In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 04-1979

Y. SANDRA RESCHNY, formerly

known as Y. SANDRA CURRAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ELK GROVE PLATING COMPANY,

an Illinois corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 7398—James B. Zagel, Judge.

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ARGUED NOVEMBER 30, 2004—DECIDED JULY 15, 2005

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Before BAUER,POSNER,andEASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Sandra

Curran, now Sandra Reschny, sued defendant-appellee

Elk Grove Plating (“Elk Grove”), alleging sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Civil Rights

Act of 1991. The district court found that Reschny’s claim

was time-barred and granted summary judgment in favor

of Elk Grove. We affirm.
2 No. 04-1979

I. Background

Elk Grove hired Reschny as a receptionist on August 18,

1994. She claims that her supervisors sexually harassed her

until she felt compelled to resign on September 11, 1995.

On September 13, 1995, Reschny filed a discrimination

charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Elk Grove. During the EEOC’s

investigation, she retained an attorney, Samuel Greenberg,

to represent her. On or about December 29, 1995,

Greenberg wrote to inform the EEOC that he would be

representing Reschny in her lawsuit and to provide his

contact information. The letter further advised that attorney Arnold Landis also represented Reschny, but no

address for Landis was given.

In April of 1997, Reschny moved to 2115 South Tonnie

Road in Arlington Heights, Illinois. Sometime prior to April

30, 1998, Reschny moved again, but she did not contact the

EEOC to update her address until October of 1999.

On April 30, 1998, the EEOC sent a Notice of Right to Sue

letter to Greenberg; a copy was not sent to Reschny, although the notice sent to Greenberg indicated that the most

current address the EEOC had for Reschny was on South

Tonnie Road. The post office returned the notice to the

EEOC because Greenberg’s firm had closed for business. A

year and-a-half later, Reschny called the EEOC to inquire

about her claim. Pursuant to her call, on November 1, 1999,

she received a copy of the notice that previously was sent to

her attorney. Reschny filed suit on November 12, 1999.

After discovery, Elk Grove moved for summary judgment,

arguing that Reschny’s complaint was filed beyond the 90-

day limit set in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The district court

granted the motion.
No. 04-1979 3

II. Discussion

Reschny contends that the district court erred as a matter

of law in holding that the 90-day period to file suit commenced on April 30, 1998, because neither she nor her

attorneys actually received the EEOC’s notice until November 1, 1999. She also argues that she could not have been in

constructive receipt of the notice on April 30, 1998, because

it was delivered to Greenberg alone, who by that point had

stopped representing her. We review the district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo. Castellano v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 373 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2004). In so

doing, we construe all facts in Reschny’s favor. McDonald

v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004).

Title VII provides that the EEOC shall notify the person

aggrieved of her right to sue, “and [that] within ninety days

after the giving of such notice, a civil action may be

brought.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). This court held in

Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 585 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir.

1978), that actual receipt of the notice is required to start

running the 90-day clock. We clarified that rule in Jones v.

Madison Serv. Corp., 744 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1984), and St.

Louis v. Alverno Coll., 744 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1984). In

Jones, we held that two types of receipt of a notice can start

running the 90-day limitation period, and each does so

equally well: actual receipt by the plaintiff, and actual

receipt by the plaintiff’s attorney, which constitutes

constructive receipt by the plaintiff. Id., 744 F.2d at 1312;

see also Threadgill v. Moore U.S.A., Inc., 269 F.3d 848, 850

(7th Cir. 2001) (citing Jones, 744 F.2d at 1312). In Alverno

Coll., we held that when the notice is delayed by fault of the

plaintiff, the constructive receipt doctrine applies and the

90-day clock starts running once delivery is attempted at

the last address provided. Id., 744 F.2d at 350. Under

Jones, Greenberg stood in Reschny’s shoes for purposes of

receiving the EEOC’s notice. Greenberg’s negligence in

failing to apprise the EEOC of his change of address does
4 No. 04-1979

not toll the period of limitations. That he might not have

acquired a new address, as Reschny argues, is irrelevant

because he was still responsible for notifying the EEOC of

changes to his contact information. His neglect puts this

case squarely within the holding of Alverno Coll.

Reschny argues that she could not have been in constructive receipt of the notice when delivery was attempted to

Greenberg because he had abandoned her representation

when his firm filed for bankruptcy and closed its doors. She

relies on an unpublished district court order, Davis v.

Panasonic Co., U.S.A., No. 02 C 1431, 2002 WL 31415726

(N.D.Ill. Oct. 28, 2002), for this proposition. In Davis, the

EEOC sent notices to the attorney only, who by that point

had stopped representing the plaintiff. Those notices were

returned, despite the fact that the attorney still resided at

the address that had been provided. Meanwhile, the

plaintiff contacted the EEOC within approximately 90 days

of when delivery of the initial notice was attempted. The

district court recognized the rule that an attorney must take

reasonable steps to ensure notice is received and that an

attorney’s negligence in this regard generally does not toll

the limitations period. Id., 2002 WL 31415726, at *2 (citing

Newson v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 2001 WL 1555200, at *5

(N.D.Ill. 2001)). However, because there was no evidence of

neglect and the plaintiff tried to file suit in a timely manner, the district court held that the plaintiff was not in

constructive receipt of the notice. Id., 2002 WL 31415726,

at *2-3.

We, of course, are not bound by the decisions of the

district court. Even if we were persuaded by the district

court’s decision in Davis, it is of no assistance to Reschny

because there was no evidence that Davis or her attorney

was responsible for the delay. Rather, Davis actively pursued litigation during the 90 days following the initial,

attempted delivery of the notice, despite the confusion surrounding her attorney. Davis, 2002 WL 31415726, at *2-3.
No. 04-1979 5

Here, by contrast, Reschny and her attorneys failed to

update their addresses, and she waited a year and-a-half

before inquiring of the EEOC about the status of her claim.

This negligence brought the constructive receipt doctrine

into play and started running the 90-day limitation period

in April of 1998.

Reschny contends that she should not be penalized for the

delay because the EEOC violated its regulations by not

sending her a copy of the notice on April 30, 1998. She relies upon 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(d) (1999), which states in relevant part, “When the complainant designates an attorney

as representative, service of all official correspondence shall

be made on the attorney and the complainant . . . .” But

that language was not in effect in April 1998; at that time,

the regulation read: “When the complainant designates an

attorney as representative, service of all documents and

decisions on the complainant shall be made on the attorney

and not on the complainant, and time frames for receipt of

materials by the complainant shall be computed from the

time of receipt by the attorney.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(d)

(1998) (emphasis added); see also Rules and Regulations:

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 64 Fed. Reg.

37644, 37661 (July 12, 1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.

1614). Because Greenberg was designated as Reschny’s

attorney, the EEOC was not obligated to send her a copy.

Therefore, the EEOC did not violate its rules when on April

30, 1998, it sent the notice to Greenberg only.

The language of the regulation aside, it is somewhat disingenuous of Reschny to contend that sending her a copy of

the notice on April 30, 1998, would have averted delay. At

that time, the only address the EEOC had for her was the

one on South Tonnie Road. She no longer lived at that

address and never apprised the EEOC of the change,

though it was her duty to do so. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b). She

argues that, had the notice been sent, it might have been
6 No. 04-1979

forwarded to her new address. But she failed to take measures to ensure that would happen; at her deposition, she

could not recall whether she filed a change of address form

with the post office to forward her mail to the new address.

Reschny Deposition at 169-70. Even if the EEOC had

mailed Reschny a copy of its notice on April 30, 1998, she

has produced no evidence that she made arrangements to

receive it.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s grant of summary judgment.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—7-15-05