IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60312

Summary calendar

ERIC CHATMAN, JR., a minor, by and through his natural mother Audrey 

Chatman,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MISSISSIPPI HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS ASSOCIATION; GULFPORT 

SCHOOL DISTRICT; HOWARD MCNEILL, in his individual capacity and 

his official capacity as Athletic Director for GSD,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:11-CV-395

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eric Chatman, Jr. brought this suit by and through his mother, alleging 

inter alia claims under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 

1983 for racial discrimination in the application of rules for high school athletic 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 15, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-60312

eligibility when a student transfers from one school district to another.1 Those 

rules provide that, absent special circumstances, a transferring student who 

does not make a bona fide change in residence must sit out one year of athletic 

eligibility at his new school. When Chatman transferred from Gulfport High 

School to St. Stanislaus after his sophomore year, the defendant Mississippi 

High School Athletics Association determined that he was ineligible to play 

sports at St. Stanislaus because he did not change his residence. Chatman 

appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants after 

concluding that Chatman failed to show a discriminatory purpose or intent in 

the application of the rules. Reviewing the record de novo, see, e.g., Floyd v. 

Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 581 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2009), we AFFIRM for 

essentially the same reasons given by the district court.

Now proceeding pro se, Chatman concedes that he was ineligible under 

the rules after his transfer, but he argues that the defendants investigate and 

treat the eligibility of white students differently from black students. He 

argues that several white students were permitted to participate in athletics

after transfers even though they did not make a bona fide move, but that he 

was not similarly allowed to participate in sports. We agree with the district 

court that Chatman fails to show that the defendants acted with the requisite 

discriminatory purpose or intent. See Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 

358 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires 

showing that the defendant had an intent to discriminate); United States v. 

Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 984 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a claim under the Equal 

Protection Clause requires a plaintiff to establish a discriminatory intent or 

purpose).

1 Since the filing of the lawsuit Chatman as attained the age of majority.

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Chatman does not address in his brief the district court’s finding that 

the defendants were unaware of Chatman’s race at the time of the eligibility 

determination. That issue is therefore deemed abandoned. See Yohey v. 

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Moreover, Chatman fails to show 

that the white students who were allegedly permitted to participate in sports 

were similarly situated to him. See Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 

424 (5th Cir. 2004). As noted by the district court, unlike Chatman, several 

students who were allegedly assisted by defendant Howard McNeill were 

transferring to the Gulfport School District, where McNeill was the athletic 

director, rather than from that district. Those students were not similarly 

situated to Chatman. Chatman argues that two white students transferred 

from Gulfport to St. Stanislaus, as he did, but were not required to sit out for 

a year. In the district court, Chatman relied on his mother’s affidavit averring 

that those students did not make a bona fide move, and he asserts 

conclusionally on appeal that they were identically situated to him. There is 

nothing in the record, however, from which to evaluate the circumstances of 

those students’ transfers or to determine whether they were in fact similarly 

situated to Chatman. Chatman fails to show a genuine issue of material fact. 

See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (a 

non-movant may not defeat summary judgment “by conclusory allegations, by 

unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence”).

Chatman also argues that the district court erroneously denied his 

motion to terminate his counsel and his motion to extend the discovery 

deadline. The motion to terminate was filed by Chatman’s mother, who was 

seeking to either represent her son pro se or obtain different counsel. But with 

limited exceptions not applicable here, a pro se, non-lawyer parent or guardian 

may not represent the interests of her minor child. See Myers v. Loudon Cnty.

Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Aduddle v. Body, 277 F. 

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App’x 459, 462 (5th Cir. 2008). Moreover, at the hearing on the motions, the 

district court suggested after extended discussion with the parties that it 

would be in the best interests of Chatman to have his current counsel continue 

with the representation since the defendants had a motion for summary 

judgment pending. Neither Chatman, Chatman’s mother, nor counsel raised 

an objection. The court then ordered that the discovery deadline be extended 

for Chatman’s counsel to conduct three depositions that had been sought before 

the motion to terminate was filed. Under the circumstances here, there was 

no abuse of discretion either in the district court’s denial of the motion to 

terminate counsel or its handling of the discovery deadline. See, e.g., Matter of 

Wynn, 889 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1989) (district court’s ruling on withdrawal 

of counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & 

Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 2011) (discovery rulings subject to 

abuse of discretion review).

AFFIRMED.

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