alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM REPEATER TECHNOLOGIES,
INC.'S SECOND QUARTER FISCAL 2001 CONDENSED, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-30-2001
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-29-2000
<CASH>                                          40,614
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    7,175
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (245)
<INVENTORY>                                      6,471
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                54,585
<PP&E>                                           7,758
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (4,883)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  57,950
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,817
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            23
<OTHER-SE>                                      44,285
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    57,950
<SALES>                                         12,225
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                12,225
<CGS>                                            8,963
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,963
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                13,339
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (2,326)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (12,430)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (12,430)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (12,430)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (1.48)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.48)


</TABLE>
No. 49987.

#### Petition 6431-R of Testing Machines, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Cole, J.

In *Railway Express Agency*v. *United States*(69 Treas. Dec. 1492, Reap. Dec. 3843), affirmed in *United States*v. *Railway Express Agency*(id. 1654, Reap. Dec. 3907), the court sustained- the importer’s entered value and held the dutiable export value of machines, identical with that covered by the shipment in question, to be $145 (Canadian currency), plus 6 percent sales tax. Entry of the machine in question was made at the same value and appraisement was made accordingly. The collector appealed for reappraisement and the court held foreign value to be the proper basis for appraisement of the machine in question, finding $225 (Canadian currency), plus 8 percent sales tax, to be such statutory value. *(United States*v. *Testing Machines, Inc.,*12 Cust. Ct. 375, Reap. Dec. 5981.) Additional duties accrued by reason of the court’s final appraised value.

When the case was called for trial the Government introduced the only witness, a customs official, who testified that he had examined the books and records of the exporting corporation and found that all sales of freeness testers in the Canadian market were at $225 each, plus the sales tax. There was nothing in the testimony of the witness to dispute petitioner’s claim of good faith in entering the merchandise in question. Counsel for the respondent conceded that if the president of the petitioner company were called as a witness, he would testify that he entered the instant merchandise without any intention to defraud the Government. From an examination of the record and a consideration of the circumstances the court was satisfied that the relief sought should be allowed. The petition was therefore granted.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal
control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Companys disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on
such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Companys internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Companys most recent fiscal quarter (the
Companys fourth quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected,
or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the Companys internal control over
financial reporting.
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the Companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the Companys internal control over financial reporting.
  /s/ Martin J. DriscollName:
    Martin J. DriscollTitle:
    Chief Executive Officer
**VehicleReflectedInertia 55.70**  **Delta OSS (rpm) Delta Time** **Decel rad/s Torque** 

Axle 4.10 82 0.41 20.9 1166 Tire 0.38 133 0.71 19.6 1093 Mass 6450 120 0.63 19.9 1111 71 0.329 22.6 1259 122 0.6 21.3 1186 86 0.5 18.0 1003**Force Grade** 

12552 11.5 11757 10.7 11955 10.9 13544 12.4 12762 11.7 10795 9.8**VehicleReflectedInertia 55.70**  **Start RPM End RPM** 

Axle 4.10 270 176 Tire 0.38 300 199 Mass 6450 313 228 488 364 546 431 868 765 **Assumptions** 814 711 Diesel Energy 38.6MJ/L 1363 1229 Diesel Engine Efficiency 33% 1891 1822 417 359

shifts mL/Shift

800 3.189**Start KE (wh) End KE (wh)** **Natural KE Loss Delta KE (wh)** **mL fuel wasted in Decel**

6.18 2.63 3.56 1.005 7.63 3.36 4.27 1.208 8.31 4.41 3.90 1.102 20.20 11.24 8.96 2.533 25.29 15.76 9.53 2.693 63.91 49.64 14.27 4.032 56.20 42.88 13.32 3.765 157.58 128.12 29.46 8.326 303.31 281.58 21.73 6.142 14.75 10.93 3.82 1.079 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.00 0 0.000

Change

37.5% 21.6% **Hybrid On**

**Hybrid Off**

**Fuel Economy Effects** Baseline (L/100km) Expected (L/100km) Dyno Effects (L/100km) 12.6 10 16
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

AARON DAVID PEREZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-10216

D.C. No. 

4:16-cr-00223-JSW-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 14, 2018

Submission Vacated July 11, 2018

Resubmitted July 3, 2019

San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,

** PAEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges. 

FILED

JUL 11 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Aaron Perez appeals the district’s court denial of his motion to dismiss his

federal indictment and his sentence of 61 months’ imprisonment, followed by three

years of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1

Because the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the dual sovereignty doctrine, see

Gamble v United States, No. 17-646 (June 17, 2019), we reject Perez’s argument

that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the United States from prosecuting him. 

We have declined to extend Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010),

beyond the Sixth Amendment context, see United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635

F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011), thus fatally undercutting Perez’s argument that

Padilla establishes a general rule that the federal government has a duty to warn a

defendant in the successive prosecution context. Nor does Perez point to any other

opinion supporting his argument that the government violated his due process

rights by failing to warn him during state court proceedings that it planned to

undertake a federal prosecution, and we have not found one. Accordingly, we

reject this claim.

Finally, the district court did not procedurally err in its treatment of Perez’s

evidence of purported racial disparities in successive prosecutions. The court did

1

 We address the remaining issues in a concurrently filed opinion, United

States v. Perez, ___ F. 3d. ___ (9th Cir. 2018). 

2
not abuse its discretion in holding that any conclusion of widespread racial

disparity based on Perez’s “anecdotal information,” about four successive

prosecutions involving African American defendants over a five year period,

would be “speculation,” as there “may be a myriad of reasons” why an individual

defendant is subject to successive prosecution. 

AFFIRMED.

3
# sec5_sf133_schp_2019

&"Arial,Bold"&9Bulletin No. 2019-14	&"Arial,Bold"&9V SF 133/Sch P - &P	&"Arial,Bold"&10IRC Handout July 11, 2019
No. 50922.

#### Protest 116063-K of Fred Leighton doing business as Fred Leighton Mexican Imports (New York).

Opinion by

Oliver, P. J.

The case was submitted for decision on the record •made, including the sample and a stipulation. In view of the stipulation that the ■merchandise consists of “beads permanently strung in the form of necklaces,” ■the claim for classification as manufactures of palm leaf under paragraph 1537 (a) was overruled, since both the provisions for beads and articles made of beads are ■more specific *(United States*v. *Emrich & Schorsch,*13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 199, T. D. 41053). Further, in view of the stipulation that the merchandise consists of •“beads permanently strung in the form of necklaces by means of cotton thread,” .•and the proviso of paragraph 1503 that the rates of duty on beads therein “shall ■be applicable whether such * * * beads are strung or loose,” the court was of ■¡the opinion that the classification by the collector as articles composed wholly •or in chief value of beads was erroneous. The merchandise was therefore held properly dutiable at 35 percent under paragraph 1503 as beads, not specially ■provided for. *(Theo. L. Stern & Co. (Inc.)*v. *United States,*20 C. C. P. A. 423, T. D. 46260, cited.)
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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Dennis Martel,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 04-0014 DFL PAN P

vs. Order

California Department

of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and

without counsel in a civil rights action. 

The United States Marshal has returned process directed to

defendant John J. Dan unserved because he could not be found. 

Plaintiff must provide new information about where this defendant

may be served with process. Plaintiff may seek such information

through discovery, the California Public Records Act, California

Government Code § 6250, et seq., or any other means available but 

must proceed with haste because Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) requires an

Case 2:04-cv-00014-ALA Document 16 Filed 09/02/05 Page 1 of 3
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action be dismissed as to a defendant not served within 120 days

after filing the complaint unless the time is enlarged based upon

a demonstration of good cause. If plaintiff’s access to the

required information is denied or unreasonably delayed, plaintiff

may seek judicial intervention.

Accordingly:

1. The clerk of the court shall mail plaintiff one form

USM-285 and a copy of the pleading filed January 5, 2004.

2. Within 90 days from the date this order is signed,

plaintiff may submit the attached Notice of Submission of

Documents with a completed form USM-285 providing instructions

for service of process upon defendant John J. Dan and two copies

of the pleading provided to plaintiff. 

3. If plaintiff does not provide new instructions for

service of process upon defendant John J. Dan within the time

allowed or show good cause for such failure I will recommend this

action be dismissed as to that defendant.

So ordered.

Dated: September 1, 2005. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

Case 2:04-cv-00014-ALA Document 16 Filed 09/02/05 Page 2 of 3
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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Dennis Martel,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S-04-0014 DFL PAN P

vs. Notice of Submission of Documents

California Department

of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants.

-oOoPlaintiff hereby submits the following documents in

compliance with the court's order filed :

 1 completed summons form

 1 completed form USM-285 

 2 copies of the January 5, 2004 

 Complaint

Dated: 

 

Plaintiff

Case 2:04-cv-00014-ALA Document 16 Filed 09/02/05 Page 3 of 3
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A22A0745. TOWNES v. THE STATE.

Jason Townes filed this appeal pursuant to a trial court order granting his

motion for an out-of-time appeal. But in Cook v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (___ SE2d ___)

(Case No. S21A1270, decided March 15, 2022), our Supreme Courtrecently held that

“there was and is no legal authority for motions for out-of-time appeal in trial courts

and that the out-of-time appeal procedure . . . is not a legally cognizable vehicle for

a convicted defendant to seek relief from alleged constitutional violations. [This]

holding applies. . . to all casesthat are currently on direct review or otherwise not yet

final.” Id. at ___ (5) (slip op. at 82). So Townes “had no right to file a motion for an

out-of-time appeal in the trial court; his remedy, if any, lies in habeas corpus.”

Rutledge v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (___ SE2d ___) (Case No. S21A1036, decided March

15, 2022) (slip op. at 4). 

Accordingly, the trial court was without jurisdiction to decide [FosterWaithe’s] motion for [an] out-of-time appeal . . . and because the trial

court’s order plainly showsthat it [granted]the motion on the merits, the

trial court’s order must be[, and hereby is,] vacated and the case [is]

remanded to the trial court with direction that the motion be dismissed.

Cook, supra (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Rutledge, supra (“we vacate

the trial court’s order [ruling on a motion for an out-of-time appeal] and remand for

entry of the appropriate dismissal order”); Lilly v. State, __ Ga. App. __ (__ SE2d __)

(Case No. A22A0564, decided Mar. 29, 2022). 

If Townes believes that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to

appeal, he may be able to pursue relief for that claim through a petition for a writ of

May 03, 2022
habeas corpus, along with any other claims alleging deprivation of his constitutional

rights in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction. See OCGA § 9-14-41 et seq.

He should be aware of the possible application of the restrictions that apply to such

habeas corpus filings, such as the time deadlines provided by OCGA § 9-14-42 (c)

and the limitation on successive petitions provided by OCGA § 9-14-51.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

05/03/2022
EXHIBIT 10(o) 

**EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**

This Employment Agreement is madeand entered into as of February 10, 2004 by and between Furniture Brands International,Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Furniture Brands”) and John T. Foy (“Foy”). 

        **WHEREAS,  **Foy has been serving as President and Chief Executive Officer of Lane FurnitureIndustries, Inc. and has recently been elected President and Chief Operating Officer ofFurniture Brands; and 

        **WHEREAS,  **Furniture Brands and Foy wish to enter into a new Employment Agreement to supersede theexisting Employment Agreement between Foy and Lane Furniture Industries, Inc. dated April29, 1997; 

        **NOWTHEREFORE,  ** in accordance with the authority granted by the Furniture Brands Board ofDirectors on January 29, 2004, and for good and valuable consideration the partiescovenant and agree as follows: 

    **1.    ****Employment.   ** FurnitureBrands agrees to employ Foy as President and Chief                Operating Officerduring the period beginning February 10, 2004 and ending                December 31, 2005(the “Employment Period”), subject to extension as                hereinprovided, and Foy agrees to serve Furniture Brands in such capacities               during the Employment Period, subject to the direction and control of the               Furniture Brands Board of Directors, all upon the following terms:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARA FLAMM : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

SARNER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.; JOSHUA SARNER; : NO. 02-4302

LEONARD SARNER, ESQUIRE; :

JODI H. BROWN, M.D.; JOHN MATUSAVAGE; :

JOHN DOE PROCESS SERVER, INDIVIDUALLY AND :

AS AGENT FOR SARNER 7 ASSOCIATES, P.C.; :

JOSHUA SARNER, ESQUIRE; LEONARD SARNER, :

ESQUIRE; AND JODI H. BROWN, M.D. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2004, after conducting a Telephone Status

Conference with counsel in the above-captioned action, it is hereby ORDERED that anotehr

Telephone Status Conference is scheduled for January 11, 2005, at 10:00 a.m. in order to

determine the status of Defendant Matusavage’s deposition, to set a time frame for dispositive

motions, and to explore the possibility of a resolution on the matter. The Court shall initiate this

conference call.

BY THE COURT:

 

M. FAITH ANGELL

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:02-cv-04302-MFA Document 64 Filed 11/19/2004 Page 1 of 1
No. 63069.

#### A. R. Roubin *v.*United States,

protest 58/14388 (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with rule 5(b) of the rules of this court, as amended, the protest was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
No. 49148.

#### Protests 104852-K, etc., of Eurasia Import Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

The record showed that certain items consist of hats similar in all material respects to those involved in *Armand Schwab*v. *United States*(8 Cust. Ct. 231, C. D. 613). The claim was sustained as to those items
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           3,070
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   97,407
<ALLOWANCES>                                     5,198
<INVENTORY>                                    151,831
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               266,030
<PP&E>                                         128,942
<DEPRECIATION>                                  78,659
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 437,311
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           74,160
<BONDS>                                        324,652
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        67,735
<OTHER-SE>                                      33,999 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   437,311
<SALES>                                         91,669
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                91,669
<CGS>                                           64,748
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   64,748
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,218<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   171
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,049
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,799)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (338)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,353)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,353)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F2>
<FN>
<F1>Product development expenses.
<F2>The Company's shares are not publicly traded.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
(Reap. Dec. 8158)

#### Inter Maritime Fwdg. Co., Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 817201.

(Decided August 5, 1952)

*Tompkins & Tompkins (Allerton deC. Tompkins*of counsel) for the plaintiff.

*Charles J. Wagner,*Acting Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

This appeal for a reappraisement has been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between counsel for the plaintiff and the Assistant Attorney General for the United States:

> (1) That the merchandise covered by the above reappraisement appeal consists of motorcycles and speedometers imported from England, as specified in paragraph (3) below.

> (2) That when said motorcycles and speedometers were exported from England to the United States there was no “foreign value”, no “export value” and no “United States value” for said merchandise within the meaning of those terms as set forth in Section 402 (c), (d) and (e), Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, and that the “cost of production” as set forth in Section 402' (f) of said Act was the proper basis for appraisement.

> (3) That when said motorcycles and speedometers were exportedfrom England to the United States the "cost of production” thereof equalled the unit prices as below specified, less 20% and less *3%%,*plus the cost of containers, which in this case amounted to £71-5-0 British currency:

> *Merchandise Unit Prices British Currency*

> Excelsior Universal Motorcycles, Model U-l_ £69-10-0

> Excelsior Roadmaster Motorcycles, Model R-l_ £78- 0-0

> Excelsior Roadmaster Motorcycles, Model R-2_ £83- 0-0

> Speedometers_ £ 3- 3-6

> (4)That the above reappraisement appeal is submitted for decision upon this stipulation and the official papers on file with the above reappraisement appeal.

Upon the agreed facts I find that cost of production, as that value is defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1402 (f)), to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved and that such values are the unit prices listed below, less 20 per centum and less *3%*per centum, plus £71-5-0 British currency for cost of containers:

> *466
>       *Merchandise Unit Prices British Currency*

> Excelsior Universal Motorcycles, Model U — 1—- £69-10-0

> Excelsior Roadmaster Motorcycles, Model R-i- £78- 0-0

> Excelsior Roadmaster Motorcycles, Model R-2- £83- 0-0

> Speedometers_ £ 3- 3-6

Judgment will be entered accordingly.