08/15/2017

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 7, 2017

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL HARRIS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 16-03011 J. Robert Carter, Jr., Judge

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No. W2016-01964-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Michael Harris, appeals from an order of the trial court denying his petition to 

suspend the remainder of his sentence. Following our review of the record, we conclude 

that the trial court did not err by denying the petition. We affirm the order of the trial 

court in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of 

Tennessee. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

THOMAS T. WOODALL, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN, and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Michael Harris, Memphis, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel; 

Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Eric Christenson, Assistant District 

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 27, 2016, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession 

with intent to sell 15 grams or more of heroin, a Class B felony. He also received an 

agreed eight-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served in the Shelby County 

Correctional Complex. On July 26, 2016, Defendant filed a petition to suspend the 

remainder of his sentence. In his petition, Defendant argued that he “appears to be 

precisely the type of offender the legislature intended to be sentenced pursuant to the 

alternative sentencing clause contained in the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform 

Act of 1989.” He also argues that his eight-year sentence exceeds “the [p]enalties 

mandated by statute even if the sentences were what the defendant bargained for in his 
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plea negotiations.” On August 3, 2016, the trial court entered an order denying the 

petition. 

ANALYSIS

Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

(a) Timing of Motion. The trial court may reduce a sentence upon 

motion filed within 120 days after the date the sentence is imposed or 

probation is revoked. No extensions shall be allowed on the time 

limitation. No other actions toll the running of this time limitation.

(b) Limits of Sentence Modification. The court may reduce a sentence 

only to one the court could have originally imposed.

(c) Hearing Unnecessary. The trial court may deny a motion for 

reduction of sentence under this rule without a hearing.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(a)-(c). The advisory commission comments to Rule 35 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure state that the intent of the rule is “to allow 

modification only in circumstances where an alteration of the sentence may be proper in 

the interests of justice.” This Court has noted that relief under Rule 35 will be limited 

when the sentence was imposed in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement. State v. 

McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Our review of a trial court’s 

ruling under Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is governed by the 

“abuse of discretion” standard. State v. Irick, 861 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1993). A petition to suspend the balance of a sentence is “akin to a motion to reduce a 

sentence. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35(a) (2006) (‘The trial court may reduce a sentence 

upon motion filed within 120 days after the date the sentence is imposed or probation is 

revoked.’). Both pleadings ask a trial court to reconsider the sentence it originally 

imposed in favor of increased leniency.” State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 777 (Tenn. 

2006). 

There is nothing in the record which demonstrates that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied the petition to suspend the remainder of Defendant’s negotiated 

sentence. The record does not contain a transcript of the guilty plea proceedings or the 

facts considered by the trial court at the time the guilty plea agreement was approved and 

accepted. Defendant’s argument that he is the type of offender the legislature intended to 

be sentenced pursuant to the alternative sentencing clause contained in the Tennessee 

Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 is not a circumstance where an alteration of the 

sentence may be proper in the interests of justice since Defendant’s eight-year sentence is 

part of a negotiated plea agreement. See State v. McDonald, 893 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1994). As for Defendant’s argument that his sentence “exceeded the 
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penalties mandated by the statute,” we note that Defendant received the minimum 

sentence in the range. See T.C.A. § 40-35-111(b)(2)(the overall sentencing range for a 

Class B felony is “not less than eight (8) years nor more than thirty (30) years.”). 

Accordingly we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

the motion. 

CONCLUSION

The order appealed from was entered in a proceeding before the trial judge 

without a jury. Such order is not a determination of guilt, and the evidence does not 

preponderate against the findings of the trial judge. No error of law requiring a reversal 

of the order is apparent on the record. In accordance with Rule 20 of the Court of 

Criminal Appeals, we affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion 

rather than by formal opinion. 

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THOMAS T. WOODALL, PRESIDING JUDGE