been cut off by land slides,

road washouts, and bridge damage. As USSOUTHCOM [US Southern

Command] planners executed Operation FUERTES APOYO, a strictly civilmilitary operation; helicopter units were the first to deploy, and were followed

by engineer and bridging units. The ability of helicopters to access remote

areas was critical during the emergency phase of the operation, when the

priority of effort was to save lives. Later, during rehabilitation and restoration

phases, as roads were cleared and bridges repaired, helicopters redeployed

as less expensive ground transportation could again be utilized.

SOURCE: United States Southern Command — Hurricane MITCH 1998

US Army CH-47 helicopter delivers supplies to villagers of Casamacoa,

Honduras during Hurricane MITCH relief operations.
II-16

Chapter II

JP 3-57

d. Support to Civil-Military Operations.

Military transportation organizations can be

invaluable in certain types of CMO. These

units can be used to distribute food, water,

and health services supplies; conduct health

services evacuation; and move refugees to a

safe environment. Additionally, some of these

organizations have the technical expertise to

assist in restoration of civilian transportation

infrastructure. The versatility of military

transportation assets (air, sea, and land) allows

the JFC to select the mode of transportation

most appropriate for the situation.

7. Military Police and/or

Security Police Forces

MP and/or security police (SP) have the

requisite training, experience, and equipment

to perform CMO activities. Aside from having

firepower, mobility, and communications

necessary to conduct combat support

operations, MP and/or SP also have a wealth

of experience in exercising authority in tense

circumstances without escalating the tension.

Their signature as a police force, rather than a

combat force, often defuses tension between

the joint force and the parties in conflict.

a. Military Police and/or Security Police

Forces Activities. MP and/or SP activities

include a wide range of specialized and routine

operations in support of the joint force.

Typical activities are shown in Figure II-5.

b. Policies. Commanders must have a clear

understanding of the legal basis and limits

pertaining to employment of MP and/or SP

and law enforcement activities in a foreign

country. They must also provide appropriate

direction to subordinate commanders.

c. Assets. The Services are organized with

a variety of MP and/or SP organizations

providing the joint force with significant

capabilities.

For further detail on Service MP and/or SP

capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Service

Capabilities,” and JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities.

Figure II-5. Military Police and/or Security Forces Activities

MILITARY POLICE AND/OR

SECURITY FORCES ACTIVITIES

Convoy defense

Patrolling and manning checkpoints

Reaction force

Liaison to civilian police forces

Investigations of criminal activity

Handling, processing, safeguarding, and accounting

for hostile individuals

Physical security and preservation of order

Dislocated civilian processing

Populace and resource control

Force protection

Convoy defense

Patrolling and manning checkpoints

Reaction force

Liaison to civilian police forces

Investigations of criminal activity

Handling, processing, safeguarding, and accounting

for hostile individuals

Physical security and preservation of order

Dislocated civilian processing

Populace and resource control

Force protection
II-17

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

d. Support to Civil-Military Operations.

MP and/or SP force structure and training are

well suited for CMO roles. MP and/or SP

can perform or assist in functions that include

staffing checkpoints, liaison with police

forces, traffic control, enemy prisoners of war

(EPWs) and dislocated civilian camps, and

force protection operations.

• Commanders must exercise caution not

to create an unintended impression on the

civilian population that US forces,

particularly MP and/or SP, are exceeding

their legal and moral limits in conducting

police activities. Frequent consultation

between the Ambassador, joint force

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), provost

marshal, CA representatives and

appropriate Federal agencies, HN, and

NGO representatives can prevent

misunderstandings and enhance

cooperation in conducting MP and/or SP

activities.

• Training and support of foreign police

forces is tightly governed by statutory

regulations. This includes restrictions on

funding sources for support of training

of foreign police forces. Commanders

must ensure that they have a clear

understanding of these restrictions when

planning CMO that include training and/

or reestablishing the police force of a

foreign nation.

8. Organizing for Civil-Military

Operations

a. Joint Task Force

• In most scenarios, JTFs will conduct

CMO.

• Commanders, joint task force (CJTFs)

may establish JCMOTFs or JSOTFs

when the scope of CMO in the JOA

requires coordination and activities

beyond that which other representation

on the staff could accomplish.

• Figure II-6 illustrates possible JTF

subordinates.

For further JTF guidance, refer to JP 0-2,

Unified Action Armed Forces(UNAAF),

and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning

Guidance and Procedures.

b. Joint Civil-Military Operations Task

Force. A JCMOTF is a means for a JFC to

plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in support

of his assigned mission.

• A JCMOTF is composed of units from

more than one Military Department or

US agency and is formed to carry out

CMO in support of a theater campaign

or other operations. Although the

During Operation SUPPORT HOPE, supplies and

equipment are off-loaded from a C-5 Galaxy to

support relief operations.
II-18

Chapter II

JP 3-57

JCMOTF is not a CA organization, there

may be a requirement for strong

representation of CA-trained personnel.

Because of their expertise in dealing with

NGO, international organizations, and

other governmental agencies, they will

greatly enhance the opportunity for

success. The JCMOTF may be

established to carry out missions of

limited or extended duration involving

military forces’ interface with civilian

populations, resources, or agencies and

military forces’ coordination with other

government agencies, multinational and

affected country forces, UN agencies,

NGOs, and international organizations.

The JFC designates the JCMOTF

commander.

•• The JCMOTF may be developed to

meet a specific CMO contingency

mission or support humanitarian or

nation assistance operations, a theater

campaign of limited duration, or a longer

duration CMO concurrent with or

subsequent to regional or general

conflict, depending on NCA or theater

guidance.

•• Figure II-7 depicts some of the

possible responsibilities of the JCMOTF.

Figure II-6. Possible Joint Task Force Subordinates

AFFOR Air Force forces

ARFOR Army Forces

MARFOR Marine Corps

forces

NAVFOR Navy forces

JOINT TASK FORCE

COMMANDER

POSSIBLE JOINT TASK FORCE SUBORDINATES

ARMY

COMPONENT

(ARFOR)

AIR FORCE

COMPONENT

(AFFOR)

NAVY

COMPONENT

(NAVFOR)

MARINE CORPS

COMPONENT

(MARFOR)

JOINT FORCE SPECIAL

OPERATIONS

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE

MARITIME

COMPONENT

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS TASK

FORCE

JOINT FORCE

LAND

COMPONENT

JOINT FORCE

AIR

COMPONENT

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY

OPERATIONS TASK

FORCE

Notes:

1. A joint force always contains Service components (because of

administrative and logistic support and training responsibilities).

2. A joint force composition can be a mixture of the above. (Navy

and Marine Corps forces alone will not constitute a joint force).

3. There also may be a Coast Guard component in a joint force.
II-19

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

Figure II-7. Possible Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force Responsibilities

POSSIBLE JOINT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

TASK FORCE RESPONSIBILITIES

Advising

Providing

Assisting

Performing

Assisting

Planning

Allocating

Advising

Assessing

Establishing

the commander, joint task force (CJTF) on policy, funding;

multinational, foreign, or host nation (HN) sensitivities; and their effect

on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions

command and control or direction of military HN advisory,

assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by US joint

forces

in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civil links

for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements

essential coordination or liaison with HN agencies, Country

Team, United Nations agencies, and deployed US, multinational, and HN

military forces and supporting logistics organizations

in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to

publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects,

to build civil acceptance and support of US operations, and to promote

indigenous capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social

development

and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations

training exercises

resources and sustaining and coordinating combat support

or combat service support elements, including necessary medical,

transportation, military police, engineer, and associated maintenance

and communications capabilities

and assisting in strengthening or stabilizing civil

infrastructures and services and otherwise facilitating transition to

peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to

other United States Government (USG) agencies, international

organizations, or HN responsibility

or identifying HN civil support, relief, or funding

requirements to the CJTF for transmission to supporting commanders,

Military Services, or other responsible USG agencies

combat identification standing operating procedures and

other directives based on CJTF guidance
II-20

Chapter II

JP 3-57

• JCMOTF Staff Organization. Figure

II-8 depicts a notional JCMOTF.

•• The composition of this organization

should be representative of the forces

comprising the JCMOTF. A JCMOTF

may have both conventional and SO

forces assigned or attached to support the

conduct of specific missions.

•• A JCMOTF normally is a US joint

force organization, similar in

organization to a JSOTF or JTF and is

flexible in size and composition,

depending on mission circumstances. It

normally is subordinate to a JTF.

•• In rare instances, a JCMOTF could

be formed as a standing organization,

depending on NCA or theater guidance

and resource availability.

•• A JCMOTF can be formed in theater,

in the CONUS, or in both locations,

depending on scope, duration, or

sensitivity of the CMO requirement and

associated policy considerations.

• Advantages of a JCMOTF

•• Consolidated and coordinated CMO

•• Unity of command and effort

•• Allows the JFC to focus on

warfighting while the JCMOTF focuses

on CMO and transition

• Disadvantages of a JCMOTF

•• Lack of synchronization between the

joint force and JCMOTF commanders

•• Duplication of effort (if JTF is

established to conduct CMO mission)

•• Increased force (personnel and

logistic) requirements

c. Joint Special Operations Task Force

• At the recommendation of the theater

special operations command (SOC)

commander, the JFC may establish a

JSOTF. A JSOTF is a JTF composed of

A member of the 568th Security Squadron briefs convoy personnel

during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
II-21

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

Figure II-8. Notional Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

NOTIONAL JOINT CIVIL MILITARY

OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

DCJCMOTF Senior Enlisted

Advisor

COMJCMOTF

Personal Staff

Surgeon J-1 Engineer

Inspector General J-4 Aviation

Chaplain J-2 Medical

J-5

Public Affairs

Officer

J-3 Communications

Provost Marshal

Staff Judge

Comptroller

Transportation

Military Intelligence

Military Police/

Security Forces

Special Operations Forces

Services and Supply

Maintenance

J-6

Chief of Staff

CMOC*

Possible JCMOTF

Units

Nonmilitary

Agencies

CMOC

COMJCMOTF

DCJCMOTF

J-1

J-2

J-3

J-4

J-5

J-6

JCMOTF

Civil-Military Operations Center

Commander, Joint Civil-Military

Operations Task Force

Deputy Commander, Joint Civil-Military

Operations Task Force

Manpower and Personnel Directorate

of a Joint Staff

Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff

Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff

Logistics Directorate of a Joint Staff

Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff

Command, Control, Communications,

and Computer Systems Directorate of a

Joint Staff

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Coordination

*CMOC is shown for illustrative purposes. The joint force commander determines the staff

relationship
II-22

Chapter II

JP 3-57

KEY TERM

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

A joint task force composed of special operations units

from more than one Service

Formed to carry out a specific special operation or

prosecute special operations in support of a theater

campaign or other operations

May have conventional nonspecial operations units

assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific

missions

special operations units from more than

one Service, formed to carry out a

specific special operation or prosecute

special operations in support of a theater

campaign or other operations.

Establishment of a JSOTF is appropriate

when SOF C2 requirements exceed the

capabilities of the theater SOC staff. A

JSOTF normally is formed around

elements from the theater SOC or an

existing SOF unit with augmentation

from other Service SOF. A JSOTF may

be established and deployed as a

complete package from outside the

theater. The theater SOC commander

may form a JSOTF and then pass tactical

control to a Service or functional

component requiring SOF support.

When a JSOTF is formed and augmented

by one or more foreign units, the

designation becomes a combined JSOTF.

• The JSOTF commander will control

assigned SOF as well as any

conventional forces provided by the JFC

in support of specific missions. Figure

II-9 depicts possible JSOTF commander

responsibilities.

See JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Joint Special

Operations Task Force Operations, for

related matters concerning JSOTFs.
II-23

Organization and Command Relationships for Civil-Military Operations

Figure II-9. Possible Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander Responsibilities

POSSIBLE JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK

FORCE COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Advising

Planning

Issuing

Analyzing

Coordinating

Evaluating

Focusing

Synchronizing

Establishing

Functioning

the joint force commander (JFC) on the proper employment

of special operations forces (SOF) and assets

and coordinating special operations (SO) and employing

designated SOF in support of the JFC's concept of operations

planning guidance

various courses of action

the conduct of SO with the other joint task force

component commanders and subordinate task forces

the results of SO

on operational-level functions and their span of control

sustainment for SOF

combat identification standing operating procedures

and other directives based on JFC guidance

as a supported and supporting commander, as directed

by the JFC
II-24

Chapter II

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER III

PLANNING CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

III-1

SECTION A. BASIC

PLANNING

1. General

It is important that CMO plans and

considerations be incorporated into the crisis

action and deliberate planning processes. It

is the responsibility of combatant

commanders to plan and conduct CMO.

CMO contribute to shaping the battlespace

and supporting the combatant

commander’s TEP. In certain situations,

CMO planning enhances the transition to

civilian control from the outset of an

operation.

a. Planning

• Planning and coordination of CMO

facilitates mission accomplishment.

CMO planning is based on national

policy and reflects a variety of legal

obligations such as the provisions of the

US Constitution, statutory law, judicial

decisions, Presidential directives,

departmental regulations, and the rules

and principles of international law,

especially those incorporated in treaties

and agreements applicable to areas where

US forces are employed.

• CMO must be a part of an overall national

strategy or in the case of some complex

contingency operations, a POL-MIL

plan. This is formulated and managed at

the interagency level and cascades into

theater or regional plans and operations.

“The goal should be to assist in developing the capability of the nation to

provide effective government administration and services so that the

democracy, the economy, and the health of the people can flourish.”

Colonel W.W. Mendel and Colonel S.K. Stewman

Planning for Haiti

Maintaining routine access and dialogue

with Department of State (DOS)

representatives, senior leaders, and the

interagency community is critical.

“There is a trade-off between limiting

the personnel involved in the planning

process and operational security.

Limiting access to the plan increases

operational security and is frequently

necessary. However, limiting access

to the plan makes it very difficult to

involve the non-government and other

agencies with significant roles. This

trade-off will have a significant impact

on planning and execution. Planners

must assess constantly the timing for

bringing other organizations into the

planning process. Frequently this

process can be expedited by preparing

a sanitized briefing that can be more

widely distributed.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Joint After Action Report (JAAR)

b. Deployment, Employment, and

Redeployment Planning

• Selection of forces to perform CMO in

support of an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or

operation order (OPORD) should be

based on a clear concept of CMO mission

requirements. JOPES integrates all

elements of deliberate or crisis action

CMO planning, and identifies,

resources, and phases CMO required

forces.

• General planning considerations are

shown in Figure III-1.
III-2

Chapter III

JP 3-57

For further detail concerning planning,

refer to JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and

Redeployment Operations, JP 5-0,

Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,

JP 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning,

and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning

Guidance and Procedures.

c. Military Operations Other Than War.

Plans for MOOTW are prepared in a similar

manner as plans for war. The mission analysis

and command estimate process is as critical

in planning for MOOTW as they are in

planning for war. Of particular importance

in the planning process for MOOTW is the

development of a clear definition,

understanding, and appreciation of all

potential threats. Oftentimes, the threats may

be unique and disproportional or have the

appearance of being asymmetrical to the US

operations being conducted. For this reason,

efforts should be made to include an

intelligence element in the first deployment

package. Although the possibility of combat

may be remote in many types of MOOTW,

commanders should always plan to have

the right mix of forces available to quickly

transition to combat operations or

evacuations. Additionally, when conducting

noncombat operations, commanders must

consider the feasibility and means of

redeployment, possibly to another theater, to

conduct other operations.

• Plans for MOOTW may be joint,

multinational, or single-Service.

• CMO as part of MOOTW is discussed

in Annex G, “Civil Affairs.” Annexes

to plans and orders should, as a minimum,

consider the items listed in Figure III-2.

For further detail concerning MOOTW,

refer to JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for

Military Operations Other Than War.

d. War. Greater authority for CMO

should be reflected in the planning

assumptions. Certain areas may be

Figure III-1. Civil-Military Operations General Planning Considerations

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Administrative, logistic, and communications support

requirements of civil-military operations (CMO) forces

The need for early deployment and employment of

CMO forces

The coordination between CMO requirements and

plans and strategies

The coordination of CMO requirements with other

appropriate staff functions and non-Department of

Defense agencies
III-3

Planning Civil-Military Operations

devastated and lack self-sufficiency in

facilities, services, and personnel as a result

of hostilities. US and multinational forces

may be required to distribute emergency food,

clothing, shelter, and health services supplies

to civilians. At the same time, identification

of CMO requirements derived from analysis

of both current operational and conflict

termination or consolidation missions may

entail any combination of the planning

considerations identified above for

contingencies or crisis-response operations.

e. Conflict Termination or

Consolidation Considerations. Planning

considerations concerning use of CMO forces

include, but are not limited to, the following.

• The post conflict mission objectives.

• The need for and roles of integrated

military-civilian organizational and

oversight elements or agencies.

Figure III-2. Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations for

Military Operations Other Than War

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Extent of US military involvement and role of US

Government agencies in civil-military operations (CMO)

Liaison requirements with other Department of Defense

elements; US Government agencies, including the Country

Team; multinational forces; host-nation government

officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian

organizations; and international public and private groups

Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve

Component forces availability

Procedures for transition, continuation, or termination of

CMO relevant functions of other agencies, as directed or

required

Identification of, and relations with, friendly and hostile

personalities and groups

Security and hostile force disarmament requirements in

uncertain environments

Organization and degree of effectiveness of the hostnation government, the condition of the economy, the

nature of cultural and social institutions, and the prevailing

perceptions and attitudes of the population

Extent of US military involvement and role of US

Government agencies in civil-military operations (CMO)

Liaison requirements with other Department of Defense

elements; US Government agencies, including the Country

Team; multinational forces; host-nation government

officials; other foreign government officials; other civilian

organizations; and international public and private groups

Additional lead time normally necessary for Reserve

Component forces availability

Procedures for transition, continuation, or termination of

CMO relevant functions of other agencies, as directed or

required

Identification of, and relations with, friendly and hostile

personalities and groups

Security and hostile force disarmament requirements in

uncertain environments

Organization and degree of effectiveness of the hostnation government, the condition of the economy, the

nature of cultural and social institutions, and the prevailing

perceptions and attitudes of the population
III-4

Chapter III

JP 3-57

• The extent of devastation and the

potential of the defeated country to regain

its place in the family of nations.

• The complexity and duration of stability

and reconstitution assistance efforts often

require counteracting local violence and

mobilizing indigenous resources toward

self-sufficiency.

• The availability of indigenous leaders

and civil servants.

• The desires and objectives of other

governments.

• The degree of US domestic political

support to involve US military forces in

nation assistance activities, regardless of

identified needs.

• The use of the US military in rescuing

failed states.

“We expected things to be bad, but we

couldn’t believe how bad it really was.

The combination of corruption,

lawlessness, and neglect created an

economic decline that had been

exacerbated by the economic embargo

imposed on the military dictatorship.

Institutions and infrastructure were for

the most part non-existent. All that was

holding the country together was fear

of the Fad’H [Forces Armee d’ Haiti]

which, once deposed, was impotent

and ignored by the Haitian people.

Under these and similar circumstances,

the operational concept under which

military forces provide needed

functions and gradually turn them over

to civilians (assistance groups or local

nationals) needs to be fleshed out.”

Interagency and Political-Military

Dimensions of Peace Operations:

HAITI — A Case Study

National Defense University

f. Joint Universal Lessons Learned

System. Planners should review CMO

lessons learned from previous operations and

exercises. In turn, upon completion of

operations, it is the responsibility of the

command to ensure lessons learned are

appropriately recorded for future use by other

joint forces.

2. Planning Factors and

Constraints

Some operational and environmental

factors that may complicate the US military’s

relationships with foreign civilians and

constrain the conduct of CMO include, but

are not limited to, the following.

a. Differing legal institutions, customs,

social relationships, economic organizations,

and concepts of fundamental rights.

b. Public communications media

controlled, censored, or considered

inconsistent with US standards.

c. Universal public education considered

undesirable for economic or cultural reasons

such as poverty, religion, race, or caste.

d. Ownership of land or other forms of

wealth-producing property.

e. Religious, cultural, and legal practices.

f. Lack of adequate education or resistance

by affected groups that results in poor health

and sanitation or inefficient agricultural or

industrial practices.

g. Effects of labor, procurement, or

contracting commodities upon the population,

economy, and governmental services.

h. Dislocation of civilian populations and

damage to facilities and infrastructure

requiring military assistance, especially in

areas of public health, DC care and control,

civilian supply, public safety, and

humanitarian relief.
III-5

Planning Civil-Military Operations

i. Humanitarian motives prompting US

personnel to furnish relief or assistance that

may conflict with local law, religion, or

cultural standards.

j. Availability of US and HN civil

communications resources to support CMO

when competed for by information news

agencies.

3. Interagency Coordination

“The most practical mechanism for

ensuring that some coherent strategic

design and planning does take place

is the system of civil military operations

centers (CMOCs), developed to

establish and maintain operational

contact among the military and

humanitarian participants in a complex

operation. While the CMOC system

was not intended for the purposes of

strategic design, its operational

usefulness is clear to most of the

humanitarian agencies, a usefulness

which could advance the notion of joint

planning. Perhaps the most important

effort that commanders could make to

encourage the coordination of strategy

and its execution would be to include a

few representatives of the major

humanitarian agencies in their

operations planning process. It is here

that some degree of coherent

interagency coordination might take

place. Commanders do not have the

authority, expertise, or resources to

correct the dysfunctional organizational

response structure, but they can make

an effort to contribute in a modest way

to its solution through the CMOC and

their own operations planning process.”

Andrew S. Natsios

Commander’s Guidance: A

Challenge of Complex

Humanitarian Emergencies

DOS officials and chiefs of diplomatic

missions, depending on policy guidance and

the operational environment, have a primary

or collateral interest in CMO or requirements

entailing coordination with HN government

officials. CMO annexes or portions of plans

and orders should clearly delineate

responsibilities, constraints, and limitations in

light of other agencies’ established parameters

and emphasize the importance of

coordinating CMO concerns and intent.

a. The nature of CMO requires focusing

on sociological, economic, and political

factors, as well as military mission

requirements, in foreign or HN areas where

US military forces are present. It also may

entail research, surveys, planning, and

coordination of both DOD and non-DOD

organizations and agencies.

b. Other governmental elements,

international organizations, NGOs, religious

organizations, commercial interests, and

private institutions may be working toward

common or associated objectives, or even

divergent or conflicted objectives, especially

during conditions other than war and periods

immediately after cessation of hostilities.

Close coordination and cooperation with

these groups may reduce costs, prevent

duplication, lessen the friction of potential

rivalry, and improve results. This is as true

in MCA that originate from USG country

plans as in humanitarian or disaster relief

contingency or crisis-response operations.

Such activities usually entail sensitivities,

political consensus, central funding,

authorization to use indicated resources, and

joint participation with non-DOD, HN,

NGOs, and international organizations.

c. The nature of CMO require that the

military interface military command, control,

communications, computers, and intelligence

(C4I) systems with the intra- and interagency

hierarchies, which network with US and HN

commercial networks to augment DOD

communications that are supporting CMO.

CMO requires detailed planning to support

information exchange between the joint force

and other USG agencies, HN authorities, and

NGOs or international organizations operating
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JP 3-57

in the JOA. This will include both voice and

data traffic, and will include the ability to

support “reachback” to functional experts and

agencies not deployed to the JOA.

d. The Country Team is a forum for

planning and control and a means of

generating the close cooperation and liaison

essential for unity, cohesion, and effectiveness

of effort.

Interagency coordination is discussed in

greater detail in Chapter IV, “Interagency

Coordination.”

4. Oversight of CMO Planning

and Activities

To establish centralized direction and staff

cognizance over planning, coordinating, and

conducting CMO, the JFC should establish a

distinct CA staff element on his staff, not

create a new CMO staff section. The complex

nature and importance of CMO normally

require the direction and oversight of a fulltime staff (typically CA elements) whose

concerns include, but are not limited to, the

following:

a. Helping formulate recommendations

for CMO policy and implementing measures

to gain or maintain civil or indigenous support

of US forces employed.

b. Coordinating support for the

Country Team and other USG agencies and

organizations involved in planning and

interfacing with the HN for support to CMO.

c. Ensuring that CMO related data are

included in Annex A, “Civil Affairs” (or in

a separate CMO annex) of plans and orders.

See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System Vol II:

(Planning Formats and Guidance), for further

guidance on developing plans and orders.

d. Preparing CMO estimates and

assessments of the impact of military

operations on the civilian environment; also,

planning and conducting surveys as a basis

for these assessments.

e. Identifying appropriate priority

information requirements in support of

CMO into command intelligence programs.

f. Coordinating with legal and other

appropriate staff officers to assist in ensuring

compliance with legal requirements, funding

authorities, and including existing SOFA or

other international agreements that may be in

effect; identifying and recording information

associated with injury, death, or damage to

property to facilitate the payment of

compensable claims; and identifying areas of

environmental contamination for future

remediation.

g. Developing recommendations

regarding the FID needs of HNs.

h. Planning and coordinating civil

information activities in conjunction with

PA, PSYOP, and other appropriate staff

officers, to advance community relations and

international information programs

supporting regional and US objectives.

i. Identifying CMO requirements and

resources to support USG and military

contingency and crisis-response operations

and civil administration programs, as required.

j. Assisting in developing and coordinating

appropriate CMO support to humanitarian

or disaster relief and SA programs,

consistent with US policy and mission

requirements.

k. Arranging for the provision of mobile

CMO survey and instructional teams to

support command and US SA missions.
III-7

Planning Civil-Military Operations

programs, the DOD, in coordination with

DOS, has developed supplemental

guidelines for use by military

commanders and security assistance

organizations. These guidelines are

intended to be helpful in scrutinizing

candidates for records of human rights

abuses, drug trafficking, corruption,

criminal activity, and other activities

inconsistent with US foreign policy

goals.

l. Determining specific CMO assets

required to support subordinate joint and

theater Service component headquarters and

forces.

m. Coordinating with theaterapportioned forces to schedule their

participation in exercises, operations, and

overseas deployment in support of CMO.

5. Environmental

Considerations

“Protecting the environment has

become steadily more important during

the past several decades. The

international community is increasingly

vigilant in its oversight of the

environmental consequences of

military operations. JAs [Judge

Advocates] must ensure that leaders

are both cognizant of the rules and the

importance of complying with these

rules. Failure to comply with

environmental law can jeopardize

current and future operations, generate

domestic and international criticism,

produce costly litigation, and even

result in personal liability of both the

leader and the individual soldier.”

Operational Law Handbook

a. CMO should be conducted with

appropriate consideration of the environment

in accordance with international treaties and

other international agreements and applicable

US policies and regulations. Early planning

• Mobile survey and instructional teams

are coordinated through the Security

Assistance Office of the combatant

command and other major commands.

International military education and

training (IMET) funds, under certain

conditions, can fund survey teams. For

example, in the US Southern Command’s

AOR, IMET funds are used by the

Defense Institute of International Legal

Studies (DIILS), to conduct a threephased program.

•• During Phase I, a legal team conducts

an in-country survey to validate the need

and nature of training.

•• During Phase II, HN representatives

travel to DIILS to finalize training to be

conducted.

•• During Phase III, education is

provided in country, preferably utilizing

the “train-the-trainer” method.

• Another vehicle for arranging mobile

CMO survey or instructional teams is the

foreign military sales (FMS) program.

FMS can be financed using Foreign

Military Financing, a US program of

funding, or the HN can pay for it. If

Foreign Military Financing or IMET

funds are requested, the DOS determines

if US funds will be disbursed. Combatant

commanders recommend use of funds to

the Defense Security Cooperation

Agency, which in turn requests

authorization for funding from the State

Department.

• Finally, whichever funding source is

utilized, whenever US forces train

foreign military forces, all foreign

military members receiving training must

be vetted for human rights violations. To

help facilitate the screening and selection

process for US-sponsored training
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JP 3-57

is essential to ensure all appropriate

environmental reviews have been completed

prior to initiating operations.

b. The SJA must advise the JFC regarding

environmental law issues and be prepared to

train the force in the applicable environmental

issues.

6. Operational Considerations

a. Force Protection. Force protection is

the security program designed to protect

Service members, civilian employees, family

members, facilities, information, and

equipment, in all locations and situations,

accomplished through planned and integrated

application of combatting terrorism, physical

security, operations security (OPSEC),

personal protective services, and supported by

counterintelligence and other security

programs.

“Force protection in Operation

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY encompassed

both protection against potentially

hostile forces and measures necessary

to prevent casualties from health and

sanitation problems. The MNF

[multinational force] commander

maximized his efforts to ensure the

protection of US personnel from both

internal and external threats. Clear

ROE [rules of engagement], fully

understood by all JTF [joint task

force] personnel, were essential to

effective and successful force

protection.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY:

US Forces In Haiti

b. Physical security measures deter, detect,

and defend against threats from terrorists,

criminals, and unconventional forces.

Measures include fencing and perimeter

stand-off space, lighting and sensors, vehicle

barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection

systems and electronic surveillance, and

access control devices and systems. Physical

security measures, like any defense, should

be overlapping and deployed in depth.

c. Effective OPSEC measures minimize

the “signature” of joint force activities, avoid

set patterns, and employ deception when

patterns cannot be altered. Although strategic

OPSEC measures are important, the most

effective methods manifest themselves at the

lowest level. Commanders discourage

terrorist activity by varying patrol routes,

staffing guard posts and towers at irregular

intervals, and conducting vehicle and

personnel searches and identification checks

on a set but unpredictable pattern.

d. Personnel security measures range from

general measures of antiterrorism to

specialized personal protective services. They

include common-sense rules of on- and offduty conduct, use of protective clothing and

equipment, use of hardened vehicles and

facilities, employment of dedicated guard

forces, and use of duress alarms.

e. JFCs and their subordinate commanders

must address force protection during all

phases of deliberate and crisis action planning.

All aspects of force protection must be

considered and threats minimized to ensure

maximum operational success. JFCs and

their subordinate commanders must

implement force protection measures

appropriate to anticipated threats based on

threat and vulnerability assessments. They

should then complete a risk assessment with

the information obtained, measured against

mission requirements.

f. Supported and supporting combatant

commanders must ensure that deploying

forces receive thorough briefings concerning

the threat and personnel protection

requirements prior to and upon arrival in the

theater.
III-9

Planning Civil-Military Operations

g. JFCs and their subordinate commanders

must evaluate the deployment of forces and

each COA for the impact of terrorist

organizations supporting the threat and those

not directly supporting the threat, but seeking

to take advantage of the situation.

h. In addition to force protection, the joint

force also may provide security for other

personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in

the mission, the extent of this security should

be addressed in the ROE, to include protection

of:

• USG, NGOs, and international

organizations personnel and equipment;

• Affected country personnel and assets;

• Relief convoys, supplies, and main

supply routes;

• Relief distribution centers;

• Stocks of supplies; and

• Ports and airfields.

i. Regardless of the environment, security

must be factored into force requirements

and support capability.

For further guidance on force protection and

related matters, refer to JP 3-0, Doctrine for

Joint Operations, JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism,

JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations

Security, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff (CJCS) Handbook 5260, Commander’s

Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.

7. Measures of Effectiveness

a. MOE may assist commanders, agency

officials, and local authorities to gauge the

progress of the mission. The key question is

whether the military is doing what it is

expected to do in terms of the mission and

situation. MOE focus on whether military

efforts achieve the desired result of the

specific mission assigned to the force. MOE

provide commanders and higher authorities a

means to evaluate the contribution of

military efforts to the more encompassing

and overarching desired end state. More

importantly, MOE provide a baseline of

indicators on how well the military achieves

its specific (possibly limited) goals according

to its mission statement. Such measures are

situation dependent, often requiring

readjustment as the situation changes and

higher level guidance develops. MOE

normally are discrete, quantifiable, and

Khobar Towers, an example of a terrorist attack against US military personnel.
III-10

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JP 3-57

helpful in understanding and measuring

progress. MOE may be developed for

quantitative or qualitative standards as

means to evaluate operations and guide

decision making. Accurate and effective

MOE contribute to mission effectiveness in

many ways. They help identify effective

strategies and tactics and points at which to

shift resources, transition to different phases,

or alter or terminate the mission. MOE assist

the commander in determining when all

or part of the mission has been

accomplished, permitting the redeployment

of some or all forces performing CMO.

“MOE [Measures of effectiveness] in

military operations are defined as tools

used to measure results achieved in

the overall mission and execution of

assigned civil tasks, compared to

stated strategic and operational

objectives.”

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace,

Emergencies, Crisis and War

b. Developing MOE. There is no single

all-encompassing checklist for MOE;

therefore, MOE will vary according to the

mission. However, commanders and staffs

should keep certain factors in mind when

developing and using MOE. Planners should

ensure that MOE are as follows.

• Appropriate. MOE should correlate to

the audience objectives. If the objective

is to present information to those outside

the command, MOE should be general

and few in number; if the objective is to

assist on-scene commanders, then MOE

should be more specific and detailed.

• Mission-related. MOE must correlate

to the mission. If the mission is relief,

MOE should help the commander

evaluate improvements in living

standards, mortality rates, and other

related areas.

• Measurable. Quantitative MOE reflect

reality more accurately than nonquantitative MOE, and hence, are

generally the measure of choice when the

situation permits their use. When using

non-quantitative MOE, clear

measurement criteria should be

established and disseminated to prevent

mismeasurement or misinterpretation.

• Numerically Reasonable. Avoid

establishing excessive MOE; they

become unmanageable or collection

efforts outweigh the value.

• Sensitive. MOE should be sensitive to

force performance and accurately reflect

changes related to joint force actions.

Extraneous factors should not greatly

affect established MOE.

• Useful. MOE should detect situation

changes quickly enough to enable the

commander to immediately and

effectively respond.

c. Possible MOE. MOE in CMO could

include the following.

• Drops in mortality rates in the affected

population below a specified level per

day.

• Increase in water available to each

disaster victim per day to various levels

established for human consumption, to

support sanitation measures, and for

livestock consumption.

• Decrease in the number of displaced

persons in camps to a level sustainable

by the affected country or non-US

military organizations. Another aspect

of this MOE is the increase in the number

of persons per day returning to their

homes.
III-11

Planning Civil-Military Operations

• Decrease in incidence of disease to an

acceptable or manageable level.

• Increase in the presence and capabilities

of NGOs and international organizations.

“During Operation SUPPORT HOPE,

the joint force tracked several specific

measures of effectiveness (MOE) to

ascertain when it had accomplished its

assigned mission. These MOE

included: (1) The refugee population

in Goma dropped from 1,200,000 on

26 Jul 94 to 575,000 on 26 Aug 94.

(Numbers of refugees were estimates

only.) (2) The estimated mortality rate

in Goma camps, based on bodies

buried per day, dropped from 6500 per

day on 27 July 94 to less than 500 per

day on 1 August 94. (3) Cargo

capacity at Kigali airfield increased

from virtually zero on 30 Jul 94 to 300-

600 tons per day on 26 Aug 94. (4)

The number of United Nations

agencies, nongovernmental

organizations, and private voluntary

organizations represented in Kigali

grew from six on 22 July 94 to over 60

on 26 August 94. This increase

represented adequate nonmilitary

capability to provide foreign

humanitarian assistance.”

JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

d. MOE only are limited by the

imagination of commanders and their staffs.

However, they should exercise a certain

degree of caution and judgment when using

statistical indicators alone. These indicators

may vary widely in interpretation, may be

valid only for a specific time, place, or group

of people, and may not have a direct

correlation to effectiveness. Quantitative

MOE may not capture qualitative changes,

which may be more important in restoring

normalcy. Engagement with local, national,

and international HNS and NGO elements can

often assist CMO planners in crafting

qualitative MOE.

e. The last prerequisite for success entails

establishing and monitoring MOE for CMO

that are useful at strategic, operational, and

tactical levels.

f. Figure III-3 (extracted from CivilMilitary Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies,

Crisis and War) provides an example of MOE

concerning force protection and/or security.

It is provided for illustrative purposes only.

SECTION B. OTHER

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

8. Public Affairs

“It is vital that we lay the ground work

for the future end state while

maintaining a high degree of agility and

flexibility as we deal with change and

development in-country over time. We

will speak with one voice from

command. Clarity and consensus are

key. The Public Affairs Officer [PAO]

is the focal point for all media activities.

While we must develop good relations

with the media, we will coordinate all

media activities with the senior

representative of the Secretary

General. The PAO will be a force

multiplier.”

United Nations Mission In Haiti

In The Service Of Peace

American public support is critical to the

success of CMO. This support is gained by

providing the news media access to both

military personnel and unclassified

information. PA personnel escort the news

media whenever they are in the operational

area. PA personnel provide American and

international news media information

concerning joint force operations. The JFC

and the public affairs officer (PAO) are the

sole official spokespersons for the command.

All news media queries should be referred to

the PAO. In performing duties as an official

spokesman, the PAO’s membership in the
III-12

Chapter III

JP 3-57

JTF’s IO cell will enable PA activities to be

integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted

within the full spectrum of planned IO. The

coordinated efforts between PA, CA, and

PSYOP representatives in the JTF IO cell are

important. Whatever is released through one

of these channels will be available to, and have

an effect on, all audiences. If information

released to the HN populace by CA and

PSYOP personnel conflicts with information

released to American forces through PA

channels, the result could be loss of credibility

for all involved and a negation of any positive

accomplishments.

a. General

• The mission of joint PA is to expedite

the flow of accurate and timely

information about the activities of US

joint forces to the public and internal

audiences. The media and military

journalists will conduct first-hand and

after-the-fact reporting of joint

Figure III-3. Examples of Force Protection and/or Security Measures of Effectiveness

EXAMPLES OF FORCE PROTECTION AND/OR

SECURITY MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Mission-level measures

of effectiveness

Task-performance measures

of effectiveness

Level of effort measures

Transition measures

General indicators

1. Number of threats to the lives of civilian and

military personnel

2. Number of operations security breaches and

types i.e., verbal, electronic

3. Number of political incidents/corruption at

each level of government

4. Number and level of changes to the military

alert status

1. Area patrolled divided by total area requiring

patrolling

2. Numbers of convoys escorted divided by

convoy escort requirement in terms of forces,

police, weapons, and vehicles

3. Number of criminal-related incidents

4. Number of facilities targeted by belligerents

1. Number, size, and types of patrols by road,

sea, and air

2. Number of convoys escorted and size of forces

assigned to convoy escort

Percentage of security requirements assumed by

host nation or follow-on forces

1. Cost of material damage sustained in

confrontations with belligerents

2. Number of police in communities deployed to

maintain law and order

3. Number of incidents involving the military or

the local police, or both

TYPE EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIC FORCE

PROTECTION/SECURITY

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
III-13

Planning Civil-Military Operations

operations. Information given to the

news media must be consistent with

national and OPSEC and must respect

the privacy of the members of the force.

PA personnel should communicate with

Service members, civilian employees,

and family members to create an

awareness of organizational goals and

inform them of significant developments

affecting them and the organization. As

appropriate, PA personnel need to

coordinate with the Country Team.

• PA and CA personnel assist in the

dissemination of information to local

populations. PA personnel have the

responsibility to deal with local media

outlets and will assist CA personnel with

passing information to the appropriate

audiences through those media outlets.

• Coordination is required to ensure that

the information released by one staff

element does not conflict with or

complicate the work of the other (PA,

CA, and PSYOP messages are different,

but they must not contradict one another

or the credibility of all three will be lost).

• US CMO elements will assist with DC,

public administration, public health,

and public works in concert with local

authorities and/or NGO and international

organizations. By their nature, their

missions and their positive results are of

interest to the local populace and their

media representatives.

• PA elements also have the responsibility,

through command information outlets, to

keep military elements informed of DC,

methods and procedures for their orderly

withdrawal from the operational area, and

any other information on this issue

deemed appropriate by the JFC.

• Today’s technological environment

provides the media greater access to

military operations. Commanders should

consider media impact during planning

and execution of all operations. Planning

should facilitate the interaction between

the military and the national and

international press organizations. Each

nation has its own viewpoint on media

freedom and access, and the JFC, who

also may be the multinational force

A press conference is conducted in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina during

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
III-14

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JP 3-57

commander, should consider this during

planning. Respect for the viewpoints of

other nations must be demonstrated, even

if they are contrary to that of the United

States. Simplicity should be the driving

factor in planning for media support

in a multinational environment.

Commanders should plan for regular

media access. Ground rules need to be

established which are clear and

maintain appropriate OPSEC. Media

considerations will be channeled through

a media coordination center at the JFC

level, which should be staffed by

representatives from participating

nations. The JFC’s media coordination

center will work on an integrated basis

with representative international

organizations operating within the

operational area. Media operations must

be synchronized and coordinated both

within the US military chain of command

and through multinational military

channels.

• Predeployment media training for

military and civilian personnel (media

included) is essential. JFCs employ the

IO cell to ensure early and continuous

coordination among PA, CA, PSYOP,

and OPSEC so their messages are not

contradictory and damaging to the

credibility of the JFC or compromising

the essential elements of friendly

information. Planners should include PA

and public information officers in the

planning process. JFCs should develop

a policy for releasing information on

incidents, especially casualty reports.

Joint force policy should distinguish

between situations where the victims are

from one nation or from several nations.

b. Information tasks in support of CMO

might include the following.

• Coordinate releases to the media with all

appropriate agencies to ensure

consistency of information to the local

population.

• Develop and disseminate media releases

about CMO efforts to local, national, and

international media, as well as to

command information outlets.

• Assist media in covering known CA

activities. It may not always be in the

United States’ best interest to take credit

for all activities. Highlighting the

participation of the affected nation or

civilian group and/or organization may

lead to a quicker and sounder solution to

the situation.

• In cooperation with CA elements, ensure

the publication and broadcasting of

information to protect DC.

For further detail concerning PA, refer

to JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs

in Joint Operations.

9. Legal

Many aspects of CMO require scrutiny by

legal experts. Key members of both the

planning and operations staffs and legal

advisors should review and assist in preparing

SOFA, ROE, plans and/or orders, as well as

any agreements or memoranda of

understanding established between US forces

and the affected country or nonmilitary

organizations inherent in CMO. Legal

personnel must know the legal status of relief

workers from the numerous agencies

involved, DC, and refugees. CMO involve a

myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy

considerations, both foreign and domestic, in

addition to the normal constraints associated

with deployments and operations. The SJA

is usually in the best position to access these

sources.
III-15

Planning Civil-Military Operations

“The Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was

a key member of the JTF [joint task

force] staff. The SJA became a

personal advisor to the JTF

commander, providing assistance in

solving numerous legal problems in

addition to managing normal legal

issues. The SJA staff should have a

variety of experience, especially in

operational law, administrative law,

rules of engagement, international

law, environmental law, fiscal law/

contracts, and joint military justice.

This is particularly important because

the SJA will be a primary command

representative with interagency

representatives and international

agencies. The basic duties of the SJA

included support for military justice,

claims, legal assistance, and trial

defense services. In addition, the SJA

provided valuable counsel to the CJTF

[commander, joint task force] in a

number of areas, such as civil affairs,

PSYOP [psychological operations],

international negotiations, and claims

and investigations.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY:

US Forces in Haiti

a. General

• The SJA of the joint force will provide

legal support and services during all

phases of CMO. In the planning phase,

SJAs provide advice and assistance in the

preparation and review of CMO plans for

consistency with US law, NCA guidance,

and the rules and principles of

international law, including treaties, other

international agreements, and the laws of

the place where US military forces will

conduct operations.

• SJAs review the legal section of area

studies and assessments and of plans and

orders compiled before deployment or

hostilities. SJAs also provide

predeployment training to personnel and

units preparing to conduct CMO. This

training should include:

•• Law of Armed Conflict. That part

of international law that regulates the

conduct of armed hostilities. It protects

combatants and noncombatants from

unnecessary suffering, and safeguards the

basic rights of all civilians, any prisoner

of war, the wounded, and the sick. The

LOAC encompasses all international law

for the conduct of hostilities binding on

the United States or its individual

citizens, including treaties and

international agreements to which the

United States is a party, and applicable

customary international law. Some

treaties include the 1949 Geneva

Conventions and the 1907 Hague

Conventions and Regulations, among

others. The Department of Defense is

committed to ensure its personnel

understand, observe, and enforce the

LOAC and the United States’ obligations

under the LOAC.

•• Human Rights Violations and

Reporting Requirements. Military

personnel should be trained to recognize

human rights violations using the

standard Common Article 3 of the

Geneva Conventions, to avoid aiding in

any violations and to report violations to

their chain of command. (1) Human

rights refers to freedoms, immunities, and

benefits that, according to widely

accepted contemporary values, every

human being should enjoy in the society

in which he or she lives. Human rights

may be thought of as that body of

international and domestic law that

protects the citizen from abuses by the

state. USG policy supports the

promotion of all human rights.

Commanders should be particularly

cognizant of gross human rights

violations, which include: torture or

cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment

or punishment, prolonged arbitrary

detention without charges or trial, causing

the disappearance of persons by the
III-16

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JP 3-57

abduction and clandestine detention of

those persons, and other flagrant denial

of the right to life, liberty, or the security

of person. (2) CMO personnel who

observe a gross human right violation

should report it through their chain of

command. Each geographic combatant

commander may have additional

reporting policies.

•• Rules of Engagement. ROE are

directives that delineate the

circumstances and limitations under

which US forces initiate or continue

engagement with hostile forces or

elements. ROE define when and how

force may be used. Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3121.01A, Standing Rules of

Engagement (SROE) for US Forces,

provides ROE that apply to US forces

during all military operations. For each

specific operation, the JFC, in

conjunction with the joint force

Operations Directorate (J-3) and legal

advisor, develops ROE (as soon as

possible after notification of the

deployment) within the framework of

the standing rules of engagement

(SROE). In many situations, the mission

may require specific ROE measures in

addition to the basic SROE.

Supplemental measures in the SROE

enable the commander to obtain or grant

those additional authorities or restraints

necessary to accomplish the mission. The

JFC must submit the changes through the

chain of command to the appropriate

approving official. When multinational

forces are under US control, US

commanders need to ensure that those

forces interpret the ROE in the same

manner as US forces. When

multinational forces are involved in the

operation, but not under US control, US

commanders should request that those

forces adopt ROE similar to those in

effect for US forces. US commanders

must understand the differences in the

various participating countries’ ROE and

the impact on operations.

•• Military Justice. JP 0-2, Unified

Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), assigns

responsibility to the JFC for the discipline

and administration of military personnel

assigned to the joint organization. This

is shared by the commanders of the

Service forces. The Uniform Code of

Military Justice, Service regulations, and

the Manual for Courts-Martial provide

the foundational laws, regulations, and

procedures by which that responsibility

is exercised. (1) Within a combatant

command, each Service component

commander is primarily responsible,

subject to the regulations of the

combatant commander, for the internal

administration and discipline of that

Service’s component forces. In the same

respect, the JFC normally should exercise

administrative and disciplinary authority

through Service component

commanders. JFCs who wish to

personally exercise full administrative

and disciplinary authority over all

military personnel assigned to the joint

force may request that such authority be

granted by the combatant commander.

This grant of authority is termed

“reciprocal” authority. (2) Military

justice is administered in accordance with

the Uniform Code of Military Justice,

Manual for Courts-Martial, and

applicable Service directives. Directives

and regulations implementing the

Uniform Code of Military Justice, aside

from the Manual for Courts-Martial, are,

for the most part, promulgated by the

separate Services. As a result, the

appropriate response to a particular

incident may vary according to Service.

(3) Authority. The Uniform Code of

Military Justice (Articles 22-24), Rules

for Courts-Martial 201, and Service

regulations grant authority to convene
III-17

Planning Civil-Military Operations

courts-martial and impose non-judicial

punishment. Service regulations

establish policies and procedures for the

delegation of these authorities and the

authority of senior commanders to limit

or withhold these authorities from

subordinate commanders. For the JFC,

the primary concern is the exercise of

jurisdiction over members of a different

Service from the commander. (4)

Convening courts-martial. Rules for

Courts-Martial 201(e) promulgates

several authorities which extend courtsmartial convening authority to

commanders of joint forces. (5)

Combatant commanders, and those

officers empowered by the Secretary of

Defense to convene courts-martial, may

convene general courts-martial over

members of any of the Armed Forces.

The Secretary of Defense may empower

any commanding officer of a joint force

to convene courts-martial, and such

commanding officers may convene

general courts-martial for the trial of

members of any of the Armed Forces.

Combatant commanders are further

empowered to authorize a commanding

officer of a subordinate joint command

to convene courts-martial for the trial of

members of other Armed Forces.

•• Status of Forces. The status of forces

is an important concern of commanders

operating overseas. Numerous legal

issues affecting the success of the

operation must be resolved, including

HN criminal and civil jurisdiction,

authority to conduct law enforcement

activities including trials by courtsmartial, claims against the United States

or US personnel, authority for US forces

to carry arms and use force, force

protection, entry and exit requirements,

customs and tax liability, contracting

authority, authority to provide health

care without a local medical license,

vehicle registration and licensing,

communications support, facilities for

US forces, hiring of local personnel,

authority to detain or arrest, and

provisions for transferring custody. The

SJA provides legal advice concerning

status of forces issues, to include the

provisions of current agreements, the

need for additional agreements, and the

procedures for obtaining agreements.

•• Environmental Law Issues. The

complexity of environmental law issues

requires the joint force SJA staff to have

expertise (or ready access to expert

assistance) in environmental law.

Political sensitivity dictates keen

attention to this area. Legal advisors and

commanders must be familiar with

agreements between the US and

participating nations as well as

international conventions signed by

participating nations. Although US

domestic environmental laws do not

apply overseas, the SJA must be familiar

with Executive Order 12,114, DODD

6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of

Major Departments of Defense Actions,

DODD 6050.16, DOD Policy for

Establishing and Implementing

Environmental Standards at Overseas

Installations, Department of Defense

Instruction (DODI) 4715.5, Management

of Environmental Compliance at

Overseas Installations, DODI 4715.8,

Environmental Remediation for DOD

Activities Overseas, and the Department

of Defense Overseas Environmental

Baseline Guidance Document, which

establish environmental regulations for

overseas activity.

• During the combat phase, SJAs address

legal issues concerning population

control measures; targeting to minimize

unnecessary collateral damage or injury

to the civilian population; treatment of

DC, civilian internees (CIs), and

detainees; requests for political asylum
III-18

Chapter III

JP 3-57

large portions of the population from

traditional economic and social areas. All

potential supply sources should be

considered, including affected country,

commercial, coalition, and pre-positioned

supplies. Lessons learned indicate that

logistics and the associated support facilities

and infrastructure necessary to sustain CMO

are frequently underestimated. CMO often

are logistics and engineering intensive.

Therefore, the overall logistic concept

should be closely tied into the operational

strategy and be mutually supporting. This

includes:

“Logistics planning should be done at

the strategic, operational, and tactical

levels. . . . Planners must identify

critical or key issues unique to a

specific operation plan they must

support. These issues include the

increased demand associated with an

expanding force; critical supply

items; constricting bottlenecks;

control of all means of transportation

(including that provided by allies and

host nations); and the sourcing of

supplies and services from coalition

sources.”

JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic

Support of Joint Operations

• Identifying time-phased material

requirements, facilities, and other

resources. Remote and austere locations

may require deployment of materials

handling equipment and pre-positioned

stocks.

• Identifying support methods and

procedures required to meet air, land, and

sea lines of communications.

• Establishing procedures for coordinating

and controlling material movements to

and within the operational area. Priorities

may be established using apportionment

systems, providing the commander

flexibility to reinforce priority efforts

with additional assets.

and refuge; acquisition control of private

and public property for military purposes;

PSYOP and their effects on the civilian

population; and other operational law

matters as necessary.

• During the stabilization phase, SJAs may

provide legal services concerning such

matters as claims submitted by local

civilians, disaster relief, and HCA issues.

• Additionally, the joint staff SJA and the

civil affairs SJA will be called upon to

give advice and assistance on matters

relating to civil administration within a

friendly or enemy country. SJAs also

may provide counsel regarding the

creation and supervision of military

tribunals and other activities for the

proper administration of civil law and

order. In addition, legal services may be

necessary with respect to the issue of a

local court’s jurisdiction over US military

personnel and activities.

b. In summary, Figure III-4 highlights

some of the legal issues that may impact on

joint force operations.

For further detail pertaining to legal support

to joint operations, refer to JP 0-2, Unified

Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), and JP

1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Legal Support to Military

Operations.

10. Logistics

a. General. Logistic planners should

assess CMO logistic requirements and

affected country and theater support

capabilities. Attendant risks and logistic

objectives also should be identified.

Emphasis must be placed upon locating

logistic bases as close as possible to the

recipients. Logistic planners should avoid

locating distribution points in major

population centers to reduce movement of
III-19

Planning Civil-Military Operations

• Planning must include logistic support

that normally is outside the bounds of

military logistics, such as support to

the civilian populace (e.g., women,

children, and the aged). CMO forces

often are going to provide support for

these categories of individuals, and

planners must take appropriate steps

Figure III-4. Legal Issues

LEGAL ISSUES

Joint Military Justice

Uniformity versus Efficiency

Courts-martial Asset Sharing

Divergent Command Philosophies

Chain of Command

Claims

Foreign Claims

Single-Service Claims Authority

Legal Assistance

Asset Utilization and Interoperability

Environmental Law

Applicability of US Law Abroad

Environmental Treaties and Agreements

Fiscal Law/Contracts

Fiscal Authority to Supply Logistic Support

Contingency Contracting and Host-Nation Support

International Law

Treaties and Customary International Law

Law of Armed Conflict

National Policy Issues

Executive Orders

Operations Law Issues

Overflight of National Airspace

Freedom of Navigation

Basing Rights (intermediate staging bases and forward

operations bases)

Displaced Persons

Humanitarian Assistance

Use of Deadly Force

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

An Operations (J-3) Responsibility

Legal Advisor may be the most experienced and educated in

ROE Development

Status-of-Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreements
III-20

Chapter III

JP 3-57

early on to ensure proper aid is

administered.

• Planning also should consider the

potential requirements to provide support

to nonmilitary personnel, e.g., NGO,

international organizations.

b. Contracting Support. Although

discussed under the logistic section, the joint

force Director for Force Structure, Resource,

and Assessment, Joint Staff (J-8) and/or

Comptroller may perform contracting, if

established by the JFC.

• General. Providing support to the joint

force and its subordinates may require

contracting interaction with foreign

governments, commercial entities, and

NGO. Contracting can be an effective

force multiplier of combat service

support for deployed forces. When

properly used, contracting is another

essential tool of the JFC in support of

the mission. Logisticians should be

thoroughly familiar with contracting

options available through the Navy’s

Emergency Construction Capabilities

Contract Process (CONCAP), the

Army’s Logistics Civilian Augmentation

Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force

Contract Augmentation Program

(AFCAP), acquisition cross-Service

agreement (ACSA), or HNS resources.

Contracting can bridge gaps that may

occur before sufficient organic support

units can deploy, or it can be used to

reduce the logistic footprint. It also is

valuable where no HNS agreements

exist, or where HNS agreements do not

provide for the supplies or services

required. Close coordination with CA,

finance and accounting activities, and

legal support also is essential.

• Contracting Support Plan. The JFC

may want to develop a contracting

support plan to provide the following

information.

•• Outline the procedures and policies for

implementation of contracting support in

the operational area, assuring full

utilization of HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP,

ACSA, and CONCAP resources.

•• Ensure that contracting solutions

receive consideration during logistic

planning and become part of the plan or

order.

•• Identify joint force subordinate

commands’ requirements that may be

met by HNS, LOGCAP, CONCAP,

AFCAP, ACSA, or contracting support.

•• Develop an area database containing

all available data concerning local

resources. The database may include area

studies, locally developed logistic

support data, a complete listing of

existing LOGCAP, CONCAP, and HNS

agreements available in the operational

area, and recommendations from State

Department Foreign Service personnel.

Information also may come from the

United States or civilian organizations

(NGO and international organizations)

familiar with the area. This part of the

contracting support plan must be

continually updated.

•• Address force protection and quality

control aspects of contracting, to include

inspection of goods received to ensure

against sabotage, poisoning, or other

terrorist-style actions and fraud.

• Joint Force Contracting Office(s). The

JFC may establish a joint contracting

office(s), staffed by personnel from all

the Services operating in the operational

area (to include linguists and interpreters

when required). A joint force contracting
III-21

Planning Civil-Military Operations

office would be responsible for the

following:

•• Including some or all of the warranted

contracting officers in the operational

area. If more than one contracting office

is required, contracting officers may have

to be assigned to other smaller joint

contracting offices to provide support on

an area basis.

•• Providing coordination and

cooperation among Services that

maintain parallel contracting

organizations within the operational area.

Precluding inter-Service competition for

local supplies or services, and obtaining

the most advantageous prices through

consolidation of requirements to more

effectively utilize scarce personnel

resources. Military forces should not

compete for scarce civilian resources.

•• Establishing coordination and

cooperation with CA, finance and

accounting activities, and legal support.

•• Providing contracting representatives

to the joint force Logistics Directorate

organizational structure.

• It is critical, upon mission termination

or redeployment, that the joint force

ensures all records or files are closed

out and submitted to the supported

combatant commander for

disposition. In addition, logisticians

must consider which equipment and

supplies may be left behind at the

completion of the mission.

c. Non-US Local Civilian Hire

• Local national civilian labor may be

utilized in support of military operations.

Procurement of local national civilian

labor will be in accordance with DOD

contracting regulations and is normally

the responsibility of component

commands. The joint force Manpower

and Personnel Directorate, as well as the

J-8 and/or Comptroller (if established by

the JFC), will be involved in the

procurement of local national labor.

• Day Labor Pay. HN employee and day

labor pay are provided through

arrangements with the HN or by a

designated component of the joint force.

The JFC has the authority to hire HN

employees and day labor and to make

Bosnian civilians employed by a US military contractor work on a

construction project during Operation JOINT FORGE.
III-22

Chapter III

JP 3-57

payments. If required, this can be

delegated to contracting officers. The

Department of State determines

payment rates. These rates, if available,

should be obtained by the supported

combatant commander and provided to

the joint force J-8 and/or Comptroller in

the planning phase of an operation.

For further detail concerning logistics

and contracting, refer to JP 1-06, Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Financial Management During Joint

Operations, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic

Support of Joint Operations, and JP

5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning

Guidance and Procedures.

11. Financial Management

“The joint force J-8 and/or comptroller

must perform two key functions for the

commander: first, ensure that

resources are available when and

where they are needed; second, aid the

commander in maintaining his or her

fiscal responsibilities.”

JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Financial

Management During Joint

Operations

a. The joint force J-8 and/or Comptroller

ensure that financial management support is

provided for CMO. Financial management

objectives include:

• Ensure quick and efficient missionessential funding;

• Reduced impact of joint operations

funding requirements on readiness;

• Mission success uncompromised by

funding shortfalls; and

• Detailed financial management plans

and coordinated efforts.

Financial managers may be collocated with

the joint force logistics officer to consolidate

efforts in the use of JFC fiscal resources.

b. Financial managers identify, acquire,

distribute, control, and account for funds.

Financial management operations include

banking liaison and currency support,

contracting payments for procurement/local

vendor services/HNS, disbursing, costcapturing, and non-US pay support (including

EPW/CI).

c. DSO is normally conducted by DOD

units under a cost reimbursement basis from

either the LFA, the local or state civil

governmental authority requesting assistance,

or under a cost share of both of the previous.

Joint force or lead Service comptroller should

provide cost data capturing requirements and

forwarding procedures to all installations and

units supporting the civil authority.

Installations and units should be prepared to

gather cost data and submit to the joint force

comptroller management for proper

reimbursement under the Stafford Act,

Economy Act, or other reimbursement

vehicle.

For further detail pertaining to financial

management, refer to JP 1-06, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Financial

Management During Joint Operations.

12. Information Gathering

a. As depicted in Figure III-5, information

gathering during CMO should be broadly

focused and may include areas concerning

political, military, paramilitary, ethnic,

religious, economic, health services,

environmental, and criminal indicators. The

primary effort must be to answer the

commander’s priority information

requirements to include those related to

force protection. The unique aspects of CMO

require that analytic assets available to the
III-23

Planning Civil-Military Operations

commander be used to fuse or integrate that

information, from whatever source, needed

to guide participating organizations in

achieving the CMO overarching goals.

Nonmilitary and non-US elements also must

be considered in both collection and

dissemination.

b. It is important to remember that, in order

to accomplish their mission, non-US military

organizations, NGOs, and international

organizations may require access to classified

information. The authority to allow these

organizations access exists in National

Disclosure Policy-1, National Policy and

Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified

Military Information to Foreign Governments

and International Organizations, DODD

5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military

Information to Foreign and International

Organizations, and applicable Director of

Central Intelligence guidance.

• Information must be readily accessible

to those who need it, while still adhering

to the security standards of need-to-know

and protection of classified information

and intelligence sources and methods.

• Because of NGOs’, international

organizations’, and other organizations’

and agencies’ sensitivities regarding

negative perceptions generated by

working with military organizations, the

term “information” should be used in

place of “intelligence.”

• There are significant legal restrictions

concerning the use of military

information assets to collect information

Figure III-5. Information Gathering

INFORMATION GATHERING

Information

Gathering

Information

Gathering

POLITICAL

MILITARY

PARAMILITARY

RELIGIOUS

ETHNIC

ECONOMIC

HEALTH

SERVICES ENVIRONMENTAL

CRIMINAL
III-24

Chapter III

JP 3-57

on US citizens or to employ certain

collection techniques.

“As the 21st century approaches, we

must also be cognizant of the changing

roles and missions facing the Armed

Forces of the United States and ensure

that intelligence planning keeps pace

with the full range of military operations.

The future battlefield will demand high

levels of joint interoperability and force

enhancement, and the value of

intelligence support as an exploitable

multiplier cannot be overstated.”

General John M. Shalikashvili

Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997

•• DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of

Information Concerning Persons and

Organizations Not Affiliated With the

Department of Defense, strictly

regulates the use of military

intelligence assets to collect

information on US citizens. During

disaster assistance operations,

intelligence personnel and assets may be

used for liaison and other support

activities.

•• Intelligence capabilities may, with

authority from the Department of

Defense: (1) Acquire information about

threats to the physical security of DOD

personnel, installations, operations,

official visitors, or for force protection.

(2) Analyze and disseminate information

to disaster relief personnel and disaster

field offices. (3) Support disaster field

office operations using intelligence

estimate procedures and skills.

• In DSO, the emphasis may be on

acquiring information about threats to the

physical security of DOD personnel,

installations, operations, official visitors,

or for force protection.

c. An intelligence architecture for the

operation will be required so the commander

can use fused, all-source information to

visualize the operational area. Normal tasking

and reporting channels will provide the basis

for this architecture, but provisions will have

to be made for working with governments for

which no previously established intelligence

agreements exist and for exchanging security

related information with public and private

international organizations, as well as HN

entities. National, theater, and tactical

collection systems can be tasked to provide

current imagery or other information

pertaining to the crisis. Imagery — such as

that provided to all interested parties via the

Internet on an “Open Skies” basis during

recovery from Hurricane MITCH in 1998 —

can be used to assess transportation networks

or locate large groups of dislocated civilians.

d. Regardless of the mechanism(s)

employed to integrate and process the

information relevant to CMO, it is essential

that all parties involved participate in a

common effort to share operationally

relevant information. This process is not

the intelligence function per se, but rather

a necessary step in achieving the

operation’s goals.

For further detail concerning intelligence

support to joint operations, refer to JP 2-0,

Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint

Operations, and JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence

Support to Military Operations.

13. Communications

Any force deploying to an operational area

must bring or coordinate for the ability to

communicate. This should include the

capability to communicate in secure and

nonsecure modes using voice, data, and video

teleconferencing through a combination of

military and commercial systems. The ability
III-25

Planning Civil-Military Operations

to communicate with all military forces,

NGOs, international organizations, UN

agencies, HN agencies, and religious and

other organizations is essential during CMO.

“[Command, control, communications,

and computers] C4 systems planners

must continually prioritize and choose

from among the individual joint and

Service system capabilities that

support different needs across the

range of military operations. Different

conflict levels impose different, and

sometimes contentious, requirements

on the C4 systems that support them.

Various conflict levels can occur

simultaneously over a wide geographic

area, and require different options and

responses.”

JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command,

Control, Communications, and

Computer (C4) Systems Support

to Joint Operations

a. Effective communications systems are

vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining

successful CMO. Operations, logistic, and

intelligence functions depend on responsive

communications. Communications is the

central system that not only ties together

all aspects of joint operations, but also

allows commanders to maintain C2 of their

forces. Therefore, the CMO plan must

provide for interoperable and compatible

communications using available commercial

telecommunications networks, military

satellite channels, and conventional military

command, control, communications, and

computer systems to support the exchange of

orders, directions, and information among all

participants. Direct communications

between commanders, NGOs, and

international organizations should be

established to facilitate effective coordination

and decision making. Information protection

for nonsecure communications must be

implemented. Additionally, communications

systems planning must consider the

termination or transition of US involvement

and the transfer of responsibility to the United

Nations, regional organizations, another

military force, or civilian organizations.

b. Communications Security.

Communications may be secured against

monitoring through encryption or codes.

Physical hardening, OPSEC (to include

physical security), and redundancy reduce

system failures stemming from sabotage and

elements of nature. Communications security

also will be complicated by the need to

coordinate with other agencies (US and nonUS) and multinational forces. A policy for

the release of classified information should

be considered early in the planning process

and introduced as soon as practical in an

operation. It is important to remember that

non-US military organizations may require

access to classified material to accomplish

their missions. Procedures for the release of

classified information to support CMO must

be established before it negatively affects the

mission. These organizations often are force

multipliers in CMO.

c. Frequency Management. Communication

planners must include frequency management

and coordinate radio frequency spectrum

requirements at the earliest planning stage to

help assure mission success. Also,

multinational forces and nonmilitary agency

frequency requirements need to consider

security precautions and coordinate

accordingly. Lastly, host governments strictly

control their sovereign spectrum use.

d. Interoperability. Identify

communications equipment interoperability

among all participants. Nonmilitary

agencies may have their own communications

networks, and the degree of sophistication will

vary. These may include commercial leased

circuits and satellite services, and high

frequency radio equipment. Commercial

satellite services can provide worldwide

voice, data, and facsimile communications.

This system can provide an excellent

communications link between both
III-26

Chapter III

JP 3-57

military and nonmilitary organizations.

Regardless of the systems available to military

and nonmilitary organizations, it is critical that

CMOCs are equipped with communication

equipment that facilitates coordination with

all participants. CMOC communications

requirements must be identified early.

Deployment planners should use commercial

off the shelf equipment to meet end user

requirements. The need for interoperability

of communications equipment in CMO also

may necessitate using unclassified

communications means during the operation.

The key to success is evaluating the use of all

available means of communicating (military,

commercial, and HN) to put together a

network that supports CMO. Every situation

will be unique.

e. Reports. JFCs should standardize

similar communication reports to increase

efficiency of operations.

f. Lessons Learned. These are some of

the critical communications lessons learned

from Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in

northern Iraq and Turkey:

• Obtain adequate communications

equipment to provide basic mission

essential service.

• Employ additional equipment, and

reconfigure connectivity to provide direct

routing to principal destinations.

• Add equipment to provide multiple

routes to prevent site isolation.

• Have sufficient equipment to support

jump capabilities, respond to new

missions, and avoid critical shortages.

• Build in redundancy.

For further detail relating to

communications support to joint

operations, refer to JP 6-0, Doctrine for

Command, Control, Communications,

and Computer (C4) Systems Support to

COMMUNICATIONS IN CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

The transition of command, control, communications, computer, and

intelligence (C4I) support from tactical military assets to contracted commercial

C4I services must be considered in the initial planning phase of any operation,

especially for military operations other than war. Based on the US Atlantic

Command experience during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, it can

take up to five months to migrate the first tactical circuit onto a commercial

system. . . . The use of commercial communications resources was driven by

the desire to redeploy tactical US military communications assets in Haiti in

conjunction with the departure of US forces. Leaving these assets with UNMIH

[United Nations in Haiti] would have reduced the capability of US forces to

provide C4I systems and personnel to support contingencies or major regional

conflicts in other theaters. Commercializing the communications infrastructure

is also strategically prudent. This is demonstrated by comparing the number

of deployed C4I personnel during the peak of MNF [multinational forces]

operations and after the transition to commercial communications services.

A cadre of over 600 personnel was reduced to 16 people after

commercialization. In addition, US forces readiness increased as the

redeployed equipment was recovered and prepared for new missions.

SOURCE: Haiti Command and Control Lessons Learned:

The Transition from Military to Commercial Communications
III-27

Planning Civil-Military Operations

Joint Operations, and JP 6-02, Joint

Doctrine for Employment of

Operational/Tactical Command, Control,

Communications, and Computer

Systems.

14. Information Operations

a. General. IO are concerned with

affecting adversary information and

information systems while protecting one’s

own information and information systems. To

accomplish this goal, IO planners work to

integrate and deconflict various capabilities

and activities to achieve IO objectives that

support the JFC’s mission objectives. CMO

is one of the activities that must be integrated

to successfully accomplish IO.

b. Information Operations and CivilMilitary Operations

• Information provided by friendly,

adversary, and neutral parties has a

significant effect on CMO planners’

ability to establish and maintain relations

between joint forces and the civil

authorities and general population,

resources, and institutions in friendly,

neutral, or hostile areas.

• Depending on the nature and mission of

specific joint operations, other joint force

capabilities and activities used to conduct

IO may complement or support CMO

efforts. Working through the IO cell on

a joint staff, CMO planners seek to ensure

that other capabilities and activities

related to IO are consistent with and

supportive of CMO objectives. At the

same time, the IO cell can deconflict

CMO with the other capabilities and

activities conducting IO.

c. Information Operations Cell. CMO

planners should ensure that they take an active

part in IO cell meetings and planning efforts

to ensure that CMO considerations and

concerns are clearly understood and

addressed.

• The IO cell, in coordination with other

elements of the joint force staff, develops

and promulgates campaign or

operation IO guidance for plans that

is passed down to the components or

subordinate JTFs for decentralized

execution.

• The IO cell is formed from select

representatives from each staff

A MEMORABLE OCCASION

In July 1997, a civil affairs direct support team (DST) commander who regularly

worked with the mayor of the town outside the base camp was invited to attend

the dedication of a memorial in the town square. Being the senior

representative of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on the scene, he was asked

to say a few words on what was a very solemn and very significant event for

the people of the town. Local media were on hand to capture the event, and,

potentially, to broadcast or print the remarks of the DST commander through

the region. Being knowledgeable of the SFOR information operations (IO)

themes, the DST commander was able to confidently give a short speech,

which both reinforced the IO themes and strengthened the working relationship

between the SFOR and the community.

SOURCE: Task Force Eagle Newsletter No. 99-2, Jan 99, Information

Operations, IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment
III-28

Chapter III

JP 3-57

a. The joint force chaplain has the

responsibility to plan, coordinate, and

implement all the religious support within the

joint force for the JFC. In addition to advising

the JFC on moral, ethical, and quality of life

issues, the chaplain advises on all religious

matters relating to religious ministry support.

The focus of religious ministry remains the

members of the joint force. The stress and

uncertainty of such environments and

missions tend to expand the need for direct

ministry to these Service members. The joint

force chaplain also is responsible for the

following:

• Developing joint religious ministry

support plans in support of the operation.

(This includes preparation of the

Appendix 6, “Religious Ministry

Support,” under Annex E, “Personnel”,

of the JFC’s OPLANs, OPORDs, or

campaign plans, to include appropriate

tabs.)

• Identifying religious ministry support

team requirements, including:

•• Personnel staffing and augmentation

requirements; and

•• Facilities, equipment, transportation

and communication requirements.

• Organizing the religious ministry support

teams to provide comprehensive

religious ministry support, which

includes:

•• Coordinating religious ministry with

Service component command chaplains;

•• Coordinating logistic support

requirements; and

•• Coordinating appropriate training for

religious support personnel.

element, component, and supporting

agencies responsible for integrating

capabilities and related activities. This

cell merges capabilities and related

activities into a synergistic plan. The

cell coordinates staff elements and/or

components represented in the IO cell to

facilitate the detailed support necessary

to plan and coordinate IO. The actual

composition or members of the IO cell

may vary based on the overall mission

of the joint force, the role of IO in

accomplishing the JFC’s objectives, and

the adversary’s or potential adversary’s

capability to conduct IO. For example,

the IO cell may assist in the CMO mission

by assisting the HN in the defense of

computer network systems that may

simplify military to civilian support in

the restoration of critical infrastructure

during the post conflict phase.

For further guidance on IO, refer to JP

3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information

Operations.

15. Religious Ministry Support

“Because there may be no precise

boundary where one condition (military

operations other than war and war)

ends and another begins, changes in

religious ministry support activities

will be more a matter of changing

intensity and emphasis than of

dramatically altered duties. Chaplains

and enlisted religious support

personnel support the accomplishment

of operational objectives through one

or more of the following activities:

advising, supporting, coordinating,

analyzing, planning, writing, training,

supervising, and evaluating. By

performing these activities, chaplains

facilitate the commander’s religious

ministry support plan during a wide

range of operations.”

JP 1-05, Religious Ministry

Support for Joint Operations
III-29

Planning Civil-Military Operations

SECTION C. SPECIALIZED

PLANNING

16. Multinational Operations

a. With the ever-increasing involvement

with multinational forces, it is imperative that

the US military forces fully understand the

special considerations arising when working

with military and paramilitary forces of other

nations.

“The United States employs a national

security strategy committed to

protecting its own national security

interests and achieving strategic

objectives by directing all the elements

of national power (political, economic,

information, and military) toward the

strategic end state. The National

Security Strategy states that, while US

forces retain unilateral capability,

whenever possible they will seek to

operate alongside alliance or coalition

forces, integrating their capabilities and

capitalizing on their strengths, to

promote regional stability throughout

the world. Therefore, US commanders

should expect to conduct operations as

part of a multinational force (MNF). US

forces may participate in these

multinational efforts across a range of

military and civil operations in concert

with a variety of US governmental

agencies, military forces of other

nations, local authorities, and

international and nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs).”

JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for

Multinational Operations

b. Political and military intentions of

multinational partners will impact planning

and operations. Nations’ agendas and interests

will differ from those of the United States in

many ways. In many instances, multinational

forces (MNFs) will not be able to influence

the planning effort without prior approval of

their home country and its commitment to the

concept of operations and mission.

• Coordinating with the other staff sections

to ensure sufficient religious assets are

available to support combat forces, health

services, civilian detainees, prisoners of

war, and other related areas.

• Recommending joint force religious

ministry support policy.

• Maintaining liaison with chaplains of

international forces and appropriate HN

civilian religious leaders.

• When appropriate, and in coordination

with the CMOC, the joint force chaplain

may conduct liaison with NGOs and

international organizations that have

religious affiliation. The joint force

chaplain assists by providing advice on

the distribution of FHA supplies arriving

from churches and other religious

organizations. Chaplains should work

with the CMOC in providing advice to

the JFC in situations where religious

groups want to send representatives to

work with detained persons.

• Providing assessment to the JFC and staff

on cultural and religious influences on

mission accomplishment.

b. Religion plays a pivotal role in the

worldview of many people and has a

significant effect on the goals, objectives, and

structure of society. It is important for the

JFC to have an understanding of the religious

groups and movements within the operational

area and the potential impact that they have

on the accomplishment of the assigned

mission. CA cultural affairs teams provide

this support to the JFC and staff.

For further detail regarding Service

capabilities and religious support to joint

operations, refer to Appendix A, “Service

Capabilities,” and JP 1-05, Religious

Ministry Support for Joint Operations.
III-30

Chapter III

JP 3-57

international organizations, religious

organizations, and others.

“Differences in defining terminology

results in differences in procedures.”

Captain Peter Feist, German Navy

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Joint Analysis Team

e. In addition to operating as part of a joint

force, Army civil affairs units must be

prepared for combined operations with land,

air and naval forces of allied governments.

Unity of effort in combined operations

proceeds from the political and strategic

leadership of the alliance. Allied governments

normally develop directives covering a

c. Additional factors should be considered

when planning with an MNF. Figure III-6

highlights some of these factors.

d. To effectively and efficiently plan with

a MNF, the JFC must recognize and accept

the differences between US and MNFs and

work to develop a harmonizing approach to

the planning effort. The JFC must make

MNFs feel as if they are part of a team. Where

possible, the JFC should develop

standardization procedures to reduce

uncertainty among MNFs. A lexicon of

mutually agreed upon terminology should be

developed and distributed to ensure

enhanced operability and maximum

understanding by all militaries, NGOs,

Figure III-6. Planning Factors for Multinational Forces

PLANNING FACTORS FOR

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Force capabilities

Command, control, and communications--will there be

problems with transfer of authority?

Logistics--will the United States have to provide support and

to what extent?

Level of training

Deployment capability--will US transportation assets be

required?

Procedures for collecting, dissemination, and sharing

intelligence (information)

Status of existing agreements--have there already been

agreements established that the joint task force will be

expected to support?

"Degree of risk"--what is acceptable to multinational forces

(may be politically driven)?

Cultural and historical background

Force capabilities

Command, control, and communications--will there be

problems with transfer of authority?

Logistics--will the United States have to provide support and

to what extent?

Level of training

Deployment capability--will US transportation assets be

required?

Procedures for collecting, dissemination, and sharing

intelligence (information)

Status of existing agreements--have there already been

agreements established that the joint task force will be

expected to support?

"Degree of risk"--what is acceptable to multinational forces

(may be politically driven)?

Cultural and historical background
III-31

Planning Civil-Military Operations

combined command’s POL-MIL objectives.

They include objectives and policies for the

conduct of CMO. Army CA personnel may

provide staff augmentation for joint or

combined headquarters in support of

multinational CMO. US military standard

staff planning and coordination as well as

interagency coordination activities are the

most likely mission support activities that CA

elements will undertake in the joint or

combined environment. Senior level

combatant command or Service component

plans, policies and programs teams are best

suited for conducting joint/combined

operations due to the rank and experience of

these team members.

For further details concerning operating with

multinational forces, refer to JP 3-16, Joint

Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

17. Consequence Management

Operations

a. CM includes those measures taken to

protect public health and safety, restore

essential public services, and provide

emergency relief to victims of, or individuals

threatened by the consequences of a chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN)

accident or incident. CM may occur before

or after the occurrence of a CBRN event. CM

includes planning, assessment, and actions to

identify, organize, and transport emergency

responders, supplies, and equipment to an

event site.

b. When an incident occurs, the CM

process continues until surviving casualties

become patients, the threat of further

casualties has been minimized, FHA is being

provided, and local public safety has been

reestablished. At that juncture, the CM

process can be terminated and restoration

activities may begin.

“I believe the proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction presents the

greatest threat that the world has ever

known. We are finding more and more

countries who are acquiring technology

— not only missile technology — and

are developing chemical weapons and

biological weapons capabilities to be

used in theater and also on a long

range basis. So I think that is perhaps

the greatest threat that any of us will

face in the coming years.”

William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense

c. CM will be planned and executed for

locations within US territory and in foreign

countries as directed by the NCA. Support of

domestic CM will be provided through the

United States Joint Forces Command as

MSCA. CM overseas will be coordinated

through the US Department of State’s

Consequence Management Program, with

assistance to a particular foreign government

coordinated through the appropriate US

embassy. The geographic combatant

commander within whose AOR the accident

occurs will be the embassy’s primary military

point of contact.

d. JFCs provide CM guidance in plans and

orders.

For further CM guidance, refer to PDD-39,

U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, PDD-56,

Managing Complex Contingency Operations,

PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional

Threats to the Homeland and American

Overseas, CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support

to Foreign Consequence Management

Operations, JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-07.7, Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Domestic Support Operations.
III-32

Chapter III

JP 3-57

18. Termination and Transition

Operations (Exit Strategy

— POL-MIL Plan, if

developed)

“Before forces are committed, JFCs

[joint force commanders] must know

how the NCA [National Command

Authorities] intends to terminate the

operation and ensure its outcomes

endure. . . . During postconflict

operations, JFCs may transfer control

to other authorities and redeploy

forces. JFCs should identify

postconflict requirements as early as

possible so as to facilitate transition and

to permit the simultaneous

redeployment of forces no longer

required.”

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations

a. Termination or transition occurs when

either the mission has been accomplished or

when the NCA so directs. CMO planners play

a major role in termination and transition.

• If developed, an interagency POL-MIL

plan under PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, will provide a

comprehensive end state and transition

exit strategy to guide follow-on planning.

• Criteria for termination or transition

may be based on events, MOE and/or

success, availability of resources, or a

specific date. A successful harvest or

restoration of critical facilities in the crisis

area are examples of events that might

trigger termination of the mission. An

acceptable drop in mortality rates, a

certain percentage of dislocated civilians

returned to their homes, or a given

decrease in threat activity against the

FHA operation are statistical criteria that

may prompt the end of US forces’

involvement.

• When other organizations (such as

international organizations, HN, UN,

NGO, LFA, OFDA, FEMA, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, and state or local

government) have marshalled the

necessary capabilities to assume the

mission, US forces may execute a

transition plan.

• Transition may occur between the US

joint force, another military force (e.g.,

United States, multinational, or affected

country), regional organization, the

United Nations, or civilian organizations.

A detailed plan addressing the various

FHA functions and to whom they will

transition will greatly reduce the turmoil

typically associated with transition. A

comprehensive transition plan includes

specific requirements for all elements

involved in the transition, summarizes

capabilities and assets, and assigns

specific responsibilities.

•• An unclassified transition plan written

in easily understood terms is particularly

required when transitioning to

nonmilitary organizations. Organizing

the plan by specific FHA functions (such

as provision of food, restoration of

facilities, and health services) also

enhances the transition.

•• The joint force staff should

periodically review the transition plan

with all organizations that have a part in

it. This will help ensure that planning

assumptions are still valid, and determine

if changes in the situation require changes

in the transition plan.

• Termination plans should cover transition

to post-disaster or emergency activities

and conditions, as well as disposition

of military forces. OPORDs and
III-33

Planning Civil-Military Operations

termination plans should be prepared

simultaneously and in conjunction with

the deployment plan, with the termination

plan serving as a supporting plan to the

OPORD. See Figure III-7 for a sample

checklist for termination planning.

b. Transition Planning. CMO planners

play a major role in transition planning and,

based on their expertise, may be the best group

to perform this function. In order for these

planners to accomplish this task, a clearly

identifiable end state and transition or

termination criteria for the operation must be

developed.

• Transition planning is an integral part of

operation planning and mission analysis.

• Transferring control of an operation from

US military to a nonmilitary organization

or another military force requires detailed

planning and execution. Mission

analysis (analysis of mission statement),

Figure III-7. Sample Checklist for Termination Planning

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR

TERMINATION PLANNING

Has the end state been achieved?

Have stated operations objectives been accomplished?

Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered,

and how do they influence termination planning?

Has the joint force commander identified postconflict

requirements?

What are

the force protection requirements?

What additional support will be required for redeployment?

What is the policy for redeployment ? What is the relationship

between postconflict requirements and the redeployment of

the joint force?

What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the

joint force?

Has the coordination for redeployment of the joint force been conducted

with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?

Has consideration been given as to when Reserve Component forces will

be released?

Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations

are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, United

Nations, or civilian organization?

What arrangements have been made with other organizations to

accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be

humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

Will the joint force be expected to support these types of activities?

Can forces be safely withdrawn from the joint operations area?
III-34

Chapter III

JP 3-57

an identifiable end state, interagency

POL-MIL plan (if developed), and the

national policy will all play an important

role in the transition process.

Transferring control of an operation is

situationally dependent and each one will

possess different characteristics and

requirements.

• Transition planning must be initiated

during the initial phases of operation

planning to ensure adequate attention is

placed in this critical area — plan for

transition when planning for intervention.

• As the redeployment phase for US forces

approaches, it is important that force

protection remain the number one

priority. The redeployment phase of the

operation can be the most hazardous in

force protection, because the tactical

focus tends to shift toward redeployment

and away from task force protection.

• Areas that will impact significantly on

the development of a transition plan are:

•• Identification of issues;

•• Key events (past and present);

•• Work required to accomplish the

transition; and

•• A thorough knowledge of the

organization or force taking over control

of the operation.

• The issues in Figure III-8 may have an

impact on transition planning.

• CA will play an integral role in both

transition planning and the process. In

any major operation, there will be

significant interface with and impact

upon the civilian populace and the local

government. CA personnel must insure

Figure III-8. Transition Criteria Issues

TRANSITION CRITERIA ISSUES

Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

Who will fund the transition?

What US forces, equipment, supplies, or other resources will remain

behind?

Who will support US forces that remain behind?

Can intelligence be shared with incoming force or organization?

Will new rules of engagement be established?

Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?

Will joint force engineer projects be halted?

Will the United States be expected to provide communications

capabilities of the incoming force or organization?
III-35

Planning Civil-Military Operations

that the gains made in this area are not

lost in the transition process. CA

planners must be involved in transition

planning from the beginning. The

CMOC prepares to hand over its role as

the facilitator between US forces and

international organizations, NGOs, other

USG agencies, and local government

agencies. CMOC personnel prepare a

transition plan that includes all ongoing

projects and coordination, points of

contact for all agencies with which the

CMOC has worked, possible resources,

and any other information that may

facilitate the transition process.

CMOC is discussed in more depth in

Chapter IV, “Interagency Coordination.”

• All CMO assets involved in a mission

must be prepared to assist in the planning

and execution of transition operations. It

is imperative that all teams and/or

sections develop historical files to aid in

the transition process. The transition

process must be considered from the

initial planning of the mission.

• Figure III-9 depicts a sample checklist

for transition planning.

19. Complex Contingency

Operations

a. PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, was initiated to

integrate the political, military, humanitarian,

economic, and other dimensions of USG

planning for complex contingencies.

b. PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, defines complex

contingency operations as peace operations

such as the peace accord implementation

operation conducted by the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia (1995-

present) and the humanitarian intervention in

northern Iraq called Operation PROVIDE

COMFORT (1991) and FHA operations, such

as Operation SUPPORT HOPE in central

Africa (1994) and Operation SEA ANGEL

in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise

directed, PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, does not apply to

domestic disaster relief or to a relatively

routine or small-scale operation, nor to

military operations conducted in defense of

US citizens, territory, or property, including

counterterrorism and hostage-rescue

operations and foreign internal armed conflict.

In recent situations as diverse as Haiti,

Somalia, Northern Iraq, and the former

Yugoslavia, the United States has engaged in

complex contingency operations in coalitions,

either under the auspices of an international

or regional organization or in ad hoc,

temporary coalitions of like-minded states.

While never relinquishing the capability to

respond unilaterally, PDD-56, Managing

Complex Contingency Operations, assumes

that the United States will continue to conduct

future operations in coalitions whenever

possible.

c. There is a direct link between complex

contingency operations and CMO. The intent

of PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, is to synchronize

and coordinate the operations of agencies

through effective interagency management

at the strategic level and using special

mechanisms, most notably a POL-MIL

plan. Integrated planning and effective

management of agency operations early in an

operation provide an interagency framework

at the national strategic level for follow-on

theater and operational level planning, avoids

delays, reduces pressure on the military to

expand its involvement in unplanned ways,

and creates unity of effort within an operation

that is essential for success of the mission.

d. Planning and preparations for CMO at

the operational level should reflect the

considerations set forth in the operations POLMIL plan as outlined at the strategic level in
III-36

Chapter III

JP 3-57

PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency

Operations. More than combat operations,

CMO can benefit from existing two-way

communication between these levels. A

combatant commander’s intent and guidance

for CMO should not be promulgated without

input from the POL-MIL plan. Conversely,

the POL-MIL plan will provide utility and

functionality to a JTF when it incorporates

Figure III-9. Sample Checklist for Transition Planning

capabilities, constraints, and ideas from the

field before it is promulgated. Such

coordination assures synchronization and

unity of effort for both the strategic and

operational objectives or end state. While no

formal process has been established for this

exchange under PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, it is to the advantage

of theater and JTF headquarters to register

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR

TRANSITION PLANNING

Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

Has the joint force's end state been accomplished?

Who will fund for the transition?

What is the new mission?

What US forces, equipment, and/or supplies will remain behind?

What will be the command relationship for US forces that remain behind?

What will be the communications requirements for US forces that remain

behind?

Who will support US forces that remain behind?

Can intelligence be shared with the incoming force or organization?

Will new rules of engagement be established?

Will ongoing operations (e.g., engineer projects) be discontinued or

interrupted?

Will the United States be expected to provide communications capability

to the incoming force or organization?

Will the incoming force or organization use the same headquarters facility

as the joint force?

What is the policy for redeployment of the joint force?

Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who

provides it?

How will the turnover be accomplished?

Who will handle public affairs for the transition?

Have redeployment airlift and sealift arrangements been approved and

passed to the United States Transportation Command?
III-37

Planning Civil-Military Operations

views from the operational level with the Joint

Staff as early as possible in this

comprehensive, civil-military planning

process.

“The need for complex contingency

operations is likely to recur in future

years, demanding varying degrees of

US involvement. PDD-56 [Presidential

Decision Directive-56] calls for all US

Government agencies to

institutionalize what we have learned

from our recent experiences and to

continue the process of improving the

planning and management of complex

contingency operations. PDD-56 is

designed to ensure that the lessons

learned — including proven planning

processes and implementation

mechanisms — will be incorporated

into the interagency process on a

regular basis. The PDD’s intent is to

establish these management practices

to achieve unity of effort among US

Government agencies and

international organizations engaged in

complex contingency operations.”

Synopsis

Presidential Decision Directive-56,

Managing Complex Contingency

Operations

For an overview of PDD-56, refer to Appendix

B, “Presidential Decision Directive-56,

Managing Complex Contingency

Operations.”

20. Planning Civil Affairs

Activities

CA activities are inherently civil-military

in nature and while they are integral parts of

CMO and MCA, they are there own separate

entity. CA activities are characterized by

applications of functional specialties in areas

normally the responsibility of indigenous

government or civil authority. CA activities

may extend to assumption of governmental

functions required in an occupied territory

during or immediately subsequent to

hostilities. Refer to Appendix C, “Planning

Considerations for Civil Affairs Activities.”

See JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs,

for more information on CA activities.
III-38

Chapter III

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER IV

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

IV-1

1. General

In CMO, interagency coordination may be

one of the top priorities. By understanding

the interagency process, JFCs will be better

able to appreciate their role in it. An

appreciation of the skills and resources of

various USG agencies and an understanding

of how they interact with NGOs, international

organizations, and regional organizations are

critical to mission accomplishment. Civilmilitary relations can create economic,

political, and social stability as they encourage

the development of the affected nation’s

materiel and human resources. JFCs utilize

Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of

plans and orders to provide guidance for

incorporating the interagency community into

military operations.

a. Interagency Operations at the

National Level

• The integration of political, economic,

civil, and military objectives and the

subsequent translation of these

objectives into demonstrable action

have always been essential to success

at all levels of operations.

• The new, rapidly changing global

environment that is characterized by

regional instability, the challenges

of pluralistic governments, and

unconventional threats will require even

greater interagency cooperation within a

fully functioning civil-military

“US Armed Forces as a whole must be multi-mission capable; interoperable

among all elements of US Services and selected foreign militaries; and able

to coordinate operations with other agencies of government, and some civil

institutions.”

National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997

relationship. Military operations must

be synchronized with those of other

agencies of the USG, as well as with

foreign forces, NGOs, international

organizations, and regional

organizations. These actions must be

mutually supporting and proceed in a

logical sequence. In order to successfully

undertake interagency operations, the

roles and relationships among various

Federal agencies, combatant commands,

state and local governments, Country

Teams, and engaged organizations must

be clearly understood.

“. . . two attributes of [military]

operations other than war that are likely

to influence command and control and

thus affect directly the outcome of the

mission: the absence of an obvious

continuum or linear relationship

between the strategic, operational, and

tactical consequences of action, and

the requirement for interagency

coordination, even at relatively low

echelons. The article uses the 1992

Los Angeles riots to illustrate some of

the unique characteristics of this type

of mission: the situation was

‘amorphous and ambiguous,’ the use

of force was greatly restrained,

coordination with nonmilitary entities

was often required at battalion and

lower echelons, and political

considerations governed military

actions at even the individual level.”

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Lessons in Command and Control

from the Los Angeles Riots
IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

• Interagency coordination forges the vital

link between the military and the

economic, political and/or diplomatic,

and informational entities of the USG as

well as NGOs and international

organizations. Successful interagency

coordination and planning enables these

agencies, departments, and organizations

to mount a coherent and efficient

collective operation — unity of effort

must be achieved.

“Planning frequently will have to be

accomplished in an ambiguous

environment. Crises will arrive quickly

and require a rapid response, often in

the absence of coalition consensus or

complete US political guidance. But,

the United States cannot afford

improvised responses to crises. To

prevent ‘ad hocery,’ the United States

must develop a sound and rigorous

policymaking apparatus and process,

and adhere to it. The interagency

process must be made to work

routinely in an effective manner.”

William T. Johnsen

Strategic Study Institute

Pandora’s Box Reopened: Ethnic

Conflict in Europe and Its

Implications

• The common thread throughout all

major operations, whether in war or

MOOTW, is the broad range of

agencies — many with indispensable

practical competencies and major legal

responsibilities — that interact with the

Armed Forces of the United States.

• The intrinsic nature of interagency

coordination demands that planners

consider all instruments of national

power and recognize which agencies

are best qualified to employ these

instruments to achieve the objective.

This consideration is especially necessary

because the security challenges facing the

United States today are growing in

complexity, requiring the skills and

resources of many organizations.

• Because the solution to a problem

seldom, if ever, resides within the

capability of just one agency, campaign

plans, OPLANs, or OPORDs must be

developed to leverage the core

competencies of all available agencies,

synchronizing their efforts with military

capabilities toward a single objective.

The NCA employ the Armed Forces of

the United States when they have deemed

it necessary to use military means to

promote national interests. The use of

the military instrument of national

power as a component of the national

security strategy takes the form of

military objectives. These objectives

need to be coordinated with associated

diplomatic, economic, and

informational objectives. The military

instrument often plays a supporting

role to other national agencies.

Understanding how military

coordination efforts interface with other

organizations toward mission

accomplishment is key to the success in

joint operations and unified actions.

“It is essential to appreciate the

strength of what I call bureaucratic

faultlines-policy areas where agencies

have overlapping responsibilities and

very distinctive institutional interests

and perspectives. The most important

faultline of this sort occurs at the

intersection of political and military

affairs. . . . What is required is not

coordination in an administrative or

technical sense but the integration of

divergent (and sometimes mutually

antagonistic) perspectives through the

active exercise of strategic thought.”

Carnes Lord

Strategy and Organization at the

National Level, Grand Strategy and

the Decisionmaking Process
IV-3

Interagency Coordination

• Each organization brings its own

culture, philosophy, goals, practices,

and skills to the interagency table. This

diversity is the strength of the interagency

process, providing a cross-section of

expertise, skills, and abilities. In one

coordinated forum, the process integrates

many views, capabilities, and options.

b. Procedures for Effective Cooperation

• The Administrator of USAID usually is

designated as the USG humanitarian

assistance coordinator for emergency

response. However, various agencies’

different and sometimes conflicting

goals, policies, procedures, and decision

making techniques make unity of effort

a challenge. Some NGOs may, in fact,

have policies that are purposely

antithetical to both the US military forces

and USG agencies. Although there is

no overarching interagency doctrine

that delineates or dictates the

relationships and procedures

governing all agencies, departments,

and organizations in interagency

operations, PDD-56, Managing

Complex Contingency Operations,

provides an overview of the management

and planning of complex contingency

operations under the direction of the

Deputies Committee. Nor is there an

overseeing organization to ensure that the

myriad of agencies, departments, and

organizations have the capability and the

tools to work together. Moreover, PDD2, Organization of the National Security

Council, provides that other senior

officials shall be invited to attend

meetings of the NSC where appropriate.

PDD-2, Organization of the National

Security Council, creates a hierarchy of

interagency committees, from the

Principals Committee and, under it, the

Deputies Committee, to Interagency

Working Groups, which are established

by the Deputies Committee as needed.

• The interagency process often is

described as “more art than science,”

while military operations tend to depend

on structure and doctrine. However,

some of the techniques, procedures, and

systems of military C2 can assist in

obtaining unity of effort if they are

adjusted to the dynamic world of

interagency operations. Unity of effort

can only be achieved through close,

continuous interagency and

interdepartmental coordination and

cooperation, which are necessary to

overcome confusion over objectives,

inadequate structure or procedures, and

bureaucratic and personal limitations. At

the combatant command level, the

political advisor (POLAD) or foreign

policy advisor (FPA) to the commander

can be of great assistance in interagency

coordination. Each combatant command

is allocated an Army CA Command

staffed with functional experts in a range

of critical civilian skills. The civil sector

functional experts are knowledgeable in

working with the civilian agencies

responsible for their functional sector. As

such they are already experienced in the

responsibilities of such agencies.

c. Political Advisor and/or Foreign

Policy Advisor

• Frequently, the Department of State

assigns geographic combatant

commands a POLAD or FPA. This

person provides diplomatic considerations

and enables informal linkage with

embassies in the AOR and with the

Department of State.

• The POLAD and/or FPA supplies

information regarding policy goals and

objectives of the Department of State that

are relevant to the geographic combatant

commander’s theater strategy.
IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

• The POLAD and/or FPA provides the

commander the following additional

capabilities:

•• Uses regional knowledge and

language skills to assist the combatant

commander in translating political

objectives into military strategy;

•• Coordinates with, and facilitates

cooperation between, the primary US

political and military personnel or their

designated representatives; and

•• Moves more freely and works more

easily with different participants than

military personnel.

• Under certain circumstances, a JTF also

may have a POLAD and/or FPA, as

occurred in Haiti.

d. Interagency Structure in Foreign

Countries

• The Chief of Mission (COM) (i.e., the

Ambassador) has authority over all

elements of the USG in country, except

forces assigned to a combatant command.

Other key USG organizations in place

within most nations include the US

Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and

the Unified States Defense

Representative — both part of the

Country Team. In some countries, a

single military office may perform these

two functions. Security assistance

organizations also perform important

functions. It is important to understand

the differences between these agencies

in theater interagency coordination.

• Chief of Mission. As discussed, the

COM is the senior representative of the

President in a foreign nation and is

responsible for policy decisions and the

activities of USG employees in the

country. The COM integrates the

programs and resources of all USG

agencies represented on the Country

Team. The COM has extraordinary

authority and a de facto coordinating

mechanism that can be tailored to each

crisis as it arises, based upon the

substance of the problem with little need

for written rules. COMs must interact

daily with the Department of State’s

strategic-level planners and decision

makers. Additionally, the COM

functions at both the operational and

tactical levels where recommendations

and considerations for crisis action

planning are provided directly to the

geographic combatant commander and

subordinate JFCs. While forces in the

field under a geographic combatant

command are exempt from the COM’s

statutory authority, the COM’s

political role is important to the success

of military operations involving

Armed Forces.

•• US Defense Attaché Office. Service

attaches comprise the USDAO. The

Defense Attaché normally is the senior

Service attaché assigned to the embassy.

While keeping the combatant

commander informed of their activities,

Defense Attaches are rated and funded

by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

These attachés are valuable liaisons to

their HN counterparts. The attachés also

serve the Ambassador and coordinate

with, and represent, their respective

Military Departments on Service matters.

The attachés assist the FID program by

exchanging information with the

combatant commander’s staff on HN

military, social, economic, and political

conditions.

•• Security Assistance Organization.

These are Department of Defense

elements located in a foreign country

with assigned responsibilities for

carrying out SA management functions.
IV-5

Interagency Coordination

These include military assistance

advisory groups, military missions and

groups, offices of defense and military

cooperation, liaison groups, and defense

attaché personnel designated to perform

SA functions.

• The Country Team. The Country

Team system provides the foundation

for rapid interagency consultation,

coordination, and action on

recommendations from the field and

effective execution of US missions,

programs, and policies. The Country

Team typically includes political,

economic, administrative, and consular

officers as well as a PA officer, regional

security officer, and communications

staff. Attachés from the Department of

Defense, Department of Agriculture, and

other USG agencies, as well as the United

States Defense Representative, often are

represented on the team, as is USAID

(Office of Transition Initiatives, Food for

Peace, OFDA, and other USAID

personnel also may play key roles) in

country. The Country Team often is less

than adequate for every need. It may not

exist (e.g., Cuba), or it may be inoperative

due to damage or casualties from a

natural or manmade disaster. The

relationship with military chains of

command is frequently ad hoc.

Coordination is necessary to better

achieve unity of effort.

•• The Country Team concept

encourages agencies to coordinate their

plans and operations and keep one

another and the COM informed of their

activities.

•• Although the US area military

commander (the combatant commander

or a subordinate) is not a member of the

diplomatic mission, the commander may

participate or be represented in meetings

and coordination conducted by the

Country Team.

•• The JFC should request that a joint

force liaison officer participate in a

Country Team’s meetings, when

appropriate.

For further detail on interagency

coordination at the national level, refer

to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination

During Joint Operations.

“For all our experience and

compassion, we in the relief and

development business do not have the

capacity to deal with such large-scale

catastrophes without help. Help from

the military is not something we should

begin to take for granted or rely upon

in all cases. But there are extraordinary

circumstances that call for responses

— manpower, equipment, expertise,

transport and communication capacity

— that only the military can deploy.”

Philip Johnston, President and

Chief Executive Officer, CARE

2. Civil-Military Relations

a. Civilian Relief and Development

Assets. Military forces characteristically

arrive “late in the day” in a complex

contingency operation. Both UN and nonUN international organizations have typically

been working in the affected area for months

or years. International organizations that have

been doing development work usually shift

or are augmented by emergency international

organizations to deal with the onset of a

complex humanitarian emergency. The

international community has mandated

specific international organizations with

operational responsibilities and

accountabilities in the relief and development

sectors. In general these international

organizations discharge their accountabilities

best when they fund and implement the bulk
IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

of their programs through competent NGOs,

as opposed to implementation through

sometimes problematical host-government

ministries. International organizations,

especially the UN operational agencies

(UNHCR; World Food Program; United

Nations Children’s Fund; and UNHCHR), are

accountable to emergency victims and the

international community for the success of the

overall operation. NGOs, however, normally

have only a limited financial accountability

to their source of funding, i.e., lead

international organizations, donor

governments, and/or private contributors.

This legally mandated system of responsibility

and accountability within the civilian asset

structure can be disciplined and made to

function best when:

• Concerned governments, especially

donor states, respect the accountability

mandates they have assigned to

international organizations, make the

bulk of their financial contributions

follow these mandates, and hold these

international organizations accountable.

• Proliferation of unfocused, unsuitable

implementing NGOs is controlled

through a formal tripartite accreditation

process involving the NGO, the host

country, and the lead UN emergency

organization.

• Military personnel view the accountable

international organizations as their

primary supported agencies and contacts

and view NGOs as the implementing

agency tier of the larger international

organizations framework.

b. The Nature of NGOs. Many NGOs

have established strong reputations for

professional performance and good

stewardship of increasingly scarce resources.

While some NGOs are multi-purpose, most

specialize in sectors such as emergency relief

(including food, health services, sanitation,

and self-reliance sub-specialties),

rehabilitation and development, or advocacy

(e.g., early warning, prevention, international

organizations reform, human rights). NGO

funding during the Cold War came largely

from private sources, with significant amounts

of operational costs underwritten by the

international organizations with which they

partnered. After the Cold War, there has been

a marked shift to direct government funding

of NGOs — for example, from the USAID in

the United States and from the European

Community Humanitarian Office in Western

Europe. This funding shift, together with

difficulties in enforcing UN agency

accountabilities, has served to complicate the

civil-military interface for military

commanders and CA personnel.

c. The Civil-Military Interface. Military

personnel must adhere to the following

principles when dealing with NGOs:

• Military personnel need to understand

and try to facilitate the principles of

civilian operational and financial

accountability as they apply to

international organizations and NGOs.

• Civilian agencies possess comparative

operational advantages for emergency

relief work. Also, military costs average

ten times the cost for civilian agencies to

perform the same relief functions.

• The range of tasks military personnel

could legitimately be called upon to

perform should be part of the civilian

mission planning process at the

highest national and/or international

organizations levels. Views of

operational level commanders must be

solicited and discussed at this early stage,

rather than after deployment.

• Legitimate military tasks that must be

considered in the mission-planning phase

include:
IV-7

Interagency Coordination

•• Protection (going beyond force

protection to possible protection of

civilian relief and human rights workers,

protection of relief LOCs and relief

operation sites, (health services and

food); and, exceptionally, protection of

emergency victims);

•• Logistics (long haul transport of such

time-sensitive items as civilian water

purification capabilities and, by

exception, retail transport of relief articles

and personnel while the civilian transport

system is catching up);

•• Engineer and communication

services (restoration, maintenance of

relief LOCs, short-term communications,

air traffic control, and airport

management services — again, while

civilian capabilities are catching up).

• Complex humanitarian emergencies

often are accompanied by a rapid influx

of NGOs. Current laxness in civilian

accreditation and accountability

standards may result in excessive

independent action on the part of some

NGOs. These problems are best resolved

through direct military contact with the

lead and/or accountable international

organizations or with national

government (both donor and host)

representatives in theater — rather than

attempting to correct the offending NGOs

directly.

• Military information on threats and

logistic matters can be especially useful

to international organizations and NGOs

and should be shared as much as possible.

While some international

organizations and NGOs may be

reluctant to share similarly vital

information with the military, it is

worth attempting to cultivate a climate

of respect and trust to facilitate such

exchanges. International organizations

and NGOs are uniquely suited to help

the military regarding local conditions

due to their long familiarity with the

people and the region.

• Sharply differing civilian and military

perspectives usually mitigate against

achieving a common operating culture.

However, military acceptance that

civilian tasks in many modern

emergencies constitute the main

operational effort and military tasks

are in support of this main effort can

assist greatly in achieving a compatible

culture in the field.

• It is important that each member of the

civil-military organization act impartially

with respect to factions and parties to civil

strife. FHA must be rendered to all

victims on an impartial basis.

• Intense civil-military communication and

coordination is vital throughout all the

phases of mission planning, deployment,

operations, and transition (exit). Any

attempt to substitute compartmentalized

civilian and military planning and

operations for comprehensive campaign

planning virtually decrees prolongation

and/or failure of overall mission

accomplishment and indeterminate delay

in permitting the military component to

make an exit.

3. Organizing for Interagency

Operations

CMO involve the interaction between

civilian organizations with military

organizations. JFCs will need to establish

coordination mechanisms with the civilian

organizations. Some coordination can be

accomplished by forming a CMOC where

civilian organizations can send their

representatives to coordinate with the military

force. However, the CMOC has inherent

limitations and cannot meet all of the civil-
IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

military coordination requirements of the JFC.

Depending on the situation, the JFC may

dispatch military personnel to civilian

organizations to serve on civilian-led

coordinating groups. Other times, the JFC

may need to establish a functionally-oriented

military-led coordination group. Civilian

groups should lead those coordinating groups

that are primarily involved in achieving civil

objectives. The military should take the lead

in forming groups involving military

objectives.

Civil military coordination will need to be

accomplished at all applicable levels. While

the military makes a distinction between

strategic, operational, and tactical levels,

civilian organizations, however, may not make

such distinctions and may have the same

individuals representing the organizations at

more than one level.

The military may need to participate or

to be an observer in a number of civil-sector

functional groups. Some groups may be

existing groups. Others may have been

formed specifically in response to the crisis

by civilian organizations. The military may

also form a military-led coordinating group

or facilitate the formation of a civilian-led

functional coordinating group if one does not

exist for a vital functional area.

Functional coordinating groups may be

needed to be formed for each of the civil

sector functional areas. Further, sub-groups

may be formed to coordinate a specific issue

or project. For example, the group

coordinating infrastructure repair may have a

separate working group concentrating on just

the reopening of an airport. Potential

coordinating groups are: Governance

Coordinating Group; Civil Security

Coordinating Group; Humanitarian

Coordinating Group (e.g., the Humanitarian

Operations Center (HOC) and the

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination

Center); Economic and Commerce

Coordinating Group; Social and Cultural

Coordinating Group; Information

Coordinating Group; and Infrastructure

Coordinating Group.

Several temporary staff organizations can

be established to support the joint force during

interagency operations. Examples of such

organizations follow.

a. Historically, a number of ad hoc or

tailored staff organizations have been

implemented to meet the requirement for the

JFCs role in interagency operations. During

the deliberate planning cycle, commanders at

all levels should consider the potential

structure and manning necessary to meet the

increased demands of the interagency process.

An interagency staff framework that is

planned, coordinated and exercised under the

deliberate planning cycle would significantly

ease staff actions during crisis action planning.

National objectives can no longer be

unilaterally attained by any one government

entity. The interagency process is designed

to ensure coherent, unified strategic and

operational objectives for multiple agencies.

b. Humanitarian Operations Center

• The HOC is primarily an international

and interagency policy making and

coordinating body that does not exercise

C2 but seeks to achieve unity of effort

among all participants in a large FHA

operation. Close joint force coordination

with the affected country, UN, and other

key members of the humanitarian relief

community forms the core of FHA

operations. Effective coordination is the

key to successful turnover of FHA

responsibilities to the affected country

or UN, NGOs, and international

organizations.

• The HOC normally is established under

the direction of the government of the

affected country or the UN, or possibly
IV-9

Interagency Coordination

OFDA during a US unilateral operation.

HOCs, especially those established by

the UN, are horizontally structured

organizations with no C2 authority,

and all members are ultimately

responsible to their own organizations or

countries.

• A HOC may be established by an HN

government that is fully in charge, yet

has a limited capacity to coordinate

massive international (civil and military)

assistance. Most countries have an

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to

manage disaster response within its

borders. When it becomes apparent that

the magnitude of a disaster will exceed

the HN’s capacity to manage it

unilaterally, it may want to establish a

HOC to facilitate the coordination of

international aid. The HOC director will

be from the HN in these cases and will

establish priorities for international

(military and civil) assistance in close

coordination with the EOC. The HOC

may collocate with the EOC to facilitate

information sharing and coordination.

Typically, over the course of the relief

effort, international military assistance

will phase out over time in favor of

international relief organizations (NGOs

and international organizations), and the

HOC would be stood down as the nature

of the response ultimately falls within the

management capacity of the EOC or

designated HN ministry/agency.

• The HOC coordinates the overall relief

strategy; identifies logistic requirements

for NGOs, UN, and other international

organizations; and identifies, prioritizes,

and submits requests for military support

to a joint force through the CMOC.

•• During large-scale FHAoperations,

a HOC may be established to

accomplish this coordination. The

country affected by a disaster and in need

of FHA normally will have a ministry

designated as the senior point of

coordination for all FHA activities.

Ministries involved could include the

Ministry of Health, Ministry of

Defense, or an emergency

management office within a ministry.

These ministries will establish the priority

needs for their country and solicit

assistance bilaterally or through the UN

for international assistance from donor

countries and relief organizations.

•• In a failed state situation, such as

Somalia (1993) or Rwanda (1994), the

UN may have the responsibility to

establish overall coordination of the FHA

effort. Increasing representation and

participation from the various relief

agencies and donor countries at the

HOC will better coordinate FHA

efforts.

•• The HOC should consist of

representatives from the affected country,

the US Embassy or Consulate, joint force

(most likely from the CMOC), OFDA,

UN, NGOs, international organizations,

and other major players in the operation.

The structure of a HOC can be formal or

informal.

•• HOCs may have political significance

and authority when directed by the

affected country, or may be less intrusive

if established by the UN. The HOC

normally is collocated with the

appropriate lead or UN headquarters

conducting the operation.

• HOCs may establish working groups

and committees based on the FHA

situation. These groups and committees

discuss and resolve issues including relief

material prioritization, health services,

sanitation, health, and other related areas.
IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

• The UN may establish a structure called

the On-Site Operations Coordination

Center (OSOCC) as a support

organization to a HOC. The OSOCC

assists in gathering, evaluating, collating,

and disseminating HOC information.

The OSOCC also may provide

facilitation services for HOC meetings.

• An end state goal of the HOC is to create

an environment in which the HN, UN,

and NGOs can assume full responsibility

for the security and operation of the entire

relief effort.

For further detail concerning a HOC,

refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign

Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-08,

Interagency Coordination During Joint

Operations.

c. Humanitarian Assistance

Coordination Center (HACC)

• Effective coordination is the key to

successful turnover of FHA

responsibilities to the affected country or

the UN, NGOs, and international

organizations. In an FHA operation,

the combatant command’s crisis

action organization may organize as a

HACC. The HACC assists with

interagency coordination and planning,

providing the critical link between the

combatant commander and other USG

agencies, NGOs, and international and

regional organizations that may

participate in an FHA operation at the

strategic level. Normally, the HACC is

a temporary body that operates during

the early planning and coordination

stages of the operation. Once a CMOC

or HOC has been established, the role of

the HACC diminishes, and its functions

are accomplished through the normal

organization of the combatant

command’s staff and crisis action

organization. If a combatant commander

chooses to organize a HACC, liaisons

from other USG agencies (e.g., USAID

and/or OFDA and US Public Health

Service), US Army Corps of Engineers

representatives, key NGOs, international

and regional organizations, and host

country agencies also may be members

of the HACC in large scale FHA

operations.

d. Civil-Military Operations Center

• A joint force must be able to work with

all organizations and groups to

accomplish a mission. A relationship

must be developed between military

forces, USG agencies, civilian

authorities, involved international and

regional organizations, NGOs,

international organizations, and the

population.

• Conceptually, the CMOC is the meeting

place of these elements. Not a new

concept, the CMOC has been effectively

employed as a means to coordinate civil

and military operations and plays an

execution role. The organization of the

CMOC is theater- and missiondependent — flexible in size and

composition. A commander at any

echelon may establish a CMOC to

facilitate coordination with other

agencies, departments, organizations, and

the HN. In fact, more than one CMOC

may be established in an operational area

(such as occurred in Rwanda), and each

is task-organized based on the mission.

• The transition from conflict to post

conflict or during FHA may require the

supported commander to shift support

priorities toward accomplishment of the

CMO mission.
IV-11

Interagency Coordination

“Possibly the most practical

mechanism for ensuring coherence

and cooperation is the CMOC [the civilmilitary operations center] . . . the civilmilitary operations center attached to

a Joint Task Force, where operational

contact in the field between military and

humanitarian participants in complex

emergencies can take place. As many

of you know, there is no ‘one size fits

all’ for the CMOC. The way a

commander makes use of it depends

on the situation. Commanders have

used the CMOC to reach out to hostcountry nationals in a locality as well

as to NGO [nongovernmental

organizations] and international

organizations, to offer a forum for airing

problems as well as a vehicle for

shaping expectations realistically

regarding what forces in the field can

and cannot do. The flexible, situationspecific CMOC may well be the

instrument of choice for broad

international and other coordination in

the field.”

Under Secretary of State

Thomas R. Pickering

Exercise EMERALD EXPRESS 98

• During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in

Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an

OSOCC, which had essentially the same

functions as a CMOC and provided a

clearinghouse for transmitting CMOC

responsibilities to the United Nations. In

Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Civil-Military

Cooperation (CIMIC) Center performs

basically the same functions as a CMOC.

A discussion of CIMIC Center appears

subsequently in this section.

• A CMOC may be formed to:

•• Carry out guidance and JFC decisions

regarding CMO;

•• Exchange information;

•• Perform liaison and coordination

between military capabilities and other

agencies, departments, and organizations

to meet the needs of the populace;

•• Provide a partnership forum for

military and other participating

organizations; and

KEY TERM

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

Established by the geographic combatant commander or

subordinate joint force commander.

May be established by commanders at any echelon as the

situation requires

Coordinates activities of engaged military forces, and other

United States Government agencies, nongovernmental

organizations, host nation, and regional and international

organizations

There is no established structure, and its size and

composition are situation dependent
IV-12

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

•• Receive, validate, and coordinate

requests for support from the NGO and

regional and international organizations.

The CMOC then forwards these requests

to the joint force for action. It is

important to remember that these

organizations may decide to attend

CMOC meetings but may choose not

to consider themselves members of the

CMOC to maintain the perception of

their neutrality. Many of these

organizations consider the CMOC as a

venue for interagency discussions but not

as an interagency forum.

• A CMOC can be tailored to the specific

tasks associated with the collective

national or international mission. In

establishing the CMOC, the JFC should

build it from a nucleus of organic assets

and CA, logistic, legal, and

communications elements. The JFC

should invite representatives of other

agencies that include the following.

•• Liaisons from Service and functional

components and supporting

infrastructure, such as ports and airfields.

•• USAID and/or OFDA representatives.

•• Department of State, Country Team,

and other USG representatives.

•• Military liaison personnel from

participating countries.

•• Host country or local government

agency representatives.

•• Representatives of NGOs and regional

and international organizations (e.g.,

UNHCR and International Committee of

the Red Cross).

•• The composition of a notional CMOC

is illustrated in Figure IV-1. It is not the

intent of this figure to emphasize the

CMOC as the center of coordination for

all activities but rather to illustrate

organizations that a JFC may cooperate

with and hold discussions with

concerning an ongoing operation.

• Political representatives in the CMOC

may provide avenues to satisfy

operational considerations and concerns,

resulting in consistency of military and

political actions. Additionally, the

CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because

it avoids guesswork by providing these

organizations a single-point of

coordination with the military for their

needs, ensuring that the unified efforts

of a joint force and the relief community

are focused when and where they are

most needed. Although US forces may

be latecomers compared to many relief

agencies and international organizations,

they bring considerable resources with

them.

•• It is incumbent on the military not to

dictate what will happen but to coordinate

a team approach to problem resolution.

•• A JFC cannot direct interagency

cooperation among engaged agencies.

However, working together at the CMOC

on issues like security, logistic support,

information sharing, communications,

and other items, can build a cooperative

spirit among all participants.

• The CMOC usually conducts daily

meetings to identify participants capable

of fulfilling needs. Validated requests go

to the appropriate joint force or agency

representative for action.

• Figure IV-2 depicts some of the CMOC

functions.

• A joint force PAO representative should

attend daily CMOC meetings. As an

active member of the CMOC, the PA
IV-13

Interagency Coordination

representative should strive to obtain a

group consensus on messages and press

releases. This will not be an easy task.

However, the PA representative still

should attempt to provide information

that is noncontradictory in nature.

• The officer in charge of the CMOC

typically reports to the CMO officer on

the J-3 staff. He might also be assigned

to the J-3, the chief of staff (COS), or the

commander of the JCMOTF, if

established. During certain operations,

such as the conduct of FHA, the JFC

might assign a deputy commander or the

COS as the Director of the CMOC,

perhaps with another officer assigned

to provide detailed supervision of its

operation. As with any other staff

officer, the CMOC officer requires

access to the JFC based on the situation

and mission.

For further detail concerning a CMOC,

see JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance, JP 3-08, Interagency

Coordination During Joint Operations,

and JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force

Planning Guidance and Procedures.

Figure IV-1. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

NOTIONAL COMPOSITION OF A CIVIL

MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

MILITARY

UNICEF

CARE

World Food

Programme

Doctors of

the World

Department of

Peacekeeping

Operations

Save the

Children

High

Commissioner

for Refugees

International

Rescue

Committee

Other Relief &

Benefit

Organizations

OFDA/DART

Country Team American Red Cross

ICRC

Other Red Cross Bodies

NGO

RED

CMOC

USG

AGENCIES

UN

CARE

CMOC

DART

ICRC

NGO

OFDA

UN

UNICEF

USG

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief

Everywhere

Civil-Military Operations Center

Disaster Assistance Response Team

International Committee of the Red Cross

Nongovernmental Organization

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

United Nations

United Nations Childrens Fund

United States Government
IV-14

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

“If for no other reason than selfinterest, the CMOC [civil-military

operations center] must become the

priority because it represents —

through close coordination with the

NGO [nongovernmental organizations]

and the rest of the humanitarian

community — the military’s best

chance to design and control its exit

strategy.”

Chris Seiple

The US Military/NGO Relationship

in Humanitarian Interventions

e. See Figure IV-3 for a comparison

between a HOC, HACC, and CMOC.

f. Domestic Support Operations

• During DSO, the Emergency Support

Team (EST) is the interagency group that

provides general coordination support to

the FEMA Regional Operations Center

(ROC) staff, Emergency Response TeamAdvance (ERT-A) Element, and

Emergency Response Team (ERT)

response activities in the field.

Figure IV-2. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS

CENTER FUNCTIONS

Providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and

matters that are civilian related

Coordinating relief efforts with US and/or multinational commands,

United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies

Providing interface with the US Information Service, US Agency for

International Development (USAID), and the Country Team

Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary

agencies

Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene

agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command

Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from

humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support

Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service

components

Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support

Coordinating with Disaster Assistance Response Team deployed by

USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military

missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort,

and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers

Convening follow-on assessment groups
IV-15

Interagency Coordination

Operating from the FEMA National

Headquarters in Washington, DC, the

Domestic Emergency Support Team is

responsible for coordinating and

tracking the deployment of Initial

Response Resources, Disaster Field

Office (DFO) kits, and other responder

support items to the field. The EST

serves as the central source of

information at the headquarters level

regarding the status of ongoing and

planned Federal disaster operations. The

EST attempts to resolve policy issues and

resource support conflicts forwarded

from the ERT. The EST also provides

overall resource coordination for

concurrent multi-State disaster response

activities. Emergency Support Function

(ESF) primary agencies send staff to the

EST or opt to coordinate response

support activities from their own agency

EOCs.

• In DSO, the ROC staff coordinates

Federal response efforts until an ERT

is established in the field and the

federal coordinating officer (FCO)

assumes coordination responsibilities.

Generally operating from the FEMA

Regional Office, the ROC establishes

Figure IV-3. Comparison Between Humanitarian Operations Center, Humanitarian

Assistance Coordination Center, and Civil-Military Operations Center

COMPARISON BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS CENTER,

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION CENTER,

AND CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

Affected

Country, United

Nations, or US

Government

Agency

Combatant

Command

Joint Task Force*

Coordinates Overall

Relief Strategy at the

National (Country)

Level

Assists with

Interagency

Coordination and

Planning at the

Strategic Level.

Normally is

disestablished once a

HOC or CMOC is

established

Assists in Coordination

of Activities at the

Operational Level with

Military Forces, US

Government Agencies,

Nongovernmental and

International

Organizations, and

Regional Organizations

Representatives from:

Affected Country

United nations

US Embassy or Consulate

Joint Task Force

Other Nonmilitary Agencies

Concerned Parties

Representatives from:

Combatant Command

Nongovernmental Organizations

International Organizations

Regional Organizations

Representatives from:

Joint Task Force

Nongovernmental Organizations

International Organizations

Regional Organizations

US Government Agencies

Local Government (Host Country)

Multinational Forces

Other Concerned Parties

Coordination

Coordination

Coordination

ESTABLISHING

AUTHORITY FUNCTION COMPOSITION AUTHORITY

HOC

HACC

CMOC

CMOC Civil-Military Operations Center

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

Humanitarian Operations Center

United States

HACC

HOC

US

* A Commander at any echelon

may establish a CMOC
IV-16

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

encompasses the FCO’s support staff and

four main sections (Operations,

Information and Planning, Logistics, and

Administration). Requests for military

support at the DFO are processed through

the Defense Coordination Officer

(DCO), the military official specifically

designated to orchestrate DOD support.

To ensure a coordinated and consistent

DOD disaster response, the DCO is the

single point of contact in the field for

coordinating and validating the use of

DOD resources (excluding those

provided by the US Army Corps of

Engineers when operating as the primary

agency for ESF #3 — Public Works and

Engineering, and those of the National

Guard forces operating under State

control). The DCO:

•• Is the designated DOD on-scene

member of the ERT;

•• Coordinates requests for assistance

and mission assignments with the FCO

or designated representative, normally

the ERT Operations Section Chief; and

•• Is supported on scene by a Defense

Coordinating Element, composed of

administrative staff and liaison personnel,

including the service Emergency

Preparedness Liaison Officers, who

normally will collocate with the ERT

Operations Section.

• Specific responsibilities of the DCO

(subject to modification based on the

situation) include validating

requirements for military support (i.e.,

determining if the military could and

should support the request); forwarding

mission assignments to the appropriate

military organization(s); and assigning

military liaison officers to provide

technical assistance to applicable

activated ESFs. The DCO, through

appropriate military channels, refers

communications with the affected State

emergency management agency and the

EST; coordinates deployment of the

ERT-A Element to field locations;

assesses damage information and

develops situation; and issues initial

mission assignments. The ROC is

activated by the FEMA Regional

Director based on the level of response

required. It is led by a ROC Director

and consists of FEMA staff and ESF

representatives, as well as the Regional

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer

who assists in coordination of requests

for military support. Financial

management activity at the ROC will be

monitored and reported by the

Comptroller.

• For DSO, the DFO is the primary field

location in each affected State for the

coordination of Federal response and

recovery operations. It operates 24 hours

per day, as needed, or under a schedule

sufficient to sustain Federal operations.

The FCO and state coordinating officer

(SCO) collocate at the DFO, along with

Federal agency regional representatives

and state and local liaison officers, when

possible. Once the DFO is ready for use,

the ERT-A Element and/or Emergency

Response Team-National is augmented

by FEMA and other Federal agency staff

to form a full ERT. The ERT is the

principal interagency group that supports

the FCO in coordinating the overall

Federal disaster operation. Located at the

DFO, the ERT ensures that Federal

resources are made available to meet state

requirements identified by the SCO. The

size and composition of the ERT can

range from FEMA regional office staff

who are primarily conducting recovery

operations to an interagency team having

representation from all ESFs primary

and support agencies undertaking

full response and recovery activities.

The ERT organizational structure
IV-17

Interagency Coordination

problematic/contentious military support

issues to the Director of Military Support

(DOMS). The DOMS facilitates the

resolution of issues at the national level.

g. NATO Civil-Military Cooperation.

CIMIC reflects the NATO’s broad approach

to security. Allied operations are increasingly

required to take account of social, political,

cultural, economic, environmental, and

humanitarian factors when planning and

conducting military operations. These

pressures, intensified by the cultural gap

between military and civilian organizations,

demand a dedicated means of communication

between the two. It is no longer sufficient to

rely on ad hoc arrangements to achieve

cooperation. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

Implementation Force established CIMIC

Centers to provide a location for NGOs to

meet and coordinate with the military.

“The CIMIC [Civil-Military Cooperation

Center] organization was to focus on

liaison with the civilian organizations

from the governmental to local opstina

level to regenerate national regulations

and promote limited nation building.

The structure was also to provide an

avenue for the numerous aid agencies

to interface with the military on support

arrangements related to their projects

in theater.”

Lessons From Bosnia:

The IFOR Experience

Institute for National

Strategic Studies

Civil-Military Cooperation:

“The means by which allied

commanders establish and maintain

formal relations with the national

authorities, populations, international

and nongovernmental organizations in

their area of interest.”

Allied Joint Pub 1

• CIMIC covers a wide variety of activities

ranging from sustaining life to restoring

government. CIMIC functions normally

are divided into the following three

groups:

•• Pre-operational. Prior to an

operation, the CIMIC task is to prepare

the allied force to deal with the civilian

conditions it will encounter in the

operational area. It involves three

functions: (1) Planning. The CIMIC

staff writes the commander’s CIMIC

Plan, normally an annex to the OPORD.

The plan is based on an assessment of

the operational area. This assessment

should cover such areas as political and

cultural history of the affected area; state

of the government, public administration

and services; the media; the industrial,

agricultural, and economic capacity of

the region; and the involvement,

capability, and structure of international

organizations and NGOs operating in the

area. (2) Advice. The CIMIC staff briefs

the commanders and their staffs on

civilian conditions in the operational

area. Emphasis must be placed on how

the civilian population and institutions

will impact the military operations and

vice versa. (3) Education. The CIMIC

staff must ensure that allied forces

entering the operational area possess the

best possible understanding of the

civilian situation.

•• Operational. The main CIMIC task

is to ensure effective civil-military

cooperation in execution of the

commander’s CIMIC plan. The

following six functions comprise the

operational phase: (1) Communication.

Effective and constant communication is

CIMIC’s fundamental function. CIMIC

must provide the means to communicate.

(2) Information. CIMIC functions as a

civil-military information exchange. It
IV-18

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

provides commanders with the most

current data on civilian organizations in

the operational area. It also, within

security restrictions, provides civilian

organizations with similar information

concerning the military force and its

planned operations. (3) Coordination.

CIMIC’s goal is to enable proper

coordination between the military and

civilian sides. (4) Agreements. CIMIC’s

function is twofold; to bring the relevant

military and civil agencies together in the

first place, and then give appropriate

advice concerning providing goods or

services to each other. (5) Assessment.

CIMIC provides commanders a

perspective of how the military force and

its operations are viewed from the civilian

side. (6) Operations. In most situations,

CIMIC operations will be conducted in

support of the overall military plan.

However, in some situations, CIMIC

operations will dominate the entire

scenario (e.g., FHA — natural disaster).

In order to execute these six functions,

substantial and regular interface is

required with the multitude of agencies

in the operational area. CIMIC centers

are established at the operational and

tactical levels solely for the purpose of

communication and coordination of

effort. There is a CIMIC center that

supports various levels of command (e.g.,

brigade, division, and corps) up to the

highest level of command in the

operational area with no other purpose

than to keep the military “on the same

sheet of music” as all the players in the

civilian sector. This hierarchy is critical

for mission execution. It recognizes that,

like the military, the civilian sector,

including the interagency community,

has the equivalent of strategic,

operational, and tactical reach. The

commander or his and/or her

representative always attends the CIMIC

meetings in concert with the lead CMO

staff. This system and these meetings are

totally separate from the daily meetings

held in the CMOC for the direct

coordination of relief.

•• Transitional. Based on the overall

concept of operations, CIMIC’s role is

to ensure the smooth transition to civil

authority. The goal is to have the least

possible disruption to civilian life.

• Staff Relationship. CIMIC is a

commander’s responsibility. To be

effective, however, CIMIC must develop

close working relationships with those

other staff sections that interact with the

CIMIC function.

• Organization. CIMIC requires an

organization containing three elements:

a staff to plan and advise the commander,

a CIMIC group to conduct the CIMIC

operations, and additional resources,

which will be drawn from the force for

specific tasks.

•• Staff. The specific organization of the

CIMIC staff will vary from headquarters

to headquarters. The CIMIC staff

members are not necessarily from

specialist backgrounds, but must have

broad military experience and be capable

of explaining military requirements to

civilian organizations and vice versa.

•• Command. A CIMIC group

normally is aligned to a NATO land

component command and supports the

NATO land component command’s

subordinate commands at every level. Its

primary task is to conduct CIMIC

operations in accordance with the

supported commander’s CIMIC’s plan.

It will be made up of a C2 headquarters

and civil area functional specialists to

perform those tasks that fall outside the

range of skills and experience of the

military. These specialists will be

essential in communicating with civilian
IV-19

Interagency Coordination

organizations and providing technical

advice. It is responsible for prioritizing,

allocating, and deploying its own limited

resources and for ensuring that its

disparate and widely-dispersed elements

maintain direction, concentration,

economy, and unity of effort. If directed

by appropriate command authority, the

CIMIC group may support other allied

joint force component commands or the

allied joint force theater headquarters.

•• Resources. Although both the CIMIC

staff and the CIMIC command will

require basic equipment to operate, the

majority of CIMIC resources will be

found within the force. They may be

placed under operational control

(OPCON) of the CIMIC command for

the duration of the force’s mission but

will, more usually, be task-organized for

specific CIMIC operations.

4. United Nations Operations

a. Coordination with the UN begins at the

national level with the Department of State

through the US Representative to the UN.

The US Representative to the UN is a

member of the NSC and participates in the

formulation of policy matters relevant to

the UN and its activities. The US

Representative is assisted at the US Mission

to the UN by a military assistant who

coordinates appropriate military interests

primarily with the UN’s Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA) and Peacekeeping Operations

(UNDPKO).

b. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,

The United Nations Participation Act of 1945,

and Executive Order 10206, Support of

Peaceful Settlements of Disputes, authorize

various types of US military support to the

UN, either on a reimbursable or

nonreimbursable basis.

c. US military operations in support of the

UN usually fall within Chapter VI, “Pacific

Settlement of Disputes,” or Chapter VII,

“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,

Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of

Aggression,” of the UN Charter.

d. The UN normally will conduct peace

operations or FHA under the provisions of

a resolution or mandate from the Security

Council or the General Assembly.

Politicians and diplomats trying to reach

compromise develop mandates. Because of

this, military commanders often have found

it difficult to translate these mandates into

workable mission orders. Commanders can

use the interagency process and the POL-MIL

plan (if developed) to feed back their concerns

through the political apparatus of the UN.

Though not always successful, clarity of

mission should always be sought from the

Ambassador or UN Resident Coordinator, as

appropriate.

e. The UN headquarters coordinates

peace operations and FHA around the world.

It does not, however, have a system for

planning and executing these operations

that is comparable to that of the United

States. The UN organizational structure

consists of the headquarters and the

operational field elements. Thus, there is a

strategic- and tactical-level equivalent to the

Armed Forces of the United States, but no

operational counterpart.

f. At the headquarters, the Secretariat plans

and directs missions. Either the UNDPKO

or the UNOCHA serves as the headquarters

component during emergencies. Additional

support by temporary augmentation from the

Joint Staff and Service headquarters staffs may

be provided for specific requirements. UN

special missions, such as the UN Protection

Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under

the direction of the UN Secretary General

(SYG).
IV-20

Chapter IV

JP 3-57

g. Field-level organization often is based

on the Resident Coordinator system

administered by the UN Development

Program in conjunction with the UNOCHA.

The Resident Coordinator mobilizes and

manages the local UN humanitarian resources

and provides direction for the field relief

effort.

“Unique to this mission was the fact that

an American commander was dualhatted as Commander of both UN

Forces and US Forces. . . . Note that

while US Forces were under

operational control of UNMIH [United

Nations Mission in Haiti], national

command of these forces was never

relinquished as was the case for all

other nations contributing forces to

UNMIH. This relationship was

satisfactory since the goals and

objectives of the US and the UN

remained the same throughout the

mission. To allay concerns of the troopcontributing nations with respect to

these command relationships, the FC

[force commander] and the Special

Representative of the Secretary

General (SRSG) visited UN

Headquarters to inform national

representatives of the operational

concept and the Commander’s Intent

for the operation. This joint appearance

by the top leaders of the mission served

to reassure contributing nations about

the employment of their forces in the

mission.”

United Nations Mission In Haiti In

The Service Of Peace

h. In serious emergencies, the UN SYG

may appoint a Special Representative who

reports to the SYG directly, as well as

advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN

headquarters. The Special Representative

may direct day-to-day operations, as was the

case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

i. The JFC deploying to a contingency site

may discover the need for a direct channel to

either the Resident Coordinator, the Special

Representative of the Secretary General, or

both. The arrangements between the joint

force and UN forces should be set forth in the

appropriate execute order.

j. UN-sponsored operations normally

employ a force under a single

commander. The force commander is

appointed by the SYG with the consent of

the UN Security Council and reports

directly to the SYG’s Special

Representative or to the SYG. In any

multinational operation, the US

commander will retain command

authority over all assigned US forces.

The US chain of command will flow from

the NCA through the combatant

commander. On a case-by-case basis, the

President will consider placing appropriate

US forces under the OPCON of a competent

UN commander for specific UN operations

authorized by the Security Council.
APPENDIX A

SERVICE CAPABILITIES

A-1

Annex A Civil Affairs

B Engineering

C Health Service Support

D Military Police and/or Security Police Forces

E Psychological Operations

F Religious Ministry Support

G Transportation

H United States Coast Guard
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-57

SERVICE CAPABILITIES

1. General

The purpose of this appendix is to provide

an overview of some of the Service

capabilities that would most likely support

CMO.

For further detail concerning Service

capabilities, see JP 3-33, Joint Force

Capabilities.

2. Service Capabilities

Each annex to this appendix will discuss a

different Service capability. For example,

Annex A to Appendix A, “Civil Affairs.”

Annex H to Appendix A, “United States Coast

Guard,” discusses United States Coast Guard

capabilities that do not readily fit into the other

annexes of Appendix A but nonetheless

provide support to CMO.
A-3

Service Capabilities

Service capabilities can provide extensive support to civil-military operations.
A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A

CIVIL AFFAIRS

A-A-1

1. United States Army

All US Army CA stationed in CONUS are

assigned by the Secretary of Defense to

USCINCSOC who has COCOM over

assigned forces.

a. Active Component. USSOCOM

maintains one Army AC CA battalion

consisting of regionally oriented companies

and structured to deploy rapidly and provide

initial CA support to military operations. It

is immediately available for contingencies and

is prepared for a variety of operational

environments worldwide. The unit’s primary

mission is to provide rapid, short-duration CA

support for contingency operations. It is not

designed or resourced to provide the full range

of CA functional specialty skills. Unit

organization may be task-organized to support

theater-specific mission requirements.

b. Reserve Component. USSOCOM

maintains more than 95% of its Army CA in

the RC. RC CA units vary in size,

organization, and capability and consist of

commands, brigades, and battalions. Units

are headquarters and headquarters-size

organizations and are designed around

professional specialties. These units provide

functional assistance, advisory, or

coordinating skills at a level of expertise not

structured in Army organic staffs and units.

As with AC units, RC units may be taskorganized for specific requirements. Their

functional skills and experience in advisory

and assistance roles with HN counterparts can

be applied to augment the AC force, support

conventional and special operations, and

support or conduct civil administration

missions. RC CA units can be expected to

arrive in theater 30-45 days after Presidential

Reserve Callup Authority for contingencies

or upon mobilization.

2. United States Marine Corps

(USMC)

a. USMC commands have the capability

to plan and conduct CMO across the range of

military operations. Dedicated CA structure

is maintained entirely within the RC and

consists of two Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs),

each commanded by a colonel. While every

effort is made to recruit and train Marines with

a broad variety of military and civilian skills,

each member of the CAG is a CA generalist.

The CAGs are organic to the Marine

expeditionary force (MEF): they augment and

reinforce the capabilities of the MEF or other

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

USMC CAGs are not apportioned separately

under the JSCP, but are attached when a MEF

is provided to a combatant command for

planning or operations. Each CAG is

regionally oriented to the projected

employment of the MEF it supports. MAGTF

commanders request USMC CA support via

their Marine Corps component commander.

USMC CA also actively participate in theater

engagement efforts when made available by

their component commanders.

b. CMO is typically first centrally planned

by the MAGTF staff for decentralized

execution by assigned forces. Each MAGTF

has organic air, ground, C2, and logistic

capabilities that provide immediate and

integrated CMO options to the JFC.

Operational maneuver from the sea,

implementing ship-to-objective maneuver and

sea-based logistics, enables rapid execution

of CMO, without the need to first establish

extensive infrastructure ashore. Initial CA

support to a deployed MAGTF might first be

provided by qualified Marine volunteers,

prepared to deploy within days of a validated

request, even if no selected callup is

authorized. Further support may next be
A-A-2

Annex A to Appendix A

JP 3-57

provided by additional volunteers, by selected

callup of CAG elements for contingencies, or

by mobilization of entire CAGs. Regardless

of size, USMC CA elements will require

support from the MAGTF in such areas as

transportation, health services, supply, and

messing. However, even when CA are

assigned, the MAGTF remains a selfsustaining force.

c. USMC CMO is performed in order to

directly support the MAGTF’s assigned

mission, which is typically of limited duration,

performed under austere conditions, and

expeditionary in nature. These missions might

include NEO, the offload of maritime prepositioning ships, HA in response to complex

emergencies, amphibious operations, or

employment as an enabler for follow-on

operations. These types of limited

contingency operations will rarely allow for

exhaustive coordination of details or extensive

planning prior to execution. Instead, the

MAGTF must understand the goals and

priorities of the JFC, ambassadors, and US

Country Teams for the JOA. This appreciation

of specifics allows CMO that independently

supports the NCA’s intent on the ground. CA

and CMO are initially focused on confirming,

updating and disseminating the assessment of

the situation, providing an initial response to

emergencies, stabilizing the JOA, and

enhancing the legitimacy of the force. Even

initial CA plans prepare for a transition of

responsibilities to other agencies, whether

other US military forces, other USG agencies,

international organizations, or NGOs. Marine

CA also are prepared to assist a supported

Navy commander. This support might be

required when amphibious shipping is tasked

to transship evacuees, provide emergency

HSS to civilian casualties, or control sea

approaches, pier space, or cargo handling.

d. As a self-contained, combined arms

force, the MAGTF may become involved in

sustained operations ashore. These situations

will allow more detailed coordination, both

with the combatant commander’s theater CA

assets, and with international organizations,

NGOs, and USG agencies operating in the

MAGTF’s area of operations. Deployed CA

(and those accessed via reach-back) facilitate

mission accomplishment by focusing on

noncombatants. They leverage the MAGTF’s

resources, especially in C2 systems, by

integrating the complementary capabilities of

other agencies in order to achieve success and

allow timely redeployment of the force.

Throughout, Marine CA efforts help the

commander to meet moral and legal

responsibilities while accomplishing the

military mission.

3. United States Air Force

(USAF)

a. The USAF does not maintain CA units.

However, a variety of functional organizations

and capabilities within the Air Force Reserve

Command and Air National Guard (ANG) as

well as the active force, can support or

complement CA activities. These include

legal, air mobility, chaplain, supply, health

services (to include dental care and preventive

medicine services), security forces,

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance,

civil engineering, bioenvironmental, and

meteorological specialists who can provide

operations and staff support. In supporting

combatant commanders, the USAF upon

request can provide specially qualified

personnel for service in Army or joint CA

units as specialists in matters of primary

concern to the USAF. CA-specific functions

are solely performed by the ANG judge

advocates. When required, CA liaisons

should be provided to the USAF Headquarters

and each deployed Aerospace Expeditionary

Force (AEF).

b. Air National Guard Readiness

Center. Access to ANG personnel with CArelated skills is accomplished through the Air

National Guard Readiness Center, an active

Air Force unit, that exercises administrative
A-A-3

Civil Affairs

control over such personnel ordered to active

duty under conditions short of full

mobilization.

c. Air Force National Security and

Emergency Preparedness (AFNSEP)

Agency. Although not a CA organization,

AFNSEP can play a significant role for the

USAF concerning CA activities. AFNSEP

oversees, and assists commanders in

implementing the Air Force’s MSCA,

MSCLEA, Continuity of Operations, and

National Security Emergency Preparedness

programs. The overall purpose of these

programs in the Air Force is to support civil

authorities’ abilities, in an all-hazards

environment, in minimizing the loss of life

and property by providing sufficient

capabilities at all levels of government to meet

essential defense and civilian needs during any

national security emergency. AFNSEP is

comprised of a team of active and reserve

personnel. The agency’s responsibilities

include the 50 States, the District of Columbia,

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin

Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the

Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall

Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, the

Republic of Palau, and the Trust Territory of

the Pacific Islands. In general, however, the

concepts for CMO that apply to AFNSEP

regard only DSO, and consequence

management including WMD or terrorism

events.

JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military

Operations Other Than War, JP 3-07.7, Joint

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Domestic Support Operations, and AFDD

2-3, Military Operations Other Than War,

details the type of activities in which AFNSEP

is most commonly involved.
A-A-4

Annex A to Appendix A

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING

A-B-1

1. United States Army

a. The US Army has a wide variety of

engineer units at division, corps, and theater

level that provide particular technical

capabilities required to accomplish essential,

diversified tasks throughout the depth of the

theater. The engineer architecture forms these

units into an organization that is responsive

to commanders at all echelons.

b. Engineer organizations range in size

from brigade to team and include specialized

functions such as water well-drilling, real

estate management, diving, quarrying, and

fire-fighting as well as the more standard

mission of providing mobility, countermobility,

and/or survivability (M/CM/S) enhancement.

c. Army engineers are capable of

integrating into a joint force and supporting

other Services as well as multinational and

civilian organizations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. The MEF is supported by an engineer

support battalion (ESB) that is organic to the

force service support group (FSSG) contained

within the MEF. The ESB is structured to

facilitate task organization and provide

general engineering and combat service

support to the MEF. The ESB is organized to

plan, coordinate, and supervise general

engineering (GE) support functions. The GE

support includes enhancing the MEF’s M/

CM/S, in addition to conducting the MEF’s

EOD missions.

• ESB provides vertical and horizontal

construction, gap crossing, water

purification, and mobile electric power.

• ESB can conduct limited counter obstacle

missions.

• ESB is the primary engineering unit to

support CMO.

b. The Marine division is supported by one

combat engineer battalion (CEB), which

provides combat engineering support and

limited GE support through task-organized

combat engineer elements. The mission of

the CEB is to enhance the M/CM/S of the

Marine division. The Marine division

contains three infantry regiments, and a

combat engineer company that normally

supports each regiment. The CEB and combat

engineer company both enhance the

movement of operational forces in much the

same manner as the ESB. The Marine aircraft

wing has engineer capabilities embedded in

the Marine wing support squadrons (MWSS).

These support squadrons possess capabilities

for the construction and maintenance of

airfields, fuel handling, materials handling,

and limited vertical and horizontal

construction. They also can provide mobile

electric power and can purify water to potable

standards. Engineer requirements exceeding

MWSS capabilities are augmented by the

ESB. The Marine division, wing, and FSSG

structure outlined here is similar for I and II

MEF. The organizational structure for

engineering support for III MEF is similar but

slightly reduced due to a smaller end strength.

3. United States Navy (USN)

a. The Naval Construction Force (NCF),

whose personnel are called “SEABEEs,” is a

responsive, mobile, versatile engineer force,

capable of accomplishing diverse civil and

military engineering tasks. The NCF provides
A-B-2

Annex B to Appendix A

JP 3-57

the JFC with a flexible expeditionary engineer

tool kit of operational response options

capable of supporting a wide range of

missions. The NCF primarily supports the

MAGTF and Navy ashore forces as directed

by existing OPLANs. The NCF also supports

component missions specified by the

combatant commanders. NCF capabilities

enable the JFC to optimize the effectiveness

of dedicated Armed Forces in MOOTW,

while at the same time preserving and

enhancing the ability to fight and win major

theater wars.

b. NCF units enhance the MAGTF through

complementary, not duplicative, support.

NCF units are highly skilled specialists

capable of executing projects of a more

sophisticated and permanent nature than

normally accomplished by Marine Corps

engineer battalions. Their capabilities include

the following.

• Military construction engineering

support to geographic combatant

commanders, the USN, and the USMC.

• Battle damage repair.

• Construct and maintain expeditionary

airfields, main supply routes, advanced

bases and port facilities, ammunition

supply points, deliberate bridging, as well

as a wide range of other combat support

and combat service support facilities.

• In a contingency environment, provide

organic capability for defensive military

operations and sustainment for

independent operations.

• In a peacetime environment, provide

combatant command Navy component

commanders with contributory support

and geographic combatant commanders

with recovery operations, FHA, peace

operations, and other MOOTW support

with a rapid, expeditionary engineering

response capability.

c. NCF units are under the OPCON and

administrative control of the fleet

commanders. The 2d Naval Construction

Brigade (NCB) is comprised of active and

reserve Naval Construction Regiments

(NCRs), naval mobile construction battalions

(NMCBs), a naval construction force support

unit (NCFSU), a construction battalion

maintenance unit (CBMU), construction

battalion units (CBUs) and an underwater

construction team (UCT) assigned to the

Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. The 3rd

NCB is comprised of similar units assigned

to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Two amphibious construction battalions

(ACBs) are under the OPCON of the fleet

commanders in chief. Two CBUs plus their

respective Reserve Augment detachment are

assigned to support each deployed Naval Fleet

Hospital.

d. Possible Force Compositions

• NMCB. Constructs advance base

facilities in support of the USN, USMC,

and other Armed Forces in military

operations. Provides repair, maintenance,

and construction support during

contingency, emergency, or recovery

operations.

• CBMU. Provides follow-on public

works operations, maintenance and repair

at existing advanced base shore facilities

or facilities constructed by NMCBs in

contingency operations.

• CBU. Provides construction, operation

and maintenance support to a 500-Bed

Combat Zone Fleet Hospital during

military operations. Each hospital

requires two CBUs plus their respective

Reserve Augment detachment. Provides

repair and maintenance support to US
A-B-3

Engineering

shore installations during peacetime and

have a secondary mission to conduct

disaster recovery missions.

• UCT. Provides underwater engineering,

construction, repair, and inspection

support. Performs complex inshore and

deep ocean underwater construction

tasks, including ocean bottom surveys for

potential underwater facilities.

• NCFSU. Provides construction and

engineering support for NCF units,

including specialized civil engineering

support equipment, material, repair parts,

and technical expertise.

• NCR. Exercises C2 over subordinate

NCF units, providing planning,

coordination, and oversight. Deploys

when two or more subordinate NCF units

deploy to a theater.

• NCB. Provides forces to fulfill

operational requirements of a combatant

commander exercising C2 over

subordinate NCRs. Deploys when two

or more subordinate NCR units (e.g., five

or more NMCBs) deploy to a theater.

• ACB. Provides over-the-shore logistic

movement and construction support to

amphibious forces, as part of the Naval

Beach Group.

4. United States Air Force

a. The Air Force engineering mission is to

provide the necessary assets and skilled

personnel to prepare and sustain global

installations as stationary platforms for

projecting aerospace power across the range

of military operations. Air operations are

highly dependent on operating bases;

consequently, engineering planners must

participate in all stages of operational planning

for bases to be available when they are needed.

Air Force engineering units can deploy either

as a part of an AEF, or as detached units

operating in support of specific missions and

operational taskings. The USAF civil

engineering mission in support of a typical

OPLAN includes rapid runway repair,

emergency war damage repair to other

essential facilities, force beddown, operations

and maintenance, crash rescue and fire

suppression, EOD, nuclear, biological, and

chemical operations, and construction

management of emergency repair of war

damage and force beddown that are necessary

for employing USAF forces and weapons

systems. These engineering forces are

organized either as Prime Base Engineer

Emergency Forces (Prime BEEF), or Rapid

Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations

Repair Squadron, Engineers (RED HORSE)

units. During any type military operation,

engineer requirements will be numerous and

military engineers may be stretched beyond

their capability. A force multiplier for Air

Force engineering is the AFCAP that allows

civil engineers to focus on the most critical

missions.

b. Prime BEEF is the primary

organizational structure for supporting both

mobility and in-place contingency

requirements. The principle objective of

deploying Prime BEEF teams is to beddown

and support an AEF. Force beddown

generally divides into three categories —

aircraft, personnel, and infrastructure support.

Aircraft support provides the maintenance

shops, hangars, squadron operations centers,

munitions storage, fuel storage, and other

facilities directly supporting the flying

mission. Personnel support provides the

housing, feeding facilities, latrines, showers,

administrative offices, and other indirect

support facilities. Infrastructure support

provides the utility systems, solid and

hazardous waste disposal, roads, and

communications that serve the beddown site.

Beddown locations range from main operating

bases with adequate existing facilities to bare

bases with no facilities other than runways,
A-B-4

Annex B to Appendix A

JP 3-57

taxiways, and aircraft parking aprons. Tasks

accomplished by Prime BEEF units include

airfield support, fire protection, fuel systems

setup and support, EOD functions, force

protection, base defense, base denial, rapid

runway repair, facility repair, and utility repair.

c. The AFCAP provides commanders with

another option to relieve military engineers,

particularly for critical high threat or critical

missions. AFCAP has installation support

capabilities that mirror the Air Force

engineering and Services functional

capabilities. AFCAP can provide all the

installation support services and operations

inherent in the Air Force engineering and

Services functional areas, except aircraft

crash-fire-rescue; EOD; nuclear, biological,

and chemical operations; field operations and

mortuary affairs. AFCAP may be used after

an initial military beddown response, for

facility erection and construction

requirements, or to support recovery

operations at existing locations across the full

spectrum of conflicts.

d. RED HORSE squadrons and their

associated unit type codes configurations

provide highly mobile, largely self-sufficient,

rapidly deployable echelons to support major

force beddown requirements and to repair

heavy war damage. RED HORSE units are

stand-alone squadrons not tied to peacetime

base support. They provide Air Force

component commanders a dedicated, flexible,

airfield and base heavy construction and repair

capability that allows the geographic

combatant commanders to move and support

missions as the air order of battle dictates.

RED HORSE units accomplish major

construction in forward locations, often in

advance of the main deploying force. They

provide heavy horizontal (earth moving and

pavements) and vertical (facility and utility

skills such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants;

structural; mechanical; and power generation)

engineer capability, and possess special

capabilities such as quarry operation (blasting

and rock crushing), well drilling, concrete and/

or asphalt batch plant operations, specialized

building construction (K-Spans), and

constructive explosive operations. RED

HORSE units also are required to be current

in a variety of other capabilities across the

range of military operations.

See JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint

Operations, and JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for

Civil Engineering Support, for more

information on Air Force engineering

capabilities.
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX A

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

A-C-1

1. Overview

a. An assessment of total HSS

requirements for CMO comes from careful

mission analysis, resource application, and an

adequate survey of existing health service

infrastructure. This health service assessment

should then be coordinated within the theater

HSS community.

b. In joint and multinational settings, the

HSS objective conserves fighting strength

by minimizing the effect of wounds,

injuries, and disease on units or the affected

patient populations’ ability to function.

Aggressive preventive medicine programs

supported by commanders at all levels and a

phased HSS system together achieve this

objective.

c. Commanders should be aware of overall

preventive health measures or programs and

ensure personnel participate in them to help

alleviate the need for health service

intervention and conserve the fighting

strength. HSS arranges the interventive aspect

of force health protection into “levels of care.”

Each level reflects an increase in health service

capabilities while retaining the capabilities

found in the preceding level. The system is

designed to provide a continuum of care from

the point of wounding, injury, or illness

through successive levels of care to definitive

rehabilitative hospitals. Depending upon the

maturity of the theater and the operational

mission, four levels of health service care may

be provided with the remaining level provided

in CONUS or other safe havens.

• Level I. Unit Level Care. It may

include self aid, buddy aid, combat

lifesaver skills, examinations, and

emergency lifesaving measures such as

maintenance of airway, control of

bleeding, prevention and control of

shock, and prevention of further injury

by trained personnel. This level may

include an aid station with physicians and

physician assistants. Treatment at aid

stations includes restoration of the airway

by invasive procedure, use of intravenous

fluids, and application of splints and

bandages. These elements of health

service management prepare patients for

return to duty or for transportation to a

higher level of care. Supporting health

service units are responsible for the

evacuation of patients from supported

treatment facilities.

• Level II. A team of physicians or

physician assistants supported by

appropriate health service or nursing

staff administers care. As a minimum,

this level of care includes basic

resuscitation and stabilization, and may

include a forward resuscitative surgical

capability, basic laboratory, limited x-ray,

pharmacy, and temporary holding

facilities. At this level, examinations and

observations are accomplished more

deliberately than at Level I. This level

includes applying emergency procedures,

such as resuscitation to prevent death,

loss of limb, or loss of body functions.

Patients are treated and returned to duty,

or for patients who require

comprehensive treatment, surface or air

evacuation is available to facilitate them

receiving the required treatment. This is

the first level where group O liquid

packed red blood cells will be available

for transfusion.

• Level III. Care administered requires

clinical capabilities normally found in a

health service treatment facility typically

located in a lower-level enemy threat
A-C-2

Annex C to Appendix A

JP 3-57

environment. The health service

treatment facility is staffed and equipped

to provide resuscitation; initial wound

surgery and post operative treatment.

This level of care may be the first step

toward restoration of functional

health, as compared to procedures that

stabilize a condition or prolong life. It

does not have the crisis aspect of initial

resuscitative care and can proceed with

greater preparation and deliberation.

Blood products available may include

fresh frozen plasma, platelets, frozen

group O red blood cells, and group A, B,

and O liquid packed red blood cells.

Those patients whose health service

conditions are such that they can recover

within the time permitted by the theater

health service evacuation policy are

returned to duty from this level.

• Level IV. Care at this level provides the

same surgical capability as in Level III,

and further therapy during the recovery

phase for those who can return to duty

within the theater evacuation policy. This

level of care may only be available in

mature theaters.

• Level V. Care is definitive,

convalescent, restorative, and

rehabilitative and normally is provided

by military, Department of Veterans

Affairs, CONUS Civilian hospitals or

other DOD-approved safe havens.

2. United States Army

a. CA units have health service personnel

assigned with the duties of providing

evaluation, advice, and coordination of

HSS within the existing infrastructure. They

do not possess a robust HSS capability.

Particular emphasis is placed upon preventive

medicine (PVNTMED) with emphasis on

sanitation and disease prevention, veterinary

medicine and prevention of zoonotic diseases.

Consequently, CA units are dependent on

theater HSS assets applied in conjunction with

HN and NGO capabilities.

b. HSS capabilities are addressed through

the ten functions of: Health service C4I,

hospitalization, primary care, patient

movement, force (population) health

protection (i.e., PVNTMED), veterinary

services, health service logistics (including

blood services), dental services, combat stress

control, and laboratory services. These

functions, although not necessarily available

at each level, are nevertheless considered

throughout the continuum of the health

care system by the health service planner or

surgeon. The special forces medical sergeant

(SFMS) is specially trained to provide

regionally focused culturally sensitive HSS.

For an in-depth overview of the SFMS and

other providers in Army SO, refer to FM 8-43,

Combat Health Support in Army Special

Operations Forces.

c. Health care professionals assigned to CA

units, NGOs, and government agencies must

work in synchronized fashion through the

CMOC and must adhere to the principles of

HSS while undertaking the tasks of

assessment and application of relief effort

resources. The principles include:

conformity with the overall relief intent;

proximity to the affected population;

readiness and flexibility to changing mission

requirements; mobility for rapid movement

to the relief population; continuity of care to

provide optimum uninterrupted care through

each level; and coordination which insures

HSS resources are effectively employed;

standards of HSS to meet standards that are

acceptable to all participating Services;

capability of HSS and health service risk

must be capable from the outset of an

operation to meet the demands of the predicted

casualty rates; levels of health service care

that must be available to all forces; provision

of life- and limb-saving surgery to enable

the patient to receive Level II care as soon as
A-C-3

Health Service Support

possible and to reach life- and limb-saving

surgery as fast as possible; and

interdependence of treatment and patient

movement determined by the operational

environment.

HSS principles are addressed in detail in JP

4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in

Joint Operations.

3. United States Marine Corps

a. The US Navy Medical Department

provides HSS within the Marine Corps. US

Navy hospital corpsmen are trained as

emergency medical technicians in trauma

medical care and life support, and receive

additional training in field sanitation, use of

intravenous fluids, and advanced combat

casualty evacuation and transportation. They

are assigned to the headquarters and service

companies of Marine battalions in the

battalion aid stations and are further assigned

to provide direct support to platoons and

squads.

b. Aid stations are highly mobile health

service units that provide routine health care

and initial resuscitation to traumatic casualties.

Within the FSSG, the health service battalion

has the capability to provide Levels I and II

health care.

c. The health service battalion provides

health service and surgical support that

exceeds the organic capability of the division,

wing, and FSSG. The health service battalion

is composed of one headquarters and support

company and three surgical companies.

d. The dental battalion is the source of

dental services to the MEF, by attaching taskorganized dental sections and detachments to

elements of the MAGTF. Battalion personnel

maintain dental readiness during exercises,

deployments, MOOTW, and war. In an

operational environment, dental personnel’s

primary function is to provide emergency

dental care, and if mission specifics allow,

dental health maintenance.

e. Maintenance and management of health

service and dental equipment and supplies

(Class VIII) is the responsibility of the medical

logistics company (MEDLOGCO), supply

battalion, FSSG. The MEDLOGCO provides

maintenance of health service equipment and

centralized acquisition, storing, stock rotation,

and construction of health service supply sets

in support of HSS units based on specific

mission needs. Forty-five days of the MEF’s

60-day Class VIII requirement is maintained

with the MEDLOGCO and 15 days are held

aboard maritime pre-positioning force assets.

4. United States Navy

a. The Navy’s fleet health service system

supports the five levels of health service care.

Levels I and II are provided by the combat

forces as part of their table of organization

and/or staffing documents. Levels III and IV

are the responsibility of the combatant

commander provided from Service

component resources in support of all

casualties generated by the operational

situation. Level V may be located in CONUS

or DOD-approved and designated safe

havens. Patients are evacuated to the level

that will provide the level of care required in

order to expedite their return to duty.

b. The Navy health service department

provides support to both the fleet and the

Marine forces under a variety of conditions.

These conditions vary from highly mobile,

low-capability support such as the type

provided by a hospital corpsmen assigned to

a Marine rifle company, to a shore-based,

highly capable CONUS hospital.

c. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery has

under its claimancy eight overseas hospitals.

These hospitals are located along the sea

LOCs and have been established to provide

general HSS to active duty personnel and
A-C-4

Annex C to Appendix A

JP 3-57

dependents located in the areas. Under

contingency situations, the three Pacific

hospitals will function as Level IV facilities.

Based on the their physical design, these

facilities have the capability of expanding their

bed capacity to accommodate casualties.

d. Casualty Receiving and Treatment

Ships. Certain amphibious ships, particularly

the general purpose amphibious assault ships

and general purpose amphibious assault ship

(with internal dock) class ships, are designed

to provide advanced HSS to the landing force

during amphibious operations. These casualty

receiving and treatment ships have laboratory

(including blood) and radiology capabilities

in support of surgical suites. During

amphibious operations, these ships are staffed

with surgical and nonsurgical personnel,

including health service technicians, needed

to provide extensive trauma support.

e. Hospital Ships. Hospital ships are

designed to provide a mobile and flexible,

rapidly responsive, acute care health service

capability in support of amphibious and Navy

forces, and disaster relief operations.

Functioning under the provisions set forth in

the Geneva Conventions, they have the

capability to deploy 12 major operating rooms

and 1,000 beds with appropriate staffing.

f. Fleet Hospitals. Fleet hospitals have

500 beds and are equipped and staffed to

provide extensive health service and surgical

resuscitation care for combat casualties. These

facilities are intended for placement in the rear

of the combat zone or in the communications

zone and are self-supporting.

5. United States Air Force

a. The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS)

deploys modular field health service units and

equipment packages to accomplish care in

AEF operations. The AFMS provides an

infrastructure designed to field and sustain a

medically ready force throughout the entire

range of military operations. AFMS assets

are tailored to meet specific operational and

environmental requirements and include light,

lean, modular health service units, with

expandable increments, and a fixed-wing

aeromedical evacuation (AE) system. This

postures the AFMS to cover the full range of

global engagement and enlargement, to

include democratic nations. The AFMS is

primarily engaged in humanitarian assistance,

disaster response, and traditional war-winning

operations. Personnel typically include

physicians, nurses, technicians, dentists,

bioenvironmental engineers, public health

personnel, and health service administrators.

AFMS functions encompass a variety of force

health protection activities. This includes

delivery of patient care services to include

primary health service care, dental care, and

surgical services, health surveillance and risk

assessment activities, AE, and preventive

medicine services. AFMS assets may be used

to support a primarily health service mission

under humanitarian, civic, or other

multinational efforts. AFMS personnel

participate at the start of force employment

planning and AEF operations. Their guidance

is considered when deciding final

employment locations. Health service

surveillance teams are critical assets in this

process and can report on health threats at

deployment locations. AEF wing

commanders each have a health service group

commander on staff responsible for ensuring

all health services assets are ready to support

a total or partial wing deployment. AEF health

service capabilities include the Expeditionary

Medical Support (EMEDS) and Air Force

Theater Hospital (AFTH) assets.

b. The AFMS is responsible for two

primary operational health support systems:

AE and Air Force Theater Hospitalization.

• The EMEDS/AFTH is a modular,

tailorable, incrementally deployable asset

providing prevention, stabilization, and

AE preparation, sustainment, and
A-C-5

Health Service Support

specialty care. The EMEDS/AFTH is

designed to support deployed forces or

specific requirements of a select

population group across the entire range

of contingency operations. This modular

approach provides the commander

flexibility to tailor a health support

package while reducing the airlift

requirements for health service forces in

theater.

• AE supports the entire spectrum of global

patient movement. The global AE

system provides oversight of casualties

transiting the AE system from point of

origin to destination. AE enables patients

to be rapidly evacuated and transported

to the most appropriate level of care.

See Annex G to Appendix A,

“Transportation,” JP 4-02, Doctrine for

Health Service Support in Joint

Operations, and JP 4-02.2, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Patient

Movement in Joint Operations, for more

information.
A-C-6

Annex C to Appendix A

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
ANNEX D TO APPENDIX A

MILITARY POLICE AND/OR SECURITY POLICE FORCES

A-D-1

1. United States Army

a. MP perform five functions in any

combination needed to accomplish the

mission in both joint and multinational

operations. These functions are:

• Maneuver and Mobility Support

Operations — support to river crossing

operations, breaching operations, passage

of lines, straggler and dislocated civilian

control, route reconnaissance and

surveillance, main supply route

regulation enforcement.

• Area Security Operations —

reconnaissance, rear area and sustainment

operations security, response force

operations, critical asset, site, and high

risk person security.

• Law and Order Operations — law

enforcement, criminal investigation and

US Customs operations.

• Internment and Resettlement

Operations — EPW and CI handling,

PRC, and US military prisoner

operations.

• Police Intelligence Operations —

intelligence preparation of the battlefield,

police liaison with federal law

enforcement agencies, HN, and other

agencies.

b. US Army Criminal Investigations

Command (USACIDC) is the Army’s sole

agent responsible for investigating felony

crimes on or off the battlefield. USACIDC

provides investigative support to commanders

at every echelon.

c. USACIDC investigates violations of

international agreements on land warfare and

provide forensic science support to other

USACIDC units in the theater. In addition,

at the direction of the commanding general

of USACIDC or higher authority, they

conduct special investigations.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. A Marine Corps MP company is

assigned to the division, wing, and FSSG. A

provost marshal assigned to the MAGTF

command element coordinates their efforts.

While MP assets are currently resident within

each MAGTF subordinate element, a variety

of task organizations and control options may

be employed by the MAGTF commander

depending on the mission and situation. The

MP company’s sole purpose is to provide

security support to the MAGTF; thus, it is

dependent upon the other organizations for

administration, supply, maintenance, health

services, and food service support.

b. The security support provided to the

MAGTF commander encompasses the

following operations:

• Antiterrorism/force protection

support (AT/FP) — Vulnerability

assessments to identify command areas

that are vulnerable to terrorist attack.

Criminal and tactical information

gathering. Assist AT/FP training.

• Traffic control maneuver and mobility

support — Route reconnaissance and

surveillance; main supply route

regulation and enforcement; area damage

control identification; and information

collection, reporting, and dissemination.
A-D-2

Annex D to Appendix A

JP 3-57

• Area security — Security and protection

of LOCs, critical assets (airfields, service

support areas, etc.), physical security, and

MAGTF rear areas.

• EPW and civilian internee operations,

US military prisoner operations;

dislocated civilian and straggler control.

• Law and order — Services to assist the

MAGTF commander in maintaining

good order and military discipline

including law enforcement, criminal

investigations, customs support, and MP

information control.

3. United States Air Force

a. USAF SP provide both law enforcement

and security functions for the Air Force. Air

bases and/or installations, as do other rear area

facilities, face a ground threat that, for

planning purposes, is divided into three threat

levels.

b. Agents, saboteurs, partisans, and

terrorist groups pose the Level I threat.

Safeguarding nuclear weapons and other high

priority resources against this threat is the

primary mission of the Air Force SP. The SP

are specifically organized, trained, and

equipped to defend the base against the Level

I threat.

c. The Level II threat includes tactical units

smaller than battalion size, particularly

unconventional warfare forces (for example,

Special Purpose and/or Special Designation

Forces and Ranger-Commandos) whose

primary tasks are covert reconnaissance and

sabotage missions to disrupt friendly sortie

generation. These forces may also use

standoff weapons from outside the base

boundaries, or they may infiltrate the base and

employ explosive devices, silent killing

techniques, and other methods to accomplish

their objectives. Equipped with a diversity

of weapons, they possess the capability of

engaging in combat with friendly ground

defense forces, if necessary, to accomplish

their mission. However, these enemy forces

normally operate covertly in small groups,

avoiding detection to increase their probability

of success. SP are organized, trained, and

equipped to defend against the Level II threat.

d. The Level III threat is posed by tactical

military units of battalion size or larger

resulting from overt enemy heliborne,

airborne, amphibious, or ground force

operations. A Level III threat probably will

include an air base as part of a larger,

coordinated plan, rather than as an individual

or separate target. Friendly force response to

the Level III threat involves the commitment

of the requisite tactical combat forces to

destroy the threat.

e. The primary ground threat to air bases

is posed by Level II forces. The enemy is

capable of conducting Level II actions against

many bases simultaneously. Accordingly, air

base ground defense forces are specifically

organized, trained, and equipped to defeat the

Level II threat while maintaining a limited

capability to detect, delay, and disrupt Level

III threat forces until the arrival of friendly

tactical combat forces.
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX A

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

A-E-1

1. United States Army

a. PSYOP are planned operations

conveying selected information and indicators

to foreign audiences and are intended to

influence the emotions, motives, objective

reasoning, attitudes and ultimately the

behavior of foreign governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals. The

purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce

foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to

US national policy objectives. PSYOP

support the combatant commander’s

intentions at the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels of warfare across the range of

military operations from peace through

conflict to war and during post conflict

operations. USCINCSOC exercises COCOM

of CONUS-based Active Army and Army

Reserve PSYOP forces and, when directed,

provides trained and ready PSYOP personnel

to geographic combatant commanders and US

ambassadors. The geographic combatant

commander exercises COCOM over all

assigned military PSYOP assets. C2 of

PSYOP forces is normally executed by the

establishment of a joint psychological

operations task force (JPOTF) directly under

the JFC. The Army PSYOP capability

consists of one strategic Active Component

PSYOP group and two tactical Reserve

groups.

b. Psychological Operations Group

(POG). The POG plans, coordinates, and

executes PSYOP activities at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels. A POG is

structured to support conventional and special

operations forces deployed worldwide. It can

operate up to two Psychological Operations

Task Forces at the combatant command and

the JTF level. A POG contains the following

organizations.

• Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB). A

regional POB provides cultural and

linguistic expertise and is capable of

providing simultaneous PSYOP support

to two or more organizations within the

combatant command.

• Dissemination PSYOP Battalion.

Dissemination POBs provide audio,

visual, and audiovisual materials

production, signal support, and media

broadcast capabilities to the POG,

JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The

dissemination POBs can simultaneously

support two separate operational areas at

the combatant command level.

• Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB).

TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support to

corps-level units and below and select

special operations and conventional task

forces at Army-level equivalent-sized

units. The TPB develops, produces, and

disseminates tactical products within the

guidance (themes, objectives, and target

audiences) assigned by the JPOTF and

authorized by the product approval

authority (combatant commander or

subordinate JFC). The TPB’s capabilities

include dissemination of PSYOP

products by loudspeaker message, leaflet,

handbill and face-to-face communications.

• Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian

Internee PSYOP Battalion. This POB

collects and evaluates PSYOP-relevant

intelligence directly from EPW/CIs

through interrogations, face-to-face

communications, and pre- and posttesting of PSYOP products and

campaigns.
A-E-2

Annex E to Appendix A

JP 3-57

c. In addition to supporting CMO, PSYOP

can also support the SO missions of FID,

unconventional warfare, direct action, special

reconnaissance, and counterterrorism.

PSYOP also support the SO collateral activity,

and humanitarian demining operations.

For additional information, refer to JP 3-53,

Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

2. United States Marine Corps

The USMC has the capability to execute

both audible and visible actions designed to

convey specific impressions to the enemy.

These PSYOP can include broadcasts from

either shore-based or airborne loudspeaker

systems. Furthermore, the KC-130 or

helicopter assault support assets organic to the

MAW can conduct leaflet dissemination.

PSYOP expertise within the Marine Corps

resides principally within the RC. The CAGs

form PSYOP detachments from personnel

drawn from the CAG, or trained for PSYOP.

The CAGs, when activated, require support

from the MAGTF command element’s

support unit in such areas as supply, health

services, mess, and transportation.

3. United States Navy

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual

products are available from Fleet Imaging

Command, Pacific; Fleet Combat Camera,

Atlantic; various film libraries; Naval Media

Center; and limited assistance from ships and

aircraft of the fleet. A Naval Reserve PSYOP

audiovisual unit assigned to the United States

Joint Forces Command also is available to

provide support.

b. Navy personnel assets have the

capability to produce documents, posters,

articles, and other material for PSYOP.

Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat

exist to prepare and produce various quantities

of printed materials. Language capabilities

exist in naval intelligence and among naval

personnel for most Asian and European

languages.

4. United States Air Force

a. The USAF has a variety of assets capable

of conducting or supporting PSYOP. Some

are specifically modified for the PSYOP role.

A limited number of EC-130 COMMANDO

SOLO aircraft have PSYOP as their primary

mission and are equipped for airborne

broadcasts of radio and television signals.

MC-130 COMBAT TALON and COMBAT

SHADOW are capable of leaflet airdrop

missions.

b. Most all other USAF aerospace assets

have the inherent capability to support

PSYOP. USAF satellites and aerial

reconnaissance photos can be used to support

PSYOP targeting and discredit adversary

claims or intentions. C-130 and HC-130

aircraft can be configured for leaflet airdrop

operations. Additionally, USAF fighter

aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping

M-129 leaflet bombs.
ANNEX F TO APPENDIX A

RELIGIOUS MINISTRY SUPPORT

A-F-1

1. United States Army

a. The commander provides religious

support through a ministry team (MT) which

consists of at least one chaplain and one

chaplain assistant. The MT helps soldiers,

families, and authorized civilians exercise

their religious beliefs and practices. The MT

is central to the organization and functioning

of the chaplaincy and organic to units in the

Army. Religious activities of the MT include

worship (services, rites, ceremonies,

sacraments, and ordinances), pastoral care

(visitation, ministry of presence, counseling,

family life support, and the care of wounded

and dying soldiers), religious education, and

spiritual fitness training.

b. To ensure the free exercise of religion,

all chaplains provide religious support to

soldiers, their family members, and authorized

civilians. Chaplains provide support

according to the tenets of their faith group. If

unable to provide support because of faith

restrictions, chaplains seek the required

support from other chaplain sources.

c. Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The

UMT is assigned to units organized according

to a table of organization and equipment. It

deploys with its unit and provides religious

support for all units in the commander’s

operational area during each stage of force

projection. Comprehensive religious support

requires the assignment and deployment of

UMTs in combat, combat support, and combat

service support units at all echelons beginning

at the battalion. The UMT deploys with the

unit to provide religious support to all

elements of the task force. When tactically

feasible, based on an assessment of the

situation, battalion UMTs move forward to

provide religious support to all elements of

the battalion: companies, platoons, squads,

and teams.

d. Unit Support. Support given to the unit

of assignment and to all those attached to the

unit. The team normally gives first priority

to this mission.

e. Area Support. Support given to

soldiers, members of other Services, and

authorized civilians who are not a part of the

team’s unit, but who are operating within the

same area of operations without organic or

available religious support.

f. Denominational Support. Support

given to soldiers and other authorized persons

of the chaplain’s own denomination for the

exercise of their religion. Limited assets and

availability determine denominational

support. Denominational support is often

provided on an area basis.

2. United States Marine Corps

a. Religious ministry for the Marine Corps

is provided by UMT. A UMT consists of a

Navy chaplain and a Navy enlisted religious

program specialist. A UMT is assigned to a

Marine Corps battalion and higher

headquarters (regiment, division, and Marine

expeditionary unit) to provide direct support

to the battalion, subordinate companies, and

attachments.

b. Unit Support. Support provided to the

unit of assignment and to those attached to

the unit. The UMT normally gives first

priority to support of the assigned unit and

provides support to other units when directed

by the commander.
A-F-2

Annex F to Appendix A

JP 3-57

c. Area Support. Support provided to

Marines, members of other Services, and

authorized civilians who are not assigned to

the UMT’s unit, but are without direct

religious support, as directed by the

commander. A regiment, Marine

expeditionary unit, or higher command

normally coordinates area religious support.

d. Faith Group Specific Support.

Support provided to Marines and other

authorized persons of the chaplain’s own

religious faith group to meet certain prescribed

sacramental requirements and for the exercise

of their religion. The unit chaplain coordinates

all faith group specific and/or sacramental

religious support by identifying such

requirements and arranging for other military

chaplains, civilian clergy, and/or command

appointed lay readers to meet the requirements

when the unit chaplain is not approved and/

or qualified to administer the required

sacrament. Faith group support is often

provided on an area basis.

3. United States Navy

US Navy provides ministry support to the

fleet, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.

Navy ministry teams support Navy forces

ashore on an area basis. Larger Navy ships

deploy with a chaplain aboard who provides

ministry to the group by moving from ship to

ship. Ships without chaplains aboard conduct

lay services when a chaplain is not available.

4. United States Air Force

a. Air Force chaplains provide religious

ministry across the range of military

operations and in a wide range of geographic

locations. The combatant commander should

appoint a command chaplain from one of the

Services, assigned or attached to the staff, to

coordinate religious ministry activities in

support of the joint mission. The command

chaplain of a combatant command may be

appointed to serve as the JTF chaplain upon

establishment of a JTF. The Air Force Service

component commander is responsible for

religious ministry support activities within the

component command. The Air Force Service

component commander may appoint a

chaplain to his staff to coordinate these

activities. Other Chaplain Service (CS) teams

supporting the Air Force component of a joint

force are assigned to the deployed wing and

provide religious support to the assigned

wings and squadrons.

b. Air Force CS teams provide essential

religious support to deployed forces, that

includes worship opportunities, pastoral care,

and advising commanders on religious,

spiritual, ethical, and moral issues. CS teams

plan, coordinate, and execute a comprehensive

CS ministry during FHA operations as well

as all levels of conflict in the operational area.

These activities include being a visible

reminder of the Holy; providing a pluralistic,

pastoral, moral, religious, and spiritual

ministry to Air Force personnel in support of

maximum Air Force combat effectiveness.

CS teams provide timely ministry to Air Force

personnel facing the trauma of mass

casualties, battle fatigue, and other combatrelated stress. Chaplains coordinate, as

required, with HN civil or military religious

representatives in order to facilitate positive

and mutual understanding. CS teams also

ensure that EPWs and CIs receive ministry

and care appropriate to their needs.

For further detail regarding religious support

to joint operations, refer to JP 1-05, Religious

Ministry Support for Joint Operations.
ANNEX G TO APPENDIX A

TRANSPORTATION

A-G-1

1. United States Army

The US Army has many transportation

capabilities (ground, sea, and air) to assist in

CMO. Below is an overview of the Army’s

rotary-wing capability.

a. Army aviation units, such as the assault,

general support and medium lift helicopter

companies, provide airlift for combat, combat

support, and combat service support

operations. An assault or general support

helicopter company provides airlift of

personnel and cargo, and a medium lift

helicopter company is employed primarily to

airlift heavy or outsize cargo loads. The

medium lift helicopter company also provides

supplementary airlift of personnel and a means

to evacuate damaged or crashed aircraft or

other sensitive equipment. The inclusion of

Army aircraft in the logistic transportation

system has added a mode that can provide

rapid movement of cargo over broad areas

with little hindrance from natural or manmade

barriers.

b. The corps aviation brigade provides the

corps organic aviation assets. A corps aviation

brigade is organic to each Army corps. Each

corps aviation brigade is designed, tailored,

and configured for the specific missions of

that corps.

c. A division aviation brigade (heavy, light,

airborne, air assault) is a component of each

Army division. The principal purpose of the

aviation brigade is to provide C2 and

maximize the employment of all aviation

assets within the division. Each divisional

aviation brigade is designed, configured, and

tailored to meet the tactical requirements of

that division.

d. Air is the most flexible of transportation

modes. While ground transport normally will

be the primary means of support for combat

operations, air LOCs become increasingly

important as the intensity and depth of

operations increase. Airlift relieves combat

units from total dependence on ground LOCs

which can become congested or interdicted

and allows rapid support to the maneuver

force with minimum regard to terrain

peculiarities. There are, however, limitations

to the capabilities of airlift. Airlift aircraft

are affected by changing weather conditions

and must have air corridors relatively free

from enemy air defense weapons and enemy

combat aircraft. Additionally, weight and size

limitations for airlift may reduce the allowable

cargo load.

2. United States Marine Corps

The US Marine Corps has many

transportation capabilities (ground and air) to

assist in CMO. Below is an overview of the

Marine Corps’ aviation capability.

a. The MAGTF ground combat element

and most of the MAGTF’s combat support

and combat service support elements are air

transportable. Assault support aircraft organic

to the aviation combat element (ACE) of the

MAGTF include fixed- and rotary-wing

aircraft. The ACE employs assault support

aviation capabilities to accomplish functional

responsibilities while acting as an integral part

of the MAGTF. Command, control, and

communication facilities for assault support

employment ashore are organic to the ACE.

MAGTF assault support aircraft transport

personnel and cargo, provide utility combat

support, and conduct other air support

activities, which facilitate landing force
A-G-2

Annex G to Appendix A

JP 3-57

operations. Assault support is provided

through all phases of amphibious operations

from support afloat, through the ship-to-shore

movement, and during subsequent operations

ashore. Aircraft are employed to satisfy

MAGTF combat and combat service support

requirements.

b. Combat missions consist of

helicopterborne assaults to seize critical

terrain, isolate pockets of enemy resistance,

attack enemy flanks and rear areas, or conduct

raids or patrols. Combat service support

missions include supply or resupply of troops,

movement of equipment, non-combat

movement of troops, messenger and liaison

service, and casualty and prisoner of war

evacuation.

c. Marine Light/Attack Helicopter

Squadrons (HMLA). The HMLA, operating

the UH-1N utility helicopter, is organized to

conduct operations as a squadron or as a

detachment as part of an ACE. The mission

of the HMLA is to provide combat utility

helicopter support during amphibious

operations and during subsequent operations

ashore.

d. Marine Medium Helicopter

Squadron (HMM). The HMM, operating

the CH-46E helicopter, is organized to

conduct operations as a squadron, normally

containing twelve aircraft. Though an ACE

is task-organized to meet specific mission

requirements, the HMM is usually the nucleus

organization to which detachments from other

aviation units attach to conduct an assault

support intensive mission (e.g., amphibious

assault, forcible entry operation, and NEO).

The mission of the HMM is to provide assault

transport of combat troops in the initial assault

waves and follow-on stages of amphibious

operations and subsequent operations ashore.

e. Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron

(HMH). The HMH, operating the CH-53D

and/or CH-53E helicopter, is organized to

conduct operations as a squadron, normally

containing sixteen aircraft. Most often the

HMH is tasked to provide aircraft

detachments to an ACE, providing the heavy

lift capability. The mission of the HMH is to

provide assault helicopter transport of heavy

weapons, equipment, and supplies during

amphibious operations and subsequent

operations ashore.

f. Marine Aerial Refueler and Transport

Squadron (VMGR). The VMGR, operating

the KC-I30F multi-mission tanker/transport

aircraft, is organized to conduct operations as

a squadron, normally containing twelve

aircraft. The KC-130F provides in-flight

refueling for both fixed- and rotary-wing

aircraft, and can conduct rapid ground

refueling when required. The KC-130F also

is used to perform aerial delivery of troops

and cargo, emergency resupply into

unimproved landing zones, and casualty

evacuation missions. The VMGR normally

will be tasked to provide the number of aircraft

necessary to fulfill ACE mission

requirements.

3. United States Air Force

a. Air Mobility Forces. Air mobility

forces include airlift, air refueling, and the

global air mobility support system (GAMSS)

forces. As a component of the DTS, they

transport personnel and materiel by air to

deploy, sustain, employ, redeploy, or provide

direct maneuver of military or nonmilitary

forces and organizations, as authorized by the

NCA or designated subordinate commanders.

These air mobility forces provide the NCA

with a rapid global mobility capability core

to US ability to protect national interests. This

ability to rapidly and flexibly project combat

power and influence anywhere in the world

increasingly hinges on US air mobility

capability. Air mobility’s ability to project

force in both a lethal and nonlethal manner

lies at the heart of our national military

strategy. Air mobility forces are a critical
A-G-3

Transportation

component of US military capability, and

because of their high demand and/or low

density nature, every effort must be made to

ensure they are used as efficiently and

effectively as possible. Air mobility forces

provide four basic missions to support

strategic, operational, and tactical

requirements: passenger and cargo movement;

combat support, employment, sustainment;

AE, and SO support. Each of these missions

can be supported by either intertheater or

intratheater operations.

b. Air mobility forces can be employed

across the range of military operations. Air

mobility forces can bring constructive force

to a humanitarian crisis by transporting

medical and CA personnel and equipment.

c. The Airlift System. The airlift system

is an integrated system that incorporates all

aspects of intertheater, intratheater, and JTFdedicated airlift to form a seamless delivery

system. Collectively, it offers the user a

seamless delivery system to move the user’s

personnel, patients, and/or cargo.

d. Classifications of Airlift Operations.

The National Air Mobility System is a broad

and comprehensive system comprised of both

private sector and USG components.

Together these components provide the C2

infrastructure, assets, personnel, and industrial

base required to create and sustain an air

mobility system capable of meeting the

nation’s requirements.

• Intertheater Airlift. Intertheater airlift

provides the airbridge that links theaters

to CONUS and to other theaters, as well

as airlift within CONUS. Due to the

intercontinental ranges usually associated

with these missions, intertheater

platforms are normally longer range and

have larger airlift capacity. Air Mobility

Command’s (AMC’s) arsenal of aircraft

include the C-5, C-9A, C-12, C-17, C-21,

C-130, C-141, KC-10, and KC-135.

AMC also will utilize commercial lease

contracts adding another dimension to

their global airlift capability. Most

intertheater air mobility forces are under

the command of USCINCTRANS and

provide common-user resources, sourced

from the Department of Defense or Civil

Reserve Air Fleet, to conduct operations

into or between theaters. Intertheater air

mobility operations are conducted in

response to requests from the combatant

commands and Services in accordance

with guidelines set by the NCA. This

system is heavily dependant upon the

GAMSS comprised of fixed, permanent,

but limited en route support locations and

mobile forces deployed under the Global

Reach Laydown strategy to either

augment permanent locations or establish

new locations where none had existed

before. This dependency dictates careful

forethought if the GAMSS is to sustain

any significant deployment, sustainment,

or redeployment effort. Equally so,

intertheater airlift and air refueling forces

are limited assets that must be used with

significant forethought if NCA taskings

are to be met in accordance with the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

priority system and flexibility retained to

meet the two near-simultaneous MTW

or multiple smaller contingency national

security strategies.

• Intratheater Airlift. Intratheater airlift

provides delivery of personnel and

materiel within the geographic combatant

commander’s AOR. This classification

of mission generally requires aircraft

capable of operating under a wide range

of tactical conditions including austere,

unimproved airfield operations.

Intratheater airlift assets are those assets

assigned or attached to a geographic

combatant commander. These assets

include (but are not limited to) the C-130,
A-G-4

Annex G to Appendix A

JP 3-57

C-9, and C-21 aircraft. The theaters also

have the option of contracting

commercial lift for their use.

• Intratheater air mobility forces, under the

COCOM of designated geographic

combatant commanders or under the

control of their designated subordinate

commanders, provide common-user

resources to conduct operations within

operational areas.

•• Intratheater air mobility operations

may be controlled by one of two C2

concepts. In a mature theater, with a

durable air mobility mission and

permanently assigned air mobility forces,

the combatant commander may establish

an air mobility operations control center

through which OPCON and/or tactical

control of theater assigned or attached

forces is exercised. During normal

operations, the Air Mobility Operations

Control Center (AMOCC) is the theater

Air Force component commander’s

single C2 layer for planning,

coordinating, tasking, and executing dayto-day theater air mobility operations.

During contingency or crisis operations

C2 mechanisms expand. This expansion

of C2 systems requires the AMOCC to

interface with both the air mobility

division within the air operations center,

the director of mobility forces

(DIRMOBFOR), as necessary, the

combat operations and combat plans

divisions within the air operations center

to ensure seamless mobility operations.

•• In a theater in which the AMOCC has

not been established, the theater Air Force

component commander normally will

establish an air mobility control

organization (typically, an air operations

center) within the theater C2 structure to

plan, coordinate, task, and execute theater

assigned air mobility assets.

•• Prior to a JTF being established,

theater requirements are usually met

through theater-assigned forces and

controlled through a theater-specific

command and control node. This node

is typically an AMOCC. A JTF mission

often will require air mobility

augmentation by theater assigned and/or

attached air mobility forces and/or

USTRANSCOM assigned air mobility

forces. With the concurrence of the

geographic combatant commander,

theater assigned and/or attached air

mobility assets normally will be made

available to the CJTF for tasking, while

tactical control will normally be

delegated and exercised by the Air Force

component commander and implemented

through the DIRMOBFOR. Intratheater

air mobility operations are conducted in

response to taskings from the combatant

commander or designated subordinate

commanders and primarily fill theater

operational requirements. Close

coordination is required between the

intertheater and intratheater air mobility

sub-systems. Successful movement and

delivery of personnel, materiel, and fuel

are dependent upon a seamless interface

of intertheater and intratheater subsystems. The Air Force component

commander and DIRMOBFOR must

ensure that the intratheater sub-system is

both organized to properly interface with

the intertheater sub-system offload and

onload points and capable of handling

the air mobility flow into and out of the

theater.

• Lead Mobility Wings (LMW). In

response to HA/disaster relief (DR) crises

and NEOs, Air Mobility Command has

designated five LMWs to provide a shortnotice deployment capability for mobility

reception. Each LMW fields a HA/DR/

NEO trained Initial Response Team

(IRT). The focus of this cross-functional
A-G-5

Transportation

team is the establishment of a US military

presence in forward airfields for the

reception of relief personnel, supplies,

and equipment, or the extraction of

noncombatants — essentially an air

mobility operation. When requested by

a supported geographic combatant

commander, this 32-member IRT,

sourced from an on-call LMW, arrives

at an airfield in the disaster area to

provide mobility expertise and

leadership, assess the requirements for

follow-on relief forces, and establish a

reception base to serve as a conduit for

relief supplies or the repatriation of

noncombatants. The IRT is attached to

the joint task force established by the

supported geographic combatant

commander.

• Operational Support Airlift (OSA).

OSA is a special classification of airlift

operations providing timely movement

of key decision makers and cargo.

Generally, these platforms are smaller

sized business type aircraft. The aircraft

assigned to the combatant commanders

perform theater airlift or other missions

in direct support of their theater assigned

combat units, while USTRANSCOM

manages the CONUS-based assets as a

common-user transportation pool.

e. Delivery Methods. There are two

methods in which airlift aircraft deliver their

payloads: airland and airdrop. A number of

planning factors and the JFC’s objectives will

determine which method is most appropriate.

• Airland. Airland delivery is the method

where an aircraft lands at an objective

area and unloads its cargo. The

offloading of personnel and cargo is done

entirely on the ground. It is the most

efficient and least expensive way to use

available airlift capacity. Therefore,

airland is normally considered the

preferred mode of delivery. Airland

operations include airlift to wellestablished airbases, as well as tactical

deliveries to unimproved, dirt strip

landing zones.

• Airdrop. Airdrop is another option of

aerial delivery. It involves the aerial

delivery of personnel, equipment, and

supplies into an objective area from an

in-flight aircraft. There are several

procedures for airdropping personnel,

equipment, or supplies from an airborne

platform. Most of these procedures

involve the use of parachutes to deliver

loads to the ground such as heavy

equipment airdrop, container delivery

system airdrop, and personnel airdrop.

f. Aeromedical Evacuation. AE is the

movement of patients under medical

supervision to and between medical treatment

facilities by air transportation. Movement of

patients normally requires specially qualified

aeromedical crewmembers to accompany the

patient, special air traffic control

considerations to comply with patient driven

altitude and pressurization restrictions, and

special aircraft systems medical equipment.

Patient Movement Requirements Centers

(PMRCs) provide patient regulating services.

Patient regulating includes accounting for bed

availability, medical airlift capability, and

patient in-transit visibility. PMRCs assume

the responsibilities formerly performed by the

Armed Services (or Joint) Medical Regulating

Offices and USAF AE coordination centers

(AECCs). The AECC is a coordination center,

within the joint air operations center’s airlift

coordination cell, which monitors all activities

related to AE operations execution. It

manages the medical aspects of the AE

mission and serves as the net control station

for AE communications. It coordinates

medical requirements with airlift capability,

assigns medical missions to the appropriate

AE elements, and monitors patient movement

activities.
A-G-6

Annex G to Appendix A

JP 3-57

• Intertheater AE. Contingency

intertheater AE normally will be

accomplished using dedicated AE Civil

Reserve Air Fleet. Retrograde or

dedicated military AE aircraft may be

used when AE Civil Reserve Air Fleet

or military aircraft may be pursued when

competing airlift or evacuee requirements

reduce airframe availability. These

alternatives could include use of other

organic military airlift, Civil Reserve Air

Fleet passenger aircraft, or authorization

for commercial travel for ambulatory

patients who do not require in-flight

supportive medical care.

• Intratheater AE. Intratheater AE

involves movement of patients within the

theater of operations from the mobile

aeromedical staging facilities located

near the front lines, to the aeromedical

staging facilitates in the rear zone. This

movement of casualties out of the combat

zone during contingency operations is

generally accomplished using dedicated

or scheduled retrograde aeromedical

aircraft.

For more information on AE airlift see

JP 4-02.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint

Operations.

4. United States Navy

The US Navy has many transportation

capabilities (air and sea) to assist in CMO.

Below is an overview of the Navy’s aviation

and sea capabilities.

a. Navy organic airlift assets support CMO

operations when not in conflict with existing

Navy mission requirements. Navy aircraft

identified to support CMO missions include

C-9Bs, DC-9s, C-130Ts, C-20s, and C-40As.

Navy rotary-wing aircraft as well as carrieron board airlift are potential CMO resources

which may also be available for search and

rescue, evacuation, and airlift support. Fleet

combatant commanders, through appropriate

subordinate command scheduling and

coordinating offices, have the responsibility

to determine the availability of these organic

assets.

b. Existing Navy sealift resource may also

support CMO requirements as well as provide

temporary holding facilities. Depending on

mission requirements as well as location of

ships, the Navy may also be able to provide

vertical airlift support on all ships with landing

platform capabilities, including aircraft

carriers, amphibious ships, and combatants.

Navy assets may also be able to support the

ferrying of personnel by small vessels from

shore-to-ship or shore-to-shore.
ANNEX H TO APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

A-H-1

1. United States Coast Guard’s

Combatant Command

Support Roles

The United States Coast Guard provides

support to both domestic and overseas CMO

across the range of military operations. Its

national defense role is to provide nonredundant, complementary resources that

support the National Military Strategy. Coast

Guard forces can provide capabilities over a

range of naval warfare duties, including:

battle group operations; sealift escort; search

and rescue; surveillance and interdiction; visit,

board, search and seizure; aids to navigation;

peace operations support; force protection of

military shipping at US sea ports of

embarkation and overseas ports of

debarkation.

2. Secretary of Defense and

Secretary of Transportation

Memorandum of Agreement

In October 1995, the Secretary of Defense

and the Secretary of Transportation, along

with the Chief of Naval Operations and the

Commandant of the Coast Guard signed a

Memorandum of Agreement that identifies

unique national defense capabilities that the

Coast Guard can bring to bear as a force

provider. These Coast Guard capabilities are

as follows.

a. Maritime interception operations

b. Military environmental response

operations

c. Port operations, security and defense

d. Peacetime military engagement

3. Maritime Interception

Operations

United States Coast Guard cutters may be

employed to enforce sanctions against another

nation. Functions conducted against vessel

traffic include intercepting, boarding,

searching, diverting, and seizing. For

example, cutters are provided to the United

States Central Command to enforce sanctions

against Iraq.

4. Law Enforcement Boarding

Teams

Coast Guard law enforcement detachments

(LEDETs) are experts at the visit, board,

search, and seizure mission. The smooth

integration of Coast Guard LEDET

capabilities into DOD maritime sanctions

enforcement missions is based on a foundation

built from more than 20 years of Coast Guard

and Navy drug interdiction experience. These

LEDETs provide commanders and allied

maritime interdiction forces with a capability

that complements sanctions enforcement or

blockading missions. LEDETs have played

a key role enforcing maritime sanctions in

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT

STORM, off Bosnia, and near Haiti. In

addition, they have conducted training for

numerous US Navy and allied ship boarding

teams.

5. Military Environmental

Response Operations

Marine pollution incidents have the

potential to disrupt defense operations, ruin

national economies, and damage natural

resources. The US Coast Guard is the LFA

for prevention and response to marine
A-H-2

Annex H to Appendix A

JP 3-57

pollution incidents. It is ready to respond to

major oil spills. Resources that may be

employed to respond include strike teams, oil

recovery systems installed in buoy tenders,

airborne sensors, and an extensive database

of worldwide response capabilities. C2

elements also may be provided to oversee

environmental operations.

6. Pollution Strike Teams

For military environmental response

operations, the Coast Guard offers three

rapidly deployable pollution strike teams with

equipment configured to be quickly loaded

onto military aircraft. The strike teams are

composed of highly skilled personnel who can

integrate into joint force staffs as consultants

and advisors in the event of a massive

pollution incident that may disrupt the ability

of US and allied forces to conduct military

operations. These strike teams can operate

under the most severe conditions, including

chemical incidents, and are recognized

internationally for their expertise and

achievements.

7. Port Operations, Security

and Defense

Domestic port security and protection have

long been a core Coast Guard mission.

However, emerging threats to the US

homeland have prompted an increased Coast

Guard focus on protection of domestic ports

and the US maritime transportation system

from asymmetric warfare and terrorist threats.

At the end of the Cold War, and in the wake

of Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT

STORM, geographic combatant commanders

recognized a need for deployable port security

and harbor defense. To meet that need, the

Coast Guard’s Maritime Defense Zone

mission has been expanded from protection

of US ports to include overseas ports.

8. Port Security Units

Port security units (PSUs) conduct port

operations and security missions in support

of national defense needs. The PSU provides

waterborne and limited land-based

antiterrorism and force protection for shipping

and critical port facilities at both ends of US

sea LOCs. PSUs are scheduled to arrive early

and designed to be rapidly deployed by aircraft

on short notice. They have deployed to

Bahrain for Operation DESERT STORM and

Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

and Korea, Turkey, Portugal, and Panama for

exercises. To conduct port operations and

security, Coast Guard forces typically join the

Naval Coastal Warfare organization. This

organization includes Navy Mobile Inshore

Undersea Warfare Units and Harbor Defense

Command Units, PSUs and patrol boats, and

possibly Army and/or Marine Corps security

forces.

9. Waterways Management

Through waterways management, the

Coast Guard operates to ensure the safe and

efficient use of America’s seaports of

embarkation and waterways to provide a

reliable re-supply of deployed US military

forces. Likewise, an efficient maritime

transportation system that provides safe

movement of cargo and the safe operations

of ports and vessels also is vital to the security

and economic health of most nations of the

world. It also is vital to outside CONUS joint

operations that other nations maintain suitable

seaports of debarkation and efficient

waterways to support the US military resupply effort. The Coast Guard can provide

expert consulting, training and coordinating

services to help ensure that other nations can

safely operate their ports and provide for the

expeditious movement of vessels.
A-H-3

United States Coast Guard

10. Maritime Navigation

Coast Guard sea going buoy tenders can

deploy overseas to mark or remark navigation

channels. They combine a heavy lift

capability with a relatively shallow draft.

Coast Guard aids to navigation experts can

be deployed to seaports of debarkation as

navigation system designers, to repair existing

aids to navigation systems, or to coordinate

navigation services of host or allied forces.

Extremely accurate differential global

positioning systems will soon be made air

deployable to ensure the precise marking of

channels in ports of debarkation. This aids to

navigation mission is an excellent means of

outreach to many nations. The Coast Guard

has provided services to Portugal, France,

Germany, England, and Ireland on a

professional exchange with those nations’

navigation agencies. Another navigation

service is polar icebreaking. Coast Guard

breakers have long supported the movement

of military cargoes, polar research, and

peacetime engagement missions worldwide.

11. Peacetime Military

Engagement

The December 1997 National Defense

Panel’s Report to Congress recommended that

the Coast Guard be a model for other nations.

This includes a stronger contribution to

geographic combatant commanders in

international programs, exercises, and other

activities. The goal is to build trust, strengthen

military-to-military ties, and improve regional

stability. Since 1986 the Coast Guard has

deployed about 600 mobile training teams to

over 65 countries. Annually, the Coast Guard

trains about 2000 students in-country and

another 300 in Coast Guard schools located

in the United States. Peacetime engagement

activities are natural for the Coast Guard

because the Coast Guard interacts with a large

and diverse number of agencies in host

countries. Additionally, Coast Guard forces

and missions closely match those of many

HNs, and the presence of Coast Guard forces

is often more desirable because of its

worldwide humanitarian reputation. Coast

Guard cutters routinely participate in various

training events and exercises with Pacific,

Asian, Central, South American, West

African, Mediterranean, Baltic, and Black Sea

navies and coast guards. The Coast Guard

routinely works with the Russian Border

Guard, China, and Japan to improve

enforcement and protection of living marine

resources.

12. Model Maritime Service

Code

The Coast Guard helps other nations create

legal authority for naval forces to conduct law

enforcement missions. It developed the

international Model Maritime Service Code

to serve as a foundation document for the

creation or improvement of a nation’s

fundamental legal authority. The Coast Guard

helps maritime states that are faced with many

challenges and issues including coastal

defense, navigation, regulation of shipping,

search and rescue, marine environmental

protection, vessel traffic management,

customs, immigration, anti-smuggling

enforcement, and vessel safety. The model

legal code has enabled the coastal forces of

many nations to function with new law

enforcement and regulatory powers. Many

nations now have coast guards, or navies with

coast guard powers, which can thwart

numerous threats to their security.

13. Air Support

The Coast Guard has an inventory of 92

HH 65 Dolphin and 42 HH 60 Jayhawk

helicopters and 41 HU 25 Guardian and 30
A-H-4

Annex H to Appendix A

JP 3-57

HC 130 Hercules fixed-wing aircraft. In

addition, two armed MH-90 Enforcer

helicopters are currently operating and future

expansion to eight aircraft is planned.

Equipment suites are updated and include

global positioning system, military satellite

communications, night vision, side looking

airborne radar, oil spill sensors, and forwardlooking infrared radar. These aircraft can

support the JFC in many military mission

areas including naval coastal warfare and

peacetime engagement. In addition, Coast

Guard aircraft and crews can provide expertise

in search and rescue, maritime patrol, aerial

delivery of rafts, pumps, data marker buoys,

oil spill dispersants, and rescue swimmers.

14. Support to Peace

Operations

The Coast Guard, as a military force and

maritime law enforcement agency, can lend

support to both the civilian and military

components of joint or multinational peace

operations. This includes boarding vessels at

sea laden with large numbers of refugees or

conducting basic search and rescue coverage.

This also may involve counter arms or

contraband smuggling, the protection of

civilian vessels from piracy, port security,

waterways management, and navigation

services. The Coast Guard can provide a vital

link with numerous agencies, both domestic

and international, to assist maritime states

overcoming the challenges to meet its

obligations under international law.
APPENDIX B

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-56, MANAGING

COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

B-1

Annex A Political-Military Plan
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-57

1. Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to provide

an overview of PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, and to illustrate a

sample POL-MIL plan.

2. PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations

The following is an extract from the

Synopsis of PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, that explains the

planning process.

a. PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, calls upon the

Deputies Committee to establish appropriate

interagency working groups to assist in policy

development, planning, and execution of

complex contingency operations. Normally,

the Deputies Committee will form an

Executive Committee (ExCom) with

appropriate membership to supervise the dayto-day management of US participation in

complex contingency operations. The ExCom

will bring together representatives of all

agencies that might participate in the

operation, including those not normally part

of the NSC structure. When this is the case,

participating agency representatives normally

will augment both the Deputies Committee

and the ExCom. In addition, the chair of the

ExCom normally will designate an agency to

lead a legal and fiscal advisory sub-group

whose role is to consult with the ExCom to

ensure that tasks assigned by the ExCom can

be performed by the assigned agencies

consistent with legal and fiscal authorities.

This ExCom approach has proved useful in

clarifying agency responsibilities,

strengthening agency accountability, ensuring

interagency coordination, and developing

policy options for consideration by senior

policy makers. The guiding principle behind

the ExCom approach to interagency

management is the personal accountability of

presidential appointees. Members of the

ExCom effectively serve as functional

managers for specific elements of the USG

response (e.g., refugees, demobilization,

elections, economic assistance, police reform,

and public information). They implement the

strategies agreed to by senior policy makers

during interagency coordination and report to

the ExCom and Deputies Committee on any

problems or issues that need to be resolved.

b. In future complex contingency

operations to which the United States

contributes substantial resources, PDD-56,

Managing Complex Contingency Operations,

calls upon the Deputies Committee to

establish organizational arrangements akin to

those of the ExCom approach. PDD-56,

Managing Complex Contingency Operations,

requires that a POL-MIL plan be developed

as an integrated planning tool for coordinating

USG actions in a complex contingency

operation. The POL-MIL plan will include a

comprehensive situation assessment, mission

statement, agency objectives, and desired end

state. It will outline an integrated concept of

operations to synchronize agency efforts. The

plan will identify the primary preparatory

issues and tasks for conducting an operation

(e.g., congressional consultations, diplomatic

efforts, troop recruitment, legal authorities,

funding requirements and sources, media

coordination). It also will address major

functional tasks (e.g., political mediation/

reconciliation, military support,

demobilization, humanitarian assistance,

police reform, basic public service, economic

restoration, human rights monitoring, social

development, public information).

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-56, MANAGING

COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
B-3

Presidential Decision Directive-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations

c. With the use of the POL-MIL plan, the

interagency community can implement

effective management practices, namely, to

centralize planning and decentralize execution

during the operation. The desired unity of

effort among the various agencies that is

created through the use of the POL-MIL plan

contributes to the overall success of these

complex operations. When a complex

contingency operation is contemplated in

which the USG will play a substantial role,

PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency

Operations, calls upon the Deputies

Committee to task the development of a POLMIL plan and assign specific responsibilities

to the appropriate ExCom officials. Each

ExCom official will be required to develop

their respective part of the plan, which will

be fully coordinated among all relevant

agencies. This development process will be

transparent and analytical, resulting in issues

being posed to senior policy makers for

resolution. Based on the resulting decisions,

the plan will be finalized and widely

distributed among relevant agencies.

PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency

Operations, also requires that the POL-MIL

plan include demonstrable milestones and

measures of success, to include detailed

planning for the transition of the operation to

activities that might be performed by a followon operation or by the host government.

According to PDD-56, Managing Complex

Contingency Operations, the POL-MIL plan

should be updated as the mission progresses

to reflect milestones that are or are not met

and to incorporate changes in the situation on

the ground. When a POL-MIL plan is

developed and adopted by the Deputies

Committee, it provides a valuable instrument

for achieving unity of effort among the USG

agencies involved in a complex contingency

operation. It does not obviate or preclude

follow-on planning at the operational level.

The latter is indispensable and provides a

degree of detail and specificity that a POLMIL plan cannot provide. Operational

planners, however, can look to the interagency

POL-MIL plan for a start-to-finish concept

of the mission that describes how each element

(military and civilian) fits within the broadest

purposes of a mission.

A sample POL-MIL plan is at Annex A to

Appendix B, “Political-Military Plan.”
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX B

POLITICAL-MILITARY PLAN

B-A-1

(The White House)

(Washington, DC)

Political-Military Plan

Operation XXXX

I. Situation

A. Threats — Actions of a Syndicate and other crime lords have resulted in a breakdown

in governance and law and order in Country X, posing a threat to neutral and efficient operation

of the causeway. Armed forces from Country X have invaded Country Y and occupy significant

portions of that country. Associated transnational security threats include drug trafficking,

organized crime, human rights violations causing forced migration (both internal and external),

and general societal breakdown associated with civil strife.

B. Friendly Assets to Counter These Threats

1. Military forces of the United States

2. States in the region prepared to offer political, diplomatic, and basing/transit

support to Country Y and US initiatives in the region

3. Organization of American States support of political initiatives

4. Humanitarian, human rights, and emergency response international organizations,

including the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross

5. UN and other reconstruction and development agencies, including the World

Bank, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund, and the

World Health Organization

6. Emergency relief and developmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),

both expatriate and indigenous, include the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere,

OXFAM-UK, Catholic Relief Services, Salesmen Missions, United Methodist Committee on

Relief, US Catholic Conference, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) USA,

World Vision International, and the Country Y Red Cross

7. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), plus some other

national economic development organizations
B-A-2

Annex A to Appendix B

JP 3-57

C. US Interests in the Region of Conflict

1. Neutral and efficient operation of the causeway, enabling full support of US

force projection requirements

2. Protection of life and property of US Nationals

3. Stable and friendly governance in the region, especially in Country X

4. Stemming transnational crime and trafficking in illegal narcotics destined for the

United States

5. Respect for the Rule of Law and protection of human rights in the region

6. Economic growth and prosperity in the region

II. Mission. Maintain assured US access to an efficiently operated causeway. Roll back

Country X aggression and restore the territorial integrity of Country Y. Create a climate of

respect for international norms of conduct, respect for the Rule of Law, and transition to democratic

governance and sustainably secure societies in the region.

III. Execution

A. Concept of Operations. Since peaceful resolution of the crisis appears unlikely, the

critical path to mission accomplishment now encompasses a two-phase operation.

1. The Crisis Phase is a predominantly military operation with sufficient force to

assure US access to an efficiently operating causeway. Concurrently, US forces will roll back

the aggression of Country X combatants out of Country Y and restore the territorial integrity of

the Country Y state. US military authorities will quantify to a maximum extent the humanitarian

and rehabilitation impacts of their military action. These impacts will be communicated

expeditiously to appropriate emergency international organizations responsible for assistance

to refugees, displaced persons, and affected populations in conflict situations. The same

information communicated to development organizations such as the World Bank and the UNDP

will trigger and facilitate discharge of their post-conflict responsibilities.

2. In the Post-Conflict Phase, a largely civilian Regional Transition Assistance Group

will provide guidance and capacity-building assistance leading to recovery from conflict impact

in Country Y and to an eventual turnover of governance and rehabilitation tasks to indigenous

authorities in Country X. US military presence in the Post-Conflict Phase will be limited to the

security component required to protect the achievements of the Crisis Phase and provide security

space to assure accomplishment of the Post-Conflict Phase objectives.
B-A-3

Political-Military Plan

B. Responsibilities and Accountability of Participating Agencies

1. US Department of State

a. Develop and implement the Political-Diplomatic Annex to the

Political-Military (POL-MIL) Plan (Annex A; to be provided).

b. Engage appropriate United Nations and other international relief and

development organizations, familiarize them with US objectives in this contingency, and enlist

their constructive participation to the end of achieving sustainable security and a climate for

reconstruction, development, and stability in the region.

c. Achieve maximum financial burdensharing through use of the United Nations

Consolidated Appeals process to avoid undue stress on US taxpayers in underwriting the costs

of both emergency humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance in Country X and Country Y.

2. US Department of Defense — Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff

a. Assure maximum visibility and familiarity with this POL-MIL plan in the

military mission planning process at every level.

b. Assure full and effective two-way communication on this plan between the

strategic level in Washington, the operational level (combatant commander, commander, joint

task force) in the theater, and the American Embassy Country Teams.

c. Determine the military support requirements that humanitarian emergency

and rehabilitation/development organizations may require in discharging their responsibilities.

d. Assure that these support requirements also include the input of NGO acting

as implementing partners with the accountable international organizations.

3. US National Security Advisor, National Security Council

a. Take charge of the US interagency process in developing and implementing

this POL-MIL plan.

b. Discipline the process prescribed in Presidential Decision Directive-56 to

assure immediate reaction to any requirement to amend the POL-MIL plan; assure that

Washington-level and operational-level mission planning and analysis are engaged with each

other and in harmony with this plan, and assure, through the State Department, the full engagement

of appropriate international and nongovernmental organizations with the outlines of this plan.
B-A-4

Annex A to Appendix B

JP 3-57

4. USAID

a. Provide input to military mission planning to assure maximum support for,

and minimum interference with, follow-on reconstruction and development activities in Country

X and Country Y.

b. For emergency response to needs of refugees, internally displaced and

internally affected populations, assure that disaster assistance response teams integrate fully

into US interagency teams (e.g., multi-agency assistance teams) dispatched to the capitals of

Country Y and Country X. Assure that any NGO proposals funded by USAID are supportive

of and in harmony with the plans and programs for which the lead UN agency — UNHCR —

is being held accountable.

c. Prepare the Reconstruction and Development Plan (Annex B; to be provided).

IV. Operational Support. The range of tasks which military forces may be called upon to

perform to support the objectives of this Plan.

A. Develop and implement the military Operation Plan XXXX (Annex C; to be provided).

B. For the Crisis Phase, prepare advance estimates of humanitarian and rehabilitation

impacts associated with military operations in theater. Civil affairs assessments of likely numbers

of civilian victims affected, and sectoral requirements to meet their emergency needs (water,

food, shelter, sanitation, preventive and curative medical services) have to be developed by the

joint task force (JTF), and communicated to the civilian international organizations for planning

and action (this is accomplished in Annex G, Civil Affairs to a military plan or order). State

Department will convey this impact/requirements assessment to the UN Emergency Relief

Coordinator at UN Headquarters. JTF commander will communicate this assessment to the

lead international emergency response organization in the field through the humanitarian

operations center and civil-military operations centers (to assure in the Crisis Phase that

appropriate civilian agencies are prepared and committed to meeting emergency humanitarian

relief requirements, and concurrently, to relieve the JTF commander of responsibility for meeting

these civilian requirements out of military assets).

C. The civil affairs component of the military operation plan needs to encompass the full

range of tasks military forces could be called upon to perform — in addition to the emergency

relief tasks cited in paragraph 2 above which should NOT be tasked to military forces. Prudence

dictates that planners consider how they might accomplish one or more of these tasks if and

when ordered, but these should not be construed as specified tasks. Rather, planners should

evaluate these tasks and advise higher headquarters of additional assets that may be required if

these tasks were to be assigned.

1. Range of potential military tasking during the Crisis Phase:

a. Security for relief convoys, relief articles distribution points, and/or sites for

immunization operations.
B-A-5

Political-Military Plan

b. Temporary security for camps or clusters of refugees and internally displaced

persons.

c. Logistic support, e.g., wholesale and retail transport of relief items, only

until broken or interrupted civilian systems can be restored or augmented.

d. Engineer support on a limited short-term basis, to open or maintain critical

humanitarian supply routes.

e. Possible apprehension of drug cartel leaders and others who may be indicted

for crimes against humanity.

f. Possible security for UN human rights monitors in their “Neighborhood

Watch” operations; security for forensic experts gathering evidence at sites of atrocities, e.g.,

mass graves, and possible security for humanitarian and human rights officials in the course of

their inspection duties in insecure areas.

2. Range of potential military tasking during the Post-Conflict Phase. Military-civil

affairs assessments of rehabilitation requirements will be key to informing and jump-starting

the work of the appropriate national, international and indigenous rehabilitation and development

agencies (e.g., USAID, World Bank, UNDP, host-government ministries). Assessments by

these bodies will come in time, but usually take so long that initial rehabilitation strategies and

plans will probably rely heavily on Civil Affairs groundwork. Civil affairs assessments will

cover the following elements:

a. Residual Humanitarian Impact and Requirements:

(1) This could include physical protection requirements for disaffected

civilians unwilling to return to their country or to their homes due to well-founded fear of

persecution and physical threat (and incapacity of civilian police). Other sectoral assessments

will include water systems; medical services; shelters and food together with recommendations

for the appropriate civilian agency response to these needs.

(2) Probably the key military support for humanitarian requirements in

this transition phase is to support the return of refugees and internally dislocated civilians. Civil

affairs community-based surveys need to focus on security, economic, and societal aspects of

determining suitability of communities to receive returnees. This information will be vital to

the responsibility of the UNHCR to manage the overall returnee program.

b. Infrastructure. This assessment will include communications, transportation,

sanitation, water systems, and medical services.

c. Economy and Social Infrastructure. To include employment opportunities,

small business financing, overall banking system, and statutory incentives/disincentives for

investment and economic development.
B-A-6

Annex A to Appendix B

JP 3-57

d. Environmental Impact. Assessment of the damage incurred and actions

required to restoring the environment to its approximate pre-conflict condition.

e. Civil affairs assessments for the above sectors will be communicated to the

appropriate UN and other international organizations humanitarian and development agencies

through the State Department and the USAID.

f. Other Military Responsibilities in the Transition to Stability Phase. A small,

tailored military presence should be prepared to facilitate the planning and start the implementation

of the international humanitarian and development agency responsibilities in Country X and

Country Y. The goal is to achieve a seamless transition from a predominantly military to a

predominantly civilian international presence, to access the necessary resources, and to build

sufficient capacity among indigenous agencies to give stability and prosperity a chance in the

region.

V. Command and Control

A. In the Crisis Phase, the President exercises his responsibilities through the National

Command Authorities. Crisis management and control in the Washington interagency arena is

the responsibility of the National Security Advisor.

B. In the Post-Conflict Phase (transition to stability), National Command Authorities

arrangements remain in place. The National Security Advisor continues to drive the interagency

process. The President has designated the Administrator, USAID, as the President’s

Representative for Reconstruction and Development, Country X — Country Y.

C. In the operational area for the Crisis Phase, military control will be exercised through

the National Command Authorities. The President’s Representative for Reconstruction and

Development will coordinate civilian responsibilities for reconstruction and development.

D. Post-conflict coordination in the field will be facilitated with the creation of Executive

Steering Groups (ESGs) in both Country X and Country Y. Ambassadors in capitol, Country X

and capitol, Country Y will chair their respective ESGs. ESGs will include representatives

from the country teams, senior military representatives, appropriate representation from

host-country development and planning ministries, and international organizations, plus NGO

representatives as observers.

For the President of the United States
APPENDIX C

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

ACTIVITIES

C-1

Certain CA units are task-organized around

the functional specialty areas which

correspond to those civilian sectors likely to

have an impact on CMO. This appendix will

address the relevancy of the functional areas

in transition planning.

1. Government Areas of

Consideration

a. Legal

• Relevant to operation of foreign judiciary

and legal systems and to matters related

to international law that may be in effect.

• Relevant to operation of US laws

governing military support to Federal,

state, and local authorities.

b. Public Administration. Relevant to

operations and/or use of civil agencies and

organizations.

c. Public Education. Relevant to

operations and/or use of civil educational

systems and programs.

d. Public Health. Relevant to operations

and/or use of civil health services facilities,

management of patients and disease controls,

and other preventive health measures or

systems.

e. Public Safety. Relevant to operations

and/or use of civil law enforcement, security,

and emergency services and facilities.

2. Economics and Commerce

Areas of Consideration

a. Economic Development

• Relevant to:

•• Operation and/or use of civil

government price and commodity

controls, rationing, and key industries;

•• Assessments of existing economic and

commercial structure and its effects on

planned military operations; and

•• Rehabilitation and/or reconstruction

of the economic commercial

infrastructure.

• Relevant to operations and/or use of civil

work force agencies and personnel.

• Relevant to operations of civil budgetary

agencies and to formulation and/or

implementation of associated monetary

fiscal policy.

b. Civilian Supply

• Relevant to coordination, acquisition,

and distribution of:

•• Civil sector resource support for

essential military needs; and

•• Military provisions essential to meet

minimum civil population needs.
C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-57

• Relevant to operations, policies, and

procedures for use and/or disposition of

real civil property, including special

consideration or protection.

c. Food and Agriculture. Relevant to

operation of civil agricultural training, crop

improvement, and overall food management

and production.

3. Public Facilities Areas of

Consideration

a. Public Communications. Relevant to

operations and management of civil

government and private postal services,

telephone, telegraph, radio, television, and

public warning systems.

b. Public Transportation. Relevant to

operations and/or use of available civil

transportation assets, including rail, highways,

ports, and airfields.

c. Public Works and Utilities. Relevant

to operations and maintenance of civil public

works and utilities such as gas, waterworks,

and sewage or refuse.

4. Special Areas of

Consideration

a. Cultural Relations

• Identifying and safeguarding cultural

property that is of personal, private, or

national value.

• Relevant to policies and procedures

regarding safeguarding significant civil

cultural traditions and properties.

b. Civil Information. Relevant to

development of effective indigenous

informational institutions and programs and

support to US informational programs,

including formulation, coordination, and

dissemination of information required notices

or proclamations to the civil population.

c. Dislocated Civilians

• Relevant to operations and care and

control measures (e.g., shelter, screening,

evacuation) to facilitate military

operations and meet humanitarian

requirements.

• Relevant to operations and/or use of civil

relief agencies and other organizations

providing supplies and other support to

civil population.

d. Emergency Services. Relevant to

operations and/or use of civil emergency

welfare and relief services; coordinated civilmilitary public safety; nuclear, biological, and

chemical attack warnings; casualty treatment

and evacuation measures; and disaster relief

and recovery actions.

e. Environmental Management.

Relevant to the rehabilitation, establishment,

delivery, and maintenance of government

environmental management systems and

agencies.

For more information, refer to JP 3-57.1, Joint

Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
APPENDIX D

REFERENCES

D-1

The development of JP 3-57 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Treaties

Treaty obligations of the United States, to include:

a. The Geneva Conventions for the protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949

(1949 GC), which include the following treaties to which the USG is a party:

• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in

the Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).

• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and

Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).

• Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW).

• Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC).

b. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October

18, 1907.

2. Federal Statutory Laws

a. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, PL 99-433

(codified in various sections of 10 USC, especially 164 and 167).

b. DOD Authorization Act of 1987, PL 99-661 (codified in various sections of Title 10,

USC, and other titles).

c. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, PL 87-195 (codified as amended in various sections

of Title 22 USC).

d. Title 10, USC 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Provided in Conjunction

with Military Operations.

e. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 93-288, as

amended (codified in Title 42 USC 5121, et. Seq., as well as individual agency statutory

authorities).

3. Presidential Decision Directives (PDD)

a. PDD-2, Organization of the National Security Council.
D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-57

b. PDD-39, US Policy on Counterterrorism.

c. PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.

d. PDD-62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and American

Overseas.

4. DOD Directives

a. DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs.

b. DODD 2100.3, CH-1, United States Policy Relative to Commitments to Foreign

Governments under Foreign Assistance Programs.

c. DODD 2310.1, DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (EPOW) and Other

Detainees.

d. DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

e. DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).

f. DODD 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of US Citizens and Designated Aliens

in Danger Areas Abroad.

g. DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).

h. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.

i. DODD 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief.

j. DODD 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program.

k. DODD 5125.1, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD [RA]).

l. DODD 5132.3, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance.

m. DODD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program (CAAP).

n. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations

Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

o. DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign and

International Organizations.

p. DODD 5525.1, Status of Forces Policies and Information.

q. DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
D-3

References

r. DODD 5530.3, International Agreements.

s. DODD 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Departments of Defense

Actions.

t. DODD 6050.16, DOD Policy for Establishing and Implementing Environmental

Standards at Overseas Installations.

5. DOD Instructions

a. DODI 4715.5, Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas Installations.

b. DODI 4715.8, Environmental Remediation for DOD Activities Overseas.

6. DOD Manuals

DOD 3025.1, DOD Manual for Civil Emergencies.

7. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memoranda, Instructions,

and Handbook

a. JCS Memorandum 71-87, Mission and Functions of the US Special Operations

Command.

b. CJCSI 3110.12, Annex L (Civil Affairs) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

c. CJCSI 3121.01 W/CH 1, Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) for US Forces.

(Secret)

d. CJCSI 3214.01, Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations.

e. CJSCI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.

f. CJCSM 3122.03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning

Formats and Guidance).

g. CJCS Handbook 5260, Commander’s Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness.

8. Joint Publications

a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.

c. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

d. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to Military

Operations.
D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-57

e. JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.

f. JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During

Joint Operations.

g. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

h. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

i. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

k. JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task

Force Operations.

l. JP 3-05.3, Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures.

m. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

n. JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense

(FID).

o. JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

p. JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

q. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

r. JP 3-07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations.

s. JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian

Assistance.

t. JP 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations.

u. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

v. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

w. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

x. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

y. JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations.

z. JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
D-5

References

aa. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

bb. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

cc. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

dd. JP 3- 61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

ee. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

ff. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

gg. JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations.

hh. JP 4-02.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint

Operations.

ii. JP 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

jj. JP 4-05, Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning.

kk. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

ll. JP 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.

mm. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

nn. JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems

Support to Joint Operations.

oo. JP 6-02, Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational/Tactical Command, Control,

Communications, and Computer Systems.

9. Multi-Service Publications

a. FM 33-1/FMFM 3-53, Psychological Operations.

b. FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10, Domestic Support Operations.

c. DA PAM 690-80/NAVSO P-1910/MCO P12910.1, Use and Administration of Local

Citizens in Foreign Areas During Hostilities.

10. Department of the Army Publications

a. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Personnel, and

Other Detainees.

b. FM 8-42, Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations.
D-6

Appendix D

JP 3-57

c. FM 8-43, Combat Health Support in Army Special Operations Forces.

d. FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons.

e. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare.

f. FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.

g. FM 100-5, Operations.

h. FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations.

11. Department of the Navy Publications

a. Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, September 1992, From the Sea.

b. NWP 9/FMFM 1-10, 1989, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval

Operations.

12. Department of the Air Force Publications

a. AFDD-2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power.

b. AFDD 2-3, Military Operations Other Than War.

c. AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

d. AFI 10-801, Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

e. AFI 10-802, Military Support to Civil Authorities.

f. AFI 10-212, Air Base Operability Program.

g. AFI 31-209, The Air Force Resource Protection Program.

h. AFI 32-4001, Disaster Preparedness Planning and Operations.

i. AFI 51-401, Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed

Conflict.

j. AFPD 10-8, Air Force Support to Civil Authorities.

k. AFPD 51-4, Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

l. AFPD 51-7, International Law.
D-7

References

13. USMC Publications

a. NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual.

b. FMFM 7-34, Civil Affairs.

c. FMFRP 7-34-2, Civil Affairs Operations.

d. FMFRP 14-3, Operational Concept for Marine Expeditionary Units (Special

Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)).
D-8

Appendix D

JP 3-57

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX E

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

E-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,

116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address

content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint

Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-57, 21 June 1995, Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JD//

USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint

Force Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC

20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this

publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an

enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested

to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in

this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________________
E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-57

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication

centers listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint

publication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside

the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint

publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the

local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,

Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned

administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,

Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

700 Robbins Avenue

Bldg 1, Customer Service

Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)

814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD), US Coast Guard

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is

unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint

publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information

Security Program.
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active Component

ACB amphibious construction battalion

ACE aviation combat element (MAGTF)

ACSA acquisition cross-Service agreement

AE aeromedical evacuation

AECC aeromedical evacuation coordination center

AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Force

AFCAP Air Force Contract Augmentation Program

AFMS Air Force Medical Service

AFNSEP Air Force National Security and Emergency Preparedness

Agency

AFTH Air Force Theater Hospital

AMC Air Mobility Command

AMOCC Air Mobility Operations Control Center

ANG Air National Guard

AOR area of responsibility

AT/FP antiterrorism/force protection

C2 command and control

C4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligence

CA civil affairs

CAG Civil Affairs Group

CBMU construction battalion maintenance unit

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

CBU construction battalion unit

CEB combat engineer battalion

CI civilian internee

CIMIC civil-military cooperation

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

CJTF commander, joint task force

CM consequence management

CMO civil-military operations

CMOC civil-military operations center

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COM chief of mission

CONCAP Construction Capabilities Contract Process

CONPLAN operation plan in concept format

CONUS continental United States

COS chief of staff

CS Chaplain Service (Air Force)
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-57

DC dislocated civilians

DCO defense coordination officer

DFO Disaster Field Office

DIILS Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

DIRMOBFOR director of mobility forces

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

DODI Department of Defense Instruction

DOMS Director of Military Support

DOS Department of State

DR disaster relief

DSO domestic support operations

DTS Defense Transportation System

EMEDS Expeditionary Medical Support

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOD explosive ordnance disposal

EPW enemy prisoner of war

ERT emergency response team

ERT-A emergency response team - advance

ESB engineer support battalion

ESF emergency support function

ESG executive steering groups

EST emergency support team

ExCom executive committee

FCO federal coordinating officer

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FID foreign internal defense

FMS foreign military sales

FPA foreign policy advisor

FSSG force service support group (USMC)

GAMSS global air mobility support system

GE general engineering

HA humanitarian assistance

HACC humanitarian assistance coordination center

HCA humanitarian and civic assistance

HMH Marine heavy helicopter squadron

HMLA Marine light/attack helicopter squadron

HMM Marine medium helicopter squadron

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HOC humanitarian operations center

HSS health service support
GL-3

Glossary

IMET international military education and training

IO information operations

IRT Initial Response Team

J-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staff

J-8 Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment, joint

staff

JCMOTF joint civil-military operations task force

JFC joint force commander

JOA joint operations area

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF joint task force

LEDET law enforcement detachment (USCG)

LFA lead federal agency

LMW lead mobility wing

LOAC law of armed conflict

LOC line of communications

LOGCAP Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program

M/CM/S mobility, countermobility, and/or survivability

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MCA military civic action

MEDLOGCO medical logistics company

MEF Marine expeditionary force

MNF multinational forces

MOE measures of effectiveness

MOOTW military operations other than war

MP military police

MSCA military support to civil authorities

MSCLEA military support to civilian law enforcement agencies

MT ministry team

MWSS Marine wing support squadron

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Command Authorities

NCB naval construction brigade

NCF naval construction force

NCFSU naval construction force support unit

NCR naval construction regiment

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation

NGO nongovernmental organization

NMCB naval mobile construction battalion

NSC National Security Council
GL-4

Glossary

JP 3-57

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operation order

OPSEC operations security

OSA operational support airlift

OSOCC on-site operations coordination center

PA public affairs

PAO public affairs officer/office

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PMRC patient movement requirements center

POB psychological operations battalion

POG psychological operations group

POLAD political advisor

POL-MIL political-military

PRC populace and resources control

Prime BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces

PSU port security unit

PSYOP psychological operations

PVNTMED preventive medicine

RC Reserve Component

RED HORSE Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair

Squadron, Engineers

ROC regional operations center

ROE rules of engagement

SA security assistance

SCO state coordinating officer

SEAL sea-air-land team

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SFMS special forces medical sergeant

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

SO special operations

SOC special operations command

SOF special operations forces

SOFA status-of-forces agreement

SP security police

SROE standing rules of engagement

SYG Secretary General (United Nations)

TEP Theater Engagement Plan

TPB tactical psychological operations battalion

UCT underwater construction team

UMT unit ministry team

UN United Nations
GL-5

Glossary

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations

UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNHCR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs

USACIDC United States Army Criminal Investigations Command

USAF United States Air Force

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USCINCSOC Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations

Command

USCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command

USDAO United States Defense Attaché Office

USG United States Government

USMC United States Marine Corps

USN United States Navy

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VMGR Marine aerial refueler and transport squadron

WMD weapons of mass destruction
antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to

reduce the vulnerability of individuals and

property to terrorist acts, to include limited

response and containment by local military

forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

civil administration. An administration

established by a foreign government in (1)

friendly territory, under an agreement with

the government of the area concerned, to

exercise certain authority normally the

function of the local government, or (2)

hostile territory, occupied by US forces,

where a foreign government exercises

executive, legislative, and judicial authority

until an indigenous civil government can

be established. Also called CA

administration. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve

component forces and units organized,

trained, and equipped specifically to

conduct civil affairs activities and to support

civil-military operations. (This term and

its definition modify the existing term and

its definition and are approved for inclusion

in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed

or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance

the relationship between military forces and

civil authorities in areas where military

forces are present; and (2) involve

application of civil affairs functional

specialty skills, in areas normally the

responsibility of civil government, to

enhance conduct of civil-military

operations. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition

and are approved for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02.)

civil affairs agreement. An agreement which

governs the relationship between allied

armed forces located in a friendly country

and the civil authorities and people of that

country. (JP 1-02)

civil defense. All those activities and

measures designed or undertaken to: a.

minimize the effects upon the civilian

population caused or which would be

caused by an enemy attack on the United

States; b. deal with the immediate

emergency conditions which would be

created by any such attack; and c. effectuate

emergency repairs to, or the emergency

restoration of, vital utilities and facilities

destroyed or damaged by any such attack.

(JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of

a commander that establish, maintain,

influence, or exploit relations between

military forces, governmental and

nongovernmental civilian organizations and

authorities, and the civilian populace in a

friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area

in order to facilitate military operations, to

consolidate and achieve operational US

objectives. Civil-military operations may

include performance by military forces of

activities and functions normally the

responsibility of the local, regional, or

national government. These activities may

occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other

military actions. They may also occur, if

directed, in the absence of other military

operations. Civil-military operations may

be performed by designated civil affairs, by

other military forces, or by a combination

of civil affairs and other forces. Also called

CMO. (This term and its definition modify

the existing term and its definition and are

approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc

organization, normally established by the

geographic combatant commander or

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-6 JP 3-57
subordinate joint force commander, to

assist in the coordination of activities of

engaged military forces, and other United

States Government agencies,

nongovernmental organizations, and

regional and international organizations.

There is no established structure, and its

size and composition are situation

dependent. Also called CMOC. (This

term and its definition modify the existing

term and its definition and are approved

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

civil requirements. The computed

production and distribution of all types of

services, supplies, and equipment during

periods of armed conflict or occupation to

ensure the productive efficiency of the

civilian economy and to provide to civilians

the treatment and protection to which they

are entitled under customary and

conventional international law. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified

command with a broad continuing mission

under a single commander established and

so designated by the President, through the

Secretary of Defense and with the advice

and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands

typically have geographic or functional

responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command

authority). Nontransferable command

authority established by title 10 (“Armed

Forces”), United States Code, section 164,

exercised only by commanders of unified

or specified combatant commands unless

otherwise directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense. Combatant

command (command authority) cannot be

delegated and is the authority of a

combatant commander to perform those

functions of command over assigned forces

involving organizing and employing

commands and forces, assigning tasks,

designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction over all aspects of

military operations, joint training, and

logistics necessary to accomplish the

missions assigned to the command.

Combatant command (command authority)

should be exercised through the

commanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercised through

the subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component

commanders. Combatant command

(command authority) provides full

authority to organize and employ

commands and forces as the combatant

commander considers necessary to

accomplish assigned missions. Operational

control is inherent in combatant command

(command authority). Also called

COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander in

chief of one of the unified or specified

combatant commands established by the

President. (JP 1-02)

combat service support. The essential

capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks

necessary to sustain all elements of

operating forces in theater at all levels of

war. Within the national and theater logistic

systems, it includes but is not limited to that

support rendered by service forces in

ensuring the aspects of supply,

maintenance, transportation, health

services, and other services required by

aviation and ground combat troops to

permit those units to accomplish their

missions in combat. Combat service

support encompasses those activities at all

levels of war that produce sustainment to

all operating forces on the battlefield. Also

called CSS. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including

antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to

reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and

GL-7

Glossary
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-57

counterterrorism (offensive measures taken

to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism),

taken to oppose terrorism throughout the

entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02)

complex contingency operations. Largescale peace operations (or elements thereof)

conducted by a combination of military

forces and nonmilitary organizations that

combine one or more of the elements of

peace operations with include one or more

elements of other types of operations such

as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation

assistance, support to insurgency, or support

to counterinsurgency. (This term and its

definition are approved for inclusion in the

next edition of JP 1-02.)

counterintelligence. Information gathered

and activities conducted to protect against

espionage, other intelligence activities,

sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or

on behalf of foreign governments or

elements thereof, foreign organizations, or

foreign persons, or international terrorist

activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken

to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

Country Team. The senior, in-country,

United States coordinating and supervising

body, headed by the Chief of the United

States diplomatic mission, and composed

of the senior member of each represented

United States department or agency, as

desired by the Chief of the US diplomatic

mission. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that

includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an

expellee, or a refugee. (JP 1-02)

displaced person. A civilian who is

involuntarily outside the national

boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

domestic emergencies. Emergencies

affecting the public welfare and occurring

within the 50 states, District of Columbia,

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US

possessions and territories, or any political

subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy

attack, insurrection, civil disturbance,

earthquake, fire, flood, or other public

disasters or equivalent emergencies that

endanger life and property or disrupt the

usual process of government. The term

domestic emergency includes any or all of

the emergency conditions defined below:

a. civil defense emergency — A domestic

emergency disaster situation resulting from

devastation created by an enemy attack and

requiring emergency operations during and

following that attack. It may be proclaimed

by appropriate authority in anticipation of

an attack. b. civil disturbances — Riots,

acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful

obstructions or assemblages, or other

disorders prejudicial to public law and

order. The term civil disturbance includes

all domestic conditions requiring or likely

to require the use of Federal Armed Forces

pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of

Title 10, United States Code. c. major

disaster — Any flood, fire, hurricane,

tornado, earthquake or other catastrophe

which, in the determination of the President,

is or threatens to be of sufficient severity

and magnitude to warrant disaster

assistance by the Federal Government

under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42

United States Code 58) to supplement the

efforts and available resources of State and

local governments in alleviating the

damage, hardship, or suffering caused

thereby. d. natural disaster — All domestic

emergencies except those created as a result

of enemy attack or civil disturbance. (JP

1-02)

domestic support operations. Those

activities and measures taken by the

Department of Defense to foster mutual
GL-9

Glossary

assistance and support between the

Department of Defense and any civil

government agency in planning or

preparedness for, or in the application of

resources for response to, the consequences

of civil emergencies or attacks, including

national security emergencies. (JP 1-02)

evacuee. A civilian removed from a place of

residence by military direction for reasons

of personal security or the requirements of

the military situation. (JP 1-02)

executive agent. A term used in Department

of Defense and Service regulations to

indicate a delegation of authority by a

superior to a subordinate to act on behalf

of the superior. An agreement between

equals does not create an executive agent.

For example, a Service cannot become a

Department of Defense Executive Agent for

a particular matter with simply the

agreement of the other Services; such

authority must be delegated by the

Secretary of Defense. Designation as

executive agent, in and of itself, confers no

authority. The exact nature and scope of the

authority delegated must be stated in the

document designating the executive agent.

An executive agent may be limited to

providing only administration and support

or coordinating common functions, or it

may be delegated authority, direction, and

control over specified resources for

specified purposes. (JP 1-02)

expellee. A civilian outside the boundaries

of the country of his or her nationality or

ethnic origin who is being forcibly

repatriated to that country or to a third

country for political or other purposes. (JP

1-02)

force protection. Security program designed

to protect Service members, civilian

employees, family members, facilities, and

equipment, in all locations and situations,

accomplished through planned and

integrated application of combatting

terrorism, physical security, operations

security, personal protective services,

and supported by intelligence,

counterintelligence, and other security

programs. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance. Programs

conducted to relieve or reduce the results

of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions such as human pain,

disease, hunger, or privation that might

present a serious threat to life or that can

result in great damage to or loss of property.

Foreign humanitarian assistance provided

by US forces is limited in scope and

duration. The foreign assistance provided

is designed to supplement or complement

the efforts of the host nation civil authorities

or agencies that may have the primary

responsibility for providing foreign

humanitarian assistance. Foreign

humanitarian assistance operations are

those conducted outside the United States,

its territories, and possessions. Also called

FHA. (This term and its definition are

provided for information and are proposed

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02

by JP 3-07.6.)

foreign internal defense. Participation by

civilian and military agencies of a

government in any of the action programs

taken by another government to free and

protect its society from subversion,

lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called

FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation which receives the

forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/

or NATO organizations to be located on,

to operate in, or to transit through its

territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military

assistance rendered by a nation to foreign
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-57

forces within its territory during peacetime,

crisis or emergencies, or war based on

agreements mutually concluded between

nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance.

Assistance to the local populace provided

by predominantly US forces in conjunction

with military operations and exercises. This

assistance is specifically authorized by title

10, United States Code, section 401 and

funded under separate authorities.

Assistance provided under these provisions

is limited to (1) medical, dental, and

veterinary care provided in rural areas of a

country; (2) construction of rudimentary

surface transportation systems; (3) well

drilling and construction of basic sanitation

facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction

and repair of public facilities. Assistance

must fulfill unit training requirements that

incidentally create humanitarian benefit to

the local populace. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance. Programs

conducted to relieve or reduce the results

of natural or manmade disasters or other

endemic conditions such as human pain,

disease, hunger, or privation that might

present a serious threat to life or that can

result in great damage to or loss of property.

Humanitarian assistance provided by US

forces is limited in scope and duration. The

assistance provided is designed to

supplement or complement the efforts of

the host nation civil authorities or agencies

that may have the primary responsibility for

providing humanitarian assistance. Also

called HA. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance coordination

center. A temporary center established by

a geographic combatant commander to

assist with interagency coordination and

planning. A humanitarian assistance

coordination center operates during the

early planning and coordination stages of

foreign humanitarian assistance operations

by providing the link between the

geographic combatant commander and

other United States Government agencies,

nongovermental organizations, and

international and regional organizations

at the strategic level. Also called a

HACC. (This term and its definition are

approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

humanitarian operations center. An

interagency policymaking body that

coordinates the overall relief strategy and

unity of effort among all participants in a

large foreign humanitarian assistance

operation. It normally is established under

the direction of the government of the

affected country or the United Nations, or

a United States Government agency during

a United States unilateral operation. The

humanitarian operations center should

consist of representatives from the affected

country, the United States Embassy or

Consulate, the joint force, the United

Nations, nongovernmental and

international organizations, and other major

players in the operation. Also called HOC.

(This term and its definition are approved

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken to

affect adversary information and

information systems while defending one’s

own information and information systems.

Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the

context of Department of Defense

involvement, the coordination that occurs

between elements of Department of

Defense, and engaged US Government

agencies, nongovernmental organizations,

and regional and international organizations

for the purpose of accomplishing an

objective. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definition

and are approved for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-11

Glossary

internal defense and development. The full

range of measures taken by a nation to

promote its growth and to protect itself from

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

It focuses on building viable institutions

(political, economic, social, and military)

that respond to the needs of society. Also

called IDAD. (JP 1-02)

international organizations. Organizations

with global mandates, generally funded by

contributions from national governments.

Examples include the International

Committee of the Red Cross, the

International Organization for Migration,

and United Nation agencies. (This term

and its definition are provided for

information and are proposed for

inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02

by JP 3-07.6.)

joint civil-military operations task force.

A joint task force composed of civilmilitary operations units from more than

one Service. It provides support to the joint

force commander in humanitarian or

nation assistance operations, theater

campaigns, or a civil-military operations

concurrent with or subsequent to regional

conflict. It can organize military

interaction among many governmental and

nongovernmental humanitarian agencies

within the theater. Also called JCMOTF.

(This term and its definition are approved

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a force

composed of significant elements, assigned

or attached, of two or more Military

Departments, operating under a single joint

force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint special operations task force. A joint

task force composed of special operations

units from more than one Service, formed

to carry out a specific special operation or

prosecute special operations in support of

a theater campaign or other operations. The

joint special operations task force may have

conventional nonspecial operations units

assigned or attached to support the conduct

of specific missions. Also called JSOTF.

(JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is

constituted and so designated by the

Secretary of Defense, a combatant

commander, a subunified commander, or

an existing joint task force commander.

Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

law of war. That part of international law

that regulates the conduct of armed

hostilities. Also called the law of armed

conflict. (JP 1-02)

lead mobility wing. An Air Mobility

Command unit designated to provide an oncall 32-member cross-functional initial

response team (IRT) for short-notice

deployment in response to humanitarian

crises. When requested by a supported

geographic combatant commander, this IRT

arrives at an airfield in the disaster area to

provide mobility expertise and leadership,

assess the requirements for follow-on relief

forces, and establish a reception base to

serve as a conduit for relief supplies or the

repatriation of noncombatants. The IRT is

attached to the joint task force established

by the supported geographic combatant

commander. (This term and its definition

are approved for inclusion in the next

edition of JP 1-02.)

military civic action. The use of

preponderantly indigenous military forces

on projects useful to the local population at

all levels in such fields as education,

training, public works, agriculture,

transportation, communications, health,

sanitation, and others contributing to

economic and social development, which

would also serve to improve the standing

of the military forces with the population.

(US forces may at times advise or engage
GL-12

Glossary

JP 3-57

in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

(JP 1-02)

National Command Authorities. The

President and the Secretary of Defense or

their duly deputized alternates or

successors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance. Civil and/or military

assistance rendered to a nation by foreign

forces within that nation’s territory during

peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war

based on agreements mutually concluded

between nations. Nation assistance

programs include, but are not limited to,

security assistance, foreign internal defense,

other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs,

and activities performed on a reimbursable

basis by Federal agencies or international

organizations. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Transferable command

authority that may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below the

level of combatant command. Operational

control is inherent in combatant command

(command authority). Operational control

may be delegated and is the authority to

perform those functions of command over

subordinate forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction necessary to

accomplish the mission. Operational

control includes authoritative direction over

all aspects of military operations and joint

training necessary to accomplish missions

assigned to the command. Operational

control should be exercised through the

commanders of subordinate organizations.

Normally this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component

commanders. Operational control normally

provides full authority to organize

commands and forces and to employ those

forces as the commander in operational

control considers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions. Operational control

does not, in and of itself, include

authoritative direction for logistics or

matters of administration, discipline,

internal organization, or unit training.

Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

peacekeeping. Military operations

undertaken with the consent of all major

parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and

facilitate implementation of an agreement

(ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement)

and support diplomatic efforts to reach a

long-term political settlement. Also called

PK. (JP 1-02)

peace operations. A broad term that

encompasses peacekeeping operations and

peace enforcement operations conducted in

support of diplomatic efforts to establish and

maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

Presidential Reserve Callup Authority.

Provision of a public law (US Code, Title

10 (DOD), section 12304) that provides the

President a means to activate, without a

declaration of national emergency, not more

than 200,000 members of the Selected

Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve

(of whom not more than 30,000 may be

members of the Individual Ready Reserve),

for not more than 270 days to meet the

support requirements of any operational

mission. Members called under this

provision may not be used for disaster relief

or to suppress insurrection. This authority

has particular utility when used in

circumstances in which the escalatory

national or international signals of partial

or full mobilization would be undesirable.

Forces available under this authority can

provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent,

or operational response, or may be used as

a precursor to any subsequent mobilization.

Also called PSRC. (This term and its

definition modify the existing term and its

definition and are approved for inclusion

in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
GL-13

Glossary

private voluntary organizations. None.

(This term and its definition will be

removed from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations. Planned

operations to convey selected information

and indicators to foreign audiences to

influence their emotions, motives, objective

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of

foreign governments, organizations,

groups, and individuals. The purpose of

psychological operations is to induce or

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior

favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

refugee. A civilian who, by reason of real or

imagined danger, has left home to seek

safety elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

security assistance. Group of programs

authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export

Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other

related statutes by which the United States

provides defense articles, military training,

and other defense-related services by grant,

loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of

national policies and objectives. Also called

SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All

Department of Defense elements located in

a foreign country with assigned

responsibilities for carrying out security

assistance management functions. It

includes military assistance advisory

groups, military missions and groups,

offices of defense and military cooperation,

liaison groups, and defense attaché

personnel designated to perform security

assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP

1-02)

special operations. Operations conducted

by specially organized, trained, and

equipped military and paramilitary forces

to achieve military, political, economic, or

informational objectives by unconventional

military means in hostile, denied, or

politically sensitive areas. These

operations are conducted across the full

range of military operations, independently

or in coordination with operations of

conventional, non-special operations

forces. Political-military considerations

frequently shape special operations,

requiring clandestine, covert, or low

visibility techniques and oversight at the

national level. Special operations differ

from conventional operations in degree of

physical and political risk, operational

techniques, mode of employment,

independence from friendly support, and

dependence on detailed operational

intelligence and indigenous assets. Also

called SO. (JP 1-02)

special operations command. A subordinate

unified or other joint command established

by a joint force commander to plan,

coordinate, conduct, and support joint

special operations within the joint force

commander’s assigned operational area.

Also called SOC. (JP 1-02)

special operations forces. Those active and

reserve component forces of the Military

Services designated by the Secretary of

Defense and specifically organized, trained,

and equipped to conduct and support special

operations. Also called SOF. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement

which defines the legal position of a visiting

military force deployed in the territory of a

friendly state. Agreements delineating the

status of visiting military forces may be

bilateral or multilateral. Provisions

pertaining to the status of visiting forces

may be set forth in a separate agreement,

or they may form a part of a more

comprehensive agreement. These

provisions describe how the authorities of

a visiting force may control members of that

force and the amenability of the force or
GL-14

Glossary

JP 3-57

its members to the local law or to the

authority of local officials. To the extent

that agreements delineate matters affecting

the relations between a military force and

civilian authorities and population, they

may be considered as civil affairs

agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful

violence or threat of unlawful violence to

inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to

intimidate governments or societies in the

pursuit of goals that are generally political,

religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum

of military and paramilitary operations,

normally of long duration, predominantly

conducted by indigenous or surrogate

forces who are organized, trained,

equipped, supported, and directed in

varying degrees by an external source. It

includes guerrilla warfare and other direct

offensive, low visibility, covert, or

clandestine operations, as well as the

indirect activities of subversion, sabotage,

intelligence activities, and evasion and

escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and CINCs

Includes scope of

project, references,

milestones, and who will

develop drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, CINC, or Joint

Staff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP and

begin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director J-7,

will solicit a written report from

the combatant commands and

Services on the utility and

quality of each JP and the

need for any urgent changes or

earlier-than-scheduled

revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is

revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or Joint

Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

CINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive



STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as

shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine

publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint

Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,

makes required changes and prepares pub

for coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for

approval as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary Review

Authority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,

Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF