Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

July 2003 HOMELAND 

DEFENSE 

DOD Needs to 

Assess the Structure 

of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military 

Missions 

GAO-03-670 
DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, 

acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. 

The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example, 

as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command 

orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military 

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the 

Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use 

of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction. 

DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command) 

and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it 

has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the 

adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the 

organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only 

recently completed. DOD’s force structure is not well tailored to perform 

domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of 

operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. 

While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain 

proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice 

the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training 

value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the 

number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo 

thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure 

may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas 

military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable 

pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat 

missions and impact future personnel retention. 

F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol over Washington, D.C. 

The way in which the federal 

government views the defense of 

the United States has dramatically 

changed since September 11, 2001. 

Consequently, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) has adjusted its 

strategic and operational focus to 

encompass not only traditional 

military concerns posed by hostile 

states overseas but also the 

asymmetric threats directed at our 

homeland by both terrorists and 

hostile states. 

GAO was asked to review DOD’s 

domestic missions, including 

(1) how DOD’s military and 

nonmilitary missions differ; 

(2) how DOD’s military and 

nonmilitary missions have 

changed since September 11, 2001; 

(3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus 

Act affects DOD’s nonmilitary 

missions; and (4) the extent to 

which DOD’s organizations, 

plans, and forces are adequate for 

domestic military missions and the 

consequent sustainability of the 

current mission approach. 

GAO recommends that DOD 

assess domestic military mission 

requirements and determine what 

steps should be taken to structure 

U.S. forces to better accomplish 

domestic military missions while 

maintaining proficiency for 

overseas combat missions. DOD 

generally concurred with the need 

to do an assessment that is 

expressed in our recommendation.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-670.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact 

Raymond J. Decker at (202) 512-6020 or 

deckerr@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-670, a report to 

the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats, 

and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

July 2003 

HOMELAND DEFENSE 

DOD Needs to Assess the Structure 

of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military 

Missions 
Page i GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

Key Differences Between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions 8

The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations 10

The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian 

Law Enforcement 11

DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military 

Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made 12

Conclusions 23

Recommendation for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 26 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 30 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39 

Related GAO Products 40 

Tables 

Table 1: Key Differences between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary 

Missions 8

Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD’s Usage of 

Stop Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003 22

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Figures 

Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility 6

Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel 

Tempo Thresholds 19

Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel 

Tempo Thresholds 20

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

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copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product. 
Page 1 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

July 11, 2003 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 

 and International Relations 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) primary mission is to deter and 

prevent aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This is 

accomplished through military presence and power projection. However, 

the federal government’s view of the defense of U.S. territory has 

dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. DOD has adjusted its 

strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military 

concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats 

directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states. 

You requested us to review DOD’s domestic missions. As agreed with your 

office, we (1) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions1

differ; (2) determined how DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions have 

changed since September 11, 2001; (3) determined how the 1878 Posse 

Comitatus Act affects DOD’s nonmilitary missions; and (4) assessed the 

extent to which DOD’s organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for 

domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the 

current mission approach. 

To address these objectives we assessed key national and defense 

strategies; DOD plans, mission orders, documents (such as training 

manuals), and directives; and laws governing DOD assistance to 

U.S. civilian authorities. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable 

officials including those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the 

services and their various commands; U.S. Northern Command; and met 

with units performing domestic military missions at various locations 

nationwide. We analyzed Army military police and other combat unit 

installation security deployments, Air Force fighter wing operational data, 

 1

 We define domestic military missions as DOD activities to protect the U.S. sovereignty, 

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure from external threats and 

aggression (i.e., homeland defense). We define nonmilitary missions as military assistance 

to U.S. civil authorities—federal, state, and local governments. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

and personnel tempo data.2 We also attended congressional hearings that 

addressed the establishment of new DOD organizations and their roles 

and responsibilities. Appendix I has a complete discussion of our scope 

and methodology. 

DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, 

acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. In military missions, 

DOD is the lead federal agency, operates without a predefined end date, 

can not reject the proposed mission, and uses combat and combat support 

capabilities for their intended purposes. In nonmilitary missions, another 

agency is generally the lead, the mission has a predefined end date, and 

DOD has some discretion to reject the requested mission and uses military 

capabilities in a noncombat manner to augment U.S. civil authorities’ 

capabilities. Generally, military missions are those primary warfighting 

functions that DOD performs in defense of the nation at the direction of 

the President functioning as the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in 

nonmilitary missions, DOD provides military capabilities in support of 

U.S. civil authorities. 

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of catastrophic terrorism has altered 

some operations of military missions. Prior to September 11, 2001, DOD 

emphasized deterring and defeating military adversaries through power 

projection overseas and still does. However, The National Security 

Strategy of the United States, published in September 2002, calls for the 

United States through its military forces, if necessary, to act preemptively 

against terrorist threats before they materialize or reach the United States. 

Moreover, some aspects of domestic military missions have also changed 

since September 11, 2001. Before that day, the North American Aerospace 

Defense Command (NORAD) had planned to order Air Force units to 

intercept military adversaries’ bombers. NORAD still plans to do so should 

these threats emerge in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, 

NORAD also orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist 

attacks. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD’s 

 2

 Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces is engaged 

in their official duties at a location that makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at 

the member’s home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers), or in the member’s civilian 

residence (for reserve components’ personnel). We reviewed personnel tempo for 

each of the military services and their respective reserve components for the period 

October 1, 2000, (when DOD started collecting data) through December 31, 2002 

(the latest data available). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Unified Command Plan,3 creating the new U.S. Northern Command, which 

has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States and 

other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil 

authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001. 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act4

 prohibits the direct use of federal military 

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by 

the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized 

the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use 

its personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian law 

enforcement to assist with drug interdiction and some terrorist incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction.5

DOD has made progress in creating new organizations and a plan to 

support domestic military missions, but it is too early to assess their 

adequacy. However, DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure 

to perform these missions. As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, 

the new security environment required that DOD take appropriate 

actions to defend the United States at home against terrorists, which are 

nontraditional adversaries. Nonetheless, some forces are generally not 

well tailored to perform domestic military missions. As a result, servicemembers may not be able to sustain a high personnel tempo under the 

current approach. 

• The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

was created to provide overall supervision of DOD’s domestic military 

missions. In addition, U.S. Northern Command was created to provide 

unity of command for domestic military operations. However, neither was 

fully operational at the time of our review. Both organizations were 

identifying key staff and organizing their operations. 

• U.S. Northern Command has only recently completed its campaign plan 

for domestic military missions, and therefore the services have had little 

 3

 Unified command plans provide guidance to combatant commanders and establish 

their missions, responsibilities, force structure, geographic area of responsibility, and 

other attributes. 

4

 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). The act expressly prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force 

to execute the laws. As a matter of policy, DOD applies the law to the Navy and Marine 

Corps through DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law 

Enforcement Officials and Navy Instruction (SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28, 1988, 

Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. 

5

 10 U.S.C. §124 (2002), and 10 U.S.C. §382 (2002). 
Page 4 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

time to determine what adjustments to training or equipment are required 

for these missions. 

• DOD has not tailored its force structure to perform domestic military 

missions and may not be able to sustain the high personnel tempo that 

preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. First, while on 

domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain 

proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice 

the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training 

value. Second, from September 2001 through December 2002,6

 the 

number of servicemembers exceeding two established personnel tempo 

thresholds increased substantially, indicating that present force structure 

may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas 

military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an 

unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to 

perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention. 

We are making a recommendation that DOD assess domestic military 

mission requirements and determine what steps should be taken to 

structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions. 

DOD generally concurred with the need to do an assessment that is 

expressed in our recommendation. However, in its comments, DOD stated 

that it does not believe that an independent force structure assessment is 

required to better match force structure to perceived new domestic 

support requirements; rather, DOD stated, force structure changes should 

be determined through the ongoing force management processes that will 

culminate with the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD 

can incorporate a force structure assessment as part of its ongoing force 

management processes, then it would generally fulfill the intent of our 

recommendation. However, we believe that DOD should examine the 

merits of actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term. DOD’s 

comments are presented and evaluated at the end of this letter following 

our recommendation and in appendix II. 

 6

 For two thresholds, DOD measures the time that servicemembers spend away from home 

in the preceding 365 days counting from the last day of any month indicated. Therefore, if a 

servicemember spent time away from home that exceeded a threshold in September 2001, 

the measurement period is October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2001. 
Page 5 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Every 4 years, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review,7 DOD conducts 

a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force 

structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and 

other elements of the defense program, and establishes a defense 

program for the next 20 years. This process helps ensure that DOD can 

effectively support the broader national security strategy of the United 

States. The 2001Quadrennial Defense Review Report was issued shortly 

after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and outlines a new defense 

strategy to (1) assure allies and friends that the United States can fulfill its 

commitments, (2) dissuade adversaries from undertaking activities that 

threaten U.S. or allied interests, (3) deter aggression and coercion, and 

(4) decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. 

Operation Noble Eagle was an immediate response to the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks; is intended to directly 

defend the homeland; and is ongoing.8 Operation Noble Eagle 

missions include combat air patrols over major American cities and 

enhanced security at federal installations. A combat air patrol is an 

airborne air defense activity involving fighter aircraft patrolling a given 

area. To support fighter coverage, other military activities have included 

aerial refueling and airborne early warning; comprehensive radio and 

radar coverage of the patrolled area; and command and control centers 

to direct fighter pilots when a threatening aircraft is detected. Concerns 

about terrorist threats to federal installations increased following the 

9-11 attacks; therefore, DOD enhanced installation security to harden 

facilities against attacks and deter future attacks through the deployment 

of additional personnel (such as military police). 

In April 2002, the President approved a revision to DOD’s Unified 

Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern 

Command was activated on October 1, 2002, and is scheduled to be 

fully operational on October 1, 2003. Its area of responsibility includes 

the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the 

surrounding waters out to approximately 500 nautical miles, which 

includes Cuba, the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, and Turks and Caicos.9

 7

 As directed by 10 U.S.C. §118 (2002). 

8

 Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 5, 2002. 

9

 U.S. Southern Command retains certain responsibilities for contingency planning, 

operations, security cooperation, and force protection for these islands. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Figure 1 displays U.S. Northern Command’s area of responsibility as 

indicated by the darkened boundary line. 

Figure 1: U.S. Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility 

Note: U.S. Northern Command is responsible for defending Alaska; however, U. S. forces stationed in 

Alaska remain assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. 
Page 7 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

U.S. Northern Command is responsible for the air, land, and maritime 

defense of the continental United States. Its mission is to conduct 

operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at 

the United States, its territories and interests within assigned areas of 

responsibility, and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, 

provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities, including consequence 

management operations. 

In June 2002, the President proposed creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security and in November 2002, Congress approved legislation 

consolidating 22 federal agencies within the new department. In July 2002, 

the administration published the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, which defines homeland security as a “concerted national effort 

to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s 

vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from 

attacks that do occur.”10 The National Strategy for Homeland Security

broadly defines DOD’s contributions to national homeland security efforts 

to include the prosecution of military missions abroad that reduce the 

terrorist threat to the United States; military missions conducted within 

the United States that DOD conducts under extraordinary circumstances 

with support, as needed, by other agencies; and support to U.S. civil 

authorities under emergency circumstances, where DOD is asked to act 

quickly and provide capabilities that other agencies do not have or for 

limited scope missions where other agencies have the lead. 

In August 2002, DOD proposed the creation of a new Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. Congress approved 

it with passage of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2003.11 The new office establishes a senior civilian officer 

within the Office of the Secretary of Defense with a principal focus on the 

supervision of the homeland defense activities of DOD (i.e., the assistant 

secretary supervises the execution of domestic military missions and 

military support to U.S. civil authorities and develops policies, conducts 

analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations for these activities 

as well as emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management 

matters to the Under Secretary for Policy and the Secretary of Defense). 

The assistant secretary also supports the development of policy direction 

 10 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 

Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 2. 

11 P.L. 107-314 (Dec. 2, 2002), §902. 
Page 8 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

to the Commander of U.S. Northern Command and guides the 

development and execution of U.S. Northern Command plans and 

activities. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is 

also responsible for representing DOD when interacting with federal, 

state, and local government entities. 

In September 2002, the President released The National Security Strategy 

of the United States of America.12 The strategy identifies U.S. interests, 

goals, and objectives vital to U.S. national security; and explains how the 

United States uses its political, economic, military, and other elements of 

national power to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals 

and objectives identified above. 

Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, 

acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. Generally, military 

missions are those primary warfighting functions that DOD performs in 

defense of the nation and at the direction of the President functioning as 

the Commander-in-Chief. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, DOD 

provides military capabilities in support of U.S. civil authorities as directed 

by the President or Secretary of Defense. Table 1 provides more details on 

the key differences. 

Table 1: Key Differences between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions 

Military missions Nonmilitary missions 

Acts as the lead federal agency and executes orders issued by 

the President functioning as the Commander-in-Chief. 

Supports a lead federal agency as directed by the President or 

the Secretary of Defense. 

Performs duties under extraordinary circumstances that do not 

necessarily have defined end dates. 

Provides support on a temporary or emergency basis normally 

with agreed upon termination dates. 

Cannot reject these missions. Has some discretion to accept or reject these requests based on 

six established criteria and uses a review process guided by DOD 

Directive 3025.15.a

Applies military combat capabilities that only DOD possesses. Augments U.S. civil authorities’ capabilities with DOD’s assets or 

capabilities, which are applied in a noncombat manner. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997. 

 12 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, 

Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2002). 

Key Differences 

Between DOD’s 

Military and 

Nonmilitary Missions 
Page 9 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Military missions involve warfighting functions, such as campaigns, 

engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services’ combat forces. 

Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples 

of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic 

military mission started on September 11, 2001, and ongoing today. In the 

latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), to order combat air patrols to 

identify and intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States. 

Because this is a military mission, DOD is the lead federal agency and is 

prepared to apply its combat power, if needed. 

Requests for nonmilitary missions generally seek DOD support to help 

after the impact of natural or man-made disasters, or assist indirectly with 

law enforcement.13 These requests are evaluated against criteria contained 

in DOD’s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

14 DOD’s 

directive specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated 

against the following criteria: 

• legality (compliance with laws), 

• lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), 

• risk (safety of DOD forces), 

• cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget), 

• appropriateness (whether it is in the interest of DOD to conduct the 

requested mission), and 

• readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission). 

According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over 

230 nonmilitary missions, in a variety of settings, such as assisting in 

fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing support for 

national security special events (such as the presidential inauguration and 

2002 Olympic Games), and for other purposes. According to DOD, during 

this same period, it rejected several missions based on the above criteria. 

For example, in November 2001, DOD declined a request from the 

U.S. Capitol Police to provide military medical personnel; however, DOD 

did not indicate which criteria were used to reach this decision. 

 13 DOD Directive 5525.5, Dec. 20, 1989, provides specific guidance on responding to 

requests for law enforcement assistance. 

14 DOD Directive 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility 

for providing military assistance to civil authorities. 
Page 10 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist 

event has altered some military operations. Before September 11, 2001, 

DOD generally emphasized deterring and defeating adversaries through 

overseas power projection, and still does. Since then, DOD has deployed 

U.S. forces overseas to prosecute the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere. Moreover, The National Security Strategy of the United States 

of America, published after September 11, 2001, emphasizes preventing 

terrorist attacks against the United States. The strategy states that the 

immediate focus of the United States will be those terrorist groups having 

a global reach and any terrorist or nation that sponsors terrorism which 

attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction. Such threats may 

now be subject to a preemptive strike by U.S. military forces if necessary, 

to prevent these threats from materializing or reaching the United States. 

Some operations associated with domestic military missions have 

also changed to proactively respond to terrorist threats. Prior to 

September 11, 2001, DOD’s strategy defended air, land, and sea 

approaches to U.S. territory from military adversaries presumed to 

originate outside the United States. If necessary, DOD had planned to 

deploy U.S. military forces within the United States to counter the military 

threats. DOD still plans to do so should these threats emerge in the future. 

However, the current defense strategy, published in the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report, states that the highest priority of the U.S. military 

is to defend the homeland from attack by any enemy, which includes 

terrorists. An example of how domestic military operations have changed 

to meet terrorists’ threats can be seen in NORAD operations. Before 

September 11, 2001, NORAD primarily focused its attention on aircraft 

approaching U.S. airspace and acted to prevent a hostile aircraft from 

entering U.S. airspace. Since then, NORAD has expanded its focus so that 

it now also monitors aircraft operating within the United States as well as 

aircraft approaching U.S. airspace. Also, before September 11, 2001, 

NORAD had planned to order Air Force units to intercept military 

adversaries’ bombers. NORAD still plans to do so if these threats emerge 

in the future. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders 

combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. In another 

example, before the attacks of 9-11, many federal installations operated at 

a normal force protection condition or routine security posture that 

allowed for open access to the installations, in many cases. However, since 

then, DOD has used additional military personnel to enhance security by 

verifying identification of all personnel and vehicles entering the 

installation and conducting patrols of critical infrastructure on the 

installation. Also, in April 2002, the President approved a revision to 

DOD’s Unified Command Plan, creating the new U.S. Northern Command, 

which has responsibility to militarily defend the continental United States 

The Threat of 

Terrorism Altered 

Some Military 

Operations 
Page 11 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

and other nearby areas. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil 

authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001. 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act15 prohibits the use of the Army and 

Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where 

authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Federal courts have 

interpreted “to execute the laws” to mean the Posse Comitatus Act 

prohibits the use of federal military troops in an active role of direct 

civilian law enforcement.16 Direct involvement in law enforcement 

includes search, seizure, and arrest.17 The act does not apply to military 

operations at home or abroad, and it does not apply to National Guard 

personnel when under the direct command of states’ governors. 

Congress has authorized DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a 

number of circumstances, for example, to: 

• assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions 

(10 U.S.C. §124 and 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding 375)); 

• protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Insurrection 

Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);18

• assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes); 

• protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear 

materials (18 U.S.C. §831); 

• assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction 

(10 U.S.C. §382); and 

• assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws 

(42 U.S.C. §§97-98). 

The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a review 

of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic security, which 

would include a review of the Posse Comitatus Act. The President 

maintained that the “threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough 

review of the laws permitting the military to act within the United States in 

 15 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). 

16 See, for example, United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975). 

17 DOD Directive 5525.5 provides other examples of prohibited direct involvement. 

18 DOD Directive 3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, 

identifies policy and responsibilities governing the planning and response by DOD for its 

assistance to civil authorities, including law enforcement. 

The Posse Comitatus 

Act Restricts DOD’s 

Role in Civilian 

Law Enforcement 
Page 12 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

order to determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts 

would benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, 

how.”19 In addition to this review, Congress directed DOD to review and 

report on the legal implications of members of the armed forces operating 

on U.S. territory and the potential legal impediments affecting DOD’s role 

in supporting homeland security.20 In March 2003, the Commander of 

U.S. Northern Command stated, “We believe the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as 

amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no 

modification is needed at this time.”21 According to DOD, on May 29, 2003, 

DOD informed Congress of the results of its legal review, which concluded 

that the President has sufficient authority to order the military to provide 

military support to civilian law enforcement authorities, when necessary. 

DOD does not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act would in any way 

impede the nature or timeliness of its response. 

In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new 

organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military 

missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. The 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required that the nation, including 

DOD, take extraordinary actions on that day. In the new security 

environment, DOD continues to defend the United States at home against 

terrorists, which are nontraditional adversaries. We could not assess the 

adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our 

review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the 

campaign plan was only recently completed. However, DOD has not 

evaluated its force structure for domestic operations and these forces 

remain organized, trained, and equipped to fight overseas military 

adversaries. Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to 

practice varied skills required for combat and consequently offer limited 

training value; thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their 

domestic military missions. In addition, servicemembers are experiencing 

 19 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 

Washington, D.C.: July 2002), 48. 

20 P.L. 107-314, (Dec. 2, 2002), §921(7) Report on Establishment of the United States 

Northern Command and §1404(11) Report on the Role of the Department of Defense in 

Supporting Homeland Security. 

21 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the House 

Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 13, 2003. 

DOD Created 

Organizations and a 

Plan for Domestic 

Military Missions, but 

Force Structure 

Adjustments Have 

Not Been Made 
Page 13 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

high personnel tempo. These factors indicate that the current mission 

approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness. 

Two new organizations—the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command—together provide 

long-term policy direction, planning, and execution capability, but were 

not yet fully operational at the time of our review, because they had only 

recently been established and were not fully staffed. First, the Senate 

confirmed the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense in February 2003. The assistant secretary is to 

provide overall supervision for domestic military missions and military 

support to U.S. civil authorities. This office was not fully operational at the 

time our review was completed, with approximately two-thirds of the staff 

positions vacant. Second, U.S. Northern Command was activated only in 

October 2002 and was not planned to be fully operational before 

October 2003. As of mid-April 2003, only 46 percent of U.S. Northern 

Command’s staff positions had been filled. According to a U.S. Northern 

Command official, the command was grappling with the need to conduct 

its ongoing missions while staffing the command’s remaining positions. 

The activation of U.S. Northern Command provides unity of command for 

military activities within the continental United States. Prior to 

U.S. Northern Command’s activation, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

provided military forces to defend U.S. territory from land- and sea-based 

threats while NORAD defended the United States from airborne threats 

(and still does). The Commander of U.S. Northern Command is also the 

Commander of NORAD, thereby providing unity of command for air, land, 

and sea missions. 

DOD’s planning process requires DOD and the services to staff, train, and 

equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign plans and 

deliberate plans22 developed by the combatant commanders, including 

the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command’s 

campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is classified. Since the 

plan was only recently completed, the services have had little time to 

determine if training and equipment adjustments were needed to support 

the plan. 

 22 Campaign plans represent the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of 

operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate plans are designed to use forces and 

apportion resources for potential contingencies. 

New DOD Organizations 

to Address Domestic 

Military Missions Were 

Not Yet Fully Operational 

The U.S. Northern 

Command Campaign Plan 

Was Recently Issued 
Page 14 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

DOD has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure, which generally 

remains organized, trained, and equipped to fight military adversaries 

overseas. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic 

military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat 

units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills23 through practice 

in normal training. Domestic missions to date generally have required only 

basic military skills and thus offered limited training value—which can 

have an adverse affect on unit readiness. In our review, we found that four 

Army military police combat units guarding federal installations in the 

United States could not train for battlefield conditions, as the Army 

requires. Similarly, Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air 

patrols were inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical 

maneuvers with the frequency that the Air Force requires. Moreover, 

from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of personnel 

exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased 

substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be 

sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military 

missions. To prevent significant near-term attrition from the force, a key 

concern during periods of high personnel tempo, DOD has used its stop 

loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from 

leaving the service. Under high personnel tempo, U.S. forces could 

experience an unsustainable pace that may lead to an erosion of unit 

readiness for combat if servicemembers leave the service. 

While on domestic military missions, some servicemembers cannot 

practice their primary combat training to maintain proficiency. During 

Operation Noble Eagle, DOD provided enhanced domestic installation 

security and combat air patrols, both of which generally require only basic 

military skills but offer little opportunity to practice the varied combat 

skills needed for wartime proficiency. As a result, military readiness 

may erode. According to Army and Air Force officials, because combat 

skills for these units are perishable, to maintain or regain proficiency, 

a resumption of normal combat training may be required before 

subsequent overseas deployment. 

 23 Combat skills are critical tasks that every servicemember must be able to perform to 

fight and win in war. 

Forces Continue to Reflect 

an Overseas Emphasis 

and May Not Be Able to 

Sustain Current 

Personnel Tempo 

Forces’ Skills Are Mismatched 

with Needs of Domestic 

Military Missions, and Some 

Forces Lose Critical 

Training Opportunities 
Page 15 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Army training focuses on combat mission performance that replicates 

battlefield conditions. To acquire the skills necessary for combat, each 

unit commander establishes a mission essential task list consisting of 

critical tasks that the unit needs to be proficient on to perform its overseas 

wartime mission. However, the four military police units that we reviewed 

were often unable to train and, thus, they were unable to maintain 

proficiency for their required mission essential tasks due to the long 

Operation Noble Eagle deployments. For example, one unit could not 

practice for two of its mission essential tasks—to establish and sustain an 

internment and resettlement facility, and process and account for 

internees—that it performs in combat. In another example, two military 

police units could not practice their combat skills, which include providing 

battlefield control of roads and logistical pipelines. Instead, the four Army 

military police units from the active, reserve, and National Guard we 

reviewed were generally guarding gates, checking identification, 

inspecting vehicles, and conducting security patrols of critical installation 

infrastructure, such as command and control centers, and housing, 

shopping, and recreation areas. 

Moreover, we found that some Army servicemembers on Operation 

Noble Eagle deployments used skills unrelated to their normal missions. 

Consequently, their units’ combat proficiency may be at risk. Specifically, 

the Army provided over 8,100 Army National Guard personnel from about 

100 units to provide installation security at domestic Air Force bases. 

However, only one unit, a military police unit, had primary skills relevant 

to the mission; the remaining units were comprised of field artillery, 

engineer, and infantry personnel that have specialized combat skills such 

as providing fire support to tactical combat units; rehabilitating the 

combat zone to enhance lines of supply and communication; and 

destroying or capturing the enemy or repelling enemy assaults by fire. 

None of these units needed its combat skills on its Operation Noble Eagle 

missions. 

Similarly, the domestic combat air patrol mission represents another 

instance where servicemembers cannot always practice their primary 

combat training for proficiency. To maintain their warfighting skills, 

fighter pilots perform training sorties when not deployed abroad. Training 

sorties involve the employment of tactical maneuvers, and the use of 

weapons or weapons simulators against other aircraft or ground targets. 

For example, an offensive counterair-training sortie is designed to train for 

destroying, disrupting, or degrading enemy air and missile threats located 

in enemy territory. When on a domestic combat air patrol, a pilot may gain 

some training benefit by performing certain activities, such as an aerial 

refueling or a night landing. However, according to several Air Force 
Page 16 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

officials, domestic combat air patrols do not constitute adequate training 

for overseas combat missions. For example, one Air Force official said 

that combat air patrols involve little more than making left turns flying in a 

circle in contrast to the difficult, tactical, defensive, and offensive 

maneuvers performed while on a training sortie or possibly on a 

combat mission. 

Air Force fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols are 

inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers 

with the frequency that the Air Force requires to maintain proficiency for 

their combat missions. For example, in one of the seven most heavily 

tasked Air National Guard fighter wings,24 the average pilot was unable to 

meet training requirements in 9 out of 13 months between September 2001 

and September 2002.25 Another wing reported that Operation Noble Eagle 

had resulted in a 5-month period when no training was performed. Even 

a short-term tasking can inhibit training needed to maintain combat 

proficiency. According to Air Force officials, three training sorties are 

generally lost for every short-notice, 4-hour domestic combat air 

patrol performed. 

To mitigate the impact on pilot readiness, the Air Force rotates the 

units tasked to perform domestic combat air patrols when a continuous 

airborne alert posture26 is required. In doing so, the Air Force has sought 

to ensure that all fighter units are able to train sufficiently for overseas 

combat missions, thereby preserving flexibility in the use of these units for 

both domestic combat air patrols and for combat missions overseas. 

However, it is unclear whether managing the force structure in this way 

fully mitigates the impact on pilot training, particularly during periods of 

frequently performed domestic combat air patrol missions. According to 

one Air Force official, under the current force structure, domestic 

combat air patrols operating at levels experienced in the months after 

September 11, 2001, would not be sustainable for more than a few weeks 

 24 Seven Air National Guard fighter wings accounted for 50 percent of the Operation 

Noble Eagle flying hours performed by all Air National Guard fighter wings from 

September 1, 2001, through September 30, 2002. 

25 Similar data from other wings were not available. According to Air National Guard and 

Air Combat Command officials, there is no requirement for wings to maintain or report this 

metric to higher authorities. Moreover, Air National Guard officials said that providing us 

with this metric would entail a significant undertaking by the affected units; therefore, we 

did not attempt to obtain it. 

26 Airborne alert posture is a state of aircraft readiness when combat-equipped aircraft are 

airborne and ready for immediate action. This posture is designed to reduce reaction time. 
Page 17 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

before the units began suffering severe training effects and thus an erosion 

in military readiness. 

DOD is undertaking planned changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting 

System, which are designed to assess the impact of homeland defense and 

civil support missions on the readiness of forces to execute their 

warfighting mission. In March 2003,27 we reported that as of January 2003, 

DOD had not developed an implementation plan for the Defense 

Readiness Reporting System that contained measurable performance 

goals, identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included 

an evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system. Even 

though the new system may have the potential to improve readiness 

reporting, without an implementation plan there is little assurance that the 

new system will actually improve readiness assessments by the time of its 

expected full capability, in 2007. Without such a plan, it will also remain 

difficult to gauge progress toward meeting the 2007 target date. DOD did 

not agree with the recommendations from our March 2003 report that it 

(1) develop an implementation plan with, among other things, 

performance goals that are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and 

(2) provide annual updates to Congress on the new readiness reporting 

system’s development. However, as stated in the March 2003 report, we 

retained those two recommendations because we continue to believe that 

it is important for DOD to develop an implementation plan to gauge 

progress in developing and implementing the new readiness reporting 

system and to provide annual updates to Congress. 

Personnel tempo data indicate that the current mission approach is 

significantly stressing U.S. forces. Between September 2001 and December 

2002, personnel tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force 

personnel due to ongoing missions or commitments around the world and 

increasing support for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.28

DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away from 

 27 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended 

to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 

28 Operation Enduring Freedom is the ongoing military mission in Afghanistan. The data did 

not include the impact on personnel tempo stemming from participation in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, which is not yet fully available. While the Navy and Marine Corps did not 

experience high levels of personnel tempo—as we measured it—during the October 2000 

to December 2002 time frame, their tempo may have subsequently increased due in part to 

deployments for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The personnel tempo data we received from 

DOD did not record a servicemember’s assigned operation, for example, Operation Noble 

Eagle. 

High Army and Air Force 

Personnel Tempo Also 

Indicates a Potential Imbalance 

in Force Structure 
Page 18 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

home, a risk exists that they will leave the service and that military 

readiness may ultimately suffer. 

Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces 

is engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend off duty 

time at the member’s home, home port (for Navy servicemembers), or in 

the member’s civilian residence (for reserve components’ personnel). The 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200029 requires that 

DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member 

of the armed forces is deployed, and it established two thresholds—

servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out 

of the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 200130 established a third threshold, which requires that 

servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the 

preceding 730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high deployment per 

diem allowance.31

DOD data indicate that tempo is high and increasing for active, reserve, 

and National Guard personnel. For example, in September 2001, over 

6,600 Army personnel had exceeded the first threshold, spending 

182 to 219 days away from home during the previous 365 days. By 

December 2002, that number had risen to over 13,000 (of which Army 

Reserve and Army National Guard personnel represented about 

20 percent). During the same period, the number exceeding the second 

threshold and spending 220 to 365 days away had risen from about 800 to 

over 18,000 (which was comprised of about 75 percent Army Reserve and 

Army National Guard personnel), as shown in figure 2. 

 29 P.L. 106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999), §586(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §991). 

30 P.L. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000), §574(c) (codified at 37 U.S.C. §436). 

31 We used the three thresholds to measure days away from home, which includes 

deployments and activities such as individual training. Although the 401-day threshold 

was established for high deployment per diem allowance, we analyzed data to determine 

whether servicemembers exceeded this threshold for the purpose of measuring the pace 

of operations. On October 8, 2001, DOD suspended the counting of deployed days for 

payment purposes as permitted by law. Moreover, the additional statutory requirement 

for general and flag officers to personally manage the deployment of servicemembers 

exceeding the 182- and 220-day thresholds was also suspended at the same time. However, 

according to DOD, as a matter of policy, the services continue to track and report 

requirements as established by the acts. 
Page 19 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Figure 2: Army Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo Thresholds 

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the 

preceding 365 days counting from the last day of the month indicated. 

The number of Army personnel exceeding the third threshold of 401 or 

more days away from home in the preceding 730 days increased slightly, 

starting at about 650 in September 2002 and rising to about 990 (of which 

about 35 percent were Army Reserve and Army National Guard personnel) 

in December 2002. 

The Air Force reported similar trends. In September 2001, about 2,100 Air 

Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 to 219 days, but that 

had risen to about 8,300 (which were comprised of about 75 percent Air 

Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel) by December 2002. Also, 

as with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had 

risen from about 1,600 to over 22,100 (of which Air Force Reserve and Air 

National Guard personnel represented about 70 percent), as shown in 

figure 3. 
Page 20 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Figure 3: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Established Personnel Tempo 

Thresholds 

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the 

preceding 365 days counting from the last day of the month indicated. 
Page 21 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

The number of Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo 

threshold of 401 or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day 

period also increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about 

3,700 in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 (of which Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard personnel represented about 65 percent) 

in December 2002. 

DOD believes that the potential exists for retention problems stemming 

from high personnel tempo. To prevent servicemembers with key skills 

from leaving the services, DOD issued 23 orders since September 11, 2001, 

to prevent erosion in combat capabilities that may stem from attrition, an 

action known as stop loss authority.32 These orders affected personnel 

with designated individual job skills or, in some cases, all of the 

individuals in specific types of units that were critical for overseas combat 

and domestic military missions. However, many of the stop loss orders 

had been terminated since September 11, 2001. For example, the Navy’s 

individual stop loss order went into effect on April 27, 2003, and 

subsequently the Navy terminated this order in mid-May 2003. Table 2 

shows the estimated number of personnel affected by the stop loss orders 

in effect as of April 30, 2003. 

 32 Stop loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. §12305 (2002). It authorizes the President to 

suspend any provision of law relating to the promotion, retirement, or separation of any 

member of the armed forces when members of a reserve component are called to active 

duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national security of the 

United States. 
Page 22 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Table 2: Estimated Military Personnel Affected by DOD’s Usage of Stop Loss Authority as of April 30, 2003 

Estimated numbers of 

personnel under stop 

loss orders 

Numbers of personnel 

involuntarily held past their 

separation date 

Services’ estimated 

numbers of additional 

personnel potentially 

affected by stop loss orders 

who could retire or whose 

service contracts expire if 

the orders remain in effect 

from May 1, 2003, through

September 30, 2003 

Army unit orders 

Active 230,000 3,500 17,000

Reserve 66,700 a a 

National Guard 80,100 a a 

Army individual job skill orderb

Active 42,000 3,800 3,800

Reserve 40,400 10,000 12,300

National Guard 3,200 1,400 1,600

Air Force individual job skill 

orderc

Active 11,000 c 4,700

Reserve 3,900 c 1,600

Navy individual job skill orderd

Active 11,000 d 1,500

Reserve 3,000 d d 

Marine Corps unit order 

Active 175,000 3,000 14,400

Reserve 39,600 500 1,100

Source: Military services’ data. 

Notes: All estimates are rounded to the nearest hundred. 

a

The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard do not have information management systems that 

can identify these numbers. 

b

Data on Army Reserve and Army National Guard for individual job skill and unit stop loss orders are 

not maintained separately. Consequently, the estimates for Army National Guard and reserve stop 

loss under individual job skills and unit orders may reflect double counting of individuals and we could 

not correct for the double counting. 

c

We provide estimates for the Air Force stop loss order as of May 2, 2003, because the order went 

into effect on that date and no service member was held past their separation date on April 30, 2003. 

d

In mid-May 2003, the Navy terminated its individual job skill stop loss order that had gone into effect 

on April 27, 2003. Even though the Navy terminated its stop loss order, we provide the Navy’s 

estimates to demonstrate the impact if the order had remained in effect. Also, if the Navy’s stop loss 

order had remained in effect, according to a Navy official, mobilized Navy reservists would not have 

had separation dates from May 2003 through September 2003 because they must be able to serve 

13 months on active duty, and the order went into effect on April 27, 2003. 
Page 23 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these 

orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain 

unit-level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic military 

missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used 

as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities 

and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction, 

and training of new servicemembers. 

DOD must balance domestic and overseas missions with a renewed 

emphasis on homeland defense. Moreover, current operations both home 

and abroad are stressing the forces, as shown in personnel tempo data. 

Complicating the situation is the fact that some units are not well 

structured for their domestic missions, cannot practice the varied skills 

needed to maintain combat proficiency while performing domestic 

missions, and receive little training value from their assigned domestic 

duties. Therefore, military force readiness may erode and future personnel 

retention problems may develop, if action is not taken to address 

these problems. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense assess domestic military 

mission requirements and determine if steps should be taken to structure 

U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions while 

maintaining proficiency for overseas combat missions. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our 

recommendation. DOD stated that our draft report provides an accurate 

assessment of DOD’s need to balance its domestic and overseas mission 

with a renewed emphasis on homeland defense. DOD added that our draft 

report describes the stress that high operational tempo could have on 

personnel. However, in its comments, DOD stated that it does not believe 

that an independent force structure assessment is required to better match 

force structure to perceived new domestic support requirements; rather, 

DOD stated that force structure changes should be determined through the 

ongoing force management processes that will culminate with the fiscal 

year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. If DOD can incorporate a force 

structure assessment as part of its ongoing force management processes, 

then it would generally fulfill the intent or our recommendation. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 24 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

However, we believe that DOD should examine the merits of taking 

actions to alleviate stress on the forces in the near term rather than wait 

until the fiscal year 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review because the 

missions causing the stress are continuing. Based on our analysis of 

personnel tempo trends through December 2002 and on discussions with 

officials conducting domestic military missions, we believe that U.S. 

military force readiness may erode because of the poor match between the 

types of forces needed for the domestic military missions we reviewed, the 

forces available, and the limited training value derived from the missions. 

Moreover, future personnel retention problems may develop in the 

meantime due to the pace of operations, which consequently may become 

unsustainable. Additionally, current operations in Iraq, which were not 

considered in our analysis of military personnel tempo data, can be 

expected to impact a significant portion of the military force structure for 

the foreseeable future. Lastly, homeland defense missions are another 

factor of military personnel tempo because these missions are ongoing. 

Therefore, we believe our recommendation is valid as originally drafted. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our evaluation of 

them. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. 

We conducted our review from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further 

distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we 

will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional 

committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies 

available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the report 

will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 25 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report please call me 

at (202) 512-6020 or e-mail me at deckerr@gao.gov. The GAO contact and 

key contributors are listed in appendix III. 

Raymond J. Decker 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

 and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military 

and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since 

September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the 

Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for 

Homeland Security,1

 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff’s J-3 Directorate 

for Operations and J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy; 

U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland 

Security;2

 the Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve 

Command; the National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the 

Army and Air National Guard. We visited and met with officials from 

U.S. Northern Command, who also provided detailed responses to our 

written questions, which we analyzed and used to continue a dialogue with 

the officials. We also analyzed documents prepared by U.S. Northern 

Command and the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security. We 

reviewed DOD directives that govern civil support missions, including 

DOD Directive 3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities issued 

January 15, 1993, and DOD Directive 3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil 

Authorities issued February 18, 1997. Also, we analyzed Director of 

Military Support data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to learn about the 

types of nonmilitary support that DOD provided to federal agencies. To 

better understand DOD’s missions, we reviewed key documents such as 

the Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and the 

Congress for 2002, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, The 

National Security Strategy of the United States, the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report, and the defense strategy issued as part of the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report. 

To more fully understand the legal context of DOD’s civil support missions 

in the United States, we reviewed laws and defense directives relevant to 

DOD’s civilian support activities. We also examined the 1878 Posse 

Comitatus Act and its restrictions on direct DOD assistance to civilian law 

enforcement. We identified and examined a series of statutory 

 1

 During our review, the Senate confirmed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense in February 2003. The Special Assistant for Homeland Security 

became the principal deputy for the recently established assistant secretary. 

2

 During our review, the Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland Security was transferred 

from U.S. Joint Forces Command to U.S. Northern Command when U.S. Northern 

Command reached its initial operational capability on October 1, 2002, and assumed 

responsibility for the defense the United States. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 27 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act. In addition, we reviewed 

DOD’s directives governing civil support missions and assistance to law 

enforcement to identify DOD’s criteria for accepting or rejecting requests 

for such assistance. 

To assess whether DOD’s organizations, plans, and force structure are 

adequate to address domestic military missions, we identified DOD’s new 

organizations and responsibilities with DOD officials and visited the 

U.S. Northern Command, reviewed plans, and compared the types of 

domestic missions performed by the forces with their primary missions. 

Specifically for DOD’s organizations, we reviewed appropriate documents, 

including the U.S. Northern Command Campaign Plan and the April 2002 

revision to the Unified Command Plan, and we discussed organizational 

changes with knowledgeable officials throughout DOD. We also attended 

several congressional hearings that addressed the establishment of new 

organizations and their roles and responsibilities. With respect to 

understanding how plans address DOD’s domestic missions, we reviewed 

our prior audit work related to the review of the 2001 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report and risk management. Also, we discussed DOD’s 

planning process with an official at the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and at U.S. Northern Command and we discussed the development of the 

campaign plan with U.S. Northern Command officials. To obtain an 

understanding of whether forces performing domestic military missions 

are tailored to perform these missions, we selected two Operation Noble 

Eagle missions performed in the continental United States by DOD forces 

since September 11, 2001. Specifically, we reviewed installation security 

provided by Army military police units and combat air patrols flown by Air 

Force fighter units. We selected these specific missions because: (1) Joint 

Force Headquarters for Homeland Security officials indicated that Army 

military police combat units were deploying at high rates due to the events 

of September 11, 2001, and (2) the combat air patrol mission was the first 

domestic military mission performed under Operation Noble Eagle. 

• To understand installation security missions, we interviewed officials 

at U.S. Forces Command; the U.S. Army Reserve Command; and the 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. We also visited and 

interviewed officials at military police combat units that deployed for 

these missions, including an Army active duty combat support 

company, an Army Reserve internment and resettlement battalion, and 

an Army National Guard guard company. We also conducted a 2-day 

videoconference with command officials from an Army National Guard 

combat support company. We analyzed documentation such as briefings, 

mission orders, and training documents from the four units. We selected 

these military police units judgmentally based on the deployment data 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

received from U.S. Forces Command, taking into consideration the 

number of days the units had performed installation security; the number 

of personnel deployed on the missions; the type of military police unit 

involved; whether the unit was from the active Army, Army Reserve, or 

Army National Guard; and whether the unit completed its mission or 

would do so prior to the conclusion of our review. To better understand 

whether the skills required for installation security were well matched to 

the unit’s primary wartime missions, we compared the required combat 

training for these units to the types of duties they routinely performed for 

enhanced installation security. Further, we reviewed Army training 

regulations and manuals. We also analyzed data pertaining to the Army 

National Guard deployments to Air Force installations in the continental 

United States. We determined the types of units that deployed on these 

missions, including those most frequently deployed, and we examined the 

primary combat training requirements these units must perform to 

maintain combat proficiency in their particular specialties. 

• To gain first-hand information about the combat air patrols, we 

interviewed officials at active duty Air Force and Air National Guard 

units that performed combat air patrol missions, and analyzed extensive 

operational, training, and maintenance data. To gain an understanding 

about operational requirements and command and control issues for 

combat air patrol missions, we interviewed officials at the Department of 

the Air Force; the Air National Guard; the Air Force Reserve Command; 

the Air Combat Command; the Continental United States Region, 

North American Aerospace Defense Command; and North American 

Aerospace Defense Command. We selected units to visit based on their 

participation in combat air patrols since September 11, 2001. We obtained 

and analyzed flying hours and sortie data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 for 

fighter (F15 and F16) wings from Air Combat Command, the Air 

National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve Command. We also 

obtained and reviewed Air Force training instructions and unit training 

performance reports. 

• To determine if military personnel experienced increases in time away 

from home while performing official military duties, we reviewed data for 

personnel tempo for each of the military services and their respective 

reserve components for the period October 1, 2000, through December 31, 

2002 (the latest data available). The services report their data to the 

Defense Manpower Data Center under the direction of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We obtained the 

Army’s data directly from the Army Personnel Command because at the 

time of our review, the Defense Manpower Data Center did not have the 

Army’s recent data in its information management system. To gain further 

insight into the personnel tempo data, we conducted in-depth interviews 

with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 29 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

and Readiness, the Defense Manpower Data Center, and the Departments 

of the Army and the Air Force. We also reviewed DOD’s use of stop loss 

authority by obtaining the stop loss orders and estimates of affected 

personnel from officials in the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Military Personnel Policy, and each of the military services. We discussed 

the estimates with the officials to determine the most appropriate way to 

demonstrate the impacts of stop loss orders. 

We reviewed the data provided by the Army, Army Reserve, Army National 

Guard, Air National Guard, Air Force, Defense Manpower Data Center, 

and Army Personnel Command for completeness and reliability. For the 

analysis of flying hours and military police deployments, we found and 

corrected some errors in the data. Specifically, we found errors in the 

Air Force’s flying hour records and corrected the data by incorporating 

data provided by the affected unit. For military police deployments we 

found duplicate deployments in some cases and eliminated the duplicate 

records. 

For the analysis of Air Force, Marine Corps, Army, and Navy personnel 

tempo data, we found and corrected some errors where possible, and did 

not use the data or specific fields where the data were unreliable or we 

could not correct the problems. Specifically, for the Air Force data, we 

eliminated duplicate records and deleted all records of personnel who had 

overlapping duty dates. For all services, where the personnel tempo end 

date was missing, we assumed the personnel were still away from home 

and set the end date to a date after our analytic period. To the extent that 

the missing date represents completed duties where the end date had not 

been entered, we are overstating the number of personnel and the extent 

of days away from home. 

Through corroborating evidence from comparisons with other DOD data 

files and our corrections, we confirmed that the data we used present a 

reliable depiction of the active Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, 

active Air Force, and Air National Guard units involved in Operation Noble 

Eagle activities; and Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel 

deployments from October 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 30 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 1. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

See comment 5. 

See agency comments 

and our evaluation on 

p. 23. 

See comment 1. 

Report language now on 

p. 12. 

See comment 4. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

See comment 9. 

Report language now on 

p. 23. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 6. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

See comment 11. 

See comment 10. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated June 30, 2003. 

1. DOD stated that it is now studying and implementing significant 

changes in the force structure to better support civil authorities during 

domestic events. First, during our audit we were not presented with 

evidence of such studies as they relate to either civil support or 

homeland defense missions. Second, in our follow-up conversation 

with a DOD official concerning this statement, the DOD official did not 

provide specific information about the scope, content, or completion 

dates of the studies. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its 

strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military 

threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and 

asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. Our draft report 

acknowledged the shifts for traditional military threats and the 

asymmetric threats posed by terrorists. Based on DOD’s comment, we 

added asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. 

2. DOD stated that it is important for the report to note that DOD military 

forces are not first responders. Rather, DOD provides support as 

directed by the President or Secretary of Defense using defense 

capabilities to assist other federal, state, and local authorities in 

response to their requests. Additionally, DOD stated that our report 

fails to emphasize that DOD is not the long-term solution to the 

nation’s domestic prevention, response, and recovery requirements. 

Our report clearly states that DOD assesses requests from civil 

authorities based upon its own criteria from DOD Directive 3025.15, 

Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, and that DOD has some 

discretion to accept or reject these requests. Moreover, DOD suggested 

that we use this opportunity to recommend a solution involving the 

fostering of a more robust state and local response structure. We 

disagree. We did not comment on such a solution in our draft report 

because this type of assessment was outside the scope of our review. 

Ultimately, the President and Congress will determine the future role 

of DOD, if any, in domestic response missions. 

3. DOD commented that our draft report does not mention the planned 

changes to the Defense Readiness Reporting System. According to 

DOD, the system’s changes are designed to assess the impact of 

homeland defense and civil support missions on the readiness of 

forces to execute their warfighting mission. At DOD’s request, we have 

GAO Comments 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

incorporated information about this system on page 17. However, in 

March 2003,1

 we reported that as of January 2003, DOD had not 

developed an implementation plan for the Defense Readiness 

Reporting System that contained measurable performance goals, 

identified resources, suggested performance indicators, or included an 

evaluation plan to assess progress in developing this system. 

4. DOD commented that our draft report used non-standard terminology, 

referring to military missions (what DOD calls homeland defense) and 

nonmilitary missions (support to civil authorities). We added language 

on page 1 (see footnote 1) to establish the meaning of the terms used 

in our report. 

5. DOD stated that it believes it is not clear that homeland defense and 

support to civil authorities missions are key factors in high personnel 

tempo. On the contrary, our draft report acknowledges that overseas 

missions as well as domestic missions contribute to high personnel 

tempo. Indeed, current personnel tempo could be even higher than is 

depicted in our draft report because the data displaying high personnel 

tempo stemming from participation in homeland defense missions or 

other deployments after December 2002, or from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, were not yet fully available at the time of our review. In 

addition, the personnel tempo data we received from DOD did not 

record a servicemember’s assigned operation—for example, Operation 

Noble Eagle. However, we added a statement to footnote 28 in our 

report that acknowledges this limitation in the personnel tempo data 

we received. 

DOD also commented that since 9/11/01, increased requirements have 

been driven more significantly by overseas operations in Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. While DOD may be 

correct, our report discussed personnel tempo, not requirements. 

Personnel tempo refers to the amount of time during which a member 

of the armed forces is engaged in official duties at a location that 

makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at the servicemember’s 

home, homeport (for Navy servicemembers), or civilian residence 

(for reserve components’ personnel). Therefore, we stand by our 

finding that high personnel tempo is an indicator that present force 

structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and 

 1

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: New Reporting System Is Intended 

to Address Long-Standing Problems, but Better Planning Is Needed, GAO-03-456

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003). 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

overseas military missions and could lead to an erosion of unit 

readiness. 

Lastly, because the assessment of rotating units to maintain combat 

readiness was outside the scope of our review, we could not evaluate 

DOD’s statements. 

6. DOD commented that activities such as mobilization and 

preparation for war would almost certainly have an impact on the 

resources available to respond to homeland defense and support 

to civil authorities missions. DOD added that our draft report leaves 

the inaccurate impression that this situation is the norm. However, 

DOD did not specifically point out where the report suggested such 

an interpretation. We disagree that our report leaves an inaccurate 

impression, because it does not have statements implying this cause 

and effect. However, because servicemembers cannot be in both 

domestic and overseas locations at the same time, we believe that 

mobilization and preparation for any one mission, even including war, 

will necessarily make them unavailable for other missions. 

DOD also commented that it is important to note that, even during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, over 200,000 soldiers and airmen were 

still available after the mobilization. We agree that a significant number 

of personnel have not been mobilized even during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, but it is unclear what DOD’s figure means. DOD did not 

provide evidence to support this figure, and we believe that, in any 

case, it is tangential to our point—that, in general, some forces are not 

optimally suited to perform domestic military missions. We found that 

some forces’ skills are mismatched with the needs of domestic military 

missions and that these forces lose critical training opportunities. 

Thus, DOD’s statement that 200,000 servicemembers were available 

does not necessarily signify that these members are well suited for the 

missions at hand. 

Lastly, we did not discuss overseas missions at length in this report, 

because the report reviewed DOD’s domestic military missions. 

7. DOD commented that when identifying Title 10 statutes that allow 

federal forces to perform domestic law enforcement missions, the 

report does not make clear that these missions are based on worst 

case scenarios and are not the norm. We agree that the use of federal 

forces to perform law enforcement missions is not the norm. As 

suggested by each of the authorized uses of federal forces in domestic 

law enforcement roles that we identified, such uses are in fact the 

exception rather than the rule. DOD is correct when it states that it 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

undertakes missions to support civil authorities at the direction of the 

President or the Secretary of Defense, and, as DOD has pointed out, 

these missions may be undertaken upon requests for assistance from 

civil authorities. 

8. DOD disagreed with our statement on page 14 that domestic military 

missions to date have offered limited training value because these 

missions generally have required only basic military skills. DOD stated 

that basic military skills require practice, just as do the more 

sophisticated skills. We agree that basic skills also need practice, and 

our report made clear that, while performing Operation Noble Eagle 

missions (such as domestic installation security and combat air 

patrols), forces are able to employ basic military skills. However, our 

discussions with service officials revealed that servicemembers were 

inhibited from executing the full range of difficult tactical maneuvers 

or from replicating battlefield conditions while deployed on Operation 

Noble Eagle missions. Moreover, we reviewed DOD training 

requirements for all the military skills of these forces, both basic and 

advanced, as well as the DOD requirements for their frequency of 

practice in order to ensure proficiency. Also, DOD asserts that there 

will be ample opportunity to increase readiness prior to operational 

employment. However, DOD did not explain how it could predict the 

amount of time available to prepare for a future contingency. In any 

case, based on DOD’s requirements, we have concluded that overall 

combat readiness may erode. 

In addition, based on the length or frequency for Operation Noble 

Eagle deployments that we reviewed, we concluded that although 

basic military skills have been frequently practiced, combat skills have 

not generally been practiced. As a result, the combat proficiency of 

many servicemembers could be jeopardized. Moreover, because DOD 

did not provide specific criteria for what constitutes the limited scope 

and duration of domestic missions, we cannot address these 

comments. Finally, Operation Noble Eagle began on 9/11/01, is 

continuing, and has no known end in sight, which raises questions 

about whether this is a “limited duration” mission. Therefore, we stand 

by our report as originally drafted. 

9. In its comments, DOD pointed out that we concluded (now on p. 23) 

that some units are not well structured for their domestic missions, 

cannot practice the varied skills needed to maintain combat 

proficiency while performing domestic missions, and receive little 

training value from their assigned domestic missions. DOD then 

asserts that a temporary reduction in a unit’s effectiveness for its 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

primary mission due to homeland security or peacekeeping missions is 

not necessarily a bad thing. A key DOD official explained to us that 

effectiveness refers to the extent to which a unit was successful in 

completing a mission to which it was assigned. However, we did not 

evaluate the extent to which any military units were successful in 

completing assigned missions, thus DOD’s comment missed our point. 

We believe that a unit’s readiness may erode in the future from 

performing a mission for which it was not designed. DOD also asserted 

that the ability of units to prepare for and execute a variety of missions 

with inherent capability adds flexibility. While DOD is apparently 

asserting that the missions we reviewed are adding flexibility and 

enhancing responsiveness, DOD did not explain how practicing the 

basic skills of flying aircraft and standing guard adds flexibility. 

Consequently, we stand by our conclusion. 

10. DOD commented that the report confused the interpretation and 

application of the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to the use of the 

military to enforce the laws of the United States. We disagree. Our 

report identified and summarized laws associated with the 1878 Posse 

Comitatus Act. We explained the laws’ impact on requests for DOD 

assistance in domestic law enforcement operations. We also reported 

that DOD does not believe the act impedes the nature or timeliness of 

its response. 

11. DOD commented that our report indicated that DOD did not complete 

a congressionally directed legal review on the use of military forces in 

the United States and any legal impediments affecting DOD’s role in 

supporting homeland security. We have updated our report to reflect 

information that DOD has recently provided to us, although DOD did 

not provide this report to us. 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 39 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 

In addition to the person named above, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K. 

Geiger, Kevin L. O’Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward, 

Michael C. Zola, Rebecca Shea, and Arthur L. James Jr. also made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 40 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and 

Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces. GAO-03-677T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 29, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership. 

GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002. 

Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations 

between Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.: 

June 13, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown 

but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. 

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 41 GAO-03-670 Homeland Defense 

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical 

and Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve 

Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: 

May 13, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs 

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National 

Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 1997. 

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