5 September 2003

Doctrine for Joint

Psychological Operations

Joint Publication 3-53
PREFACE

i

1. Scope

This publication addresses military psychological operations planning and execution in

support of joint, multinational, and interagency efforts across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces

of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement

in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of

authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes

doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed

Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the

authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC

deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of

combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of

these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one

Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service

support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed

except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.

If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,

this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part

of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine

and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the

United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine

and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JAMES A. HAWKINS

Major General, USAF

Vice Director, Joint Staff
ii

Preface

JP 3-53

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-53 DATED 10 JULY 1996

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Revises the categories of military psychological operations to strategic,

operational, and tactical

Discusses missions supported by psychological operations

Covers the concept of psychological operations measures of effectiveness

Explains in detail the integration of psychological operations with

information operations

Updates the duties and responsibilities of the organizations involved with

psychological operations

Clarifies the command relationships over psychological operations forces

Discusses psychological operations planning in support of the joint

campaign

Provides guidance on the psychological operations approval process, to

include approval of psychological operations objectives and themes and

psychological operations products

Expands the discussion of peacetime psychological operations to include

theater security cooperation plans

Discusses psychological operations support to joint force campaign phasing

Includes a discussion of psychological operations during interagency

operations and multinational operations

Provides a sample of the psychological operations tab to the information

operations appendix of an operation plan or order
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Summary of Changes

JP 3-53

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

• General ...................................................................................................................... I-1

• Statutes and Policy ..................................................................................................... I-2

• Treaties and Agreements ............................................................................................ I-2

• Military Psychological Operations ............................................................................. I-2

• Policies and Strategies ............................................................................................... I-3

• Missions .................................................................................................................... I-5

• Principles of Joint Psychological Operations .............................................................. I-5

• Psychological Operations Relationships ..................................................................... I-9

• Psychological Operations Integration with Information Operations .......................... I-11

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

• Responsibilities........................................................................................................ II-1

• United States Forces Commanders Serving in Multinational Commands .................. II-7

• Other United States Government Agencies............................................................... II-8

CHAPTER III

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

• General ................................................................................................................... III-1

• Organizing Psychological Operations Forces .......................................................... III-2

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF THE

JOINT FORCE CAMPAIGN

• Objectives of Joint Psychological Operations .......................................................... IV-1

• Planning Skills........................................................................................................ IV-1

• Psychological Operations Concepts......................................................................... IV-3

• Psychological Operations Functions........................................................................ IV-4

• Planning Guidance .................................................................................................. IV-7

• Psychological Operations Support to Joint Force Campaign Phasing ....................... IV-8

• Psychological Operations Plan Development ........................................................ IV-13

• Psychological Operations Studies Program ........................................................... IV-14

• Coordination with other Government Agencies ..................................................... IV-16
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JP 3-53

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS APPROVAL PROCESS

• Operation Plan Approval........................................................................................... V-1

• Psychological Operations Product Approval.............................................................. V-1

• Approval Process in Multinational Operations .......................................................... V-3

• Peacetime Psychological Operations Approval .......................................................... V-3

• Summary .................................................................................................................. V-4

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS

• General ................................................................................................................... VI-1

• Theater Security Cooperation and Peacetime Psychological Operations .................. VI-4

• Psychological Operations Support to the Targeting Process ...................................... VI-6

• Psychological Operations Support to Special Operations and

 Interagency Operations ......................................................................................... VI-8

• Multinational Operations ...................................................................................... VI-13

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ENABLERS

• Intelligence ............................................................................................................ VII-1

• Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems............................... VII-3

• Logistics................................................................................................................ VII-4

APPENDIX

A Department of Defense Psychological Operations Capabilities........................... A-1

B Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations).......................................... B-1

C References......................................................................................................... C-1

D Administrative Instructions................................................................................ D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1

Part II Terms and Definitions............................................................................... GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Categories of Military Psychological Operations............................................ I-4

I-2 Psychological Operations Support Requirements ........................................... I-8
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Table of Contents

III-1 Combatant Commander Responsibilities..................................................... III-1

III-2 Joint Force Organizational Options............................................................. III-4

IV-1 Joint Psychological Operations General Objectives..................................... IV-2

IV-2 Examples of United States Psychological Operations Leaflets Produced

and Disseminated in Afghanistan in Support of Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM ......................................................................... IV-5

IV-3 Specific Psychological Operations Guidance and Planning

Considerations.......................................................................................... IV-8

IV-4 Phases — Joint Campaign .......................................................................... IV-9

V-1 Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities ................ V-2

V-2 Psychological Operations Program Approval Process ................................... V-4

V-3 Psychological Operations Program and Product Approval ............................. V-5

VI-1 Joint Military Psychological Operations Objectives Across the

 Range of Military Operations.................................................................... VI-2

VI-2 Special Operations Supported by Psychological Operations ........................ VI-8

VII-1 The Intelligence Process ............................................................................ VII-2
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JP 3-53

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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ix

Provides an Overview of Psychological Operations

Discusses Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

Explains Command Relationships

Discusses Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force

Campaign

Highlights the Psychological Operations Approval Process

Discusses Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military

Operations

Overview

The purpose of

psychological operations

(PSYOP) is to induce or

reinforce foreign attitudes

and behavior favorable to

the originator’s objectives.

There are three categories

of military PSYOP:

strategic, operational, and

tactical.

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to

convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences

to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

groups, and individuals. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad

range of US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic

activities. PSYOP characteristically are delivered as information

for effect, used during peacetime and conflict, to inform and

influence. When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of

friendly and/or adversary forces by reducing adversaries’ will to

fight. By lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency,

PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create

dissidence and disaffection within their ranks, ultimately inducing

surrender.

PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such,

are an inherent responsibility of all military commanders. There

are three categories of military PSYOP, strategic, operational,

and tactical, which are used to establish and reinforce foreign

perceptions of US military, political, and economic power and

resolve. Strategic PSYOP are international information activities

conducted by US Government (USG) agencies to influence

foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of US goals

and objectives during peacetime and in times of conflict. These

programs are conducted predominantly outside the military arena

but can utilize Department of Defense (DOD) assets. Operational
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Executive Summary

JP 3-53

PSYOP are conducted across the range of military operations,

including during peacetime, in a defined operational area to

promote the effectiveness of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s)

campaigns and strategies. Tactical PSYOP are conducted in the

area assigned a tactical commander across the range of military

operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces.

During peacetime, the Secretary of Defense (or designated

representative) translates national security policy into military

policy. Because the execution of policy routinely contains an

informational element and desires behavior favorable to its

intent, there is an inherent psychological dimension. During

war, policy flows directly from the President, as the Commander

in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the

Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff to the combatant commanders. The combatant commander

is responsible for the centralized direction and conduct of PSYOP

within the command’s area of responsibility.

PSYOP units support the JFC and contribute to all aspects of joint

operations by performing the following missions:

Advising the supported commander through the targeting

process regarding targeting restrictions, psychological

actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed

by the military force.

Influencing foreign populations by expressing

information through selected conduits to influence

attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or noninterference with friendly military operations.

Providing public information to foreign populations to

support humanitarian activities, ease suffering, and restore

or maintain civil order.

Serving as the supported commander’s voice to foreign

populations by conveying the JFC’s intent.

Countering adversary propaganda, misinformation,

disinformation, and opposing information to correctly

portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others

the ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political

will of the United States and its multinational partners

within an operational area.

The President and

Secretary of Defense issue

national security policy

through directives and

statements.

PSYOP supports joint

force commander

missions.
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Executive Summary

Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

The Secretary of Defense participates in the establishment of

national security policy and objectives and provides strategic

PSYOP advice to USG agencies and allies.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD [P]) approves

all PSYOP programs unless the authority is delegated to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity

Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]), and delegates product approval and

dissemination authority to the appropriate level for peace,

contingency, or war.

The ASD(SO/LIC) acts as principal staff assistant and advisor

to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,

and the USD (P) on PSYOP matters; coordinates PSYOP policy,

plans, and programs with other USG departments and agencies;

develops PSYOP policy for the Department of Defense; reviews

and approves all PSYOP plans and programs delegated by the

USD(P); and evaluates the effectiveness of DOD PSYOP plans

and programs.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises the President,

Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council on all matters

regarding PSYOP forces, capabilities, programs, and missions.

When directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commander,

US Special Operations Command transfers PSYOP forces

by attachment to geographic combatant commanders. When

these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the

gaining commander (and the losing commander will relinquish)

over those forces must be specified; in most cases that will be

operational control.

PSYOP forces, organized as a joint psychological operations task

force (JPOTF), normally serve as a subordinate joint command

of a joint force. The JPOTF exercises command and control

of those PSYOP assets assigned, attached, or in support from

the Services components and, when applicable, from other

nations. Further, although tactical PSYOP units are usually

assigned to maneuver commanders, the JPOTF normally has

coordinating authority with tactical forces for developing,

producing, and disseminating PSYOP products.

Organizational

responsibilities for PSYOP

involve many parts of the

Department of Defense.

Unless otherwise directed

by the Secretary of

Defense, the Commander,

US Special Operations

Command exercises

combatant command

(command authority) over

all assigned military

PSYOP forces.

Command Relationships
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Executive Summary

JP 3-53

The scale of operations

generally will dictate the

organization of PSYOP

forces.

Effective use of PSYOP

increases the potential for

operational success.

The Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff’s

execute order (authorized

by the Secretary of

Defense) should designate

who has authority for

PSYOP product approval

and PSYOP product

dissemination.

As a crisis begins to develop, one of the first elements deployed to a

supported commander is the PSYOP assessment team (POAT).

The POAT provides staff support to the operations directorate (J-3)

of the joint force. The POAT assesses the situation, confers with the

commander, develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends an

appropriate combination of personnel, equipment, and support

provided by Service components to accomplish the mission. If the

POAT assesses that significant PSYOP forces are required to support

the JFC’s objectives, the POAT recommends to the JFC that a JPOTF

or PSYOP support element be established.

PSYOP are involved in all three types of planning processes for

joint operations: campaign, deliberate, and crisis action.

Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that PSYOP planners

must be involved throughout the planning process and that

bringing PSYOP in early to the process can significantly improve

the PSYOP contribution to the overall operation.

The overall function of PSYOP is to cause selected foreign

audiences to take actions favorable to the objectives of the United

States and its allies or coalition partners. PSYOP forces are the

only DOD asset given the authority to influence foreign target

audiences (TAs) directly through the use of radio, print, and other

media. PSYOP personnel specifically advise the supported

commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts

of every aspect of force employment to achieve the overall

campaign objectives. Their duties are wide-ranging but include,

as a minimum, advising on the psychological impacts of planned

operations, the identification of foreign TAs, and any

psychological weaknesses.

The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product

approval to the supported combatant commander. This does not

mean that the supported combatant commander also has been

delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination. In some

cases, PSYOP products may be politically sensitive and may

require separate approval for dissemination. The supported

combatant commander may, in turn, delegate PSYOP product

approval to a joint task force (JTF) commander but not lower

without approval of the Secretary of Defense.

In all PSYOP activities, commanders must be aware of two levels of

product approval. PSYOP objectives and themes frame the products

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Campaign
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Executive Summary

that reach foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and

strategy. Approval of themes andmessages is reserved by USG policy

at Office of the Secretary of Defense-levels where the interagency

process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of

considerations. Commanders subordinate to JTF commanders can

modify approved products, within the guidelines issued by higher

headquarters, to better target local foreign TAs.

Military operations other than war (MOOTW) not involving

the use or threat of force that can be supported by joint PSYOP

include foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, foreign

internal defense, consequence management, and DOD support

to counterdrug operations. These military activities provide

training and in-theater access to allow for the facilitation and use

of PSYOP during the transition to war. Nonlethal activities such

as PSYOP can be decisive in MOOTW involving the use or threat

of force. Joint PSYOP are capable of supporting operations

conducted during MOOTW, to include strikes and raids,

combatting terrorism, foreign internal defense, enforcement of

sanctions and maritime intercept operations, peace operations

(e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation

operations or flexible deterrent options as directed. During war

prehostilities, PSYOP can provide powerful operational leverage

in support of flexible deterrent options. Among their potential

contributions, PSYOP can be employed to gather critical

information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity

to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces.

During war, PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical level

may enhance the success of operations at all echelons.

PSYOP are operations planned to convey selected information and

indicators to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and

ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups,

and individuals. To accomplish this goal, PSYOP must have a clearly

defined mission, the ability to analyze and evaluate targets and their

effects, a reliable media transmission, and a rapid ability to implement

their activities. PSYOP depend on communications to ensure proper

execution of the mission and objectives. This is accomplished by

command and control, preplanning, and support from all levels of the

chain of command.

PSYOP support joint and

multinational operations

and designated

government agencies.

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

CONCLUSION
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Executive Summary

JP 3-53

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CHAPTER I

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: AN OVERVIEW

I-1

“In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen many great

changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the

development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon.”

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. General

a. The employment of any instrument of national power, particularly the military instrument,

has always had a psychological dimension. Foreign perceptions of US military capabilities are

fundamental to strategic deterrence. The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on US ability to

influence the perceptions of others. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations

to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,

motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations,

groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP are to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and

behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of

US diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities. PSYOP characteristically

are delivered as information for effect, used during peacetime and conflict, to inform and

influence. When properly employed, PSYOP can save lives of friendly and/or adversary forces

by reducing adversaries’ will to fight. By lowering adversary morale and reducing their efficiency,

PSYOP can also discourage aggressive actions and create dissidence and disaffection within

their ranks, ultimately inducing surrender.

b. The President and Secretary of Defense issue national security policy through directives

and statements. During peacetime, the Secretary of Defense (or designated representative)

translates national security policy into military policy. Because the execution of policy routinely

contains an informational element and desires behavior favorable to its intent, there is an inherent

psychological dimension. During war, policy flows directly from the President, as the Commander

in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense through the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to the combatant commanders. The combatant

commander is responsible for the centralized direction and conduct of PSYOP within the

command’s area of responsibility (AOR). Early and full PSYOP support to the supported

commander is critical throughout the crisis action planning process.

“[Members of the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) of the Joint

Task Force (JTF) NOBLE ANVIL] . . . Psychological Operations (PSYOP) played

a key role throughout Operation ALLIED FORCE. Your efforts at influencing

diverse groups ranging from Serb military and police forces in Kosovo, to the

civilian population in Belgrade and in small towns and villages throughout the

remainder of Serbia, to Kosovar Albanian refugees in camps in Albania and

Macedonia, were truly impressive. Although difficult to measure, I truly believe

your efforts had a significant impact on the success of the operation.
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Chapter I

JP 3-53

During the 78-day air campaign, the JPOTF developed over 40 different leaflets.

More than 104.5 million leaflets were dropped throughout Serbia over the course

of the campaign.

The JPOTF also produced radio and television programming in Serbian and

Albanian which was broadcast by EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft. The format

for the program, modeled after National Public Radio’s programming, set a high

standard for honesty and objectivity and provided a valuable antidote to Serb

propaganda. . . .

Your efforts, combined with other elements of the JTF, helped to save lives and to

prevail in this conflict.”

J.O. Ellis, Admiral, United States Navy

Commander, Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL

2. Statutes and Policy

Several Presidential Security Directives and Executive Orders apply to PSYOP. Additionally,

regulatory guidance pertaining to the conduct of PSYOP is promulgated by the Department of

Defense (DOD).

Specific Executive and departmental citations are listed in Appendix C, “References.”

3. Treaties and Agreements

Bilateral defense treaties usually have agreements concerning the conduct of PSYOP by

the signatories. Use of PSYOP also may be regulated under status-of-forces agreements. A

current list of treaties and other international agreements in force is found in Department of State

Publication 9434, Treaties In Force.

4. Military Psychological Operations

a. PSYOP are an integral part of military operations and, as such, are an inherent

responsibility of all military commanders. They have been used throughout history to influence

foreign groups and leaders. Modern PSYOP are enhanced by the expansion of mass

communications capabilities. Nations may multiply the effects of their military capabilities by

communicating directly to their intended targets promises or threats of force or retaliation,

conditions of surrender, safe passage for deserters, invitations to sabotage, support to resistance

groups, and other messages. The effectiveness of this communication depends on the perception

of the communicator’s credibility and capability to carry out promises or threatened actions. It

is important not to confuse psychological impact with PSYOP. Actions such as shows of

force or limited strikes may have a psychological impact, but they are not PSYOP unless the

primary purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, decision making, or

behavior of the foreign target audience (TA).
I-3

Psychological Operations: An Overview

TRUTH IS THE BEST PROPAGANDA

“. . . While B-52s rain terror from the skies, an elaborate psychological

operation is fighting for the hearts and minds of Afghans, trying to turn

them against Osama bin Laden. American armies have used PSYOP

[psychological operations] since the Revolutionary War (leaflets were passed

out to British soldiers at the battle of Bunker Hill promising free land if they

defected). It has a reputation as a black art, the stuff of Tokyo Rose and

Nazi propaganda, but today’s psywarriors act more like Madison Avenue ad

executives — except they wear combat fatigues and jump out of planes.

Four PSYOP specialists, for example, parachuted in with Army Rangers

who raided a Taliban compound and air base Oct. 19; they heralded the

arrival of US forces by spreading leaflets with the picture of a New York

firefighter raising an American flag. Psywarriors have found that ‘the truth

is the best propaganda,’ says COL [Colonel] James Treadwell, the 4th

[Psychological Operations] Group’s commander. Otherwise, ‘you lose

credibility,’ he explains, and the audience tunes out. Leaflets have explained

how to use relief food packets and warned civilians to stay away from combat

zones. Commando Solo’s broadcasts mix world news stories with sales

pitches. A recent show [broadcast], for example, reported on United Nations

efforts to organize Taliban opposition groups and ended with the plea: ‘this

must happen for there to finally be peace in Afghanistan.’ . . . . “

SOURCE: Douglas Waller, TIME.com, December 10, 2001

b. Every activity of the force has psychological implications that may be leveraged in

the battle to influence a foreign TA. If communicated to the potential opponent, such things as

the arrival of the force in the operational area, the multinational nature of the force, its combat

power, technological sophistication, level of training, and preparation of US and multinational

forces can break the adversary’s will to fight.

c. Categories of military PSYOP are shown in Figure I-1.

d. Military PSYOP constitute a systematic process of conveying messages to selected foreign

groups to promote particular themes that result in desired foreign attitudes and behaviors. PSYOP

are used to establish and reinforce foreign perceptions of US military, political, and economic

power and resolve.

5. Policies and Strategies

a. PSYOP in support of US national policies and strategies to resolve conflicts, deter

hostile action, and attain objectives in crises or open hostilities are designed to influence foreign

groups and leaders so that their behaviors and actions will promote the attainment of US national

goals.
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Chapter I

JP 3-53

b. Strategic-level US Government (USG) departments and agencies conduct

international information activities to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in

favor of US goals and objectives. These activities predominantly take place outside the military

arena but can use DOD assets and receive support from military PSYOP forces. Strategic

PSYOP play an important role in theater security cooperation (TSC) agreements by

supporting US country team initiatives such as counterdrug and mine awareness programs.

c. Operational-level PSYOP are designed to strengthen US and multinational capabilities

to conduct military operations in the operational area and accomplish particular missions across

the range of military operations. Along with other military operations, PSYOP may be used

independently or as an integral part of other operations throughout the operational area.

Operational-level PSYOP also play an important role in supporting military-to-military programs

as part of TSC agreements. These initiatives have promoted military professionalization and

human rights programs within host nation militaries, as well as many other programs designed

to improve civil-military relations.

d. Tactical-level PSYOP outline how military force will be employed against opposing

forces to attain tactical objectives. PSYOP are conducted as an integral part of multinational,

joint, and single-Service operations.

For details concerning PSYOP support to multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI,

“Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations.”

Figure I-1. Categories of Military Psychological Operations

CATEGORIES OF MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Strategic Psychological

Operations (PSYOP)

International information activities

conducted by US Government

agencies to influence foreign

attitudes, perceptions, and behavior

in favor of US goals and objectives

during peacetime and in times of

conflict. These programs are

conducted predominantly outside

the military arena but can utilize

Department of Defense assets.

Military PSYOP with potential

strategic impact must be

coordinated with national efforts.

Operational PSYOP

Conducted across the range of

military operations, including during

peacetime, in a defined operational

area to promote the effectiveness of

the joint force commander’s

campaigns and strategies.

Tactical PSYOP

Conducted in the area assigned a

tactical commander

to support the

tactical mission against opposing

forces.

across the range

of military operations
I-5

Psychological Operations: An Overview

6. Missions

a. PSYOP units support the joint force commander (JFC) and contribute to all aspects of joint

operations by performing the following missions:

(1) Advising the supported commander through the targeting process regarding

targeting restrictions, psychological actions, and psychological enabling actions to be executed

by the military force.

(2) Influencing foreign populations by expressing information through selected

conduits to influence attitudes and behavior and to obtain compliance or non-interference with

friendly military operations.

(3) Providing public information to foreign populations to support humanitarian

activities, ease suffering, and restore or maintain civil order.

(4) Serving as the supported commander’s voice to foreign populations by conveying

the JFC’s intent.

(5) Countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and

opposing information to correctly portray friendly intent and actions, while denying others the

ability to polarize public opinion and affect the political will of the United States and its

multinational partners within an operational area.

b. The above missions highlight the fact that PSYOP are a force multiplier and one of the

most effective nonlethal weapons available to a JFC.

7. Principles of Joint Psychological Operations

“If you are going to win any battle, you have to do one thing. You have to make

the mind run the body. Never let the body tell the mind what to do . . . the body is

never tired if the mind is not tired.”

General George S. Patton, US Army

a. PSYOP Methodology. Although the complexity of the methodology varies with the

foreign TAs, basic considerations for development of all PSYOP are the same. The following

are essential to successful PSYOP:

(1) PSYOP Core Task. The PSYOP core task must be clearly defined in terms that

correspond to the supported commander’s vision of how the campaign or operation will proceed.

(2) PSYOP Approval Process. The PSYOP approval process must be clarified in the

initial planning, and modified as required to facilitate the process. (See Chapter V, “Psychological

Operations Approval Process.”)
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Chapter I

JP 3-53

(3) Early Planning. Early planning

and employment of PSYOP are critical in

maximizing their impact upon the foreign TA.

(4) PSYOP Themes, Activities,

and Symbols. PSYOP themes, activities, and

symbols should be based on a thorough

analysis of targets, including friendly and

adversary PSYOP capabilities, strengths, and

weaknesses.

(5) Impact of Military Operations.

All military force presence and actions should be

thoroughly evaluated for their psychological

implications and, where necessary, supported by

deliberate PSYOP to offset potentially negative

effects and reinforce positive effects.

(6) Media Selection. The medium

or media selected for transmission or

dissemination should be relevant, reliable, and

readily accessible by the intended foreign TAs.

The potential for adverse environmental

consequences should also be weighed as

planners select the appropriate medium or

media.

(7) Timeliness. Timely exploitation of

PSYOP themes is critical. The PSYOP process is interactive, the dynamics of which force the executor

to perform an action, assess a reaction, and implement an appropriate counteraction. The PSYOP

approval process is rooted in DOD policy to ensure adequate oversight of this potential activity. A

streamlined and responsive approval process will facilitate the flexibility a commander requires.

(8) Continuous Assessment. Where possible, the results of PSYOP should be

continually evaluated for relevance to the mission and to national and military goals. As with

initial planning actions, decisions to terminate or revise PSYOP programs must be linked to

careful analysis of all-source intelligence.

(9) Measure of Effectiveness. A PSYOP measure of effectiveness (MOE) provides a

systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program (series of PSYOP products

and actions) has on specific foreign TAs. PSYOP MOE, as all MOE, change from mission to mission,

and encompass a wide range of factors that are fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP. PSYOP

impact indicators collectively provide an indication of the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP task.

Development of MOE and their associated impact indicators (derived from measurable supporting

PSYOP objectives) must be done during the planning process. By determining the measure in the

Soldiers erect the antenna of the Special

Operations Media System-Broadcast (SOMS-B)

capable of providing local radio and television

support including editing of radio and audiovisual

products.
I-7

Psychological Operations: An Overview

planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence,

are identified to assist in evaluating MOEs for the execution of PSYOP. Evaluating the effectiveness of

PSYOP may take weeks or longer given the inherent difficulties and complexity of determining cause

and effect relationships with respect to human behavior.

b. Psychological Impact. The psychological dimension affects those fighting the battle,

their military leaders and staffs, the political leaders, and the civilian population. Within the

battlespace, US forces want to face an adversary that is both unsure about its cause and

capabilities and sure about its impending defeat — an adversary who, even if unwilling to

surrender, has little will to engage in combat.

“To seduce the enemy’s soldiers from their allegiance and encourage them to

surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is more hurt by desertion than

by slaughter.”

Flavius Vegetius Renatus,

The Military Institutions of the Romans, c. 378 AD

c. Support Requirements. Support requirements for successful PSYOP are shown in

Figure I-2 and discussed below.

(1) Intelligence Support

(a) Intelligence. Intelligence support for military PSYOP requires detailed

information concerning the target identity, location, vulnerabilities, accessibility, and the political,

economic, social, cultural, religious, and historic conditions within the operational area.

Intelligence also supports the detection and analysis of adversary propaganda programs in support

of PSYOP counterpropaganda activities. Collection should be from all available sources and

agencies and is based upon thorough mission and requirements planning. Developing a

well-planned collection management architecture ensures that the requisite intelligence is available

to support the development of PSYOP.

For further details concerning intelligence support to PSYOP, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological

Operations Enablers.”

(b) Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence support for military PSYOP consists

of identifying, exploiting, deterring, or neutralizing foreign intelligence service targeting of PSYOP

plans, operations, personnel, and equipment, especially at the operational and tactical levels.

Upon execution of PSYOP, counterintelligence and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations

can provide feedback on its effect.

(2) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4S). Military

C4S are vital to planning, mounting, and sustaining successful joint PSYOP. The Services must design

C4S that provide interoperable, rapid, reliable, and secure exchange of information throughout the chain

of command.
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JP 3-53

For further details concerning C4S, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological Operations Enablers.”

(3) Logistic Support. Support of joint PSYOP places unique additional demands on

Service and theater logistic systems. Although the majority of PSYOP sustainment

requirements are satisfied by standard Service support systems, PSYOP-specific equipment

is generally low-density items requiring careful management. To ensure continuous

sustainment and support of PSYOP, commanders, planners, and logisticians must plan for and

coordinate the effective procurement and distribution of operating supplies, repair parts, and

major end items for PSYOP-specific equipment. Distribution of these assets to PSYOP forces

may pose problems that are dictated by the nature of the operation, the existing transportation

infrastructure, and rates of consumption. Before any PSYOP plan is executed, all aspects of

logistic supportability must be considered and coordinated. Emphasis also should be placed

on locating and using equipment and supplies already available in theater; i.e., printing presses

and radio and/or television (TV) broadcast transmitters.

For further details concerning logistic support to PSYOP, refer to Chapter VII, “Psychological

Operations Enablers.”

Figure I-2. Psychological Operations Support Requirements

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT

REQUIREMENTS

Intelligence

Intelligence support to PSYOP includes

current and accurate intelligence for PSYOP

analysis and assessment, as well as

counterintelligence detection, deterrence, or

neutralization of foreign intelligence targeting

Command, Control, Communications,

and Computer Systems

Provide interoperable, rapid, reliable, and

secure exchange of information

Logistics

All aspects of logistic supportability

must be considered and coordinated
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Psychological Operations: An Overview

8. Psychological Operations Relationships

a. PSYOP Relationship to Public Affairs (PA)

“One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public

opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of

propaganda.”

General Douglas MacArthur, US Army

(1) PSYOP are used to influence the attitudes, opinions, and behaviors of foreign TAs

in a manner favorable to US objectives.

(2) Military PA are the public information, command/internal information, and

community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal audience with

interest in the Department of Defense. PA provide accurate and timely information without

attempting to influence or sway the audience. As open sources to foreign countries and the

United States, PA channels can be used to disseminate international information. To maintain

the credibility of military PA, care must be taken to protect against slanting or manipulating

such PA channels. PA channels can be used to provide facts that will counter foreign propaganda,

including disinformation, directed at the United States.

(a) PA operations and activities shall not focus on directing or manipulating public

actions or opinion.

(b) PA and PSYOP products should provide a timely flow of information to

external and internal audience. Based on policy, PA and PSYOP must be separate and distinct

even though they reinforce each other and involve close cooperation and coordination.

Each function requires distinct efforts to plan, resource, and execute as part of the commander’s

operation plan (OPLAN). It is critically important that PA and PSYOP coordinate with each

other to maintain credibility with their respective audiences. Therefore, PSYOP representatives

should coordinate with command PA offices supporting the joint information bureau and PA

representatives present within joint planning organizations such as the joint planning group,

operations planning group, or information operations (IO) working group to integrate operational

activities while strictly maintaining autonomy.

(c) PA and PSYOP products must be coordinated and deconflicted early in the

planning process and during execution. Although PA and PSYOP generated information

may be different, they must not contradict one another or their credibility will be lost.

Although each has specific audiences, information often will overlap between audiences. This

overlap makes deconfliction crucial. Under no circumstances will personnel working in PA

functions or activities engage in PSYOP activities. Commanders will establish separate agencies

and facilities for PA and PSYOP activities, with PA being the commander’s primary contact with the

media.
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For further details concerning PA, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs

in Joint Operations.

b. PSYOP Relationship to Military Deception and Operations Security (OPSEC).

PSYOP convey information not only to intended PSYOP foreign TAs but also to foreign

intelligence services and their customers. Therefore, PSYOP messages must be coordinated

with counterintelligence planners and operators, with military deception planners, and with

OPSEC planners to ensure that essential secrecy is realized, counterintelligence operations are

not compromised, and messages reinforce the desired outcomes of counterintelligence and

deception as well as PSYOP plans. Additionally, PSYOP can be executed to support deception

actions or vice versa.

(1) Military Deception Operations

(a) PSYOP normally are directed toward a TA whereas military deception

operations normally target specific individuals, i.e., adversary decision makers. An individual

targeted by military deception also may be part of a target group. Groups that might be suitable

for targeting by PSYOP in support of military deception include adversary command groups,

planning staffs, specific factions within staffs, nonmilitary interest groups who can influence

military policies and decisions, and intelligence systems analysts.

(b) PSYOP can magnify the effects of and reinforce military deception plans

through the skillful use of associated truths. Dedicated PSYOP dissemination assets can discreetly

convey intended information to selected foreign TAs through appropriate “key communicator”

back channel networks. PSYOP convey information not only to the intended foreign TAs but

also to foreign intelligence systems. This provides the opportunity for mutual support if military

deception and PSYOP are carefully coordinated.

(c) PSYOP units plan and conduct counterpropaganda operations that can

complement and enhance military deception operations. Counterpropaganda operations are

those PSYOP activities that identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness,

and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces.

(2) Operations Security

(a) PSYOP integrate with OPSEC to assist in denying critical information about

friendly forces to an adversary.

(b) Planning for, preparing for, and conducting PSYOP and psychological actions

must be accomplished to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s intent and to gain and

maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP courses of action (COAs).

For further details concerning military deception and OPSEC, refer to JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for

Military Deception, and JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security, respectively.
I-11

Psychological Operations: An Overview

9. Psychological Operations Integration with Information Operations

a. General

(1) IO exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in dependence on

information supporting military activities. IO should be conducted in concert with operations

conducted by general-purpose military forces to provide a fully integrated warfighting capability.

In peacetime, IO support national objectives primarily by influencing foreign perceptions and

decision making. In crisis and hostilities, IO can be used as a flexible deterrent option to

communicate national interest and demonstrate resolve. In conflict, IO can be applied to achieve

physical and psychological results in support of military objectives. IO contribute by taking

advantage of information technology, exploiting the growing worldwide dependence upon

automated information systems and near real time global dissemination of information, to affect

adversary decision cycles with the goal of achieving information superiority.

(2) IO contribute by both defending military decision making from adversary attacks

and degrading an adversary’s decision-making capability, thereby producing a relative information

advantage. IO also contribute by shaping adversary perceptions and behavior.

b. Core Capabilities. IO core capabilities are employed by DOD components to influence

foreign decision makers or groups while protecting friendly decision making. PSYOP, military

deception, and OPSEC are three core capabilities associated with influencing foreign

decision making. Electronic warfare (EW) and computer network operations (CNO) are

concerned with affecting or defending the electromagnetic spectrum, information systems, and

information that support decision makers, weapon systems, command and control (C2) and

automated responses. Integration of all of these core capabilities is critical to mission

accomplishment.

c. Integration

(1) As one of the core capabilities of IO, PSYOP must be integrated with the other IO

capabilities providing mutual benefits for both. PSYOP are used to conduct counterpropaganda,

KEY TERM

INFORMATION OPERATIONS:

Actions taken to affect adversary information and

information systems while defending one’s own

information and information systems. Also called IO.
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JP 3-53

induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior to friendly objectives, and discourage support for

adversaries and their goals. As an integrated part of the IO plan PSYOP can:

(a) Integrate with IO capabilities by either providing or withholding information for

adversary analysis.

(b) Be used to attack adversary legitimacy and credibility.

(c) Build and sustain support among selected foreign TAs.

(d) Shift loyalty of adversary forces.

(e) Help promote the cessation of hostilities.

(f) Undermine adversary confidence.

(g) Persuade isolated and bypassed adversary forces to surrender.

(2) PSYOP are an integrated part of IO through effective analysis of adversary

propaganda and information efforts to:

(a) Counter and diminish adversary propaganda efforts.

(b) Discourage adversary offensive operations.

(c) Assist host/foreign nation in providing information and support to its civilian

populace.

(d) Reduce or neutralize support of adversary operations.

(e) Reorient or educate the selected foreign TAs in liberated or occupied territory.

(f) Support command information programs.

d. Psychological Operations and the Information Operations Cell

(1) PSYOP is a critical core capability of IO. They are conducted to influence foreign

TAs. PSYOP are also an important contributor when conducting interagency coordination for

joint operations involving the influence of foreign TAs.

(2) The coordination of IO elements is critical to successful execution of IO.

(3) The JFC’s staff, which includes the IO cell, develops and promulgates guidance/

plans for IO that are passed to the components and supporting organizations and agencies for

detailed mission planning and decentralized execution. The IO cell integrates the broad range
I-13

Psychological Operations: An Overview

of potential IO actions and activities that help contribute to the JFC’s desired end state in an

operational area.

(4) The IO cell is comprised of representatives from each staff element, component,

and supporting agency responsible for integrating IO capabilities and related activities.

(a) PSYOP representatives to the IO cell are integral members of the cell.

(b) The duties PSYOP representatives perform in the IO cell are in addition to the

ones they perform, for example in a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF).

(c) In the IO cell, PSYOP representatives integrate, coordinate, deconflict, and

synchronize the use of PSYOP with IO capabilities and related activities. They also advise and/

or recommend on multinational information activities within a JFC’s operational area, that may support

IO.

(d) It is important to note that these representatives integrate the PSYOP supporting

plans with the overall IO strategy.

(e) A PSYOP representative must be prepared, at the direction of the JFC or

Director of the Joint Staff, to assume duties as chief of the IO cell.

For further detail concerning IO, refer to JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations,

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S3600.1, Information Operations (IO) (U), and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01A (S), Joint Information

Operations Policy (U).

e. Information Operations Support to a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

(1) The IO cell supports the JFC’s JPOTF by performing the following tasks:

(a) The cell supports improved PSYOP product development by obtaining critical

personality profiling data and human factor analysis data for PSYOP use and obtains special

information not usually available through DOD intelligence systems for PSYOP use upon request.

It also can augment dissemination of PSYOP products and programs via non-standard

dissemination assets or platforms, and provide responsive access and use of classified and

compartmented information and programs for PSYOP forces as required.

(b) The cell facilitates PSYOP communications, distribution, and dissemination

through joint restricted frequency list deconfliction, frequency spectrum analysis, media analysis,

propagation analysis, and modeling, and helps in the facilitation of PSYOP contingency planning

by coordinating resources to support the PSYOP scheme of maneuver. Additionally, it facilitates

the PSYOP product approval process as part of an IO program and foreign TA polling, post-test

analysis, and impact assessment of PSYOP programs, and establishes systems for adversary

propaganda collection, reporting, and analysis to facilitate PSYOP counterpropaganda programs.
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(c) The cell coordinates and synchronizes PSYOP with IO capabilities and related

activities and other aspects of joint force operations and assists in the collection and analysis of impact

indicators and MOE of PSYOP plans and programs. Furthermore, it assists in coordination and

synchronization with strategic information operations, programs, or activities, and helps coordinate PSYOP

requirements for support from other government agencies at the strategic level.

(d) The cell ensures the integration of PSYOP with military deception, EW, CNO,

OPSEC, and related activities of PA and civil-military operations (CMO). The cell also ensures

the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) supports the JFC PSYOP objectives.

(e) The cell makes sure that the JTCB has the support of PSYOP subject matter

experts.

(2) If military potential is to be maximized, PSYOP and IO cannot be conducted in a vacuum;

rather, they must be woven into the strategies and operations across the range of military operations to

include integrating them with joint, multinational, and interagency operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IMPACT

Millions of PSYOP [psychological operations] leaflets were dropped [during

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM]; they called on the Iraqis

not only to surrender, but also warned them to stay away from their

equipment because it was the target of Coalition air strikes. Most leaflets

were dropped by MC-130s. F-16s and other aircraft flew several missions

a day carrying the MK 129 leaflet container, showering the Iraqi troops with

messages and warnings. USMC [United States Marine Corps] A-6s dropped

another version of the leaflet in Kuwait. UH-1Ns used loudspeakers and

Arab linguists to convince Iraqi soldiers to surrender along the Kuwait

border. One leaflet depicted a mosque and a schoolyard, in which Saddam

Hussein had liberally interspersed tanks, AAA [antiaircraft artillery] guns,

and other military equipment. The message to the Iraqi soldier was that

Saddam Hussein was deliberately endangering their religion and families.

The detonation of several 15,000-pound bombs, which were dropped from

MC-130 special operations planes, also seemed to have a psychological

effect on Iraqi troops. Senior Iraqi officer EPWs [enemy prisoners of war]

frequently commented that their troops also were terrified of B-52s, and

could clearly see and hear their strikes, even when miles away.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992
CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

II-1

“For a strong adversary (corps) the opposition of twenty-four squadrons and twelve

guns ought not to have appeared very serious, but in war the psychological factors

are often decisive. An adversary who feels inferior is in reality so.”

Field Marshal Carl Gustav Baron von Mannerheim

The Memoirs of Field Marshal Mannerheim, 1953

1. Responsibilities

The following responsibilities are outlined in DODD S3321.1, Overt Peacetime

Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Contingencies Short of Declared

War:

a. The Secretary of Defense:

(1) Participates in the establishment of national security policy and objectives.

(2) Recommends to the President the mobilization of Reserve Components (RC) assets,

as necessary, and provides strategic PSYOP advice to USG agencies and allies.

b. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]):

(1) Approves all PSYOP programs not delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD [SO/LIC]).

(2) Delegates product approval and dissemination authority to the appropriate level

for peace, contingency, or war.

c. The ASD(SO/LIC):

(1) Acts as principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy

Secretary of Defense, and USD(P) on PSYOP matters.

(2) Represents the Secretary of Defense in interagency forums and coordinates PSYOP

policy, plans, and programs with other USG departments and agencies.

(3) Provides guidance on the planning and conduct of PSYOP activities and their

integration into USG activities during peacetime, and more specific guidance for the planning

and conduct of these activities across the range of military operations.

(4) Develops PSYOP policy for the Department of Defense.
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JP 3-53

(5) Reviews and approves all DOD PSYOP programs delegated by USD(P).

(6) Evaluates the effectiveness of DOD PSYOP programs.

d. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) reviews all DOD

PSYOP plans and programs and provides recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC) on the

development of specific PSYOP programs affecting the geographic combatant commanders.

e. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs review all DOD PSYOP

plans and programs and provide recommendations to the ASD(SO/LIC) on the development of

specific PSYOP programs affecting their responsible areas.

f. The DOD General Counsel conducts legal reviews of all proposed PSYOP programs.

g. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Advises the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council on all matters

regarding PSYOP forces, capabilities, programs, and tasks.

(2) Represents the Secretary of Defense on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PSYOP Working Group and in other multinational military forums.

(3) Coordinates and directs the preparation of multinational PSYOP plans and US

participation in multinational military PSYOP training programs.

(4) Provides PSYOP representation to the interagency organizations and their working

groups.

(5) Provides the general policy and establishes production priorities for the PSYOP

Studies Program.

(6) Provides the guidance for PSYOP conducted by the combatant commanders.

(7) Prepares strategic plans and issues policy for the use of military PSYOP across the

range of military operations.

(8) Reviews the PSYOP plans and programs of the combatant commanders to ensure

they are adequate, feasible, and consistent with USG and DOD policy.

(9) Provides PSYOP plans and programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for

review and approval.

(10) Reviews the peacetime psychological operations plans and programs of the

combatant commanders.
II-3

Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

(11) Establishes in conjunction with the Commander, US Special Operations Command

(USSOCOM) joint doctrine for PSYOP.

(12) Provides a joint, prioritized statement of military requirements for PSYOP

capabilities to meet the needs of the Secretary of Defense, the Service Chiefs, combatant

commanders, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(13) Provides an integrated statement of joint PSYOP training requirements and ensures

that these requirements are appropriately addressed.

(14) Apportions PSYOP forces to the combatant commands through the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

(15) Prepares integrated logistic and mobilization guidance for PSYOP capabilities.

(16) Provides a unified, prioritized list of PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence

requirements to meet the needs of the combatant commanders, Joint Staff, and Services.

(17) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into the CJCS Exercise Program and

Joint Experimentation Program.

(18) Incorporates PSYOP instruction into joint professional military education

programs.

(19) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into military planning for TSC activities,

contingency operations, and war.

(20) Ensures integration of PSYOP activities into the preparation and review of joint

OPLANs that conform to policy guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense.

h. Geographic combatant commanders have the following responsibilities in addition

to those listed in Annex D, JSCP and those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Designate specific staff responsibility for maintaining a PSYOP planning element,

coordinating PSYOP actions, and ensuring that regional plans, activities, and operations support

national psychological objectives.

(2) Develop intelligence and counterintelligence requirements necessary to perform

PSYOP analysis, planning, and execution.

(3) Plan, support, and conduct in peacetime and during conflict PSYOP activities in

support of theater military missions and US national and regional objectives. Peacetime PSYOP

must be coordinated with the chiefs of US Diplomatic Missions within the combatant

commander’s geographic AOR.
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JP 3-53

(4) Prepare PSYOP plans and, upon approval, conduct theater PSYOP to support the

execution of operations.

(5) Foster cooperative PSYOP policies among multinational military forces and regional

security organizations.

(6) Ensure advance contingency planning for use of non-DOD informational and related

capabilities in DOD PSYOP.

(7) Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information about PSYOP

adversary activity, apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities, and any anticipated changes to

ongoing PSYOP activities.

(8) Integrates PSYOP activities into the preparation and review of joint OPLANs.

i. Combatant Commanders (less Commander, USSOCOM) have the following

responsibilities in addition to those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Ensure that staffs and organizations within their commands have sufficient

representation and working proficiency in the planning and conduct of joint PSYOP. This includes

requesting liaison officers from other USG agencies when appropriate.

(2) Develop plans and programs, in coordination with the Joint Staff and the

USSOCOM, to support PSYOP requirements identified by supported geographic combatant

commanders, and develop and submit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff additional

PSYOP requirements necessary to support geographic combatant commanders.

(3) When directed by the Secretary of Defense, accept the attachment of PSYOP forces

from the Commander, USSOCOM. Employ these forces as directed.

j. Commander, USSOCOM. The Commander, USSOCOM’s responsibilities for the

development of strategy, doctrine, and tactics for joint PSYOP are interrelated with those of the

Service Chiefs. The Commander, USSOCOM exercises combatant command (command

authority) (COCOM) of all active and reserve US Army PSYOP forces. The Commander,

USSOCOM has the following responsibilities in addition to those detailed in Annex D, JSCP:

(1) Prepares program and budget to fund approved PSYOP programs. In fulfilling

this responsibility, the Commander, USSOCOM coordinates with the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and the other combatant commanders to ensure that all PSYOP

and support requirements are addressed.

(2) Provides trained and ready PSYOP forces to support the Secretary of Defense and

the other combatant commanders with strategic, operational, and tactical PSYOP support.
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Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

(3) Acts as CJCS Executive Agent for the programming, training, and equipping of joint

PSYOP forces.

(4) Prepares and provides assigned PSYOP forces to the other combatant commanders,

when directed by the Secretary of Defense.

(5) Supports the other combatant commanders’ PSYOP requirements.

(6) Provides the special operations (SO)-peculiar resources necessary to sustain the

forces, capabilities, and support programs. This includes identification of PSYOP future concepts,

technology development, and acquisition of PSYOP systems.

(7) Provides training to foreign military personnel, when directed.

(8) Recommends PSYOP policy guidance to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Service Chiefs, and US military commanders, as required.

(9) Validates and develops priorities for PSYOP training, intelligence, and military

requirements and provides these to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support Service,

combatant command, and Joint Staff responsibilities as they relate to PSYOP.

(10) Provides visibility of PSYOP issues, activities, tasks, and capabilities to the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and commanders at other US military command levels.

(11) Coordinates with the Commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to

integrate PSYOP activities into joint training and experimentation plans and programs.

(12) Acts as the lead agent for joint PSYOP doctrine development.

(13) Develops PSYOP concepts to support national security objectives, reviews Service

PSYOP doctrine development for consistency with joint doctrine, and ensures that joint and

Service PSYOP training supports national objectives.

(14) Participates with assigned PSYOP forces in CJCS and combatant command

exercises to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for PSYOP forces.

(15) Manages the PSYOP Studies Program and coordinates PSYOP input to the

Defense Intelligence Production schedule.

(16) Ensures that PSYOP forces are trained to plan and conduct PSYOP in regions to

which they are apportioned.

(17) Provides for employment of RC PSYOP forces in planning, developing concepts,

and participating in joint training exercises and contingency operations.
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(18) Coordinates with the Service Chiefs for planning and providing combat support, combat

service support, and sustainment of PSYOP forces assigned to the other combatant commanders for

conduct of PSYOP.

k. The Military Departments and Services:

(1) Provide civilian and military personnel with appropriate PSYOP training and

planning skills.

(2) Provide capabilities organic to Service forces to execute PSYOP actions and

dedicated PSYOP forces and equipment.

(3) Develop Service PSYOP doctrine relating to the primary functions assigned to the

particular Service.

(4) Provide PSYOP forces or detachments (not assigned to the Commander,

USSOCOM) to combatant commanders for service in foreign countries.

(5) Provide departmental intelligence and counterintelligence assets that are trained,

equipped, and organized to support planning and conduct PSYOP.

(6) Incorporate PSYOP instruction into Service training and education programs.

For further detail concerning Service PSYOP capabilities, refer to Appendix A, “Department of

Defense Psychological Operations Capabilities.”

l. The Chief of Staff, US Army, in addition to responsibilities delineated as Chief of a

Service, trains foreign personnel in PSYOP, when required.

m. Joint task force (JTF) commanders have the following responsibilities in addition to

those listed for all military commanders:

(1) Coordinate all JTF PSYOP efforts with appropriate US and multinational authorities

in the joint operations area, and incorporate PSYOP in JTF plans.

(2) Maintain up-to-date PSYOP estimates for designated operational areas.

(3) Monitor and review component PSYOP plans, including coordination of the

development of appropriate PSYOP force capability.

(4) When directed, accept the attachment of and employ PSYOP forces from the

combatant commander.
II-7

Organizational Responsibilities for Psychological Operations

n. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency:

(1) Establishes and implements a plan to satisfy PSYOP intelligence and

counterintelligence requirements.

(2) Assists in the preparation of PSYOP intelligence and counterintelligence estimates

and appraisals of foreign groups designated by USD(P), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Service Chiefs, Commander, USSOCOM, and other combatant commanders.

(3) Provides PSYOP training for intelligence analysts to ensure a capability to respond

to intelligence production requirements in support of PSYOP programs.

(4) Recommends PSYOP opportunities in support of US policy.

(5) Provides indications of potential vulnerability to hostile PSYOP or foreign

intelligence services.

o. The Director, Defense Information Systems Agency provides computer systems

support of the PSYOP automated system (POAS) and will support the communications and

information systems requirements for the transmission of PSYOP products from the continental

United States (CONUS) production facilities to overseas PSYOP forces.

p. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, provides

intelligence information to satisfy intelligence collection requirements.

q. All military commanders, when appropriate:

(1) Include PSYOP planning in the preparation of plans for all military actions across

the range of military operations.

(2) Consider the psychological effects and implications of all COAs during joint

operation planning.

(3) Include PSYOP forces in the planning and conduct of all military exercises.

2. United States Forces Commanders Serving in Multinational Commands

a. Implement multinational PSYOP plans to the extent consistent with international law,

including the law of armed conflict, and treaty obligations in relations with the government and

civilian population of countries where US forces are assigned.

b. Request guidance from the Secretary of Defense on implementation of multinational

policies and objectives, as appropriate.
II-8

Chapter II

JP 3-53

c. Coordinate joint PSYOP planning with appropriate multinational commanders and national

forces of host countries.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to Chapter VI, “Psychological

Operations Across the Range of Military Operations.”

3. Other United States Government Agencies

a. During peacetime, the Department of State provides overall direction, coordination, and

supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas. In peacetime operations or in conflict, the

Department of State may restrict PSYOP messages and themes used within specific countries or

areas.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of

Governors, Department of Treasury, Department of Justice, and other agencies impacted by

military PSYOP, including peacetime PSYOP activities, may review plans to ensure consistency

of effort.

Reachback, support near real time video, audio, and data over the Ethernet from Ft. Bragg

to a SOMS-B site at Bagram, Afghanistan provided through JITI and DVDS transmission.
CHAPTER III

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

III-1

“As the excited passions of hostile people are of themselves a powerful enemy,

both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them.”

Lieutenant General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini

Summary of the Art of War, 1838

1. General

a. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Commander, USSOCOM

exercises COCOM over all assigned military PSYOP forces. When directed by the Secretary

of Defense, the Commander, USSOCOM transfers PSYOP forces to geographic combatant

commanders. When these forces are transferred, the command relationship of the gaining

commander (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified;

in most cases that will be operational control (OPCON). Upon transfer of those forces,

combatant commander responsibilities commence as described in Figure III-1.

b. Because of the strategic and operational importance of the PSYOP contribution to the

combatant commander’s strategic concept, centralized planning of PSYOP should be focused at

that level. Likewise, when the combatant commander activates a subordinate joint force, PSYOP

planners should be on the subordinate JFC’s staff. The supported combatant commander may

obtain, through the Secretary of Defense, required PSYOP forces in the same manner that other

forces are obtained.

Figure III-1. Combatant Commander Responsibilities

COMBATANT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Ascertain

PSYOP Force

Requirements

Give Authoritative

Direction to Subordinate

Commands and

Psychological Operations

(PSYOP) Forces

Establish

the Chain of Command

for PSYOP Forces

Operating Within The

Operational Area

Exercise

or Delegate

Operational Control

of PSYOP Forces

Task, Organize, and

Employ PSYOP Forces

to Accomplish Assigned

Missions
III-2

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JP 3-53

c. PSYOP forces, organized as a joint PSYOP task force, normally serve as a subordinate

joint command of a joint force. The JPOTF exercises C2 of those PSYOP forces assigned,

attached, or in support from the Services components and, when applicable, from other

nations. Further, although tactical PSYOP units are usually assigned to maneuver commanders,

the JPOTF normally has coordinating authority with tactical forces for developing, producing,

and disseminating PSYOP products. This procedure allows PSYOP forces to meet the maneuver

commander’s requirements more effectively, while ensuring continuity with the objectives and

intent of the combatant commander, or JTF commander. The JPOTF works closely with the US

country team, other USG officials, allies and coalition officials, and international organizations.

Finally, it coordinates strategic-level PSYOP requirements with the combatant commander.

d. The combatant commander may attach PSYOP forces to a subordinate joint force

commander, normally a JPOTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander.

This prevents the development of conflicting PSYOP programs and messages, and facilitates a

more rapid approval process and product responsiveness. PSYOP planners will identify foreign

TAs and PSYOP objectives, themes, symbols, activities, and products that support the JFC’s

campaign plan. PSYOP have significant impact on the JFC objectives as they involve the need

to mobilize the civilian population, while simultaneously isolating the adversary, taking away

its ability to muster popular support. Subordinate commanders will identify requirements for

PSYOP forces to the JFC. Depending on mission requirements, PSYOP staff support may be

provided to the commander of a subunified command, JTF, or component command to enhance

planning and coordinating capability.

2. Organizing Psychological Operations Forces

a. The scale of operations generally will dictate the organization of PSYOP forces.

This organization will vary with the nature of the mission, availability and operational

requirements; and the supported commander’s assessment of the PSYOP mission requirements.

b. As a crisis begins to develop, one of the first elements deployed to a supported

commander is the PSYOP assessment team (POAT). The POAT provides staff support to the

operations directorate (J-3) of the joint force. This small, tailored team (approximately 4-12

personnel) should consist of PSYOP distribution/dissemination and logistic planners, capable

of assessing the needs and requirements for a JPOTF. It should deploy with organic

communications and vehicles. The POAT assesses the situation, confers with the commander,

develops the PSYOP objectives, and recommends an appropriate combination of personnel,

equipment, and support provided by Service components to accomplish the mission. If the

POAT can accomplish necessary planning and assist commanders in executing PSYOP activities,

no further PSYOP forces are likely to be required. The POAT also coordinates with other USG

agencies with related missions.

c. If the POAT assesses that significant PSYOP forces are required to support the JFC

objectives, the POAT recommends to the JFC that a JPOTF or PSYOP support element (PSE)

be established.
III-3

Command Relationships

(1) The decision on whether or not to activate a JPOTF is determined by the following

factors:

(a) Requirement for C2 of PSYOP product production elements in the operational

area.

(b) Geographical size of the operational area requires dispersed operations.

(c) Number and types of supported units exceed the capability of a PSE to advise

and assist.

(d) Number and types of PSYOP units and/or assets to be coordinated exceed the

C2 capability of a PSE.

(2) A PSE is a tailored element that can provide limited PSYOP. PSEs do not

contain organic C2 capability; therefore, command relationships must be clearly defined. The

size, composition, and capability of the PSE are determined by the requirements of the supported

commander. A PSE is not designed to provide full-spectrum PSYOP capability; reachback is

critical for its mission success.

(3) The regional PSYOP battalion normally provides C2 assets and product

development capability. The regionally oriented battalion is augmented by production assets

(audio-visual studios, printing presses, and other related equipment), and dissemination assets

(radio stations and radios, TV stations and TVs, tactical PSYOP teams [loudspeakers]), including

RC, enemy prisoner of war (EPW)/civilian internee (CI)/dislocated civilian (DC), and tactical

units, as required.

(4) Retention of OPCON of the JPOTF by the JFC and integration of its functions into

the J-3 structure optimizes interaction with other operational activities and streamlines the approval

and oversight process (see Figure III-2). Because all products used throughout the joint force

must be consistent, they are developed in one product development cell. Retaining OPCON at

the joint force headquarters allows the most effective use of scarce PSYOP-trained personnel

and linguists while ensuring access of PSYOP products to all subordinate commands.

(5) Tactical dissemination assets, primarily tactical PSYOP teams and liaison teams,

may be attached in CONUS to deploying units, attached in theater based on mission requirements,

or deployed with the JPOTF and remain in support of the entire joint force. When attached to a

maneuver unit, tactical PSYOP forces normally are placed under the OPCON of the maneuver

unit commander.

(6) Factors that will affect the size and composition of the PSYOP force include, but

are not limited to, the following:

(a) Scope and duration of the PSYOP objectives.
III-4

Chapter III

JP 3-53

(b) Requirements for liaison and coordination with other USG and host nation

(HN) agencies.

(c) Requirements for sustaining and coordinating with supported units.

(d) Policy, funding, and foreign or HN sensitivities and their effect on other

combatant command and supporting component objectives.

(e) Foreign intelligence and security service threats emanating from within the

host country or from the target country.

d. The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area, normally the JPOTF commander,

also may serve as the de facto joint force PSYOP officer. If the situation can be handled by

augmenting the JFC’s staff, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure that component staffs are

aware of the PSYOP products available. Working through the various component operations

staffs, the joint force PSYOP officer will ensure continuity of psychological objectives, and

themes to stress and avoid.

Figure III-2. Joint Force Organizational Options

JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

JCMOTF

JFACC

JFLCC

JFMCC

JFSOCC

JPOTF

JSOTF

JTF

Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Joint Force Air Component Commander

Joint Force Land Component Commander

Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force

Joint Task Force

Joint Special Operations Task Force

Operational Control

JTF

Theater

Special

Operations

Command

Navy

Component

Air Force

Component

Navy

Component

Marine

Corps

Component

Air Force

Component

JFSOCC

JPOTF JCMOTF

JFLCC JFMCC

JSOTF

Marine

Corps

Component

Army

Component

Geographic Combatant Commander

Army

Component

JFACC
III-5

Command Relationships

e. When deployed in support of joint force operations, COMMANDO SOLO normally

remains under the OPCON of the commander, JSOTF while the Navy’s transportable amplitude

modulation (AM) and frequency modulation (FM) radio broadcast system (TARBS) normally

remains under the OPCON of the Navy component commander. Coordinating authority is

granted between the COMMANDO SOLO element, the TARBS element, and the JPOTF to

facilitate PSYOP dissemination.

“. . . PSYOP [psychological operations] and COMMANDO SOLO. We have an

EC-130 aircraft that is rigged out as a broadcasting studio. And it broadcasts —

. . . we were broadcasting in Afghanti — in the various languages with Afghan

music intermittently to put on a five-hour radio program covering all of Afghanistan

in theater. We were running two five-hour broadcasts per day out of this aircraft,

short wave and AM. The leaflet drops — . . . from 14 October to 21 October, the

B-52s, which obviously dropped other things, dropped over 10 million leaflets

across Afghanistan. And our MC-130s also were dropping leaflets there. The 4th

PSYOP Group [Airborne] that you mentioned is down at Fort Bragg, North Carolina,

and it’s a very unique operation of video, graphics arts, printed media, some very

good professionals down there that work on the PSYOP themes that are approved

here at national policy, at the State Department, et cetera.”

Mr. Robert Andrews, Principal Duty Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)

Defense LINK News Transcript, December 12, 2001

f. During full mobilization, the entire US military PSYOP capability becomes available

for employment by the supported combatant commander. PSYOP units apportioned for theater

planning purposes and available for employment are identified in Annex D to the JSCP.

g. Operations may require use of RC PSYOP forces. Early identification of PSYOP

requirements is necessary to facilitate RC activation, processing, and training. Required

EC-130E COMMANDO SOLO from the 193rd Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air

National Guard, supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
III-6

Chapter III

JP 3-53

RC PSYOP forces must be included in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD),

along with Active Component (AC) PSYOP forces; otherwise, data essential for Joint Operation

Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will not be available and deployment of forces required

for the operations may be delayed.

h. The high demand for PSYOP forces to support worldwide operations make

reachback a critical component for PSYOP success. Reachback assets must be considered

whenever planning is conducted to minimize transportation requirements and provide flexibility

to support future operations. Improvements in technology will continue to increase the ability

of PSYOP to support multiple geographic areas with limited assets.

For further details concerning JOPES, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

(CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies

and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II:

(Planning Formats and Guidance).
CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING IN SUPPORT OF THE

JOINT FORCE CAMPAIGN

IV-1

“The real target in war is the mind of the enemy command, not the bodies of his

troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that

action will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of

warfare and the development of new weapons — aircraft and tanks — promise to

give us increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological

target.”

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Thoughts on War, 1944

1. Objectives of Joint Psychological Operations

a. General. The campaign planning process represents the art of linking major operations,

battles, and engagements in an operational design to accomplish theater strategic objectives.

Combatant commanders translate national and theater strategy into strategic and operational

concepts through the development of campaign plans. These plans represent their strategic

view of related operations necessary to attain theater strategic objectives. Campaign planning

can begin before or during deliberate planning, but it is not completed until after crisis action

planning, thus combining both planning processes. PSYOP are involved in all three types of

planning processes for joint operations: campaign, deliberate, and crisis action. Experience

has repeatedly demonstrated that PSYOP planners must be involved throughout the planning

process and that bringing PSYOP in early to the process can significantly improve the PSYOP

contribution to the overall operation.

b. The general objectives of joint PSYOP are shown in Figure IV-1.

2. Planning Skills

To plan for the effective employment of PSYOP, JFCs and their staffs must possess a

thorough knowledge of national security policy and objectives, as well as national and theater

military objectives. In addition, PSYOP planners must possess joint operation-planning skills,

with knowledge of PSYOP doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and force structure; and a

thorough understanding of the customs, mores, and values of the foreign TA. They must be able

to develop three distinct types of documents: military plans and orders that synchronize the

activities of military units; develop operations of persuasion that cause selected foreign TAs to

behave in ways that support the commander’s objectives; and an external information plan or

proposal to clarify information, synchronize military PSYOP with national information programs,

and leverage national resources to facilitate the actions of the supported commander. They must

be able to explain how other IO capabilities and related activities support PSYOP.
IV-2

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

On 10 June 1999, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] suspended the

air campaign following confirmation that the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian

security forces from Kosovo had begun. NATO had prevailed in its first

protracted endeavor outside the shadows of the Cold War. Psychological

operations [PSYOP] had proven to play a key role in setting the conditions

for this victory.

During the 78-day bombing campaign, a total of 104.5 million leaflets were

dropped over Belgrade, Kosovo and other major urban and rural areas

throughout the country. The thousands of Yugoslav Federal Army (VJ)

soldiers within Kosovo, as well as the civilian population throughout Serbia,

were routinely targeted by PSYOP products. In addition to the millions of

leaflets dropped, thousands of posters, handbills and newspapers were

also produced by tactical PSYOP forces in Albania. From the refugee camps

in Albania and Macedonia to the citizens of Belgrade and Kosovo, PSYOP

products were widely disseminated to inform and influence the Serbian

and Kosovar Albanian populations.

Figure IV-1. Joint Psychological Operations General Objectives

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

Support

and enhance

foreign humanitarian

assistance, foreign

internal defense, and/or

foreign nation

assistance military

operations

Facilitate

reorganization and

control of occupied

or liberated areas in

conjunction with

civil-military

operations

Reduce efficiency

of opposing forces

Further US and/or

multinational effort by

modifying, changing,

or reinforcing attitudes

and behavior of

selected foreign

Obtain the

cooperation of

allies and neutrals

in any

psychological

operations effort
IV-3

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

In addition to the printed products created to support Operation ALLIED

FORCE, daily radio and television programs were broadcast from 1 April

until the final broadcast on 27 June 1999. NATO’s Allied Voice Radio and

Television brought current world news and information about the situation

in Kosovo to listeners throughout Yugoslavia. In areas where national media

assets had been destroyed, and particularly in the face of heavily censored,

state-run media, Allied Voice Radio and Television provided the Supreme

Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) with a powerful communications asset

to reach the Yugoslav people.

Additionally, the production of the daily radio and television program was a

significant accomplishment for the soldiers of the 4th Psychological

Operations Group (Airborne). The success of the Reachback concept

permitted the program to be written, translated, and recorded at Fort Bragg,

then sent forward via secure communications to Germany where it was

assembled into a 60-minute or 90-minute broadcast. Daily Allied Voice Radio

and Television programs, which aired less than 24 hours after recording at

Fort Bragg, validated the Reachback concept and demonstrated the

responsiveness and advanced capabilities of PSYOP.

. . . the contributions of PSYOP during the war in Kosovo made one thing

clear: PSYOP will continue to be a weapon of first choice as a combat and

diplomatic multiplier and a combat reducer for future military operations.

SOURCE: Psychological Operations Support

to Operation ALLIED FORCE

3. Psychological Operations Concepts

“If we do go to war, psychological operations are going to be absolutely a critical,

critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III

Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1988 to 1991

Operation DESERT SHIELD

Effective use of PSYOP increases the potential for operational success. As plans are

developed the following concepts must be kept in mind:

a. Persuasive Communications. All communications that systemically convey information

with the intent of affecting the perceptions and behaviors of the foreign TA are persuasive

communications. These communications will interact with individual beliefs to change or

reinforce attitudes and behaviors.

b. Command Disruption. Disruption of C4S not only directly interferes with the

capabilities of an adversary to succeed in combat but also can have serious impact upon the

morale, cohesion, discipline, and public support essential to efficient operations.
IV-4

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

c. Counterinformation. Competing parties systematically can deny opponents information

they require to formulate decisions. The DOD Information Security Program establishes

procedures to protect classified information, and the OPSEC program establishes measures to

deny unclassified but sensitive indicators of friendly activities, capabilities, and intentions.

d. Intelligence Shaping. It is possible to systematically convey or deny data to opposing

intelligence systems with the objective of causing opposing analysts to derive desired judgments.

These judgments interact with the perceptions of opposing planners and decision makers to

influence estimates upon which capabilities, intentions, and actions are based.

4. Psychological Operations Functions

“U.S. planes are dropping leaflets as well as bombs and humanitarian rations

over Afghanistan in hopes of winning support inside the country for its anti-terrorist

campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Monday. ‘We’re working to

make clear to the Afghan people that we support them, and we’re working to free

them from the Taliban and their foreign terrorist allies,’ Rumsfeld said. In addition,

he said, the United States has begun broadcasting its message to people on the

ground, he said, but said U.S. planes were not yet dropping radios to help them

hear the message. ‘The partnership of nations is here to assist the people of

Afghanistan,’ the leaflets said. They are accompanied by a photo of a Western

soldier shaking hands with an Afghan civilian. Another leaflet lists the frequencies

on which U.S. broadcasts can be heard and broadcast times.” [See Figure IV-2,

The leaflets were not produced in English. The English examples are used in the

figure for clarity and understanding by the users of JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint

Psychological Operations.]

CNN.com, War Against Terror, 15 October 2001

a. The overall function of PSYOP is to cause selected foreign audiences to take actions

favorable to the objectives of the United States and its allies or coalition partners. PSYOP

forces are the only DOD asset given the authority to influence foreign TAs directly through the

use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOP personnel specifically advise the supported

commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts of every aspect of force

employment to achieve the overall campaign objectives. Their duties are wide-ranging but

include, as a minimum, advising on the psychological impacts of planned operations, and the

identification of foreign TAs and any psychological weaknesses. PSYOP staff officers assist in

integrating and coordinating psychological activities to ensure unity of effort and thematic

consistency within the operational area. PSYOP officers often can provide input most

effectively by participating in the targeting process through the JTCB of the supported

combatant command or JTF. At the JTCB, members discuss target priorities, recommend

engagement methods and timings, discuss consequences and collateral damage issues, and

recommend approval or disapproval for decision. Although the time frame is operationally

dependent, the doctrinal tasks or functions of PSYOP units are enduring. PSYOP units have

functions that must be considered, regardless of mission, level of conflict, range of military

operations, or situation. The following paragraphs explain each function.
IV-5

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

b. Provide Command and Control for Psychological Operations. A PSYOP commander

performs C2 functions by arranging personnel, equipment, communications, computers, facilities,

and procedures when planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling PSYOP forces and

operations. PSYOP C2 always is austere and the commander uses the resources of the

supported command to the maximum extent possible. The intelligence function is inherent

to C2 but unique in PSYOP. PSYOP forces possess limited capabilities to collect, process,

integrate, analyze, evaluate, and interpret PSYOP-relevant intelligence information for PSYOP

Figure IV-2. Examples of United States Psychological Operations Leaflets Produced and

Disseminated in Afghanistan in Support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

EXAMPLES OF UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

LEAFLETS PRODUCED AND DISSEMINATED IN AFGHANISTAN IN

SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

FRONT

BACK

FRONT

BACK

FRONT BACK FRONT BACK

NOTE: Leaflets were not produced in English. English leaflet

versions are provided for clarity and understanding.
IV-6

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

forces and for use by supported geographic combatant commands, JTFs, component commands,

other government agencies, and other intelligence organizations.

c. Develop Psychological Operations Programs and Products. PSYOP development

includes the planning of a PSYOP program, the development of prototype information products,

and the recommendation of PSYOP actions to be executed by other forces to communicate and

ultimately influence the beliefs of foreign populations, thereby changing behavior. Programs

primarily are developed at the PSYOP development center of the JPOTF, and at the tactical

PSYOP development detachment of a tactical PSYOP company when deployed in support of a

ground maneuver force. This function consists of detailed planning of informational activities,

studying targeted foreign populations, constructing informational prototypes, and testing and

evaluating of these informational prototypes before and after dissemination to measure and

improve effectiveness.

d. Produce Psychological Operations Media. PSYOP production is the transformation

of products into media that are compatible with the way foreign populations are accustomed to

receiving information. Production is not just the technological transfer of script to media, but

the study, refinement, and application of media technique, language, journalistic style, theater,

art, music, visual cues, and media format. Most PSYOP production occurs at the media production

center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the theater media production center deployed forward into

the operational area, or forward with PSYOP units. Some production requirements may be

Leaflet rolls being packed at Fort Bragg, NC for loading on to PDU-5/B leaflet bombs that

eventually will be dropped in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
IV-7

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

contracted to private industry, while still other production requirements may be done by units

attached to the PSYOP force. The production function includes the use of video, audio, and still

photographic personnel to obtain visual and auditory material required for the prototypical

products.

e. Distribute Psychological Operations Information. PSYOP distribution is the physical

and electronic linkage of developers, producers, and disseminators, in order to facilitate the

development, production, and dissemination of PSYOP informational products and programs.

Telecommunications networks may be established using organic PSYOP equipment and forces,

commercial assets, and other Service component resources to transfer large data files globally.

f. Disseminate Psychological Operations Messages. PSYOP dissemination involves

transmitting PSYOP informational products directly to the foreign TA, via desired media. PSYOP

messages may be disseminated via the organic resources of PSYOP forces, by other governmental

agencies, by contracted sources of media, by multinational partners, or through airborne and

seaborne platforms supporting PSYOP. PSYOP dissemination forces will attempt to leverage

as many different media as possible to ensure access to the foreign TA.

g. Employ Tactical Psychological Operations. Tactical PSYOP forces with augmentation

of product development and/or dissemination assets are capable of providing all functions of

PSYOP, on a limited scale, to Service and functional component commands . This force provides

face-to-face communications with foreign populations. Tactical forces serve as an ideal tool for

the commander to resolve issues of armed resistance and local interference to military operations,

while encouraging dialogue and cooperation with noncombatants. They also are trained to

collect pertinent PSYOP-related intelligence information for use by the supported commander

and PSYOP developers.

h. Conduct EPW, CI, and DC Operations. In virtually all situations of crisis proportion

where military forces are used, the management of EPWs, CIs, and DCs will become an integral

part of military operations. Military forces conducting these operations understand they usually

are handling, and to a large extent controlling, the lives of people who are demoralized, desperate,

apprehensive, and distrustful. These emotions can create a volatile atmosphere that is dangerous

to the military force and those civilian noncombatants and EPWs being managed, handled, or

interned. This function of PSYOP is used to dispel rumors, create dialogue, and pacify or

indoctrinate EPWs, CIs, or DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations, and

ensure safe and humanitarian conditions persist. PSYOP forces also may use this function to

facilitate other PSYOP tasks. These tasks include testing informational PSYOP materials,

assessing the culture of potential audiences, collecting intelligence, and recruiting key

communicators, informants, and collaborators.

5. Planning Guidance

Specific joint PSYOP guidance and planning considerations are shown in Figure IV-3.
IV-8

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

6. Psychological Operations Support to Joint Force Campaign Phasing

a. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, states that phasing operations are a tool commonly

used by commanders to organize operations. Phasing assists commanders and staffs to

visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements

Figure IV-3. Specific Psychological Operations Guidance and Planning Considerations

Convey to the target audience an awareness of US resolve to attain national security

objectives

Consider and plan for the early conduct of military psychological operations (PSYOP)

and, if required, use of host-nation resources and non-PSYOP military assets for

media production and dissemination; e.g., use of Navy ship printing facilities for

production of PSYOP products

Plan the movement of PSYOP specific equipment

Integrate PSYOP measures into counter command and control plans

Assist multinational military and/or civilian governmental organizations in developing

coordinated PSYOP programs

Use host-nation and US Country Teams to gain local support

Deter and discourage would-be aggressors from threatening vital US interests

Include the use of the Psychological Operations Automated System

Maintain the capability to accomplish US-only objectives when PSYOP forces and

capabilities are provided to multinational commands

Consider the effects of terrain, weather, and a nuclear, biological, and chemical

environment on forces, equipment, and the planned method for dissemination of

PSYOP products

Ensure comprehensive coordination of plans with emphasis on those staff elements

or agencies that generate information, such as the public affairs officer, so all

information activities are concordant

Integrate tactical exploitation of national capabilities and assets before and during

mission execution

Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information about:

1. Adversary PSYOP activity

2. The apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities

3. Any anticipated changes to ongoing activities

Consider preparation of PSYOP to counter the effects of an adversary's psychological

warfare effort before, during, and after US military combat operations

SPECIFIC PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GUIDANCE

AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
IV-9

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The primary benefit of phasing is that it

assists commanders in achieving major objectives that cannot be attained all at once, by planning

manageable subordinate operations. Although the commander will determine the actual phases used

during a campaign, use of the following phases provides a flexible model to arrange the full spectrum of

operations. The notional example at Figure IV-4 reflects phases a combatant commander can use while

planning and conducting a campaign in support of strategic and operational goals and objectives. As

stated in Chapter I, “Psychological Operations: An Overview,” there are five missions in which PSYOP

units contribute to all aspects of joint operations.

b. It is important that PSYOP planning is aggressively integrated early into commanders’

plans. This ensures force integration and synchronization of activities.

(1) To remain effective, commanders must continually adjust PSYOP as the battle

damage assessment of programs is accomplished. Successful integration of planned PSYOP

activities (e.g., TV/radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and loudspeaker broadcasts) and diplomatic,

informational, military, or economic activities enables commanders to shape the psychological

environment of an operational area.

(2) PSYOP planners must be able to develop three distinct types of documents. First, they

must be able to develop plans and orders that synchronize the activities of military units. Second, they

must develop activities that persuade selected foreign TAs to behave in ways that support the commander’s

objectives. Third, they must develop an external information plan or proposal to clarify information,

PHASES - JOINT CAMPAIGN

Actions to Assure

Full Spectrum Dominance

Deter/

Engage Transition SeizeInitiative

Decisive

Operations

Crisis

Defined

Seize Initiative

Assure Friendly

Freedom of Action

Access Theater

Infrastructure

Establish Dominant

Force Capabilities

Achieve Full

Spectrum

Dominance

Establish

Control and

Rule of Law

Redeploy

Figure IV-4. Phases — Joint Campaign
IV-10

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

synchronize military PSYOP with national information programs, and employ national resources to

facilitate the actions of commanders.

c. Deter and Engage Phase. This phase may be for deterring aggression or taking action

against threats to national or multinational interests, possibly requiring mobilization and other

predeployment activities . During this phase, the combatant commander expands partnerships,

enhances relationships, and conducts actions to prepare for potential crises. Flexible deterrent options

may be initiated in this phase supported by PSYOP as part of pre-hostility activities.

(1) PSYOP forces are key contributors to shaping the international security environment

and reacting to events. PSYOP can be executed aggressively and offensively in support of all

the instruments of national power.

(2) PSYOP are crafted to meet a unique set of circumstances with appropriate themes

and messages.

(a) PSYOP planning and execution actions are applied to influence the behavior

of foreign TAs.

(b) PSYOP planning, foreign TA analysis, product development and dissemination,

and test and evaluation are conducted during this phase in the same manner for both MOOTW

and war.

d. Seize Initiative Phase. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through the

application of appropriate joint force capabilities. In combat operations this involves executing

offensive operations at the earliest possible time, defeating the adversary and setting the conditions

for decisive operations. In noncombat operations, the JFC establishes conditions for stability by

providing immediate assistance to relieve the conditions that precipitated the crisis.

(1) During the seize initiative phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are:

(a) Deploy a PSYOP force tailored to mission requirements with the capability to

dominate the information environment early.

(b) Advise the commander on supporting psychological actions throughout the

operation.

(c) Create and exploit opportunities.

(d) Clearly communicate multinational and US intent.

(e) Develop the situation by forcing the adversary to react by seizing the initiative

on the “information front.”

(f) Advise and contribute in the influence over factions in the operational area.
IV-11

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

(g) Establish conditions conducive to political solutions by defusing/reducing factional

tensions, recognizing and preempting inherent dangers, and disrupting illegal activities.

(2) Retaining the initiative requires planning beyond the initial operation and

anticipating possible events. Follow-on forces are tailored to meet specific concerns of the

long-term mission. Initiative requires delegating decision-making authority to the lowest practical

level.

e. Decisive Operations Phase. The decisive operations phase continues with full spectrum

employment of joint force capabilities and the appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational

area as quickly as possible. This phase focuses on defeating the adversary and achieving the

objectives. The JFC seeks to dominate the situation with decisive operations designed to establish

conditions for an early, favorable conclusion, setting the conditions for the transition phase.

(1) During the decisive operations phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are as follows:

(a) Work to gather popular support for US and multinational operations.

(b) Establish the legitimacy and credibility of US and multinational systems and

programs.

(c) Weaken the legitimacy and credibility of an adversary’s systems and programs.

(d) Lessen external support for an adversary — political, military, fiscal, human,

and informational.

(e) Weaken the loyalty of adversaries.

(f) Deter interference with US and multinational operations.

(g) Promote cessation of hostilities to reduce casualties, minimize collateral

damage, and hasten a transition to post-conflict operations.

(2) PSYOP forces must evaluate their actions as they occur and continuously assess

their results.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Planning for psychological operations [PSYOP] began immediately after

the [Iraqi] invasion of Kuwait [Operation DESERT SHIELD]. A PSYOP

planning group consisting of military and civilian personnel from CENTCOM

[US Central Command], SOCOM [US Special Operations Command], and

the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) was formed at CENTCOM

Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, FL, in early August of 1990. This

group became the nucleus of the PSYOP command and control element

that deployed to Saudi Arabia.
IV-12

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JP 3-53

Leaflet, radio, and loudspeaker operations were combined and this

combination was key to the success of PSYOP. Leaflets were the most

commonly used method of conveying PSYOP messages. Twenty-nine

million leaflets consisting of 33 different messages were disseminated in

the Kuwait theater of operations. Delivery means consisted of MC-130, HC

-130, A-6, F-16, B-52, and artillery.

A building block approach for leaflet operations was used, with the first

leaflet themes being ones of peace and brotherhood. Increasing the intensity

of the PSYOP message as events evolved, leaflet themes transitioned to

emphasizing the United Nations imposed 15 January deadline. After the

UN deadline passed and Operation DESERT STORM began, themes

emphasizing abandonment of equipment and desertion were used.

Exploiting the effects of specific munitions leaflets were also used to inform

Iraqi units that they were going to be bombed. Feedback from interviews

with enemy prisoners of war validated the success of leaflet operations.

“Voice of the Gulf” was the Coalition’s radio network that broadcast from

ground based and airborne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The

radio script was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi

propaganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and

surrender.

Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the theater. Each

tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached. Many

of the 66 teams came from the Army Reserve Components. Loudspeaker

teams accompanied units into Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of

prepared surrender messages. Messages were transmitted in Arabic and

were developed by cross-cultural teams. These messages were similar to

those on the leaflets being dropped. Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to

surrender, were warned of impending bombing attacks, and told they would

be treated humanely and fairly. Many Enemy Prisoners of War mentioned

hearing the loudspeaker broadcasts in their area and surrendered to the

Coalition forces because they feared more bombing.

SOURCE: Final Report to Congress

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992

f. Transition Phase. The transition phase enables the JFC to focus on synchronizing joint force

activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, ideally characterized by self-sustaining peace

and the establishment of the rule of law. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in

support of other governmental, nongovernmental, and international organizations/agencies.

(1) During the transition phase, the objectives of PSYOP forces are:

(a) Modify the behavior of selected foreign TAs toward US and multinational capabilities.
IV-13

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

(b) Support the peacetime elements of US policy.

(c) Support the geographic combatant commander’s TSC.

(d) Support the US country team.

(2) As with the other joint campaign phases, PSYOP forces must be prepared to work

with interagency organizations during transition.

7. Psychological Operations Plan Development

a. The following guidance is provided for the development of Tab D, (Psychological

Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations) of plans and

orders. Additional information on Tab D is provided in Appendix B, “Format for Tab D,

(Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations).”

(1) Research and Analysis. Research must be conducted and requisite data must be

collected to plan PSYOP. The data must be analyzed to determine competing and complementary

US and other-party goals, and possible strategies and PSYOP supportability of COAs to achieve

these goals. The planner also should make a determination of key questions about friendly

intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act

effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission

accomplishment. Such key questions are termed critical information. Critical information

is used to develop taskings for intelligence collection and analysis.

(2) Development. The perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular

targets must be evaluated. Both the sources upon which particular targets rely and the US ability

to influence those sources must be determined. Target information-gathering interests and

activities need to be identified. Information and indicators that should be conveyed and denied

to targets to reinforce desired appreciations and preserve essential secrecy must be ascertained.

Execution means and methods to convey or deny information and indicators have to be selected.

A plan for a general phasing of those means has to be developed. Tasks to prepare and execute

implementing actions and to supervise overall execution need to be identified. Themes and

actions to be stressed or avoided must be developed to support the attainment of specific

psychological objectives. Success or failure of PSYOP can hinge on analysis of culturally

sensitive themes or actions that may be viewed as offensive to the foreign TA. Planners

should identify the assets necessary to execute the plan and list them in OPLAN TPFDDs;

otherwise, it may become difficult to obtain these assets in time to execute the plan. A

dissemination or PSYOP activity timeline also must be developed and be listed in OPLANs

submitted for approval.

b. Production Requirements. The forces, assets, and capabilities needed to produce PSYOP

products must be analyzed to determine the correct task organization to support mission requirements.

These factors must be compared to the forces assigned or available for planning. Tasks for available
IV-14

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

PSYOP resources, including specific requirements, also must be provided. Requirements for PSYOP

resources in excess of those available to the combatant command will be forwarded to the Joint Staff.

c. Dissemination Plan. The dissemination plan must take into account the type of PSYOP

product (e.g., leaflets, radio broadcasts, TV broadcasts, and internet-based products) and the

means to deliver them. Coordination among the commands planning and executing PSYOP is

necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint communications plan should be prepared to

ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Regardless of the means

used to disseminate PSYOP products, the messages and actions must be carefully evaluated for

intent and impact. The effects of PSYOP actions on targets, deceptions in use or planned,

OPSEC posture and vulnerabilities, and policy consistency demand close scrutiny and

coordination among all planners. Planners must also ensure plans are consistent with existing

environmental requirements.

8. Psychological Operations Studies Program

a. The Research and Analysis Division of the 4th POG(A), is the only source of finished

PSYOP analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire PSYOP

community, the geographic combatant commanders, and the intelligence community. The

PSYOP studies program includes the special PSYOP study (SPS), the special PSYOP

assessment (SPA), and the Psychological Operations Appendix to the Military Capabilities

Study (MCS). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides general policy guidance and establishes

production priorities for the program. Commander, USSOCOM, as the supporting combatant

commander, manages the PSYOP Studies Production Program, issues taskings, and monitors production.

Soldiers in CONUS use deployable video editing equipment to process raw video footage

harvested by organic electronic news gathering kits in Afghanistan.
IV-15

Psychological Operations Planning in Support of the Joint Force Campaign

Products of the PSYOP studies program primarily are designed to support the operational requirements

of the combatant commands and of US PSYOP forces worldwide, although they also are used by a

variety of other organizations (e.g., Department of State). Studies provide combatant commanders

with PSYOP perspectives on issues of direct significance to peacetime strategy, joint operation planning,

and operational preparations. Studies on all topics of interest can be requested through a combatant

command’s PSYOP staff officer or supporting intelligence officer, who will enter them in the community

on-line intelligence system for end-users and managers [COLISEUM] system for managing intelligence

production requirements.

b. Special PSYOP Study. The SPS is a relatively narrow, focused study that may address

any of a wide variety of different subjects; it has a flexible format to permit the most effective

analytical approach to be taken. The SPS might identify looming problems in a country of

current or potential significance to the United States or it might discuss a social institution, a

region within a country, a particular target group, the PSYOP environment, or an important issue

that affects the population in a given area — always with an eye toward how they might affect

US interests or involvement. The SPS provides greater depth of analysis on a relatively narrower

topic than any other type of PSYOP study.

c. Special PSYOP Assessment. The SPA is a time-sensitive intelligence memorandum

that analyzes the PSYOP significance of such things as crisis situations, important events, or

pressing issues and how they may affect US national interests or politico-military operations.

SPAs normally are produced on short notice and are disseminated as electronic messages to an

established distribution list in addition to being posted on INTELINK and INTELINK-S (collateral

vision).

d. Psychological Operations Appendix to the Military Capabilities Study. The MCS

distills the encyclopedic mass of PSYOP-relevant information (or intelligence) available on a

given country into a brief, issue-oriented summary. Because of the conciseness of the format,

detailed factual description and proof are avoided in favor of succinct summaries of PSYOP

issues, target group or key audiences, and vulnerabilities. The challenge is to “boil down”

complex realities into short statements without compromising accuracy.

e. Various products can be produced in response to requests for more narrowly focused

PSYOP analyses. Included among them are Assessments of the PSYOP Environment, which

summarize and assess the basic psychological conditions in a country or region of current interest;

PSYOP Audience Analyses, which identify and analyze key groups that could be targeted in a

PSYOP operation, suggesting the most effective methods of communications and the lines of

approach that likely are to be most influential; and PSYOP Issue Analyses, which analyze

attitudes toward a specific issue or set of issues that is of concern in a particular country or

region. PSYOP spot reports are short, time-sensitive notices that analyze discrete events and

issues of potentially immediate interest to PSYOP.

f. Most PSYOP studies are posted on the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) (Airborne)

home page on INTELINK-S and on INTELINK. The INTELINK home page is resident on the
IV-16

Chapter IV

JP 3-53

USSOCOM joint staff intelligence home page under “PSYOP Studies.” It should be noted that no

special password is required to access these Web sites other than basic system access.

9. Coordination with other Government Agencies

a. Coordination of PSYOP with other USG agencies ensures that policies and plans

supporting PSYOP objectives are articulated and in consonance with Secretary of Defenseapproved themes and policies.

b. Department of State. The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is the

principal international strategic communications service for the foreign affairs community. IIP

designs, develops, and implements a variety of information initiatives and strategic

communications programs, including Internet and print publications, traveling and electronically

transmitted speaker programs, and information resource services. These reach — and are created

strictly for — key international audiences, such as the media, government officials, opinion

leaders, and the general public in more than 140 countries. The office’s products and services

are uniquely designed to support the State Department’s initiatives, as well as those of other US

foreign policy organizations. It also manages Information Resource Centers overseas and offers

reference specialists based in Washington, DC, to answer specialized information queries from

abroad.

(1) The IIP was created from elements of the US Information Agency when it merged

with the Department of State on October 1, 1999.

(2) The IIP, operating as a reinvention laboratory through its team-based management

structure, comprises three offices:

(a) The Office of Geographic Liaison is the first point of contact within IIP for

missions overseas and the audiences they serve. Its writer-editors, information resource officers,

program officers, and translators provide regionally oriented products and services.

(b) The Office of Thematic Programs has multifunctional teams organized in

one of two ways: along subject-matter lines, such as economic security, or along product lines,

such as electronic media. The thematic teams work closely with the geographic teams in preparing

products and services that support Secretary of State initiatives and mission requests.

(c) The Office of Technology Services is responsible for developing, interpreting,

and applying government-wide technology policies and procedures in support of the Under

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Exchanges,

and IIP.

c. In addition to the Department of State, PSYOP should be coordinated with other USG

agencies, including, but not limited to, the Central Intelligence Agency; Broadcasting Board of

Governors; Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice; Drug

Enforcement Administration; and the US Coast Guard.
CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS APPROVAL PROCESS

V-1

“The approval chain for PSYOP [psychological operations] should be as short

and streamlined as possible to facilitate timely review, approval, production and

dissemination. Although coordination of PSYOP with other staff elements and

organizations is absolutely critical in maximizing PSYOP effectiveness, the

coordination process should not be so cumbersome as to adversely impact

dissemination necessary to achieve the intended effect.”

CJCSI 3110.05B, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement

to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 1998

1. Operation Plan Approval

a. Combatant commanders submit their OPLANs, including Tab D, Psychological

Operations, to the Joint Staff for review. The Joint Staff reviews the plans for adequacy, feasibility,

acceptability, and compliance with joint doctrine. The OPLANs are then forwarded to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for appropriate review and interagency coordination.

b. During deliberate and crisis action planning, the geographic combatant commanders

submit their overall campaign plans, which include a PSYOP annex or appendix, to the Joint

Staff for Secretary of Defense approval. Once the campaign plan is approved, the JFC is delegated

PSYOP approval authority.

c. ASD(SO/LIC) normally will conduct the required Office of the Secretary of Defense review

and interagency staffing for the PSYOP portions of the plans. Upon completion of Office of Secretary

of Defense-level coordination, the Secretary of Defense approves the OPLAN.

2. Psychological Operations Product Approval

a. The Secretary of Defense normally delegates PSYOP product approval to the supported

combatant commander. This does not mean that the supported combatant commander also

has been delegated approval for PSYOP product dissemination. In some cases, PSYOP

products may be politically sensitive and may require separate approval for dissemination. The

CJCS execute order (authorized by the Secretary of Defense) should designate who has authority

for PSYOP product approval and who has authority for PSYOP product dissemination. The

supported combatant commander may, in turn, delegate PSYOP product approval to a JTF

commander but not lower without approval of the Secretary of Defense (see Figure V-1).

b. In all PSYOP activities, commanders must be aware of two levels of product approval.

(1) PSYOP Objectives and Themes. Objectives and themes frame the products that

reach foreign TAs and reflect national and theater policy and strategy. Approval of themes and

messages is reserved by USG policy at Office of the Secretary of Defense-levels where the

interagency process can address PSYOP products with a broad range of considerations.
V-2

Chapter V

JP 3-53

(2) Products. Commanders subordinate to JTF commanders can modify approved

products, within the guidelines issued by higher headquarters, to better target local foreign TAs.

c. The JPOTF will develop PSYOP products and recommended actions, based on the

Secretary of Defense-approved objectives and themes included in the execute order, for approval

by the combatant commander or JTF commander.

d. The JPOTF will review all requests for PSYOP support to include those submitted by

components, the US country team, other USG agencies, international organizations, and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and obtain combatant commander or JTF commander

approval as appropriate. Upon approval, the JPOTF will produce and disseminate the product

or notify the requesting component or organization that the product is approved for production

and dissemination.

e. Without timely approval, the relevance of PSYOP messages to current operations may be

reduced. The JFC with product approval authority can assist the JPOTF commander by the early

Figure V-1. Psychological Operations Plan and Program Approval Authorities

Product Approval can be

delegated

Objectives/Themes Approval

Advises Secretary of

Defense on PSYOP

Approval Policy

No Directive Authority

Peacetime PSYOP

Product Approval

Authority

Senior Military Supervises

Day-to-Day Activities

Product Approval Authority

when delegated

Exercises Operational Control

(OPCON) of Joint Psychological

Operations Task Force (JPOTF)

Product Approval Authority

when delegated by the

Combatant Commander

Exercises OPCON of JPOTF

No Product Approval Authority

May Exercise OPCON or Tactical

Control of Attached Psychological

Operations (PSYOP) Units

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLAN AND PROGRAM

APPROVAL AUTHORITIES

Secretary

of Defense

Combatant

Commander

Commander,

Joint Task

Force

Service or

Functional

Component

Commander

Chairman

of the

Joint Chiefs

of Staff

Country Team
V-3

Psychological Operations Approval Process

establishment of a streamlined internal approval process. The JFC should provide clear guidance to the

participants in his/her staff review of the product, and specify coordinating and comment versus disapproval

authority.

3. Approval Process in Multinational Operations

a. A multinational JPOTF may deploy to support multinational military operations as well

as operations involving international and regional organizations such as the United Nations and

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. When US PSYOP forces remain under the OPCON of

a US commander, the Secretary of Defense normally will delegate PSYOP product approval to

the supported combatant commander in the execute order. The combatant commander may

subdelegate PSYOP product approval authority to a US military officer who is serving as the

commander of the multinational operation.

b. When US PSYOP forces are attached to a multinational command under the command

of a non-US commander for the purposes of developing multinational products only (i.e., no US

information products), PSYOP approval authority could remain with the combatant commander,

be subdelegated to the senior US military officer or diplomatic official involved in the operation,

or be subdelegated to the non-US commander with the Secretary of Defense approval.

4. Peacetime Psychological Operations Approval

a. The US ambassador/chief of mission, or his/her designee, normally exercises product

approval for PSYOP forces deployed in support of the US country team under the auspices of

peacetime PSYOP activities (see Figure V-2).

b. Annual peacetime PSYOP programs will be submitted to the Joint Staff for coordination

and transmittal to USD(P) or designee, ASD(SO/LIC), for staffing and interagency coordination.

Annual programs approved by the USD(P) or the ASD(SO/LIC) will be returned through the

Joint Staff to the geographic combatant commanders for execution as part of their theater security

cooperation program (see Figure V-3). Approval of an overall annual program is required before

the conduct of specific operations. Previously approved annual programs may continue while

the following year’s proposed program is in the staffing and approval process.

For further details concerning peacetime PSYOP activities, refer to Chapter VI, “Psychological

Operations Across the Range of Military Operations.”
V-4

Chapter V

JP 3-53

5. Summary

“Successful Psychological Operations [PSYOP] require: 1) the early development

of an overall PSYOP strategy, 2) the early integration of PSYOP planners, 3)

visibility at the CJTF [commander, joint task force] level for integrating PSYOP

into current and future operations, 4) expedient approval of PSYOP products,

and 5) the assets necessary for executing PSYOP.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY

Joint After Action Report (JAAR)

United States Atlantic Command

Regardless of the particular situation and the delegation of approval authority, all PSYOP

actions and messages must comply with, complement, and stay within the bounds of the approved

PSYOP objectives and themes as stated in the execute order. Requests for changes to the original

Figure V-2. Psychological Operations Program Approval Process

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PROGRAM APPROVAL PROCESS

Peacetime & Contingencies Short of Declared War*

Approval With Changes

Request Recommend Recommend

Approval Approval Approval

Approval With Changes

UCC

Theater Peacetime

PSYOP Activities

J-3 DDIO

PSYOP Div

ASD (

CIA

DDIO

Div

DJS

DOS

J-2

J-3

J-5

J-7

SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (

Central Intelligence Agency

Deputy Director of Intelligence Operations

Division

Director, Joint Staff

Department of State

Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff

Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff

Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff

Operational Plans and Joint Force

Development Directorate, Joint Staff

Special

Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)

LC

OASD (

Orgs

OSD

PA

PSYOP

Reps

UCC

US

USD(P)

SO/LIC)

Legal Counsel

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(

Organizations

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Public Affairs

Psychological Operations

Representatives

Unified Central Command

United States

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)

DJS USD(P)

ASD (SO/LIC)

Approved

For Action

Coordination Coordination Coordination

Ambassadors

US Defense Reps

Security Assist Orgs

Other US Agencies

OASD (SO/LIC)

OSD/Interagency

Coordination

(DOS, CIA, others as Required)

Joint Staff

Coordination

(J-2, 3, 5, 7, PA, LC)

* Per DODD S-3321.1
V-5

Psychological Operations Approval Process

Figure V-3. Psychological Operations Program and Product Approval

approved objectives and themes must be forwarded through the combatant commander to the Secretary

of Defense for approval. PSYOP objectives and themes must support US policies concerning the

operation as promulgated by the Secretary of Defense.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PROGRAM AND PRODUCT APPROVAL

Peacetime & Contingencies Short of Declared War*

ASD (

CJCSI

COMJTF

SO/LIC) OSD

PSYOP

USD(P)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

Commander, Joint Task Force

Special Operations/

Low Intensity Conflict)

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Psychological Operations

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

* Per DODD S-3321.1

USD (P)

ASD SO/LIC

Joint Staff

PROGRAM APPROVAL DELEGATION OF

“The PSYOP Plan” PRODUCT APPROVAL

Coordinated with OSD,

Interagency, and Joint

Staff

Objectives

Themes

Themes to Avoid

Target Audiences

Media

Dissemination Means

Leaflets

Pamphlets

Radio Programs

TV Programs

Advertisements

Novelty Items

. . . and, per CJCSI, may

be sub-delegated to

COMJTF

Combatant

Commander

COMJTF
V-6

Chapter V

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE

OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

VI-1

“It is your attitude, and the suspicion that you are maturing the boldest designs

against him, that imposes on your enemy.”

Frederick the Great

Instructions to His Generals, 1747

1. General

a. PSYOP support joint and multinational operations and designated government agencies.

The role of PSYOP varies depending on the level of operational activity or environment. Although

the following discussion of PSYOP applicability to the range of military operations describes

each in discrete terms, in actual circumstance there may not be a precise boundary where a

particular state ends and another begins. See the range of military operations model as outlined

in JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, for further clarification.

b. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

“MOOTW [military operations other than war] encompass a wide range of activities

where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other

than large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. . . . MOOTW

usually involve a combination or air, land, sea, space, and SO [special operations]

forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and NGOs

[nongovernmental organizations], in a complementary fashion.”

JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

(1) MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. To be effective, peacetime

military PSYOP are conducted in accordance with DODD S-3321.1, Overt Peacetime

Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Services in Peacetime and in Contingencies

Short of Declared War (U), and require interagency coordination and authorization at the national

level. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force that can be supported by joint PSYOP

include foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance, foreign internal defense

(FID), consequence management, and DOD support to counterdrug operations. These

military activities provide training and in-theater access to allow for the facilitation and use of

PSYOP during the transition to war. The broad objectives of PSYOP in these circumstances are

shown in Figure VI-1.

(2) MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force. When other instruments of national

power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, and economic) are unable to influence a deteriorating or potential

hostile situation, military force or threat of its use may be required to demonstrate US resolve and

capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms.

Nonlethal activities such as PSYOP can be decisive in MOOTW involving the use or threat of force.
VI-2

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

Joint PSYOP are capable of supporting operations conducted during MOOTW, to include

strikes and raids, counterterrorism (CT), FID, enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept

operations, peace operations (e.g., peace enforcement operations), noncombatant evacuation

Figure VI-1. Joint Military Psychological Operations Objectives

Across the Range of Military Operations

JOINT MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

OBJECTIVES ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) War

MOOTW Not

Involving the Use

or Threat of Force

MOOTW

Involving the Use

or Threat of Force

Modify the behavior of

selected target audiences

toward US and

multinational capabilities

Support the peacetime

elements of US national

policy objectives, national

security strategy, and

national military strategy

Support the geographic

combatant commander’s

regional security strategy

objectives

Support the objectives of

the country team

Promote the ability of the

host nation to defend itself

against internal and

external insurgencies and

terrorism by fostering

reliable military forces and

encouraging empathy

between host nation armed

forces and the civilian

populace

Mobilize popular support

for US and multinational

military operations

Gain and sustain popular

belief in and support for US

and multinational political

systems (including

ideology and infrastructure)

and political, social, and

economic programs

Attack the legitimacy and

credibility of the adversary

political systems

Publicize beneficial reforms

and programs to be

implemented after defeat of

the adversary

Shift the loyalty of

adversary forces and their

supporters to the friendly

powers

Deter adversary powers or

groups from initiating

actions detrimental to the

interests of the US, its

allies, or the conduct of

friendly military operations

Promote cessation of

hostilities to reduce

casualties on both sides,

reduce collateral damage,

and enhance transition to

post-hostilities

Explain US policies, aims,

and objectives

Arouse foreign public

opinion or political

pressures for, or against,

a military operation

Influence the development

of adversary strategy and

tactics

Amplify economic and

other nonviolent forms of

sanctions against an

adversary

Undermine confidence in

the adversary leadership

Lower the morale and

combat efficiency of

adversary soldiers

Increase the psychological

impact of US and

multinational combat

power

Support military deception

and operations security

Counter hostile foreign

psychological operations

efforts
VI-3

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

operations or other flexible deterrent options as directed. Failure to consider the use of nonlethal

activities during planning may prolong the operation at the cost of lives. In MOOTW involving the use

or threat of force, PSYOP offer the Secretary of Defense options for engagement that potentially avoid

the employment of additional combat forces, reduce the period of confrontation, and enhance the

diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. PSYOP are directed

toward selected foreign TAs in support of MOOTW involving the use or threat of force to achieve the

objectives shown in Figure VI-1.

c. War. Actions combatant commanders are able to take before the initiation of hostilities

can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations. Most inclusive is preparing

the operational area, which involves intelligence and counterintelligence operations to understand

clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the

geography, weather, demographics, and culture(s) of the operational area. During prehostilities,

PSYOP can provide powerful operational leverage in support of flexible deterrent options.

Among their potential contributions, PSYOP can be employed to gather critical information,

undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities

of multinational forces. During war, PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical level

may enhance the success of operations at all echelons. PSYOP objectives during war are shown

in Figure VI-1.

A SOMS-B media broadcast site operating at Kandahar, Afghanistan.
VI-4

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

2. Theater Security Cooperation and

Peacetime Psychological Operations

a. TSC plans are deliberate plans for all

military activities involving other nations

intended to shape the security environment

in peacetime. Based on guidance from the

Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders

develop plans and employ forces and personnel

in peacetime to protect and promote US

interests and regional objectives. TSC is

comprised of the combatant commander’s

strategic concept. The geographic combatant

commanders and executive agents develop

TSC plans; the functional combatant

commanders, Services, and other Defense

agencies develop supporting and/or

coordinating plans.

For further details concerning TSC, refer to

CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement

Planning, and JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint

Operations.

b. Peacetime Psychological Operations

(1) PSYOP shall be employed

routinely by combatant commanders to shape the operational environment during peacetime.

PSYOP activities shall be based on Annex A to the Contingency Planning Guidance as well as

thoroughly integrated and consistent with the combatant commanders TSC and any other direction

provided by the Secretary of Defense. The peacetime PSYOP program, executed as part of the

combatant commander’s TSC, is coordinated and integrated with the country team in each country

involved. Products developed in support of peacetime PSYOP program are reviewed and

approved by the country team.

(2) Peacetime PSYOP plans shall be submitted to the Joint Staff for each fiscal year

concurrent with the TSC and contain, as a minimum, theater objectives, priority countries,

information themes encouraged to employ PSYOP in peacetime engagement activities including,

but not limited to, conducting military-to-military PSYOP programs and support to CBT and

counterproliferation activities.

(3) Peacetime PSYOP activities must be approved by the ASD(SO/LIC) before

execution. As appropriate, PSYOP activities will be coordinated with interagency organizations

to ensure coherency with other USG efforts.

The broad objectives of psychological operations

are best served by modern, sophisticated systems

such as deployable editing equipment being used

in conjunction with the SOMS-B.
VI-5

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

PEACETIME PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

The primary focus of the Peacetime Psychological Operations Program is

the Regional Information Support Team (RIST) or the Military Information

Support Team (MIST). The term “RIST” or “MIST” is used because it is

more palatable than psychological operations (PSYOP) to the governments

and public of Latin America. The number one mission of RIST Colombia is

support to the Andean Ridge Initiative. The RIST is the United States

Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) number one priority in the drug

war. In Bolivia, the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne) maintains permanent MISTs

that coordinate their PSYOP programs with the RIST in Colombia. In

addition, temporary MISTs deploy for shorter duration to Venezuela,

Ecuador, Guatemala, EL Salvador, the Bahamas, and the Dominican

Republic. The majority of peacetime PSYOP missions in USSOUTHCOM

are funded with counterdrug (CD) money, but PSYOP also support a

humanitarian demining mission each quarter.

The Fiscal Year 2001 Deployment Order authorizes up to 14 soldiers for

RIST manning at the United States Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. Currently,

the United States Military Group (USMILGP) limits RIST personnel to four

soldiers, plus augmentation of a civilian intelligence analyst as necessary.

With prior coordination, the USMILGP authorizes the RIST to surge

additional personnel as required to meet mission requirements.

Under peacetime PSYOP, the RIST integrates the national objectives of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Commander, USSOUTHCOM’s

plan, and the United States Ambassador’s plan. RIST operations, to include

PSYOP product development, are coordinated and synchronized with the

Participating Nation’s (PN) military or government agencies, the country

team, and the embassy’s public affairs officer. The Deputy Chief of Mission

(DCM) gives the final approval to all RIST-developed PSYOP products

(print, audio or audiovisual). The RIST has limited production and

dissemination capabilities; as a result, the production and dissemination

of products are contracted to PN vendors.

The RIST uses the full gamut of PN media available in addition to other

delivery systems necessary to reach intended target audiences.

Throughout 2001, RIST Colombia produced as many products as the joint

PSYOP task force (JPOTF) in Sarajevo, which has 43 personnel.

RIST Colombia’s support is to JTF-South [Joint Task Force-South], the main

effort of USSOUTHCOM, the Country Team, and the Government of

Colombia, with the focus on Human Rights. The supporting effort is

eradication, interdiction, and institution building. The economy of force is

demand reduction and alternative development.
VI-6

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

[See examples of a poster, booklet, and handbill associated with this vignette

on the following page.]

SOURCE: Major Leo G. Pullar

4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)

3. Psychological Operations Support to the Targeting Process

a. PSYOP planning and targeting is performed concurrently with the development of the

higher headquarters plans and orders. The PSYOP planner plans in concert with the higher

headquarters operational staff.

b. As a JPOTF within a JTF or as a member of a battlestaff, the PSYOP planner contributes

to each phase (or step) of the overall plan/order and gains needed information to make decisions

while formulating and refining the PSYOP plan. If targeting is successfully integrated into the

higher headquarters plan or order, the PSYOP targeting plan will likely answer the following

questions:

(1) Phase 1 — Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, and Intent. What is the strategy

translated to discrete tasks, each logically and directly related to the overall desired outcome?

What are the developed MOEs to assess whether objectives have been attained?

(2) Phase 2 — Target Development, Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.

What specific foreign TAs, nodes, or links must be attacked and what objectives must be achieved

with specific PSYOP forces to support the commander’s intent and the concept of the operation?

(3) Phase 3 — Capabilities Analysis. What resources are necessary to determine the

vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, and accessibility to reach the desired targets and audiences?

How are the attitudes and impressions assessed, and how are products designed to overcome

censorship, illiteracy, or interrupted communications?

(4) Phase 4 — Commander’s Decision and Force Assignment. How (what assets)

and when will be the attack of these adversary targets?

(5) Phase 5 — Mission Planning and Force Execution. What is the detailed

information on the targets, which supported by the analytical reasoning, linked the target with

the desired effect (Phase 2). As the adversary responds and deviates from friendly force

assumptions, what changes are needed in order to allow commanders to maintain the initiative

through flexibility?

(6) Phase 6 — Combat Assessment. What defines success for the PSYOP objectives

and how will the impact be assessed? Is there an effective method to establish a direct link

between a message and a specific attitude?
VI-7

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

Human Rights - Over 30,000 Human Rights

Posters were produced and disseminated to

the Colombian general population and military

(JTF-South soldiers). Messages on the

posters included the commitment of the

Colombian military to the defense and

protection of human rights in Colombia and

emphasis on JTF-South respect for human

rights and international law.

Eradication - Eradication handbills were

produced and disseminated to the

Colombian general population. The

PSYOP supported objectives of these

series were to discourage the planting of

illicit crops and to provide notice that

Colombian Security Forces would

continue to eradicate new illicit crops.

Eradication - Thousands of Eradication

information booklets were produced and

disseminated to the Colombian general

population. The booklets provided

information on Glyphosate, the herbicide that

is used for aerial eradication in Colombia. The

booklet's objective was to persuade

Colombians that Glyphosate is not harmful to

the environment.
VI-8

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

4. Psychological Operations Support to Special Operations and Interagency

Operations

“PSYOP [psychological operations] are the most powerful weapon in the SOF

[special operations forces] inventory.”

General Carl Stiner, US Army

Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, 1990 to 1993

Address at the Association of the US Army Symposium, April 1993

a. Special Operations. SO are integral parts of a theater campaign . While SO can be conducted

unilaterally in support of specific theater or national objectives, the majority of SO are designed and

conducted to enhance the likelihood of success of the overall theater campaign. SO can be conducted

in support of or separate from conventional military operations. SO must complement — not compete

with — conventional forces. PSYOP may support the following SO core tasks (see Figure VI-2):

For further guidance concerning SO, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

(1) Unconventional Warfare (UW). A major component of UW is psychological

preparation of the battlespace. Conventional PSYOP techniques may be applicable during UW

operations, but because of the changing operational environment, different target groups exist.

The four major UW targets of PSYOP are listed below.

(a) The Uncommitted. Members of the general populace who are neutral, but

may doubt the potential success of a resistance organization or friendly government supported

by the United States and its allies or coalition partners. PSYOP efforts focus on obtaining the

support of these neutral citizens for a US-backed resistance movement or government.

(b) Hostile Sympathizers. Hostile sympathizers can be categorized as willing

collaborators, persons under duress, or passive hostile sympathizers. PSYOP are used to halt or

SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Unconventional Warfare

Foreign Internal Defense

Direct Action

Special Reconnaissance

Counterterrorism

Counterproliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Civil Affairs Operations

Figure VI-2. Special Operations Supported by Psychological Operations
VI-9

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

prevent the sympathizer’s support by sowing doubt as the validity of the hostile power’s actions and

instilling fear for collaborating.

(c) Hostile Military Forces. Hostile military forces may be government forces,

an occupying power, or other forces helping the hostile government. The hostile military forces’

nationality may or may not be the same as the populace. PSYOP directed at this foreign TA seek

to provoke feelings of isolation to the point of distrust of one another, and insecurity about the

outcome of the struggle and the legitimacy of their cause.

(d) Resistance Sympathizers. Resistance sympathizers are in favor of the

resistance movement’s goals but are not active members of a resistance organization. PSYOP

promote the foreign TA active support or passive cooperation.

(2) Foreign Internal Defense. In FID, PSYOP forces target particular groups with

specific objectives.

(a) PSYOP support the achievement of national goals by targeting specific

audiences. In FID, specific PSYOP goals exist for the following foreign TAs.

1. Insurgents. Create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion,

and defection within insurgent forces, as well as help discredit them.

Inside the video production and editing tent of the SOMS-B complex at Kandahar, Afghanistan

during a broadcast in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
VI-10

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

2. Civilian populace. Gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN

government and its counterinsurgency programs.

3. Military forces. Strengthen military support, with emphasis on building

and maintaining the morale of the HN forces.

4. Neutral elements. Gain the support of uncommitted groups inside and

outside the HN.

5. External hostile powers. Convince hostile foreign TAs the insurgency

will fail.

(b) PSYOP forces can assist a FID core task by:

1. Improving popular support for the HN government.

2. Discrediting the insurgent forces with neutral groups and the insurgents

themselves.

3. Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States.

4. Supporting defector programs.

5. Providing close and continuous support to CMO.

6. Supporting HN programs that protect the population from insurgent

activities.

7. Strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace

control and protection from insurgent activities.

8. Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill.

9. Passing instructions to the HN populace.

10. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

(3) Direct Action (DA). PSYOP in support the DA core task depend on the situation,

mission, and type of forces involved. When PSYOP forces participate in DA, their presence needs to

be closely coordinated and linked to US public diplomacy and command information programs. The

following are common PSYOP objectives in DA operations:
VI-11

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

(a) Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary’s reaction and ensure

that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.

(b) Influence noncombatants, neutrals, and other groups in the operational area.

(c) Reduce interference in the DA operation by hostile forces and nations.

(d) Exploit foreign TAs that might not otherwise be accessible. Exploitation

includes demoralizing potential adversaries with the results of the operation.

(e) Assess the psychological impact of the operation.

(f) Reduce the adverse effects of mission failure.

(g) Capitalize on DA mission success in strategic PSYOP.

(h) Support DA missions in contingency operations.

(4) Special Reconnaissance (SR). PSYOP support SR by assessing the psychological

impact of the operation to include the impact on compromised operations, limiting or negating

the effects of compromise, conducting deception operations, and providing personnel to help in

area assessments.

(5) Counterterrorism. PSYOP must integrate with other security operations to target the

elements employing terrorism. The aim is to place the terrorists on the psychological defensive. To do

so, PSYOP forces analyze the terrorists’ goals and use psychological programs to frustrate those goals.

PSYOP support CT by the following means:

(a) Countering the adverse psychological effects of a terrorist act.

(b) Lessening popular support for the terrorist cause.

(c) Publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups.

(d) Deterring terrorist acts by persuading potential terrorists of the futility of their

actions or guarantee of defeat/death in the attempt.

(e) Promoting legitimacy of US and HN governments.

(6) Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. PSYOP support

operations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in numerous ways.

Specifically, PSYOP perform the following:

(a) Discredit the adversary or nonstate actor with neutral groups and the adversarial

group itself.
VI-12

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

(b) Project a favorable image of the USG.

(c) Strengthen HN support of programs that provide positive populace control

and protection from weapons of mass destruction.

(d) Explain the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary action and ensure

that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why.

(e) Inform the international community of US and HN intent and goodwill.

(f) Assess the psychological impact of the operation.

(g) Provide personnel to help in area assessments.

(7) Civil-Affairs Operations (CAO). PSYOP can provide key support and information

for CAO. PSYOP can provide support in the following areas:

(a) In addition to military intelligence PSYOP can develop information for CAO

concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of

the operational area.

(b) Disseminate information concerning the safety and welfare of the indigenous

civilian population.

(c) Influence a civilian population’s attitude toward US policy and prepare it for CAO

involvement across the range of military operations.

(d) Maximize CAO efforts in the area of FHA by exploiting the goodwill created by US

efforts in the area of medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities.

(e) During disaster-relief operations, foster international support for host

governments and coordinate publicity for US and HN efforts.

(f) Conduct assessments before and after the operation to determine the most

effective application of effort and document the results.

(g) Provide direct support to CAO conducting emergency relocation operations of

DCs and for operation of the DCs camps.

(h) As a corollary, when conducted within the framework of a viable civil-military concept,

CAO activities can contribute significantly to the overall success of PSYOP activities.

For further details, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1,

Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
VI-13

Psychological Operations Across the Range of Military Operations

b. Interagency Operations

“The common thread throughout all major operations, whether in war or military

operations other than war, is the broad range of agencies — many with

indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that

interact with the Armed Forces of the United States.”

JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I

(1) Military operations must be synchronized with operations of other agencies of the

USG as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, and regional and international organizations for the

purpose of accomplishing an objective. Success will depend to a large extent on the ability to

blend and engage all instruments of national power. These actions must be mutually supporting

and proceed in a logical sequence. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the

military instrument of that power and the economic, diplomatic, and informational entities of

the USG as well as NGOs and international organizations. Successful interagency coordination

enables these agencies, departments, and organizations to mount a coherent and efficient collective

operation.

(2) The impact of interagency operations on PSYOP planning is significant. PSYOP

planners must understand not only the interagency environment but also the criticality of

interagency coordination. As the use of information activities in support of US objectives

increases, so does the role of military PSYOP in the interagency arena. Presidential Decision

Directive-68 directs the integration and synchronization of interagency PA, public

diplomacy, and international military information, a euphemism for military PSYOP.

This integration is accomplished through high-level interagency coordination committees and

working groups.

(3) The projection of information to targeted foreign audiences by the USG is an

important element of US national power.

For further details concerning interagency operations, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination

During Joint Operations.

5. Multinational Operations

“NATO [North Atlantic treaty Organization] planners established the need for a

campaign targeted at the local population of B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and

designed to shape attitudes and behavior in favor of IFOR [Implementation Force]

(later SFOR [Stabilization Force]) troops and operations. To carry out this task,

IFOR’s primary tool was its psychological operations [PSYOP] campaign, called

the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC). Although an official NATO term, the term

‘psychological operations’ was not used. Some NAC [North Atlantic Council]

members did not want to be associated with a ‘psychological operations campaign.

‘IFOR Information Campaign’ seemed to ease these fears. However, there is
VI-14

Chapter VI

JP 3-53

little doubt that the ‘information campaign’ was a psychological operations

campaign. It was conducted by PSYOP forces and according to NATO’s draft

peace support psychological activities doctrine.

The PSYOP Campaign was primarily conceived as a force protection tool. First,

by making NATO’s mandate and intentions clear to the local population and FWF

[Former Warring Factions], the IIC sought to prevent misunderstanding leading

to unnecessary violence. Second, the IIC objective was to ensure broad

compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement and discourage the factions from

interfering with IFOR/SFOR operations. The NAC themes and objectives,

approved in December 1995, reflected the overwhelming importance attached to

the force protection aspect of the mission. Indeed, a majority of themes

emphasized that IFOR/SFOR had robust rules of engagement and the capability

to enforce the peace agreement, and would respond in an even-handed manner

to all violations of the peace agreement. Further themes sought to discourage

the factions and local populations from hindering IFOR/SFOR operations and to

encourage cooperation with NATO.”

Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations

NATO-Led Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina December 1995-1997

Pascale Combelles Siegel

a. PSYOP units should be integrated into all multinational operations. The

multinational force commander must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless of national

origin, are coordinated. PSYOP must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a

population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can

be used from day one of an operation. PSYOP provide the commander with a controlled

mechanism to communicate with all elements of a population: civilians, military, or belligerent

factions. PSYOP communicate policy, provide information, and can persuade groups to cooperate

with multinational forces. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, religion, political climate,

and military organization can help the multinational force commander to effectively apply PSYOP

to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly

forces.

b. When the Armed Forces of the United States are integrated into a multinational command

structure, peacetime PSYOP policies and wartime conduct should be coordinated and integrated

to the maximum extent possible for the attainment of US and multinational security objectives.

However, US PSYOP normally will be approved in US channels regardless of the

composition of the multinational force chain of command.

For further details concerning multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for

Multinational Operations.
CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ENABLERS

VII-1

“The enemy bombards our front not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with

a drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen also

throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.”

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg

1847 - 1934

1. Intelligence

a. The use of PSYOP forces and assets is predicated on political, military, economic, cultural,

religious, and psychological or social conditions. PSYOP planners must possess a thorough

and current knowledge of these conditions to develop PSYOP targeted at selected foreign

groups to influence their objective and emotional reasoning. This knowledge is obtained

through the intelligence process producing actionable, timely, and relevant intelligence, and made available

to PSYOP. The intelligence process, shown in Figure VII-1, has six integrated phases that include

planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination

and integration, and evaluation and feedback.

b. Intelligence and counterintelligence requirements include current intelligence, background

studies of foreign countries, and intelligence and counterintelligence estimates. Each command

must evaluate its assigned missions and operational areas and identify specific PSYOP intelligence

and counterintelligence needs. The thoroughness of this evaluation and identification will

determine how well intelligence-gathering organizations and counterintelligence support

organizations can gather essential information and produce relevant intelligence and

counterintelligence products. Development of PSYOP-related intelligence and

counterintelligence should be predicated on a detailed collection plan with specific collection

requirements to exploit all available sources and techniques. It should include basic intelligence

and country studies on foreign cultures and particular target groups as well as current intelligence

on foreign group attitudes, behavior, and capabilities.

c. Intelligence should be provided continually about specified target groups to keep PSYOP

estimates current and to provide feedback about group reactions to PSYOP messages. In addition,

interrogations of EPWs and line crossers, CIs, current defector information, and other similar

current data are needed to evaluate, plan, and execute real-time PSYOP and to ascertain the

effectiveness of ongoing operations.

d. PSYOP planners should ensure that specific needs for finished intelligence products are

communicated to the intelligence community so that the requests can be tasked, processed,

exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner. When appropriate, planners also should ensure

that information gaps are identified as intelligence requirements to drive collection or as a

HUMINT collection requirement, time-sensitive collection requirement, or ad hoc HUMINT

requirement for tasking to the Defense HUMINT Service.
VII-2

Chapter VII

JP 3-53

e. Any factor that presents a recurring and identifiable obstacle to achieving success of

a military PSYOP program is deemed a threat. The early identification and exploitation of threats

increase the potential for successful fulfillment of PSYOP program goals and objectives. The collections

manager, in coordination with the PSYOP planner, needs to develop a collection plan with specific

information requirements pertinent to PSYOP. Intelligence and counterintelligence assets can then be

tasked to collect the information for analysis. Generally, three environments are viewed as posing a

threat to the effectiveness of military PSYOP.

(1) Conflict environment threats are those that can stem from governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals using military and economic power to gain control of a

region and influence or counter the strategic intent of the United States and its allies or coalition

partners. Whatever the method used, the US PSYOP analyst should identify specific information

requirements for which the intelligence collection manager can levy collection requirements,

Figure VII-1. The Intelligence Process

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

PLANNING

AND

DIRECTION

DISSEMINATION

AND

INTEGRATION

COLLECTION

PROCESSING

AND

EXPLOITATION

ANALYSIS

AND

PRODUCTION

MISSION

EVALUATION

AND E FE DBACK
VII-3

Psychological Operations Enablers

assisting the PSYOP planner in recognizing the PSYOP effort to influence the behavior of individuals

toward a desired goal.

(2) Technological environment threats are products of an expanding ability of governments,

organizations, groups, and individuals worldwide to use easily accessed communications resources.

Many of these entities possess electronic attack and electronic protection assets that can degrade US

military PSYOP efforts. The PSYOP planner needs to submit specific information requirements so the

intelligence collection manager can task collection assets to assist in determining the adversary’s capabilities

to jam PSYOP signals, counter US and multinational PSYOP messages, and conduct other technical

operations.

(3) Social and political environment threats are created through upheavals in a

country’s economic, religious, cultural, and political structures. These changes may be sudden

or anticipated, temporary or permanent, and may alter the perceptions held by the country’s

populace. This can pose a threat to the success of US military PSYOP if planners do not recognize

the potential for these changes in perception. The PSYOP planner needs to submit specific

information requirements so the collection manager can task collection assets to assist in

determining changes to political, religious, economic, and cultural structures.

(4) PSYOP studies are unique in format; however, other military intelligence products

can contain this type of intelligence. In general, they profile the salient features of a country or

its people; provide an analysis of the influences that lead different social, occupational, and

ethnic groups of that country to act as they do; discuss issues that elicit strong responses from the

indigenous population; assess attitudes; identify vulnerabilities; and suggest ways and means to

influence people.

For further detail concerning intelligence support to operations, refer to the JP 2-0 series.

2. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

a. Communications between commands that are planning and executing PSYOP actions

are necessary for effective use of capabilities. A joint PSYOP communications plan should be

prepared to ensure that communications systems are compatible and adequate. Theater

communications architecture must include plans for integration of PSYOP support requirements

into secure voice and data nets, satellite communications systems, and a capability to communicate

with US national level agencies, multinational, and HN communications systems.

b. Control should favor centralized planning and direction and decentralized

execution. Control is exercised from the lowest level that accomplishes the required coordination.

PSYOP considerations may dictate that control be at high national levels. The flexibility needed

necessitates that PSYOP forces have access to long- and short-haul communications.

c. The POAS, which originated as a joint computer system, has been absorbed into the United

States Army Special Operations Command’s REDNET system. POAS plays an important part in

supporting PSYOP worldwide — for the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the interagency
VII-4

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JP 3-53

community. Unique POAS capabilities facilitate the research and analysis that underlie foreign TA

analysis, PSYOP product development, finished PSYOP intelligence production, special projects, and

operational deployments by conventional as well as special operations forces. POAS users can draw

on a number of different database collections:

(1) DOD Message Traffic Collections. These collections contain daily Automatic

Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Defense Messaging System (DMS) messages from different

government agencies and military sources, including the Department of State, Central Intelligence

Agency, and Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The system has the capability to do a full

search and retrieval against AUTODIN/DMS message traffic with a continuous real-time message

feed and indexing. The message archives are readily accessed and extensive, running from

October 1989 to the present. This unique feature makes historical searches easy and allows

immediate retrieval of material for discernment of long-range trends.

(2) PSYOP Study Collection. This collection holds all extant PSYOP studies and

assessments produced by the Strategic Studies Detachments. The PSYOP collection is the most

complete archive available for past PSYOP studies.

(3) Radio/TV Collection. This collection has statistics on radio and TV facilities in

various countries. It includes such information as location, equipment range, and frequencies,

and users can search the collection based on facility characteristics.

(4) The POAS electronically archives studies and also offers analysts access to various

classified and unclassified databases. Commanders can obtain most of these studies through the

4th POG(Airborne)’s home page on the secret-level classified intelligence system, INTELINK-S.

PSYOP intelligence products of all types are posted on this site as soon as they are completed,

making dissemination far faster and easier than in the pre-electronic past. All of the PSYOP

studies are posted on INTELINK (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System) along

with studies that are excluded from INTELINK-S because of dissemination restrictions or

classification constraints. On INTELINK, they can be found on the home page of the USSOCOM,

under intelligence products. Copies of PSYOP studies can be downloaded or printed from the

computer system. In the unlikely event that an end user does not have access to INTELINK or

INTELINK-S, the POAS staff can, by exception, forward a copy.

d. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned has reports and reviews regarding PSYOP at their

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network website.

3. Logistics

a. PSYOP forces normally will deploy with a 30-day basic load of PSYOP supplies. This

is a baseline-planning figure and may not be sufficient to meet specific contingency mission

requirements. Commanders and their staffs must ensure that PSYOP support requirements are

taken into account when planning logistic support.
VII-5

Psychological Operations Enablers

b. Although PSYOP rely heavily on state-of-the-art systems, planning must take into consideration

the potential for having to integrate into less sophisticated equipment often found in remote areas of the

world. Host-nation support (HNS) may provide much of PSYOP-required supplies. HN

personnel and organizations can perform many of the support-related functions, thus reducing the strain

on US logistic systems. CA can identify potential sources of HNS for PSYOP requirements. Early

identification of PSYOP HNS requirements is critical to facilitate location and establishment of agreements

or contracts to provide necessary PSYOP-related supplies, equipment, and facilities.

c. When US PSYOP forces support multinational operations, they normally will be supported

by US logistic systems unless otherwise determined by agreements, directives, or approved

OPLANs. HN forces involved in US-sponsored or US-supported PSYOP activities may provide

the major portion of their logistic support requirements. When approved by the combatant

commander, US PSYOP or logistic systems may furnish military supplies, services, PSYOPspecific equipment, and US medical support in accordance with directives and approved OPLANs.

d. JPOTFs must submit statements of requirements for additional material and equipment

to support ongoing operations.
VII-6

Chapter VII

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL

OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

A-1

“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a

regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one

hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the

enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, what is of supreme

importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. Next best is to disrupt his

alliances by diplomacy. The next best is to attack his army. And the worst policy

is to attack cities.”

Sun Tsu

The Art of War

1. General

Each Military Service has the inherent capability to support US national strategic objectives

with organic assets for production and/or dissemination of PSYOP products. Aircraft, ships,

and other military equipment can have psychological effects on a TA through presence, weapons

employment, or delivery of goods/equipment. Planning guidance is contained in the JSCP,

JOPES, and Service doctrine. Plans should address the use of strategic, operational, and tactical

PSYOP as aspects of the overall strategy for conducting operations.

2. US Army Psychological Operations Assets

“The role of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the information age is to assist

military commanders in articulating their mission objectives, to help identify the

decision makers who can promote or interfere with these objectives, and to

recommend appropriate courses of action to properly influence them. In this

regard, PSYOP are applicable across the operational continuum because

command objectives may vary at any point in time and because key decision

makers exist at every level of military endeavor. . . . By converting command

objectives into the people who have the ability to act on them, and by

recommending the use of available military and nonmilitary resources, PSYOP

soldiers attempt to educate and motivate targeted decision makers to act, or refrain

from acting, in ways that support the commander’s objectives.”

Colonel Robert M. Schoenhaus

7th PSYOP Group Commander, June 1999

FM 3-05.03, Psychological Operations

a. Army PSYOP capability consists of one AC PSYOP group and two RC PSYOP groups.

The AC PSYOP group is capable of conducting limited strategic PSYOP. However, it primarily

conducts operational and tactical PSYOP. The two RC PSYOP groups are tactical units. They

have some regional capabilities due mainly to their assigned parts of the world, and some

language competencies.
A-2

Appendix A

JP 3-53

b. Psychological Operations Group. A POG plans, coordinates, and executes PSYOP

activities at the operational and tactical levels. It also can provide limited support to strategic

planning and operations. A POG is structured to support conventional and special operations

forces deployed worldwide. It can support several JPOTFs at the combatant command and the

JTF level. A POG may contain the following organizations:

(1) Research and Analysis Division. Department of the Army civilian analysts give

the 4th POG (Airborne) a unique research and analysis capability and add a deeper dimension

of socio-cultural expertise and institutional continuity to the array of operational skills possessed

by the POG. No other operational unit in the US Army has a comparable pool of experts organic

to it. The analysts have advanced degrees and many have had years of military experience. As

a condition of employment, they must be able to read and understand the language of their

primary country of specialization. Some speak with native fluency, while others are competent

in several languages. Virtually all of the analysts have lived in their geographical area of focus,

some for many years. Their knowledge of foreign cultures and their analytical capabilities

undergird all of the efforts of the 4th POG (Airborne) — in planning and operational deployments

as well as in research and analysis.

(2) Regional PSYOP Battalion (POB). Regional POBs provide cultural and linguistic

expertise and is capable of providing simultaneous PSYOP support to two or more organizations

within the combatant command.

(3) Dissemination PSYOP Battalion. Dissemination POBs provide audio, visual,

and audiovisual materials production, signal support, and media broadcast capabilities to the

POG, JPOTF, and tactical PSYOP units. The dissemination POBs are structured to support two

separate operational areas at the combatant command level.

(4) Tactical PSYOP Battalion (TPB). TPBs provide tactical PSYOP support to corpslevel units and below and select special operations and conventional task forces at Army-level

equivalent-sized units. The TPB develops, produces, and disseminates tactical products within

the guidance (themes, objectives, and foreign TAs) assigned by the JPOTF and authorized by

the product approval authority (combatant commander or subordinate JFC). The TPB’s

capabilities include dissemination of PSYOP products by loudspeaker message, leaflet, handbill,

and face-to-face communications.

(5) EPW/CI/DC PSYOP Battalion. This POB collects and evaluates PSYOP-relevant

intelligence directly from EPW, CIs, and DCs through interrogations, face-to-face

communications, and pre- and post-testing of PSYOP products and themes. Camp functions

performed by the battalion dispel rumors, create dialogue, and pacify or indoctrinate EPWs/CIs/

DCs to minimize violence, facilitate efficient camp operations, and ensure safe and humane

conditions persist.
A-3

Department of Defense Psychological Operations Capabilities

3. US Navy Psychological Operations Assets

a. Capabilities to produce audiovisual products are available from Fleet Audiovisual

Command, Pacific; Fleet Imagery Command, Atlantic; Fleet Combat Camera Groups; various

film libraries; Naval Imaging Command; and limited assistance from ships and aircraft of the

fleet. Naval Reserve USJFCOM PSYOP Audiovisual Unit 0286 provides audiovisual and training

support to USJFCOM.

b. The Navy is developing the capability to produce documents, posters, articles, leaflets,

handbills, and other material for PSYOP. Administrative capabilities ashore and afloat exist to

prepare and produce various quantities of printed materials. The Navy is developing in large

deck ships a high-speed leaflet and handbill production capability that can be used in conjunction

with naval air assets to rapidly disseminate PSYOP products early in a crisis. Language capabilities

exist in naval intelligence and among naval personnel for most Asian and European languages.

c. The Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), located at the Little Creek Naval

Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Virginia, has a limited ability to provide specialized training in

planning and executing PSYOP, FHA, military support to civil authorities, and is available to

assist fleet units. FIWC maintains a close relationship with the 4th POG (Airborne), Fort Bragg,

North Carolina, for training, equipment employment, product dissemination, and tactics,

techniques, and procedures development in the area of Navy support to PSYOP.

The soldiers of a tactical PSYOP team stand beside their loudspeaker-equipped

HMMWV in Afghanistan before a mission in support of Operation ANACONDA.
A-4

Appendix A

JP 3-53

(1) TARBS is a prototype high-power radio station installed on selected ships with the primary

mission of supporting PSYOP. TARBS provides the ability to conduct PSYOP broadcasts intended

for the civilian and military population as part of naval IO in littoral areas. Secondary non-PSYOP using

TARBS include providing radio broadcast capability in support of FHA and military support to civil

authorities in the event of US domestic disasters.

(2) TARBS ideally will be installed onboard one ship in each amphibious ready group.

When needed, TARBS will broadcast voice information as directed and authorized by the JFC.

PSYOP broadcast information products will be produced for the JFC by the 4thPOG (Airborne)

or the JPOTF supporting the JFC, and forwarded to the TARBS operators for final dissemination.

The products will be forwarded either electronically to the TARBS laptop computer or by other

means as necessary (e.g., cassette and compact disc-read only memory). Once authorized by the

JFC, the TARBS operators will conduct both AM and FM broadcasts of this product on designated

frequencies.

(3) TARBS is designated as a portable system divided into three subsystems, mostly

contained in a transportable shelter 173 inches long, 86 inches wide, and 84 inches high, with an

approximate loaded weight of 9,600 pounds. TARBS is comprised of an audio transmitter and

antenna subsystems capable of operations ashore or afloat.

(4) Most US Navy vessels have the ability to support PSYOP through an organic high

frequency transmission capability.

d. Several US naval aircraft have the capability to support PSYOP. Naval F/A-18 aircraft

can disperse leaflets by dropping SUU-76 (PDU-5) ROCKEYE leaflet bombs. Shipborne

helicopters can provide leaflet drop, loudspeaker broadcast, and foreign humanitarian aid

dissemination.

4. United States Air Force Contribution to Psychological Operations

“Air Force PSYOP [psychological operations] support national and military

objectives by conveying specially tailored information to target audiences.”

AFDD 2-5.3, Psychological Operations

a. Air Force contributions to PSYOP leverage air and space power, and applicable

technologies to achieve USG and theater commander objectives. Air Force PSYOP is focused

on the employment of air and space as the Air Force’s primary means of preparing, shaping, and

exploiting the psychological dimension of the battlespace.

b. Air Force PSYOP forces support JFC objectives through a variety of operations and

activities that include development of psychologically informed targeting strategies. The US

Air Force (USAF) information warfare flights have individuals located in either Air Force air

and space operations center (AFAOC) or joint air operations center that assist commanders in

many disciplines of IO, to include PSYOP. They coordinate/liaise between the AFAOC and the
A-5

Department of Defense Psychological Operations Capabilities

JPOTF, and utilize all-source analysis of an adversary’s sociological, cultural, and demographic information

to recommend effective PSYOP.

c. A wide variety of USAF assets have the inherent capability to execute missions in support

of JFC/JPOTF PSYOP objectives. Certain aircraft have PSYOP as their primary mission. The

EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO aircraft are equipped for airborne broadcasts of PSYOP messages

via radio and television signals. In addition to disseminating PSYOP messages electronically, a

number of airdrop aircraft are capable of performing leaflet airdrop missions. Also, USAF

fighter and bomber aircraft can dispense leaflets by dropping leaflet bombs.

5. US Marine Corps Psychological Operations Assets

Although the Marine Corps has no organizational PSYOP structure, it does have the capability

to execute both audible and visible actions designed to convey specific impressions to an adversary.

These actions can include broadcasts from either shore-based or airborne loudspeaker systems

and leaflet dissemination by various aircraft. PSYOP expertise within the Marine Corps resides

in the individual Marines who have received training from joint and Service schools. The civil

affairs groups, when activated, normally will have formally trained personnel capable of advising

the Marine air-ground task force commander on PSYOP.
A-6

Appendix A

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B

FORMAT FOR TAB D, (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS) TO APPENDIX 3,

(INFORMATION OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C, (OPERATIONS)

B-1

1. Overview

The guidance in this appendix relates to the development of Tab D (Psychological Operations)

to Appendix 3 (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) for plans and orders.

a. Situation and Overview

(1) What is the general psychological situation in the operational area?

(2) What, if any, are the ongoing PSYOP programs?

(3) What are the significant factors influencing PSYOP activities?

(4) What are the competing PSYOP goals in the operational area?

(5) What is the PSYOP task to be accomplished?

b. US (or US and Allied/Coalition) Perspective

(1) How will the assigned PSYOP task be accomplished?

(2) What resources will be used?

(3) What will be the general phasing of current actions with future actions?

c. Neutral Perspective (if applicable)

(1) What are the projected actions of the neutral populations under various

circumstances?

(2) What activities and resources are available to these neutral intentions?

(3) What actions and behavior by the neutral population(s) would favor mission

accomplishment?

(4) Which apparent current COAs might affect mission accomplishment?

(5) What resources are available to execute alternative COAs?

(6) What objective and subjective factors could affect decisions and resource

effectiveness?
B-2

Appendix B

JP 3-53

(7) What are the staff factions and who are the particularly influential individuals?

(8) What are the characteristics of decision makers and their key advisors, major staff

planners, staff factions (to include particularly influential individuals), and intelligence system

analysts?

(9) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(10) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciations for each group?

d. Adversary Perspectives

(1) Decision Makers and Staffs

(a) What COAs might affect friendly task accomplishment?

(b) What resources are available to execute each COA?

(c) Who are the decision makers who can direct development or allocation of

resources of COAs pertinent to the task assigned?

(d) What are the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisors,

and staff (particularly intelligence analysts)?

(2) Intelligence Systems

(a) What are the intelligence systems that support decision makers and their staffs?

(b) What are the intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation?

(c) What are the objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of

collection planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of

information gathering resources?

(d) What are the groups of related planner and decision maker critical information?

(e) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciations for each group?

(3) Target Audiences

(a) What groups can influence plans, decisions, and operational effectiveness in

task accomplishment?
B-3

Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)

(b) How susceptible are these groups to PSYOP?

(c) What group behavior is favorable or harmful to task accomplishment?

(d) What are the apparent goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group?

(e) Who are the leaders who can cause these groups to behave in various ways?

(f) What are the groups of related foreign TA critical information?

(g) What is the estimated background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciations for each group?

(4) Command Systems

(a) What communications systems and command centers will be used to plan

COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the planned COA?

(b) What is the purpose and what are the characteristics of each C2 communications

net?

(c) What are the PSYOP targets for jamming or attacking?

(d) When should PSYOP to demoralize and disorganize opposing command be

executed?

(e) When should PSYOP to reduce opposing operational effectiveness be

executed?

(f) When should PSYOP to enhance the effectiveness of planned deceptions be

executed?

(g) When should PSYOP to support OPSEC to the maximum advantage be

executed?

e. Mission. How will PSYOP support the maneuver commander’s mission?

f. Execution

(1) Concept of Operations

(a) Overview

1. What is the commander’s intent?
B-4

Appendix B

JP 3-53

2. What is the overall concept for using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment?

3. Who will plan and conduct strategic PSYOP in peacetime and in support

of preconflict deterrence options? Who are the supporting commanders?

4. Who will plan and conduct strategic and theater PSYOP in support of

sustained hostilities? Who are the supporting commanders?

5. Who will plan and conduct joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational

COAs? Who are the supporting commanders?

(b) General Guidance to Units and Forces

1. What are the valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic and

theater PSYOP objectives?

2. What are the valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged? Include

indications of specific foreign TA sensitivities and harm that might occur if foreign TAs accept

the themes.

(c) PSYOP Actions Suitable for Use

1. What is the guidance for the conduct of military operations, actions, and

personnel behavior to promote valid PSYOP themes?

2. What is the guidance for avoiding military operations and actions and

personnel behavior that would result in harmful foreign TA attitudes and behavior?

3. What are the cultural and psychological characteristics of foreign TAs,

which will aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with foreign

TA members?

(d) Adversary PSYOP

1. What adversary PSYOP will be directed at US personnel and at foreign

groups in the operational area?

2. What is the guidance for countering such adversary operations?

(e) Outline of Each Planned PSYOP

1. What is the foreign TA and set of PSYOP objectives, overall themes,

subgroups to be targeted (to include their characteristics), and specific themes to be promoted

for each subgroup?
B-5

Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)

2. What are the provisions for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating

PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP effectiveness?

3. What are the command and staff arrangements? Who are the supporting

commanders?

4. What resources are required to plan and conduct PSYOP actions? Include

civil capabilities; indigenous assets; exploitation of EPWs, internees, and detainees for PSYOP;

and military PSYOP resources.

5. What are the logistic requirements? Include preparation, distribution, and

stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and personnel to operational areas

and their basing and support while conducting PSYOP; provisions for the supply and maintenance

of US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel matters.

6. What are the requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP control

sheets?

7. What is the code word for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP?

(f) What is the OPSEC planning guidance? Include planning for, preparing for,

and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s

intent and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs.

(2) Situation Monitoring

(a) How will intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence, security monitoring,

and operational feedback be provided?

(b) What is the requirement for running situation estimates; periodic estimates of

target appreciations responsive to critical information, actions, and attitudes and behavior; and

current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline counterintelligence information, security

monitoring results, and implementing actions?

(c) What resources are required? What is their availability?

(3) Control

(a) How will control be affected and implementation centrally coordinated?

(b) What are the coordinating instructions?

(c) How will implementation planning and supervision of the planned action be

accomplished?
B-6

Appendix B

JP 3-53

(d) What is the need for specific PSYOP?

(e) What coordination is required with adjacent commands and civilian agencies,

to include US diplomatic missions and US Agency for International Development (USAID)?

(f) What coordination is required with military deception and OPSEC planners,

electronic warfare planners, and planners in the fields of civic action; FHA; CMO; EPWs;

detainees, command, control, and communications; legal; captured US personnel; and operations?

(4) Tasks

(a) What responsibilities must be assigned to implement the concept?

(b) Is designation of an executive agent to coordinate implementation among

multiple organizations required?

(c) How will feedback to ensure effectiveness of tasks be provided?

g. Administration and Logistics

(1) Logistics

(a) What is the guidance on stocking of PSYOP and information materials and

provisions to disseminating organizations?

(b) What are the provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-unique

supplies and equipment?

(c) What are the provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment

and materials?

(d) What are the fiscal matters relating to special funds?

(e) What are the personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel?

(2) Administration

(a) What are the requirements for special reports?

(b) What are the requirements for planning and operations in support of education

programs regarding EPWs and CIs?

(c) What will be the participation in interrogation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees to

obtain information essential or peculiar to PSYOP?
B-7

Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)

h. Command and Control

(1) Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K (Command, Control, Communication,

and Computer Systems) and provide pertinent extracts of information included in the basic plan

or Annex K, to include the following.

(2) What are the recognition and identification instructions?

(3) What is the electronic policy?

(4) What are the headquarters locations and movements?

(5) What are the code words?

(6) What is the frequency allocation?

2. Tab D Format

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS, US EUROPEAN COMMAND

APO AE 09128

8 February 1999

TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO USEURCOM OPLAN 4999-99 ( )

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ( )

( ) References:

a. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

b. Presidential Decision Directive-68, International Public Information.

c. CJCSI 3110.05B, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan FY 1998.

d. Memorandum in the Name of the Chairman-163-98, Cooperation Agreement for Policy

Coordination between the United States Information Agency and the Department of Defense

(1997).

e. List plans, estimates, basic PSYOP studies, special PSYOP studies, special PSYOP

assessments, and other documents that have a significant bearing on the conduct of PSYOP.
B-8

Appendix B

JP 3-53

1. ( ) Situation. Summary of the psychological situation in the operational area, any ongoing PSYOP

programs and any significant factors influencing PSYOP activities. (If parts of the situation description

are long or complex, include as attachments.)

a. ( ) Overview. Describe the general situation, competing goals, and the task(s) to be

accomplished.

b. ( ) US (or US and Allied) Perspective. Briefly outline intentions (how the assigned

task(s) will be accomplished), capabilities (resources to be used), and activities (current actions

and general phasing of future actions).

c. ( ) Neutral Perspective (if applicable). Briefly outline estimated neutral intentions under

various circumstances, the resources available to them, and their activities. State neutral actions

and behavior that would favor mission accomplishment. Indicate apparent current COAs that

might affect mission accomplishment and summarize resources available to execute alternative

COAs. (Include the abilities to execute information operations strategies.) State objective and

subjective factors that could affect decisions and resource effectiveness. Identify staff factions

and particularly influential individuals. Describe the characteristics of decision makers, their

key advisers, major staff planners, staff factions (particularly influential individuals), and

intelligence system analysts. List groups of related planner and decision maker critical

information, and for each group, list estimates of background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciations.

d. ( ) Adversary Perspectives

(1) ( ) Decision Maker and Staff. Identify the decision makers who can direct

development or allocation of resources of COA execution pertinent to the task assigned. Outline

feasible, alternative actions that would favor or harm friendly operational effectiveness. Indicate

COAs that might affect friendly task accomplishment and summarize resources available to

execute each COA. Describe the characteristics of adversary decision makers, their key advisers,

and staff (particularly intelligence analysts).

(2) ( ) Intelligence Systems. Identify intelligence systems that support decision makers

and their staffs. Summarize intelligence systems’ capabilities pertinent to the situation. Cite

references for detail. Describe objective and subjective factors and the characteristics of collection

planners and decision makers that affect their development and selection for use of informationgathering resources. List groups of related collection planner and decision maker critical

information and for each group, list estimates of background knowledge and desired and harmful

appreciation.

(3) ( ) Target Audiences. Identify groups that can influence plans, decisions, and

operational effectiveness in task accomplishment; identify their susceptibility to PSYOP. State

group behavior favorable and harmful to task accomplishment. Briefly describe the apparent

goals, motivations, and characteristics of each group and the leaders who can cause groups to
B-9

Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)

behave in various ways. List groups of related target audience critical information and, for each group,

list estimates of background knowledge as well as desired and harmful appreciations.

(4) ( ) Command Systems. Describe communication and computer systems and

command centers used to plan COAs and control, coordinate, and supervise execution of the

planned COA. Briefly identify the purpose of each C4S and its characteristics. State targets for

jamming or attacking. Indicate when to execute operations to demoralize and disorganize opposing

command, reduce opposing operational effectiveness, enhance the effectiveness of planned

deceptions and PSYOP, and support OPSEC to the maximum advantage.

2. ( ) Mission. Refer to the Basic Plan

3. ( ) Execution

a. ( ) Concept of Operations

(1) ( ) Overview. State the commander’s intent. Outline the overall concept for

using PSYOP in support of task accomplishment. Sequentially address strategic PSYOP in

peacetime and in support of preconflict deterrence options; strategic and theater PSYOP in

support of sustained hostilities (conduct of war globally or in a region, and support for campaigns

and operations); and joint tactical PSYOP in support of operational COAs. State who will plan

and conduct each PSYOP and the supporting commanders.

(2) ( ) Provide the following as general guidance to units and forces involved:

(a) ( ) Valid PSYOP themes to be promoted to induce strategic and theater PSYOP

objectives.

(b) ( ) Valid or invalid PSYOP themes to be discouraged and indications of

specific target audience sensitivities and harm that might occur if the themes are accepted by

target audiences.

(c) ( ) PSYOP actions suitable for use:

1. ( ) Guidance for the conduct of military operations and actions, and

personnel behavior, to promote valid PSYOP themes.

2. ( ) Guidance for avoiding military operations and actions, and personnel

behavior, that would result in harmful target audience attitudes and behavior.

3. ( ) Description of the cultural and psychological characteristics of target

audiences to aid operational planners and personnel in selecting COAs and interacting with

target audience members.
B-10

Appendix B

JP 3-53

(d) ( ) Description of adversary PSYOP (including disinformation and propaganda)

directed at US personnel and at foreign groups in the operational area and guidance for countering such

adversary operations.

(3) ( ) Provide an outline of each planned PSYOP operation. Indicate for each target

audience and set of PSYOP objectives, overall themes, subgroups to be targeted, their

characteristics, and specific themes to be promoted for each subgroup. As appropriate, refer to

intelligence studies, basic PSYOP study, SPS, and SPA for detailed intelligence. State provisions

for testing, producing, stocking, and disseminating PSYOP materials and for measuring PSYOP

effectiveness. Describe command and staff arrangements for each campaign or operation and

indicate supporting commanders. List resources required to plan and conduct PSYOP actions,

including civil capabilities, indigenous assets, exploitation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees for

PSYOP, and military PSYOP resources. State logistic requirements, including preparation,

distribution, and stocking of PSYOP materials; transport of PSYOP material and personnel to

operational areas and their basing and support while conducting PSYOP; provisions for the

supply and maintenance of US and indigenous PSYOP material; and fiscal and personnel matters.

Indicate requirements for implementing schedules and PSYOP operation control sheets. (Note:

Treat plans for PSYOP conducted in support of UW operations by SO forces in support of

military deceptions as OPSEC-sensitive. Assign each plan a code word and distribute it separately

from the Basic Plan and Tab D.)

(4) ( ) In the basic concept description and in each tab describing separate operations,

provide OPSEC planning guidance. The guidance should address planning for, preparing for,

and conducting PSYOP and PSYOP actions to maintain essential secrecy for the commander’s

intentions and to gain and maintain essential secrecy for OPSEC-sensitive PSYOP COAs.

b. ( ) Situation Monitoring. Describe how intelligence, multidiscipline counterintelligence,

security monitoring, and operational feedback will be provided. State requirement for running

situation estimates; periodic estimates of target appreciations responsive to critical information,

actions, and attitudes and behavior; and current reporting of intelligence and multidiscipline

counterintelligence information, security monitoring results, and implementing actions. Identify

resources required and their availability.

c. ( ) Control. Outline how control will be affected and implementation centrally

coordinated. State coordinating instructions. Describe accomplishment of implementation

planning and supervision of the planned action. Identify the need for specific PSYOP. Address

coordination with adjacent commands and civilian agencies, including US diplomatic missions

and USAID. Address also coordination with military deception and OPSEC planners, EW

planners, and planners in the fields of civic action, FHA, PA, CMO, EPW, civilian internees,

detainees, command, control, communications, and computers, legal, captured US personnel,

and operations.
B-11

Format for Tab D, (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3,

(Information Operations) to Annex C, (Operations)

d. ( ) Tasks. Assign responsibilities to implement the concept. When multiple organizations are

involved, designate an executive agent to coordinate implementation. Ensure that tasks clearly fix

responsibilities and provide for feedback about effectiveness.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic

arrangements applicable to PSYOP but not covered in the Basic Plan or another annex thereof.

Include data on:

a. ( ) Logistics

(1) ( ) Stocking of propaganda and information materials and provisions to

disseminating organizations.

(2) ( ) Provisions for the supply and maintenance of PSYOP-unique supplies and

equipment.

(3) ( ) Provisions for control and maintenance of indigenous equipment and materials.

(4) ( ) Fiscal matters relating to special funds.

(5) ( ) Personnel matters relating to indigenous personnel.

b. ( ) Administration

(1) ( ) Requirements for special reports.

(2) ( ) Requirements for planning and operations in support of education programs

regarding EPWs and CIs.

(3) ( ) Participation in interrogation of EPWs, CIs, and detainees to obtain information

essential for or peculiar to PSYOP.

5. ( ) Command and Control. Refer to appropriate sections of Annex K and provide pertinent

extracts of information included in the Basic Plan or Annex K, including:

a. ( ) Recognition and identification instructions.

b. ( ) Electronic policy.

c. ( ) Headquarters locations and movements.

d. ( ) Code words.

e. ( ) Frequency allocation.
B-12

Appendix B

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX C

REFERENCES

C-1

The development of JP 3-53 is based upon the following primary references.

1. US Public Laws

a. National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 413).

b. DOD Reorganization Acts of 1958 and 1986.

c. Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1987 (Public Laws 99-591 and 99-661).

d. 10 USC 167, Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces.

2. Executive Branch Documents

a. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.

b. National Security Directive 51, US Government International Broadcasting.

c. National Security Decision Directive 130, US International Information Policy.

d. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-68, International Public Information (IPI).

e. National Security Strategy of the United States (current year).

f. National Drug Control Strategy (current year).

g. “US Capabilities to Engage in Low-Intensity Conflict and Conduct Special Operations,”

The President’s Report to Congress.

h. National Security Decision Directive 77.

3. Department of State Publication

Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties in Force.

4. DOD Publications

a. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Peacetime Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military

Services in Contingencies Short of Declared War.

b. DODD S-3600.1, Information Operations (IO) (U).
C-2

Appendix C

JP 3-53

c. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components.

d. DODD 5132.3 w/ch1, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance.

e. DODD 5138.3, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low-Intensity

Conflict).

f. DODD 5525.1 w/ch2, Status-of-Forces Policies and Information.

g. DODD 5530.3 w/ch1, International Agreements.

h. DODI 5240.10 w/ch1, DOD Counterintelligence Support to Unified and Specified

Commands.

i. DOD Handbook 0-2000.12-H w/ch1, ch2, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities

Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence.

5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions and Manuals

a. CJCSI 3110.05B, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan FY 1998.

b. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy (u).

c. CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning.

d. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol I:

(Planning Policies and Procedures).

e. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol II: (Planning

Formats and Guidance).

6. Joint Publications

a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. JP 1-05, Religion and Religious Support in Joint Operations.

c. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

d. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

e. JP 2-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence in Joint

Operations.
C-3

References

f. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

g. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

h. JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task

Force Operations.

i. JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting

and Mission Planning.

j. JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War.

k. JP 3.07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).

l. JP 3.07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.

m. JP 3.07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations.

n. JP 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations.

o. JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.

p. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

q. JP 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).

r. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

s. JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare.

t. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

u. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

v. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

w. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

x. JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting.

y. JP 3-61, Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations.

z. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.
C-4

Appendix C

JP 3-53

aa. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

bb. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

7. Department of the Army Publications

a. FM 3-0, Operations.

b. FM 3-05, Doctrine for Army Special Operations.

c. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations.

d. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations.

e. FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare.

f. FM 31-20(C), Special Forces Operations.

g. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures.

h. FM 100-6, Information Operations.

8. Department of the Navy Publications

a. OPNAVINST 3430.25, Information Warfare and Command and Control Warfare.

b. OPNAVINST 3430.26, Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare Command.

c. OPNAVINST 3434.1, Psychological Operations.

d. SECNAVINST 3300.1A, Law of Armed Conflict (Law of War) Program to Insure

Compliance by the Naval Establishment.

e. Navy Warfare Publication 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval

Operations.

9. Department of the Air Force Publications

a. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine.

b. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations.

c. AFDD 2-5.3, Psychological Operations.

d. AFDD 2-7, Special Operations.
C-5

References

e. AFDD 2-7.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

f. AFPD 51-4, Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict.

g. AFPD 51-7, International Law.

h. AFI 51-401, Training and Reporting to Ensure Compliance with the Law of Armed

Conflict.

i. AFI 51-701, Negotiating, Concluding, Reporting, and Maintaining International

Agreements.

10. United States Marine Corps Publications

a. MCWP 3-33.1, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations.

b. MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

c. MCWP 3-40.6, Psychological Operations.
C-6

Appendix C

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX D

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:

Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116

Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy,

usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Special Operations Command. The Joint Staff

doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-53, 10 July 1996, Doctrine for Joint Psychological

Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//SOOP-JD//

INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JDETD//

USJFCOM NORFOLK VA//JW100//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force

Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-7000, with

info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate

will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military

Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when

changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED

NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
D-2

Appendix D

JP 3-53

5. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers

listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the joint publication is not

available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the

combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to

foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense

Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon,

Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative

support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters

of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL

1655 Woodson Road

Attn: Joint Publications

St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center

2800 Eastern Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point

700 Robbins Avenue

Bldg 1, Customer Service

Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)

814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321

Albany, GA 31704-0321

Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard

2100 2nd Street, SW

Washington, DC 20593-0001

Commander

USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102

Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)

116 Lake View Parkway

Suffolk, VA 23435-2697
D-3

Administrative Instructions

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.

However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in

accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.
D-4

Appendix D

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active Component

AFAOC Air Force air and space operations center

AM amplitude modulation

AOR area of responsibility

ASD(SO/LIC) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity

Conflict)

AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network

C2 command and control

C4S command, control, communications, and computer systems

CAO civil affairs operations

CI civilian internee

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual

CMO civil-military operations

CNO computer network operations

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COLISEUM community on-line intelligence system for end-users and

managers

CONUS continental United States

CT counterterrorism

DA direct action

DC dislocated civilian

DMS defense message system

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense directive

EPW enemy prisoner of war

EW electronic warfare

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance

FID foreign internal defense

FIWC fleet information warfare center

FM frequency modulation

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HUMINT human intelligence
GL-2

Glossary

JP 3-53

IIP international information program

IO information operations

J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

JFC joint force commander

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JP joint publication

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

JTF joint task force

MCS Military Capabilities Study

MOE measure of effectiveness

MOOTW military operations other than war

NGO nongovernmental organization

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs

POAS PSYOP automated system

POAT psychological operations assessment team

POB psychological operations battalion

POG psychological operations group

PSE psychological operations support element

PSYOP psychological operations

RC Reserve Components

SO special operations

SPA special psychological operations (PSYOP) assessment

SPS special psychological operations (PSYOP) study

SR special reconnaissance

TA target audience

TARBS transportable amplitude modulation and frequency modulation

radio broadcast system

TPB tactical psychological operations battalion

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

TSC theater security cooperation

TV television
GL-3

Glossary

USAF United States Air Force

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USG United States Government

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare
basic psychological operations study. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-

02.)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the

application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective.

Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems

(air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military

operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required

inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of

physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment.

Also called BDA. See also combat assessment; measures of effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

battlefield psychological activities. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP

1-02.)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained,

and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military

operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the

relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are

present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally

the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP

1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or

exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve

operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military

forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military

actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civilmilitary operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces,

or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established

by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders

of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or

the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated

and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 3-53
operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the

combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control

is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during

military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle

damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack

recommendation. Also called CA. See also battle damage assessment; measures of

effectiveness. (JP 1-02)

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce

vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent,

deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat

spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

consolidation psychological operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating

specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two

or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander

or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but

does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement

cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating

authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be

exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than

to operations. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage,

other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign

governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international

terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterpropaganda operations. Those psychological operations activities that identify

adversary propaganda, contribute to situational awareness, and serve to expose adversary

attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

GL-5

Glossary
GL-6

Glossary

JP 3-53

critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed

by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable

consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

direct action. Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations

forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage

on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations

forces or special operations-capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics;

emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or

maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct

independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called DA. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian. A broad term that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an

internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called DC. (JP

1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in

any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems

while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP

1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US

Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international

organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

joint psychological operations task force. A joint special operations task force composed of

headquarters and operational assets. It assists the joint force commander in developing

strategic, operational, and tactical psychological operation plans for a theater campaign or

other operations. Mission requirements will determine its composition and assigned or

attached units to support the joint task force commander. Also called JPOTF. (This term

and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion

in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

measures of effectiveness. Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall mission and

execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite to the performance

of combat assessment. Also called MOEs. (JP 1-02)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers

as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary

to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the

friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are as follows. a. strategic
GL-7

Glossary

military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military

commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic

military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception — Military deception

planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary

actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception

is planned and conducted in a theater to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical

military deception — Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical

commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and

operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.

d. Service military deception — Military deception planned and executed by the Services that

pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect

and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in

support of operations security (OPSEC) — Military deception planned and executed by and in

support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of

sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, or intentions. Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed

to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities.

(JP 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing

friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those

actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that

hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to

derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute

measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions

to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

perception management. Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators

to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning as well

as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately

resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives.

In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security,

cover and deception, and psychological operations. (JP 1-02)

propaganda. Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence

the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor,

either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign

audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of

foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations

is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations assessment team. A small, tailored team (approximately 4-12 personnel)

that consists of psychological operations planners and product distribution/dissemination and logistic
GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-53

specialists. The team is deployed to theater at the request of the combatant commander to assess

the situation, develop psychological operations objectives and recommend the appropriate level of

support to accomplish the mission. Also called POAT. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition

of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations impact indicators. An observable event or a discernible subjectively

determined behavioral change that represents an effect of a psychological operations activity

on the intended foreign target audience at a particular point in time. It is measured evidence,

ascertained during the analytical phase of the psychological operations development process,

to evaluate the degree to which the psychological operations objective is achieved. (Approved

for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological operations support element. A tailored element that can provide limited

psychological operations support. Psychological operations support elements do not contain

organic command and control capability; therefore, command relationships must be clearly

defined. The size, composition and capability of the psychological operations support element

are determined by the requirements of the supported commander. A psychological operations

support element is not designed to provide full-spectrum psychological operations capability;

reachback is critical for its mission success. Also called PSE. (Approved for inclusion in

the next edition of JP 1-02.)

psychological warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations

activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department

of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States

Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to

understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening

the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.

(Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

public information. Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public

news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable

or nonobjectionable to the responsible releasing agency. (JP 1-02)

receptivity. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations

forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information

concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to

secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a

particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance.

Also called SR. (JP 1-02)
GL-9

Glossary

strategic psychological activities. Planned psychological activities in peace, crisis, and war,

which pursue objectives to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries

and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries to wage

war. (JP 1-02)

susceptibility. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

target audience. An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological

operations. (JP 1-02)

unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally

of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are

organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external

source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or

clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence

activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)
GL-10

Glossary

JP 3-53

Intentionally Blank
Assessments/

Revision

CJCS

Approval

Two

Drafts

Program

Directive

Project

Proposal

J-7 formally staffs with

Services and combatant

commands

Includes scope of project,

references, milestones,

and who will develop

drafts

J-7 releases Program

Directive to Lead Agent.

Lead Agent can be

Service, combatant

command, or Joint Staff

(JS) Directorate

STEP #2

Program Directive

 The combatant commands

receive the JP and begin to

assess it during use

18 to 24 months following

publication, the Director, J-7, will

solicit a written report from the

combatant commands and

Services on the utility and quality

of each JP and the need for any

urgent changes or earlier-thanscheduled revisions

No later than 5 years after

development, each JP is revised

STEP #5

Assessments/Revision



ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, combatant commands,

or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services and

combatant commands

J-7 initiates Program Directive



STEP #1

Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above.

is in the series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of

the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-53 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

INTELLIGENCE LOGISTICS PLANS C4 SYSTEMS

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required

changes and prepares pub for coordination with

Services and combatant commands

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

STEP #4

CJCS Approval

 Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA)

to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands,

Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3

Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINT

WARFARE



















 

JP 0-2

UNAAF

JP 3-0

OPERATIONS