J-A27026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DOUGLAS LEROY STIFFLER

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 667 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 1, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000388-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED December 1, 2017

Appellant, Douglas Leroy Stiffler, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on March 1, 2017. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual background of this matter as

follows:

[Appellant] entered [into] a relationship with the victim,

Penny McClaine, in July of 2014. McClaine is a resident of Clarion

County. At the time, McClaine owned a 2001 GMC truck that she

intended to sell. In the fall of 2014, [Appellant] began using the

truck regularly with McClaine’s permission. Eventually,

[Appellant] offered to purchase the truck from McClaine for

$3,000, and she agreed. [Appellant] continued to use the truck

regularly, but did not make any payments.

In January of 2016, McClaine ended her relationship with

[Appellant] and requested payment for the truck, which was still

in [Appellant’s] possession. In the weeks following their break- up, McClaine attempted to arrange a time to transfer title of the

truck to [Appellant] and collect payment. On at least two
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occasions, [Appellant] agreed to meet McClaine to complete the

transaction, but failed to appear at the arranged date and time.

In March of 2016, McClaine informed [Appellant] that she

wanted the truck back, and she arranged to meet him and pick

up the truck at his residence in Mahaffey, Clearfield County.

[Appellant] cancelled this meeting shortly before McClaine

arrived to pick up the truck, stating that he had to take the truck

to work. On another occasion, McClaine drove to [Appellant’s]

work place in Altoona, Blair County, to retrieve the vehicle using

her spare set of keys. The truck was not at the site, and after

speaking with [Appellant] on the phone to ask where it was, he

told McClaine that [the truck] was in Huntingdon, Huntingdon

County. [Appellant] again told McClaine that he would return her

truck.

McClaine first spoke with Pennsylvania State Police Trooper

Mark Graf about retrieving her truck on March 13, 2016. Trooper

Graf called [Appellant] on McClaine’s behalf and told him that he

needed to return the truck to McClaine. [Appellant] stated that

he would return the truck as soon as possible, but mentioned

that he was currently working out of state. On April 16, 2016,

Trooper Graf received another call from McClaine, who informed

him that her truck had still not been returned. Trooper Graf left a

voicemail for [Appellant] instructing him to return the truck and

informing him that he may need to start compiling information

for a police report if the truck was not returned promptly.

[Appellant] left a return voicemail for Trooper Graf, again

acknowledging that he needed to return the truck.

Approximately one month later, McClaine again contacted

Trooper Graf to inform him that the truck had not been returned.

Trooper Graf attempted to call [Appellant] but did not get an

answer, so he called [Appellant’s] work place and requested they

have [Appellant] call him. [Appellant] then left another voicemail

for Trooper Graf stating that he knew he had to return the truck.

When the truck was still not returned, Trooper Graf filed the

Criminal Complaint for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle on

June 14, 2016. State police in Hollidaysburg, Blair County,

executed the arrest warrant on [Appellant] on July 11, 2016, and

secured the truck. [Appellant] was arrested on his way to work

in Altoona, Blair County.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/17, at 1-3.
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Appellant was charged with one count of unauthorized use of

automobiles and other vehicles.1 On February 6, 2017, following a jury trial,

Appellant was found guilty. On February 8, 2017, Appellant’s motion for

judgment of acquittal was denied. On March 1, 2017, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to a minimum term of nine months to a maximum term

of two years less one day, with credit for time served. On March 2,

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion that was denied on April 12, 2017.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for this Court’s

consideration:

Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence for the

jury to find Appellant guilty of Unauthorized Use of a Motor

Vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

under the following parameters:

Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable

inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient ____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a). 2 The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporated by reference the

April 12, 2017 opinion and order that disposed of Appellant’s post-sentence

motion.
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to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence

at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the

fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s

guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and

weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part

or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these

principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of

the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276-1277 (Pa. Super.

2006)).

The crime underlying this appeal is codified as follows:

§ 3928. Unauthorized use of automobiles and other

vehicles

(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of

the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane,

motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of

another without consent of the owner.

(b) Defense.-It is a defense to prosecution under this section

that the actor reasonably believed that the owner would have

consented to the operation had he known it.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3928. “A conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle must be

predicated on proof that the defendant operated the vehicle without the

owner’s consent and that the defendant knew or had reason to know that he

lacked the owner’s permission to operate the vehicle.” Commonwealth v.

Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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Our courts have held that whether a person is in actual physical

control of a motor vehicle is determined based on the totality of the

circumstances, including the location of the vehicle, whether the engine was

running, and whether there was other evidence indicating that the defendant

had driven the vehicle at some point prior to the arrival of police on the

scene. Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384, 1385 (Pa. 1996). With

respect to the crime of unauthorized use of an automobile, the intent

element is more relaxed because the Commonwealth must establish only

that the defendant was reckless “with respect to the owner’s lack of consent

to the accused’s operation of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 505

A.2d 255, 257 (Pa. Super. 1985); see also Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468

A.2d 493, 495-496 (Pa. Super. 1983) (finding recklessness as minimum

standard for mens rea for crime of unauthorized use of automobiles and

other vehicles).

Here, the Commonwealth established that McClaine, the owner of the

vehicle, demanded that Appellant return her truck. N.T., 2/6/17, at 12.

Moreover, McClaine sought the assistance of the Pennsylvania State Police in

retrieving her truck from Appellant. Id. at 13. Pennsylvania State Trooper

Graf contacted Appellant and informed him that he was to return the truck

to McClaine. The evidence reveals that on each occasion McClaine and

Trooper Graf had contact with Appellant, Appellant acknowledged he had to

return McClaine’s truck. Id. at 15, 26, and 28. However, despite multiple
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opportunities to return the vehicle, Appellant opted to retain possession and

continued to use the truck.

After review, we conclude that the Commonwealth established

evidence that was sufficient to prove that Appellant recklessly used

McClaine’s truck without her authorization. Dunlap, 505 A.2d at 257.

Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is meritless.

We find that the Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to

establish the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Therefore, we

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/1/2017