1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ASHRAF MANIAR and UMAIMA 

SHAIKH, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 

v. 

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, in his 

official capacity as 

Secretary of the United 

States Department of 

Homeland Security, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Civil Action No. 19-3826 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction 

Plaintiffs Ashraf Maniar (“Mr. Maniar”) and Umaima Shaikh 

(“Ms. Shaikh”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action 

asserting constitutional and procedural claims related to their 

alleged inclusion in the Terrorist Screening Dataset (“TSDS”), a 

governmental, interagency tool that compiles the nation’s 

watchlists, including the No Fly List and the Selectee List. See

Second Am. Compl. (“Compl.”), ECF No. 22 at 4 ¶ 8.1 Plaintiffs 

have sued various federal government officials in their official 

capacities (collectively, “Defendants” or “the government”), 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum 

Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the 

original page number of the filed document. 

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including Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security (“DHS”); David Pekoske, Administrator of 

the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”); Troy Miller, 

Acting Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(“CBP”); Merrick Garland, the U.S. Attorney General; Christopher 

Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); 

and Charles Kable, IV, Director of the Terrorist Screening 

Center (“TSC”).2 Id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 3-8. Plaintiffs, two U.S. citizens 

married to each other who identify as practicing Muslims, id. at 

3 ¶¶ 1-2; have alleged violations of the First and Fifth 

Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and of the Administrative 

Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and are seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief, see id. at 17-26.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Renewed Motion to 

Dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23. Upon consideration of 

Plaintiffs’ complaint, the pending motion, the opposition, the 

reply thereto, and the applicable law and regulations, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; and 

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint, ECF No. 22; for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current 

government officials holding these positions are “automatically 

substituted as” Defendants for their predecessors. 

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II. Background 

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 

The TSC is a multi-agency executive organization created by 

Presidential Directive in 2003, Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 17; 

that is administered by the FBI in coordination with DHS, the 

Department of State, and the Department of Justice, Defs.’ Ex. 

A, Overview of the U.S. Government’s Watchlisting Process and 

Procedures, ECF No. 23-2 at 3 [hereinafter “Watchlisting 

Overview”].3 The TSC consolidates the U.S. government’s terrorist 

watchlists into a single database known as the TSDS,4 which 

3 The Court takes judicial notice of the Watchlisting Overview, 

“released by the U.S. government in January 2018” and providing 

“a description of watchlisting policies and procedures[,]” 

Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 17 n.2; and of the other exhibits 

attached to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss that are also 

referenced in Plaintiffs’ complaint, see Patrick v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Although a 

court generally cannot consider matters beyond the pleadings at 

the motion-to-dismiss stage, it may consider ‘documents attached 

as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 

documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily 

relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in 

the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss[.]’” 

(citation omitted)); Ashbourne v. Hansberry, 245 F. Supp. 3d 99, 

103 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that courts may take judicial notice 

of “official, public documents”); Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. 

Gov’t of Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 85 (D.D.C. 2015) (same 

conclusion for “public records and government documents 

available from reliable sources”). 

4 The TSDS was formerly known as the Terrorist Screening 

Database. See Defs.’ Ex. 3, Decl. of Jason V. Herring (TSC’s 

Deputy Director for Operations), Moharam v. FBI, No. 21-2607 

(JDB) (D.D.C. Jan. 18. 2022), ECF No. 20-5 at 3 ¶ 5 (explaining 

that the term “TSDS” “more accurately describes the terrorist 

screening information maintained by the TSC”). 

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“contains both biographic and biometric identifying information 

. . . of known and suspected terrorists”—which is “accessible 

only to persons who have a ‘need to know’ such as federal law 

enforcement officials for their screening and vetting 

activities.” Id. Inclusion in the TSDS results from a multi-step 

nomination process, in which U.S. government agencies and 

foreign partners “nominate” individuals to add to the database 

where there is enough credible investigative information “to 

satisfy a reasonable suspicion that the individual is a [known 

or suspected terrorist].” Id. at 4; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 

18. These nominations are then reviewed by the FBI and the 

National Counterterrorism Center before the TSC makes the final 

determination on whether to add the nominated persons to the 

TSDS. See Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 4-5. 

 Once individuals are added to the database, the TSC sorts 

them into subset lists, known as the No Fly List and the 

Selectee List, which are used by TSA “to secure commercial air 

travel against the threat of terrorism.” Id. at 3; see 49 U.S.C. 

§ 114(f) (providing TSA’s mandate to “assess” and “deal[] with 

threats to transportation security” “at airports and other 

transportation facilities”); 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(ii) 

(directing TSA to perform “the passenger prescreening function 

of comparing passenger information to the automatic selectee and 

no fly lists” to identify threats to civil aviation or national 

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security). Nominees to the No Fly and Selectee Lists “must 

satisfy criteria distinct from that used for mere inclusion in 

the TSD[S,]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 5; with 

inclusion on the No Fly List being the most restrictive of the 

subsets, reserved for individuals presenting “a terrorist threat 

with respect to an aircraft, the homeland, U.S. facilities or 

interests abroad, or a threat of engaging in or conducting a 

violent act of terrorism and is operationally capable of doing 

so[,]” id.; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 18. TSA prohibits 

individuals on the No Fly List from boarding flights on U.S. 

carriers, as well as flights into, out of, over, or within U.S. 

airspace, Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 3; while it 

subjects individuals on the Selectee List to enhanced security 

screenings at airports and border crossings,5 id.; Compl., ECF 

No. 22 at 15 ¶ 104. The U.S. government does not publicly 

disclose who is on either TSDS list or the criteria for 

placement on the Selectee List.6 Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 

23-2 at 3, 5; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 18. 

5 Plaintiffs allege that these enhanced screening measures “can 

take several hours on departing flights at U.S. airports[,]” 

which “can result in the individuals missing scheduled flights.” 

Compl., ECF No. 22 at 15 ¶ 105. They also allege that “Selectee 

list persons often encounter extreme difficulties traveling 

abroad, including being detained in foreign countries . . . , or 

being prohibited from entering them altogether, due to the 

dissemination of the TSD[S] to foreign governments.” Id. ¶ 106. 

6 According to Plaintiffs, “[p]ersons removed from the No Fly 

List are often demoted to the Selectee List.” Id. at 16 ¶ 112. 

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 The U.S. government also has a policy against informing 

individuals of their placement on or removal from the Selectee 

List, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 113; although it may inform 

U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents (“U.S. persons”) of 

their presence on the No Fly List after they are denied boarding 

of a commercial aircraft, Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 

10. U.S. persons who “believe they have been unfairly or 

incorrectly delayed, denied boarding, or identified for 

additional screening or inspection at airports or U.S. ports of 

entry” may submit an inquiry through DHS’s Traveler Redress 

Inquiry Program (“DHS TRIP”). Id. at 8; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.205(a)-

(b); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I), (j)(2)(G)(i), 

44926(a)-(b); 49 C.F.R. §§ 1560.201–207. As part of the inquiry, 

individuals must send DHS TRIP “personal information and copies 

of the specified identification documents.”7 49 C.F.R. § 

1560.205(c). Then, the TSC’s Redress Office, “a separate 

component within the TSC that processes inquires related to the 

use of TSD[S] data by screening agencies[,]” works with DHS TRIP 

to review travelers’ information and documentation to determine 

whether they “should remain in the TSD[S], be modified, or be 

removed[.]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 9. If changes 

7 Each DHS TRIP inquiry is assigned a unique Redress Control 

Number, enabling individuals to check the status of their 

inquiry on DHS’s TRIP website at any time. Watchlisting 

Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 8; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.205(c). 

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to a record’s status are warranted, the TSC’s Redress Office 

ensures corrections are made, and then DHS TRIP “sends a 

determination letter advising the traveler of the results of the 

adjudication of the redress inquiry.” Id. at 10. 

Historically, the U.S. government did not confirm or deny 

for DHS TRIP complainants whether they were on the No Fly List, 

Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 114; but in 2015, in response to 

litigation, TSA adopted revised DHS TRIP procedures to allow 

disclosure of No-Fly status to U.S. persons denied boarding who 

thereafter file a redress inquiry, id. ¶ 116; Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 23-1 at 21. Complainants can “request and receive additional 

information” regarding the reason(s) for their status, which 

includes, “where possible when national security and law 

enforcement interests at stake are taken into account, an 

unclassified summary of information supporting the individual’s 

No Fly List status[,]” and they may also submit information in 

rebuttal to their No-Fly designation. See Compl., ECF No. 22 at 

17 ¶¶ 118-121 (stating that upon election by the traveler to 

receive more information, “DHS TRIP commits to [ ] provide a 

second, or ‘stage-two’ letter, including the specific criteria 

under which the individual has been placed on the No Fly List”); 

Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10 (noting that “[t]he 

amount and type of information provided will vary on a case-bycase basis,” and in some instances, an unclassified summary may 

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not be provided due to national security concerns). The TSC will 

then review the complainant’s file and either: (1) remove the 

person from the No Fly List if it determines that such status is 

unwarranted; or (2) conclude that the person should stay on the 

No Fly List and provide a recommendation as such to the TSA 

Administrator. Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 9-10; 

Compl., ECF No. 22 at 17 ¶ 122. The TSA Administrator “makes 

final determinations concerning listing on the No Fly List[,]” 

Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10 n.5; and will issue a 

final order either maintaining or removing the person’s No-Fly 

status, or alternatively remanding the matter back to the TSC 

for more information or clarification, id. at 10. If TSA issues 

a final order maintaining the person’s No Fly List designation, 

DHS TRIP will send the complainant a determination letter, which 

states the basis for the decision “to the extent feasible in 

light of national security and law enforcement interests at 

stake,” and notifies the person of the ability to seek judicial 

review in the appropriate Court of Appeals. Id.; Compl., ECF No. 

22 at 17 ¶ 123; see also 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) (“[A] person 

disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by . . . 

the Administrator of the [TSA] . . . may apply for review of the 

order by filing a petition for review in the United States Court 

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit or in the court 

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of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the 

person resides or has its principal place of business.”).8

Selectee List persons are also sent “a determination letter 

advising [them] of the results of the adjudication of the 

redress inquiry[,]” Watchlisting Overview, ECF No. 23-2 at 10; 

but this response does not confirm or deny travelers’ inclusion 

in or deletion from that list,9 Compl., ECF No. 22 at 16 ¶ 117, 

17 ¶ 124; information which is protected by the law enforcement 

privilege and as Sensitive Security Information pursuant to 49 

U.S.C. § 114(r), Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 14 n.1, 18; see 

also 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(9). “Individuals who are not on the 

8 Prior to the 2015 revisions to DHS TRIP procedures, the TSC was 

the “sole entity with . . . the authority to remove names from 

the No-Fly List/TSD[S.]” Ege v. DHS, 784 F.3d 791, 795 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, under the current procedures, “the TSA Administrator is 

solely responsible for issuing a final order maintaining a 

traveler on the No Fly List. TSC submits a recommendation, along 

with supporting materials, to the TSA Administrator[,]” who 

“ultimately issues the final order[.]” Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 

358, 391 (9th Cir. 2019); accord Busic v. TSA, No. 20-1480, 2023 

WL 2565069, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2023). 

9 According to plaintiffs in similar cases, “the standard 

response sent to people who are not on the No Fly List, but who 

could be on the Selectee List” states as follows: “DHS has 

researched and completed our review of your case. DHS TRIP can 

neither confirm nor deny any information about you which may be 

within federal watchlists or reveal any law enforcement 

sensitive information. However, we have made any corrections to 

our records that our inquiries determined were necessary, 

including, as appropriate, notations that may assist in avoiding 

incidents of misidentification.” Jibril v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 

804, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also Matar v. TSA, 910 F.3d 

538, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (indicating that the petitioner 

received a letter with identical wording from DHS TRIP). 

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No Fly List, but who may be on the Selectee List, are therefore 

often unable to receive a response that meaningfully informs 

them of the results of their DHS TRIP inquiry.” Jibril v. 

Mayorkas, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2023 WL 2240271, at *1 (D.D.C. 

Feb. 27, 2023) [hereinafter “Jibril III”].10

B. Factual and Procedural Background 

The following facts reflect the allegations in the 

Complaint and the documents incorporated by reference therein, 

which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding 

this motion and construes in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Baird v. 

Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Plaintiff Ashraf Maniar is a U.S. citizen by birthright and 

of Pakistani national origin. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 3 ¶ 1. 

Plaintiff Umaima Shaikh is a U.S. citizen of Pakistani national 

origin who acquired citizenship at birth due to the U.S. 

citizenship of a parent. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs identify as 

practicing Muslims and are a married couple living together in 

10 Jibril III is the most recent decision issued by this Court 

regarding TSDS watchlists. It is preceded by Jibril v. Wolf, No. 

1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2020 WL 2331870 (D.D.C. May 9, 2020), which 

was affirmed in part and reversed in part by Jibril v. Mayorkas, 

20 F.4th 804 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (“Jibril II”). The Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) 

remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 

opinion, which culminated in Jibril III, decided on February 27, 

2023. Although these cases primarily concerned the Jibrils’ 

alleged placement on the Selectee List, the Court relies on 

Jibril II and Jibril III in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ No Fly 

List and Selectee List claims. See infra section IV.A. 

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North Carolina. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. Neither has a history of mental 

health concerns, id. at 5 ¶ 13, 10 ¶ 64; nor have they ever been 

convicted of or charged with criminal activity, id. at 10 ¶ 63; 

Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 9. Both Plaintiffs have “experienced 

ongoing and severe difficulties in airport travel,” including 

“the inability to print boarding passes and the inability to 

board a plane,” with Mr. Maniar also once “being escorted out of 

the airport.” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5 ¶ 19, 10 ¶ 65. They have 

also encountered difficulties with ground travel within the U.S. 

and traveling via car to Canada. See id. at 9 ¶¶ 50-54, 10-11 ¶¶

66-67. Plaintiffs were placed on the No Fly List, id. at 7 ¶ 36, 

12 ¶ 78; but have both since been removed from that list, id. at 

8 ¶ 44, 13 ¶ 88. The facts of their alleged experiences 

pertaining to their designations on and subsequent removals from 

the No Fly List are detailed separately below.

1. Plaintiff Ashraf Maniar

Mr. Maniar has business and religious interests involving

travel abroad. See id. at 5 ¶¶ 15-18. First, he maintains 

commercial ventures in Malaysia via online business 

transactions. Id. ¶ 15. Second, as a practicing Muslim with 

sincerely held religious beliefs, he intends to travel to Saudi 

Arabia to complete Hajj and Umrah, two religious pilgrimages.

Id. ¶¶ 15-18. Mr. Maniar has traveled to Saudi Arabia for Umrah 

in the past and hopes to complete Hajj in the future. Id. ¶ 17. 

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Mr. Maniar alleges that because of his placement on the No Fly 

List, he was “unable to travel to Saudi Arabia to complete Hajj 

and pilgrimage requirements, or participate in chosen employment 

and business ventures.” Id. ¶ 20, 9 ¶ 56.

Mr. Maniar recalls being prohibited from flying for the 

first time in May 2017, id. ¶ 22; and as a result, he filed his 

first DHS TRIP inquiry around that time, id. at 6 ¶ 23. Although 

he was permitted to fly in November 2017 from Boston to Los 

Angeles, id. ¶ 25; he claims his travel experiences worsened 

thereafter despite the initiation of his inquiry, id. ¶ 26. 

First, on December 14, 2017, FBI agents raided Mr. Maniar’s 

house pursuant to a warrant and seized his electronics and 

passport. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Then, on December 16, 2017, Mr. Maniar 

booked a flight from Nevada to Georgia to attend his wedding in 

Atlanta, but two days later, when he tried to board his flight, 

he was not allowed to print his boarding pass, was prohibited 

from flying, and was escorted out of the airport. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. 

These events led Mr. Maniar to initiate another DHS TRIP inquiry 

on February 21, 2018 to “acquire information as to whether he 

[was] on the No Fly List, the reasons for that designation, if 

any, and a way to appeal any determination.” Id. ¶ 32.

On June 7, 2018, Mr. Maniar filed a Petition for Writ of 

Mandamus in this Court, explaining his travel difficulties and 

seeking to compel DHS TRIP “to provide an initial determination 

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as to whether or not [he was] on the No Fly List” in line with 

the applicable regulations regarding redress. Id. at 7 ¶ 35; 

Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, Maniar v. Nielsen, No. 18-1362 (RDM) 

(D.D.C. June 7, 2018), ECF No. 1 at 5.11 On June 27, 2018, DHS 

sent Mr. Maniar a letter confirming his placement on the No Fly 

List because, following a review of his records “in consultation 

with other federal agencies,” he was “identified as an 

individual who ‘may be a threat to civil aviation or national 

security.’” Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 23-3 at 2 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 

114(h)(3)(A)). No other information as to the reasons for his 

No-Fly designation were provided in the letter. See id.; Compl., 

ECF No. 22 at 7 ¶¶ 36-38. That same day, Mr. Maniar’s counsel 

contacted DHS TRIP to notify the agency that its letter was 

“insufficient” given Mr. Maniar’s entitlement to “the specific 

criterion under which [he was] placed on the No Fly List and . . 

. an unclassified summary of information supporting [his] No Fly 

List status[.]” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 7 ¶ 39.

On October 30, 2018, DHS TRIP issued Mr. Maniar a stage-two 

letter that provided him with “an unclassified summary that 

include[d] the reasons supporting [his] placement on the No Fly 

List . . . to the extent feasible,” after considering national 

11 This matter was voluntarily dismissed on August 19, 2020 

following Mr. Maniar’s removal from the No Fly List. See Notice 

of Non-Suit & Voluntary Dismissal, Maniar v. Wolf, No. 18-1362 

(RDM) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2020), ECF No. 35 at 1.

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security and law enforcement interests. Defs.’ Ex. C, ECF No. 

23-4 at 2. The letter informed Mr. Maniar that he was determined 

to represent “a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent 

act of terrorism and [ ] operationally capable of doing so[,]”

and stated: 

You are on the U.S. Government’s No Fly [L]ist 

due to, in part, your association and 

extensive communication with a known extremist 

located in the United Kingdom who has 

supported terrorist organizations. The 

additional details regarding your placement on 

the U.S. Government’s No Fly List cannot be 

provided to you due to national security 

concerns.

Id. at 2-3; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 7-8 ¶ 40. Despite claiming 

that this “unclassified summary” did not provide him with “a 

meaningful [way to] challenge” his designation, Compl., ECF No. 

22 at 8 ¶ 41;12 on December 31, 2018, Mr. Maniar timely filed an 

administrative appeal with DHS TRIP, which included information 

contesting the reasons for his No Fly List status as stated in 

his stage-two letter, id. ¶ 43.

While his appeal was pending, in June 2020, Mr. Maniar was 

pulled over by CBP agents in New Mexico while he was driving 

from Georgia to California. Id. at 9 ¶ 53. Although he only had 

12 Mr. Maniar claims that the lack of specific information in his 

stage-two TRIP letter did “not satisfy the Agency’s substantive 

obligation to disclose sufficient information to allow [him] ‘to 

correct erroneous information in the government’s terrorism 

database.’” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 42 (quoting Latif v. 

Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1162-63 (D. Or. 2014)).

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a backpack with him, CBP detained him for over an hour, searched 

him, and fingerprinted him. Id. ¶ 54.

On August 18, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Mr. Maniar by letter 

that he had been removed from the No Fly List “based on the 

totality of available information, including information [he] 

provided to DHS TRIP.” Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2. The 

letter also stated that he would “not be placed back on the No 

Fly List based on currently available information[,]” and that 

the determination “render[ed his] administrative redress case 

moot” and therefore closed. Id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 44.

2. Plaintiff Umaima Shaikh

Ms. Shaikh has familial and religious interests involving

travel abroad. See Compl., ECF No. 22 at 14 ¶ 99, 15 ¶ 100. 

First, she has family members residing in Pakistan with whom she 

was unable to visit for two years as a result of her designation 

on the No Fly List. Id. at 14 ¶ 99. This separation included 

missing her brother’s wedding, her grandmother’s funeral, family 

members’ graduations, and visits to sick relatives. Id. Second, 

as a practicing Muslim with sincerely held religious beliefs, 

Ms. Shaikh has pilgrimage obligations that she claims were 

hindered by her No-Fly status. Id. at 15 ¶ 100. She has traveled 

to Saudi Arabia for Umrah in the past and hopes to travel there 

to complete Hajj in the future. Id.

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Ms. Shaikh recalls being prohibited from traveling via car 

to Canada with Mr. Maniar on March 15, 2018, id. at 11 ¶ 67; and 

being prohibited from flying for the first time on or before 

July 3, 2018, id. ¶ 68. Ms. Shaikh was scheduled to take an 

Emirates Airline flight to Pakistan to attend her brother’s 

wedding, but when she arrived at the ticketing counter, airline 

officials informed her that they could not issue her a boarding 

pass, nor provide her with a reason why. Id. ¶¶ 68-71. As a 

result, Ms. Shaikh was not able to board her flight and missed 

her brother’s wedding. Id. ¶ 72.

On August 13, 2018, Ms. Shaikh initiated a redress inquiry, 

in which she notified DHS TRIP that her husband, Mr. Maniar, had 

received an initial determination letter that he was on the No 

Fly List. Id. ¶¶ 74, 77. Four months later, on December 18, 

2018, Ms. Shaikh also received an initial determination letter 

from DHS TRIP informing her that she was on the No Fly List 

because she was “identified as an individual who ‘may be a 

threat to civil aviation or national security.’” Defs.’ Ex. E, 

ECF No. 23-6 at 2 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3)(A)). No other 

information as to the reasons for her No-Fly designation were 

provided in the letter, although the letter stated that Ms. 

Shaikh could request additional information regarding her 

designation within thirty days. See id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 

12 ¶¶ 78-79. On December 26, 2018, Ms. Shaikh’s counsel 

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contacted DHS TRIP to request all relevant information 

supporting her placement on the No Fly List, including an 

unclassified summary. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 12 ¶ 81.

On May 14, 2019, Ms. Shaikh filed suit in this Court, 

seeking to compel DHS TRIP to provide the specific reasons 

supporting her placement on the No Fly List pursuant to a 

complaint for declaratory relief under the APA and a Petition 

for Writ of Mandamus. Id. ¶ 82; Compl. & Pet. for Writ of 

Mandamus, Shaikh v. McAleenan, No. 19-1398 (RBW) (D.D.C. May 14, 

2019), ECF No. 1 at 7.13 Nearly nine months later, on February 3, 

2020, DHS TRIP issued Ms. Shaikh a stage-two letter providing 

her with “an unclassified summary that include[d the] reasons 

supporting [her] placement on the No Fly List.” Defs.’ Ex. F, 

ECF No. 23-7 at 2. The letter informed Ms. Shaikh, like Mr. 

Maniar, that she was determined to represent “a threat of 

engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and [ ] 

operationally capable of doing so[,]” and stated: 

You are on the U.S. Government’s No Fly List 

due to, in part, your provision of support to

an individual, made with the knowing purpose 

of furthering the individual’s desire to join 

a foreign-based terrorist organization, as 

well as your association and communication 

13 This matter was dismissed on March 31, 2020 following Judge 

Reggie B. Walton’s order granting Defendant’s Second Motion to 

Dismiss. See Order, Shaikh v. Wolf, No. 19-1398 (RBW) (D.D.C. 

Mar. 31, 2020), ECF No. 16 at 7. Judge Walton determined that 

Ms. Shaikh’s claims “were rendered moot when [DHS TRIP] issued 

the [stage-two] February 3, 2020 letter to [her].” Id. at 5.

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with multiple known extremists. Additional 

reasons for and details regarding your 

placement on the U.S. Government’s No Fly List 

cannot be provided to you due to law 

enforcement and national security concerns.

Id. at 2-3; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶¶ 84-85. Despite claiming 

that this “cursory stage-two letter” did not “permit her to make 

a meaningful response,” Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶ 86; on March 

9, 2020, Ms. Shaikh timely filed an administrative appeal, which 

included information contesting the reasons for her No Fly List 

status as stated in her stage-two DHS TRIP letter, id. ¶ 87.

On July 15, 2020, DHS TRIP notified Ms. Shaikh by letter 

that she had been removed from the No Fly List “based on the 

totality of available information, including information [she] 

provided to DHS TRIP.” Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2. The 

letter also stated that she would “not be placed back on the No 

Fly List based on currently available information[,]” and that 

the determination “render[ed her] administrative redress case 

moot” and therefore closed. Id.; Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶ 88.

3. Events Following Plaintiffs’ Removals from the 

No Fly List 

Plaintiffs jointly initiated the instant suit on December 

26, 2019, see Original Compl., ECF No. 1; but following their 

removals from the No Fly List—first Ms. Shaikh on July 15, 2020 

(after approximately two years on the list), and then Mr. Maniar 

on August 18, 2020 (after approximately three years on the 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 18 of 70
19 

list)—they have since amended their pleading twice, first on 

August 12, 2020, see First Am. Compl., ECF No. 19; and again on 

September 9, 2020, see Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 22. As 

Defendants’ note, “[t]he allegations in the operative Second 

Amended Complaint are materially similar to those in 

[Plaintiffs’] original pleading . . . except that [they] now 

include [ ] additional allegations concerning certain subsequent 

events following their removal[s] from the No Fly List.”14 Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 25. 

As to Ms. Shaikh, she alleges that on July 25, 2020—ten 

days after her removal from the No Fly List on July 15, 2020—she 

was unable to obtain a boarding pass for her flight from 

Raleigh, North Carolina to Atlanta, Georgia without speaking to 

a ticketing counter clerk, who in turn had to receive permission 

prior to issuing the boarding pass. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 13 ¶¶ 

89-90. When Ms. Shaikh received her boarding pass, it had an 

“SSSS” notation printed on it, which stands for “Secondary 

Security Screening Selection.” Id. at 14 ¶ 91. Ms. Shaikh 

alleges that such a notation indicates that she is “still 

included within the TSD[S], even though no longer on the No Fly 

14 Defendants originally moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims on 

March 9, 2020, see Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9 at 1; but 

the Court denied that motion as moot after granting Plaintiffs 

leave to file their first amended complaint, see Minute Order 

(Aug. 11, 2020); and thereafter granted them leave to file their 

second amended complaint, see Minute Order (Aug. 24, 2020). 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 19 of 70
20 

List” and that her July 2020 travel experience is “consistent 

with persons on the Selectee List.” Id. ¶¶ 92-93. 

As to Mr. Maniar, he alleges that on August 30, 2020—twelve 

days after his removal from the No Fly List on August 18, 2020—

he traveled to Pakistan to visit family and friends. Id. at 8 ¶ 

45; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 12. Upon arrival in Turkey for 

his connecting flight, Mr. Maniar was subjected to “extensive 

individualized questioning” before being allowed to board his 

next flight to Pakistan. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8 ¶ 46. When he 

landed in Pakistan, Mr. Maniar was detained by Pakistani 

authorities and again questioned extensively. Id. at 9 ¶ 47. 

Although he was released, Mr. Maniar was not permitted to remain 

in Pakistan and was forced to immediately book travel back to 

the U.S. Id. Mr. Maniar alleges that such events indicate that 

he “is still included within the TSD[S], even though no longer 

on the No Fly List” and that his August 2020 travel experience 

is “consistent with persons on the Selectee List[,]” which is 

“communicat[ed ] to other nations.” Id. ¶¶ 47-49. 

Plaintiffs additionally allege that they have both 

separately learned that FBI agents have asked people they 

personally know questions about them, during which the agents 

“strongly impl[ied] that [Plaintiffs have] criminal and/or 

nefarious intentions and/or contacts.” Id. at 10 ¶ 57, 14 ¶ 95. 

Both Plaintiffs claim the actions of these FBI agents damaged 

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21

their reputations and violated their privacy interests, id. at 

10 ¶ 59, 14 ¶ 97; as well as caused them “extreme emotional 

distress, as a result of the stigmatization created by [ ]

Defendants’ actions[,]” id. at 10 ¶ 60, 14 ¶ 98; see also id. at 

9 ¶ 55 (stating Mr. Maniar’s belief that he found helicopters 

hovering above his house and has been followed on more than one 

occasion subsequent to his placement on the No Fly List). 

Plaintiffs claim that their “former designation on the No 

Fly List, believed current placement on the Selectee List, and

substantial likelihood that [they] could again be placed on the 

No Fly List, infringe on [their] religious exercise,” id. at 10 

¶ 61, 15 ¶ 100; in addition to prior and ongoing “infringements 

on [their] chosen employment [and ability to travel], 

reputational damage, [ ] emotional distress[,]” and family 

separation, id. at 9 ¶ 50, 14 ¶ 94, 16 ¶ 110; see also id. at 3 

(“These ongoing travel difficulties, and the risk of repetition 

for [Plaintiffs] to again be placed on the No Fly List, result 

in infringements upon their constitutional rights and protected 

interests.”); Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 12 (alleging “ongoing”

harm due to the “continuing heightened scrutiny” of Plaintiffs 

during travel and the sharing of their TSDS placement with 

foreign governments). They bring the following claims in 

“challenging the constitutionality and adequacy of Defendants’ 

policies and actions,” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 7: (1) 

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22

violations of their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive 

due process rights against all Defendants (Counts One and Two, 

respectively); (2) violations of the APA due to alleged 

inadequacies in the DHS TRIP redress process against Defendants 

Alejandro Mayorkas (DHS) and David Pekoske (TSA) (Count Three); 

(3) violations of their First Amendment rights against all 

Defendants (Count Four); and (4) entitlement to attorney’s fees 

and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as 

amended, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Count Five), see

Compl., ECF No. 22 at 17-25.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. See id.

at 25-26. First, they ask the Court to declare that Defendants

violated and continue to violate their rights under the U.S. 

Constitution. See id. at 25. Second, they ask the Court to 

declare that Defendants’ actions against them “constitute an 

abuse of discretion” and are “arbitrary and capricious” in 

violation of the APA. See id. at 25-26. Third, they ask the 

Court to order DHS TRIP “to provide persons with meaningful 

opportunities to challenge future inclusion on the No Fly List 

moving forward[.]” Id. at 26. Finally, they seek attorney’s fees 

and costs and any additional relief the Court deems proper. Id.

On September 28, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 22 of 70
23

No. 23 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6)). In 

support of that motion, Defendants filed accompanying Exhibits A 

through G, of which the Court takes judicial notice. See supra

note 3. Plaintiffs filed their opposition brief on October 19, 

2020, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25; to which Defendants replied 

on November 2, 2020, see Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26. On September 

28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority to 

bring to the Court’s attention “the recently issued decision[s]

of Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 762 (9th Cir. 2022)” and Long v. 

Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417 (4th Cir. 2022), which they claim “bear[] 

directly on the facts of this case.” See Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. 

Authority (“Pls.’ Suppl. Notice”), ECF No. 29 at 1. Defendants 

responded to this notice on October 16, 2022, claiming that 

“neither case aids [Plaintiffs’] claims in this action.” See

Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Notice of Suppl. Authority (“Defs.’ Suppl. 

Resp.”), ECF No. 30 at 1. Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss 

is now ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

“A federal district court may only hear a claim over which 

[it] has subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court’s 

jurisdiction.” Gregorio v. Hoover, 238 F. Supp. 3d 37, 44 

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 23 of 70
24

motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the 

court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Moran 

v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 

S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)). “Because Rule 12(b)(1) 

concerns a court’s ability to hear a particular claim, the court 

must scrutinize the plaintiff’s allegations more closely when 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than 

it would under a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” 

Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 

(D.D.C. 2011). In so doing, the court must accept as true all of

the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, but the court need not 

“accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal 

conclusions that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 

154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 

“the court need not limit itself to the allegations of the 

complaint.” Id. (citing Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 

241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 

S. Ct. 2246, 96 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1987)). Rather, the court “may 

consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems 

appropriate to resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction 

to hear the case.” Scolaro v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Elections 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 24 of 70
25 

& Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome 

Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). “Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 

Rule 12(b)(6), a court should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion because [o]nce a court determines that it lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.” Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. Article III Standing 

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of 

federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Susan B. Anthony 

List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 189 L. Ed. 

2d 246 (2014) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “‘One element 

of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must 

establish that they have standing to sue.’” Clapper v. Amnesty 

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 

(2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S. Ct. 

2312, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849 (1997)); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 

(calling standing “the irreducible constitutional minimum”); see 

also Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *4 (“[A] court might lack 

subject-matter jurisdiction [ ] if a plaintiff lacks Article III 

standing.” (citing Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987))). The law of Article III standing “is built on 

separation-of-powers principles” and “serves to prevent the 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 25 of 70
26

judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 

political branches.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408.

To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an 

‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a 

‘likel[ihood]’ that the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 157-58 (quoting 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61); see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 

U.S. 693, 705, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013) (“To 

have standing, a litigant must seek relief for an injury that 

affects him [or her] in a personal and individual way[, i.e.,] . 

. . possess[ing] a direct stake in the outcome of the case.” 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The 

plaintiff, as “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction[,]

bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 561. “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but 

rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each 

element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on 

which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the 

manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages 

of the litigation.” Id.; see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 

S. Ct. 2190, 2208, 210 L. Ed. 2d. 568 (2021) (“[S]tanding is not 

dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 26 of 70
27

for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that 

they seek (for example, injunctive relief and damages).”).

At the pleading stage, plaintiffs need only “‘state a 

plausible claim’ that each of the standing elements is present.” 

Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 625-26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 

(citation omitted); see also Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866 

(D.C. Cir. 2021) (“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim [of standing] that 

is plausible on its face.’” (citation omitted)). The court 

“assume[s], for purposes of the standing analysis, that 

plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of their claim[s,]” 

Attias, 865 F.3d at 629; but it “must dismiss the case pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(1)” if plaintiffs fail to prove that they have 

standing, Jibril v. Wolf, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2020 WL 

2331870, at *3 (D.D.C. May 9, 2020), aff’d in part, rev’d in 

part & remanded, Jibril v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 804 (D.C. Cir. 

2021) [hereinafter “Jibril II”].

IV. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ operative complaint 

on the ground that Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue any of 

their claims, and thus the Court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 27-31. 

Specifically, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ “injury theory”

rests on speculation and does not establish “certainly 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 27 of 70
28

impending” harm sufficient to confer standing since they “seek 

prospective relief for a number of alleged injuries associated 

with the No Fly List . . . [b]ut [ ] are no longer on the No Fly 

List[.]” Id. at 14-15. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing, 

despite their removals from the No Fly List, due to ongoing 

religious infringements and reputational, employment, and 

emotional harms resulting from their former No-Fly status, along 

with continued impacts to their ability to travel from their 

“believed current placement on the Selectee List,” and because 

of a “substantial likelihood [they] could again be placed on the 

No Fly List[.]” See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 15-17; Compl., 

ECF No. 22 at 9 ¶ 50, 10 ¶ 61, 14 ¶ 94, 15 ¶ 100, 16 ¶ 110. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs proffer arguments as to why their claims 

under the First and Fifth Amendments, APA, and EAJA should 

proceed to the merits. See Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 21-35.

Because “[a] federal district court may only hear a claim 

over which [it] has subject-matter jurisdiction[,]” Gregorio, 

238 F. Supp. 3d at 44; the Court first turns to the parties’ 

jurisdictional arguments before determining whether “it can 

proceed [ ] further” to the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional 

and statutory claims, Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 90.

A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue Any of Their Claims

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that they “have 

(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 28 of 70
29

the challenged conduct of [Defendants], and (3) that is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. 

v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 194 L. Ed. 2d 635 

(2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). Here, Plaintiffs’ 

case for declaratory and injunctive relief “primarily concerns 

injury in fact, the ‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s three 

elements.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 

Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 

(1998)); Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158 (“This case 

concerns the injury-in-fact requirement, which helps to ensure 

that [Plaintiffs have] a personal stake in the outcome of the 

controversy.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

To establish injury in fact, Plaintiffs must show that they 

suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is 

“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339-40 

(defining a “particularized” injury as one that “affect[s] the 

plaintiff in a personal and individual way” and a “concrete” 

injury as a “real, and not abstract” injury that “must actually 

exist” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Chemistry 

Council v. Dep’t of Transp., 468 F.3d 810, 820 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(“Article III does not require actual harm. . . . [I]mminent 

harm will suffice.”). “Although imminence is concededly a 

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somewhat elastic concept,” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409; for claims

seeking prospective relief, like those alleged by Plaintiffs, 

“[a]n allegation of future injury may suffice [as imminent] if 

the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a 

‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur[,]” Susan B. Anthony 

List, 573 U.S. at 158 (citation omitted); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 

409 (distinguishing between threatened injury that is “certainly 

impending,” which constitutes injury in fact, and “[a]llegations 

of possible future injury,” which are insufficient); see also

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210 (“[A] person exposed to a risk of 

future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to 

prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of 

harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.” (citing Clapper, 

568 U.S. at 414 n.5; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 

102, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983))). 

Although a plaintiff seeking prospective relief “may not 

rest on past injury” alone to establish standing, Arpaio v. 

Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Dearth v. Holder, 641 

F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011); “[p]ast wrongs may serve as 

evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat 

of repeated injury,” Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 814 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, past exposure to 

illegal conduct, when accompanied by “any continuing, present 

adverse effects,” may suffice to support Article III standing in 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 30 of 70
31

a case or controversy regarding declaratory and injunctive

relief. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S. Ct. 

669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974); see also Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501 

(requiring plaintiffs to show they are suffering from “an 

ongoing injury or face[] an immediate threat of injury”). 

In addition, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs 

must state a plausible claim that any alleged injury in fact is 

“‘fairly traceable to the actions of [Defendants, and] is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.’” Taylor 

v. FAA, 351 F. Supp. 3d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Food & 

Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 

2015)). Causation and redressability “‘are closely related’ like 

‘two sides of a . . . coin.’” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1235 

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Dynalantic Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 115 

F.3d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “Like heads and tails, 

however, the two concepts are distinct: causation focuses on the 

‘connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the 

alleged injury’ whereas redressability focuses on the 

‘connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief 

requested.’” Id. at 1235-36 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 

737, 753 n.19, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1984)).

Given the constitutional import of standing, the Court 

delineates in detail the parties’ opposing arguments. First, 

Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs do not have standing to obtain 

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32

prospective relief with respect to their prior No Fly List 

placement” because they cannot establish a “certainly impending” 

injury. Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 28. The government 

identifies, from the Second Amended Complaint, “a number of 

[Plaintiffs’] alleged injuries associated with the No Fly List,” 

such as: (1) an alleged inability to travel, including for 

religious or professional reasons; and (2) alleged reputational 

or emotional impacts. Id. at 14-15, 28. However, at the time 

they filed the operative complaint, Plaintiffs were “no longer 

on the No Fly List,” so the government argues that they cannot 

now proffer allegations of harm “due to any ongoing placement” 

on the list, nor allegations that “they are currently unable to 

travel[,]” as both have traveled recently. Id. at 15, 28

(emphases added). Instead, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on past

emotional, reputational, or travel impacts, the government 

argues that “their requested, prospective relief [ ] cannot 

redress th[o]se harms.” Id. at 28; see also Defs.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 26 at 10 (“[B]ecause Plaintiffs have been removed from the 

No Fly List, any declaration or injunction regarding the 

lawfulness of that list . . . could have no immediate . . . 

consequences for [them.]”). Also, to the extent “Plaintiffs’ 

injury theory” rests on the assertion that they “may again be 

restored on the [No Fly] list, despite DHS’s assurance that they 

will not be placed back on the list based on currently available 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 32 of 70
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information[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15; see also Defs.’ 

Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2; Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2; 

Defendants argue that such a “speculative” theory “‘does nothing 

to establish a real and immediate threat that [they] [will] 

again’ be placed on the No Fly List[,]” id. at 15, 25, 29 

(quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105); see also Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 

26 at 11 (“[A]ny risk of a future re-designation is . . . 

‘hypothetical[.]’”). In other words, Defendants claim that 

“Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate an injury in fact at this 

time” in relation to their former placement on the No Fly List. 

Id. at 15, 25; Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 14.

Second, the government argues that Plaintiffs also cannot 

establish standing as to their Selectee List claims, as “the 

Second Amend[ed] Complaint does not bring [well-pled] claims 

that challenge [their] alleged Selectee List placement, and in 

any event could not allege that placement on the Selectee List 

will result in harms equivalent [to those] associated with the 

No Fly List[.]” See Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 25, 30

(“Plaintiffs also allege that they may be on another, less 

restrictive watch list, thus creating the risk of future delays 

and additional screening at airports[, b]ut there is no 

allegation that [they] will necessarily suffer these injuries

when traveling in the future.”). Finally, Defendants argue that 

standing, not mootness, “is the proper jurisdictional framework” 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 33 of 70
34

for evaluating Plaintiffs’ No Fly and Selectee List claims since 

they filed the Second Amended Complaint after being removed from 

the No Fly List, and the Court “must measure standing” as of the 

date of that complaint. Id. at 27 n.5-28.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ arguments regarding 

standing “ignore[] important factual realities[,]” as they 

allege that their “harm did not cease at the time of their 

removals from the No Fly List[.]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. at 25 at 

14-15. They argue that they continue to suffer from “extreme 

emotional distress” because of prior periods of family 

separation and hindrances to chosen employment ventures while 

they were on the No Fly List, along with “the stigmatization 

created by [ ] Defendants’ actions[,]” none of which 

“evaporate[d] upon removal from the” list. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs 

also allege concrete injury in the form of continued impacts to 

their ability to travel, namely the potential for “severe” and 

“extensive” questioning and detention abroad, like what Mr. 

Maniar experienced in Turkey and Pakistan, and “extensive 

screening” in the U.S. Id. at 15-16. Plaintiffs thus allege that 

they have standing because “[a]s pled in [their] Amended 

Complaint, . . . these actions occurred due to [ ] Defendants[’] 

placement of [them] on the No Fly List and Selectee List, and 

communication of that placement to other nations[,]” which have 

caused them “particularized” and “ongoing” harms. Id. at 16-17. 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 34 of 70
35

Although Plaintiffs concede they are no longer on the No Fly 

List, they furthermore allege harm due to “the very real 

possibility of recurrence of [ ] injury[,]” namely redesignation

to the No Fly List. Id. at 17. They argue that this potential

harm is “capable of redress only by a ruling ordering DHS TRIP 

to revise [its] procedures to provide [them] with an ability to 

meaningfully challenge future likely inclusions on the No Fly 

List[.]” Id.; see also Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26.

As an initial matter, the Court adopts the government’s

(uncontested) argument that “standing, rather than mootness, is 

the proper jurisdictional framework.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 

at 27 n.5. Whereas standing mandates that “[t]he requisite 

personal interest . . . exist at the commencement of the 

litigation[,]” mootness “has been described as . . . standing 

set in a time frame[,]” requiring that the personal stake

continue throughout the duration of the litigation. Arizonans 

for Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22, 117 S. Ct. 

1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (citations and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A case becomes moot, mandating dismissal, “when 

the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a 

legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. 

Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91, 133 S. Ct. 721, 184 L. Ed. 2d 553 

(2013) (citation omitted); see also Clarke v. United States, 915 

F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Even where litigation poses a 

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36

live controversy when filed, the [mootness] doctrine requires a 

federal court to refrain from deciding it if events have so 

transpired that the decision will neither presently affect the 

parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of 

affecting them in the future.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)); Long, 38 F.4th at 423 (defining mootness as 

“[a] change in factual circumstances[,] . . . such as when the 

plaintiff receives the relief sought”). While plaintiffs bear 

the burden of establishing standing, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; 

defendants bear the “heavy” burden of establishing “that a oncelive case has become moot[,]” West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 

2587, 2607, 213 L. Ed. 2d 896 (2022); see also Zukerman v. USPS, 

961 F.3d 431, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[T]he party urging mootness 

bears a heavy burden.”).

“[T]here are important exceptions to the mootness doctrine 

that distinguish it from standing.” Nat. L. Party of the U.S. v. 

FEC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D.D.C. 2000). One such exception is 

the voluntary cessation doctrine, which “disfavors dismissal of 

claims a defendant purposely ‘moots’ when such dismissal would 

leave the defendant ‘free to return to his old ways.’” Hinton v. 

Dist. of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 3d 30, 43 (D.D.C. 2021)

(citation omitted). To protect against this unfair outcome, the 

doctrine “prohibits courts from conclud[ing] that a defendant’s 

voluntary cessation of disputed conduct renders a case moot 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 36 of 70
37

unless the party urging mootness demonstrates that (1) there is 

no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, 

and (2) interim relief or events have completely or irrevocably 

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190, 

120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (“[A] defendant 

claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears a 

formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the 

allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 

recur.”). Another exception to mootness is the “capable of 

repetition yet evading review” doctrine, requiring a plaintiff 

to demonstrate that “(1) the challenged action is in its 

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation 

or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that 

the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action 

again.” Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 

316, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Clarke, 

915 F.2d at 704 (requiring proof as to both prongs to “fit [a] 

case into one of the ‘exceptional situations’ to which this 

doctrine applies”).15

15 Defendants note that “Plaintiffs appear to reference the 

‘capable of repetition yet evading review’ mootness 

exception[.]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 29 n.6; see Pls.’ 

Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17 (arguing that Defendants can “escape 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 37 of 70
38

In this case, the Court need not address the issue of 

whether Plaintiffs’ removals from the No Fly List have possibly 

mooted their case, since Defendants argue for dismissal solely 

on the basis that Plaintiffs lack standing, and Plaintiffs 

proffer no arguments in opposition that the burden should shift 

to the government to prove mootness.16 See Nat. L. Party, 111 F. 

Supp. 2d at 41; see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180

(addressing the question of standing before determining whether 

review” in this and future lawsuits “by removing Plaintiffs from 

the No Fly List for the time being”). Because the Court is 

persuaded that standing, not mootness, “is the proper 

jurisdictional framework,” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 27 n.5; 

to the extent Plaintiffs’ Opposition seeks to apply this 

mootness exception, the Court rejects that attempt.

16 The Court notes Plaintiffs’ Notice of Supplemental Authority, 

which brings to the Court’s attention “the recently issued 

decision[s] of Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 762 (9th Cir. 2022)” and 

Long v. Pekoske, 38 F.4th 417 (4th Cir. 2022), which they claim 

“bear[] directly on the facts of this case.” Pls.’ Suppl. 

Notice, ECF No. 29 at 1. However, the Court’s review of these 

cases, which concern the “application of the voluntary cessation 

exception to mootness to a[ government] affidavit promising that 

a plaintiff would not be added back to a TSDS watchlist[,]” 

indicates that they do “not provide a helpful analog.” Jibril 

III, No. 1:19-cv-2457 (RCL), 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 n.2 (D.D.C. 

Feb. 27, 2023). “Unlike in those cases,” where mootness was the 

“proper framework,” under the standing analysis, it is not 

“incumbent on the government to make ‘absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior’ of returning [Plaintiffs] to a 

watchlist ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Id.

(quoting West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2607, 213 L. Ed. 

2d 896 (2022)). Defendants made the same argument in their 

response to Plaintiffs’ supplemental notice. See Defs.’ Suppl. 

Resp., ECF No. 30 at 1-2 (arguing that neither Fikre nor Long

“aids [Plaintiffs’] claims in this action[,]” as “the ‘voluntary 

cessation’ exception to mootness has no analogue relevant to the 

standing question presented by Defendants’ motion”).

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 38 of 70
39

to turn to mootness). While standing is generally determined at 

the time the suit is initiated, Nat. L. Party, 111 F. Supp. 2d 

at 41; “when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court and 

then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the 

amended complaint to determine jurisdiction[,]” Rockwell Int’l 

Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473-74, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 

167 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2007); see also Cnty. Of Riverside v. 

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 

(1991) (assessing standing “at the time the second amended 

complaint was filed”); Feinman v. CIA, No. 08-2188 (EGS), 2009 

WL 10692650, at *3 n.4 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2009) (“Because subject 

matter jurisdiction must be evaluated at the time the action was 

brought, this Court must evaluate standing from the time the 

motion for leave to amend the complaint was filed.”); G&E Real 

Estate, Inc. v. Avison Young-Washington, D.C., LLC, 168 F. Supp. 

3d 147, 159-60 (D.D.C. 2016) (requiring courts to “measure 

standing by the state of the world as of the date of . . . a 

supplemental or amended complaint”). Here, Ms. Shaikh and Mr. 

Maniar were removed from the No Fly List on July 15, 2020 and 

August 18, 2020, respectively, Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 8; 

and thereafter filed their Second Amended Complaint on September 

9, 2020, see Compl., ECF No. 22. Therefore, the relevant 

question is whether they had “[t]he requisite personal interest” 

to establish standing as of “the state of the world” on

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40

September 9, 2020. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22; G&E Real 

Estate, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 159.

Given the parties’ above arguments as to standing and 

Plaintiffs’ burden to establish standing “for each claim” they 

are pursuing and “for each form of relief” they are seeking, see 

Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439, 137 

S. Ct. 1645, 198 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2017) (collecting U.S. Supreme

Court cases “mak[ing it] clear that ‘standing is not dispensed 

in gross’”); the Court separately evaluates standing for 

Plaintiffs’ claims first as to the No Fly List, and second as to 

the Selectee List. For the reasons detailed below, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to 

pursue both their No Fly and Selectee List claims.

1. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Standing to 

Pursue Their No Fly List Claims

Presuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, 

Rann, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 64; the Court concludes that Plaintiffs 

lack standing to pursue their No Fly List claims because both 

were removed from that list as of the date of the Second Amended 

Complaint, such that “any declaration or injunction regarding 

the lawfulness of that list, their alleged prior status on it, 

and/or the procedures that they were afforded to challenge the 

same, could have no immediate or real-world consequences for” 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 40 of 70
41 

them, i.e., “nothing concrete remains at stake in their 

claims[,]” Defs.’ Reply. ECF No. 26 at 10. Because Plaintiffs 

seek prospective relief as to their No Fly List claims, see

Compl., ECF No. 22 at 25-26; they cannot rely on “past injuries 

alone” to establish standing, Dearth, 641 F.3d at 501; rather, 

they must “establish an ongoing or future injury that is 

‘certainly impending[,]’” Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 472 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19). But, by 

continuing to advance claims based on their former No Fly List 

designations, Plaintiffs fail to allege any “ongoing” injury, as 

“[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 

present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if 

unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” 

O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-96; see also Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 

at 15, 28 (arguing that there can be no reputational or 

emotional impacts to Plaintiffs due to “ongoing placement on the 

No Fly List,” nor allegations that they are “currently unable to 

travel” because of that list); Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10 

(“Simply put, the No Fly List no longer prevents either 

Plaintiff from boarding flights, and can by no means be said to 

present any ‘certainly impending’ injury to either of them.” 

(quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401)). Recent cases considering 

standing following a person’s removal from a TSDS watchlist have 

reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Jibril III, 2023 WL 

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42

2240271, at *6 (concluding that subsequent removal from a TSDS 

list after initiating a DHS TRIP inquiry but prior to the filing 

of a complaint causes plaintiffs to “lack standing to seek 

prospective relief because they could not demonstrate a 

substantial risk of future injury”); Nur v. Unknown CBP 

Officers, No. 1:22-cv-169, 2022 WL 16747284, at *8 (E.D. Va. 

Nov. 7, 2022) (concluding that a plaintiff would lack standing 

if “he was once on [a TSDS] watchlist but has since been 

removed, as he does not face a ‘real and immediate’ threat of 

injury”); Scherfen v. DHS, No. 3:CV-08-1554, 2010 WL 456784, at 

*8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (concluding that plaintiffs who were 

in the TSDS “at one time, but have since been removed” would 

lack standing because their removal “would deprive [the c]ourt 

of the requisite ‘live controversy’” and would make the court 

“unable to grant effective relief”); see also Feinman, 2009 WL 

10692650, at *4-5 (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing 

to challenge an FBI policy or practice “at the time she sought 

leave to amend her complaint” because “the injury she had 

allegedly sustained no longer existed”).17

17 Defendants direct the Court to cases dismissing “analogous 

claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, following the 

plaintiff’s removal from the No Fly List.” See Defs.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 26 at 10; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 28-29. The Court does 

not regard these cases as directly on point because they pertain 

to dismissal based on mootness rather than standing, but to the 

extent they support the Court’s conclusion that a plaintiff’s 

claims are no longer justiciable following removal from a TSDS 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 42 of 70
43

Although Plaintiffs claim that they continue to suffer from 

“extreme emotional distress” and “stigmatization created by [ ] 

Defendants’ actions[,]” which “did not cease at the time of 

their removals from the No Fly List,” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 

watchlist, the Court cites them here. See, e.g., Bosnic v. Wray, 

No. 3:17-cv-826, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 

2018) (recommending dismissal based on the conclusion “that the 

relief sought by Plaintiff with respect to the No Fly List—

injunctive or declaratory—no longer ‘remains viable, and without 

any tenable claim to redress, the case [with respect to the No 

Fly List] has become moot’” where “DHS TRIP affirmatively 

informed Plaintiff that he had been removed from” that list), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-cv-826 (Aug. 1, 

2018), ECF No. 32 at 1-2; Scherfen v. DHS, No. 3:CV-08-1554, 

2010 WL 456784, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010) (concluding that 

under both the standing and mootness doctrines, plaintiffs who 

are removed from the TSDS “cannot maintain” their actions 

because no meaningful injunctive relief could be granted without 

the existence of the requisite “legally cognizable 

interest[s]”); Mokdad v. Sessions, 876 F.3d 167, 170 (6th Cir. 

2017) (“When TSC agreed to stipulate that [Plaintiff] was not on 

the No Fly List and would not be put on the list based on 

current information, . . . there was no live case or 

controversy, and the district court properly dismissed [his] 

claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); see also

Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 10 (collecting cases from other 

contexts that were dismissed on mootness grounds following the 

plaintiffs’ removals from the lists or designations at issue). 

Thus, even if the Court were to assume Plaintiffs have standing 

and move on to analyzing their subsequent removals from the No 

Fly List under the mootness doctrine, see Arizonans for Off. 

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L. 

Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs had 

standing to analyze the mootness issue); these cases indicate 

that their No Fly List claims would still fail, Scherfen, 2010 

WL 456784, at *8-9; see also Long, 38 F.4th at 423 (concluding 

“that Long’s claims challenging his No-Fly status [were] moot” 

following his removal from that list); Kovac v. Wray, 449 F. 

Supp. 3d 649, 655 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (finding that the plaintiff’s 

removal from the No Fly List was a “change in circumstances” 

that mooted those particular claims).

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 43 of 70
44 

15; however true that may be, the Court is persuaded by existing 

caselaw that such “residual” feelings, id. at 17; do not amount 

to “actual” or “concrete” injury in fact, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

560; see also Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 (“Even if the 

interests cited by the Jibrils amount to constitutionally 

protected liberty interests[, including travel, religious, and 

reputational interests], the alleged injuries to those interests 

would be ongoing only if the Jibrils were in fact currently on

the Selectee List.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, the harms 

Plaintiffs allegedly experienced because of their placement on 

the No Fly List, including “family separation” from relatives 

abroad and hindrances to Mr. Maniar’s “chosen employment and 

business ventures[,]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 15; are not 

“ongoing” but “past” injuries, for which they may not now seek 

declaratory and injunctive relief, see Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19. 

“[I]t is equally insufficient for a plaintiff claiming 

standing to observe that the challenged conduct is repeatable in 

the future.” See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 561 (4th Cir. 

2012) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a basis 

for standing.” (citing Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, 89 

S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969))). Yet, Plaintiffs argue 

that “the power to decide whether to place them back on the No 

Fly List . . . rests entirely and exclusively in the hands of 

Defendants with no meaningful way for Plaintiffs to challenge 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 44 of 70
45

the underlying data[,]” and that the “threat of recurring harm 

continue[s]” because they have “no assurance that they will not 

again be placed on the No Fly List[.]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 

at 15, 17. Although DHS TRIP told both Plaintiffs, in their 

letters informing them of their removals from the No Fly List, 

that they “no longer satisfy the criteria for placement” on that 

list “based on currently available information[,]” Defs.’ Ex. D, 

ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2; Plaintiffs argue 

that this “explicit language . . . leaves open the possibility 

for recurrence[,]” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17. The government 

responds that “any risk of a future re-designation is the very 

definition of an entirely ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ 

alleged harm that cannot support Article III standing.” Defs.’ 

Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11. The Court agrees.

To establish standing based on an “imminent” injury in 

fact, Plaintiffs must allege that the threatened injury—

redesignation to the No Fly List—is not merely “possible” but 

“certainly impending” or has a “substantial risk” of occurrence. 

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5 (emphasis in original); 

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210 (requiring future injury for 

purposes of prospective relief to be “sufficiently imminent and 

substantial”). However, when “the prospect of future injury 

rest[s] on the likelihood that [Plaintiffs] will again be” 

redesignated to the No Fly List, “[t]he most that can be said 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 45 of 70
46

for [their] standing” is that if they are redesignated to the No 

Fly List, they will again be subjected to the subsequent 

discriminatory harms alleged in their complaint. See Lyons, 461 

U.S. at 102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 

Court cannot “find a case or controversy in those circumstances: 

the threat to [Plaintiffs is] not sufficiently real and 

immediate to show an existing controversy simply because they 

anticipate” redesignation to the No Fly List. Id. at 103 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); O’Shea, 414 

U.S. at 497 (“attempting to anticipate whether and when” a 

future injury will recur is “speculation and conjecture”); 

Golden, 394 U.S. at 109 (stating that prior events are “hardly a 

substitute for evidence . . . of ‘immediacy and reality’”); see 

also Lebron, 670 F.3d at 560-61 (concluding that a plaintiff, 

who was formerly designated and detained as an enemy combatant, 

lacked standing to pursue declaratory relief when his prior 

designation “prove[d] no more than . . . a possibility that [he] 

could be redesignated as an enemy combatant” in the future); 

Feinman, 2009 WL 10692650, at *4 (“[T]here is simply nothing in 

the record the Court could rely on—aside from ‘unadorned 

speculation’—to conclude that Plaintiff [ ] is likely to be 

subjected to the FBI’s alleged policy or practice again.”).

Moreover, both Plaintiffs have received confirmation from 

the government that they will “not be placed back on the No Fly 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 46 of 70
47

List based on currently available information[,]” Defs.’ Ex. D, 

ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2; which leads to 

the inference that the same information that led to their 

original designations, “without more, cannot be used to renominate either of them to th[at l]ist,” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 

26 at 11; or create an “‘immediate threat that [they] [will] 

again’ be placed on the No Fly List[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-

1 at 29. Another Judge in this District reached a similar 

conclusion in Jibril III, when he determined that the plaintiffs 

in that case could not establish standing based on hypothetical 

future redesignation to the Selectee List:

[I]f the government satisfied the Court with 

an affidavit given under penalty of perjury 

that it would not add Mohammed Jibril back to 

the Selectee List unless new information 

provided a reason for doing so, any 

apprehension that the Jibrils might be 

subjected to similar enhanced screening 

measures on a future trip . . . or have any 

reason to make further attempts to contest 

their potential watchlist status . . . , would 

depend on the hypothetical possibility that 

the government might receive new information 

in the future convincing it that Mohammed 

Jibril once again met the criteria for 

inclusion on the Selectee List. Without a way 

of demonstrating that ‘a threatened inquiry

[was] certainly impending or there [was] a 

substantial risk that the harm will occur,’ 

the Jibrils would be unable to meet their 

burden of establishing standing.

Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *6 (emphasis added) (citations 

and some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 47 of 70
48

for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth Circuit”) reached a similar 

conclusion in Long: “The [TSC] has removed Long from the No Fly 

List and has assured us that won’t change based on the 

information it has now. Taking that assertion at face value, any 

future controversy over Long’s No-Fly status is not only distant 

and hypothetical but would also depend on a new set of facts.” 

38 F.4th at 423; see also Scherfen, 2010 WL 456784, at *8

(concluding that removal from a TSDS watchlist “would render 

speculative any claim that Plaintiffs will again experience the 

kind of injury attributable to the alleged wrongful conduct that 

animates this litigation” (emphasis added)); Bosnic v. Wray, No. 

3:17-cv-826, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2018)

(finding it “not reasonably likely that Plaintiff will be added 

back to the No Fly List, based on existing circumstances”),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-cv-826 (Aug. 1, 

2018), ECF No. 32 at 1-2. The Fourth Circuit further held that 

it was “satisfied”—based on identical language to that in 

Plaintiffs’ final determination letters, that “the government 

[would] only return Long to the No Fly List on a new factual 

record[,]” which could include, though not exclusively, 

“whatever information prompted it to add him in the first

place.”18 Compare Long, 38 F.4th at 422, 425 (quoting DHS TRIP’s 

18 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) 

reached an opposing conclusion in Fikre v. FBI, 35 F.4th 762 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 48 of 70
49

letter to Mr. Long, and a similar signed declaration from the 

government, “that [he would] not be placed back on the No Fly 

List based on the currently available information”), with Defs.’ 

(9th Cir. 2022). In Fikre, the Ninth Circuit declined to moot 

the plaintiff’s claim after he was removed from the No Fly List 

following the commencement of the litigation despite a 

government declaration that he “was removed from the No Fly List 

upon determination that he no longer satisfied the criteria for 

placement on the [list]” and would “not be placed back on the 

[list] in the future based on currently available information.” 

35 F.4th at 767. In its analysis of the voluntary cessation 

exception to the mootness doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that 

the government’s declaration did “not satisfy the heavy burden 

of making it absolutely clear that the government would not in 

the future return Fikre to the No Fly List for the same reason 

it placed him there originally[,]” leaving the government 

“practically and legally free to return to [its] old ways.” Id.

at 771-72 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (“Fourth 

Circuit”) rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “strict application of” 

the voluntary cessation doctrine to the government. See Long, 38 

F.4th at 424-25 (determining that Fikre went “too far” and 

“demand[ed] too much of the government” because “[t]o say 

otherwise would be to suggest the government risked national 

security simply to moot a lawsuit”); see also Nur v. Unknown CBP 

Officers, No. 1:22-cv-169, 2022 WL 16747284, at *9 (E.D. Va. 

Nov. 7, 2022) (following the approach in Long rather than Fikre

to find the plaintiff lacked standing); Kovac, 449 F. Supp. 3d 

at 655 n.17 (distinguishing Fikre and finding the plaintiff’s 

challenge to his No-Fly status moot because DHS “informed Kovac 

that he no longer satisfie[d] the criteria for placement, he was 

removed, and he [would] not be placed back on the list based on 

currently available information”). The Court reiterates its 

prior determination, see supra note 16; that neither Fikre nor 

Long directly apply, since they analyzed the voluntary cessation 

doctrine, which imposes a heavy burden on the government to 

prove mootness, in contrast to the standing analysis at issue 

here, in which Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, see Jibril 

III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 n.2. In addition, both cases from 

outside this Circuit are merely persuasive authority, but the 

Court finds itself persuaded by Long, to the extent it supports 

Jibril III’s position as to the speculative nature of 

Plaintiffs’ No Fly List redesignation arguments. See id. at *6.

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 49 of 70
50

Ex. D, ECF No. 23-5 at 2, & Ex. G, ECF No. 23-8 at 2 (exhibiting 

nearly identical assurances). “The plain lesson of these cases 

is that there are circumstances in which the prospect that a 

defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too 

speculative to support standing,” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 

at 190; and since Plaintiffs have not alleged the existence of 

“new evidence that has or will come to light which would result 

in their reinstatement onto the No Fly List[,]” Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 23-1 at 29; the Court concludes that their “speculative 

chain of possibilities does not establish that injury based on 

potential future [redesignation] is certainly impending[,]”

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.

Finally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that removal from the 

No Fly List should at least “not affect their standing to bring 

their due process and APA challenges to the policy itself—that 

is, the DHS TRIP procedures for [challenging] one’s possible 

placement on the [No Fly] List.” Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at 

*6; see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17 (arguing that they have 

standing, despite their removals from the No Fly List, to 

challenge “the current regulatory framework” and request that 

the Court order DHS TRIP “to revise their procedures to provide 

Plaintiffs with an ability to meaningfully challenge future 

likely inclusions on the No Fly List”); Compl., ECF No. 22 at 

26. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “under the legal 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 50 of 70
51

analysis urged by Defendants, [they] would not possess standing 

to challenge their placement on a watchlist until after they 

‘tested’ that placement by attempting to travel, encountered 

difficulties, and suffered the effects of those injuries[,]” and 

that Defendants could “escape review” in “this or any future 

lawsuit” by removing individuals from the No Fly List “for the 

time being.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17. However, to pursue a 

challenge to the government’s policy once their “request for 

specific relief is no longer at issue,” Plaintiffs “must still 

demonstrate standing to challenge th[at] disputed policy or 

practice.” See Cause of Action Inst. v. Dep’t of Just., 999 F.3d 

696, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (finding the plaintiff met that 

standard in establishing standing because it had “additional 

FOIA requests” pending with the Department of Justice and was 

thus “at risk of receiving the same improper treatment in the 

future” based on the application of the policy guidance).

Here, Plaintiffs have been removed from the No Fly List and 

are therefore not presently “at risk” of the same treatment they 

allegedly experienced in the past based on their prior placement 

on that list. See id.; Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7 

(concluding that the Jibrils would lack standing to challenge

DHS TRIP procedures if they were removed from the Selectee List 

because then “there would be no agency policy ‘continu[ing] to 

affect a present interest’ asserted in the complaint”). Because 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 51 of 70
52

the Court has already concluded that the challenged policy—the 

DHS TRIP process for challenging one’s No-Fly status—“[does] not 

continue to injure” Plaintiffs and does not pose “a substantial 

likelihood that it [will] injure them again in the future, they 

[do] not have standing to challenge that policy” in its 

entirety. Jibril III, 2023 WL 2240271, at *7; see also Lyons, 

461 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing 

to challenge the city’s allegedly unconstitutional policy of 

using chokeholds, and concluding that his claim of having 

previously been subjected to the policy was insufficient to 

confer standing to challenge future applications of that 

policy); Feinman, 2009 WL 10692650, at *4 (deciding that the 

plaintiff lacked standing because she was unlikely to again be 

subjected to the FBI’s alleged policy and that her additional 

attempt “to challenge the legality of the policy itself rather 

than a particular application of that policy [did] not permit 

her to simply sidestep the constitutional standing 

requirement”); Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at *5 (negating the 

plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief as to the legality of 

the No Fly List nomination policies since those claims were moot 

after his removal from that list).19

19 The Court acknowledges the possibility that the government 

could remove someone from the No Fly List during the pendency of 

litigation “to escape review.” Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 17. 

The Court encourages caution regarding this possibility, but it 

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53

In sum, because Plaintiffs cannot show an ongoing, legally 

cognizable harm capable of redress today from their former No 

Fly List statuses, or certainly impending injury from the 

potential for redesignation to that list, the Court concludes 

that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to pursue 

their No Fly List claims and are constitutionally prohibited 

from proceeding to the merits of those claims. See Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 23-1 at 25; Long, 38 F.4th at 427 (reaching the same 

conclusion based on mootness grounds).20

notes that Plaintiffs in this case have proffered no factual 

allegations in their complaint that the government specifically 

removed them from the No Fly List for the purposes of escaping 

judicial review (instead only mentioning this argument for the 

first time in their opposition brief). Since Plaintiffs have not 

pled any such allegations to substantiate this possibility, the 

Court declines in this instance to consider that the government 

might have “risked national security simply to” have this 

lawsuit dismissed on standing grounds. See Long, 38 F.4th at 

425; Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at *4 (finding that “the decision 

to remove Plaintiff from the No Fly List appear[ed] to be the 

result of substantial deliberation, and not merely an attempt to 

manipulate jurisdiction[,]” as there was “no evidence to suggest 

that Plaintiff’s removal from the No Fly List was not a result 

of a genuine assessment of [his] DHS TRIP complaint”). Thus, to 

the extent Plaintiffs argue for “a pre-deprivation challenge to 

the No Fly List,” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11 n.1; the Court 

rejects that attempt, see Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-50, 

2015 WL 4394958, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2015) (concluding that 

“a balancing of the respective interests does not weigh in favor 

of pre-deprivation notice” of a No Fly List designation since 

such notice “would alert an individual, and through him or her, 

others, whom the government suspects of terrorist activity, and 

thereby compromise on-going investigations and endanger those 

persons involved in those investigations”).

20 The government also argues that “even if Plaintiffs ha[ve] 

standing, the Court lacks jurisdiction over their claims 

relating to the No Fly List because there is a special review 

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54

2. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Standing to 

Pursue Their Selectee List Claims

procedure for challenging No Fly List determinations and related 

procedures: 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (“[§] 46110”).” Defs.’ Mot., ECF 

No. 23-1 at 15. § 46110 states that “a person disclosing a 

substantial interest in an order issued by . . . the 

Administrator of the [TSA] with respect to security duties and 

powers . . . may apply for review of the order by filing a 

petition for review in” the D.C. Circuit. 49 U.S.C. § 46110. The 

statute further states that the D.C. Circuit “has exclusive 

jurisdiction to affirm, amend, modify, or set aside any part of 

the order[.]” Id. The D.C. Circuit recently embraced § 46110’s 

review scheme to conclude that it has exclusive jurisdiction to 

review petitions challenging No Fly List designations made 

pursuant to a final order issued by the TSA Administrator. Busic 

v. TSA, No. 20-1480, 2023 WL 2565069, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 

2023); accord Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 391 (9th Cir. 2019). 

However, the Court does not view Busic as divesting it of 

jurisdiction in this instance because: (1) Plaintiffs are no 

longer on the No Fly List and thus cannot challenge the earlier 

order maintaining them on the list, and (2) they have not framed 

their complaint as challenging the final order removing them 

from the list. See Busic, 2023 WL 2565069, at *1 (noting that a 

traveler may challenge the TSA Administrator’s final order 

either “‘maintaining’ or ‘removing’ [them] from the No Fly 

List”). In any event, the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs 

lack standing to pursue their No-Fly claims (in relation to both 

their former statuses and possible re-designations), so there 

remain no substantive claims to transfer to the D.C. Circuit. In 

addition, Plaintiffs’ complaint asks for declaratory relief as 

to the DHS TRIP procedures for challenging future No Fly List 

designations, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26; but the “procedures 

themselves are not an order within § 46110, . . . [so those] 

claims fall outside § 46110 jurisdiction[,]” Long v. Barr, 451 

F. Supp. 3d 507, 530 (E.D. Va. 2020). But see Mokdad v. Lynch, 

804 F.3d 807, 811-12 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to opine whether 

§ 46110 would deprive the district court of subject-matter 

jurisdiction over claims challenging the adequacy of the DHS 

redress process but noting that such challenges to the redress 

process could “amount to a challenge to a TSA order”).

Ultimately, should Plaintiffs be re-designated to the No Fly 

List, they will need to “file a new redress inquiry[,]” which 

“could culminate in a final order by the TSA over which the 

[D.C. Circuit] would [then] have ‘exclusive’ jurisdiction.” 

Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 32.

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Presuming the truth of the allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, 

Rann, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 64; the Court next concludes that the 

remaining allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint specific to the 

Selectee List, along with their current prayer for relief as to 

that list, do not establish that Plaintiffs have standing to 

pursue those claims.

Defendants argue that to the extent “Plaintiffs attempt to 

premise their standing on their alleged continued placement on 

‘another watchlist’—by which Defendants assume Plaintiffs mean

the [TSDS] and its Selectee List subset—any such argument” 

should fail for two reasons. Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 11. 

First, Defendants argue that assuming Plaintiffs are currently 

on the Selectee List, “the Second Amended Complaint does not 

bring any actual claims based on such status[,]” id. at 12; and 

that “in any event [it does] not allege that placement on [that 

l]ist will result in harms equivalent [to those] associated with 

the No Fly List (e.g., an inability to travel)[,]” instead only 

alleging risks “of being subject[ed] to additional screening and 

delays at airports” when traveling in the future, Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 23-1 at 15, 25, 30. Second, Defendants note factual 

allegations in the Complaint about travel incidents Plaintiffs 

experienced following their removals from the No Fly List, such 

as the extensive questioning and detention abroad that Mr. 

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56

Maniar experienced in August 2020 when he traveled to Turkey and 

Pakistan, see Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8-9 ¶¶ 45-47; and the 

difficulties Ms. Shaikh encountered in obtaining a boarding pass 

for a domestic flight in July 2020, see id. at 13-14 ¶¶ 89-91; 

but they argue that nothing in these allegations supports a 

finding that the incidents are fairly traceable to Defendants, 

nor “attributable to [Plaintiffs’] alleged placement on the 

Selectee List[,]” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 26 at 12; Defs.’ Mot., 

ECF No. 23-1 at 30. Plaintiffs rebut “Defendants[’] attempt to 

reduce [their] harm [from the Selectee List] to the possibility 

that [they] may ‘face delays and inconveniences when traveling,’ 

[as] the realit[ies]” of extensive questioning, screening, and 

foreign detention are “substantially more severe.” Pls.’ Opp’n, 

ECF No. 25 at 15-16. In addition, they specifically allege that 

“these actions occurred due to the Defendants[’] placement of 

[them] on the . . . Selectee List, and communication of that 

placement to other nations.” Id. at 16.

After a careful analysis of Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint, the Court disagrees with the government’s assertion 

that the Complaint “includes no well-pled” factual allegations 

regarding harms based on Plaintiffs’ alleged placement on the 

Selectee List. See Defs. Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30; Defs.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 26 at 12. To the contrary, it alleges that, shortly 

after his removal from the No Fly List, Mr. Maniar was 

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57

extensively questioned in Turkey before being allowed to board 

his flight to Pakistan, and that upon arrival in Pakistan, he 

was detained and again questioned extensively before being 

forced to immediately return to the U.S., where he was also 

extensively screened. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 8-9 ¶¶ 45-47; see 

also Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 25 at 16 (adding that Mr. Maniar was 

detained in Pakistan “by unknown government agents[] and taken 

to an unidentified location with a bag over his head during 

travel”). The Complaint notes that these travel experiences “are 

consistent with persons on the Selectee List” and specifically 

alleges that “Plaintiff Maniar believes these actions occurred 

due to [ ] Defendants placing him on the . . . Selectee List” 

and communicating that list to other countries. Compl., ECF No. 

22 at 9 ¶¶ 47, 49. The Complaint also alleges that Ms. Shaikh’s 

difficulties, following her removal from the No Fly List, in 

obtaining a boarding pass for a domestic flight and subsequently 

receiving a boarding pass with the notation “SSSS” are 

experiences “consistent with persons on the Selectee List.” Id.

at 14 ¶ 93. Both Plaintiffs furthermore claim that their 

“believed current placement on the Selectee List” infringes on 

their religious exercise and ability to travel. Id. at 10 ¶ 61, 

15 ¶ 100. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ claims, the Second 

Amended Complaint not only “challenge[s Plaintiffs’] alleged 

Selectee List placement,” but also alleges “comparable” harms, 

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58 

such as severely restricted travel abilities (i.e., Mr. Maniar 

being forced to immediately book travel back to the U.S. upon 

arrival in Pakistan), detention abroad (which, drawing all 

inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, resulted from their inclusion 

in the TSDS and the global dissemination of that information, as 

opposed to the random “actions of foreign governments” detaining 

or denying admission to traveling U.S. citizens), and excessive 

screening and questioning (including FBI agents asking invasive 

personal questions about Plaintiffs to their acquaintances). 

Compare Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30, and Defs.’ Reply, ECF 

No. 26 at 11-12, with Compl., ECF No. 22 at 9 ¶ 47, 10 ¶¶ 57-59, 

13 ¶ 90, 14 ¶¶ 95-97. 

Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, taken as true, “lead to 

the reasonable inference that [they] will again be subjected to 

many of the alleged illegalities they challenge in this action” 

should they attempt to travel again, which appears plausible 

from the Complaint. Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 812. Plaintiffs’ 

travel history abroad for employment and religious purposes, and 

their existing family ties to Pakistan, “combined with their 

professed desire to continue” traveling for those reasons, 

“strongly suggest[] that they will travel internationally within 

the next year or two.” Id. at 814. For example, Mr. Maniar’s 

ongoing commercial ventures in Malaysia, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5 

¶ 15; Ms. Shaikh’s inability to visit family members in Pakistan 

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during the two years she was on the No Fly List, id. at 14 ¶ 99; 

and Mr. Maniar’s immediate travel to Pakistan just twelve days 

after the lifting of his No-Fly status, id. at 8 ¶¶ 44-45; 

provide support for this inference, see Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 

814. “It is also noteworthy that [Plaintiffs’] sincerely held 

religious beliefs require them to travel to Saudi Arabia to 

fulfill religious obligations[,]” id.; which they have both done 

in the past and have professed an intent to do again in the 

future, Compl., ECF No. 22 at 5 ¶¶ 15-17, 15 ¶ 100-01. These 

allegations enable the Court to infer that Plaintiffs “will soon 

travel again,” opening them up to “a substantial risk of future 

harm” from more searches, screenings, interrogations, and 

detentions. See Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 812, 814 (“The Jibrils’ 

allegations plausibly support their claim that they will soon 

fly again and . . . [be] expose[d ] to an imminent risk of 

invasive and undue Government actions[.]”). 

Caselaw supports the conclusion that Plaintiffs can allege 

“concrete travel plans.” Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 465 

(5th Cir. 2021). For example, in Jibril II, the D.C. Circuit 

rejected the government’s contention that the Jibrils had only 

alleged “‘some day’ intentions” to travel, as was the case for 

the plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 

564, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992). 20 F.4th at 815. 

Based on the Lujan plaintiffs’ affidavits that they intended to 

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60 

travel abroad but “had no current plans” to do so, the U.S. 

Supreme Court concluded that their previous travel “prove[d] 

nothing,” and only “‘some day’ intentions—without any 

description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification 

of when the some day will be”—could not support an imminent 

future injury sufficient to confer standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 

564. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Lujan “is easily 

distinguishable, as the Jibrils allege[d] an extensive travel 

history supporting their future plans, which evince[d] an 

imminence the Lujan plaintiffs’ ‘some day’ intentions lacked.” 

Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 815 (some internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Ghedi, 16 F.4th at 465 (concluding that a 

plaintiff, purportedly on the Selectee List, who “allege[d] both 

a professional need for habitual travel and that his injuries 

[were] tied to the act of flying, not his destination” plausibly 

pled “that his next flight, and thus, injury, [wa]s both real 

and immediate” and that the government’s attempt to compare his 

case to Lujan was “an apples-to-oranges comparison”). 

That the Complaint only states Plaintiffs’ beliefs that 

these actions occurred due to their placement on the Selectee 

List, see Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30; does not necessarily 

prevent the Court, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, from 

accepting the truth of these allegations, especially since the 

government “does not disclose the status of any individual with 

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61 

respect to the TSD[S], or its subset lists[,]” id. at 14 n.1.21

Drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, as it must, 

the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that 

they appeared on a terrorist watchlist in 2020. The Court 

“infer[s] from the inclusion of ‘SSSS’ on [Ms. Shaikh’s] 

boarding pass[]” from her July 2020 domestic flight, along with 

her inability to obtain that boarding pass without speaking with 

airline officials, and from “the extensive searches and 

interrogation [Mr. Maniar] endured during [his] international 

travels” in Turkey and Pakistan in August 2020 that they both 

“appeared on a terrorist watchlist during [those] trip[s].” 

Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 815. The D.C. Circuit in Jibril II used 

nearly identical experiences to those of Plaintiffs, including 

extensive searches and screenings, interrogations, and prolonged 

detainment, which it labeled “severe and time-delaying” 

treatment, to infer that the Jibrils appeared on the Selectee 

List in 2018 at the time of their travels. Id. at 815-16; see 

also Scherfen, 2010 WL 456784, at *3, *7 (finding that the 

plaintiffs’ complaint alleging additional screenings at airport 

security checkpoints, difficulties obtaining a boarding pass, 

detention during travel, and advisement that they were “on some 

21 In fact, the government states that the Court must, pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), accept as true 

“Plaintiffs’ apparent allegations that they are now on the 

Selectee List.” Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 14 n.1. 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 61 of 70
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watch list” supported “a fair inference that [they] ha[d] 

experienced intensified screening as a result of inclusion in 

the TSD[S]”); Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 

2013) (noting the conclusion of other courts that “a traveler’s 

subjection to heightened searches while entering the United 

States can be an indicator that an individual is on a terrorist 

watchlist”). Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have 

plausibly alleged imminent injury that “is plainly traceable to 

the [g]overnment’s actions,” Jibril II, 20 F.4th at 817; thereby 

negating Defendants’ argument to the contrary, see Defs.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 26 at 12 (“[N]othing in Plaintiff Maniar’s allegations 

supports any finding that the actions of the Pakistani 

Government are fairly traceable to [ ] Defendants.”); Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30 (attempting to argue that the alleged 

injuries resulted “from the independent actions of some third 

party not before the court”). 

Despite Plaintiffs’ plausible satisfaction of the first two 

standing elements, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs 

have failed to satisfy their burden to prove the redressability 

aspect of their Selectee List harms. “To demonstrate that a 

claimed injury is redressable requires [Plaintiffs] to show that 

the [C]ourt possesses the authority to grant the remedy 

requested.” Taylor, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 104; see also Swan v. 

Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the 

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63 

“‘redressability’ element of standing . . . causes [ ] concern” 

when the federal court does not have the power to grant the 

plaintiff’s requested relief); West, 845 F.3d at 1236 (noting 

that “redressability focuses on the connection between the 

alleged injury and the judicial relief requested” (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “[t]he 

redressability inquiry, to which the [C]ourt now turns, poses a 

simple question: If [P]laintiffs secured the relief they sought, 

. . . would [it] redress their injury?” Taylor, 351 F. Supp. 3d 

at 104 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, this question is not so “simple” in Plaintiffs’ 

case because the Complaint, as written, does not indicate the 

specific declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs are 

seeking regarding the Selectee List. The Court finds that 

Plaintiffs’ causes of action “based on the No Fly List and the 

TSD[S] are so intertwined that it is difficult to evaluate 

[their] claims based on the [Selectee List alone] now that [they 

have] been removed from the No Fly List.” Bosnic, 2018 WL 

3651382, at *5. Although Plaintiffs were given leave to amend 

their complaint following their removals from the No Fly List 

and did so twice to reflect this change, see First Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 19; Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 22; as discussed above, 

their operative complaint continues to maintain claims related 

to the No Fly List, including allegations of ongoing injury 

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64 

related to that list, the possibility of redesignation to that 

list, and procedural insufficiencies related to the process for 

challenging future inclusion on that list, see Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF 

No. 25 at 15-17. Claims related to the No Fly List dominate the 

operative complaint, and in their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs 

mention only the No Fly List, see Compl., ECF No. 22 at 26 

(requesting that the Court “[o]rder DHS TRIP to provide persons 

with meaningful opportunities to challenge future inclusion on 

the No Fly List moving forward (emphasis added)); while only 

generally requesting that the Court declare that Defendants’ 

actions “violated, and continue to violate” their rights under 

the First and Fifth Amendments and the APA, see id. at 25-26. 

Plaintiffs thus never mention the Selectee List by name in their 

request for prospective relief. See id. 

Instead, in the “Causes of Action” section of their 

complaint, Plaintiffs allege, without reference to either list 

by name, that they “have suffered punishments, including the 

inability to fly, substantial burdens on their religious 

exercise, the inability to engage in chosen employment, and 

more,” including, injury to their reputations and stigmatization 

by the government and in their community. See id. at 20-21 ¶¶ 

148-49 (appearing in Count One: “Violations of Plaintiffs’ Fifth 

Amendment Procedural Due Process Rights”). The Court notes that 

these alleged Fifth Amendment violations could refer to factual 

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65 

allegations in the Complaint pertaining to both the No Fly and 

Selectee Lists; however, the Selectee List is only named under 

Count Four: “Violations of the First Amendment.” See id. at 23-

24 ¶ 180 (stating that “Defendants’ supposed demotion of 

[Plaintiffs] to the Selectee List still creates a risk that they 

will likely be detained internationally or prohibited from 

traveling overseas altogether”). The Court therefore concludes 

that the Complaint fails to clearly request a specific remedy 

for Plaintiffs’ Selectee List claims, separate and apart from 

that requested for their No Fly List claims, such that the Court 

could be certain that there remains any requested prospective 

relief that could redress injuries related to the Selectee List. 

See, e.g., id. at 10 ¶ 61 (combining Mr. Maniar’s “former 

designation on the No Fly List, believed current placement on 

the Selectee List, and substantial likelihood that he could 

again be placed on the No Fly List” as the reasons for the 

alleged constitutional infringements requiring redress). 

For example, in Jibril II, the plaintiffs “ask[ed] the 

court to order the Government to revise its TRIP policies” as to 

the Selectee List redress process and “then re-examine [their] 

inquiries” regarding “the extensive and intrusive security 

screenings they endured [ ] consistent with the Government’s 

treatment of Selectee List travelers.” 20 F.4th at 810-11. Here, 

however, as part of their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs have not 

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66 

asked for redress regarding the sufficiency of the procedures 

involved in challenging potential Selectee (as opposed to No 

Fly) List inclusion, nor have they asked for removal from the 

Selectee List or the TSDS as a whole. See, e.g., Scherfen, 2010 

WL 456784, at *1 (“Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as 

well as injunctive relief in the form of ‘removal of Plaintiffs 

from any watch lists or databases that inhibit their travel in 

any manner.’”). Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they 

attempted the DHS TRIP process in relation to their 2020 travel 

experiences, which as Plaintiffs admit, “represents [their] only 

administrative avenue of redress” before proceeding to judicial 

review. Compl., ECF No. 22 at 6 ¶ 34, 11 ¶ 76. In other words, 

Plaintiffs have alleged the resolution of their DHS TRIP 

inquiries as to their No Fly List status, but not whether they 

ever began or followed through to completion such inquiries 

following their 2020 Selectee List suspicions. And completion of 

“the only redress process available to them” is necessary for 

the Court to reasonably infer, for purposes of redressability, 

that they may remain on the Selectee List today. See Jibril II, 

20 F.4th at 816-17 (inferring that the Jibrils remained on the 

Selectee List when they completed the DHS TRIP process and the 

government “provided no information to the contrary”). Thus, the 

Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ alleged Selectee List 

injuries are redressable by a favorable judicial decision 

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 66 of 70
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because: (1) they have not alleged completing the DHS TRIP 

process as to their 2020 travel experiences, and (2) they have 

not asked for any specific relief that might affect their 

alleged placement on that list or the procedures involved in 

challenging such placement. Cf. id. at 817 (concluding that “the 

prospective relief the Jibrils [sought], including revisions to 

the TRIP policies [as to the Selectee List], would ameliorate 

the alleged future harms with respect to which they complain”). 

In sum, the operative Complaint does not make clear what 

redress Plaintiffs seek for their remaining claims. It is also 

unclear “whether [they] remain[] on any [ ] federal terrorist 

watchlist or whether [they are presently] being injured by 

[their] presence on any such list.” Bosnic, 2018 WL 3651382, at 

*5. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed 

to meet their burden to establish all three elements of standing 

as to their Selectee List claims, and that it must grant 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismiss without prejudice the 

Second Amended Complaint. The Court, however, “will not dismiss 

the action itself at this time[,]” and will instead afford 

Plaintiffs the chance to file an amended complaint, as they are 

in the best position to disentangle their Selectee List claims 

from their nonjusticiable No Fly List claims. See Momenian v. 

Davidson, No. 1:15-cv-00828, 2016 WL 259641, at *7 (D.D.C. Jan. 

21, 2016) (similarly granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

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68 

dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, and 

granting the plaintiffs time to file an amended complaint to 

address timeliness issues); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 

661, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between dismissal 

of the complaint and dismissal of the action); Food & Water 

Watch, 808 F.3d at 913 (“[A]n inability to establish a 

substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion 

[to dismiss], not dismissal of the case.”). The Court will 

afford Plaintiffs 30 days from this date to file an amended 

complaint should they choose to do so.22 See Bosnic, 2018 WL 

3651382, at *1, *5 (recommending that the plaintiff’s claims 

based on the TSDS “be re-pled in light of his removal from the 

No Fly List so that the [c]omplaint [could] reflect[] his 

present circumstances”). If Plaintiffs amend their complaint, 

the government may file a motion to dismiss that complaint. 

Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiffs presently 

lack standing to pursue their No Fly List and Selectee List 

claims, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider 

22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to 

file an amended complaint should be “freely give[n] . . . when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where the court 

grants a plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, the 

amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint(s) to become 

the operative complaint. Nat’l City Mortg. Co. v. Navarro, 220 

F.R.D. 102, 106 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Washer v. Bullitt 

Cnty., 110 U.S. 558, 562, 4 S. Ct. 249, 28 L. Ed. 249 (1884)). 

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whether the Complaint also fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.23

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

Renewed Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 23; and DISMISSES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive 

and Declaratory Relief, ECF No. 22.

Plaintiffs shall file, by no later than May 1, 2023, an 

amended complaint that addresses the Court’s concerns stated 

herein. If Plaintiffs do not timely file an amended complaint, 

the Court will enter a final, appealable order dismissing this 

case.

23 Because the Court reaches this conclusion, it does not 

consider Defendants’ additional argument that Plaintiffs have 

improperly attempted “to expand the reach of their claims to 

agencies other than TSA, DHS, and the [TSC.]” See Defs.’ Reply, 

ECF No. 26 at 9, 31-32; Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 54-56.

Additionally, should the Court ever determine “that Plaintiffs 

have standing to challenge their placement on the Selectee 

List,” Defendants seek to “preserve[] . . . for the record” an 

argument that 49 U.S.C. § 46110 would deprive the Court of 

jurisdiction over a procedural due process challenge to the DHS 

TRIP redress procedures involving the Selectee List. Defs.’ 

Mot., ECF No. 23-1 at 30, 34. While the Court need not fully 

address this issue today, it notes that this argument would 

likely fail because § 46110 gives the D.C. Circuit exclusive 

jurisdiction over final determinations made by the TSA 

Administrator “concerning listing on the No Fly List[,]” not the 

Selectee List. See 49 U.S.C. § 46110; Watchlisting Overview, ECF 

No. 23-2 at 10 n.5. Moreover, as noted above, any challenge to 

the DHS TRIP procedures involving the Selectee List would likely 

be outside the purview of § 46110 because the “procedures 

themselves are not an order within § 46110[.]” Long, 451 F. 

Supp. 3d at 530.

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70

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 30, 2023

Case 1:19-cv-03826-EGS Document 33 Filed 03/30/23 Page 70 of 70