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Thank you for your assistance

Synchronizing Airpower and

Firepower in the Deep Battle

Laughbaum

COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH, AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Synchronizing Airpower

and Firepower in the Deep Battle

R. KENT LAUGHBAUM

Lt Col, USAF

CADRE Paper

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6610

January 1999
Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

ii
CADRE Papers

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iii

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 2 EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE

 DURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine . . . . . . 7

Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle . . . . . . . 11

Evolution of the Fire Support

 Coordination Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

 3 DEEP BATTLE DURING THE

PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Deep-Battle Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Fire Support Coordination Line Friction . . . . 34

Synthesis and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

 4 DEEP BATTLE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Army Doctrinal Evolution since

 the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Air Force Doctrine since the

 Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle . . . . . . . 56

Synthesis and Final Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 61

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

v
Illustrations

Figure Page

1 Combat Missions during the

Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2 Coalition Ground Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3 Air Interdiction Missions Supporting

Battlefield Preparation by Kill Box . . . . . . . . 31

4 Fire Support Coordination Line Movements

by Day, 1800L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

vi
Foreword

The concept of “deep battle” was formally introduced to US

war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army’s

AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army

leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay

and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a

European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle

construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing

deep operations and for employing air interdiction against

Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the

decisive “close battle.” The fire support coordination line

(FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range

from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air

Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle.

During the late 1980s the Army began fielding a potent

deep-battle capability of its own. Concurrently, Army doctrine

assigned to the ground force commander responsibility for

synchronizing deep operations with the close battle. Thus

were planted the seeds of conflict with the Air Force over

management of the deep battle. To better influence deep

operations, the Army defined the FSCL as a permissive fire

support coordination measure and also extended the range of

the FSCL from the FLOT.

The Persian Gulf War “field tested” US deep-battle doctrine.

The joint force air component commander (JFACC)

synchronized deep operations using several ad hoc procedures

approved by the joint force commander (JFC). By most Air

Force accounts, the deep battle was well managed and

executed, except for the Army’s use of the FSCL during the

last days of the war. Conversely, the Army was thoroughly

disappointed with prosecution of the deep battle during

Operation Desert Storm. Army frustration arose from the fact

that the deep battle was synchronized by the JFACC and not

by the ground force commander—a direct violation of joint

and Army doctrine.

Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War has attempted

to create a framework for synchronizing airpower and

land-based firepower in the deep battle. In spite of that effort,

many contentious issues between airmen and soldiers remain

vii
unresolved, chief among them the matter of command

relationships on and above the deep battlefield.

In this award-winning study on Synchronizing Airpower and

Firepower in the Deep Battle, Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum

argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient

and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and

Army deep operations. To improve such synchronization,

Colonel Laughbaum proposes five modifications to current

joint doctrine:

• assign the joint force commander responsibility for establishing and positioning the fire support coordination line;

• redefine the fire support coordination line as a restrictive

fire support coordination measure;

• include all planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver

operations beyond the fire support coordination line in

the air tasking order;

• position the fire support coordination line relatively close

to the forward line of own troops, typically no farther

than the maximum range of tube artillery; and

• restrict planned air interdiction missions from targets

short of the fire support coordination line.

Originally submitted as a thesis for Air University’s School

of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Synchronizing Airpower

and Firepower in the Deep Battle won the 1997 Air Force

Armament Museum Foundation Prize as the best SAAS thesis

on technology and airpower.

We commend Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the

Deep Battle to all war fighters—airmen and soldiers alike—

who are seeking an informed perspective on the hotly contes ted

issue of orchestration of the deep battle.

JAMES R. W. TITUS

Dean of Research

Air University

viii
About the Author

Lt Col R. Kent Laughbaum (BS, Texas A&M University;

MAS, Embry–Riddle Aeronautical University) is chief of

nuclear operations and a joint operations planner for NATO’s

Central Region, Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe in

the Netherlands. He completed pilot training in 1984 and is a

senior pilot with 3,300 hours in F-15E and A-10 aircraft.

Previous assignments include England Air Force Base (AFB),

Louisiana, Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Royal Air Force (RAF)

Lakenheath, United Kingdom. At England AFB, Colonel

Laughbaum flew the A-10 with the 23d Fighter Wing and

served as flight commander, weapons and tactics officer, and

chief of electronic combat. His positions at Nellis AFB were

instructor pilot and flight commander in the A-10 Division,

chief of conventional weapons employment, and member of

the initial cadre of F-15E Division instructor pilots. At RAF

Lakenheath he was assigned for two years to the 48th Fighter

Wing and then served as assistant operations officer and chief

of F-15E weapons and tactics for the 494th Fighter Squadron.

Colonel Laughbaum is a graduate of the USAF Fighter

Weapons School, the US Army Command and General Staff

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a 1997 graduate of

the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force

Base, Alabama. He and his wife, Mary, have two daughters,

Christen and Rachel.

ix
Chapter 1

Introduction

Modern combat resources allow the attack to be mounted in

such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously over his

whole depth and to delay the movement of his reserves to

the threatened sector. We now have at our disposal

resources like aviation . . . which can make these deep

sallies [raids]. In this way the enemy should be pinned

down over the entire depth of his dispositions, encircled and

destroyed.

—Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski

Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1934

During the 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the

concept of deep battle. Their objective was to attack the enemy

simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force to

induce a catastrophic failure in his defensive system. 1 Soviet

deep-battle theory was driven by technological advancements

and the hope that maneuver warfare offered opportunities for

quick, efficient, and decisive victory. The concurrent

development of aviation and armor provided a physical

impetus for this doctrinal evolution within the Red Army.

Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevski stated that airpower should

be “employed against targets beyond the range of infantry,

artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft

should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space,

against targets of the highest tactical importance.” 2

The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) captured much

of Tukhachevski’s intent for airpower in Europe during the

last year of World War II. American airmen were not familiar

with the term deep battle, but they were well acquainted with

air interdiction (AI) in support of battlefield operations. AI

operations prevented the movement of German armor during

the D day invasion and subsequently shaped the battlefield

for the Normandy breakout. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower

claimed that it was US airpower’s ability to intervene in the

land battle that made the Normandy invasion possible. 3 To

1
ensure close coordination between airpower and ground forces

during the subsequent campaign, a tactical air command was

paired with each field army. An example was the close

relationship between Maj Gen Elwood “Pete” Quesada’s IX

Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley’s

First Army that developed during the battle for France. The

following description of Operation Cobra, the Normandy

breakout, draws an excellent illustration of American airpower

applied to the battlefield near Saint-Lô:

On the morning of 25 July waves of American Thunderbolt fighterbombers swept over the [Panzer Lehr] division, every two minutes, fifty

at a time. They dropped high explosive bombs and napalm

incendiaries. They were followed by four hundred medium-bombers

carrying 500-pound bombs. Then from the north came the sound

every German soldier dreaded, the heavy drone of the big bombers—

1,500 Flying Fortresses and Liberators. From their swollen bomb-bays

3,300 tons of bombs obliterated almost everything on the ground.

Finally the German line, or what was left of it, was pounded by three

hundred Lightnings carrying fragmentation bombs and more of the

new incendiaries. . . . One survivor remembered that everything shook

so much “it was like being at sea in a force 10 gale.” 4

In 1982 the US Army (USA) introduced AirLand Battle

doctrine. AirLand Battle was developed specifically to counter

the Soviet armor threat facing western Europe. The doctrine’s

precepts are partly traceable to pre-World War II Soviet

military theory. AirLand Battle emphasized the importance of

the operational level of war. The new doctrine claimed

initiative, agility, synchronization, and depth as tenets. The

tenet “depth” led to deep battle’s official introduction into USA

war-fighting doctrine.

Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (1993), describes

deep battle as “operations designed in depth to secure

advantages in later engagements, protect the current close

fight, and defeat the enemy more rapidly by denying freedom

of action and disrupting or destroying the coherence and

tempo of its operations.”5 Historically, the Army has relied on

the Air Force to prosecute the deep battle. This was certainly

the case when AirLand Battle doctrine was originally

published. Regarding deep battle, Gen Donn Starry, USA,

claimed “the air commander must concentrate on this task,

CADRE PAPER

2
for the ground commander hasn’t the organic resources either

to find or to fire at the second echelon.” 6

Many in the Air Force, especially fighter pilots within TAC

and US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), embraced airpower’s role

in AirLand Battle. Since airpower was solely responsible for

executing deep battle when AirLand Battle was introduced,

the air commander naturally accepted responsibility for

synchronizing deep missions. The fire support coordination

line (FSCL), normally set at maximum artillery range, served

as an unofficial boundary between Air Force and Army

battlefield operations.

The Army began procurement of organic deep-battle weapon

systems in the mid-1980s, including the AH-64A Apache and

the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). The acquisition

of these weapons, and the Army’s intention to use them at

battlefield depths previously reserved for airpower, generated

conflict between airmen and soldiers. The position of the FSCL

and the interpretation of its definition were initial sources of

debate between the services. Equally divisive was the issue of

ultimate authority for synchronizing deep firepower. The Army

describes synchronization as

arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point.

Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, the massed effects of

combat power at the point of decision. Some of the activities that

commanders synchronize in an operation might occur before the

decisive moment. They may take place at locations distant from one

another. Though separated in time and space, these activities must be

well synchronized if their combined effects are to be felt at the decisive

time and place. Synchronization seeks to gain overwhelming combat

power.

Synchronization usually requires explicit coordination among the

various units and activities participating in any operation. In the end,

the product of effective synchronization is the maximum use of every

resource to make the greatest contribution towards success. 7

The Air Force claimed that the deep battle was best prosecute d

through air interdiction, and that all airpower must be

controlled by an air commander. The Army asserted that the

deep battle was just a portion of the land battle, and the

responsibility for synchronization of the deep battle should

reside with the ground force commander.

LAUGHBAUM

3
During the Persian Gulf War these disagreements were

apparent during both the planning and execution of the deep

battle. The joint force air component commander (JFACC)

organized the deep operations during the war and was harshly

criticized by US Army leadership for target selection and use

of the FSCL. An Army report of Gulf War lessons learned

stated that “the lack of commonly understood joint fire

support doctrine and the parochial interpretation of fire

support coordination measures caused significant problems in

fire support coordination.”8

This paper examines deep battle in US war-fighting doctrine.

Chapter 2 traces the development of the Army’s AirLand Battle

doctrine and historical Air Force perspectives on the deep

battle. Additionally, it examines the evolution of the FSCL.

Chapter 3 investigates deep battle during the Gulf War, with

particular emphasis on targeting and the use of the FSCL.

Chapter 4 analyzes service and joint doctrine produced since

Operation Desert Storm. After developing the deep-battle

requirements and disagreements illuminated in the previous

chapters, chapter 4 determines if current joint and service

doctrine effectively synchronizes deep operations. In chapter 5,

the author makes recommendations to improve US warfighting doctrine.

The contentious issues between the services surrounding

the deep-attack weapon mix are not addressed. The acquisition

and balance of weapon systems for the deep battle have

already received intense focus within the Department of

Defense (DOD) through the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study

(DAWMS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review.

The deep battle is waged in an area where both Air Force

and Army firepower can attack the enemy. Ideally, deep

operations are synchronized and seamless. The ultimate aim

of this paper is to better synchronize the deep battle through

superior doctrine. Doctrine must grow, evolve, and mature. 9

According to Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the

Armed Forces of the United States, doctrine “provides the

distilled insights and wisdom gained from our collective

experience with warfare. Doctrine facilitates clear thinking

and assists a commander in determining the proper course of

action under the circumstances prevailing at the time of

CADRE PAPER

4
decision.”10 Trust and cooperation are cornerstones of joint

doctrine. If our services fail to work together effectively, a tear

will appear in our joint fabric. Future adversaries will search

for and exploit such weaknesses.

Notes

1. Bruce W. Menning, “An Operator/Planner’s Introduction to Operational

Art,” Net Call, Spring–Summer 1995, 9–12.

2. Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevski

(London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987), 199–200.

3. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United

States Air Force, 1907–1960, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air

University Press, 1971), 173.

4. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,

1996), 208.

5. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, 1993, G-2.

6. John L. Romjue, “The Evolution of the AirLand Battle Concept,” Air

University Review 35, no. 4 (May–June 1984): 6. As Training and Doctrine

Command commander, General Starry was the senior officer most

responsible for the development of AirLand Battle.

7. FM 100-5, 2-8 to 2-9.

8. Department of the Army, Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned

(Tait Report), vol. 3, Operational (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and

General Staff College, 1992), 3-3.

9. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, vii.

10. Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the

United States, 10 January 1995, vi.

LAUGHBAUM

5
Chapter 2

Evolution of Deep-Battle Doctrine

during the Cold War

Gen Creighton Abrams, US Army chief of staff, in his 1973

letter to Gen William E. DePuy, the Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) commander, opined that “I have long

believed that since there exists in the Army and Air Force a

unique complementary relationship to conduct warfare on the

landmass, it is absolutely essential that a close relationship

exist, at all levels, between the two Services.” 1

Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine

As the US military scaled back combat operations in

Vietnam from 1970 to 1973, Army leadership was able to

devote more attention and resources toward preparing for war

in Europe. Although war against the Warsaw Pact was the

least likely possibility among the potential armed conflicts

around the world, such a war was also the most dangerous in

terms of American national survival. The Soviet Union,

already at nuclear parity with the United States, was also

improving its extremely powerful conventional military forces

at a rapid pace. Soviet doctrine, equipment, and training

significantly changed emphasis, from a principally defensive

focus in 1968 to an offensive orientation by the early 1970s.

In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Central

Region, Warsaw Pact ground forces were poised to attack from

two echelons in depth, initial and reinforcing. The initial

attacking units were expected to attempt to penetrate NATO

defenses, while the follow-on echelon forces would exploit the

breakthrough. According to the European Command deputy

commander in chief (DCINC), the Soviets had a significant

advantage in nearly every quantitative measure of military

power.2

During this time period, the US Army was suffering

physically and psychologically. The last years of the Vietnam

conflict had been particularly difficult for the Army, which was

7
burdened with discipline problems, demoralization in the

officer corps, a sense of inferiority, and an overall absence in

direction.3

To address the Soviet conventional threat in Europe, the

Army published a new version of FM 100-5 in 1976. It was the

Army’s capstone war-fighting doctrine document. General

DePuy was the driving force behind the creation of the new

doctrine. This doctrine, unofficially nicknamed active defense,

placed importance on heavy firepower and the massing of

forces to win the first battle along the forward edge of the

battle area (FEBA).4 Active defense recognized the reality of

fighting outnumbered in Europe. The new doctrine suggested

that a Warsaw Pact invasion could be blunted by using terrain

as a defense multiplier, employing new antitank weapon

technology, and fighting the Soviets as part of a combined

effort with the Air Force. When asked how the United States

would respond to a massive Soviet conventional attack,

General DePuy said that while ground forces rushed to the

attack location “we would hope that the US Air Force was

working on the second echelon. It is doubtful that the Air

Force would eliminate the second or third echelon. It is highly

desirable that they do it a lot of damage.” 5

The 1976 publication of FM 100-5 spurred great doctrinal

debate within the Army. Critics claimed that active defense

overemphasized firepower and attrition and did not focus

sufficiently on maneuver warfare. The new doctrine was also

viewed by many as defensively oriented, and many believed it

should have focused more on winning a war’s last battle

rather than the first clash.6 On the other hand, the Air Force

found the active defense doctrine mostly satisfactory. The

Army’s claim that it could “not win the land battle without the

Air Force”7 was perceived by airmen as a clear indication of

the Army’s desire to fight as a member of a joint team.

General Starry replaced DePuy as commander of TRADOC

in 1977. General Starry recognized the apparent weaknesses

in active defense and led the effort to produce the 1982

version of FM 100-5. The Army’s 1982 capstone doctrine

emphasized maneuver warfare as well as the concept of

auftragstaktik—the ability of battle leaders to act independently

as the situation required based on thorough training and an

CADRE PAPER

8
understanding of their commander’s intent. The new FM also

introduced the operational-level warfare concept to the

American Army. The purpose of operational-level warfare was

to conduct “sustained operations designed to defeat an enemy

force in a specified space and time with simultaneous and

sequential battles.”8 The 1982 publication of FM 100-5

eliminated the active defense doctrine and its apparent

emphasis on winning the first battle, replacing it with the

superior concept of operational-level combat, offensively

oriented towards winning the war.

Crucial to the success of the Army’s new doctrine was the

requirement to engage successfully Soviet armored forces in

depth. A Warsaw Pact combined arms army extended

approximately 100 kilometers (km) in depth. Its first echelon

divisions, when in contact at the FEBA, ranged to a depth of

30 km. Lead elements from its second echelon divisions were

expected to initially locate 50 to 60 km from the FEBA, in

position to exploit penetrations created by the first echelon.

The second echelon combined arms armies could be found

120 km from the FEBA.9 FM 100-5 claimed depth as a tenet of

Army operational-level warfare.10 This new doctrine, officially

named AirLand Battle, recognized that by delaying,

disrupting, and destroying the Soviets in depth, NATO could

prevent the Red Army from massing irresistible combat power

for the close battle. In other words, attacking the Soviets in

depth would wrest the initiative from the enemy and set the

conditions for decisive NATO victory in the close battle.

During initial combat operations, Soviet second and

follow-on echelon forces were expected to deploy outside the

range of NATO ground-based firepower. AirLand Battle

doctrine, reflecting its moniker, relied almost exclusively upon

the Air Force to prosecute operations in depth. General Starry

coined the term AirLand to signal the Army’s desire for

airpower support. According to General Starry, “breaking up

the mass and slowing the momentum of second echelon forces

is critical to the ground commander fighting the first echelon.

The air commander must concentrate on this task, for the

ground commander hasn’t the organic resources either to find

or to fire at the second echelon. Forces fighting the first

LAUGHBAUM

9
echelon must have the additional target servicing of aerial

firepower to win against a breakthrough. (Emphasis added)” 11

Despite Air Force capability and intent to fight the deep battle,

the Army initiated procurement programs for deep-attack

weapon systems during the 1980s. The most notable

acquisitions were the AH-64A Apache and the ATACMS. These

organic deep-attack weapon systems filled three perceived

shortfalls in airpower support provided by the Air Force.

Ostensibly, these deficiencies were a slow moving Air Force

targeting cycle and the possibilities that insufficient Air Force

airpower would be allocated to the deep battle and that the Air

Force might select deep-battle targets not synchronized with the

ground commander’s intent.12 The first combat ready Apache

was delivered in January 1984, and by 1991 the Army had

acquired more than 700 airframes.13 The Apache was designed

to fly and fight at night and had a combat radius in excess of

150 km. It was armed with a 30 millimeter (mm) chain gun and

a flexible combination of rockets and laser-guided Hellfire

missiles.14 The Apache’s most important weapon was the

Hellfire, because the missile possessed the capability to destroy

all known types of armored vehicles.

The ATACMS was acquired to provide corps field artillery

with a weapon system that could range the entire battlefield

and outrange any known artillery threat. Two ATACMS

missiles could be carried and launched from a multiple

launch rocket system (MLRS) vehicle. ATACMS production

began in 1990 on an initial purchase of 300 missiles. The first

ATACMS variant, Block 1A, delivered 950 M74 antipersonnel/

material submunitions and had a 124 km range. 15 Response

time for the weapon system was 15 to 60 minutes, and time of

flight to maximum range was 5.5 minutes. The warhead was

optimized for soft or lightly armored targets such as radars

and petroleum storage containers and had no capability

against heavily armored targets.16

As the Army acquired organic deep-battle weapon systems,

its doctrine evolved to synchronize deep attack with the close

battle. The 1989 edition of FM 100-15, Corps Operations,

placed the responsibility for planning, coordinating, and

executing deep operations with three organizations located

within the corps main command post—the plans cell, the

CADRE PAPER

10
operations cell, and the fire support cell. Plans cell deepoperations tasks included planning the deep battle, determining

high payoff targets, and developing detection and delivery

concepts to support deep attack. The current operations cell

function was to synchronize the deep battle with close and

rear operations. The fire support cell tasks were to ensure

adequate fire support for the deep battle, to coordinate tactical

air support, and to control all organic deep fires. 17

The Army’s major organization for deep-battle synchronization with the Air Force was the battlefield coordination

element (BCE). The BCE was located at the tactical air control

center (TACC), and served as the interface between the land

component commander and the air component commander.

The BCE was tasked to process Army requests for air support,

monitor and explain the current ground situation in the

TACC, and provide a conduit of information and intelligence

between the TACC and the land component headquarters. The

BCE was organized for operations involving echelons above

corps and was staffed by approximately 30 soldiers. 18

In summary, AirLand Battle became the Army’s operational

war-fighting doctrine in 1982 and remained so through the

Persian Gulf War. Its genesis was in the assessment that a

European conventional war against the Warsaw Pact could not

be won through the close battle alone. Instead, a successful war

opposite the Soviets demanded deep-attack operations against

second and follow-on armored forces—thus setting the

conditions for victory in an offensive-minded close battle.

AirLand Battle doctrine required joint commitment from the Air

Force because the weight of US deep-attack firepower was Air

Force airpower. During the late 1980s, the Army began to field a

potent organic deep-operations capability by acquiring attack

helicopters and long-range, surface-to-surface missiles. Finally,

the Army created the BCE to represent the land component

commander’s interests in the TACC, as well as assist in

synchronizing Army-Air Force operations.

Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle

Basic Air Force doctrine, codified in Air Force Manual (AFM)

1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine (1975), remained

LAUGHBAUM

11
relatively stable as the Army developed AirLand Battle. This is

not to say that the Air Force was unresponsive to the rising

Soviet conventional threat and the Army’s efforts to counter the

Warsaw Pact. Rather, Air Force basic doctrine essentially

remained relevant to all of AirLand Battle’s evolutionary phas es.

During and after the US involvement in Vietnam, the Air

Force leadership was keenly aware of the conventional

airpower threat to NATO posed by the Soviet Union and its

satellite states. A Senate Armed Services Committee visit to

NATO in 1972 reported that all major Air Force officials

believed that it would be very difficult to achieve and maintain

air superiority during a European conventional war. Air Force

leaders had ample reason for concern since Warsaw Pact

tactical aircraft outnumbered NATO’s 5,000 to 3,000. In

addition to numerical superiority, Red combat aircraft were

dispersed to numerous airfields and protected in modern

concrete shelters.19

Air Force leaders were also cognizant of the Warsaw Pact

armored menace and made statements regarding methods to

defeat a Soviet invasion that were amazingly consistent with

future Army doctrine. In 1975 Gen David C. Jones, Air Force

chief of staff, stated that “the plan is to use the air in Europe

to stop a breakthrough, with very, very limited operations deep

in enemy territory or deep strikes for air superiority against his

airfields. . . . I am not saying there will not be some of that.

But, basically most of our air would be committed to battlefield

support and battlefield air superiority. (Emphasis added)”20

This comment reflected concern with the massive Soviet

armored threat. General Jones’s statement also indicated a

commitment to use intense air interdiction and close air support

(CAS) near the battlefield in a defensive effort to blunt an enemy

initiative. This focus had much in common with the Army’s

active defense doctrine that was produced one year late r.

The 1975 edition of AFM 1-1 stated that air interdiction

operations are conducted to “destroy, neutralize, or delay

enemy ground or naval forces before they can be brought to

bear against friendly forces. These operations also restrict the

combat capability of enemy forces by disrupting their lines of

communications and by destroying the supplies that sustain

an effective level of enemy activity. Aerospace forces

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12
responsible for air interdiction must be capable of timely

response to the requirements for attacking fleeting, point, and

area targets, and ranging throughout enemy territory to seek

out and destroy these targets.”21

A sense of frustration with air interdiction’s apparent

ineffectiveness during the Vietnam conflict motivated Air Force

leaders and other US defense officials to examine closely the

interdiction mission. A DOD Systems Analysis Office study

asserted that interdiction employed near the battlefield was

more effective than the classic long-range air interdiction

historically accomplished by the Air Force. The study defined

battlefield interdiction as air support integrated with ground

operations, which has the aim of halting enemy movements

and resupply into a given area. The study claimed that during

both the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts long-range air

interdiction had been a failure. It predicted that long-range

interdiction efforts would produce the same results in a major

European conflict. In Europe, air interdiction against rear

lines of communication (LOC) would be ineffective due to the

size and redundancy of the LOC network. According to the

Systems Analysis Office, “it would be virtually impossible to

disrupt the flow of essential war materiel from rear areas to

the front by means of a conventional bombing campaign

against railroad centers, bridges, and roads. Systems analysis

studies indicated that even if flow capacity could be reduced by

as much as 90 percent, the remaining capacity would be enough

to reinforce and resupply an 80-division Warsaw Pact forc e.”22

Airpower thinkers, in addition to analyzing the appropriate

depth for air interdiction, also examined interdiction’s target

categories and desired effects. AFM 1-1 (1975) listed three air

interdiction effects: destroy, neutralize, and delay.23 Gen

Leslie Bray, Air Force director of Doctrine, Concepts, and

Objectives, stated in 1972, “interdiction today has come to be

identified almost solely with reducing the flow of men and

materials. Indeed, if airpower can find and strike enemy forces

. . . it might well emerge as a significant and perhaps decisive

factor for countering enemy land forces.” 24 General Bray

believed that air interdiction in support of the battlefield might

be more effective if the focus was on the enemy’s destruction

rather than simply reducing his rate of advance. This

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13
disposition to directly engage the Soviet Army with airpower,

which was held by some of the most important leaders in the

Air Force, made the AirLand Battle concept an easy sell for the

US Army.

In 1973 Gen Robert J. Dixon, TAC commander, initiated a

series of joint staff meetings with General DePuy to improve

air-land interoperability. General Dixon also recognized the

growing Soviet conventional threat to NATO and believed that

an Air Force-Army battle team was critical to countering the

threat.25 TAC’s relationship with TRADOC was formalized in

1975 with the creation of the Air-Land Forces Applications

(ALFA) directorate. ALFA’s main purpose was to improve joint

capabilities, procedures, and doctrine to win the air-land

battle. General DePuy stated that “we are working on the

procedures . . . for close air support, air defense suppression,

and a lot of other things . . . I submit to you it probably has

not ever happened before with the intensity that it has right

now. We have a mission to make the joint Air Force-Army

team out there as effective as we can.” 26

An important project under the supervision of ALFA was the

Joint Second Echelon Interdiction (J-SEI) study. Later known

as Joint Attack Second Echelon (J-SAK), the study group was

tasked to develop second echelon attack concepts and

procedures in 1981. General Starry later used the results from

this study to help produce AirLand Battle doctrine. 27

A clear indication of Air Force interest in fighting the deep

battle was the addition of the term battlefield air interdiction

(BAI) to AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, in 1979. Also, according to that manual, BAI

was not a new mission but a subset of the air interdiction

mission. BAI was defined as that portion of the air interdiction

mission which may have a direct or near-term effect upon

surface operations. BAI required that both the air and land

commanders coordinate their operations to ensure effective

support.28

Some airmen were unhappy with the addition of BAI to Air

Force doctrine. The BAI concept generated two basic areas for

concern. First, some officers perceived that it created a

condition where the ground commander could directly task

interdiction missions. One Air Force colonel remarked “our

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14
own doctrine has broken off a piece of the interdiction

mission, given it a separate title, and then essentially applied

to it the definition of close air support in requiring it to be

coordinated with the ground commander’s fire and

maneuver!”29 Most airmen believed that if centralized control

over airpower was lost, air operations would be severely

degraded. Dividing airpower and parceling it to individual

ground commanders for targeting would destroy its most

important characteristic, flexibility.30 Gen Wilbur L. Creech,

who replaced General Dixon as TAC commander, addressed

those officers who had concerns with BAI targeting. He

claimed that the Army should have more interest and greater

voice in BAI effects, but BAI remained a form of air

interdiction and the Air Force was responsible for interdiction

targeting.31 Second, some airmen believed that the term BAI

was unnecessary, because air interdiction’s definition and

historic tradition more than adequately encompassed the BAI

role. AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, stated that “air

interdiction operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or

delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought

to bear effectively against friendly forces.”32

Regardless of the concerns voiced about BAI, it gained a

degree of acceptance within the Air Force, particularly in the

Tactical Air Command. In 1980 TAC signed a memorandum of

understanding with TRADOC to provide BAI to Army forces, 33

and the 1984 publication of AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force, included an expanded

description of BAI planning and execution.34 BAI was

enthusiastically welcomed by the Army. Nearly all Army field

manuals referenced BAI instead of air interdiction when

referring to Air Force support of the AirLand Battle.

NATO doctrine also adopted the term BAI. Allied Tactical

Publication (ATP) 27, Offensive Air Support Operations, defined

BAI as air action against hostile surface targets which are in a

position to directly affect friendly forces and which require

joint planning and coordination. While BAI missions require

coordination in joint planning, they may not require

continuous coordination during the execution stage. In NATO

doctrine, BAI missions did not require positive control but

were planned against targets on either side of the FSCL. 35

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15
This policy was different from Air Force doctrine, which stated

that all interdiction missions were flown against targets

beyond the FSCL.36 ATP 27 also combined BAI into a category

of missions called offensive air support (OAS). The OAS

missions, which included CAS and tactical air reconnaissance,

were conducted in direct support of land operations. Under

NATO doctrine, control of OAS missions was not centralized

under a theater air commander. Instead, these missions were

allocated to a regional air commander at the allied tactical air

force (ATAF) level. This was significant for two reasons. First,

the ATAF commander worked directly for an army group

commander, who had far greater influence over air operations

and targeting than a ground commander had under US

doctrine. Second, many US Army officers cut their teeth in

NATO and did not understand that the NATO model for

airpower command and control would not be used when the

United States went to war outside Europe. 37

The Air Force, especially TAC and USAFE, embraced its role

in the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. Like their Army peers,

Air Force leaders recognized the threat posed by the Warsaw

Pact and believed that the air-land team offered opportunities

for combat success. Many in the Air Force believed that BAI

would be extremely effective, especially in light of long-range

interdiction’s apparent failure during the Vietnam War. With

the establishment of ALFA, the Air Force institutionalized an

AirLand Battle partnership with the Army. AirLand doctrine

was appealing to airmen for many reasons. High among those

reasons was the fact that the deep battle set the conditions

for victory, and air interdiction was the primary means for

deep attack.

Evolution of the

Fire Support Coordination Line

The FSCL, which is a critically important tool for the

conduct of the deep battle, has a long and contentious history.

Its ancestors were developed during the 1940s, and it has

gone through a series of evolutionary changes to keep it

relevant to US war-fighting doctrine. Comprehending the

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FSCL’s record is necessary to understanding the issues that

define its use in battle.

The US military entered World War II with extremely limited

doctrine to guide the coordination between air attack and

ground maneuver forces. The 1940 edition of FM 6-20, Field

Artillery Tactics and Techniques, designated the division

artillery officer as responsible for coordination between the Air

Corps and ground forces operating in the division sector.

Unfortunately, the manual did not provide any specifics on

how to accomplish this task.38

A series of fratricide incidents in Normandy during the

summer of 1944 demonstrated the requirement for a more

sophisticated air-ground deconfliction planning tool. The

Eighth Air Force and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber

Command were ordered to bomb the German lines to support

Operation Cobra. On at least four occasions, Allied heavy

bombers attacked their own ground forces.39 Hundreds of

Americans were killed in these incidents, including Lt Gen

Leslie McNair.40 These fratricides can be attributed to several

causes, including the orientation of air attacks relative to the

army front lines, but one of the most important factors was

the inability to coordinate and synchronize airpower and

ground maneuver.

The 1948 edition of FM 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and

Techniques, incorporated the air-ground coordination lessons

learned during World War II into official doctrine. The manual

introduced a planning tool called the bomb safety line, which

was the direct predecessor to the FSCL. The bomb safety line

was established by the ground commander to facilitate

air-to-surface engagement of targets while preventing friendly

casualties. Attack aircraft could engage the enemy beyond the

bomb safety line without immediate coordination with the

local ground forces. To assist the pilot, FM 6-20 (1948)

directed the ground commander to position the bomb safety

line along recognizable terrain. The manual also recommended

placing the bomb safety line as close to the forward elements

as the situation permitted, thus maximizing airpower’s

flexibility and potential effectiveness.41

The FSCL was established in Army doctrine in 1961,

replacing the bomb safety line. The 1961 publication of FM

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17
6-20-1, Field Artillery Tactics, defined the FSCL as “a no-fire

line between corps and higher echelons and a bomb line for

ground and air forces. An FSCL may be established by the

corps commander to ensure coordination of those fires

delivered by forces not under control of the corps which may

affect current tactical operations. When possible, the FSCL

should be easy to define on the map and easy to recognize

from the air.”42 The FSCL was a dual-purpose coordination

tool. Like the now obsolete bomb safety line, it protected

friendly troops from air-to-surface fratricide. Additionally, the

FSCL required that higher echelons coordinate artillery fire

with the corps before employing fire short of the line.

A new edition (published in 1965) of FM 6-20-1, Field

Artillery Tactics, slightly modified the definition and doctrinal

use of the FSCL. Instead of being established by a corps

commander, the FSCL was to be established by an appropr iate

ground commander. Furthermore, the ground commander

was required to consult with the tactical air commander and

other supporting elements prior to placing the FSCL. Normally

the FSCL was placed at the maximum range of the ground

commander’s organic indirect-fire artillery systems.43

In an effort to standardize US Army doctrine with NATO

doctrine, the 1967 version of Field Artillery Tactics produced

some important changes to the FSCL definition. This release

of Field Artillery Tactics defined the FSCL as “a line which

takes the place of the bomb line. It should be established by

the appropriate land (normally the corps) commander in

consultation with the Tactical Air Commander or his delegate.

It is used to coordinate supporting fire by forces not under the

control of the appropriate land force commander which may

affect tactical operations. The FSCL should be as close to the

forward elements as possible, consistent with troop safety and

the tactical situation. Furthermore it should be easy to define

on a map and easy to identify from the air.” 44 This definition

of the FSCL emphasized fratricide prevention over managing

terrain for ground maneuver or artillery fire support. In this

regard, the 1967 FSCL was actually quite similar to its earliest

ancestor, the bomb safety line. Another improvement

introduced by this new FSCL definition should be noted. By

specifying that the FSCL be positioned “as close to the forward

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18
elements as possible,” the enemy’s potential for engagement

by US airpower was maximized.

FSCL doctrine remained stable for 10 years, probably

because of the US Army’s focus on unconventional warfare in

Southeast Asia. The 1977 edition of FM 6-20, Fire Support in

Combined Arms Operations, defined the FSCL as “a line

beyond which all targets may be attacked by any weapon

system without endangering friendly troops or requiring

additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.”45

During this period the Army’s war-fighting doctrine was active

defense, which relied heavily upon Air Force close air support.

Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations stated that the

FSCL could be considered a dividing line between planned

CAS support and air interdiction missions.46 Since the 1977

definition did not demand FSCL positioning close to friendly

troops, it became standard practice for the Army to establish

the coordination measure at maximum artillery range.

Normally this distance was 10 to 20 km from the forward line

of own troops (FLOT).47 It is important to note that in this

definition the Army considered the FSCL to be a permissive

fire support coordination measure (FSCM). The phrase—

beyond which all targets may be attacked by any weapon

system without . . . coordination with the establishing

headquarters—clearly indicates that forward of the FSCL,

there were no procedural restrictions to the permissive

employment of airpower and firepower. However, since only

the Air Force operated weapon systems that could be

employed beyond the FSCL, the coordination line actually

served as an unofficial battlefield boundary for targeting

synchronization between the services.

The final step in the evolution of FSCL doctrine before the

Persian Gulf War occurred in 1989. A new definition was

produced in JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, and the Army specified

additional FSCL guidance in FM 6-20-30, Fire Support for

Corps and Division Operations. JP 1-02 defined the FSCL as

a line established by the appropriate ground commander to ensure

coordination of fire not under the commander’s control but which may

affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is

used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using

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19
any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support

coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. The

establishment of the fire support coordination line must be

coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other

supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward

of the fire support coordination line, without prior coordination with

the ground force commander, provided the attack will not produce

adverse effects on, or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface

targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate

ground force commander.48

The fact that joint doctrine required the ground commander

to coordinate with his supporting commanders when

establishing or moving the FSCL indicates Air Force concern

with the line’s location. During the previous decade the Army

had been using its maximum artillery range to guide FSCL

positioning. This was a very satisfactory arrangement for the

air commander, who could synchronize operations forward of

a relatively shallow coordination line. However, the Army had

recently fielded the AH-64A and was preparing to produce the

ATACMS. The increased range of these weapon systems, if

used to determine FSCL location, would seriously restrict

airpower access to the enemy on the battlefield. 49 Though not

a joint publication, FM 6-20-30 augmented joint FSCL

doctrine to guide the soldier. The field manual stated that “the

attack of targets beyond the FSCL by Army assets should be

coordinated with supporting tactical air . . . however, the

inability to effect this coordination does not preclude the

attack of targets beyond the FSCL.”50 This statement, which

emphasized the Army’s assertion that the FSCL was a

permissive coordination measure for targets forward of the

line, was troublesome for the Air Force. To airmen it reflected

a lack of concern within the Army for surface-to-air fratricide

and perhaps an attempt to extend targeting authority into

terrain traditionally under the jurisdiction of air commanders.

Synthesis

During the 15 years from 1975—when General DePuy

introduced active defense—until 1990 when Saddam Hussein’s

forces invaded Kuwait, the US Army and Air Force worked

together to field a powerful war-fighting team. The Army’s

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AirLand Battle doctrine symbolized the bond between the two

services. AirLand Battle was doctrine for the operational level

of war and was designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact in a

conventional European conflict. A central aspect of AirLand

Battle was the role of deep operations, which were conducted

to set the conditions for decisive victory in the close battle.

When AirLand Battle doctrine was officially introduced in

1982, the Air Force was solely responsible for planning and

executing deep-attack operations. The Army’s close battle was

completely dependent upon the conditions set by the Air Force

in the deep battle—requiring the component commanders to

effectively synchronize their operations in time and purpose.

As the Persian Gulf War approached, two issues threatened

to disrupt AirLand Battle synchronization. First, the Army and

Air Force had different historical and doctrinal interpretations

of the FSCL. The Army viewed the FSCL primarily as a

permissive fire control measure, while the Air Force saw the

FSCL as a means for the prevention of fratricide and a

boundary for division of the battlefield. Since the land

component commander set the position of the FSCL, often at

maximum organic fires range, the Air Force was very

concerned about being pushed out of the battle area. The

second issue that threatened to disrupt AirLand operations

was target selection for the deep battle. As has been the case

since the dawn of military aviation, the land commander

naturally wants to participate in the airpower targeting and

allocation process. The pressure on the land commander to

control airpower is especially intense under AirLand Battle

doctrine, because airpower prosecutes the AirLand deep

battle. These potential problems aside, AirLand Battle doctrine

was ready for its first test in January 1991, and hope among

airmen and soldiers was high.

Notes

1. Robert J. Dixon, “TAC-TRADOC Dialogue,” Strategic Review 6, no. 1

(Winter 1978): 46. General Dixon was commander of Tactical Air Command

from 1973 until 1978.

2. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1961–1984, vol. 2 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1989), 347–49, 547–48.

LAUGHBAUM

21
3. Harold R. Winton, “Partnership in Tension: The Army and Air Force

between Vietnam and Desert Shield,” Parameters 26, no. 1 (Spring 1996):

101.

4. John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort

Monroe, Va.: TRADOC Center of Military History, 1997), 16.

5. Futrell, 548–49.

6. William S. Lind, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States

Army,” Military Review 57, no. 3 (March 1977): 54–65.

7. FM 100-5, Operations, 1976, 1-1.

8. Romjue, 19.

9. FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, 1984, 4-4 to 4-9.

10. FM 100-5, Operations, 1982, 2-1.

11. John L. Romjue, “The Evolution of the AirLand Battle Concept,” Air

University Review 35, no. 4 (May–June 1984): 6.

12. David H. Zook, The Fire Support Coordination Line: Is It Time to

Reconsider Our Doctrine? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General

Staff College, 1992), 75.

13. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 1996–97 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s

Information Group, 1997), 661–64.

14. US Third Army, Deep Operations Standard Operating Procedures

(Fort McPherson, Ga.: Department of the Army, 1 December 1989), C-1.

15. Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 1996–97 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s

Information Group, 1997), 780.

16. Deep Operations Standard Operating Procedures, C-2.

17. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, 1989, C-1 to C-3.

18. FM 6-20, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle, 1988, 2-2.

19. Futrell, 494.

20. Ibid.

21. AFM 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1975, 3-2.

22. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough?

Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969 (New York: Harper and Row,

1969), 221–22.

23. AFM 1-1, 1975, 3-2.

24. Futrell, 548.

25. Ibid., 540.

26. Ibid., 542.

27. TAC-TRADOC ALFA, Air Land Bulletin, 25 September 1981, 5.

28. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force ,

February 1979, 2-13.

29. Robert D. Rasmussen, “The Central Europe Battlefield: Doctrinal

Implications for Counterair-Interdiction,” Air University Review 29, no. 5

(July–August 1978): 11–13.

30. FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, July 1943, 1-2.

“The inherent flexibility of airpower is its greatest asset.”

31. Futrell, 554.

32. AFM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 1969, 7-1.

CADRE PAPER

22
33. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The

Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982 (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC

Center for Military History, 1984), 62–63.

34. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force ,

1984, 3-3 to 3-4. According to this manual, air interdiction against targets

that are close enough to have a near-term effect on friendly ground forces is

called battlefield air interdiction. The manual adds, “the primary difference

between battlefield air interdiction and the remainder of the air interdiction

effort is the level of interest and emphasis the land commander places on

the process of identifying, selecting, and attacking certain targets.

Therefore, battlefield air interdiction requires joint coordination at the

component level during planning, but once planned, battlefield air

interdiction is controlled and executed by the air commander as an integral

part of a total air interdiction campaign.”

35. NATO Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 27(B), Offensive Air Support

Operations (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardisation, 1983),

3-2 to 3-3.

36. AFM 2-1, 1969, 7-1.

37. Winton, 110.

38. FM 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques, 1942, 42.

39. Benjamin Franklin Cooling, ed., Case Studies in the Development of

Close Air Support (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 271.

40. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of

France and Germany 1944–1945 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University

Press, 1981), 117.

41. FM 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques, 1948, 95–98.

42. FM 6-20-1, Field Artillery Tactics, 1961, 30–31.

43. FM 6-20-1, Field Artillery Tactics, 1965, 23.

44. FM 6-20-1, Field Artillery Tactics, with Change 1, 1967, 23–24.

45. FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, 1977, 3–15.

46. Ibid., D-4.

47. Winton, 113.

48. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, December 1989, 146.

49. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Making the Most of Air Power,” Field Artillery,

September–October 1996, 5.

50. FM 6-20-30, Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, 1989, F-3.

LAUGHBAUM

23
Chapter 3

Deep Battle during the Persian Gulf War

Of all the lessons we learned about tactical air operations,

perhaps the most important is that the air commander must

have a sincere desire to become part of the ground team.

The army must, of course, have the same dedication to

reciprocate.

—Lt Gen Elwood “Pete” Quesada 

IX Tactical Air Command, 1944

Iraq invaded Kuwait at 0200 hours on 2 August 1990. 1 Its

invasion force, which included three armored divisions

supported by attack helicopters and fighters, quickly

surprised and overwhelmed the Kuwaiti defenders. The Iraqi

army captured Kuwait City by noon and reached the Saudi

Arabian border early the following morning.2

Six days after Iraq’s invasion, President George H. Bush

announced the US objectives in the Persian Gulf region to

counter the Iraqi aggression were to:

• secure the immediate, unconditional, and complete

withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait,

• restore Kuwait’s legitimate government,

• assure the security and stability of the Persian Gulf

region, and

• protect the lives of American citizens abroad.3

During the next four months, the Iraqis deployed forces to

increase their combat power in the Kuwaiti theater of

operations (KTO). By January 1991, Iraq had positioned 42

divisions within the KTO.4 The Iraqis arrayed their ground

forces in a multitiered defense in depth, somewhat modeled on

Soviet doctrine. The first tier included Iraqi Reserve Army

infantry divisions, which built an elaborate defensive network

containing trenches, minefields, and barbed wire. The second

tier consisted of Regular Army armored divisions whose

mission was to conduct a mobile defense. Finally, six

Republican Guard divisions, three each of armor and infantry,

25
defined the third tier. The Republican Guard was tasked with

counterattacking any Coalition force that penetrated the first

two defensive layers.5

Thirty-one states formed a Coalition to oppose the Iraqis.

The Coalition forces included 1,800 combat aircraft and

540,000 soldiers and marines.6 Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, served as

commander in chief (CINC) for all US forces in theater.

Initially, the United States deployed a single corps to the

region, the XVIII Airborne Corps, but in early November

President Bush decided to send the VII Corps as well.

Deploying the VII Corps, which was stationed in Germany,

provided General Schwarzkopf with sufficient combat power to

cross the Saudi border and forcibly eject the Iraqi army from

the KTO.7

General Schwarzkopf designated Lt Gen Charles A. Horner

as the JFACC. General Horner was responsible for planning

and tasking theater air operations based on General

Schwarzkopf’s apportionment decisions. This responsibility

was a Herculean task. By the war’s end, more than 3,000

Coalition aircraft of all types were in the theater, flying more

than 2,000 missions per day. The JFACC used the air tasking

order (ATO) to manage air operations. During Operation

Desert Storm, the ATO directed nearly all fixed-wing sorties,

the exception being naval aircraft remaining at sea.

Helicopters flying at less than 500 feet were also exempted

from JFACC control.8

The CENTCOM staff developed a four-phase theater campaign

plan for Desert Storm. The JFACC managed the first three

phases, while General Schwarzkopf directed the final phase.

Phase I was a strategic air campaign. US Air Forces Central

Command (CENTAF) air planners identified three centers of

gravity for targeting during the strategic air campaign:

leadership, infrastructure, and military forces.9 In USAF

doctrine, air superiority is normally an air campaign’s first

objective.10 Efforts to gain and maintain regional air

superiority began during the first moments of phase I and

continued during the rest of the war. Air planners used

strategic attack to shorten the time required to achieve air

superiority. Phase II was designed to gain air supremacy in

CADRE PAPER

26
the KTO. This effort included rolling back the Iraqi air defense

system thereby establishing a relatively permissive air

environment over the KTO. During phase III the JFACC

conducted deep operations to prepare the battlefield for the

future ground offensive. To prepare the battlefield adequately,

General Schwarzkopf tasked the JFACC to significantly attrit

the Iraqi fielded forces with airpower. Specifically, 50 percent

of the Iraqi armor was ordered to be destroyed or disabled.

Finally, phase IV was the ground offensive. The primary

objectives of phase IV were to liberate Kuwait and to complete

the destruction of the Republican Guard.11

This chapter examines deep-battle targeting and application

of the FSCL during the Gulf War. Both issues were identified

as potential points of friction between the Air Force and Army

before Desert Storm. During the war, joint targeting and the

FSCL proved to be significant subjects of disagreement

between the two services. With regards to targeting, the US

Army’s after-action report, Operation Desert Storm Lessons

Learned, stated that “Desert Storm campaign plans highlighted

several shortcomings in joint targeting. First, CENTCOM

exercised no single targeting authority for lethal and nonlethal

fires, resulting in competing priorities between the CENTAF

and US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) planners.

The lack of common priorities between Army and Air

component planners led to the perception among ground

commanders that the air operation was unresponsive to

shaping the battlefield.”12 Interpretation and movement of the

FSCL caused as much frustration between airmen and

soldiers as did targeting disagreements. After the Army

significantly extended FSCL range from the FLOT on the last

day of the war, an Air Force officer stated, “The safest place for

an Iraqi to be was just behind the FSCL.” 13

Deep-Battle Targeting

The Coalition launched combat operations on 17 January

1991. At 0238 hours, AH-64s fired the first shots of the war at

an early warning radar site in southern Iraq. The JFACCs first

objective, air superiority, was achieved within 24 hours. 14 The

Coalition prosecuted an intensive air campaign against Iraqi

LAUGHBAUM

27
fielded forces, leadership, weapons of mass destruction, and

infrastructure for the next 45 days. Although the CENTCOM

staff conceptualized the war in terms of sequential phases, the

JFACC initiated the first three phases simultaneously.

Airpower attacked strategic, operational, and tactical targets

in parallel, so the campaign phases should instead be thought

of as priorities of interest. Phase I, the strategic air campaign,

was emphasized during the first week of the war. General

Schwarzkopf identified the Republican Guard as a strategic

target, hence air-land deep battle against fielded forces began

almost immediately. More than 700 missions were flown

against the Iraqi army during the first seven days of the war. 15

Additionally, strategic attacks against the Iraqi leadership also

contributed to the Coalition’s efforts to shape the battlefield.

The Iraqis had six corps in the KTO but lacked an overall

commander in theater. Instead, Saddam maintained

centralized control over his forces from Baghdad. Although the

effects are difficult to assess accurately, strategic attacks

against the Iraqi centralized command and control system

degraded Saddam’s ability to coordinate military operations in

Kuwait and southern Iraq.16

General Schwarzkopf shifted the emphasis from strategic

attack to battlefield preparation during the second week of air

combat. The JFACC tasked 2,800 missions into the KTO

during the same week. Airpower’s primary focus remained on

attacking Iraqi fielded forces in the KTO, especially the

Republican Guard, from this time until the end of the war.

Figure 1 displays airpower missions devoted to battlefield

preparation, air superiority, and strategic attack during

Desert Storm.17

During the final three weeks of the war, missions against

the Iraqi army increased from 3,500 to more than 4,000 per

week. In total, 89 percent of all JFACC missions were tasked

to support battlefield preparation.18

Coalition ground forces attacked at 0100 hours on 24

February 1991. The Coalition’s main effort was a single

envelopment from the west by the US VII Corps. VII Corps’

mission, as restated by the corps commander, was “on order,

VII Corps attacks to envelop and penetrate Iraqi defenses and

destroy the Republican Guard Forces in zone; be prepared to

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28
defend the northern Kuwait border to prevent [the Iraqis from]

re-seizing Kuwait.”19

The XVIII Airborne Corps was positioned west of VII Corps.

The XVIII Corps was ordered to protect the main effort’s flank

and to attack toward the Euphrates River valley. East of the

main effort were the Coalition forces and the US Marine Forces

Central Command (MARCENT) divisions. MARCENT, composed

primarily of US Marines, attacked north towards Kuwait City. 20

Figure 2 shows the Coalition ground force’s multiple axis attack.

During the Gulf War, the US corps commanders and

ARCENT leaders made repeated complaints about inadequate

battlefield preparation, as well as the JFACC’s proper role in

the conduct of the deep battle. With regards to battlefield

preparation, the Army perceived that the JFACC was not

focusing on the needs of the ground force and claimed that he

was ignoring the targets they nominated for interdiction. An

ARCENT situation report on 18 February stated that “air

Source: Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS), vol. 2, pt. 2, Effects and Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.:

Government Printing Office, 1993), 269.

Figure 1. Combat Missions during the Persian Gulf War

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29
support related issues continue to plague the final preparation

of combat operations, and raise doubts concerning our ability

to shape the battlefield prior to the initiation of the ground

campaign. Too few sorties are made available to VII and XVIII

Corps. And while air support missions are being flown against

1st echelon enemy divisions, Army nominated targets are not

being serviced. Efforts must be taken now to align the

objectives of the air and ground campaigns to ensure the

success of our future operations.”21 Lt Gen Frederick M.

Franks, VII Corps commander, complained that the JFACC

attacked only 300 of his 2,000 nominated targets. 22 The field

commanders were worried about Iraqi artillery near the front,

which in some cases outranged US tube artillery. If the Iraqi

artillery was left unchecked, it could cause heavy American

casualties during the ground war’s initial trench and obstacle

breaching operations.

Source: GWAPS Summary Report, 9.

Figure 2. Coalition Ground Offensive

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30
When considering the number and percentage of air

interdiction missions targeted against the Iraqi fielded forces,

it seems inconceivable that ARCENT and the corps commanders could complain about the JFACC’s dedication to

battlefield preparation. Figure 3 displays the number of air

interdiction missions, per kill box, allocated to battlefield

preparation. The field commanders had valid concerns, but

the focus of their complaints should not have been on the

JFACC. The JFACC was simply following the CINC’s guidance.

General Schwarzkopf denied a certain quantity of airpower

to the two US Army corps for several reasons. First, a critical

component of the ground campaign was the element of

surprise. The Iraqis thought the Coalition would attack either

north along the coast or by way of the Wadi al-Batin. 23 To

surprise the enemy with an envelopment from the far west,

Source: GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1.

Figure 3. Air Interdiction Missions Supporting Battlefield Preparation

by Kill Box

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31
the CINC initially limited the number of interdiction missions

in the western KTO. Second, on 12 February, the CINC

directed the JFACC not to attack Iraqi divisions that were at

less that 50 percent strength. Since nearly all of the Iraqi

divisions in the VII and XVIII corps sectors were assessed at

less than 50 percent strength with 10 days remaining until

the ground war, the JFACC targeted the stronger Iraqi units

elsewhere in theater. General Schwarzkopf’s highest priority

targets in the KTO were the Republican Guard armored

divisions. Throughout the entire battlefield preparation phase

the Republican Guard divisions were rated at well over 50

percent strength. Consequently, these divisions received a

very high percentage of the air interdiction effort. 24 This action

made strategic and operational sense, as attriting the

Republican Guard ultimately best served the interests of the

corps commanders.

Finally, many of the corps’ air interdiction nominations

were rejected through General Schwarzkopf’s target selection

process. During Desert Storm, the CINC developed an ad hoc

system to review interdiction nominations. Instead of forming

a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) or similar forum to

examine corps interdiction requests in a joint environment,

all requests were reviewed by Lt Gen Calvin Waller, the

CENTCOM DCINC. General Waller accepted approximately 40

interdiction nominations per day from each corps. His staff

then reviewed the nominations, judging them for validity and

suitability. Many targets were rejected by General Waller

because CENTCOM had more timely and accurate target

intelligence than was organically available at the corps level.

General Waller’s staff began this process at 1200 ea ch day,

and at 1800 sent the list of targets to the JFACC. General

Horner then assigned aircraft to attack each DCINC approved

target.25

ARCENT and General Franks misidentified the reasons why

many of their air interdiction nominations were rejected. The

problem was not, as many in the Army assessed, a failure of

airmen to support soldiers. As was stated earlier, 89 percent

of all JFACC missions were tasked to prepare the battlefield.

This fact is a testament to the JFACC’s interest in supporting

land forces with airpower. The JFACC executed the air

CADRE PAPER

32
campaign in accordance with the desires of the CINC.

Unfortunately, General Schwarzkopf did not notify his corps

commanders of his theater priorities for airpower. Moreover,

the corps commanders were unaware that it was General

Schwarzkopf’s staff who re-directed much of the air interdic tion

effort in the KTO towards targets, such as the Republican

Guard, whose destruction best achieved the CINC’s operationallevel objectives.26 Therefore, the problem was actually a communications breakdown between the CINC, the ARCENT staff,

the corps commanders, and the air component.

There were two systems available through which ARCENT

and the corps commanders should have been better informed

about the JFACC’s air campaign: a JTCB and the BCE. A joint

target coordination board creates a forum where the JFACCs

can explain their airpower targeting priorities to the component

commanders. The JTCB also gives the field commanders an

opportunity to express their airpower requirements to the

JFACC. Essentially, a JTCB should facilitate communication

between airmen and soldiers at the senior command level.

General Schwarzkopf chose not to form this type of board.

Consequently, the field commanders had no direct contact

with the air commander, creating an environment of mistrust.

According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, “regardless of the

reasons for not establishing a theater command-level target

advisory board, the absence of such a board meant that a

formal communications channel did not exist for Army corps

commanders to express their concerns to the CINC and the

JFACC about targeting. . . . Instead, the ground commanders

approached Schwarzkopf’s deputy, Gen. Calvin Waller.” 27

General Waller actually formed a low-level targeting board

composed of a Marine lieutenant colonel, an Army captain,

and an Air Force captain. This board, although named a

JTCB, simply reviewed corps nominated targets in the KTO. 28

Since a command-level targeting coordination board was not

formed, there was no effective joint campaign oversight. 29

Although a senior-level JTCB was not formed during the Gulf

War, a battlefield coordination element was established and

functioned during the conflict. The BCE, which operated in

the TACC, should have kept ARCENT informed of the direction

and focus of the air campaign. Besides explaining the current

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33
ground situation to the JFACC, the BCE was tasked to provide

a conduit of information and intelligence between the TACC

and ARCENT headquarters. The US Army’s Desert Storm

after-action report stated that communication between the

BCE and ARCENT was not effective. This failure to

communicate added to the confusion and concern at the VII

and XVIII Corps over the direction of the JFACC’s effort in the

KTO.30

General Horner’s air effort to prepare the battlefield closely

reflected the desires of the CINC. The air campaign was

focused at the operational level of war. By almost any measure

it was extremely effective. The Gulf War Air Power Survey

stated that “by creating the conditions under which

CENTCOM could redeploy its forces, and by executing an

almost ceaseless campaign against enemy forces in the KTO,

air power established the conditions under which Coalition

ground forces could catch enemy forces by surprise. Airpower

destroyed whatever willingness most [Iraqis] might have had

to fight the ground battle.”31 The conflicts over targeting and

resulting mistrust between soldiers and airmen were primarily

a result of communication breakdowns. If the JFACC’s

purpose in the deep battle was to set the proper conditions for

a successful ground force close battle, then Army criticisms of

the JFACC’s airpower targeting were a result of

misperceptions, which is an old issue. In North Africa during

1943, British general Bernard Montgomery’s staffs had similar

communication and perception problems. General Montgomery

observed, “All that is required is that the two staffs, army and

air, should work together at the same headquarters in

complete harmony, and with complete mutual understanding

and confidence.”32

Fire Support Coordination Line Friction

The US military deployed to Southwest Asia with FSCL

guidance specified in joint doctrine. However, FSCL use

during Desert Storm often did not comply with doctrine, and

at critical times disrupted the synchronization of the deep

battle. Few issues divided the Air Force and Army more than

the application of the FSCL.

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34
During the air war the FSCL was positioned on the Saudi

northern border by the CENTCOM staff.33 This placement

maximized the JFACC’s ability to shape the battlefield through

air interdiction because the JFACC used the FSCL as a

dividing line between planned air interdiction and CAS

operations.34 The JFACC accepted the responsibility to

synchronize all deep-attack operations during the air war.

General Horner stated, “if it’s inside the fire support

coordination line, don’t bother to tell me. If it’s [not], put it in

the ATO.”35 The FSCL’s location and the requirement to

coordinate all operations beyond it were troublesome issues

for several Army commanders. General Abrams, the VII Corps

Artillery commander, claimed that the Air Force was using the

FSCL in a restrictive manner, preventing the timely execution

of deep fires and attack helicopter operations. Typically,

coordination and clearance to fire beyond the FSCL required

30 minutes to two hours. The 1st Cavalry Division Executive

Summary made a similar observation: “Fire support measures

were not doctrinally applied. The corps FSCL was too

restrictive. It [the FSCL] was positioned too close and used

more as an RFL [restrictive fire line]. It hindered engagement

of targets of opportunity and counterbattery targets. . . . It

denied the division commander the ability to direct artillery

fires onto his priority targets.”36 The US Army’s Desert Storm

after-action report also criticized the JFACC’s use of the FSCL,

claiming joint doctrine clearly described the coordination line

as a permissive measure and “in no way establishes territorial

jurisdiction for the air component commander.” 37

The JFACC intentionally used the FSCL as a restrictive

measure. He did this not only to synchronize deep operatio ns

but also to prevent surface-to-air and fighter-to-helicopter

fratricide. As was illustrated earlier, the JFACC had reason to

use the FSCL in this manner, since historically airmen viewed

it as a line between Army operations in the AirLand close

battle and Air Force dominated activities in the deep batt le.

It is important to note that General Schwarzkopf was both

joint forces land component commander (JFLCC) and CINC.

As JFLCC, he set the FSCL position during the air w ar. As

CINC, he established the battlefield preparation goals to guide

the JFACC’s air effort.38 With most Army deep-attack weapon

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35
systems on the sidelines and the JFACC properly shaping the

KTO for the future close battle, the CINC approved the

coordination requirements deemed necessary by General Horner.

To precisely coordinate fires during the ground offensive,

corps planners developed a series of on-order FSCLs, all

associated with phase lines. FSCL progression, by day of the

ground war, is displayed in Figure 4.

During the opening period of the ground war, each corps set

an FSCL location for its sector. This was in contrast to the

FSCL established during the air war, which was controlled by

the JFLCC. The first FSCL implemented by the VII Corps for

its offensive was located 25 km beyond the Saudi northern

border. On 24 February the FSCLs progressed at a rate

relatively consistent with the advance of the land forces. 39

Corps efforts to shape the battlefield were accomplished

Source: Richard B. H. Lewis, Desert Storm—JFACC Problems Associated with Battlefield Preparation (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1993), 24.

Figure 4. Fire Support Coordination Line Movements by Day, 1800L

CADRE PAPER

36
through artillery fires, attack helicopter operations, and

dedicated CAS missions. As had been the practice during the

air war, the corps were restricted from attacking targets

beyond the FSCL unless clearance from the TACC was

acquired.40 The TACC created another type of coordination

line that was located 30 km beyond and parallel to the FSCL.

This line, since nicknamed the Horner Line, was part of the

JFACC’s effort to precisely shape the battlefield just beyond

the FSCL. Between the FSCL and the Horner Line, air

interdiction missions were directed to kill boxes, where a killer

scout would assist in targeting. A killer scout was typically an

experienced F-16 fighter pilot who was familiar with the

enemy disposition in the area. If the ground forces required

additional CAS support short of the FSCL, kill box air

interdiction missions could easily have been retasked to close

air support roles by the airborne battlefield command and

control center (ABCCC). This requirement was not necessary

because preplanned and push CAS missions fulfilled corps air

support requirements.41 The TACC was very concerned with

the risk of air-to-surface fratricide; therefore, it required all

Coalition CAS missions short of the FSCL to be executed

under the positive control of a forward air controller (FAC). 42

A primary objective for the ground campaign was the

destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard. On 27 February

Army intelligence assets and JSTARS43 detected indications

that the Iraqi army was preparing to retreat from Kuwait. 44 In

an effort to prevent the escape of the Iraqis by means of

maneuver, firepower, and CAS, the VII and XVIII Corps

commanders independently extended the range of the FSCL.

These actions had the unintended effect of giving the Iraqis

sanctuary from Coalition airpower and ultimately permitted

the nearly unimpeded escape of most enemy troops and much

of their equipment to Iraq. It is important to examine the

specifics and rationale for both of these FSCL movements.

On 27 February Coalition aircraft were attacking Iraqi forces

attempting to flee from northeastern Kuwait. At the same time,

VII Corps had accomplished its sweeping right turn from north

and was attacking to the northeast in sector. General Franks

believed that his corps was on the verge of defeating the

remaining Iraqi defenses and was preparing to conduct pursuit

LAUGHBAUM

37
operations to complete the envelopment and destruction of the

Republican Guard in his sector. Corps leaders, concerned

about fratricide and their perceived inability to properly shape

the battlefield with organic assets, notified the TACC in Riyadh

that the FSCL was to be moved east of the coastal highway

leading north from Kuwait City. This action placed the FSCL

approximately 80 km beyond the FLOT. General Horner and

Brig Gen Buster C. Glosson, whose aircraft were executing

massive attacks against the retreating Iraqis, pleaded with

General Schwarzkopf to return the FSCL to a position where air

and land attacks could be synchronized.45 General Franks

countered the JFACC and persuaded the CINC to maintain the

FSCL’s coastal location. Fatefully, the VII Corps ground attack

stalled. This series of events created a situation where the VII

Corps had nothing but CAS to apply in the deep battle. Since it

is difficult to achieve a massive quantity of firepower with CAS, a

form of sanctuary was created for the Iraqis in northeastern

Kuwait, which allowed the Hammurabi and Medina Republican

Guard Divisions to escape to Iraq. Col Richard B. H. Lewis, who

served as an air campaign planner during the war, called this

incident “the number one mistake of the ground campai gn.”46

A similar event occurred on the same day in the XVIII

Airborne Corps sector. The Iraqi army, in addition to

retreating along the coastal highway from Kuwait City, was

also canalized on the Hawr Al Hammar causeway. The

causeway passes over a swampy area just south of the

Euphrates River. Iraqi forces in column on the causeway

presented a perfect opportunity for the mass employment of

airpower. Since the Hawr Al Hammar causeway was north of

the FSCL, the TACC sent fighters to exploit the circumstances.

Lt Gen Gary Luck, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, was

also aware of the situation on the causeway. He tasked the

101st Airborne Division, under the command of Maj Gen

Binford Peay, to attack the enemy traveling on the causeway

and other roads northeast of Basrah.47

To eliminate coordination requirements with the JFACC,

General Luck moved the FSCL to a position well to the north of

the Euphrates River.48 Unlike the FSCL controversy in the area

north of Kuwait City, this FSCL change was not rationalized by

the movement of Coalition ground forces. No Coalition ground

CADRE PAPER

38
troops were north of the Euphrates, and there were no plans

to position them there—Coalition ground forces were still 60

km from Basrah when hostilities ceased. Instead, by moving

the line forward, the XVIII Corps staff avoided JFACC control

over its 101st Division Apache helicopters, the weapon

system selected for the deep operation.49

The TACC immediately objected to the FSCL location

because it prevented air interdiction missions against the

Iraqi armor on the causeway and pontoon bridges over the

Euphrates. Col Michael Reavey, director of night operations

at TACC, stated that “the Army would attempt to coordinate

an FSCL move with us without really thinking through the

impact of what that was going to do to our campaign and

our ability to support them. . . . The Army was moving the

FSCL well out past where they were going to impact on

anything it seemed to us, and when they did that they took

away airspace and ground area for us to hit.” 50 The TACC

appealed the FSCL change directly to General Schwarzkopf.

After 15 hours the CINC altered the FSCL position to a

location south of the Euphrates. During the interim,

Coalition airpower was essentially restricted from attacking

the causeway and highways north of the Euphrates because

no FACs were available. Nearly all of the FACs were

concentrated farther south in Kuwait supporting other CAS

missions, especially along the coastal highway north of

Kuwait City where VII Corps had moved its FSCL. 51 XVIII

Airborne Corps ground FACs were also not in a position to

provide CAS direct control in the Hawr Al Hammar area

because they were located many miles away with the rest of

the airborne corps’ ground forces.

Without question, the XVIII Airborne Corps decision to

extend the FSCL north of the Euphrates River disrupted the

synchronization of the deep battle along the Kuwaiti

frontier. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, “the

placement of the coordination line [north of the Euphrates]

created a zone of diminished effectiveness for air power . . .

it is clear that Iraqi forces benefited from the shortcomings

of Army/Air Force coordination.”52

LAUGHBAUM

39
Synthesis and Challenges

To fully grasp the problems associated with FSCL use

during the Persian Gulf War, it is important to remember the

coordination line’s development and the services’ interpretations

of FSCL and AirLand Battle doctrine. General Horner

orchestrated the deep battle—that was the historic role of the

air commander under AirLand Battle doctrine. To ensure

synchronization of Army organic firepower into the deep battle

and to reduce the possibility of surface-to-air fratricide, he

used the FSCL in a restrictive fashion. General Horner

required that all Army weapons employment beyond the FSCL

either be included on the ATO or receive real-time clearance to

fire from the TACC.53 Essentially, the JFACC used the FSCL

to delineate a forward boundary for the ground commander’s

area of responsibility.

The JFACC’s application of the FSCL, though completely

understandable to airmen, violated joint doctrine. JP 1-02

stated that “supporting elements may attack targets forward

of the FSCL without prior coordination with the ground

commander, provided the attack will not produce adverse

surface effects on, or to the rear of the line.” 54 This 1989

guidance demands coordination short of the FSCL, but

beyond the line encourages permissive employment of

firepower. Additionally, joint doctrine directed the land force

commander to coordinate with the air commander before

establishing or moving an FSCL, but no provision was made

to protect aviators from surface-to-air fratricide.

The JFACC’s use of the coordination line frustrated the VII

and XVIII Corps commanders as well as their subordinates

who were involved in deep operations planning and execution.

Army AirLand Battle doctrine placed the responsibility for

synchronizing the deep battle with the corps commanders and

their staffs.55 To retain control of their weapon systems during

attack operations, both the VII and XVIII Corps commanders

chose to radically extend the range of their respective FSCLs.

Joint doctrine did not address a specific range for FSCL

placement. The air commander wanted it as close to the FLOT

as safety allowed, thus maximizing his unimpeded access to

the battlefield. When AirLand Battle doctrine was introduced,

CADRE PAPER

40
US Army doctrine recommended that the FSCL be used as a

boundary between planned CAS and air interdiction. 56

Traditionally, Army ground commanders set it as close as

practical to their forward troops, normally 10 to 20 km from

the FLOT at maximum organic artillery range. This arrangement both satisfied the air commander and complied with

Army doctrinal requirements. However by 1989, the Army no

longer planned to keep the FSCL as close as practical to the

troops. Instead, corps doctrine advised placing the line beyond

the area in which the corps intends to execute deep operations.57 With the Army’s acquisition of long-range organic

firepower during the late 1980s, logic suggested the FSCL distance from the FLOT would increase dramatically.

During the Persian Gulf War, FSCL disagreements and

targeting concerns between the Air Force and Army were

multifaceted. Joint and service doctrine must address these

problems. Targeting objections were mostly the result of

communication and coordination breakdowns. For example,

the lack of a senior-level JTCB prevented the corps command ers

from comprehending the intent of General Horner’s air

campaign plan.58 Additionally, because there was no JTCB,

the JFACC was unable to address adequately the corps

commanders’ displeasure with unfulfilled air interdiction

requests. Finally, the failure of the BCE to keep ARCENT and

the corps commanders aware of the airpower focus during

battlefield preparation increased frustration and distrust

between soldiers and airmen.

FSCL difficulties during the Gulf War were more substantial

than communication failures. To synchronize deep operations,

the TACC used the FSCL as a boundary and wanted it close to

the FLOT. Obviously, airmen are concerned about fratricide

short of the line, but they are also uneasy about the fratricide

possibilities beyond the FSCL that a permissive interpretation

does not adequately address. The Army, in accordance with

joint doctrine, believes the FSCL is permissive. Soldiers

understand that positioning the FSCL is mission, enemy,

troops, terrain and weather, and time (METT-T) dependent, 59

and that the coordination line must be located sufficiently

deep to permit unconstrained fire and maneuver.

LAUGHBAUM

41
These disagreements between the Air Force and the Army

are serious, but in reality they point to a greater problem—a

conflict over who is ultimately responsible for synchronizing

the deep battle. During the Gulf War, the JFACC and both

corps commanders manipulated the FSCL to synchronize deep

operations. As a result, the deep battle lost its coherence and

ultimately much of the Iraqi army escaped destruction.

Notes

1. 0200 hours in Kuwait City is 0500 Greenwich mean time.

2. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Airpower and the Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 133.

3. Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the

Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 37.

4. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Summary Report (Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office [GPO], 1993), 8–10.

5. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations, 251.

6. GWAPS Summary Report, 7.

7. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The

Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995),

157.

8. GWAPS Summary Report, 3–6.

9. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, Planning the Air Campaign, 149–89.

10. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United

States Air Force, vol. 1, March 1992, 10.

11. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, 149–89.

12. Department of the Army, Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned

(Tait Report), vol. 3, Operational (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and

General Staff College, 1992), 3-1.

13. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 259.

14. GWAPS Summary Report, 11–12 and 56–57.

15. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 259 and 268.

16. GWAPS Summary Report, 70.

17. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 265–71.

18. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, Operations, 271–89.

19. David H. Zook, The Fire Support Coordination Line: Is It Time to

Reconsider Our Doctrine? (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General

Staff College, 1992), 101.

20. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 295–300.

21. Gordon and Trainor, 330.

22. Richard B. H. Lewis, Desert Storm—JFACC Problems Associated with

Battlefield Preparation (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College, 1993), 29.

23. Gordon and Trainor, 126–27. The Wadi al-Batin is a very wide

streambed that parallels the western Kuwaiti border with Iraq. It remains

CADRE PAPER

42
dry, hard, and flat during most of the year and is an excellent high-speed

avenue of attack for armor.

24. Lewis, 33–34.

25. Ibid., 6–7, 30–31.

26. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 284.

27. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, 63.

28. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2, Command and Control, 171.

29. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, 63.

30. Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned (Tait Report), 3-2 to 3-7.

31. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 326.

32. Bernard L. Montgomery, High Command in War (Tripoli, Libya:

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 1943), 2.

33. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, 232.

34. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 1, 339. CAS was not required until the ground

war began.

35. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2, 64.

36. Zook, 114–22. A restrictive fire line is “a line established between

converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires of their effects across

that line.” JP 3-09 (preliminary coordination), “Doctrine for Joint Fire

Support,” 1996, GL-7.

37. Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned (Tait Report), 3-11.

38. GWAPS Summary Report, 48–51 and 119.

39. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 2, 243.

40. Zook, 127–31.

41. Lewis, 23–24.

42. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 314.

43. JSTARS stands for joint surveillance, target attack radar system.

This aircraft, designated E-8C, is a highly modified Boeing 707 used for

battlefield target detection, surveillance, and battle management.

44. Zook, 3–4.

45. Buster C. Glosson was General Horner’s chief air campaign planner.

46. Lewis, 22–25.

47. Gordon and Trainor, 411–12.

48. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare?

(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 133–34.

49. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 257–59 and 315.

50. Gordon and Trainor, 411–12 and 511–12.

51. GWAPS, vol. 2, pt. 1, 315.

52. Ibid., 257.

53. GWAPS, vol. 1, pt. 2, 64.

54. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, December 1989, 146.

55. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, 1989, C-1 to C-3.

56. FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations, 1977, D-4.

57. FM 6-20-30, Fire Support for Corps and Division Operations, 1989, F-3.

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58. General Horner executed the air campaign with the complete

approval of General Schwarzkopf.

59. METT-T stands for mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and

time available. METT-T is a commander’s list of factors for consideration

when conducting his estimate.

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Chapter 4

Deep Battle Today

While serving as the chiefs of staff of their respective

services Gen Dennis J. Reimer, USA, and Gen Ronald R.

Fogleman, USAF, stated that “we have finally broken the

doctrinal logjam.”1 US war-fighting doctrine has steadily

matured since the end of the Persian Gulf War. During this

period numerous doctrine publications, position papers, and

articles have addressed the prosecution of deep battle. The

Army produced a new FM 100-5 that eliminated the term

AirLand Battle. The Air Force initially updated AFM 1-1 in

1992, and then completely replaced it in 1997 with a new

capstone publication named Air Force Doctrine Document

(AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine. Via AFDD 1 the Air Force

has reemphasized its vision of dominant and decisive air

operations. Additionally, the Air Force codified its JFACC

concept initially with the printing of the JFACC Primer and

most recently with publication of AFDD 2, Organization and

Employment of Aerospace Power. Finally, several joint

documents have also been published, some containing very

important deep-battle guidance for today’s air and land

commanders.

Earlier chapters have highlighted two major doctrinal

conflicts between soldiers and airmen pertaining to deep

operations. First, the services disagree over the definition and

application of the fire support coordination line. Second, both

the air commander and ground commander claim final

responsibility for prosecuting the deep battle. The previous

chapters also identified other deep-battle coordination

problems, including the proper roles and responsibilities for

the JTCB and the battlefield coordination element. This

chapter canvasses present Army, Air Force, and joint doctrine

for guidance and opinions relevant to deep operations. The

purpose of this examination is to determine if today’s US

war-fighting doctrine adequately addresses these problematic

issues and contributes to more effectively synchronizing the

deep battle.

45
Army Doctrinal Evolution

since the Persian Gulf War

The Army was thoroughly frustrated with the conduct of

deep operations during the Gulf War. This discontent has

manifested itself in the composition of several new doctrine

manuals. Army doctrine has forcefully accounted for each of

the major deep-battle problems identified by soldiers during

and after Operation Desert Storm.

In August 1991 General Franks was given the command of

TRADOC and subsequently promoted to four-star rank. As

TRADOC commander, General Franks was the principal

author for the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 and was the driving

force behind the Army’s doctrine producing tempest. 2

The new FM 100-5 eliminated the term AirLand Battle and

replaced it with Army Operations. The reasons for this change

were both symbolic and concrete. Army leadership believed

that the AirLand Battle label, which symbolized a tight

Army-Air Force bond, had become too restrictive for a joint

environment. The dissolution of the Soviet threat also

provided motivation to rename the doctrine. However, the

most important reason for the elimination of the term AirLand

Battle was the Army’s conclusion that organic long-range

weapons made soldiers less reliant on the Air Force in the

deep-battle arena.3

Conceptually, the critical change in FM 100-5 is the Army’s

vision of depth and simultaneous attack. Under the old

AirLand concept, the role of deep battle was to destroy or

delay the enemy’s reserve and exploitation forces, thereby

maintaining favorable force ratios for the close battle.

Essentially, deep operations shaped the battlefield to set the

conditions for victory in the close battle. That paradigm is

broken by today’s FM 100-5. The Army’s new doctrine uses

deep operations to “simultaneously engage enemy forces

throughout the depth of the battle area and achieve decisive

results rapidly. The purpose of these operations is to deny the

enemy freedom of action and to disrupt or destroy the

coherence and tempo of his operations.”4 This vision of the

battlefield, where the enemy has no sanctuary, closely

resembles Marshal Tukhachevski’s original intent for deep

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46
battle. “Modern combat resources allow the attack to be

mounted in such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously

over his whole depth [emphasis added] and to delay the

movement of his reserves to the threatened sector. . . . In this

way the enemy should be pinned down over the entire depth of

his dispositions, encircled and destroyed (emphasis in

original).”5 The 1993 FM 100-5 claims that the deep battle ma y

be the commander’s main effort, with the close battle in support.

Additionally, the doctrine states that on the modern battlefield

the lines of distinction between these two battles tend to blu r.6

During an interview in 1993, General Franks described his

concerns with the land force commander’s difficulties in

synchronizing operations on the battlefield.

This is the crux of the argument. . . . The land commander is given an

area of operations within which he is assigned a mission by the Joint

Force Commander (JFC). He does not normally have all other organic

assets to accomplish the mission there. When assets that are n ot organic

to him operate in that area, since he has the mission responsibilit y he

should also determine the priority of what targets are struck, or what

functions are struck by those external assets. . . . What you have

emerging is that the Joint Force Air Component Commander will

decide, or could decide, through the joint targeting board, priority and

numbers of targets struck beyond the fire support coordination line.

Now I don’t think that is a satisfactory solution. (Emphasis added) 7

General Franks’s assertion that the land commander should

synchronize all airpower and firepower in his assigned area of

operations (AO) is clearly reflected in current Army doctrine.

The Army recognizes that in the past airpower was the

predominate force in the deep battle; however, “the increasing

range and accuracy of projectile, rocket, and missile systems,

combined with maneuver and attack capabilities from attack

helicopters and light forces, now provide the Army commander

with his own organic operational-fires capability. The senior

army commander, in supporting the CINC’s campaign plan,

plans operational fires within his AO. His major role is to

synchronize ground and air operational fires in his AO to

achieve operational and tactical objectives.”8

Army FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater

Operations, assigns the land force commander the overall

responsibility for managing interdiction operations within his

AO. Decisive Force maintains that the senior Army commander

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47
is responsible for orchestrating organic and joint weapons

employment to “disrupt, delay, destroy, or degrade enemy

operational forces.”9 He is directed to specify target priority,

timing, and the desired effects to the supporting commanders.

Since the land force commander is the supported

commander,10 FM 100-7 relegates the JFACC to a supporting

role for all interdiction in the AO—even beyond the FSCL.

The Army raised serious complaints with the JFACC’s

restrictive use of the FSCL during the Gulf War. The Army’s

Desert Storm after-action report stated, “Joint doctrine

specifically identifies the FSCL as a permissive measure.

During Operation Desert Storm the Air Force required

coordination of all fires forward of the FSCL, implying that the

portion of the battlefield beyond the FSCL was the Air Force’s

responsibility. Joint doctrine [states] . . . supporting elements

may attack targets forward of the FSCL without prior

coordination. . . . This definition in no way restricts fires

[beyond the FSCL].”11 Decisive Force reiterates the Army’s

plans for establishing and using an FSCL. The doctrine

manual claims that, as the supported commander in his AO,

the land force commander is responsible for assigning any

restrictions or constraints for operations beyond the FSCL.

The field manual also states that supporting commanders,

like the JFACC, must follow the ground commander’s

guidance for activities beyond the coordination line. 12

The ground commander uses METT-T factors to determine

where the FSCL will be located. He bases his decision largely

on the balance between airpower and firepower support.

Additionally, the land force commander will place the

coordination line deep enough to permit the flexible

employment of his maneuver forces.13 During offensive

operations the US Third Army plans to position the FSCL at

80 to 100 km from the forward line of own troops. This

standard operating procedure accounts only for the maneuver

of friendly armor, not for aviation. When a planned deep

operation includes aviation, the FSCL’s distance from the

FLOT can increase to greater than 150 km. 14 General Luck’s

deep placement of the FSCL during the last day of the Gulf

War provides a model for contemporary Army doctrine and an

example for today’s land force commanders.

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Since Army commanders generally intend to establish the

FSCL deep within the area of operations, the coordination line

does not represent a demarcation between the close and deep

battles. Accordingly, CAS missions are expected to contribute

to the deep-battle effort. FM 100-7 also claims that air

interdiction targets can be located both short and long of the

FSCL. “Attack of planned interdiction targets on either side

requires no further coordination, assuming the attack is

proceeding as planned. Deviation from the plan requires

coordination with affected commanders.”15 The statement

implies that the ATO will provide sufficient coordination for air

interdiction short of the FSCL.

Recently published Army doctrine views the permissive

employment of fires beyond the FSCL as both a potential risk

and a necessity. Regarding these organic fires, FM 100-7

states they “must be coordinated with all other affected

commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary action to

avoid friendly casualties. . . . The inability to effect this

coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the

FSCL.” Army doctrine cautions soldiers to consider the

increased fratricide dangers that an uncoordinated attack

generates, implying that a balance should be achieved

between the risk of friendly fire and the benefits of target

destruction.16

To prosecute the deep battle with organic assets, the Army

has significantly increased its weapons capabilities since the

Persian Gulf War. The AH-64A fleet, totaling more than 750

airframes, is currently being modified with the Longbow target

acquisition and missile system. The modernized helicopter is

designated the AH-64D. The Longbow Apache retains all of the

AH-64A capabilities. Additionally, Longbow utilizes a

millimeter wave (MMW) radar to locate, classify, and target

enemy armor and support vehicles. The Longbow Apache can

fight at night and in almost any weather, since its

radar-guided missile can track targets through smoke and fog.

With Longbow, the Apache can engage up to 16 targets

simultaneously.17

The Army is also improving the ATACMS. The original

ATACMS had a 165 km maximum range. Newer missiles have

a 300 km range.18 In addition to increased range, the missile

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49
payload is far more lethal. A new warhead, named Brilliant

Submunition (BAT), gives the missile a precision attack

ability. BAT incorporates acoustic and infrared sensors to

locate targets. Six to 13 BATs can be loaded into each

ATACMS.19

Both the ATACMS and Longbow Apache are optimized to

defeat battlefield vehicles. Example targets include tanks,

surface-to-air missile systems, and Scuds. These deep-attack

weapon systems have little capability against large, hard

targets such as bridges and heavily fortified command posts.

The Army has created a new organization to synchronize the

corps’ deep battle—the deep operations coordination cell

(DOCC). The DOCC is located in the corps main command

post. According to FM 100-7, “the primary mission of the

DOCC is to provide centralized coordination and management

of ARFOR [Army forces headquarters] deep operations. The

DOCC ensures effective and efficient employment of critical

assets and facilitates synchronization of joint operations.” The

DOCC’s numerous responsibilities include recommending

FSCL location, determining high payoff targets, planning

deep-attack helicopter operations, coordinating and executing

ATACMS fire missions, and creating target nomination lists for

air interdiction.20 The DOCC coordinates with the Air Force

through the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD).

The BCE was renamed battlefield coordination detachment

after the Gulf War. Following Desert Storm, an Army

after-action report criticized the BCE for insufficient staffing

and inadequate communications capability.21 FM 100-13,

Battlefield Coordination Detachment, was published in 1996 to

address these issues and provide doctrine for BCD operations.

The BCD is located within the air operations center (AOC) 22

and has the mission to “facilitate the synchronization of joint

air operations with Army ground maneuver and fires, to

coordinate joint air support, and to facilitate the exchange of

operational and intelligence data.”23 The detachment is

divided into six functional sections: operations, plans,

intelligence, air defense, airspace management, and airlift.

The BCD sections liaise directly with their Air Force

counterparts within the AOC. The BCD is required to provide

a ground picture for the AOC, coordinate Army requests for

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airpower, facilitate the exchange of intelligence, deconflict

airspace, integrate Army air defense with counterair

operations, coordinate airlift support, and provide feedback

from AOC to the ground commander. 24

In summary, through Army doctrine the ground commander

has claimed responsibility for synchronizing the deep battle.

The main rationale for this claim is the deep-battle’s locati on—

inside the ground force commander’s area of operations. To

better synchronize deep attack, the Army has created a DOCC

located in the corps main command post and a more robust

battlefield coordination detachment in the AOC. Frustration

with the use of the FSCL during the Gulf War motivated the

Army to clearly specify its application. The Army claims the

FSCL is a permissive coordination measure, and only the

ground commander has the authority to position the line and

establish restrictions to its use. Finally, the new FM 100-5 has

changed the Army’s deep-battle concept from shaping the

battlefield for the close fight, to “simultaneously engaging

enemy forces throughout the depth of the battle area.” 25

Air Force Doctrine

since the Persian Gulf War

The Gulf War air campaign validated classic Air Force

doctrine. According to Gen Colin L. Powell, “command and

control of joint air operations was the best in US military

history.”26 The Gulf War Air Power Survey describes airpower’s

effect in the deep battle as “the events on the ground made

clear that air power essentially paralyzed or demoralized the

Iraqi heavy divisions on which the Iraqi strategy depended.

The remnants of some divisions were destroyed in place or

surrendered with little resistance; while others fled the theater

without much of their equipment.”27 Doctrine produced by the

Air Force since 1991 has been built upon the successes

enjoyed by airmen and soldiers during the war. It also

reaffirms several of airpower’s enduring precepts.

Centralized control, flexibility and versatility, and concentration are tenets of airpower. Before examining these tenets

in current doctrine, it is worth viewing the airman’s perspecti ve

in 1943 as noted in FM 100-20, Command and Employment of

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51
Air Power, “the inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest

asset. This flexibility makes it possible to employ the whole

weight of the available air power against selected areas in

turn; such concentrated use of the air striking force is a batt lewinning factor of the first importance. Control of available air

power must be centralized and command must be exercised

through the Air Force commander if this inherent flexibility

and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploit ed.”28

AFDD 1 is neoclassic airpower doctrine. Its purpose is to

guide Air Force operations with the essential truths discovered

50 years earlier—but later forgotten. Some airpower thinkers

in the Air Force were concerned about the “unholy alliance

between the TAF [tactical air forces] and the Army.” 29 AirLand

Battle was Army doctrine and cast airpower in a supporting

role. Under certain conditions, this role may have been

appropriate, but it eliminated the potential for battle-winning

independent air operations.

AFDD 1 effectively argues the merits of centralized control

over airpower. “Air and space power must be controlled by an

airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater

perspective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space

assets to attain the objectives of all US forces in any

contingency across the range of operations. The lesson [of the

Persian Gulf War] is clear: attempts to fragment the control

and planning of air and space power will ultimately cost blood

and treasure by diverting effort and impact. Centralized

control allows commanders to focus on those priorities that

lead to victory.”30

As JFACC, General Horner enjoyed centralized control over

airpower during the Persian Gulf War. Through centralized

control he was able to achieve unity of effort for the air

campaign and the deep battle. General Horner’s initial

objectives for airpower were air superiority and strategic

paralysis. After air superiority was achieved, he unleashed the

Coalition air armada on the Iraqi army. General Horner’s

ability to shift the air campaign effort from counterair to

interdiction demonstrated airpower’s inherent flexibility. It

was not uncommon for a fighter pilot to execute an offensive

counterair mission and then immediately turn to an

interdiction or strategic attack sortie. For the deep battle,

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52
airpower’s flexibility permitted the airborne battlefield

command and control center to shift airborne missions from

air interdiction to CAS, and vice versa, as the situation

demanded. Airpower’s flexibility and versatility make it the

only form of military power that can alternately “strike at

enemy centers of gravity wherever or whatever those centers

might be, . . . destroy enemy forces before they come in

contact with friendly forces, . . . and assist directly in surface

battles, perhaps with decisive effects.”31

Centralized control gave General Horner the means to

concentrate airpower on the CINC’s priorities. General Horner

was under great pressure from the corps commanders to

release battlefield air interdiction missions for corps tasking.

Richard P. Hallion claims that “despite a distribution of

targets made by an Army Deputy CINC [General Waller] using

lists provided by ground force commanders, and approved

overall by an Army theater CINC [General Schwarzkopf],

ground commanders still complained that they weren’t getting

sufficient air support! They continued to demand unnecessary

targeting of Iraqi forces and positions directly in front of their

sectors.”32 Airpower is most effective when it is concentrated.

Centralized control allowed General Horner to execute a

coherent campaign where airpower was focused on the

operational center of gravity and not consumed on relatively

unimportant tactical-level targets.

Current and draft Air Force deep-battle doctrine is a

reflection of the Persian Gulf War model. It also has been

heavily influenced by Gen Merrill A. McPeak’s efforts during

the Commission on Roles and Missions. General McPeak was

USAF chief of staff during Desert Storm and retired in 1994.

He stated that “the close battle should be fought by ground

forces (including organic aviation and air defense) under the

command of a joint forces land component commander, either

USA or United States Marine Corps, depending on who

supplies the preponderance of forces. The deep battle should

be fought by air forces under command of a joint forces air

component commander, either USAF or United States Navy,

depending on who provides key force elements and has

appropriate C3I [command, control, communications, and

intelligence].”33 Historically, the Air Force had responsibility

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53
for the deep battle, and during the Gulf War airmen demonstrated high competence in executing and synchronizing deep

operations. General McPeak believed that the services should

concentrate on missions where they are most effective.

Accordingly, the deep battle should belong to the JFACC. 34

Current Air Force doctrine maintains the FSCL is a

boundary between the close and deep battles, and the JFACC

has responsibility for synchronizing operations beyond the

coordination line. JFACC Primer states, “Just as synchronization

of all attack assets is critical to the land component command er

for all fires inside the FSCL, so it is critical to the air compon ent

commander for all attacks beyond the FSCL.” 35 According to

General Fogleman, the former USAF chief of staff, “the Air

Force considers the JFACC as best suited to coordinate

operations beyond the FSCL.”36

Air Force strategists assert that airpower’s flexibility and

freedom to concentrate is maximized, and the enemy is put at

the greatest risk, when the coordination line is positioned

relatively close to the FLOT. A close FSCL permits the air

commander to decisively concentrate air interdiction on the

battlefield and reduces the otherwise time-consuming

coordination that CAS procedures require. Airmen remember

the Army’s use of the FSCL during the Gulf War, and how it

prevented airpower from completing the destruction of the

escaping Iraqi army. General Fogleman stated, “If the FSCL is

established too far out, you slow and reduce air power’s access

to enemy targets. . . . If the FSCL is so far forward that ground

troops don’t have the sufficient organic sensors and shooters to

cover the targets, then you give the enemy a sanctuary. Air

component assets can’t attack targets inside the FSCL without

tremendous coordination. The last thing we want is to give an

enemy sanctuary on the battlefield.”37 The Air Force maintains

that the FSCL should be positioned to maximize the effects of

airpower and firepower. According to the JFACC Primer, “the

most reliable way to maximize the enemy’s risk is to place the

FSCL at the range where artillery and missiles stop being the

greatest threat to the enemy and air attack becomes the greatest

threat. All operations beyond the range of observed fires should

be under the purview of the JFACC.”38 AFDD 2-1.3 (second

draft), “Counterland,” adds “the proper placement of the FSCL

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54
will normally be at the maximum range of organic artillery

and rockets, since beyond that point the ‘current tactical

situation’ is mostly affected by airpower.”39

The Air Force recognizes the Army’s desire to extend the

range of the FSCL and argues against such action. Airpower

employment short of the FSCL requires detailed integration

with surface force operations and therefore is essentially

limited to CAS. According to AFDD 1, “CAS should be used at

decisive points in a battle and should normally be massed to

apply concentrated combat power and saturate defenses.”40

CAS assets are normally scarce resources.41 If the Army

extends the range of the FSCL, its finite CAS allocation will be

diluted across the battlefield and consequently will lose much

of its effectiveness.

Airpower allocated to prosecute the deep battle is primarily air

interdiction. The 1992 publication of AFM 1-1 purged all

references to BAI, thereby reducing the lingering concerns

among airmen over the centralized control of air interdiction on

the deep battlefield. AFDD 1 strengthens this position, “joint

force interdiction needs the direction of a single commander who

can exploit and coordinate all the forces involved, whether air-,

space-, surface- or information-based.”42 According to current Air

Force doctrine, the JFACC is the supported commander for air

interdiction and is responsible for planning, coordinating, and

executing the theaterwide interdiction effort.43 Even more

specifically, the Air Force maintains that Army weapon systems

performing interdiction missions beyond the FSCL should be

synchronized by the JFACC. According to the JFACC Primer,

“Army aviation assets are normally retained for employment as

organic forces. . . . However, some Army helicopters could also

be employed in interdiction, in which case they may come under

the purview of the JFACC when the JFACC has been tasked to

plan and execute the theater interdiction effort. The same can

hold true for other systems (such as ATACMS) when employed

for interdiction.”44 General Fogleman believed that Army

operations beyond the FSCL should be included on the air

tasking order. According to General Fogleman, the ATO is the

only comprehensive picture of the deep battle and can reduce

the possibilities of fratricide and redundant targeting. During

the Persian Gulf War, General Horner demanded that Army

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55
operations beyond the FSCL be included on the air tasking

order for the same reasons. General Fogleman claimed that

ultimately the CINC must decide whether or not the JFACC

will control Army deep-battle weapons, but regardless of that

decision, the planned use of those weapons must be

accounted for in the ATO.45

Within the Army’s AirLand Battle construct, airpower was

boxed into a supporting role. The Air Force has rejected that

paradigm. Air Force doctrine asserts that airpower will at

times be the CINC’s main effort. Moreover, airpower can be

independently decisive when making war against enemy

fielded forces. AFDD 1 claims that combat operations during

the Gulf War have proven “that air and space power now have

the potential to be the dominant and, at times, the decisive

element of combat in modern warfare. We have also learned,

contrary to conventional wisdom, that air and space forces

can be supported by surface forces in attaining assigned

objectives as well as acting to support them.” 46

In summary, current airpower doctrine for the deep battle is

modeled on an extremely successful Gulf War air campaign.

Its foundation is quintessential airpower thought. Through

centralized control the air commander can concentrate the

entire air effort at the decisive point. Centralized control also

permits the flexible employment of airpower—the ability to

shift the air campaign focus nearly anywhere for any purpose.

Contemporary Air Force doctrine assigns the responsibility for

synchronizing the deep battle with the JFACC. The air

commander plans to use the FSCL as a boundary between his

operations and the land component’s responsibilities. Air

Force leaders want the coordination line positioned relatively

close to the FLOT and believe that all operations beyond the

FSCL should be included on the ATO. Finally, the JFACC’s

effort in the deep battle can be the main effort in theater and

has the potential to be independently decisive.

Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle

Air Force and Army deep-battle doctrine appear to be

incompatible. Both air and land component commanders

claim the ultimate responsibility for synchronizing deep

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56
operations. The air component commander demands centralized

control over all airpower assets. As the supported commander

for interdiction, the air commander wants a shallow FSCL to

demarcate his deep operations from the close battle. He also

envisions a restrictive FSCL and synchronizes airpower and

firepower beyond the coordination line with the ATO. Army

doctrine assigns the responsibility for synchronizing airpower

and firepower to ground force commanders, since they are the

supported commanders for all operations in their AOs. The

ground force commander believes the FSCL is a permissive

coordination measure used to unshackle long-range firepower

from detailed coordination requirements. The difficult task for

joint doctrine is to reconcile these differences.

Joint doctrine is authoritative and by regulation takes

precedence over service doctrine. If a conflict between service

and joint doctrine arises, joint doctrine must be used unless

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides other

guidance. Additionally, commanders are required to comply

with joint doctrine unless extraordinary conditions exist. 47

The central principle required to successfully conduct joint

operations is unity of effort, which is “common action

throughout the joint force in pursuit of common objectives.” 48

Unity of effort requires that activities in a combat theater be

synchronized. The joint force commander (JFC) is ultimately

responsible for ensuring that theater operations are

synchronized in time, space, and purpose. Joint doctrine

instructs the JFC to designate the forces made available to

component commanders and the type of control the component

commander will have over those forces. For example, the land

force commander normally has tactical control (TACON) over

allocated CAS missions. To enhance unity of effort, the JFC

has the authority to establish supported and supporting

relationships among the respective commanders.49

According to JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the

commander of the supported force has the authority to specify

the general direction of the supporting force. General direction

is “designation and prioritization of targets or objectives,

timing and duration of the supporting action, and other

instructions necessary for coordination.”50 The supporting

commander is required to determine the needs of the

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supported force and take action to meet those needs—

assuming immediate capabilities and other JFC assigned

tasks in theater permit such action.

The JFC establishes areas of operation throughout the

theater to facilitate joint force coordination. Land forces can

be assigned areas of operation, which vary in size based on

METT-T factors. The areas of operation must be large enough

for the land force commanders to accomplish their mission

and protect their forces. The JFC is responsible for positioning

the rear, lateral, and forward boundaries that define the land

component commander’s AO.51

The land force commander is the supported commander

inside his area of operations. The supported commander is

“responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and

interdiction . . . within his AO.” 52 Joint doctrine directs the

land force commander to initially strike interdiction targets

with organic firepower. When organic firepower is unable to

satisfy the interdiction requirements, the land force

commander requests support from the JFACC who is the

supporting commander for interdiction in the land

commander’s area of operations. Joint doctrine instructs land

commanders to clearly portray their vision of air interdiction

support for maneuver operations. When requesting support,

he “designates target priority, effects, and timing of

interdiction operations within his AO.” However, the land

commander should also “provide the supporting commanders

as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of

their operations.”53

JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, states,

“The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall

air interdiction effort.”54 Additionally, the JFC will normally

delegate to the JFACC the responsibility for planning and

executing theaterwide interdiction operations.55 Joint doctrine

describes interdiction as “action to divert, disrupt, delay, or

destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be

used effectively against friendly forces. Joint interdiction

operations are those interdiction operations conducted in

support of theater wide . . . priorities, or interdiction

operations between supported and supporting components.”56

JFACCs typically have operational control (OPCON) over their

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assigned and attached forces as well as TACON over other

forces made available by the service commanders.57 Essentially,

the JFACC provides centralized direction over these interdiction

assets that serve two important purposes. First, the air

commander generates a unifying effort for the JFC’s campaign

by personally directing all air interdiction. Second, the JFACC

optimizes theaterwide joint interdiction targeting. Efficient and

effective interdiction targeting is essential because the

demands for interdiction support are almost always greater

than available assets.

The air component commander is not assigned a specific

area of operation. Since interdiction, counterair, and strategic

attack targets may be located anywhere, the JFACC cannot be

constrained by land boundaries. Joint doctrine states that air

interdiction may constitute the main effort in theater.

According to JP 3-0, “JFCs may choose to employ interdiction

as a principal means to achieve the intended objective, with

other components supporting the component leading [JFACC]

the interdiction effort.”58 This was the case during phases I, II,

and III of the Persian Gulf War.

The JFACC is the supported commander for theater

operations outside the land force commander’s AO. 59 Joint

doctrine directs the JFACC to conduct theater interdiction

planning, allocation, coordination, deconfliction, and tasking.60

The air tasking order is the JFACC’s tool for accomplishing

these activities. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air

Operations, states that “targets scheduled for deliberate attack

by component direct support air capabilities/forces should be

included in the joint ATO, when appropriate, for deconfliction

and coordination.”61 This directive, however, does not force

the Army into submitting attack aviation mission data for ATO

publication because the Army considers attack helicopters a

maneuver force, not an air support force.

To provide joint targeting oversight, the JFC may, and

normally will, establish a joint target coordination board. The

joint force commander can model a JTCB on one of two

examples described in joint doctrine. The first example is a

target integration center where junior officers deconflict

organic and joint interdiction. The second JTCB model is a

JFC-level review council. This senior-level targeting board is

LAUGHBAUM

59
normally chaired by the JFC’s deputy commander and

attended by the air and land component commanders or their

immediate subordinates. The JTCB can be tasked to

determine general targeting priorities, pass target information,

and prepare or refine joint target lists. 62

Since the JFACC can attack targets anywhere in theater,

the JFLCC uses the fire support coordination line to limit

fratricide and redundant targeting within his area of

operations. The fire support coordination line in joint doctrine

is similar to the FSCL described by the Army. The

coordination line is established and adjusted by the land

commander, who must first discuss the FSCL plans with

superior, subordinate, and supporting commanders. JP 3-03

cautions, “the decision on where to place or even use an FSCL

requires careful consideration. . . . Establishment of the FSCL

too far forward can limit the responsiveness of air interdiction

sorties.”63 Airpower employment short of the FSCL, normally

CAS allocated to the ground forces, requires detailed

synchronization with the land commander’s scheme of

maneuver. According to JP 3-0, “short of the FSCL, all fires are

controlled by the land force commander [emphasis added].”64

Joint doctrine states that air interdiction may be used to

attack targets on either side of the coordination line. When air

interdiction operations are short of the FSCL, “they must be

controlled by the . . . land force commander,” 65 and must

receive battlefield threat and target updates through the

tactical air control system.66

When surface targets are beyond the FSCL, but still within

the land component commander’s AO, the coordination

requirements are less stringent. Air interdiction operations in

this region are not under JFLCC tactical control but remain

under OPCON to the air commander. To reduce the possibility

of fratricide and redundant targeting, the JFACC and JFLCC

should coordinate attacks beyond the fire support coordination

line. Even so, the FSCL remains permissive in joint doctrine.

JP 3-0 states that “in exceptional circumstances the inability

to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of

targets beyond the FSCL.”67

The Army and Air Force chiefs of staff discussed deep-battle

coordination requirements at the 1996 Army-Air Force

CADRE PAPER

60
Warfighter Conference. The conference was hailed as a

watershed event for the resolution of several contentious

doctrine issues. Generals Reimer and Fogleman agreed that

all targets for joint fires, including those inside and outside

the land commander’s AO, will be coordinated between

components to the maximum extent possible. The chiefs of st aff

also agreed that there will be times when coordination is not

possible, thus permissive fires beyond the FSCL remain

authorized. According to the war-fighter agreement, the

commander executing the uncoordinated mission would accept

the responsibility for fratricide incidents that may occur.68

Synthesis and Final Analysis

Joint doctrine resolves several of the deep-battle management

conflicts between the Army and Air Force. Within the JFLCC’s

area of operations, the land commander is the supported

commander and therefore responsible for synchronizing

airpower and firepower. The JFACC is a supporting commander

inside the land commander’s AO. Outside the land commander’s

area of operations the JFACC is the supported commander.

Determining the size of the land commander’s AO is a

critically important task for the joint force commander.

Regardless of the JFC’s uniform, the JFC must act rationally

and without bias when establishing boundaries. A primary

objective when placing boundaries is maximizing combat

power. Due to increased coordination requirements, a degree

of efficiency is lost when component commanders provide

support across boundaries—consequently combat power is

reduced. The land commanders’ area of operations must be

just large enough to accomplish each mission and protect all

forces. If the AO is larger than necessary, the JFACC’s access

to the deep battlefield is unacceptably impeded. Conversely, if

the land commander’s area of operations is too small, that

mission could be jeopardized and those forces exposed to

increased risk.

Joint doctrine mandates coordination between the JFACC

and JFLCC. At the command level, the joint target

coordination board provides a forum for achieving unity of

effort in the deep battle. The Air Force and Army want a

LAUGHBAUM

61
senior-level targeting forum with a macro-view of the campai gn,

as opposed to a board of junior officers convened to select

targets. Beyond the land force commander’s area of operation,

the JFACC uses the air tasking order to coordinate airpower

and firepower. Within the land commander’s AO, corps and

division deep operations cells plan the deep battle and

communicate with the JFACC’s air operations center through

the battlefield coordination detachment.

Although joint doctrine clearly defines how the battlefield

will be divided and demands coordination between the air and

land commanders, it does not provide sufficient and acceptable

guidance to synchronize the deep battle. The core of the

problem is fire support coordination line doctrine. FSCL

guidance in joint doctrine threatens the JFACC’s centralized

control over airpower and permits a situation where the joint

force commander’s combat power is weakened. It also places

airmen at unacceptable risk from friendly fire.

The land force commander establishes and positions the

FSCL, has tactical control over all operations short of the

coordination line, and beyond the FSCL also synchronizes

operations but does not control supporting forces such as the

JFACC’s airpower. The temptation to increase the area of

tactical control encourages the land component commander to

set the fire support coordination line deep within the AO. The

land commander is also led to position the FSCL deeply

because such an arrangement increases span of control over

the battlefield and simultaneously reduces coordination

requirements with the JFACC.

Joint doctrine demands detailed integration and coordination

of airpower short of the FSCL. Close air support procedures

provide the necessary coordination to safely employ airpower

short of the FSCL—assuming the coordination line is relatively

close to the FLOT or that an airborne forward air controller is

available. If the coordination line is positioned at a great

distance from the FLOT and only a ground FAC is available, it

is nearly impossible to provide the detailed integration

required for close air support. Moreover, a deep FSCL dilutes

the land commander’s finite quantity of allocated CAS sorties.

Spreading limited CAS assets across the depth of the AO

CADRE PAPER

62
inhibits employment in mass and makes the CAS effort far

less effective.

Joint doctrine states that air interdiction may be flown sho rt

of the fire support coordination line. Essentially, this provision

gives tactical control of air interdiction to the ground

commander—a situation that is completely unacceptable to

airmen. If the JFACC abdicates centralized control over air

interdiction, airpower’s flexibility is diminished. Additionally,

air interdiction executed short of the FSCL demands the same

burdensome coordination as required for CAS. Air interdiction

operations do not easily lend themselves to detailed coordination

and integration with ground forces, thus greatly increasing

the probability of air-to-surface fratricide.

Airpower and firepower beyond the FSCL should be

coordinated to the maximum extent possible. However, joint

doctrine permits noncoordinated attacks under exceptional

conditions—generating a situation where the risk of fratricide

is balanced against the possibility of destroying a target.

Allowing permissive fires beyond the coordination line creates

a slippery slope, thus leading to a point where the chances of

surface-to-air fratricide increase dramatically when airpower

and firepower are not synchronized.

Each of these issues adversely affects the joint force

commander’s ability to effectively conduct deep operations.

Chapter 5 provides several recommendations that address these

problems and hopefully will improve the synchronization of

airpower and firepower in the deep battle.

Notes

1. Message, 191947Z DEC 96, Joint Agreements from the Army-Air Force

Warfighter Conference, 19 December 1996.

2. John L. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort

Monroe, Va.: TRADOC Center of Military History, 1997), 1–4.

3. Ibid., 79–88.

4. FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 7-13.

5. Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal

Tukhachevski (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987), 170.

6. FM 100-5, 7-12.

7. William Robinson, AirLand Battle Tactics: An Analysis of Doctrine and

Experience (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and General Staff College,

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63
1994), 44. This quotation is taken from a 1993 interview given by Gen

Frederick M. Franks, TRADOC commander.

8. FM 100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, 1995, 5-5.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 7-6.

11. Department of the Army, Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned

(Tait Report), vol. 3, Operational (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and

General Staff College, 1992), 3–11.

12. FM 100-7, 7-8.

13. Dennis J. Reimer and Ronald R. Fogleman, “Joint Warfare and the

Army-Air Force Team,” Joint Force Quarterly no. 11 (Spring 1996): 13.

14. Notes from a briefing presented to the School of Advanced Airpower

Studies by Col William Powell, USA, on 12 February 1997. Colonel Powell

was the director of Aviation Training, Doctrine, and Simulation at Fort

Rucker, Ala.

15. FM 100-7, 7-8.

16. Ibid.

17. Cash Striplin, Longbow Lifts the Fog of War, briefing slides (Fort

Rucker, Ala.: US Army Aviation Center, 1996).

18. US Third Army, Deep Operations Standard Operating Procedures

(Fort McPherson, Ga.: Department of the Army, 1977), C-2.

19. Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 1996–97 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane’s

Information Group, 1997), 781.

20. FM 100-7, 7-6 to 7-9.

21. Operation Desert Storm Lessons Learned (Tait Report), 3-2.

22. The air operations center (AOC) was known as the tactical air control

center (TACC) during and before the Persian Gulf War.

23. First Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), Operations,

briefing slides (Fort Bragg, N.C.: First BCD, 1997).

24. FM 100-13, Battlefield Coordination Detachment, 1996, 1-4 to 2-14.

25. FM 100-5, 7-13.

26. JFACC Primer, February 1994.

27. Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS) Summary Report (Washington,

D.C.: GPO, 1993), 116.

28. FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943, 1-2.

29. Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the

Airpower Debates (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 166.

30. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine,

September 1997, 23.

31. AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force , vol.

2, March 1992, 115–16.

32. Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq: Airpower and the Gulf War

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 208.

33. Merrill A. McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles and

Missions of the Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 39.

CADRE PAPER

64
34. Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works, 1990–1994 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

Air University Press, 1995), 355–59.

35. JFACC Primer, 33.

36. Reimer and Fogleman, 11.

37. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Making the Most of Air Power,” Field Artillery,

September–October 1996, 4.

38. JFACC Primer, 33–34.

39. AFDD 2-1.3 (second draft), “Counterland,” May 1998, 59.

40. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, 50.

41. AFDD 2-1.3, 34.

42. AFDD 1, 49.

43. Ibid.

44. JFACC Primer, 12.

45. Fogleman, 3.

46. AFDD 1, 41.

47. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1995, i.

48. Ibid., I-1.

49. Ibid., II-9 and II-15.

50. Ibid., II-9.

51. Ibid., II-19 and III-33.

52. Ibid., ix and IV-15.

53. Ibid.

54. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, 1997, viii.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., I-1.

57. JP 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, November

1994, II-2.

58. JP 3-0, III-33 and IV-14.

59. Message, 191947Z DEC 96.

60. JP 3-03, xi.

61. JP 3-56.1, IV-3.

62. Ibid., IV-2.

63. JP 3-03, II-15.

64. JP 3-0, xiii.

65. JP 3-03, ix.

66. Ibid., II-15.

67. JP 3-0, III-34.

68. Message, 191947Z DEC 96.

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65
Chapter 5

Conclusion

On 12 November 1945, Henry “Hap” Arnold, United States

Army Air Forces commanding general, stated in his last report

to the secretary of war that “the greatest lesson of this war has

been the extent to which air, land, and sea operations can and

must be coordinated by joint planning and unified command.

The attainment of better coordination and balance than now

exist between services is an essential of national security.” 1

Deep battle was formally introduced into US war-fighting

doctrine during the early 1980s. The initial purpose for the

deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and

follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. The

Air Force had the unofficial and singular responsibility for

synchronizing deep operations and planned to employ air

interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the

conditions for victory in the decisive close battle. The fire

support coordination line, normally positioned at field

artillery’s maximum range from the FLOT, separated the Air

Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle.

During the late 1980s, the Army fielded a potent deep-battle

capability. Army organic firepower and attack aviation

provided the land component commander the ability to

prosecute the deep battle in concert with the Air Force, or

independently if necessary. Army doctrine assigned the

ground forces commander the responsibility for synchronizing

deep operations with the close battle—germinating the seeds

of conflict with the Air Force over deep-battle management. To

better influence deep operations, the Army defined the FSCL

as a permissive fire support coordination measure and also

extended the range of FSCL from the FLOT.

During the Persian Gulf War, General Horner synchronized

deep operations. To manage the deep battle, he used several ad

hoc procedures—all approved by General Schwarzkopf. General

Horner employed a restrictive FSCL, requiring all planned

airpower, firepower, and maneuver operations beyond the fire

support coordination line to be included on the air tasking

67
order. General Horner’s restrictive FSCL facilitated a coherent

deep-battle plan, minimized redundant targeting, and

eliminated surface-to-air fratricide. By most accounts,

Coalition efforts in the deep battle were extremely successful.

There were two exceptions. During the last day of the war the

VII and XVIII Corps commanders significantly extended the

range of their respective FSCLs and consequently prevented

the JFACC from attacking the Iraqi Republican Guard.

Unfortunately, the corps commanders were then unable to

mass combat power against the Iraqis. These events created a

form of sanctuary on the battlefield for the most important

elements of the Iraqi army—ultimately leading to the enemy’s

successful retreat into Iraq.

Joint doctrine produced since the Gulf War attempts to

create a framework to synchronize airpower and firepower in

the deep battle. Several contentious issues surrounding the

deep battle have been resolved—especially regarding command

relationships and forums for communication between the

various component commanders. Unfortunately, current joint

doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance

to synchronize Air Force and Army deep operations. This

study’s final chapter presents five recommendations to change

joint doctrine, thereby improving the joint force commander’s

capability to engage the enemy simultaneously throughout the

depth of the battlefield.

• Assign the joint force commander the responsibility for

establishing and positioning the fire support coordination

line.

Currently, the ground force commander positions the fire

support coordination line. Joint doctrine requires that the

commander consult with superior, subordinate, and

supporting commanders before placing the FSCL. The ground

force commander is strongly tempted to establish a deep

FSCL—under certain conditions greater than 150 km from the

FLOT. A distant FSCL increases the ground force commander’s

span of tactical control over the battlefield and reduces the

coordination requirements with the JFACC.

Airmen prefer to have the fire support coordination line

positioned near the close battle. An FSCL located near the

CADRE PAPER

68
FLOT maximizes airpower’s flexibility and places the enemy at

the greatest risk from air attack. This is because all air

operations short of the FSCL require detailed integration with

ground firepower and maneuver forces, while air interdiction

missions beyond the FSCL do not demand the same exacting

degree of coordination.

Obviously, the Air Force and Army are in direct conflict

regarding the proper depth of the coordination line. Airmen

and soldiers can make seemingly rational arguments to

support their mutually exclusive views. However, since the

ground force commander ultimately positions the FSCL, the

argument will go in the ground force commander’s favor—

unless the joint force commander intervenes as General

Schwarzkopf did during the Desert Storm air war.

Joint doctrine must be changed to designate the JFC with

the responsibility for establishing and repositioning the fire

support coordination line. The JFC is accountable for the

aggregate performance of the joint command and should not

be influenced by service politics. This fact compels the joint

force commander to make a rational judgment when

positioning the FSCL, primarily basing the decision on

maximizing relative combat power for the deep battle.

• Redefine the fire support coordination line as a restrictive

fire support coordination measure.

Joint doctrine defines the FSCL as a permissive FSCM.

Currently, airpower and firepower missions beyond the FSCL

should be coordinated through the air and land component

staffs. However, “in exceptional circumstances the inability to

conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets

beyond the FSCL.”2 The Army strongly endorses joint doctrine’s

permissive definition of the fire support coordination line.

The Air Force, on the other hand, is unhappy with a

permissive FSCL. Airmen point to the considerable efforts

made to reduce the likelihood of air-to-surface fratricide short

of the coordination line and want the same emphasis placed

on eliminating surface-to-air friendly fire beyond the FSCL.

The Air Force finds it disconcerting that soldiers, when

executing permissive fires, essentially balance the risk of

surface-to-air fratricide against the possibility of destroying a

LAUGHBAUM

69
target. Not only do such uncoordinated attacks increase the

probability of surface-to-air fratricide but they also invite

redundant targeting.

Joint doctrine should redefine the FSCL as a restrictive fire

support coordination measure, forcing the air and land

component staffs to coordinate all operations beyond the

FSCL. During the Persian Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf

defined the coordination line as a restrictive FSCM. Although

the Army complained about the FSCL’s restrictive nature

during and after the war, it contributed to safety and combat

efficiency and did not significantly inhibit or delay operations.

Recent improvements in communications and computer

technology make the achievement of this recommendation a

relatively simple task. The air and land component staffs

already coordinate internal operations—all that remains is the

fusion of data between airmen and soldiers. This proposal will

reduce the likelihood of friendly fire incidents and largely

eliminate redundant targeting. Additionally, the JFACC will

acquire a more accurate picture of the land component

commander’s deep-battle planning and execution—facilitating

more effective, efficient, and timely airpower support.

• Include all planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver

operations beyond the fire support coordination line on

the air tasking order.

According to joint doctrine, the land force commander is the

supported commander “responsible for the synchronization of

maneuver, fires, and interdiction . . . within his AO.” 3

Although he has the authority to specify the general direction

of the supporting force, the land commander should also

“provide the supporting commanders as much latitude as

possible in the planning and execution of their operations.” 4

This recommendation does not challenge the ground

commander’s authority to specify the general direction of

airpower and firepower within his AO. Instead, this proposal

suggests that planned airpower, firepower, and maneuver

operations beyond the FSCL can best be deconflicted using

the air tasking order. According to General Fogleman, “a

comprehensive ATO is the only document coming out of the

CADRE PAPER

70
targeting process that shows the total target servicing plan in

time and space for the deep battle.” 5

Central Command currently uses the ATO to coordinate

operations beyond the FSCL. According to US CENTAF

Concept of Operations for Command and Control of Air

Operations (U), “preplanned JFLCC fires/operations beyond

the FSCL will be deconflicted in the ATO construction process.

Conflicts will be brought to the attention of the JFLCC who

will determine how the conflict is to be resolved.” 6 These

CENTCOM procedures provide an excellent framework for the

development of future joint doctrine.

• Position the fire support coordination line relatively close

to the forward line of own troops, typically no farther than

tube artillery’s maximum range.

Joint doctrine does not recommend a specific distance from

the FLOT for FSCL placement—and it should not. The joint

force commander must consider METT-T factors when

positioning the FSCL. Ideally, the coordination line’s location

should place the enemy at the greatest possible risk from US

airpower and firepower. It should also be located sufficiently

deep to ensure the ground forces commander has the

necessary terrain to maneuver and protect the forces.

A relatively shallow FSCL, positioned approximately at the

maximum range of tube artillery, will place the enemy at the

greatest total risk in most situations. This shallow FSCL will give

the air commander the ability to mass airpower for the deep

battle. Moreover, the ground commander will not be burdened

with excessive coordination requirements when the coordination

line is positioned at tube artillery’s maximum range. Only the

ground commander’s firepower and maneuver operations

beyond the FSCL, essentially ATACMS and attack helicopter

missions, will require detailed coordination with the JFACC.

• Restrict planned air interdiction missions to targets

beyond the fire support coordination line.

Current joint doctrine states that AI may be flown against

targets short of the fire support coordination line. This

provision essentially gives tactical control over a portion of the

AI effort to the ground commander—a situation that is

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71
unacceptable to airmen. The air component commander must

maintain centralized control over all AI operations. Allocating

“small packets” of air interdiction to the ground commanders

for targeting will diminish airpower’s flexibility and

effectiveness.7 This important truth, discovered through a

bitter US defeat in the North African desert during World War

II, must not be forgotten.

Additionally, AI operations short of the coordination line

demand the same burdensome coordination and control as

required for CAS. According to JP 3-03, “control of air-to-surf ace

operations short of the FSCL requires detailed synchronization,

increased communications assets, more restrictive rules of

engagement, positive identification procedures, and more

key personnel involved in the decision cycle than for those

missions conducted beyond the FSCL.”8 As previously described, AI operations do not readily lend themselves to such

detailed coordination and integration with ground forces. Air

interdiction missions executed against targets short of the

FSCL are far more likely than CAS to result in air-tosurface fratricide.

During the Persian Gulf War, Generals Schwarzkopf and

Horner recognized the necessity of restricting AI operations to

targets located beyond the FSCL. General Schwarzkopf’s CAS

allocation, when coupled with a reasonably positioned FSCL,

more than fulfilled the ground commander’s airpower

requirements for targets short of the coordination line. Today,

the US Central Command has formally adopted the AI

procedures established by the two generals.9 Future joint

doctrine should also restrict planned air interdiction missions

to targets beyond the coordination line.

This paper has examined US deep-battle doctrine. The deep

battle is fought in an area where both Air Force airpower and

Army firepower can attack the enemy. Ideally, deep operations

are synchronized and seamless. The Persian Gulf War

demonstrated that Army, Air Force and joint doctrine for the

deep battle require improvement. To better synchronize

airpower and firepower in the deep battle, the author

recommends five changes for joint doctrine.

Successful application of these recommendations for the deep

battle will demand that airmen and soldiers trust each other.

CADRE PAPER

72
Ultimately, cooperation and trust are cornerstones of joint

doctrine and the basis for decisive combat operations on and

above the deep battlefield. Gen John M. Shalikashvili’s vision for

joint operations, as stated in Joint Vision 2010, is focused

exactly on target: “The nature of modern warfare demands that

we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is

essential today, and will be even more imperative tomorrow.”10

Notes

1. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1907–1960, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University

Press, 1971), 192.

2. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1995, III-34.

3. Ibid., ix and IV-15.

4. Ibid.

5. Ronald R. Fogleman, “Making the Most of Air Power,” Field Artillery,

September–October 1996, 3.

6. US CENTAF/JFACC, Concept of Operations for Command and Control

of Air Operations (U), Shaw AFB, S.C.: US CENTAF/DO, January 1996, 11.

(Secret restricted fire line [REL] MNF) Information extracted is unclassified.

7. Bernard L. Montgomery, High Command in War (Tripoli, Libya:

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, 1943), 2. After finally achieving victory

over German forces in North Africa, the British general reflected on the

proper use of airpower in war. In High Command in War, General

Montgomery observed,

Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must

understand clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air

power. The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility, and this

enables it to be switched quickly from one objective to another in

the theatre of operations. So long as this is realised, then the who le

weight of the available air power can be used in selected areas in

turn; this concentrated use of the air striking forces is a batt lewinning factor of the first importance. It follows that control of the

available air power must be centralised, and command must be

exercised through RAF [Royal Air Force] channels. Nothing could be

more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into

small packets placed under command of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier

must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces [emphasis added].

8. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, April 1997, II-15.

9. US CENTAF/JFACC, 9–11.

10. Joint Vision 2010, “America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow,” 1996.

LAUGHBAUM

73
Glossary

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and

 control center

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AH attack helicopter

AI air interdiction

ALFA Air-Land Forces Applications (directorate)

AO area of operations

AOC air operations center

ARCENT US Army Forces Central Command

ARFOR US Army forces

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATAF allied tactical air force

ATO air tasking order

ATP Allied Tactical Publication

BAI battlefield air interdiction

BAT Brilliant Submunition

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

BCE battlefield coordination element

CAS close air support

CENTAF US Air Forces Central Command

CENTCOM Central Command

CINC commander in chief

DAWMS Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study

DCINC deputy commander in chief

DOCC deep operations coordination cell

FAC forward air controller

FEBA forward edge of the battle area

FLOT forward line of own troops

FSCL fire support coordination line

FSCM fire support coordination measure

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JP joint publication

75
J-SAK Joint Attack Second Echelon

J-SEI Joint Second Echelon Interdiction (study)

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

KTO Kuwaiti theater of operations

LOC lines of communication

MARCENT US Marine Forces Central Command

METT-T mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather,

 and time

MLRS multiple launch rocket system

MMW millimeter wave

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAS offensive air support

OPCON operational control

RAF Royal Air Force

RFL restricted fire line

TAC Tactical Air Command

TACC tactical air control center

TACON tactical control

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

USAAF US Army Air Forces

USAFE US Air Forces Europe

76
Bibliography

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and Army Field Manuals

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic

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AFDD 2-1.3 (second draft). “Counterland,” May 1998.

Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1. United States Air Force Basic

Doctrine, January 1975.

———. Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air

Force, February 1979.

———. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,

March 1984.

———. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force,

2 vols., March 1992.

AFM 2-1. Tactical Air Operations, 1969.

Field Manual (FM) 6-20. Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,

1942.

FM 6-20. Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques, 1948.

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Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower

in the Deep Battle

Air University Press Team

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Hattie D. Minter

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Diane Clark

Book Design and Cover Art

Daniel M. Armstrong

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Linda C. Colson