Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:00 p.m.. EDT 

Tuesday, April 29, 2003 HOMELAND DEFENSE

Preliminary Observations 

on How Overseas and 

Domestic Missions Impact 

DOD Forces 

Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

GAO-03-677T 
DOD’s military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, 

discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally employed. 

DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality, 

lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the mission, 

and the impact on military readiness. 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military 

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the 

Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use 

of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug interdiction or 

assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. 

It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management 

organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their 

domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command to plan and 

execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command’s plan for domestic 

military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the 

nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic 

missions and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force 

fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air 

patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. 

Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in 

personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel 

had spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year, but 

by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that 

long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat 

capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily retain 

critical personnel. 

F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol Over Washington, D.C. 

The way in which the federal 

government views the defense of 

the United States has dramatically 

changed since September 11, 2001. 

Consequently, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold 

War strategic focus (of defending 

against massed combat forces) to 

better encompass defense against 

the asymmetric threats that small 

terrorist cells represent to U.S. 

territory. 

GAO was asked to review DOD’s 

participation in domestic missions. 

This testimony represents our 

preliminary work in response to 

the request. It addresses (1) the 

primary differences in military and 

nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD 

evaluates nonmilitary mission 

requests; (3) how the 1878 Posse 

Comitatus Act impacts on DOD’s 

nonmilitary missions; (4) whether 

current management organizations, 

plans, and forces are adequate to 

support DOD’s domestic missions; 

and (5) the impact of overseas and 

domestic missions on military 

personnel tempo. 

GAO is making no 

recommendations in this 

testimony. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-677T.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Raymond J. 

Decker, (202) 512-6020, deckerr@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-677T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

April 29, 2003

HOMELAND DEFENSE 

Preliminary Observations on How 

Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact 

DOD Forces 
Page 1 GAO-03-677T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the demands being 

placed on the Department of Defense (DOD) in the post September 11, 

2001, environment. DOD’s primary mission is to deter aggression abroad 

and fight to win if deterrence fails. It does this by undertaking major 

combat operations on a global basis. However, the federal government 

view of the defense of U.S. territory has dramatically changed since 

September 11, 2001. In this regard, DOD is adjusting its Cold War strategic 

focus of defending against massed combat forces attacking allied nations 

or U.S. territory to encompass the asymmetric threats that small terrorist 

cells represent. 

You asked us to review DOD’s participation in domestic military missions. 

We will issue a final report on this issue later this spring. My testimony 

today is based on the preliminary work that we have completed to date on 

your request. I will address (1) the primary differences in military and 

nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary 

missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD’s 

nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, 

plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD’s domestic missions; and 

(5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel 

tempo.1

 To determine the differences in DOD’s missions and how DOD 

evaluates mission requests, we reviewed appropriate guidance and 

directives specifying mission types, and discussed these issues with 

knowledgeable officials. To identify legal constraints on DOD’s 

nonmilitary missions, we reviewed the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act and 

related laws. To determine the adequacy of organizations, plans, and 

forces, we reviewed DOD reorganizations, visited the new U.S. Northern 

Command, reviewed campaign plans and related documents, and 

compared the types of missions performed by forces with their primary 

missions. Finally, to determine the impact of domestic or overseas 

missions on personnel tempo, we obtained personnel tempo databases 

from DOD for the period October 2000 through December 2002 (the most 

recent data available) and analyzed the data. We conducted this work from 

July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

 1

 Personnel tempo is the amount of time that a member of the armed forces is engaged in 

their official duties at a location that makes it infeasible to spend off duty time at the 

member’s home, homeport (for Navy service members), or in the members’ civilian 

residence (for reserve components’ personnel). 
Page 2 GAO-03-677T 

Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions in terms of roles, 

duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally 

employed. In military missions, DOD is the lead federal agency, operates 

without a predefined end date, cannot reject the planned mission, and uses 

combat power and combat support capabilities for their intended 

purposes. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions, another agency is generally 

the lead, the mission has a predefined end date, and DOD has some 

discretion to reject the requested mission and uses military capabilities in 

a noncombat manner to augment U.S. civil authorities’ capabilities. 

DOD evaluates all requests by U.S. civil authorities for military assistance 

against six established criteria, including legality, safety, funding, and 

impact on readiness. DOD has provided a variety of requested nonmilitary 

assistance, including over 230 missions in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, such 

as assisting in fighting wildfires; recovering from tropical storms; 

providing post-September 11, 2001, assistance to New York City and 

Virginia; and providing support for the presidential inauguration. 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act2

 prohibits the direct use of federal military 

troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by 

the Constitution or Act of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized 

the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use its 

personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian law 

enforcement to assist with drug interdiction efforts and terrorist incidents 

involving weapons of mass destruction.3

 The Commander of U.S. Northern 

Command has stated “We believe the [Posse Comitatus] Act, as amended, 

provides the authority we need to do our job, and no modification is 

needed at this time.”4

It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management 

organizations or their plans for their domestic missions, since the 

organizations only recently began operations and the campaign plan was 

 2

 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). The Act expressly prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force to 

execute the laws. It applies to the Navy and Marine Corps through DOD Directive 5525.5, 

DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials and Navy Instruction 

(SECNAVISNT) 5820.7B, Mar. 28, 1988, Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement 

Officials. 

3

 10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding §375) (2002), and 10 U.S.C. §382 (2002). 

4

 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the House 

Committee on Armed Services, March 13, 2003. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-03-677T 

only recently written, although some forces may not be fully tailored to the 

missions. First, DOD has established (1) the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and (2) U.S. Northern 

Command to provide long-term planning and execution capability for 

domestic missions. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall 

supervision of DOD’s domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command is to 

provide unity of command for U.S. military actions to counter threats to 

U.S. territory and is to provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities 

when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Neither 

organization was fully functional at the time of our review, so we could 

not yet evaluate the adequacy of these organizations for their new 

missions. Second, U.S. Northern Command recently completed its 

campaign plan for domestic military missions, making it unlikely that the 

services have yet trained or equipped their forces for these missions. In 

addition, the plan was developed prior to issuance of a Federal Bureau of 

Investigation counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials 

had agreed amongst themselves on the nature of the threat and thus may 

not take into account the current range of identified threats. Finally, forces 

are not adequately structured for some current domestic missions, and 

military readiness may erode. For example, following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks, the President deployed fighter aircraft to protect 

U.S. cities under Operation Noble Eagle. In addition, DOD needed to 

enhance installation security and deployed military police units. While the 

missions are legitimate, these forces’ military readiness may erode 

because they get limited training benefit from the missions and do not 

have the opportunity to conduct required combat training while 

performing the missions. 

Current overseas and domestic missions are impacting U.S. forces as 

measured by personnel tempo. DOD measures personnel tempo based on 

three thresholds: 182 days, 220 days, and 401 days deployed5

 away from 

home. DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away 

from home, a risk exists that they will eventually leave the service and 

military readiness may suffer. From September 2001 through December 

2002, the number of Air Force personnel exceeding the personnel tempo 

threshold of 182 days away from home rose from about 2,100 to about 

8,300; the number exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 220 days 

away from home rose even higher, from about 1,600 to about 22,100. Army 

 5

 We used the thresholds to measure days away from home, which includes deployments 

and activities such as individual training. 
Page 4 GAO-03-677T 

data also revealed that personnel tempo had increased during the period. 

To prevent significant near-term attrition from the force, DOD has used its 

stop loss authority6

 to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from 

leaving the service. DOD has acknowledged that stop loss should only be 

used for a short period of time and is not to be used as a long-term force 

management practice. 

Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions on a variety of factors, 

as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Differences between DOD Military and Nonmilitary Missions 

Military missions Nonmilitary missions 

Acts as the lead federal agency and follows 

orders issued by the President, as 

Commander-in-Chief. 

Supports a lead federal agency. 

Performs missions under extraordinary 

circumstances that do not necessarily have 

defined end dates. 

Provides support on a temporary or 

emergency basis with agreed upon end 

dates. 

Generally cannot reject these missions. Has some discretion to accept or reject 

these missions based on six established 

criteria and uses an approval process 

guided by DOD Directive 3025.15a

 to 

determine whether to provide the 

requested support. 

Applies military combat capabilities that only 

DOD possesses. 

Augments U.S. civil authorities’ 

capabilities with DOD’s own military 

assets or capabilities from its existing 

force, which are applied in a non-combat 

manner. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

a

 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, Feb. 18, 1997. 

Military missions involve coordinated military actions, such as campaigns, 

engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services’ combat forces. 

Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples 

of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic 

military mission started on September 11, 2001, and continuing today. In 

 6

 Stop Loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. §12305 (2002). It authorizes the President to 

suspend any provision of law relating to the promotion, retirement, or separation of any 

member of the armed forces when members of a reserve component are called to active 

duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national security of the 

United States. 

DOD’s Military and 

Nonmilitary Missions 

Differ 
Page 5 GAO-03-677T 

the latter mission, the President directed the Commander, North American 

Aerospace Defense Command, to order combat air patrols to identify and 

intercept suspect aircraft operating in the United States. Since these are 

military missions, DOD is the lead federal agency and is prepared to apply 

its combat power if needed. 

Requests for nonmilitary missions are evaluated against criteria contained 

in DOD’s Directive, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities.

7

 These 

requests generally seek DOD support to help alleviate suffering, recover 

from disasters or assist indirectly with law enforcement.8

 DOD’s directive 

specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated against the 

following criteria: 

• legality (compliance with laws), 

• lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces), 

• risk (safety of DOD forces), 

• cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget), 

• appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD 

to conduct), and 

• readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission). 

According to DOD, in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, it supported over 230 

nonmilitary missions in a variety of settings, such as assisting in fighting 

wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, providing post-September 11, 

2001, assistance to New York City and Virginia, providing support for the 

presidential inauguration, and for other purposes. According to DOD, 

during this same period, the Department rejected a handful of missions 

based on the above criteria. 

 7

 DOD Directive 3025.15, Feb. 18, 1997, which establishes DOD policy and assigns 

responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authorities. 

8

 DOD Directive 5525.5 provides specific guidance on requests for law enforcement 

assistance. 

DOD Evaluates 

Requests for 

Assistance from Civil 

Authorities Against 

Established Criteria 
Page 6 GAO-03-677T 

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act9 prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force 

“to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the 

Constitution or Acts of Congress. Federal courts have interpreted “to 

execute the laws” to mean the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of 

federal military troops in an active role of direct civilian law 

enforcement.10 Direct involvement in law enforcement includes search, 

seizure, and arrest.11 The act does not apply to military operations at home 

or abroad. Further, it does not apply to National Guard personnel when 

under the direct command of states’ governors. 

Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain 

situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment to: 

• assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions 

(10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding §375)); 

• protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection (the Civil 

Disturbance Statutes; 10 U.S.C. §§331-334);12

• assist the U.S. Secret Service (18 U.S.C. §3056 Notes); 

• protect nuclear materials and assist with solving crimes involving nuclear 

materials (18 U.S.C. §831); 

• assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction 

(10 U.S.C. §382); and 

• assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws 

(42 U.S.C. §§97-98). 

The President identified as a major homeland security initiative a review 

of the legal authority for military assistance in domestic security, which 

would include the Posse Comitatus Act. The President maintained that the 

“threat of catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws 

permitting the military to act within the United States in order to 

determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would 

benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, how.” 13

 9

 18 U.S.C. §1385 (2002). 

10 See, for example, United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975). 

11 DOD Directive 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials 

provides other examples of prohibited direct involvement. 

12 DOD Directive 3025.12, Feb. 4, 1994, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, which 

identifies policy and responsibilities governing the planning and response by DOD for its 

assistance to civil authorities, including law enforcement. 

13 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002. 

The Posse Comitatus 

Act Restricts DOD’s 

Role in Civilian Law 

Enforcement 
Page 7 GAO-03-677T 

In addition to this review, the Congress directed DOD to review and report 

on the legal implications of members of the Armed Forces operating on 

United States territory and the potential legal impediments affecting 

DOD’s role in supporting homeland security.14 In March, 2003, the 

Commander of U.S. Northern Command has stated, “We believe the [Posse 

Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, 

and no modification is needed at this time.”15 At the time of our review, 

neither the President’s nor the congressionally directed legal reviews had 

been completed. 

It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management 

organizations or its plans, although forces may not be fully tailored to the 

current domestic missions. DOD has established new organizations for 

domestic missions at the policy and operational levels, and written a new 

campaign plan for the defense of the United States. At the same time, DOD 

has used existing forces for these missions since September 11, 2001. 

However, at the time of our review, the organizations were not yet fully 

operational; plans had been developed before issuance of a 

counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials had reached 

agreement on the nature of the threat; and force capabilities were not well 

matched to their domestic missions, potentially leading to an erosion of 

military readiness. 

Two new organizations—the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command—together provide 

long-term policy direction, planning, and execution capability but are not 

yet fully operational, because they have only recently been established and 

are not fully staffed. Because these organizations had only recently been 

activated and were still being staffed and structured, we did not evaluate 

the adequacy of these organizations for their missions. 

 14 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, P.L. 107-314, 

(Dec. 2, 2002), Sec. 921(7) Report on Establishment of the United States Northern 

Command and Sec. 1404(11) Report on the Role of the Department of Defense in 

Supporting Homeland Security. 

15 Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command and North Aerospace Defense Command, before the House Committee on 

Armed Services, March 13, 2003. 

The Adequacy of New 

Management 

Organizations, Plans, 

and Forces for 

Domestic Missions 

New DOD Organizations to 

Address Military Domestic 

Missions Are Not Yet Fully 

Operational 
Page 8 GAO-03-677T 

The Senate confirmed the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense in February 2003, but this office was not 

fully operational at the time of our review, with approximately one-third of 

the staff positions filled. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall 

supervision for domestic missions. 

U.S. Northern Command was established by the President in an April 2002 

revision to the Unified Command Plan16 and was activated in October 2002. 

However, the command is not planned to be fully operational until 

October 2003. As of last week, only about 46 percent of the command’s 

positions had been filled. During our trip to U.S. Northern Command, we 

found that a key challenge that the command is grappling with is the need 

to conduct its ongoing missions while staffing the command’s positions. 

The activation of the command marks the first time that there has been a 

unity of command for military activities within the continental United 

States. Prior to U.S. Northern Command’s activation, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command provided for military actions to defend U.S. territory from landand sea-based threats. The North American Aerospace Defense Command 

defended the United States from airborne threats (and still does). The 

Commander of U.S. Northern Command is also the Commander of the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command providing the new unity of 

command for the three missions. 

DOD’s planning process requires the Department and the services to staff, 

train, and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign 

plans and deliberate plans17 developed by the combatant commanders, 

including the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern 

Command’s campaign plan was completed in October 2002 and is 

classified. However, I can note, that although it may reflect current 

intelligence from DOD and other intelligence community sources, it was 

completed before the January 2003 issuance of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s counterterrorism threat assessment, so it may not take all 

threats into account. Moreover, an official in the Office of the Secretary of 

 16 Unified Command Plans provide guidance to the combatant commanders and establish 

their missions, responsibilities, force structure, and geographic areas of responsibility, 

among other things. 

17 Campaign plans represent the combatant commander’s vision of the arrangement of 

operations to attain strategic objectives. Deliberate plans are designed to use forces and 

apportion resources for potential contingencies. 

The Nature of the Threat 

Was Still Under Discussion 

When the Campaign Plan 

Was Written 
Page 9 GAO-03-677T 

Defense acknowledged that DOD officials continue to debate the nature of 

the threat to U.S. territory, thus DOD itself has not yet reached internal 

agreement on the nature of the threat facing the United States. 

Based on our review, DOD’s forces are not tailored for some of the 

missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and 

the result could be eventual erosion of military readiness. To respond to 

the terrorist attacks of that day, the President identified the need to 

protect U.S. cities from air attack, and in response, DOD deployed 338 Air 

force and about 20 Navy aircraft within 24 hours of the attacks. Air Force 

fighter aircraft flew continuously from September 11, 2001, through March 

2002, and intermittently thereafter. These combat patrols continue today. 

While these forces may obtain some training benefit from actually 

conducting the mission, the benefit is limited by the narrow scope of 

maneuvers performed during these missions. Specifically, Air Force and 

Air National Guard fighter units performing domestic combat air patrols 

are inhibited from executing the full range of difficult, tactical maneuvers 

with the frequency that the Air Force requires to prepare for their combat 

missions. In one Air National Guard wing that we reviewed, the average 

pilot could not meet their training requirements in 9 out of 13 months 

between September 2001 and September 2002. Consequently, such units 

may need to resume training after domestic combat air patrols end or they 

are reassigned, to ensure their readiness for combat operations, their 

primary missions. Similarly, DOD identified the need to enhance 

installation security, and it subsequently deployed active, reserve, and 

National Guard military police units for the mission. However, these units 

were designed for a different mission, and received limited training benefit 

from the domestic mission. For example, officials at a military police 

internment and resettlement battalion told us that while the battalion can 

provide installation security, its primary mission is to operate enemy 

prisoner of war camps. Instead, for nearly a year, the battalion carried out 

a domestic installation security mission, which while important, prevented 

the battalion from completing required training for its primary overseas 

combat mission. As a result, the battalion’s military readiness may become 

eroded, which could mean accepting an increased risk to the battalion if it 

deploys or resuming training before it deploys again. 

DOD’s Forces Are Not 

Tailored to Conduct LongTerm Military Missions 

Domestically 
Page 10 GAO-03-677T 

Current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as 

measured in personnel tempo data. DOD believes that if servicemembers 

spend too much time away from home, a risk exists that they will leave the 

service and military readiness may ultimately suffer. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200018 requires that 

DOD formally track and manage for the number of days that each member 

of the armed forces is deployed and established two thresholds—

servicemembers deployed more than 182 or 220 days away from home out 

of the preceding 365 days. The National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 200119 established a third threshold, which requires that 

servicemembers who are deployed for 401 or more days out of the 

preceding 730-day (2-year) period receive a $100 high deployment per 

diem allowance.20 Between September 2001 and December 2002, personnel 

tempo increased dramatically for Army and Air Force personnel due to 

ongoing missions or commitments around the world and their increasing 

support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.21

DOD data that we obtained indicated tempo is high and increasing. For 

example, as shown in figure 1, in September 2001, over 6,600 Army 

personnel (including active, reserve, and National Guard personnel) had 

exceeded a desired threshold, spending 182 to 219 days away from home 

during the previous 365 days. By December 2002, that number had risen to 

over 13,000. During the same period, the number spending 220 to 365 days 

away, had risen from about 800 to over 18,000. 

 18 P.L. 106-65 (Oct. 5, 1999), §586(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §991). 

19 P.L. 106-398 (Oct. 30, 2000), §574(c) (codified at 37 U.S.C. §436). 

20On October 8, 2001, DOD suspended the counting of deployed days for payment purposes 

as permitted by law. Moreover, the statutory requirement for general and flag officers to 

personally manage the deployments of servicemembers exceeding the 182- and 220-day 

thresholds was also suspended at the same time. 

21 The data does not include the impact on personnel tempo stemming from participation in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, which is not yet fully available. Operation Enduring Freedom is 

the ongoing military mission in Afghanistan. While the Navy and Marine Corps did not 

experience high levels of personnel tempo during the October 2000 to December 2002 time 

frame, their tempo may have increased due in part to deployments for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. 

Increased Overseas 

and Domestic 

Missions Add to High 

Army and Air Force 

Personnel Tempo 
Page 11 GAO-03-677T 

Figure 1: Army Personnel Exceeding the Desired Personnel Tempo Thresholds 

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the 

preceding 365 days from the last day of the month indicated. 

The Air Force reported similar trends. As shown in figure 2, in September 

2001, about 2,100 Air Force servicemembers were away from home for 182 

to 219 days, but that had risen to about 8,300 by December 2002. Also, as 

with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen 

from about 1,600 to over 22,100. 
Page 12 GAO-03-677T 

Figure 2: Air Force Personnel Exceeding the Desired Personnel Tempo Thresholds 

Note: Each data point represents the total number of servicemembers away from home in the 

preceding 365 days from the last day of the month indicated. 

The number of Air Force active, Air Force reserve, and Air National Guard 

Air Force personnel exceeding the third personnel tempo threshold of 401 

or more days away from home in the preceding 730-day period also 

increased during the latter period of 2002, starting at about 3,700 

personnel in September 2002 and rising to more than 8,100 

servicemembers in December 2002. Of those, about one-half of these 

personnel were Air National Guard personnel, some of whom were tasked 

with conducting air sovereignty alert missions in the continental United 

States.22 In September 2002, 1,900 had spent more than 401 days away from 

 22 These servicemembers are deployed from their home to another installation in the United 

States. 
Page 13 GAO-03-677T 

home over a 2-year period. By December 2002, the number of Air National 

Guard personnel spending more than 401 days away from home had 

increased to about 3,900. Exceeding the threshold on a sustained basis can 

indicate an inadequacy in the force structure or the mix of forces. 

DOD has recognized the potential for retention problems stemming from 

the current high personnel tempo but has balanced that against immediate 

critical skill needs to support ongoing operations. Therefore, to prevent 

servicemembers with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued 

orders to prevent degradation in combat capabilities, an action known as 

stop loss authority. DOD took these actions because it recognized that 

individuals with certain key skills—such as personnel in Army military 

police and Air Force fighter units—were needed, in some cases, to 

perform the increasing number of military domestic missions. These 

orders affected personnel with designated individual job skills or in some 

cases all of the individuals in specific types of units that were critical for 

overseas combat and military domestic missions. 

Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these 

orders cautioned that they are short-term tools designed to maintain unitlevel military readiness for overseas combat and military domestic 

missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not to be used 

as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities 

and requirements, or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction, 

and training of new servicemembers. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

answer any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 

For future questions about this statement, please contact Raymond J. 

Decker at (202) 512-6020. Individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include Brian J. Lepore, Deborah Colantonio, Richard K. Geiger, 

Kevin L. O’Neill, William J. Rigazio, Susan K. Woodward, and Michael C. 

Zola. 
Page 14 GAO-03-677T 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Homeland Security.GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership. 

GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to 

Success.GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002. 

Reserve Forces: DOD Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between 

Reservists and Their Employers. GAO-02-608. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 

2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and 

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown 

but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention. GAO-01-9. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied 

Capabilities: Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination. 

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000. 

Related GAO Products 
Page 15 GAO-03-677T 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and 

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 

1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve 

Counterterrorism Operations. GAO/NSIAD-99-135. Washington, D.C.: 

May 13, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize 

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs 

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. 

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National 

Policy and Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-97-254. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 

1997. 

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