Report to the Ranking Minority 

Members, Subcommittees on Total 

Force and Readiness, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

May 2003 MILITARY 

READINESS 

Lingering Training and 

Equipment Issues 

Hamper Air Support of 

Ground Forces 

GAO-03-505 
The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the 

barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized close 

air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations. This is 

the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces have limited 

opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2) home station 

training is often restricted and thus does not always provide realistic training 

to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the services use different 

training standards and certification requirements for personnel responsible 

for coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual services, 

joint close air support training is often a lower priority than other missions. 

While the department recognizes the need to improve the training for the 

mission, progress has been slow on many of the issues because the services 

have been unable to agree on joint solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops 

engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-minute 

training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield. 

Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the 

joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons 

capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD’s goals for interoperability 

and cost-effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the accuracy of 

battlefield information and can speed the transmission of information from 

the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However, the services have 

acquired equipment that is not able to communicate across the services, a 

key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the services are procuring 

equipment independently to meet individual service needs, thereby missing 

opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint service purchases. 

Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air Support Mission 

MILITARY READINESS

Lingering Training and Equipment Issues 

Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-505.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Neal Curtin at 

(757) 552-8100 or curtinn@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-505, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Members of the 

Subcommittees on Total Force and 

Readiness, House Committee on Armed 

Services 

May 2003

Recent operations in Afghanistan 

demonstrated the dangers of 

providing air support close to 

troops on the ground. Such close 

air support requires timely, wellpracticed procedures and 

communication between ground 

and air elements. While most close 

air support operations in 

Afghanistan were successful, 

“friendly fire” incidents have 

resulted from mistakes made while 

conducting the mission. 

At the request of the Ranking 

Minority Members of the 

Subcommittees on Total Force and 

Readiness, House Committee on 

Armed Services, GAO reviewed 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

efforts to provide adequate close 

air support training, as well as 

efforts to enhance the equipment 

used to support this mission. 

GAO is recommending several 

initiatives to provide the leadership 

and accountability needed to 

resolve the lingering close air 

support training shortfalls. GAO is 

also recommending actions to 

achieve greater equipment 

interoperability among the 

services. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred with the 

report’s recommendations and is in 

the process of establishing specific 

completion dates for initiatives that 

will address the lingering training 

and equipment interoperability 

shortfalls. 
Page i GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Despite DOD’s Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training 

Deficiencies Remain 6

Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases 

Hampers Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs 19

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Matters for Congressional Consideration 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air 

Support 32 

Appendix III Joint Close Air Support Training and Friendly Fire 

Accidents 34 

Appendix IV 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan 35 

Appendix V Comments from the Department of Defense 36 

Tables 

Table 1: Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground 

Controllers to Maintain Currency 15

Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for 

Ground-Targeting Equipment 24

Table 3: Units and Locations Included on This Assignment 29

Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft 32

Table 4: Continued 33

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Table 5: Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf 

War 34

Table 6: 2001 Action Items Status 35

Figures 

Figure 1: Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a 

Close Air Support Mission 5

Figure 2: Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations 

Met Ground Commander’s Intent at Army’s National 

Training Center (Calendar Years1998-2000) 9

Figure 3: Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined 

Visual and Digital Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and 

Visual and Voice Communication 20

Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground 

Controllers and Selected Aircraft 21

Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment 

Procurements 23

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Page 1 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

May 2, 2003 

The Honorable Vic Snyder 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Total Force 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The success or failure of our military forces in combat is directly linked to 

the realism and thoroughness of their training beforehand. This axiom is 

especially true when aircraft are needed to deliver bombs on targets close 

to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires painstaking 

coordination between air and ground elements. Timely, well-practiced 

procedures and communication are essential because close air support on 

the battlefield often has to happen fast to achieve its objective. Failure to 

respond to a call for air support can leave troops exposed to enemy fire; 

however, mistakes in communications and targeting can result in fatalities 

among friendly forces. In Afghanistan, close air support became 

particularly critical because light forces were introduced into battle 

without artillery, leaving air power as their sole means of fire support. 

Though we completed our work before hostilities began in Iraq, this 

operation also showed the increased importance of integrating air power 

into the ground fight. While most recent close air support operations have 

been successful, “friendly fire” incidents tragically illustrated the dangers 

of the mission. Even before the war in Afghanistan, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) had begun looking for solutions to long-standing problems 

facing the close air support mission. Because joint close air support is—by 

its nature—a joint mission that transcends any single military service, 

DOD has formed steering groups and other interservice task forces to 

examine the mission area. The working groups have addressed a myriad of 

issues, but their primary focus has been on improving training and 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

equipment interoperability1 across the services in both the active and 

reserve components. 

Because of concerns about such unfortunate “friendly fire” occurrences, 

you requested that we review close air support training and doctrine to 

ensure that the U.S. military is prepared for future conflicts. You asked 

that we recommend any actions that DOD and the services could take to 

improve close air support effectiveness while simultaneously reducing risk 

to friendly forces. Thus, our objectives were to assess efforts by DOD and 

the military services to (1) provide adequate training for joint close air 

support missions and (2) enhance the capabilities of the equipment used 

to support this mission. A detailed description of our scope and 

methodology is included in appendix I. 

DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent 

troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to 

prepare them for joint operations. In discussions with military officials and 

during our visits to training sites, we found that adequate realistic training2

is often not available because of four lingering problems: (1) Ground and 

air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint 

environment. When such joint training does occur, according to DOD 

reports and unit officials, it is often ineffective. Data from national training 

centers show that joint close air support training seldom meets the 

expectations and needs of the ground commander. (2) Similarly, the 

training that troops receive at their home stations is usually unrealistic 

because of range restrictions; moreover, it lacks variety—for example, 

pilots often receive rote, repetitive training because of limited air space 

and other restrictions. (3) The services train their aircraft controllers, who 

are the linchpin for close air support coordination, to different standards. 

The lack of universal standards hampers the ability of these controllers to 

perform in a joint operation. (4) Finally, within individual military services, 

the training for close air support missions is often given a lower priority—

in doctrine, school curriculum, and training exercises—than other 

missions. For example, the Air Force focuses more on deep strike and airto-air employment during large force exercises, while the Army places 

 1

 Interoperability refers to the ability of one system to provide and accept information from 

another system. 

2

 Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

more emphasis on training for artillery and the use of its own fire support. 

While DOD has recognized the need to improve the effectiveness of 

training the mission,3

 the steering committee tasked to implement the 

action plan has been unable to resolve most of the plan’s 15 action items 

because of the time and effort required to solve the issues and the 

services’ inability to reach agreement on them. DOD changed the 

responsibility for chairing the executive steering committee to Joint 

Forces Command in hopes of resolving the lingering interservice issues. 

Until these problems are resolved, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air 

support missions will be forced to conduct last-minute training or create 

ad hoc procedures on the battlefield—practices that reduce the 

effectiveness of the mission and increase the risk of injury or death to 

friendly forces. 

Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used in joint close air 

support have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and, as a 

result, do not achieve DOD’s goals for ensuring interoperability and costeffectiveness. The services have acquired digital transmission systems that 

are used to share information instantly between airborne and ground 

personnel. However, these systems are not yet interoperable across the 

services, potentially hampering their effectiveness in joint operations. 

While the services have recognized the need for such a system and have 

plans to field one by 2007, the absence of an interoperable system in the 

near term limits the ability of air and ground forces to coordinate air 

attacks efficiently and under all conditions. Moreover, the services have 

acquired a variety of ground-targeting systems, which allow ground 

controllers to accurately locate targets for attacking aircraft, but they are 

not purchasing these systems cost-effectively. Although DOD has tasked 

the services to develop joint requirements for ground-targeting equipment, 

they have not yet completed them. As a result, the services are procuring a 

variety of systems independently and may be missing opportunities to 

achieve cost benefits from joint purchases. 

We are making several recommendations to help resolve DOD’s lingering 

close air support training shortcomings and ensure that equipment 

procured for this mission is interoperable and meets interservice 

requirements. In written comments on a draft of this report, the 

Department of Defense stated that it concurred with our 

recommendations and is in the process of establishing specific completion 

 3

 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, November 2001. 
Page 4 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

dates for each of the issues identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support 

Action Plan. 

Close air support is an air action by either fixed and rotary wing aircraft 

against hostile targets which are near friendly forces and which require 

detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and maneuver of 

those forces. Several different types of aircraft are assigned the close air 

support mission; examples are described in appendix II. To be successful, 

this type of combat mission requires detailed integration and close 

coordination between air and ground forces.4

 Air is only one type of fire 

support available to ground forces—other forms include artillery, mortars, 

and naval surface fires. Ideally, these fires will be integrated to achieve the 

intended effect on the target. The controller plays the key role in 

coordinating the close air support mission. The controller is often located 

on the ground alongside maneuver forces; however, airborne controllers 

may also control attacks. The controller is responsible for ensuring that 

aircraft strike the target accurately while avoiding hitting friendly troops. 

During battle, when a ground commander needs air support, this specially 

trained controller initiates a call, using voice or digital communications, to 

the aircraft. The controller provides the attacking aircraft with the location 

of the target as well as the position of any friendly troops in the area. 

Based on this information, the aircraft’s crew directs the plane’s bombs to 

the target. Figure 1 depicts a typical mission. 

 4

 Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Figure 1. Typical Steps Required in the Final Coordination of a Close Air Support Mission 

Note: GAO analysis of DOD documents. 

DOD is in the process of developing technologically advanced equipment 

to improve the military’s ability to conduct close air support missions 

under all types of conditions. Historically, such missions were conducted 

during the day under favorable weather conditions. This allowed both 

aircrews and ground controllers to visually acquire and attack ground 

targets. Today, these missions are typically undertaken at night or under 

poor visibility conditions. In addition, because the rules of engagement 

have placed strict limits on collateral damage, the aircraft need to deliver 

munitions precisely. For example, the use of bombers flying at high 

altitudes to perform close air support in recent operations in Afghanistan 

shows how the mission has evolved. Bombers carried out missions using 

precision weapons from altitudes that prevented aircrews from visually 

acquiring targets. The use of these weapons required controllers to 

provide more accurate target information to the attacking aircraft. In 
Page 6 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

addition, technological advancements in equipment continue to improve 

the accuracy by which aircraft can strike their targets. For example, 

equipment such as laser rangefinders and systems that allow controllers to 

transmit information digitally improve accuracy and help mitigate the risk 

of human error. 

Significant differences exist in the services’ approaches to close air 

support. Controllers from the Air Force, Marine Corps, and special 

operations forces attend different schools to learn the basics of controlling 

attack aircraft. To support Army ground units, the Air Force incorporates 

officers and enlisted controllers into Army units. These Air Force 

personnel live and work with the Army and are intended to become an 

integral part of the unit’s fire support staff. The Army must rely on aircraft 

from other services during training or combat. In contrast, the Marine 

Corps uses its own aviators—on a rotational assignment with ground 

forces—to control aircraft. The Marine Corps’ attack aircraft squadrons 

are attached to Marine expeditionary forces, and their primary mission is 

to support ground forces. Day to day, this means that Marine Corps 

ground commanders have attack aircraft at their disposal, allowing them 

to more easily incorporate close air support into their training events. The 

inherently joint nature of the mission requires that all the services train 

together to be adequately prepared. Training is fundamental, according to 

a DOD assessment of the mission area, because technological 

advancements are “meaningless if not supported by training.” 

DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent 

troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to 

prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems include few 

opportunities for ground and air forces to train together in a joint 

environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at troops’ home 

stations, differences in the training standards for aircraft controllers, and 

the low priority placed on joint close air support training in the services’ 

school curriculum and exercises. While DOD has acknowledged the need 

for more effective training in its 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan, 

it has been unable to resolve most of the plan’s action items because of the 

time and effort required to resolve the issues and disagreement among the 

services. 

Despite DOD’s 

Efforts, Joint Close 

Air Support Training 

Deficiencies Remain 
Page 7 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

According to joint doctrine, training must be habitually emphasized in a 

joint training environment, and proficiency can only be obtained though 

dedicated, realistic joint training.5

 Historical experience shows that 

realistic training is critical to success in combat. Realistic training is 

particularly important in the close air support mission where detailed 

coordination is required to effectively deliver bombs close to friendly 

forces. However, DOD has acknowledged that joint close air support 

mission deficiencies have existed for many years. We reviewed documents 

from the mid-1990s that showed that shortfalls in close air support 

procedures have led to decreased mission effectiveness and a greater 

chance of fratricide. Recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated 

that the military is placing an increased emphasis on joint close air 

support, but some serious challenges remain. Many of the soldiers, pilots, 

and aircraft controllers who are asked to perform this mission in combat 

told us that they feel ill prepared to do so. Service personnel told us that it 

was common for both pilots and ground controllers to be forced to learn 

new procedures “on the fly” during actual combat operations. During our 

unit visits, personnel from all services expressed concerns over their 

ability to perform the joint close air support mission. These concerns 

revolve around four interrelated factors, discussed below, which adversely 

affect training. 

Pilots, controllers, and ground commanders from the services that are 

involved in joint close air support need to train together frequently in 

order to develop confidence in one another and become familiar with one 

another’s procedures. Without such regular exercises, pilots are not 

willing to fully trust the instructions they receive from controllers, and 

ground commanders are not confident that the air support will be timely 

and accurate. 

However, opportunities for the services to train together to prepare for the 

joint close air support mission are infrequent. Within the United States, 

there are primarily three training facilities that have the necessary 

maneuver and air space to adequately train close air support with both 

ground forces and attacking aircraft. These are the Army’s National 

Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; the Army’s Joint Readiness 

Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and the Marine Corps’ Air Ground 

Combat Center at Twenty-nine Palms, California. These training centers 

 5

 Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, December 1995 (currently being revised). 

Close Air Support Training 

Barriers Continue to 

Linger 

Joint Training Opportunities 

Are Infrequent and Ineffective 
Page 8 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

provide the maneuver space, airspace, and live ordnance delivery freedom 

to train for this mission under simulated combat conditions that are not 

available at home station training ranges. The centers are designed to offer 

the most realistic and challenging battlefield experiences available; 

however, units normally train at one of these locations only once every 12 

to 18 months and for only 3 weeks at a time. 

Information collected from training exercises at the Army’s National 

Training Center has pointed to the need for more training in joint close air 

support procedures. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, which collects 

and consolidates data from operations and training events, identified 

several long-standing problems associated with the execution of close air 

support during these exercises. For example, in 1995 it reported that the 

full effects of the mission are rarely achieved during training, and in 1998 it 

found that integration issues between Army and Air Force personnel 

continued to hamper the execution of the mission and may contribute to 

fratricides. 

Observations made by the Secretary of Defense’s Joint Close Air Support 

Joint Test and Evaluation task force further confirmed that significant 

problems exist. Chartered in 1998, the task force has collected and 

analyzed a large quantity of data from the Army’s National Training Center. 

By early 2001, it had observed 22 simulated battles that included more 

than 200 close air support sorties. One of the key conclusions from its 

study is that close air support seldom achieved the outcome sought by the 

ground commander during such training exercises. As figure 2 shows, 

close air support operations met the ground commander’s intent—that is, 

they destroyed or otherwise disrupted enemy troops—less than one-third 

of the time. More often than not, close air support failed to meet the 

ground commander’s needs. 
Page 9 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Figure 2. Percentage of Time That Close Air Support Operations Met Ground 

Commander’s Intent at Army’s National Training Center (Calendar Years1998-2000) 

The task force attributed this low success rate to several factors, in 

particular the lack of integration between the Air Force controllers and 

Army fire support teams, whose mission is to coordinate different types of 

firepower. Ideally, air power would be employed seamlessly along with 

artillery and other fire support. We heard frequently about this issue from 

the commanders of Army units we visited in the United States, Germany, 

and Korea. They told us that Army teams did not view assigned aircraft 

controllers as a part of their teams and, thus, were not as comfortable 

relying on the controllers to provide support as they were with their own 

unit personnel. Army unit personnel work with the controllers only a few 

times a month or during field training exercises. Consequently, a deployed 

Army team may have to rely on controllers with whom they have not 

worked during training and in whom they have not developed confidence. 

On the other hand, Air Force controllers who are trying to integrate 

themselves into the Army structure must still report to Air Force 

leadership, and thus they have to satisfy the needs of two different 

commanders. Perhaps most telling, the task force observers also noted 
Page 10 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

that integrating close air support was often an “afterthought” during 

ground maneuver exercises. Some participants they interviewed 

expressed concerns about how well they were prepared for the mission. 

Air Force participants, for example, noted they did not get enough practice 

with the Army’s teams, and Army participants pointed out that training for 

this mission was often overlooked and underemphasized. 

In addition to infrequent training opportunities, many of the unit leaders 

and soldiers we interviewed expressed disappointment with the 

effectiveness of the close air support training they received at the Army’s 

training centers. Pilots told us that because training scenarios at the 

centers are scripted to maximize training benefits for maneuver forces, 

ground commanders fail to use aircrews effectively. In short, available 

aircraft are underutilized, thus limiting the training pilots receive. In the 

United States, personnel from the 18th Air Support Operations Group told 

us that because the Army runs the training events, nearly all of the training 

time at the centers is devoted to Army maneuver tasks rather than to joint 

close air support. As a result, ground controllers are often not included in 

the planning and execution of missions. In Europe, personnel from the 4th 

Air Support Operations Group told us that the Army limits their controller 

training to an hour a day at the Army’s Combined Training Center at 

Grafenwoehr, Germany. On the other hand, aircraft availability is 

sometimes a problem. According to military officials, joint close air 

support is planned into all exercises, but in many cases the aircraft do not 

arrive for a variety of reasons, such as weather conditions and mechanical 

problems. One brigade official told us that during his unit’s last training 

center rotation in Germany, 12 sorties were planned, but none was 

actually undertaken. 

While the Marines are widely considered to be proficient at integrated 

close air support training, the training they provide at the Twenty-nine 

Palms training center, for example, is typically not joint. Marines supply 

their own attack aircraft and ground controller assets to train for close air 

support missions. Overall, the task force concluded that Marine Corps 

ground controllers figure prominently in the development of offensive and 

defensive operational plans and that the mission was generally well 

planned and executed. However, the training center presents its own 

challenges. The aircraft maneuver space is restrictive, a simulated enemy 

rather than a well-trained opposing force is used, and the exercises focus 

more on training than on evaluating capabilities. 

Combined training events between U.S. and coalition forces are also 

infrequent. For example, U.S. officials in Korea told us that Army and Air 
Page 11 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Force personnel rarely practice close air support with South Korean 

ground controllers or aircrews. In addition, U.S. ground controllers and 

pilots stationed in Korea and Germany said that barriers such as accents 

and the use of nonstandard phraseology by foreign aircrews impact the 

effectiveness of combined training. Dutch military officials told us that it is 

difficult to train with U.S. personnel. While two combined training 

exercises promote close air support training—Clean Hunter and Flying 

Rhino—Dutch officials stated that U.S. ground controllers have not 

participated. Furthermore, these officials said that while A-10s from the 

81st Fighter Squadron support Dutch ground controller training, this 

relationship is informal and they cannot rely on U.S. support. U.S. officials 

stated there are opportunities to train with coalition military personnel. 

For example, Navy officials said that they schedule combined training with 

British forces as part of their Joint Maritime Course. Moreover, they told 

us that because the Navy does not own training ranges in the European 

theater, it schedules training events with host nations to gain access to 

live-fire ranges. In addition, U.S. Air Force officials in Korea told us that 

they are planning to combine ground controller training for both U.S. and 

South Korean personnel. 

Air Force and Navy units also have limited opportunities for realistic joint 

training for air support missions at their home stations, primarily because 

of various air space and range restrictions.6

 For example, Air Force 

officials in South Korea said that their pilots experience numerous 

airspace restrictions near the demilitarized zone separating North and 

South Korea. Because of such restrictions, the Air Force rarely 

synchronizes its training with the U.S. Army or South Korean forces. This 

impedes the Air Force’s ability to train all the integrated elements they 

would need to have in combat. Moreover, Air Force officials told us that 

because of live ordnance limitations during training, fighter pilots may 

employ live munitions for the first time in combat, under hostile 

conditions, and close to friendly forces. Because range limitations often 

force units to perform air attacks from the same direction and oriented on 

the same targets, training officials frequently refer to this limited training 

as “range close air support,” which means that it is done in a specific way 

because of range restrictions rather than as it would be carried out in 

 6

 Such range limitations have been the subject of related GAO work, including, Military 

Training: Limitations Exist Overseas but Are Not Reflected in Readiness Reporting, 

GAO-02-525 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2002) and Military Training: DOD Lacks a 

Comprehensive Plan to Manage Encroachment on Training Ranges, GAO-02-614

(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2002). 

Range Restrictions Limit Home 

Station Training 
Page 12 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

actual combat. In short, the training is not realistic, and its value is 

diminished because trainees become familiar with the terrain and target. 

The following are other additional examples of restricted training 

environments: 

• The Fort Bragg, North Carolina, range used by the 23rd Fighter Group 

has altitude and laser restrictions and prohibits the use of tactical 

rockets. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically practiced. 

• The ground controllers from the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron 

in Hawaii are not able to maintain their currency requirements7

 at their 

home stations because there are no close air support aircraft available 

to train them; thus, they must return to the mainland periodically to 

train. 

• Airspace restrictions in Germany force A-10 pilots from the 81st Fighter 

Squadron to train at altitudes of 17,000 to 20,000 feet rather than 5,000 

feet, where the A-10was designed to operate. 

• About 10 percent of last year’s planned close air support missions for 

the 31st Fighter Wing in Italy were executed. In addition, the squadron 

does not have a range where close air support can be undertaken with 

a ground controller or where units can train at night. 

Likewise, home station training for Navy pilots is limited not only because 

of range restrictions but also because of the Navy’s 18-month deployment 

cycles. Before they are deployed, Navy pilots are sent to the Naval Strike 

Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada, for 4 weeks of 

training. The proficiency pilots gain at Fallon, however, erodes during 

their 18-month deployment cycle because they have access to few ranges, 

many of which may be inadequate. A second challenge comes after 

deployment, when the pilots return to their home stations. According to 

Navy personnel, the pilots’ mission skills continue to erode because they 

have limited access to aircraft and equipment, and they are restricted to 

using only local ranges for training that they feel is inadequate. Marine 

 7

 A currency requirement is the frequency with which a skill needs to be practiced during a 

given period of time. 
Page 13 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Corps pilots at units we visited echoed the concerns voiced about range 

restrictions and the lack of varied training opportunities. For example: 

• Dare County Bomb Range, North Carolina, has only a 7-mile range 

when 30 miles is necessary for the F/A-18 to effectively employ air-toground weapons for close air support training.8

• One range attached to the Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North 

Carolina, is not much larger than the Dare County range and is 

considered inadequate for effective close air support training. Another 

range near the air station prohibits the use of live ordnance. 

While range restrictions curtail realistic home station training 

opportunities, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel told us that a close 

air support simulator device could provide a mechanism to augment live 

training opportunities. For example, officials said that the development of 

a ground controller simulated training device, linked to an attack aircraft 

simulator, would provide valuable training for both controllers and pilots. 

DOD recognizes that simulators can enhance the planning, preparation, 

and training for close air support. According to its capstone requirements 

document, simulators enable units to practice the communication and 

coordination procedures associated with the close air support mission 

when constraints prohibit live-fire training. However, the United States 

does not currently own any close air support simulated training devices.9

In Europe, the Air Force has arranged to lease simulator time from the 

Dutch military. We visited the training facility in the Netherlands and 

observed controllers using the device to practice simulated close air 

support missions. Both Dutch and U.S. officials believe such a simulator 

provides the capability to train close air support effectively in a safe 

environment. 

The individual services and the special operations communities do not use 

common certification or currency requirements to train their aircraft 

controllers. For initial certification, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

operate formal schools that have curriculums based on the individual 

 8

 The 30-mile standard is documented in the Navy’s Top Gun manual, Volume IV – 

Employment/Tactics, May 2002. 

9

 After completion of our audit work, Air Force officials indicated that they have 

incorporated extremely limited simulated close air support training devices in their Joint 

Firepower Course. 

Inconsistent Controller 

Training Hampers Joint 

Operations 
Page 14 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

services’ interpretation of DOD’s Joint Publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics 

Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support (1995). Overall, this 

initial instruction is fairly common among the schools, and the Navy and 

Marine Corps schools have the same requirements. The Air Force and the 

Navy/Marine Corps curriculums cover such topics as intelligence, 

equipment operation, integration of close air support with other fires, and 

battle damage assessments. However, the time devoted to each topic, as 

well as the specific instructional material presented, varies among the 

services. Two notable differences exist in initial certification requirements 

between the Navy/Marine Corps and the Air Force programs. The 

Navy/Marine Corps program requires its controllers to practice close air 

support with a variety of aircraft, including helicopters. The Air Force 

does not require helicopter practice because it does not have combat 

helicopters in its conventional force, and the Army does not use its 

helicopters in a close air support role. A second difference is that the 

Navy/Marine Corps requires its controllers to practice coordinating live 

indirect fire support, such as artillery. The Air Force does not require 

practice with live artillery for its initial certification. Usually, the Army 

coordinates the use of indirect fires on the battlefield. The controller 

certification debate is further complicated by the fact that NATO 

certification requirements are more demanding and comprehensive in 

some areas than those for U.S. personnel. For example, NATO standards 

require controllers to have 12 successful low-level controls, controlling 

close air support attacking aircraft at altitudes below 500 feet, to be 

qualified. No such standard exists for U.S. controllers. 

Once schooling is complete and controllers are sent back to their units, 

they are required to maintain a level of proficiency throughout the year. 

These annual currency requirements vary by service. (See table 1.) For 

example, the Marine Corps and Air Force require controllers to practice 12 

times a year to remain current, while NATO controllers need 24 practices. 
Page 15 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Table 1. Number of Practices Required Annually by Ground Controllers to Maintain 

Currency 

Total number 

 of practices 

Number of 

 daylight practices 

Number of 

 nighttime practices 

Marine Corps 12 8 4 

Air Force 12 10 2 

NATO 24 20 4 

Source: DOD and NATO. 

Note: GAO analysis of DOD and NATO training publications.10

Likewise, currency requirements for controllers in the special operations 

community differ among the Air Force, Navy, and Army because they are 

required to meet their service-directed requirements. Special operations 

controllers receive their initial certification by attending one of the service 

schools. However, the services have different requirements for 

maintaining their controllers’ status. In fact, only Air Force special 

operations controllers have a specific annual currency requirement to 

maintain. Because of this situation, some personnel we interviewed told us 

that during operations in Afghanistan, ground commanders were hesitant 

to have non-Air Force personnel directing close air support missions, and, 

in most cases, asked to have Air Force ground controllers attached to their 

special operations teams. In addition, it was not clear how recently nonAir Force special operations controllers had practiced this skill, adding to 

the ground commanders’ reluctance to use them. 

In interviews, controllers from conventional forces told us that while they 

have currency standards to maintain, it is difficult to meet them. 

According to Air Force officials, 50 percent of the assigned Air Force 

ground controllers in Europe are not current in nighttime or live ordnance 

controls. One contributing factor is that Air Force pilots can meet all of 

their close air support training requirements using an airborne controller, 

thus negating the need to provide air support for ground controller 

training. For example, according to personnel from the 81st Fighter 

Squadron in Germany, less than 20 percent of their close air support 

 10 The publications are as follows: Marine Corps order P3500.37, Aviation Training and 

Readiness Manual vol. 9 Tactical Air Control Party Officer, dated May 8, 2001; Air Force 

Instruction 13-102, Air Support Operations Center and Tactical Air Control Party Training 

and Evaluation Procedures, dated September 1, 1996; Minimum Qualifications for Forward 

Air Controllers, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standardization Agreement #3797, 

dated February 26, 1979. 
Page 16 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

training sorties involve the use of a ground controller. Recognizing this 

shortage, Air Force officials have requested funding for a simulator to help 

train their ground controllers stationed in Europe. 

Beyond certification and currency standards, some stark differences exist 

in the procedures that U.S. and NATO forces use to pass target 

information from ground controllers to attacking aircraft. U.S. controllers 

are trained to use a standardized 9-linebriefing format, while NATO troops 

use a 15-line briefing. This lack of commonality creates a potentially 

hazardous battlefield situation in operations involving U.S. military allies. 

One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training needed 

to adequately prepare U.S. forces to plan and execute the joint close air 

support missions is the low priority they give to this mission in 

comparison with other training requirements. This lack of emphasis is 

apparent in operational doctrine, school instruction, and the number of 

pilot sorties devoted to close air support, all of which prevent aircrews 

and controllers from developing their mission skills. 

The Air Force has historically not placed a high priority on close air 

support in its doctrine. Service officials we interviewed stated that the Air 

Force tends to emphasize air-to-air and deep attack missions over close air 

support. In our review of Air Force doctrine, we found that the Air Force 

prioritizes air superiority, strategic attack, and air interdiction missions 

because it views such missions as a more effective and efficient use of its 

resources. While officials indicated that the Air Force would provide joint 

close air support when it was needed to support ground troops, they said 

that it is more efficient to use the aircraft to attack enemies before they 

come in contact with friendly forces. 

Key Air Force and Navy pilot training schools also give a low priority to 

close air support training in their curriculums. At the Air Force weapons 

school, for example, only 13 percent of the F-16’s flight syllabus is devoted 

to this mission. Moreover, for pilots of the A-10—an aircraft primarily 

designed to perform close air support—only 31 percent of Weapons 

School training sorties were for the mission. At the Navy’s air warfare 

center, pilots receive 8 days of close air support training during their 4-

week course. However, because of the number of pilots attending the 

course, the 8 days devoted to close air support only allow aircrews to fly 

two close air support missions. 

Furthermore, some Air Force unit training programs place low emphasis 

on this mission. According to the Air Force, active duty F-16 squadrons 

Some Services Give Low 

Priority to Joint Close Air 

Support Training 
Page 17 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

stationed in the United States devote only about 5 percent of their training 

sorties to close air support. In addition, an Air Force official in Europe 

stated that less than 10 percent of his F-16 squadron’s training program is 

devoted to close air support, while 50 percent is for air-to-air missions. 

Given the difficult nature of the mission, many pilots believe that this level 

of training is not sufficient to develop adequate mission skills. 

According to DOD’s task force, the lack of integration between the Army’s 

fire support elements and the Air Force’s ground controller personnel is 

the top problem facing joint close air support training. Such poor 

integration is primarily the result of the services’ low emphasis on joint 

training for this mission. We confirmed this conclusion during our visits to 

various units. For example, Army commanders have been trained to use 

direct and indirect fire, with joint close air support being used as a last 

resort. Joint close air support is only one of a myriad of support options 

available to ground force commanders that must be trained. Army units 

rarely integrate close air support into training exercises outside the 

training centers and, as a result, joint close air support integration training 

is often unrealistic. In addition, the Air Force’s selection of air liaison 

officers, who provide ground commanders with expertise on the 

employment of joint close air support, shows a lack of Air Force 

commitment and has added to the lack of confidence on the part of the 

Army and the ground controllers. Both Army and Air Force personnel at 

several locations we visited raised concerns that this position has not been 

considered a career-enhancing position. These officers not only do not get 

a chance to fly but they also have to live in the “dirt” with Army forces 

during various maneuvers. According to personnel, the best personnel, or 

even those with extensive close air support training, have not filled this 

position. However, according to Air Force officials in Europe, beginning in 

2000 the service implemented a change that elevates the selection of 

candidates for this position to the same level as picking candidates for 

flying and operational squadron support commands for their theater. This 

should produce higher-quality candidates for the position. 

The Marine Corps emphasizes close air support in its training and 

considers integrating aviation with other supporting fires as a critical 

element because it lacks the amount of artillery available to Army 

commanders. However, Marine Corps training is usually limited to 

practicing close air support with its own air assets supporting its own 

ground forces. The Marines do not emphasize training these skills with 

other services. We found that the Marines rarely conduct joint training for 

this mission, which limits their ability to integrate on the battlefield when 

they are called upon to perform this mission with others. According to an 
Page 18 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

internal Operation Enduring Freedom after-action report, investigators 

found that Marine Corps ground controllers require more extensive joint 

training opportunities, particularly for controlling air support in joint 

operations. 

Even before the extensive use of close air support in Afghanistan 

highlighted the potential dangers inherent in this mission, DOD had 

acknowledged that action was needed to improve its effectiveness. In an 

internal assessment, DOD concluded that current capabilities do not meet 

all present or projected needs and that the joint community faces a 

substantial challenge in attaining the new levels of capabilities required to 

support emerging war fighting concepts.11

In January 2000, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council chartered an 

executive steering committee to identify shortfalls across the mission area. 

The steering committee developed a Joint Close Air Support action plan to 

address a number of training and equipment interoperability issues. The 

training issues include such items as increasing joint training exercises; 

establishing joint integrated training plans; and creating a “joint terminal 

attack controller” with standardized certifications, which DOD says will 

improve joint operations and reduce the potential for accidents and 

fratricides. However, none of the action item target dates for completion 

were met on time. In fact, only 3 of the 15 action items have been 

completed to date, and the remaining 12 issues have rolled over into the 

updated 2003 plan. The complete list of issues contained in the action plan 

is included in appendix IV. 

According to service personnel we interviewed, progress on resolving the 

training issues has been slow because of the joint nature of the mission. 

Getting agreement across the services is difficult because there are 

fundamental differences in how the individual services employ close air 

support. Moreover, no joint organization is responsible for overseeing the 

training and equipping of the mission. Individual service and joint staff 

representatives expressed frustration with the executive steering 

committee’s inability to resolve the action items. The services have not 

been able to agree on several of them. For example, the services disagree 

on what to include in the joint terminal attack controller certification. The 

committee does not have the authority to require individual services to 

 11 Capstone Requirements Document for Close Air Support, JROCM 067-02, May 6, 2002. 

DOD is Making Efforts to 

Resolve Training 

Deficiencies 
Page 19 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

train jointly or to compromise by developing common training standards 

for their controllers. In October 2002, DOD changed the responsibility for 

chairing the Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee to 

Joint Forces Command. Previously, the committee had been cochaired by 

the Air Force and the Marine Corps. According to DOD officials, this 

action was undertaken, at least in part, in hopes of resolving the 

interservice issues. At Joint Forces Command, the Joint Requirements and 

Integration Directorate (J8) serves as the lead joint integration expert, 

ensuring that the various services and defense agencies combine their 

capabilities into a single successful effort. 

DOD has acknowledged that such deficiencies in joint training are not 

limited to the close air support mission. In March 2002, DOD announced a 

plan for transforming all of its training programs. This plan emphasizes the 

need to provide comprehensive and systematic joint training focused on 

the operational requirements of the combatant commanders. Furthermore, 

it acknowledges a need for increasing the use of live and virtual training in 

its training environment. According to DOD, a Joint National Training 

Capability would be established to provide training that is less servicefocused and more reflective of how U.S. forces actually fight today. The 

first training event is scheduled for May 2003 and will focus on Army 

maneuver forces at Fort Irwin, California; however, the event will also 

include supporting forces at several locations across the United States. 

The military services have not yet achieved DOD’s goals for ensuring that 

equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable and 

cost-effective. The digital transmission systems that the services procured 

to transmit information instantly between airborne and ground personnel 

are not interoperable across the services, and a common capability is not 

expected to be fielded until 2007. The lack of interoperability does not 

allow participants to take advantage of the increased effectiveness that 

digital transmissions add to the mission. In addition, the services’ 

independent purchases of different kinds of ground-targeting equipment 

have precluded them from achieving potential cost savings from joint 

purchases. 

Advanced technological systems that allow ground and air forces to 

transmit battlefield information digitally can greatly improve the 

effectiveness and timeliness of close air support missions. These systems 

are designed to allow a ground controller to input the information needed 

for a ground attack into a computer and transmit this information instantly 

Lack of Equipment 

Interoperability and 

Coordinated 

Purchases Hampers 

Effectiveness of Close 

Air Support Mission 

Programs 

Current Digital 

Transmission Systems Are 

Not Interoperable across 

the Services 
Page 20 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

to a computer on board an aircraft. The use of digital communication has a 

number of advantages over visual or voice communication. Digital 

transmissions speed up the execution of a mission and can reduce 

transcription errors between the controllers and the pilots of attack 

aircraft. For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the amount of 

time required for transmitting and verifying coordinates could be reduced 

from about 7 minutes (the time needed for voice communication) to less 

than 1 minute for digital communication. Digital transmissions can also 

enhance the effectiveness of a mission during darkness, in inclement 

weather, or under other conditions when the ground controller may not be 

in position to observe the aircraft. In addition, digital transmission systems 

can transmit more detailed information, thereby improving the “situational 

awareness” of both ground and air forces. For example, digital systems 

can provide the ground controller’s mission computer with detailed and 

constantly updated battlefield information, including the position of the 

attack aircraft, verification of target acquisition, and the location of 

friendly forces. According to tests performed at the Army’s National 

Training Center during February 2002, the use of digitally transmitted 

communication significantly improved mission performance. As figure 3 

shows, this equipment allowed ground controllers to provide the correct 

attack decision more often (89 to 93 percent of the time) than when they 

relied on only what they could see and communicate by voice to the attack 

aircraft (correct 67 percent of the time). 

Figure 3. Percentage of Correct Attack Decisions for Combined Visual and Digital 

Systems, Digital Systems Alone, and Visual and Voice Communication 
Page 21 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Digital transmission systems are currently available on only four types of 

aircraft. The Air Force has installed this equipment on less than threequarters of its active-duty F-16 fighter aircraft12 and has procured a limited 

number of portable systems for its B-52 bombers. The Marine Corps has 

installed similar equipment on roughly 95 percent of its AV-8Bs and on 

about 20 percent of its F/A-18s. Because of the limited number of aircraft 

with this equipment, ground controllers told us that they have had few 

opportunities to transmit information digitally to attack aircraft. Even 

when digital transmission equipment is available on board an aircraft, it 

may be incompatible with the equipment that is on the ground because the 

services use different systems. This lack of interoperability across the 

services reduces the equipment’s effectiveness and limits its usefulness. 

Some ground controllers told us that they would hesitate to bring this 

equipment to the battlefield because they would not be able to control 

attack aircraft from another service. Figure 4 shows that only one (the AV8B) of six aircraft that currently perform the close air support mission is 

fully capable of receiving digital transmissions from its own service 

controllers. However, none is capable of receiving such transmissions 

across service lines. 

Figure 4: Digital Transmission Capabilities between Ground Controllers and 

Selected Aircraft 

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

 12 In addition to the active duty Air Force effort to enhance digital transmission capabilities, 

the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard have developed the Situational Awareness 

Data Link. However, primarily only Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard F-16s are 

equipped with this system. 
Page 22 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Given the uncertainties surrounding equipment interoperability, ground 

troops and aircrews may have to resort to using multiple means of 

communication. In Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom, for 

example, the primary means of passing targeting information from 

controllers to attack aircraft was by voice communication. Service 

personnel who took part in these operations stated that the use of multiple 

modes of communication was a cause of confusion on the battlefield. 

Recognizing that it needs to improve the interoperability of digital 

transmission systems, DOD has developed a plan for the services to field 

an interoperable system by 2007. This system, commonly called “Link 16,” 

would provide an integrated air and ground display of friendly and enemy 

battlefield positions. Link 16, as it is currently fielded, is limited to air-toair missions, but DOD plans to expand its capabilities to include the air-toground mission. In the interim, the Air Force and Marine Corps are 

seeking ways to improve the interoperability of their current systems by 

developing common software applications. However, these efforts are in a 

preliminary stage and, according to DOD officials, it will be at least 2004 

before the interim solutions are in place. 

The services are independently procuring a wide variety of different 

ground-targeting systems to improve their execution of close air support 

missions. However, these service-specific purchases have not taken 

advantage of the benefits of buying common equipment that could reduce 

overall program costs. 

The services are procuring new ground-targeting equipment to improve 

their ability to undertake close air support missions during night 

operations, in adverse weather conditions, and from increasingly higher 

altitudes. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. forces delivered precision 

weapons from medium to high altitudes; this meant that ground 

controllers had to determine target coordinates with precision in order to 

maximize mission effectiveness and avoid fratricides. According to DOD 

officials, recent technological advancements in ground-targeting 

equipment are providing this needed precision. Figure 5 shows examples 

of the equipment the services are procuring to enhance ground-targeting 

capabilities. 

Services’ Fielding of 

Multiple Ground-Targeting 

Systems Do Not Take 

Advantage of Possible Cost 

Savings 
Page 23 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Figure 5: Selected New Ground-Targeting Equipment Procurements 

Note: GAO generated based on DOD documents. 

Each service has established its own program to acquire more advanced 

systems to enhance the capabilities of its ground-targeting equipment. The 

Air Force and Marine Corps, for example, have initiated acquisition 

programs to buy equipment that will more precisely locate targets at all 

levels of visibility, mark targets for attack by precision weapons, and 

increase communication connectivity with all battlefield participants. 

Table 2 provides an overview of the Marine Corps and Air Force programs, 

which were initiated in 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
Page 24 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Table 2: Air Force and Marine Corps Acquisitions Programs for Ground-Targeting 

Equipment 

Dollars in millions 

Service 

Total 

program cost 

Fiscal year 

2004 budget 

request

Examples of groundtargeting equipment 

Program 

fielding 

completion 

date 

Marine Corps $79.6 $29.8 • Laser rangefinder 

• GPS receiver 

• Laser target 

designator 

• Multiband radio 

• Mission computer 

2005 

Air Force $344 $15.1 • Laser rangefinder 

• GPS receiver 

• Multiband radio 

• Mission computer 

• Infrared laser 

2011 

Source: GAO. 

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations 

Command have procured technologically advanced ground-targeting 

equipment for their special operations forces. This equipment was used 

during Operation Enduring Freedom and, according to after-action 

reports, it significantly enhanced the ground controllers’ ability to identify 

ground targets for attack aircraft, thereby improving mission effectiveness. 

Although this equipment can improve mission effectiveness, because of 

the lack of joint requirements, the services have fielded multiple types of 

equipment with similar capabilities. For example, Special Operations 

Command officials told us that U.S. forces used four different groundtargeting systems in Operation Enduring Freedom. An analysis of the 

services’ procurement plans shows that a variety of similar ground 

targeting equipment will be fielded. For example, the services have 

programmed funding to procure at least six different laser rangefinders 

and four different laser target designators. 

DOD has determined that equipment commonality for the mission could 

reduce overall program costs for the services. The Joint Close Air Support 

Executive Steering Committee, for example, recommended that the Air 

Force and Marine Corps identify opportunities for multiservice 

procurement of ground-targeting equipment to meet joint requirements. 

U.S. Central Command officials echoed the recommendation that U.S. 

forces should acquire a common set of ground-targeting equipment and 
Page 25 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

further emphasized that all forces should be trained in its use and 

characteristics. However, with the services continuing to pursue individual 

programs based on service-specific requirements, DOD cannot provide 

assurances that the services are acquiring the most cost-effective systems. 

GAO has previously reported that DOD fails to consider joint solutions and 

broader mission requirements when proposing systems.13 While the 

services conduct considerable analyses in justifying major acquisitions, 

these analyses can be narrowly focused and may not fully consider 

alternative solutions, such as joint acquisition of a system with other 

services. As a result, there is no assurance that DOD and the services are 

avoiding costly duplication of systems, investing in the most cost-effective 

and affordable solutions, and optimizing mission performance. 

Furthermore, because the services plan, acquire, and operate systems to 

meet their own operational concepts, not necessarily the requirements of 

joint operations, there is no guarantee that fielded systems will operate 

together effectively. A joint acquisition strategy, based on broader mission 

requirements, would provide assurances that the services are acquiring 

systems that are cost-effective and function together during joint 

operations. 

DOD needs to provide better and more realistic training to prepare U.S. 

forces for joint close air support operations. With forces growing lighter, 

ground commanders may need to rely more heavily on close air support. 

Even a small mistake in conducting this mission can be deadly to friendly 

forces, a tragedy we witnessed in Afghanistan. While ineffective training is 

the fundamental problem facing close air support, technological 

advancements hold promise for enhancing battlefield information. 

However, the services have pursued solutions to meet their individual 

needs, and it will be years before DOD takes advantage of the 

enhancements on a wide scale. As a result, the services are spending 

millions of dollars on uncoordinated efforts to obtain equipment, and 

different types of systems are proliferating in the field. 

DOD’s efforts to improve close air support training have met with limited 

success. DOD’s Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit several 

roadblocks—primarily because the services have been unable to agree on 

 13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks, 

Department of Defense. GAO-03-98 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

Conclusions 
Page 26 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

joint solutions. Thus, the solutions to long-standing problems will likely 

have to come from an organization such as the Joint Forces Command. 

DOD and the services understand the issues, but a strong commitment 

from senior leadership may help to implement pending action items and 

address lingering problems. Such problems may also be indicative of 

larger-scale training concerns in the department. DOD recognizes that 

significant challenges exist in delivering realistic joint training to prepare 

forces for a wide range of missions, not just close air support. DOD’s plans 

to create a Joint National Training Capability could ultimately provide a 

venue for better joint training. Such training is certainly needed to prepare 

U.S. troops to conduct close air support missions. 

To resolve the lingering training and equipment close air support issues, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense give close air support 

priority when implementing the department’s training transformation 

initiatives. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary provide the 

Commander of the Joint Forces Command with the authority and 

resources, if necessary, to resolve the issues identified in the joint close air 

support action plan. The Command’s actions should include 

• emphasizing close air support as part of the department’s new Joint 

National Training Capability to ensure that units receive realistic joint 

training; 

• seeking ways to mitigate home station training limitations, including 

the use of simulation to augment live training; and 

• preparing aircraft controllers to perform in a joint environment by 

standardizing training and certifications. 

We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint 

Forces Command or other appropriate organizational entity, review the 

services’ plans for procuring advanced close air support equipment to 

ensure that it is interoperable and meets valid joint requirements. 

Because of the long-standing nature of training and equipment issues 

associated with the joint close air support mission, Congress may wish to 

consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to report on the progress the 

department has made toward resolving the identified issues. Congress 

needs this information to ensure that U.S. forces are adequately prepared 

to perform the mission and that the department is making cost-effective 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 
Page 27 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint performance on the 

battlefield. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred 

with our recommendations and has tasked the U.S. Joint Forces Command 

with establishing specific completion dates for each of the issues 

identified in the 2003 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to fully 

implement them in a timely manner. DOD further stated that it would 

provide a copy of the timetable to GAO by May 30, 2003. DOD’s comments 

are reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air force, the Secretary of the 

Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. 

If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-8100. Key 

contributors to this report were John Pendleton, Laura Durland, Vincent 

Balloon, Nancy Benco, Ray Carroll, Matthew Ullengren, and Lester Ward. 

Neal P. Curtin 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 28 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the 

services have made in providing adequate training for the joint close air 

support mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and unit-level 

service representatives both within the United States and overseas. 

Specifically, we met with members of the Joint Close Air Support 

Executive Steering Committee to document the actions they had been able 

to accomplish in resolving the training shortcomings listed in their 2001 

Joint Close Air Support Action Plan and to identify the reasons for their 

lack of progress. In addition, we gathered data from each service to 

determine, from the user’s perspective, what barriers were preventing 

adequate training in close air support. We also obtained the training 

curriculum from each service’s ground controller schools and analyzed 

these documents, looking for commonalities and inconsistencies. Table 3 

lists all of the major units, commands, and training facilities that we visited 

or contacted to obtain our data. 

To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of 

the equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we 

obtained the services’ acquisition strategies for the specific equipment 

they were procuring to enhance mission effectiveness. We interviewed 

service personnel and obtained documentation to verify the value these 

procurements added and to determine any barriers that would limit their 

effectiveness. Once we determined that no joint requirement existed and 

that the services were procuring interoperable digital transmission devices 

and multiple variants of ground-targeting equipment, we obtained 

documentation on the potential solutions for obtaining interoperable 

common equipment. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 29 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Table 3. Units and Locations Included on This Assignment 

Army U.S. Army Safety Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. 

 U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. 

 Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 

 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 

 101st Air Mobile Division, Fort Campbell, Ky. 

 U.S. Army Artillery Training Command, Fort Sill, Okla. 

 U.S. Army Headquarters Europe, Heidelberg, Germany 

 Eighth U.S. Army, Yongsan Post, Republic of Korea 

 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea 

 2nd Infantry Division, 1st Brigade, Camp Casey, Republic of 

Korea 

 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 

Air Force Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. 

 U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Warner-Robbins Air Force 

Base, Ga. 

 U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 

 Detachment 1, 334th Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 

 23rd Fighter Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C. 

 18th Air Support Operations Group, Pope Air Force Base, N.C. 

 19th Air Support Operations Center, Fort Campbell, Ky. 

 U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School, Nellis Air Force 

Base, Nev. 

 U.S. Air Force Weapons School, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 

 6th Combat Training Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 

 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.

 Detachment 1, 28th Test Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. 

 2nd Operations Support Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 

 20th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 

 93rd Bomber Squadron (AF Reserve), Barksdale Air Force Base, 

La. 

 96th Bomber Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 

 548th Combat Training Squadron, Barksdale Air Force Base, La. 

 303rd Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Whiteman Air Force Base, 

Mo. 

 457th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Naval Air Station Joint 

Reserve Base, Fort Worth, Tex. 

 706th Fighter Squadron (AF Reserve), Joint Reserve Base, New 

Orleans, La. 

 U.S. Air Force Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany 

 81st Fighter Squadron, Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany 

 555th Fighter Squadron, Aviano Air Base, Italy 

 32nd Air Ground Operations School, Germany 

 4th Air Support Operations Group, Germany 

 1st Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany 

 2nd Air Support Operations Squadron, Germany 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

 Headquarter Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii 

 7th Air Force, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 

 51st Operations Support Squadron, Osan Air Base, Republic of 

Korea 

 51st Fighter Wing, Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea 

 25th Air Support Operations Squadron, Hickam Air Force Base, 

Hawaii 

Navy Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Naval Air Station Fallon, 

Nev. 

 U.S. Naval Safety Center, Naval Air Reserve, Norfolk, Va. 

 Naval Air Forces-Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Station Norfolk, Va. 

 Strike Fighter Wings Atlantic, Oceana Naval Air Station, Va. 

 VFA-136, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va. 

 VF-211, Naval Air Station Oceana, Va. 

 Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, Naval Amphibious 

Base, Coronado, Calif. 

 U.S. Navy Europe, London, England 

Marine Corps Marine Corps, Aviation Plans, Policy, and Budget Branch, 

Washington, D.C. 

 Marine Corps, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department, 

Washington, D.C. 

 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va. 

 Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va. 

 Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, Va. 

 Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command, Twenty-nine 

Palms, Calif. 

 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-One, Yuma 

Marine Corps Air Station, Ariz. 

 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 

 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C. 

 Marine Air Group 14, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air 

Station, N.C. 

 Marine Air Group 29, New River Marine Corps Air Station, N.C. 

 Marine Air Group 31, Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, S.C. 

 Marine Forces Pacific Command, Hawaii 

Special Operations U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. 

 3rd Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. 

 5th Special Forces Group, Fort Campbell, Ky. 

 720th Special Tactics Group, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 

 19th Special Operations Squadron, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 

 U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

 U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla. 

Joint 

Organizations 

Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team, Eglin Air Force 

Base, Fla. 

 Joint Close Air Support Joint Test & Evaluation Task Force, Eglin 

Air Force Base, Fla. 

 The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Readiness and Training, 

Washington, D.C. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

 The Joint Staff, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments, 

Washington, D.C. 

 U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. 

 U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea 

 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Va. 

 U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii 

Netherlands Royal Netherlands Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, 

Netherlands 

Source: DOD. 

We conducted our review from April 2002 through March 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that 

Perform Close Air Support 

Page 32 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

The services use many different aircraft to deliver close air support. Table 

4 provides pictures and brief descriptions of these aircraft. 

Table 4: Close Air Support Aircraft 

Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that 

Perform Close Air Support 
Appendix II: Examples of DOD Aircraft that 

Perform Close Air Support 

Page 33 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Table 4: Continued 

Source: DOD. 
Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support 

Training and Friendly Fire Accidents 

Page 34 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

DOD and the services identified three close air support training mishaps 

that resulted in fatalities since the Persian Gulf War and three official joint 

close air support friendly fire events. Friendly fire is a circumstance in 

which members of a U.S. or friendly military force are mistakenly or 

accidentally killed or injured in action taken by U.S. or friendly forces 

actively engaged with an enemy or who are directing fire at a hostile force 

or what is thought to be a hostile force. According to DOD personnel and 

the conclusions reached in the investigations, these incidents have been 

caused by human error, by not following established standardized 

procedures, and by lack of experience and training. Two well-known 

events did not meet our criteria and are thus excluded. The April 17, 2002, 

incident where an Air National Guard F-16 bombed Canadian troops did 

not involve air support of ground forces, so it was not close air support. 

Secondly, the July 1, 2002, “wedding party” incident in which civilians 

were killed and injured is not by definition a friendly fire incident. Table 5 

contains a description of the close air support friendly fire and training 

incidents and the status of the investigations. 

Table 5. Training and Friendly Fire Incidents since the Persian Gulf War 

Date Location Description of incident Who was hurt 

Status of 

incident report 

Training Incidents

July 18, 1995 Fort Sill, Oklahoma An Air Force Reserve A-10 aircraft 

dropped a 500-pound bomb on a 

forward observation post. 

One person was 

killed and 13 others 

injured. 

Complete 

April 19, 1999 Atlantic Fleet Weapons 

Training Facility, Vieques 

Island, Puerto Rico 

A Marine FA-18C dropped two 500-

pound bombs that impacted outside 

the live impact area but within the 

confines of the range. 

One person was 

killed and 4 others 

injured. 

Complete 

March 12, 2001 Udairi Range, Kuwait A Navy F/A-18C dropped three 500-

pound bombs on an observation post 

during a night exercise. 

Six people were 

killed and 11 others 

injured. 

Complete 

Friendly Fire Incidents

November 26, 2001 Mazar-e Sharif, 

Afghanistan 

A Navy F/A-18 aircraft dropped a joint 

direct attack munition that exploded 

near friendly forces. 

No fatalities and 5 

others injured. 

Ongoing 

December 5, 2001 Afghanistan A B-52 bomber dropped a joint direct 

attack munition that exploded near 

friendly forces. 

Three people were 

killed and 19 others 

injured. 

Complete 

March 2, 2002 Terghul Ghar, 

Afghanistan 

During Operation Anaconda, an AC130 engaged coalition forces, 

mistaking them for the enemy. 

One person was 

killed and 3 others 

injured. 

Complete 

Source: DOD. 

Appendix III: Joint Close Air Support 

Training and Friendly Fire Accidents 
Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close 

Air Support Action Plan 

Page 35 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

The 2001 Joint Close Air Support Action Plan contained 15 action items. 

All of the items originally had completion dates tasked within fiscal year 

2002. However, 12 of them have not yet been completed, and the executive 

steering committee has recommended that they transition into the updated 

2003 action plan. Table 6 lists the action items for 2001, their original 

estimated completion dates, and whether the action item has been 

completed. 

Table 6. Status of Fiscal Year 2001 Action Items 

Action items 

Original date 

for completion Completed 

Standardize ground controller training. Jan. 2002 

Standardize airborne controller training. Mar. 2002 

Expand air liaison officer course. Dec. 2001 

Expand fire support element curriculum. Jan. 2002 

Produce joint mission essential task lists. Feb. 2002 

Establish joint integrated training plans. Jan. 2002 

Increase use of simulated training. Jan. 2002 

Increase joint exercises. Feb. 2002 

Include new concepts in joint publication 3-09.3. Periodic Yes 

Update service tactic techniques and procedures 

to reflect joint publication 3-09.3 revisions. 

Sep. 2002 

Develop new concepts experiments to validate 

systems and procedures. 

Feb. 2002 

Publish a capstone requirements document. Aug. 2002 Yes 

Explore joint Air Force-Marine Corps ground 

controller equipment procurement. 

May. 2002 

Standardize symbols and graphics. Apr. 2002 

Coordinate with Combat Identification action plan 

team on overlapping issues. 

Apr. 2002 Yes 

Source: GAO. 

Note: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

In addition to the 12 remaining items, of which 2 have been combined, the 

executive steering committee has proposed adding 3 new items to the 

updated plan. These are the inclusion of unmanned aerial vehicles in joint 

close air support operations, an increased emphasis on precision targeting, 

and an increase in live sortie and artillery resources. 

Appendix IV: 2001 Joint Close Air Support 

Action Plan 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness 
Appendix V: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-03-505 Military Readiness (350192) 
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