Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

June 2003 FIREARMS 

CONTROLS 

Federal Agencies 

Have Firearms 

Controls, but Could 

Strengthen Controls in 

Key Areas 

GAO-03-688 
GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over 

95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms, had 

policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that were 

consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria. 

However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have 

been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory 

management. These areas include 

• recording and tracking firearms inventory data; 

• maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories; 

• ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and 

• requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for 

individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability 

procedures. 

Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms, 

audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that 

agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement 

procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and investigating 

missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since these weaknesses 

were identified, we found that agencies have implemented, or are in the 

process of implementing, actions to strengthen their firearms controls. 

In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total of 

1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between 

September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for stronger 

controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824 firearms still 

missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency 

firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these 

firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies’ total 

firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected missing firearms 

cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury identified instances of 

firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the course 

of criminal investigations. 

Federal Agencies with Personnel Authorized to Carry Firearms Included in GAO’s Review 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms National Institutes of Health 

Bureau of Engraving and Printing National Park Service 

Drug Enforcement Administration U.S. Customs Service 

Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 

Federal Bureau of Prisons U.S. Marshals Service 

Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Mint 

Federal Protective Service U.S. Postal Inspection Service 

Immigration and Naturalization Service U.S. Secret Service 

Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Department of Veterans Affairs 

Source: GAO survey of agencies’ data. 

In March 2001, the Department of 

Justice Office of Inspector General 

reported that the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service could not 

account for over 500 of its firearms. 

Furthermore, in July 2001, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

disclosed that 449 of its firearms 

were lost or stolen. Given the 

possible threat that lost, stolen, or 

missing firearms poses to the 

public, GAO assessed (1) the 

consistency of federal agencies’ 

firearms controls with federal 

internal control standards and 

related criteria; and (2) compliance 

by Justice and Treasury agencies 

with established firearms controls 

and improvements made to 

strengthen and enforce controls. 

To provide better assurance that 

firearms are safeguarded from loss, 

theft, or misuse, Department 

officials should reassess, and 

modify if necessary, existing 

firearms controls based on 

generally accepted internal control 

standards. The agencies should 

also document firearms controls in 

agency policies and procedures so 

they can be consistently 

understood and applied. 

Officials generally agreed with 

GAO’s findings. Two agencies 

agreed with our recommendation, 

and three said they had taken 

actions consistent with the 

recommendation. A fourth agency 

expressed concern about GAO’s 

recommendation, saying its 

existing controls were effective. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-688.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen 

Berrick at (212) 512-8777 or 

berrickc@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-688, a report to 

Congressional Requesters 

June 2003

FIREARMS CONTROLS

Federal Agencies Have Firearms 

Controls, but Could Strengthen Controls 

in Key Areas 
Page i GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 6

Agencies’ Policies and Procedures Were Consistent with Internal 

Control Standards, but Agencies Could Strengthen Controls in 

Key Areas 8

Audits Found Weaknesses in Firearms Controls at Justice and 

Treasury Agencies, but Improvements Are Being Made 15

Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed 

Reported Missing Firearms 22

Conclusion 26

Recommendations 27

Agency Comments 27

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Agency Controls Over Weapons Other than Firearms 

and Weapons Components 34 

Agencies Established Controls to Account for Other Weapons and 

Weapons Components 34

Agencies Reported Having Inventories of Explosives, Gas and/or 

Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 34

Agencies Used Inventory Counts and Other Methods to Control 

Weapons and Weapons Components 35

Appendix III Presence of Key Firearms Activities in Agency 

Policies and Procedures 40 

Appendix IV Survey Questionnaire 42 

Appendix V Follow-up Survey Questionnaire 63 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix VI Justice and Treasury Reports on Internal Controls 

Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Property 66 

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Health and 

Human Services 67 

Appendix VIII Comments from the Department of the Interior 69 

Appendix IX Comments from the Department of Justice 72 

Appendix X Comments from the United States Postal Service 77 

Appendix XI Comments from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 81 

Appendix XII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 84 

GAO Contact 84

Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables 

Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal 

Law Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 3

Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, 

DEA, FBI, INS, and USMS 17

Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted 

for between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 24

Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in 

Our Survey of Federal Firearms Control Policies, 

Procedures, and Practices 31
Page iii GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 5: Agencies’ Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms 

and Weapons Components 34

Table 6: Agencies’ Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for 

Explosives, Gas and/or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 36

Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and 

Procedures as Reported by Selected Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 40

Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax 

Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over 

Firearms and Other Sensitive Property 66

Abbreviations 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

BEP Bureau of Engraving and Printing 

BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics 

BOP Bureau of Prisons 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

IRS/CI Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NIH National Institutes of Health 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

TIGTA Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 

USMS U.S. Marshals Service 

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

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Page 1 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

June 13, 2003 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John D. Dingell 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Robert C. “Bobby” Scott 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Crime 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Lamar S. Smith 

House of Representatives 

In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) reported that over 500 firearms belonging to the U.S. Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) were lost, stolen, or missing.1

 Four 

months later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) disclosed that 449 

of its firearms were lost or stolen.2

 The loss of firearms and other weapons 

by federal law enforcement agencies may pose serious risks to the public, 

including the risk that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily harm 

or to further criminal activity. 

 1

Of the more than 500 missing firearms, INS identified 497 as missing during an August 1998 

agencywide inventory. An additional 42 firearms were subsequently identified as missing 

by Justice’s OIG during an audit of INS property management. 

2

FBI officials reported that 161 of the reported 449 lost or stolen weapons were 

nonfunctional training weapons that could not easily be converted to live firearms. In 

addition, officials said that some of the 161 training weapons had been given to state/local 

training institutions and were subsequently destroyed. 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Given these losses, you expressed concern that federal agencies with 

personnel authorized to carry firearms may lack adequate controls for 

securing and accounting for their firearms. Accordingly, we determined 

• the extent to which agencies’ policies and procedures for controlling 

and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control 

standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and 

management organizations; 

• whether reviews conducted by the Departments of Justice and 

Treasury3

 identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies 

and procedures, and whether agencies took actions to correct 

identified weaknesses, particularly related to (1) conducting 

inventories, (2) investigating missing firearms, and (3) disciplining 

employees; and 

• the number of firearms that federal agencies identified as lost, stolen, 

or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and 

July 2002. 

You also requested that we determine how federal agencies maintain 

control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and 

associated weapons components. Information on these weapons and 

weapons components can be found in appendix II. 

To evaluate agencies’ policies and procedures for controlling and 

safeguarding firearms, the number of missing agency firearms, and 

agencies’ control over other weapons and weapons components, we 

reviewed the firearms control activities of 18 agencies with personnel 

authorized to carry firearms and make arrests4

 within the executive branch 

of the federal government. We selected these agencies from four strata: 

those with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel, those with 500-999 

law enforcement personnel, those with 100-499 law enforcement 

 3

When we initiated our review, INS was part of the Department of Justice; U.S. Customs 

Service, U.S. Secret Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were part 

of the Department of the Treasury. With the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, INS, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Secret Service were transferred to the 

Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms was transferred to the Department of Justice as of January 24, 2003 (P.L. 107-296). 

4

Henceforth, these agencies will be referred to as federal law enforcement agencies. 
Page 3 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

personnel, and those with less than 100 law enforcement personnel.5

Together, these agencies employed over 95 percent of approximately 

80,000 federal officers and agents authorized to make arrests and carry 

firearms, as of June 2000. Table 1 identifies the 18 federal law enforcement 

agencies we surveyed and the number of firearms reported by the agencies 

as of their most recently completed inventories, at the time of our survey. 

Table 1: Most Recently Completed Firearms Inventories of Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies Reviewed as of July 2002 

Agency 

Date of completed 

firearms inventory 

as of July 2002 

Number of

firearms 

inventorieda

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms January 2002 21,125

Bureau of Engraving and Printing June 2002 527

Drug Enforcement Administration September 2001 14,921

Federal Bureau of Investigation January 2002 49,600

Federal Bureau of Prisons April 2002 19,023

Federal Emergency Management Agency June 2001 188

Federal Protective Service December 2001 1,806

Immigration and Naturalization Service August 2001 54,930

Internal Revenue Service, Criminal 

Investigation September 2001 5,467

National Institutes of Health June 2002 263

National Park Service September 2001 10,718

U.S. Customs Service April 2002 24,751

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service September 2001 5,234

U.S. Marshals Service October 2001 14,495

U.S. Mint October 2001 1,026

U.S. Postal Inspection Service December 2002b

6,228

U.S. Secret Service December 2001 9,396

Department of Veterans Affairs March 2003c

3,319

Total 243,017

Source: GAO survey of agencies. 

a

Data were not independently verified. 

b

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service provided information as of December 2002. 

c

The Department of Veterans Affairs does not have a centralized inventory, but maintains inventory 

records at its more than 100 facilities. For our review, officials calculated its total firearms inventory 

as of March 2003. 

 5

We selected all 11 agencies in the 1,000 or more stratum, the 2 largest in each of the 3 

remaining strata, and 1 additional Treasury agency to account for all Justice and Treasury 

law enforcement agencies. 
Page 4 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

We surveyed the 18 agencies to determine their policies and procedures 

for controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories, and the numbers of 

firearms lost, stolen, or not in their possession, and subsequently 

recovered, between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also reviewed 

agency policies and procedures, federal internal control standards, and 

other criteria for controlling inventories to determine whether agencies’ 

policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms were consistent with 

established criteria. 

To determine whether the Departments of Justice and the Treasury 

identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and 

procedures and have taken action to correct identified weaknesses, we 

reviewed the results of audits conducted by these departments of their 

respective agencies’ firearms control practices. We also interviewed 

agency officials and obtained documentation identifying corrective action 

taken in response to departmental reviews. Appendix I contains detailed 

information on the scope and methodology we used during our review. 

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies 

and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms that were 

generally consistent with federal internal control standards and related 

criteria. These controls addressed (1) recording and tracking of firearms 

inventory data; (2) maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms 

inventories; (3) personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and 

(4) investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for individuals 

determined not to have followed firearms accountability procedures. 

Although agencies had policies and procedures to control and safeguard 

firearms, agencies could strengthen their controls in some of these areas. 

In addition, agencies did not always document these controls in their 

policies and procedures. 

Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs and the Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) found weaknesses in 

agency procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms. Specifically, 

they found that some agencies did not conduct periodic firearms 

inventories or report and investigate instances of missing firearms, as 

required by their policies and procedures. However, the OIGs and TIGTA 

found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not 

appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. In 

response to these audits, agencies have taken, or are in the process of 

taking, action to correct all identified weaknesses. 

Results in Brief 
Page 5 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Although agencies generally established policies and procedures to 

control and safeguard firearms, 15 of the 18 we reviewed reported a total 

of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession at 

some point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Of these 

firearms, 188 were recovered during the same time period, leaving 

824 firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact 

percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, 

it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent 

of agencies’ total firearms inventories.6

 Agencies reported that some losses 

occurred despite employees taking appropriate precautions, and some 

missing firearms did not pose a threat to the public. However, audits 

conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs identified instances in which 

firearms were recovered in connection with criminal activity or during a 

criminal investigation. 

In order to assist federal law enforcement agencies in more effectively 

securing firearms, we are recommending that agencies strengthen their 

policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms 

inventories in the key control areas consistently recognized as important 

for effective inventory management and document those controls in 

agency policies and procedures. 

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 

Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the 

Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and 

Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed 

with the information presented and suggested technical changes that have 

been incorporated where appropriate. The National Institutes of Health, 

Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs commented on the 

recommendation. The National Institutes of Health and the Fish and 

Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified actions 

they have taken to strengthen firearms controls. The U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service also identified changes it has made, or is making, to its 

policies and procedures to strengthen its controls over firearms, 

consistent with our recommendation. 

 6

Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed from different 

bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency reporting systems, and are based on 

different time periods, they are not directly comparable. 
Page 6 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) expressed concerned about our 

recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing 

firearms losses, as evidenced by its not having any missing firearms during 

the time period of our review. Although the department did not report 

missing firearms during this time period, the potential exists that firearms 

could be lost or stolen at some point in the future. Accordingly, we believe 

that the department as well as other agencies we reviewed should 

periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly when their 

organization or operations have changed or when firearms have been 

identified as missing, to determine whether their controls have been 

effective or should be modified. 

Written comments that we received from the Departments of the Interior, 

Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the National Institutes of Health; and the U.S. 

Postal Service are included in appendixes VII through XI. 

In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act7

requiring executive agencies to establish and maintain controls that, 

among other things, provide reasonable assurance that assets are 

safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation. 

The act also mandated that GAO’s internal control standards8

 serve as the 

framework for agencies to use in establishing and maintaining their 

internal control systems. Among other things, GAO’s internal control 

standards require agencies to establish physical controls to secure and 

safeguard vulnerable assets such as cash, securities, inventories, and 

equipment, which might be vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In 

March 2002, GAO published a supplemental guide for inventory controls,9

which summarized fundamental principles that have been successfully 

implemented by seven private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory 

management. 

GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing internal 

controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset losses and 

establish control activities to help ensure those risks are addressed. The 

 7

31 U.S.C. 3512. 

8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). 

9

U.S. General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Best Practices in Achieving 

Consistent, Accurate Physical Counts of Inventory and Related Property, GAO-02-447G

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002). 

Background 
Page 7 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

standards further require that agencies document and monitor control 

activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented and are effective 

in addressing risk inherent in agency operations. 

In addition to the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and GAO 

standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing 

inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management 

Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and 

maintaining inventory systems.10 The criteria addressed management’s 

responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and 

implementing physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability 

for inventory items. Furthermore, in August 1983, the Commission on 

Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent 

accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies,11 published 

accreditation standards to include procedures for inventory and property 

control. 

 10The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program is a financial management 

improvement program involving the Department of the Treasury, Office of Management 

and Budget, Office of Personnel Management, GAO, and other agencies under the statutory 

authority of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 [see 31 U.S.C. 3511 (d)]. 

The purpose of the program is to promote the efficient management of assets and provide 

useful financial information on federal government operations. 

11The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., was established 

as an independent accrediting authority in 1979 by four major law enforcement 

membership associations: International Association of Chiefs of Police, National 

Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriffs’ Association, and 

Police Executive Research Forum. The purpose of the accreditation program is to improve 

law enforcement operations by developing standards addressing a wide range of law 

enforcement topics. 
Page 8 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies 

and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the 

first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of internal 

control. These controls were generally consistent with federal internal 

control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and 

management organizations. However, agencies could strengthen controls 

in key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory 

management. Strengthening controls could assist agencies in ensuring 

their firearms are secured from loss, theft, or unauthorized use. 

In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies’ policies and 

procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established 

criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards designed 

to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected against 

damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria included GAO’s 

internal control standards and supplemental inventory guidelines, advisory 

criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program 

for maintaining inventory systems, and accreditation standards for 

inventory and property control issued by the Commission on Accreditation 

for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. 

Our analysis of federal internal control standards and other related criteria 

found four key areas that were consistently identified as important for 

effective inventory management. These four areas include (1) recording 

firearms inventory data in property management records and systems 

(inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories 

(inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for safeguarding firearms 

and overseeing the conducting of firearms inventories (personal and 

supervisory accountability); and (4) investigating missing firearms and 

considering employee discipline when requirements for maintaining and 

controlling firearms are not met (investigations and discipline). 

Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and 

related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies in 

controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For example, in 

the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria recommend that 

agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for issuing agency 

firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas; 

(2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; (3) use occasions other 

Agencies’ Policies and 

Procedures Were 

Consistent with 

Internal Control 

Standards, but 

Agencies Could 

Strengthen Controls 

in Key Areas 

Federal Standards and 

Other Criteria Provide 

Guidance for Controlling 

and Safeguarding Firearms 
Page 9 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

than periodic inventories to confirm employees’ possession of assigned 

firearms; and (4) limit access to secured firearms storage areas and 

facilities to authorized personnel. 

We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms 

with controls identified in federal internal control standards and related 

criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III identifies, for 

each agency reviewed, whether the agency established policies and 

procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO and other 

management organizations within each of the four areas. 

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to 

record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records and 

property management systems, consistent with standards issued by GAO 

and other management organizations. Specifically, we determined whether 

agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the update of 

property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new firearms, (2) as 

a result of discrepancies identified during periodic firearms inventories, 

and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories. 

The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important 

component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on 

activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from inventory, 

as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, are needed to 

ensure management has adequate oversight over agency firearms. The 

absence of these controls could result in management being unaware of 

the number and location of firearms they have on-hand, and could result in 

a lack of appropriate oversight over these assets. 

The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies and 

procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data. 

Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt and the 

specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person and unit to 

which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property management 

records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 18 agencies 

required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory records as a 

result of discrepancies identified during physical inventory counts. Sixteen 

agencies also required the update of property management records upon 

the removal of firearms from agency inventories. 

Inventory Data—Agencies 

Required the Recording 

and Update of Firearms 

Data 
Page 10 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine 

whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent with 

federal internal control standards and related criteria, addressing the 

(1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and 

functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms 

and the manner in which inventories should be conducted; and (3) use of 

occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees’ 

possession of assigned firearms. We also surveyed agencies to determine 

whether they (4) limited access to secured firearms storage areas and 

facilities to authorized personnel. 

The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on-hand, and limited 

access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that agencies 

appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn of missing or 

stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or when they use 

occasions other than inventories to confirm employee’s possession of 

firearms. Without these controls, management may not be alerted when 

firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored firearms are not 

adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized use. 

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and 

procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, but 

could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies generally 

had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance of agency 

firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational units (16 out of 

16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, all 18 agencies 

required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms, and 15 of 

these agencies required that the objectives, timing, and instructions for the 

counts be established. However, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that 

persons assigned responsibility for conducting inventories be trained in 

inventory counting procedures. 

In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required counters to verify firearm ID 

numbers and descriptive information about the firearm during inventory 

counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude individuals from counting 

firearms if they had firearms custodial responsibilities. Furthermore, only 

2 of these 9 agencies established compensating procedures such as using 

count teams of 2 or more members, or ensuring that counters have no 

prior knowledge of the firearms inventory being counted. 

Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to verify 

employees’ possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access to 

secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed 

Inventory Control—

Agencies Required the 

Recording of Firearms 

Data and Periodic 

Inventories, but Could 

Strengthen Other Controls 
Page 11 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

confirmed an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm during 

firearms retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies 

required unannounced inspections to verify employees’ possession of 

assigned firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this control 

applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage areas and 

facilities. 

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and 

procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related 

criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned firearms from 

damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store firearms in lock 

boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We also surveyed agencies 

to determine whether (3) job descriptions included requirements for 

conducting inventories, (4) individual performance in conducting 

inventories is assessed during performance evaluations, and (5) whether 

supervisory oversight is provided over periodic firearms inventories. 

Internal controls addressing an individual’s responsibility in maintaining 

assigned firearms, and a supervisor’s responsibility in overseeing the 

control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure firearms policies are 

adhered to and firearms are appropriately secured. In order to be 

accountable for safeguarding firearms, employees and supervisors must be 

made aware of their responsibilities related to firearms control. The lack 

of these controls could make responsibilities related to firearms control 

unclear and result in difficulties in holding appropriate individuals 

accountable for failing to follow established procedures. 

The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and 

procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but could 

strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms inventories. 

Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and procedures requiring 

individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from damage, theft, loss, and 

unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies required that firearms be 

secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or that trigger locks be used. 

However, only 12 agencies assigned responsibility for conducting firearms 

inventories in job descriptions, and only 7 agencies assessed individuals’ 

performance in conducting firearms inventories during performance 

evaluations. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that 

supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories. 

Personal and Supervisory 

Accountability—Agencies 

Required that Firearms Be 

Safeguarded, but Could 

Strengthen Other Controls 
Page 12 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written 

policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls 

standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing firearms 

are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for not 

safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Specifically, we 

determined whether agencies had policies and procedures requiring that 

(1) missing firearms be investigated, (2) investigations of missing firearms 

be conducted by an independent body, (3) missing firearms be reported to 

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC),12 (4) disciplinary action be 

taken for failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action be 

taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms. 

Federal internal control standards and related criteria provide that 

agencies should have the ability to investigate instances of missing 

firearms and consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce 

compliance with firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should 

be investigated to identify the reasons the firearms were missing and to 

provide management with information to implement any corrective 

actions needed. In addition, procedures requiring the discipline of 

individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a 

missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere to 

these controls. 

The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures 

requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately 

investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that 

physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 agencies 

required that written instructions for investigating such discrepancies be 

developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written policies and procedures 

requiring that an independent body conduct the investigations, and 

15 agencies required that missing firearms be reported to the NCIC. 

Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees failing 

to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms accountability 

procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that disciplinary action be 

taken for employees failing to report missing firearms. In addition, 

14 agencies required disciplinary action for employees failing to 

appropriately safeguard their firearms. 

 12NCIC, located in the FBI, provides a computerized database for ready access by 

authorized users to criminal justice information, including information on stolen firearms. 

Investigations and 

Discipline—Agencies 

Required Investigations of 

Missing Firearms and 

Discipline When Deemed 

Appropriate 
Page 13 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and 

controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require that 

internal control activities be clearly documented in management 

directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we 

found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed, 

16 of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a 

matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies and 

procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and 

INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of the 

controls we reviewed. 

Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies 

relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies and 

procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency reported 

updating property management records and systems to identify out-ofservice and disposed of firearms, but did not include this requirement in 

its policies and procedures. Another agency reported adjusting inventory 

records as a result of physical inventories, but did not require this in its 

policies and procedures. 

In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18 agencies surveyed reported 

conducting some aspect of inventory control that was not required by their 

policies and procedures. For example, 9 agencies reported taking 

measures to ensure the integrity of firearms counts, and 9 agencies 

reported limiting access to secured firearms storage areas, but did not 

include these controls in their policies and procedures. 

Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold individuals 

accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure that inventories 

are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies reported assessing 

individuals’ participation in inventories during performance evaluations, 

and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory oversight of firearms 

inventories, without including these requirements in their policies and 

procedures. 

Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee 

discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body 

investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in their 

policies and procedures. In another example, 3 agencies reported that 

while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject to 

disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the agencies’ 

policies and procedures. 

Agencies Did Not Always 

Document Firearms 

Controls in Policies and 

Procedures 
Page 14 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be 

consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in 

helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and safeguarded. 

Without documented controls, individuals may not know the controls are 

required, and management may not be able to enforce their use. Agencies 

that rely on unwritten practices to protect their firearms run the risk that 

those controls may not be followed, and their firearms may not be 

appropriately secured. 

The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards and 

other criteria—inventory data, inventory control, personal and supervisory 

accountability, and investigations and discipline—provide a framework to 

assist agencies in building their systems of firearms controls. However, 

internal control guidance recommends that agencies tailor these controls 

to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their relative 

risks for firearms losses. Agency management is ultimately responsible for 

implementing the combination of controls deemed reasonable to 

effectively control and safeguard their firearms, based on agency needs. 

Firearms control needs may vary depending on an agency’s operations and 

structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of 

Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 

generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one or few 

central locations when they are off-duty. Conversely, employees at the 

FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct 

investigations nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them at 

all times. As a result, BEP and NIH may require different methods for 

conducting firearms inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, and 

INS. In addition, the FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other occasions to 

check an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm, along with annual 

inventories, such as unannounced inspections and checks during 

retraining or testing in firearms use. 

Key Controls Provide 

Framework for Controlling 

and Safeguarding 

Firearms, but Appropriate 

Mix of Controls Should be 

Based on Agency Needs 
Page 15 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and 

TIGTA found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies 

and procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or 

establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some 

agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and 

investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the audits 

found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not 

appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. Although 

these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process 

of taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. See 

appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted by the OIGs and 

TIGTA of their agencies’ controls over firearms. 

The Department of Justice’s OIG reviewed the firearms control activities 

of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), FBI, 

and INS from March 1999 through March 2002,13 to assess the effectiveness 

of agencies’ controls over firearms and to determine what actions were 

taken by the agencies in response to the identification of lost or stolen 

firearms. The OIG reported that some agencies did not always conduct 

periodic physical inventories of firearms or investigate instances of 

missing firearms, but generally disciplined employees who did not report 

or control missing firearms as required by their policies and procedures. In 

addition, the OIG found that employees did not always report missing 

firearms or follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles 

or retrieving firearms from separating employees. 

Justice’s OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic 

physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and 

procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted every 

2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical inventories of 

firearms.14 Despite these requirements, the OIG found that until it began its 

review in 2001, FBI had not completed a firearms inventory since prior to 

1993. In addition, the OIG found that DEA and INS did not properly 

 13The BOP, DEA, and USMS audits identify firearms that were missing between October 

1999 and August 2001. The FBI audit identifies firearms that were missing between October 

1, 1999 and January 21, 2002. The INS audit identifies firearms that were determined 

missing during an agencywide inventory of firearms conducted in August 1998, therefore, 

reflecting losses over an extended period. 

14Prior to 1998, INS required that firearms inventories be conducted every 2 years. 

Audits Found 

Weaknesses in 

Firearms Controls at 

Justice and Treasury 

Agencies, but 

Improvements Are 

Being Made 

Justice’s OIG Found that 

Agencies Did Not Always 

Control and Maintain 

Firearms as Required 

Justice Agencies Did Not 

Always Conduct Periodic 

Firearms Inventories 
Page 16 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

conduct or document past inventories, including not inventorying all 

firearms. For example, INS had not completed inventories in accordance 

with its policies and procedures, including tracking inventory adjustments 

and confirming that that appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG 

found that BOP and USMS were generally current in conducting firearms 

inventories. 

According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they had not 

conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons, 

including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and 

relying on other methods to verify inventories.15 For example, FBI officials 

said that they did not conduct all required inventories due to budgetary 

and equipment limitations and due to the reassignment of personnel who 

had conducted inventories in the past. At DEA, officials stated that they 

relied on the physical check of assigned firearms during agents’ annual 

firearms qualifications as a substitute for the required annual inventories. 

Despite this reliance, however, DEA still reported firearms as lost or 

stolen from its inventories. 

While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI 

and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency 

policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that 

investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies 

investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and grants 

agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to have 

followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined that 

29 of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 1996 and 

September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG could not find 

evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing firearms incidents 

reported for the period October 1999 through January 2002. 

Although the OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not 

always initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms usually 

resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being disciplined.16

 15The OIG did not report the reasons why INS had not conducted inventories in accordance 

with its policies and procedures. 

16The OIG reported that BOP did not recommend disciplinary action for the two missing 

firearms cases the OIG reviewed, but did not identify whether the BOP should have 

recommended disciplinary action for those cases. For the 12 USMS cases reviewed, the 

OIG found that no disciplinary action was taken because USMS did not find employee 

negligence. The OIG’s review of INS, undertaken during a different time period, did not 

address the issue of disciplining employees who lost firearms. 

Justice Agencies Did Not 

Always Investigate Missing 

Firearms, but Generally 

Disciplined Responsible 

Employees 
Page 17 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing firearms cases reviewed for the 

period October 1999 through August 2001 resulted in disciplinary action, 

including letters of reprimand and recommendations for suspensions 

without pay. In another example, the OIG concluded that 37 of 70 

investigations of missing property (firearms17 and laptops) at the FBI from 

October 1999 through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for 

disciplinary action, including letters of censure and suspensions without 

pay. 

Justice’s OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a 

timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG further 

found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for 

storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating 

employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for employees to 

report missing firearms within their agency and the number of missing 

firearms reported to the NCIC. 

Table 2: Reporting and Investigating Missing Firearms by BOP, DEA, FBI, INS, and 

USMS 

Agency 

Average time taken to

report firearms losses 

internally after discovery

Number of missing firearms

not reported to NCIC

BOP 0.5 days Reporting not requireda

DEA 15 days 3 of 16

FBI 4.3 years 14 of 276

INS NAb394 of 539

USMS 7 days 2 of 6c

Source: GAO analysis of Justice data. 

a

BOP did not require the reporting of missing firearms to NCIC. 

b

The OIG’s data regarding the timing of reported firearms losses within INS were not comparable to 

data obtained from the other components. 

c

According to the OIG, USMS identified that the two firearms had not been reported to NCIC because 

both were destroyed and were, therefore, accounted for. 

The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting 

missing firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the BOP 

 17The OIG did not report how many of the 70 investigations at the FBI were of missing 

agency firearms. 

Justice Agencies Did Not 

Always Report Missing 

Firearms or Secure and 

Retrieve Firearms 
Page 18 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

to 4.3 years at the FBI.18 While the USMS required the immediate reporting 

of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting within 48 hours, the FBI 

and BOP did not include a timetable for reporting missing firearms in their 

policies and procedures. The OIG attributed delays for reporting missing 

firearms at the FBI to the absence of a required timetable for reporting 

missing firearms, but concluded that the BOP generally reported missing 

firearms in a timely manner due to firearms being stored in a central 

location. The OIG could not determine whether USMS experienced delays 

in reporting missing firearms because agency loss reports did not identify 

the date the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays of 1 to 

89 days in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did not 

identify the reasons for these delays. 

The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for 

reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all 

agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP,19 had policies and 

procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. However, 

the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 to more 

than 300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only USMS had 

reported all missing firearms.20 Reporting missing firearms to NCIC would 

assist agencies in retrieving lost or stolen firearms recovered by the law 

enforcement community, since the NCIC system is generally regarded by 

law enforcement agencies as the primary nationwide method for tracking 

stolen firearms. 

In addition, Justice’s OIG found that some agencies did not always follow 

established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving 

firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG found that 4 of 

16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999 through September 

 18Justice commented that while local officials completed internal notification on a timely 

basis, the notifications of lost firearms were not always forwarded to the National Firearms 

Program or Property Management Units until such time as the weapons were called for 

destruction. The failure to report losses or thefts to the National Firearms Program 

resulted in the OIG determining a higher average reporting time. 

19BOP officials said that they are in the process of revising their policies to require the 

immediate reporting of all lost, stolen, or missing firearms to the NCIC. 

20Justice said that prior to 2000, NCIC only had a category for stolen firearms, not lost or 

missing firearms, resulting in some lost or missing firearms not being reported. 

Additionally, officials reported that some firearms that the OIG identified as not being 

entered into NCIC were entered, but subsequently deleted, because the information was 

not updated after a certain time period. 
Page 19 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In some cases, the 

employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, despite internal 

policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG found that some of the 

5221 firearms stolen from FBI or privately owned vehicles, during the 

period October 1999 through January 2002, were due to firearms not being 

properly secured in vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at 

USMS were due to thefts from vehicles.22 Both FBI and USMS allowed the 

storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or indefinitely 

(USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm was placed in 

a locked container. 

The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies’ use of accountable 

property checklists designed to retrieve property from separating 

employees, sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being 

retrieved. Department of Justice policies require that each agency develop, 

maintain, and distribute an accountable property checklist for employees 

to complete prior to separating from the department to help facilitate the 

return of agency property, including firearms. Despite this requirement, 

the OIG found weakness in the use of these checklists at all of the 

agencies reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the use of the checklist; 

(2) lack of relevant accountable signatures; and (3) failure to include key 

identifying information, such as the firearm’s serial number. As a result, 

firearms were not always retrieved from separating employees. For 

example, the OIG reported that in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms 

of separated employees could not be accounted for. 

 21The OIG did not report how many of the 52 cases (out of total of the 212 missing firearms 

cases reviewed) of FBI firearms stolen from vehicles were the result of the firearms not 

being properly stored. 

22The loss of two BOP firearms for the period October 1999 through February 2002 were 

determined to have not been lost or stolen from employees vehicles. BOP stated that while 

these missing firearms were not reported to NCIC, they were reported to the agency and 

were investigated. The investigations found that the airlines lost one weapon from checked 

baggage and the second was discovered missing after the transfer of several weapons by 

mail between facilities. In addition, the OIG did not report firearms losses from vehicles at 

INS. 
Page 20 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of the 

ATF, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, BEP, the U.S. Mint, and 

Internal Revenue Service/Criminal Investigation (IRS/CI) for fiscal years 

1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine 

whether the agencies’ inventory practices were sufficient for controlling 

items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the public’s safety, national 

security, or ongoing criminal investigations. The OIG and TIGTA 

concluded that the agencies generally conducted periodic firearms 

inventories; investigated instances of missing firearms; and disciplined 

employees for not maintaining firearms as required by agency policies and 

procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U.S. Mint did not 

follow all policies and procedures related to conducting periodic 

inventories or identify its firearms from its property management records. 

In addition, TIGTA determined that IRS/CI did not appropriately record 

and report missing firearms data. 

Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the 

exception of the U.S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least 

annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For 

example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical 

inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen without 

being promptly detected. At IRS/CI, TIGTA found that property inventories 

were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance with 

established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that 

the U.S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical inventory of 

firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the firearms inventory 

completed in October 2001 was not conducted in accordance with agency 

policies and procedures. 

In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U.S. Customs Service, Secret 

Service, and IRS/CI investigated instances of firearms losses and 

appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency 

policies and procedures.23 For example, the OIG determined that ATF’s 

Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of missing 

firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September 

30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in each of 

those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of the 

 23Treasury’s OIG determined that the U.S. Mint and BEP did not have any firearms losses 

for the periods October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001. 

Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA 

Found Agencies 

Safeguarded Firearms, but 

Could Strengthen and 

Enforce Controls in Some 

Areas 

Treasury Agencies Generally 

Conducted Firearms 

Inventories, Investigated 

Missing Firearms, and 

Disciplined Employees 
Page 21 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 cases 

were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review. 

The OIG also determined that the U.S. Customs Service’s Board of Survey, 

the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, investigated all 

72 missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through 

September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that employees were held 

financially responsible for losses in 26 of the cases and not financially 

responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 7 cases were still under 

investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review. 

The OIG determined that the U.S. Mint could not provide a listing of 

firearms from its property management records to support reported 

firearms inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The OIG 

concluded that without this list it would not be possible to reconcile the 

firearms that were on-hand against recorded inventory counts, resulting in 

the possibility that missing firearms might not be identified. The OIG 

concluded that these and other factors, including the number and storage 

of its firearms at several locations, increased the Mint’s risk of lost or 

stolen firearms. 

TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/CI missing 

firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy 

reports of IRS/CI missing firearms were not always prepared or 

completed. Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/CI’s inventory management 

system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a 

result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/CI missing 

firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and 

comment on hard copy reports from IRS/CI field offices in order to 

identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were 

not completely prepared. 

Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to 

strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations 

made by the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March 

2001 and August 2002, Justice’s OIG made a total of 63 recommendations 

to INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control 

activities. Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms-related 

recommendations in reports to the U.S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/CI in 

November 2001 and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA, 

agencies agreed to all recommendations and have taken, or are in the 

process of taking, corrective action addressing all identified weaknesses. 

U.S. Mint and IRS/CI Did Not 

Always Record or Report 

Firearms Information 

Justice and Treasury 

Agencies Are Taking 

Action to Strengthen 

and Enforce Firearms 

Controls 
Page 22 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29 

of the 63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the 

process of implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the 

34 recommendations that have not been implemented, management has 

begun taking corrective actions and is working with the OIG to ensure 

their efforts address the weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing 

actions include establishing procedures requiring periodic firearms 

inventories on an annual basis and the appropriate segregation of duties 

during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring that missing 

firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes for 

completing investigations of missing firearms be established. In addition, 

agencies are requiring that all missing firearms cases be adjudicated and 

that controls for securing firearms in vehicles and recovering firearms 

from separating employees be strengthened. 

In addition, the U.S. Mint and IRS/CI have implemented all five 

recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U.S. Mint 

now requires the performance and documentation of an independent 

physical inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those 

inventories against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/CI 

agreed to change its inventory management system to be able to 

differentiate between lost, stolen, and damaged items in their property 

management system, and now requires that missing firearms reports be 

completely prepared. IRS/CI also established guidelines addressing the 

types of lost or stolen equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for 

investigation. 

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported 

firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some 

point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency officials 

reported that although some firearms were lost due to negligence, some 

losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being taken by 

employees. Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs found that 

some missing firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime, 

or in connection with a criminal investigation. 

Majority of Federal 

Law Enforcement 

Agencies Reviewed 

Reported Missing 

Firearms 
Page 23 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported 

1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during 

some point in time between September 1998 and July 2002.24 As of July 

2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving 

824 still missing.25 While we could not determine the exact percentage of 

agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that 

these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of agencies’ 

total firearms inventories.26 Only BEP, the U.S. Mint, and Veterans Affairs 

reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms. Agencies identified 

missing firearms using internal reporting systems, through which 

personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic physical 

inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost, stolen, or 

otherwise not in an agency’s possession for the 18 agencies surveyed, 

those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms still missing as 

of July 2002. 

 24Of these missing firearms, 178 had been converted to dummy firearms (e.g., training 

weapons) and rendered inoperable. FBI officials said that these weapons could not be 

easily converted to live firearms. 

25Agencies could not identify which firearms recovered or still missing were dummy 

firearms. 

26Since the firearms inventory and missing firearms data were developed from different 

bases, such as inventory counts or internal agency reporting systems, and are based on 

different time periods, they are not directly comparable. 

Fifteen of 18 Agencies 

Surveyed Reported 

Missing Firearms 
Page 24 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 3: Firearms Reported Missing, Recovered, and Unaccounted for between September 30, 1998 and July 2002 at Selected 

Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 

Agency 

Firearms identified as 

lost, stolen, or 

otherwise not in the 

agency’s possession 

between September 30, 

1998 and July 2002a

Firearms subsequently 

recovered between 

September 30, 1998 and 

July 2002a

Firearms still lost, 

stolen, or otherwise not 

in the agency’s 

possession as of

July 2002a

ATF 16 7 9

BEP 0 0 0

BOP 2 0 2

DEA 63 4 59

FBI 458b72 386

Federal Emergency Management Administration 2 0 2

Federal Protective Service 3 0 3

Fish and Wildlife Service 27 1 26

INS 114c13 101d

IRS/CI 6 3 3

National Institutes of Health 3 0 3

National Park Service 196 63 133

Postal Inspection Service 14 0 14

U.S. Customs Servicee 94 20 74

USMS 10 3 7

U.S. Mint 0 0 0

U.S. Secret Service 4 2 2

VA 0 0 0

Total 1,012 188 824

Source: GAO survey of these agencies. 

a

Data were not independently verified. 

b

FBI reported that 458 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency’s possession 

during the period September 30, 1998 through July 2002. FBI reported to the Senate Judiciary 

Committee that, as of July 2001, 449 of its firearms were not accounted for; of these firearms, 161 

were training weapons. 

c

INS reported that 114 of its firearms were lost, stolen, or otherwise not in the agency’s possession 

during the period September 30, 1998 through July 2002. The more than 500 missing INS firearms 

reported by the Justice OIG included those firearms found missing during an INS agencywide 

inventory conducted in August 1998. 

d

INS officials said that of the 101 missing firearms, 13 were lost; 74 were stolen; and 14 were 

otherwise missing. 

e

The U.S. Customs Service reported 22 lost and 72 stolen firearms; it also reported additional 

firearms destroyed in the World Trade Center bombing. 
Page 25 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise not 

in their possession,27 most missing firearms were pistols (541). Agencies 

also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 157 training weapons, 

92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 stun gun as missing. 

Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to 

negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in 

locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. However, 

officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite appropriate 

precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one agency 

reported that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of the airlines, 

and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent behavior of the 

employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a locked, hard-sided 

gun case, in accordance with agency policies and procedures. Due to the 

manner in which the agencies recorded missing firearms data, they usually 

could not readily identify, for the missing firearms we reviewed, the 

number of firearms determined to have been lost due to negligence. 

Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the 

agency’s possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm 

the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost in 

the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable 

and therefore did not pose a threat to the public. 

Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs identified several 

incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with 

criminal activity or during a criminal investigation.28 The OIGs made this 

determination during separate audits of agency controls over weapons, 

laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U.S. Secret Service, 

and U.S. Customs.29

For example, Justice’s OIG reviewed 16 missing firearms cases reported to 

the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period 

 27FBI data came from the Justice OIG report. 

28To determine if missing agency firearms were used in connection with criminal activity, 

the OIGs reviewed missing firearms recovered from October 1, 1999 through August 27, 

2001, and October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, respectively. For DEA, the Justice 

OIG reviewed cases for the period October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001. 

29See appendix VI for a complete listing of related reports issued by the Departments of 

Justice and Treasury OIGs. 

Justice and Treasury 

Audits Identified Instances 

of Recovered Firearms 

Used in Criminal Activity 
Page 26 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been 

recovered by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a 

handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated 

criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury’s OIG reviewed 10 of 

13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U.S. Customs Service, for 

the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and found 

that 

5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a robbery, a 

drive-by shooting, or during the execution of a search warrant. 

The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act requires that executive 

agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable 

assurance that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized 

use, and misappropriation. Standards and guidance for effectively 

maintaining and controlling firearms inventories are available to assist 

federal law enforcement agencies in designing controls to safeguard their 

firearms. Although these controls provide a framework to assist agencies 

in controlling and safeguarding their firearms, agencies should tailor these 

controls to meet their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their 

risks for firearms losses. Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls may 

vary for each federal law enforcement agency. 

When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should 

reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not effective 

and if they should be modified. This is particularly important when 

agencies find that existing controls have not been implemented or have 

been implemented but have not prevented the loss of agency firearms, as 

was the case with some agencies reviewed by the Departments of Justice 

and Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have been established to 

safeguard firearms, but were not appropriate controls based on the 

agencies’ needs, or were not implemented or properly applied, provide 

little assurance that firearms are safe from loss, theft, or misuse. 

In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in policies 

and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees may not 

know of their requirement, and the controls may not be uniformly applied 

agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for management to enforce a 

control that is not required by policy and procedures, such as disciplining 

employees who do not adhere to firearms controls. 

The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of 

controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of 

Conclusion 
Page 27 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a 

serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to inflict 

bodily harm or to further criminal activity. 

The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Veterans 

Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National Institutes of 

Health, and the Postmaster General should 

• periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to control 

and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been 

effective, or should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses. 

In assessing firearms controls, agencies should use as guides 

(1) internal control standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial 

Management Improvement Program, and Commission on Accreditation 

for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the 

Department of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and 

TIGTA of agencies firearms controls, and 

• document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the 

maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently 

understood and applied. 

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the 

Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior, 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the 

Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and 

Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed 

with the information presented. Six agencies provided technical changes 

that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four agencies—the NIH, Fish 

and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U.S. Postal Inspection 

Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs—provided comments on the 

report recommendation. NIH and Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with the 

recommendation and identified actions taken to strengthen their controls 

over firearms. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service also identified actions 

taken to strengthen firearms controls consistent with the 

recommendation. The Department of Veterans Affairs expressed 

concerned about our recommendation, saying that its controls were 

effective in preventing firearms losses. Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI 

include the written comments from these four agencies. In addition, 

although the Department of Justice did not comment on the 

recommendation, its letter presents general observations regarding 

standards for control over agency firearms and is included in appendix IX. 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 
Page 28 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review 

conducted by the department’s OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to 

strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating and 

including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms inventory 

database, and appointing and training property custodial officers for the 

NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also agreed with the 

recommendation, and said that as a result of an internal assessment, the 

Service will (1) develop a Web-based firearm training guide addressing 

various internal controls over firearms, (2) conduct unscheduled random 

checks of firearms against property records, and (3) annually review 

reports of any lost and/or stolen firearms to determine if policies and 

procedures should be modified to prevent future losses. 

Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U.S. 

Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these 

standards along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the 

Inspection Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service provided 

us with a copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to incorporate 

into its firearms inventory and accountability procedures. We appreciate 

that the Service provided the proposed update and look forward to 

receiving the final updated policy. 

VA expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying that its lack 

of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its 

having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said that its 

police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily basis; 

generally do not remove their firearms from department property; check 

their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; conduct 

monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; have 

unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent 

annual inventories of firearms. 

Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of our 

review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen at some 

point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other agencies we 

reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly 

when their organizations or operations have changed, or when firearms 

are identified as missing. These assessments should be conducted to 

determine whether established controls have been effective, are still 

relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA recently reported that as 

of March 2003, police officers at more than 100 of its field sites were 

assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers at only 27 sites were armed. We 
Page 29 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

believe that this is a good example of when an organizational change 

necessitates a reevaluation of an agency’s firearms controls to reduce the 

risk of potential firearms losses. We further believe that federal internal 

control standards and other criteria included in our report provide a useful 

framework from which to conduct these assessments, and identify 

appropriate firearms controls when an agency’s environment has changed, 

or when existing controls have not been effective. 

In addition, six agencies requested that we change some of their original 

responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually to identify 

that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a specific control. 

We made these technical changes in all cases in which the agency 

provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency said that the 

policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we did not change 

the original response and look forward to receiving documentation 

identifying changes that have been incorporated into its policy. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content earlier, 

we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue 

date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the appropriate 

congressional committees, the Attorney General, Secretary of the 

Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary 

of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, 

and the Postmaster General. We will also make copies available to others 

on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call me on 

(202) 512-8777. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII. 

Cathleen A. Berrick, Acting Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies’ control over firearms to 

determine (1) the extent to which these agencies’ policies, procedures, 

and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent 

with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law 

enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews 

conducted by the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury 

identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and 

procedures, and whether agencies have taken actions to correct identified 

weaknesses, particularly regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b) 

investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3) the 

number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies 

identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between 

September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also determined how selected 

agencies maintained control and accountability over weapons other than 

firearms and weapons components. (See app. II.) 

To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained 

and controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we 

selected for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement agencies 

in the executive branch identified by the Department of Justice’s Bureau 

of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as having personnel with the 

authority to carry firearms and make arrests.1

We systematically selected the agencies for our review. First, we stratified 

the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the agency had 

(1) 1,000 or more, (2) 500—999, (3) 100—499, or (4) less than 100 law 

enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 1,000 or more 

law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 agencies with the 

largest number of law enforcement personnel in each of the remaining 

3 strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all Department of Justice and 

Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also included BEP, which fell into 

the 100—499 strata (1 agency). These 18 agencies employed about 96 

percent (76,510) of the total personnel employed by the federal civilian 

law enforcement agencies (79,910) that are authorized to carry firearms 

and make arrests, as reported in the BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18 agencies 

selected for review, along with the strata from which they were selected. 

 1

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 

Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2000 (Washington, D.C.: July 2001). Although the 

survey on which this report was based included certain OIGs, we did not include these 

offices in our review. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 4: Eighteen Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Included in Our Survey of Federal Firearms Control Policies, 

Procedures, and Practices 

 

Agencies categorized by number of personnel authorized the 

arrest and carry firearms 

Agency 

Number of personnel 

authorized to arrest and 

carry firearms in 2000a

1,000 or more 500-999 100-499 Less than 100 

BEP 211 X 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms 1,967 X 

DEA 4,161 X 

FBI 11,523 X 

Federal Bureau of Prisons 13,557 X 

Federal Protective Service 803 X 

FEMA Security Division 33 X 

INS 17,654 X 

IRS-Criminal Investigation 

Division 2,726 X 

National Institutes of Health Police 39 X 

National Park Service (Interior) 

Division of Ranger Activities 

U.S. Park Police X 

U.S. Customs Service 10,522 X 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 888 X 

U.S. Mint 354 X 

USMS 2,735 X 

U.S. Postal Inspection Service 3,412 X 

U.S Secret Service 4,039 X 

Department of Veterans 

Affairs/Veterans Health 

Administration/Police Serviceb

 342 X 

Source: GAO analysis of BJS data. 

a

By 2003, some agencies reported increases in the number of personnel with the authority to make 

arrests and carry firearms. For example, ATF reported to have 2031 personnel; VA, 2,200 personnel; 

and Customs, approximately 14,165 personnel with such authorities. 

b VA has authority to arm its police officers under 38 U.S.C. 904. An initial pilot program to arm its 

officers was established at 5 VA sites and then expanded to 12 sites. Prior to 2000, police officers at 

27 sites were armed; as of March 2003, more than 100 sites have armed officers. 

We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We pretested 

the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third federal law 

enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and made relevant 

changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also surveyed the 

18 agencies using a follow-up questionnaire to obtain additional related 

information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial and follow-up 

questionnaire, respectively. 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 32 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms inventories 

and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in place to control 

their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the results of their most 

recently completed 100-percent inventory since September 30, 1998, and 

the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 agencies to identify their 

policies and procedures related to recording firearms inventory data, 

controlling firearms inventories, ensuring personal and supervisory 

accountability for agency firearms, and investigating missing firearms and 

administering associated employee discipline. We also asked agencies to 

identify the number of firearms reported missing since September 30, 

1998, the number of those missing firearms recovered up to the time of our 

survey, and the sources of the missing firearms information. 

To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control 

and accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons 

components, specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical 

agents, we surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, procedures, 

and practices for tracking and controlling these items. 

Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. 

However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce 

errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, 

difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of 

information that are available to respondents, or in how the data are 

entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce unwanted 

variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the 

questionnaires, the data collection, and the data editing and analysis to 

minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, to the extent possible, we 

obtained and reviewed agencies’ firearms control policies and procedures 

to verify their responses to our questionnaire. 

To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by the 

Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General (OIG) 

and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). 

These audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and Treasury law 

enforcement agencies adhered to internal controls over firearms 

inventories and other sensitive properties and were completed between 

March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and dates 

issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice and 

Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control 

policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected agencies’ 

internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies and 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 33 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in 

response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations. 

We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 34 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing 

inventory controls to account for weapons other than firearms and 

weapons components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining 

accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, 

and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory counts of 

the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual inventories. 

Agencies also reported using other methods, such as tracking the 

distribution of items to individuals or organizational units and limiting 

access to areas in which inventories are stored, or a combination of 

methods, to account for the inventories. 

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having 

explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5 identifies 

weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported by the 

agencies surveyed. 

Table 5: Agencies’ Reported Use of Weapons Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Agency Explosives 

Gas and/or chemical 

agents Ammunition 

ATF X X X 

BEP X X 

BOP X X X 

Customs X X X 

DEA X 

FBI X X X 

Federal Protective Service X X 

Fish and Wildlife Service X 

FEMAa X 

INS X X 

IRS/CI X X 

U.S. Mint X X X 

National Park Service X 

NIH X 

U.S. Postal Service X 

U.S. Secret Service X X X 

USMS X X X 

VA X X 

Total 7 12 18 

Source: GAO survey of these agencies. 

a FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Agencies Established 

Controls to Account 

for Other Weapons 

and Weapons 

Components 

Agencies Reported 

Having Inventories of 

Explosives, Gas 

and/or Chemical 

Agents, and 

Ammunition 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 35 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported having 

explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/or chemical agents. Seven 

agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including BOP, FBI, 

USMS, ATF, U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Mint, and U.S. Secret Service. 

Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical agents 

responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices, 

defensive chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were items 

such as flash-bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect and smoke 

grenades that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents or 

membrane irritants. 

The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having 

accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons 

components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on 

inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the agencies 

reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components through 

monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a running 

summary of the quantities on hand through perpetual inventories. 

Agencies Used 

Inventory Counts and 

Other Methods to 

Control Weapons and 

Weapons Components 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 36 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 6: Agencies’ Reported Use of Inventory Procedures for Explosives, Gas 

and/or Chemical Agents, and Ammunition 

Ammunition inventories 

Agency Annuala Monthly Perpetual Othera

ATF b 

BEP X 

BOP X 

Customs X 

DEA X 

FBI X X 

Federal Protective 

 Service 

 X 

Fish and Wildlife Service Xc

FEMAd X 

INS X X 

IRS/CI X 

U.S. Mint X X X 

National Park Service X X 

NIH X 

U.S. Postal Service X 

U.S. Secret Service X X X 

USMS X 

VA X 

Source: GAO survey of these agencies. 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 37 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Explosives inventories Gas and/or chemical agent inventories 

Annual Monthly Perpetual OtheraAnnual Monthly Perpetual Othera

X X X 

 X X 

 X X 

 X X 

 

 X X 

 X 

 X X 

 X 

 X X X 

 

X X X X 

 X X 

 X 

a Other refers to a variety of practices in addition to those identified that agencies used to account for 

ammunition, explosives, or gas/chemical weapons. For example, Customs reported using quarterly 

or trimester inventories to account for these items. 

b

At the time of our survey, ATF reported that it was in the final stage of review for a draft order 

“Ammunition Accounting Procedures” to safeguard its ammunition. 

c

The Fish and Wild Life Service controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution and limiting 

access to supply. 

d

FEMA is the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to 

control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some 

agencies reported using additional procedures, or a combination of 

procedures, to account for their inventories. For example, IRS/CI reported 

controlling ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their distribution to 

field installations from a headquarters procurement office, while the 

National Park Service reported that it controlled ammunition by 

monitoring its distribution to law enforcement personnel. In addition, the 

Fish and Wildlife Service reported that it controlled ammunition by 

monitoring its distribution and limiting access to supply. In another 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 38 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of gas and/or chemical 

agents at a military storage facility, thereby reducing access and the 

potential for unauthorized use or loss. 

In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA reported 

using a combination of methods to account for these weapons and 

weapons components. For example, the FBI reported controlling access to 

ammunition supplies in addition to maintaining a record of each time 

ammunition was received or disbursed. INS reported that, in addition to 

conducting annual inventories of ammunition and gas and chemical 

agents, it maintains logs at all locations that record receipts from 

manufacturers and issuances for operational purposes. In another 

example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining a 

separate record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, perpetual 

record of transactions; and conducting annual inventories and inspections. 
Appendix II: Agency Controls Over Weapons 

Other than Firearms and Weapons 

Components 

Page 39 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms 

Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures 

Page 40 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 7: Key Firearms Control Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures as Reported by Selected Federal Law 

Enforcement Agencies 

Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms 

Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures 

Description of control

Inventory data

Information required to be included in permanent property 

record on receiving new firearms

Date of physical receipt

Specific identification

Organizational unit or functional area to which firearm is 

assigned

Person firearm assigned to

Adjustments made to firearms inventory records as a result 

of physical inventory counts 

Update property management systems to identify firearms 

being disposed of as out-of-service

Update property management system to remove firearms 

being disposed of from agency's firearms inventory

Inventory control

Written policies and procedures for issuing agency-owned 

firearms to individuals 

Written policies and procedures for assigning agency 

owned firearms to organizational units or functional areas

Requires periodic firearms counts

Guidance for firearms counts

Objectives for inventory established

Timing of counts established

Instructions for conducting inventories established

Integrity of inventories

Training or instruction provided to firearms counters

Selected federal law enforcement agencies

Employees involved in controlling and safeguarding 

firearms precluded from counting firearms

Counters have no prior knowledge of inventory

2-member (or more) count teams 

Counters required to verify firearms ID numbers

Counters required to verify descriptive information about 

the firearm 

Use occasions other than inventory to check firearms

During employee retraining or testing in firearm use

Unannounced inspections of employee's firearms

Other

BOP

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

DEA

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

N

N/A

W

W

U

N

W

FBI

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

W

N/A

W

W

W

W

N/A

INS

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

USMS

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

N

W

W

W

U

N

USCS

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

W

W

N/A

W

W

W

W

W

W

U

U

U.S. SS

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

U

W

W

W

N

N

ATF

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

N

N/A

IRS/CI

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

U

N/A

W

W

W

N

N

FEMA

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

N

N

U

U

W

W

W

W

W

BEP

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

U.S. Mint

W

W

N

W

W

N

N

W

W

N/A

W

U

U

N/A

W

U

U

U

U

W

N

U

Fish and Wildlife Service

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

N

U

U

N

U

N

Federal Protective Service

W

W

W

W

N

U

U

W

W

W

W

U

W

U

N

U

U

W

W

W

W

U

National Park Service

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

U

W

W

W

N

N

NIH

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

U

W

W

U

U

U

N

N

N

USPIS

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

U

N

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

VA

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

W

W

N/A

W

W

W

W

W

W
Appendix III: Presence of Key Firearms 

Activities in Agency Policies and Procedures 

Page 41 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Description of control

Selected federal law enforcement agencies

Access limited to secured firearms storage areas or facilities 

Single person has access

ATF

BOPDEA

FBI

INS

USCS

USMS

U.S. SS

W

BEP

FEMA

Fish and Wildlife Ser

IRS/CI

U.S. Mint

vice

Federal Protective Service

National Park Service

NIH

USPIS

VA

Single person and his/her designees

Single person, his/her designees, and others with one-time 

access authorizations

Personal and supervisory accountability

Individuals must safeguard assigned firearms from

Damage

Loss

Theft

Unauthorized use

Individuals must store firearms in:a

Lock box and/or trigger lock and/or secured gun case

Lock box only

Trigger lock only

Secured gun case

Other

Individuals are held accountable for firearms inventory

Individuals assigned responsibility for conducting firearms 

inventories in job descriptions

Individuals' performance in conducting firearms inventories 

assessed during performance evaluations

Supervisory Oversight of firearms inventories 

Investigations and discipline

Investigations

Require investigation of physical count discrepancies of 

firearms 

Instructions for investigating discrepancies 

Require investigations be conducted by inspector general 

or independent authoritya

Report missing firearms to NCICa

Employee discipline

Disciplinary action for failure to report missing firearmsa

Disciplinary action for persons failing to take appropriate 

firearms safeguardsa

Source: Agency responses to our survey.

Not applicable

Includes response other and may include

additional responses not specified

N/A

Other

=

=

Written policy or procedure

Unwritten practice

No policy, procedure, or practice

W

U

N

=

=

=

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

N

W

W

N

N

U

N

N

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

W

W

W

U

U

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

U

N

U

N

W

U

U

U

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

U

U

U

N

W

W

W

W

N

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

N

W

N

N

N

N

N

N

W

W

W

U

U

W

W

W

N

W

N

U

U

U

W

U

U

U

U

U

U

W

U

U

U

W

U

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

U

W

N

N

N

N

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

N

W

N

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

N

N

N

N

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N/A

N/A

N/A

W

W

N

W

U

U

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

W

U

W

N

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

W

N

N

N

U

W

W

W

U

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

U

W

N

N

N

U

W

W

W

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N/A

N/R

N/A

W

N

N

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

U

U

W

N

N

W

N

N

W

W

U

W

W

U

U

W

W

W

W

W

U

U

N

W

N

N

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

N

N

N/A

N/A

N/A

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

a

 These are practices that, while not specified in the criteria, reflect the criteria.
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 42 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 43 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 44 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 45 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 46 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 47 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 48 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 49 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 50 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 51 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 52 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 53 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 54 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 55 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 56 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 57 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 58 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 59 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 60 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 61 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IV: Survey Questionnaire 

Page 62 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire 

Page 63 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire 
Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire 

Page 64 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix V: Follow-up Survey Questionnaire 

Page 65 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on 

Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other 

Sensitive Property 

Page 66 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Table 8: Justice, Treasury, and Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Reports on Internal Controls Over Firearms 

and Other Sensitive Property 

Report title Report number Report issue date 

Justice, Office of the Inspector General 

The Department of Justice’s 

Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers - Summary Report 

Report No. 02-31 August 2002 

The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 

Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers 

Report No. 02-30 August 2002 

The Drug Enforcement Administration’s 

Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers 

Report No. 02-28 August 2002 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 

Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers 

Report No. 02-27 August 2002 

Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Management of Property 

Report No. 01-09 March 2001 

The U.S. Marshals Service’s 

Control Over Weapons and Laptop Computers 

Report No. 02-29 August 2002 

Treasury, Office of Inspector General 

Protecting the Public: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms’ Control Over 

Sensitive Property Is Adequate 

OIG-02-097 June 19, 2002 

Protecting the Public: Bureau of Engraving and Printing’s Control Over Sensitive 

 Property Needs To Be Improved 

OIG-02-092 May 30, 2002 

Protecting the Public: U.S. Customs’ Control Over Sensitive Property Needs To 

Be Improved 

OIG-02-109 August 5, 2002 

Protecting the Public: U.S. Mint’s control Over Sensitive Property Needs To Be 

Improved 

OIG-02-094 May 30, 2002 

Protecting the Public: U.S. Secret Service’s Control Over Selected Sensitive 

Property Is Adequate 

OIG-02-095 June 6, 2002 

Treasury, Inspector General for Tax Administration 

Management Advisory Report: Follow-on Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive 

Items of Inventory at the Internal Revenue Service 

Reference Number: 

2002-10-065 

March 2002 

Management Advisory Report: Review of Lost or Stolen Sensitive Items of 

Property at the Internal Revenue Service 

Reference Number: 

2002-10-030 

November 2001 

Source: Compiled by GAO. 

Appendix VI: Justice and Treasury Reports on 

Internal Controls Over Firearms and Other 

Sensitive Property 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services 

Page 67 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Health and Human Services 
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Health and Human Services 

Page 68 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of the Interior 

Page 69 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of the Interior 
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of the Interior 

Page 70 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix VIII: Comments from the 

Department of the Interior 

Page 71 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 72 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix IX: Comments from the 

Department of Justice 
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 73 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 74 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 75 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 76 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix X: Comments from the United 

States Postal Service 

Page 77 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix X: Comments from the United 

States Postal Service 
Appendix X: Comments from the United 

States Postal Service 

Page 78 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix X: Comments from the United 

States Postal Service 

Page 79 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix X: Comments from the United 

States Postal Service 

Page 80 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 

Page 81 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Appendix XI: Comments from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs 
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 

Page 82 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix XI: Comments from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 

Page 83 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 84 GAO-03-688 Firearms Control 

Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 

Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas, Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. Davis, 

Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M. Kaufman, David P. Alexander, Delois N. 

Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and Miko D. Johnson made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440079) 
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