Testimony 

Before the Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, June 3, 2003 DRUG CONTROL

Financial and Management 

Challenges Continue to 

Complicate Efforts to 

Reduce Illicit Drug 

Activities in Colombia 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-03-820T 
In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million in 

assistance to train and equip a Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and 

supply the army with 72 helicopters and related support. Most of this assistance 

has been delivered and is being used for counternarcotics operations. 

In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has 

had mixed results. Since 1995, coca cultivation rose in every year until 2002 and 

opium poppy cultivation remained relatively steady until 2001. But, for 2002, the 

U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy reported that net coca cultivation in 

Colombia decreased 15 percent and net opium poppy cultivation decreased 

25 percent—the second yearly decline in a row. U.S. officials attributed this 

success primarily to the Colombian government’s willingness to eradicate coca 

and poppy plants without restriction. 

 

Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently 

begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in Plan Colombia, Colombia and 

the United States must continue to deal with financial and management 

challenges. Neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police can 

sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. funding and 

contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy 

officials, these programs alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future 

costs for some other programs have not been determined. Because of overall 

poor economic conditions, the government of Colombia’s ability to contribute 

more is limited, but the continuing violence from Colombia’s long-standing 

insurgency limits the government’s ability to institute economic, social, and 

political improvements. Moreover, Colombia faces continuing challenges 

associated with the need to ensure it complies with human rights standards and 

other requirements in order for U.S. assistance to continue. As GAO noted in 

2000, the total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were 

unknown. Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still 

not developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in 

Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to 

achieve it. 

 

Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation in Colombia, 1995-2002

The United States has been 

providing assistance to Colombia 

since the early 1970s to help reduce 

illicit drugs. In 1999, the 

Colombian government introduced 

Plan Colombiaa program that, 

among other things, proposed 

reducing illicit drug activities by 

50 percent over 6 years. In fiscal 

years 2000-03 alone, the United 

States provided more than 

$2.5 billion in counternarcotics 

assistance. Despite this aid, 

Colombia remains the world’s 

leading producer and distributor of 

cocaine and a major source of the 

heroin used in the United States. 

This testimony discusses the status 

of U.S. counternarcotics assistance 

to the Colombian Army and for a 

U.S.-supported Colombian police 

aerial eradication program. It also 

addresses challenges Colombia and 

the United States face in sustaining 

these programs. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-820T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-820T, testimony 

before the Caucus on International 

Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate 

June 3, 2003 

DRUG CONTROL

Financial and Management Challenges 

Continue to Complicate Efforts to Reduce 

Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia
Page 1 GAO-03-820T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss GAO’s work on U.S. counternarcotics 

assistance to Colombia. Today we will highlight the preliminary findings 

from our ongoing review of U.S. assistance to Colombia. Our draft report 

is with the responsible agencies for comment; we expect to issue a final 

report in mid-June. I will focus my comments on (1) the status of U.S. 

counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian Army in fiscal years 2000-03 

and how this assistance has been used, (2) what the U.S.-supported 

Colombian National Police aerial eradication program has accomplished 

in recent years, and (3) what challenges Colombia and the United States 

face in sustaining these programs. 

In 1999, the Colombian government introduced Plan Colombiaa 

$7.5 billion program that, among other things, proposed reducing the 

cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent 

over 6 years.1

 A key component of the Colombian-U.S. counternarcotics 

strategy was the creation of a Colombian Army 2,285-man 

counternarcotics brigade, for which the United States agreed to provide 

helicopters to help it move around southern Colombia to reduce cocaine 

production and trafficking. Closely allied with this objective was U.S. 

support for the Colombian National Police’s aerial eradication program to 

significantly reduce, if not eliminate, coca and opium poppy cultivation.2

 

In fiscal years 2000-03, the United States provided about $640 million to 

train and equip the Colombian Army counternarcotics brigade and supply 

the army with 72 helicopters and related training, maintenance, and 

operational support. Most of this assistance has been delivered and is 

being used for counternarcotics operations. However, some problems 

were encountered. For example, 

• After a successful first year of operations, the brigade’s results dropped off 

in 2002. U.S. and Colombian officials attribute this, in part, to coca 

 1

For more information on U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, see U.S. General Accounting 

Office, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results, 

GAO-01-26 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2000). 

2

The leaves of the coca plant are the raw ingredient of cocaine, and opium poppy is used to 

produce heroin. The aerial eradication program involves spraying the coca and poppy 

plants from low-flying airplanes with an herbicide that attacks the root system and kills the 

plant. 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-03-820T 

growers and producers moving out of the brigade’s range in southern 

Colombia. In late 2002, with U.S. assistance, the Colombian Army 

reorganized the brigade and gave it authority to operate anywhere in the 

country. This change, according to U.S. embassy and Colombian Army 

officials, will improve the brigade’s ability to conduct operations against 

high-value, drug-trafficking targets, such as cocaine production 

laboratories and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in drugtrafficking activities. One of the brigade’s retrained battalions has been 

operating in Narino department since early May 2003. 

• Some initial impediments slowed the delivery and operational use of the 

helicopters. The start of entry-level helicopter pilot training was delayed 5 

months while the United States determined who would provide and fund 

the training. The delivery of 25 UH-II helicopters was delayed 5 months 

while the United States and Colombia decided what type of engine to use 

in the aircraft. U.S. funding for the brigade’s operations was slowed for a 

total of about 5 months in 2002 because the Department of State did not 

meet congressional deadlines for reporting on Colombia’s progress in 

addressing human rights violations. 

U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan 

Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army 

taking over the responsibilities of operating and maintaining the aircraft. 

However, U.S. embassy and Colombian officials stated that a continued 

level of U.S. assistance will be needed beyond this date because the army 

is not expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary. 

Although U.S. embassy officials stated that they have not officially 

estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected that 

it would cost between $100 million and $150 million a year to sustain 

ongoing counternarcotics programs. In addition, other recently initiated 

U.S. programs will require additional support. 

In recent years, the Colombian National Police aerial eradication program 

has had mixed results. Since 1995, net coca cultivation rose in every year 

until 2002 and net opium poppy cultivation remained between 6,100 to 

7,500 hectares. But in recent months, the Office of National Drug Control 

Policy reported that 

• net coca cultivation in Colombia decreased 15 percent in 2002, from 

169,800 hectares in 2001 to 144,450 hectares, and 

• net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia decreased 25 percent in 2002, 

from 6,500 hectares in 2001 to 4,900 hectares—the second yearly decline in 

a row. 
Page 3 GAO-03-820T 

U.S. embassy officials attributed this recent success primarily to the 

current Colombian government’s willingness to spray coca and poppy 

plants without restriction in all areas of the country. However, since at 

least 1998, U.S. embassy officials have been concerned with the rising U.S. 

presence in Colombia and the associated costs of the aerial eradication 

program. At the time, the embassy began developing a 3-year plan to have 

the Colombian National Police assume control over the program; but, for 

various reasons, the police never agreed to the plan. Since then, contractor 

involvement and the associated costs have continued to rise, and the 

Colombian National Police are not yet able to assume more control of the 

aerial eradication program. In fiscal year 1998, U.S. embassy officials 

reported that the costs for the U.S. contractor, fuel, herbicide, and related 

support totaled $48.5 million. For fiscal year 2003, U.S. embassy officials 

estimated that the comparable costs totaled $86.3 million. Much of this 

increase occurred between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 to support the 

additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated 

continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to U.S. 

embassy officials, these costs are expected to remain relatively constant 

for the next several years. 

Although the U.S.-supported counternarcotics program has recently 

shown some of the results envisioned when Plan Colombia was first 

introduced, Colombia and the United States continue to face financial and 

management challenges in sustaining programs in Colombia. 

• Colombia’s financial resources are limited. Neither the Colombian Army 

nor the Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counternarcotics 

programs without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the 

foreseeable future. According to U.S. embassy officials, ongoing programs 

alone may cost up to $230 million per year, and future costs for some other 

programs have not been determined. 

• Colombia also continues to face challenges associated with its political 

and economic instability fostered by its long-standing insurgency and, for 

U.S. assistance to continue, the need to ensure that (1) the military and 

police comply with human rights standards, (2) the aerial eradication 

program meets certain environmental conditions, and (3) alternative 

development is provided in areas subject to aerial eradication. 

Colombia is a longtime ally and significant trading partner of the United 

States and, therefore, its economic and political stability is important to 

the United States as well as the Andean region. Colombia’s long-standing 

insurgency and the insurgents’ links to the illicit drug trade complicate its 
Page 4 GAO-03-820T 

efforts to tap its natural resources and make systemic economic reforms. 

Solving these problems is important to Colombia’s future stability. On the 

other hand, recent world events—from the global war on terrorism to the 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted scarce U.S. resources and 

made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources 

committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the 

total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. 

Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not 

developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in 

Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to 

achieve it. 

The United States has provided assistance to help reduce illegal drug 

production and trafficking activities in Colombia since the 1970s. Yet, 

Colombia is still the world’s leading cocaine producer and distributor and 

a major source of the heroin used in the United States. According to State, 

Colombia provides 90 percent of the cocaine and about 40 percent of the 

heroin entering the United States. The Drug Enforcement Administration 

reports that several billion dollars flow into Colombia each year from the 

cocaine trade alone, and this vast amount of drug money has helped the 

country’s two largest insurgency groupsthe Revolutionary Armed Forces 

of Colombia and the National Liberation Armygain unprecedented 

economic, political, and social power and influence. The insurgents 

exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory 

east and south of the Andes where much of the coca is grown. 

In an effort to address the influx of cocaine and heroin from Colombia, the 

United States has funded a counternarcotics strategy in Colombia that 

includes programs for interdiction, eradication, and alternative 

development, which must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually 

reinforcing results. Besides assistance for the Colombian Army 

counternarcotics brigade and the Colombian National Police aerial 

eradication program, the United States has supported Colombian efforts to 

interdict illicit-drug trafficking along rivers and in the air as well as 

alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced 

persons programs. The Departments of Defense and State have provided 

most of the funding and State, through its Bureau for International 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and Narcotics Affairs Section in 

the U.S. Embassy Bogotá, oversees the program. In fiscal years 2000 

through 2003, the United States provided more than $2.5 billion to 

Colombia for counternarcotics assistance. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 

2004, the administration has proposed an additional $700 million in aid. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-820T 

Table 1: U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia, Fiscal Years 2000-03 

Dollars in millions 

Fiscal years 

Agency 2000a2001 2002 

2003b

(estimated) Total 

State $774.9 $48.0 275.4 $452.0 $1,550.3 

DOD 128.5 190.2 119.1 149.9 $587.7 

USAIDc 123.5 0 104.5 151.0 $379.0 

Total $1,026.9 $238.2 $499.0 $752.9 $2,517.0 

Source: Departments of Defense and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 

a

Includes funds appropriated for Plan Colombia through the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

Act, Fiscal Year 2000 (Division B of P.L. 106-246). 

b

Includes $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds appropriated in the Foreign Operations, 

Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2003 (Division E, Title III of P.L. 108-7); $34 million 

appropriated to State and $34 million appropriated to Defense in the Supplemental Appropriations Act 

to Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 108-11); and $37.1 

million for Foreign Military Financing allotted from fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations. 

c

In fiscal years 2000-03, State transferred $375 million to the U.S. Agency for International 

Development for alternative development, judicial sector reform, and internally displaced persons 

programs. 

Following increased violence in Colombia during early 2002, the Congress 

provided “expanded authority” for the use of U.S. assistance to Colombia, 

which enabled the Colombian government to use the U.S.-trained and -

equipped counternarcotics brigade, U.S.–provided helicopters, and other 

U.S. counternarcotics assistance to fight groups designated as terrorist 

organizations as well as to fight drug trafficking. Similar authority was 

provided for fiscal year 2003 and is being sought for fiscal year 2004. 

U.S. assistance to the Colombian Army during fiscal years 2000-

03$640 million for the counternarcotics brigade, 72 helicopters, and 

related supporthas, for the most part, been delivered and is being used 

for counternarcotics operations. However, both the United States and the 

Colombian Army experienced some unanticipated problems that delayed 

the operational use of the helicopters. In addition, U.S. support will be 

needed for the foreseeable future to sustain operations. 

The United States initially agreed to train and equip a Colombian Army 

counternarcotics brigade of three battalions and a total of about 2,285 

professional and conscripted soldiers. The United States provided the 

Assistance to the 

Colombian Army Has 

Been Delivered, but 

Problems Were 

Encountered 

Status of the Brigade 
Page 6 GAO-03-820T 

counternarcotics brigade with about $45 million in training and 

equipment—from weapons and ammunition to rations, uniforms, and 

canteens. The brigade’s primary mission was to plan and conduct 

interdiction operations against drug-trafficking activities, including 

destroying illicit drug-producing facilities, and, when called upon, to 

provide security in insurgent-controlled areas where aerial eradication 

operations were planned. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the 

brigade was highly effective in 2001for example, it destroyed 25 cocaine 

hydrochloride laboratories3

but was less successful in 2002, when it 

destroyed only 4 such labs. U.S. embassy officials stated that the brigade 

became less effective because the insurgents moved their drug-producing 

activities, such as the laboratories, beyond the brigade’s reach. In addition, 

according to these officials, the brigade became more involved in 

protecting infrastructure, such as bridges and power stations, and 

performing base security. Moreover, the aerial eradication program did not 

call on the brigade to provide ground security on very many occasions, 

essentially planning spray missions in the less threatening areas. 

In August 2002, U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials agreed to 

restructure the brigade to make it a rapid reaction force capable of making 

quick, tactical strikes on a few days’ notice. As part of this restructuring, 

the Colombian Army designated the brigade a national asset capable of 

operating anywhere in Colombia rather than just in its prior area of 

responsibility in southern Colombia. The newly restructured brigade 

consists of three combat battalions and a support battalion with a total of 

about 1,900 soldiers, all of whom are professional. Two of the combat 

battalions have been retrained. The third combat battalion should be 

retrained by mid-June 2003. This change, according to U.S. embassy and 

Colombian Army officials, will improve the brigade’s ability to conduct 

operations against high-value, drug-trafficking targets, such as laboratories 

containing cocaine and the leadership of insurgent groups involved in 

drug-trafficking activities. One of the retrained battalions has been 

operating in Narino department since early May 2003. 

A key component of U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia was enhancing the 

brigade’s air mobility. To do this, the United States provided the 

 3

The laboratories are used in the final stages of processing coca into cocaine and are 

considered high-value targets. 

Status of the Helicopters 
Page 7 GAO-03-820T 

Colombian Army with 33 UH-1N helicopters, 14 UH-60 Black Hawk 

helicopters, and 25 UH-II helicopters.4

• The 33 UH-1N helicopters were supposed to serve as interim aircraft until 

the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters funded under Plan Colombia were 

delivered. The UH-1Ns were delivered in stages between November 1999 

and March 2001. Since flying their first mission in December 2000, the 

helicopters have logged 19,500 hours in combat and have supported more 

than 430 counternarcotics brigade operations. Colombian Army personnel 

are qualified as pilots and mechanics, but many of the experienced pilots 

and mechanics who operate and maintain the aircraft are provided 

through a U.S. contractor. 

• The UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were delivered between July and 

December 2001 but did not begin support operations for the brigade until 

November 2002 because of a shortage of fully qualified Colombian Army 

pilots. Forty-two Colombian Army personnel have completed the 

minimum UH-60 pilot training, of which 13 have qualified as pilot-incommand. U.S.-funded contract pilots fill in as pilots-in-command. In 

addition, a U.S.-funded contractor continues to maintain the helicopters 

and provide maintenance training. 

• State procured 25 UH-II helicopters under Plan Colombia and planned to 

deliver them to the Colombian Army between November 2001 and June 

2002. However, they were delivered between March and November 2002 

instead because the Colombian military was considering whether to use a 

more powerful engine in the helicopters than the one usually installed. 

Ultimately it decided to use the more common engine. According to NAS 

officials, although some of the UH-II helicopters are being used for 

missions, all the helicopters will not be operational until June 2003. As of 

January 2003, 25 Colombian Army pilots had completed their initial 

training and 21 of these pilots are completing the training needed to 

qualify for operational missions. However, contractor pilots continue to 

supplement Colombian Army pilots and a U.S.-funded contractor 

continues to provide maintenance support. 

Although all the U.S.-provided helicopters are in Colombia, a number of 

unanticipated problems in training Colombian Army pilots and mechanics 

 4

Of the 33 UH-1Ns, 28 remain available for use by the brigade; 1 crashed on a mission and 4 

were transferred to support the aerial eradication program. 

Problems with Pilot and 

Mechanic Training 
Page 8 GAO-03-820T 

to operate and maintain the helicopters were encountered. Some of these 

problems continue to limit the Colombian Army’s ability to operate and 

maintain the aircraft. Primarily, the Colombian Army will have to continue 

to rely on contractor support because it will not have enough trained 

pilots-in-command and senior mechanics for the foreseeable future. 

• When the United States agreed to provide the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters 

for the Colombian Army in July 2000, the assistance for Plan Colombia did 

not include any funds to train the Colombian pilots and mechanics needed 

to operate and maintain the helicopters. About 6 months after passage of 

U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia, Defense agreed to provide the training 

and reported that it would transfer up to $20 million from other 

counternarcotics projects in Colombia to pay for it. 

• A training plan was approved in mid-2001. Although the plan provided 

training for Colombian Army personnel to meet the minimum 

qualifications for a pilot and mechanic, it did not include the additional 

training necessary to fly missions in a unit or to become a senior 

mechanic. Basic training for 117 helicopter pilots—known as initial entry 

rotary wing training—began in November 2001 and is projected to be 

completed by December 2004. This training is intended to provide a pool 

or pipeline of pilots for more advanced training to fly specific helicopters. 

In addition, according to U.S. embassy officials, a new pilot takes an 

average of 2 to 3 years to progress to pilot-in-command. 

• According to U.S. embassy and contractor officials, 105 out of 159 

Colombian Army personnel have completed the basic UH-60 and UH-II 

maintenance training and are taking more advanced training to qualify as 

senior mechanics. These officials told us that the remaining 54 personnel 

will receive the contractor-provided basic training in the near future, but 

they did not know when it would begin. Moreover, these officials also told 

us that it typically takes 3 to 5 years for mechanics to gain the experience 

necessary to become fully qualified on specific helicopter systems, in 

particular the UH-60 Black Hawks. 

• The Colombian Army Aviation Battalion is responsible for providing 

helicopters and other aircraft and personnel for all Colombian Army 

missions with an aviation component, including counternarcotics and 

counterinsurgency operations throughout Colombia. Information provided 

by the Colombian Aviation Battalion shows that it is staffed at only 80 

percent of its required levels and that, over the past several years, it has 

received between 60 percent to 70 percent of its requested budget for 

logistics and maintenance. The Colombian military’s decision to continue 

using the UH-1N helicopters in addition to the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters 
Page 9 GAO-03-820T 

will also make it more difficult for the Aviation Battalion to provide the 

numbers of personnel needed to operate and maintain the helicopters. 

State originally intended that the UH-1N helicopters would not be used 

after the UH-60 and UH-II helicopters were available to support 

operations. 

• According to bilateral agreements between Colombia and the United 

States, the Colombian Army must ensure that pilots and mechanics who 

receive U.S. training be assigned to positions using their training for a 

minimum of 2 years. This has not always been the case. For example, 

although 19 Colombian Army personnel were qualified to serve as pilotsin-command on UH-1N helicopters, only 1 pilot was assigned to serve in 

this position. The remaining pilots-in-command were provided by a U.S. 

contractor. 

• Of the funds appropriated for fiscal year 2002, $140 million was used to 

support Colombian Army counternarcotics efforts. Most of this amount 

was used for U.S.- provided helicopter operations and maintenance, 

logistical, and training support. However, not all the funding could be 

released until the Secretary of State certified, in two separate reports to 

appropriate congressional committees,5

 that the Colombian military was 

making progress meeting certain human rights conditions. Because State 

was late in providing these reports, the U.S. embassy could not use this 

funding for operations and training on two occasions for a total of about 

5 months during 2002.6

 These delays resulted in fewer counternarcotics 

operations and limited the training and experience Colombian Army pilots 

could obtain to qualify as pilots-in-command. 

 5

Section 567 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 

Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L. 107-115). Specifically, the act provided that not more than 60 

percent of the funds could be obligated until after the Secretary of State made a 

determination and certification that the Colombian military was (1) suspending members 

of the Colombian Armed Forces who have been creditably alleged to have committed gross 

violations of human rights, (2) cooperating with civilian prosecutors and investigators, and 

(3) severing links between the Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. In addition, the 

remaining 40 percent of the funds could be obligated only after June 1, 2002, and after the 

Secretary of State made a second determination and certification with respect to the same 

conditions. 

6

According to U.S. embassy political section personnel, they encountered difficulties 

developing the information required to make the human rights determination and 

certification. The first report was issued on May 1, 2002—almost 2 months later than 

State’s target date. The second report was issued on September 9, 2002—almost 3 months 

later than State’s target date. 
Page 10 GAO-03-820T 

U.S. assistance to support the helicopters provided as part of Plan 

Colombia was originally planned to end in 2006 with the Colombian Army 

taking over these responsibilities. However, U.S. embassy and Colombian 

Army officials stated that a continued level of U.S. contractor presence 

will be needed beyond this date because the Aviation Battalion is not 

expected to have the personnel trained or the resources necessary. 

Although the embassy officials stated that they have not officially 

estimated what this assistance level will be, they tentatively projected that 

it would cost between $100 million and $150 million annually to sustain 

the U.S.-supported counternarcotics programs. Moreover, other recently 

initiated U.S. programs will likely require U.S. assistance and contractor 

support, but the long-term costs of sustaining such programs are not 

known. 

Since the early 1990s, State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (through the U.S. Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section 

(NAS) and the Office of Aviation) has supported the Colombian National 

Police’s efforts to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the cultivation of 

coca and opium poppy. However, for the most part, the net hectares of 

coca under cultivation in Colombia continued to rise until 2002, and the 

net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation remained relatively steady 

until 2001-02.7

 In addition, the U.S. embassy has made little progress in 

having the Colombian National Police assume more responsibility for the 

aerial eradication program, which requires costly U.S. contractor 

assistance to carry out. 

As shown in figure 1, the number of hectares under coca cultivation rose 

more than threefold from 1995 to 2001—from 50,900 hectares to 169,800 

hectares—despite substantially increased eradication efforts.8

 But in 2002, 

the Office of Aviation estimated that the program eradicated 102,225 

 7

The estimates of net hectares of coca and opium poppy under cultivation are prepared 

annually by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, Crime and Narcotics Center. See U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in 

Colombia, GAO-03-319R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 8, 2003). 

8

The number of hectares eradicated is provided by the Office of Aviation and is based on 

the number of net hectares sprayed multiplied by an estimated “kill rate.” Although many 

thousands of hectares of coca and poppy are killed, coca and poppy farmers often replant 

in the same or other areas, which helps explain why the number of hectares under 

cultivation often does not decline. 

Continued U.S. Support 

Needed to Sustain 

Operations 

Colombia’s Aerial 

Eradication Program 

Has Had Mixed 

Results 

Recent Progress in 

Reducing Net Cultivation 

of Coca and Poppy 
Page 11 GAO-03-820T 

hectares of coca—a record high. In March 2003, the Office of National 

Drug Control Policy reported for the first time since before 1995 a net 

reduction in coca cultivation in Colombia—from 169,800 hectares to 

144,450 hectaresa 15 percent decline. 

Figure 1: Net Hectares of Coca under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated in 

Colombia, 1995-2002 

As shown in figure 2, the net hectares of opium poppy under cultivation 

varied between 6,100 and 6,600 for the period 1995-98 but rose to 7,500 

hectares in 1999 and 2000. In 2001, the net hectares of poppy estimated 

under cultivation declined to 6,500 and, in 2002, further declined to 4,900—

nearly a 35 percent reduction in net cultivation over the past 2 years. 
Page 12 GAO-03-820T 

Figure 2: Net Hectares of Poppy under Cultivation and Hectares Eradicated in 

Colombia, 1995-2002 

U.S. embassy officials attributed the recent unprecedented reductions in 

both coca and poppy cultivation primarily to the current Colombian 

government’s willingness to allow the aerial eradication program to 

operate in all areas of the country. They also noted that 

• the number of spray aircraft had increased from 10 in July 2001 to 17 in 

January 2003; 

• recently acquired spray aircraft can carry up to twice the herbicide as the 

older aircraft; and 

• as of January 2003, aircraft were flying spray missions from three forward 

operating locations—a first for the program. 

The ability to keep an increased number of spray aircraft operating out of 

three bases was made possible, at least in part, because the U.S. embassy 

hired a contractor to work with the Colombian National Police to, among 

other things, help maintain their aircraft. As a result, the availability of 

police aircraft for the spray program increased. Moreover, in August 2002, 

the Colombian government allowed the police to return to a higher 

strength herbicide mixture that, according to embassy officials, improved 

the spray’s effectiveness.9

 These officials project that the aerial eradication 

program can reduce the amount of coca and poppy cultivation to 30,000 

 9

In March 2002, the previous Colombian government reduced the strength of the spray 

mixture because of environmental concerns. 
Page 13 GAO-03-820T 

hectares and 5,000 hectares, respectively, by 2005 or 2006, assuming the 

police continue the current pace and can spray in all areas of Colombia. 

As we reported in 2000,10 beginning in 1998, U.S. embassy officials became 

concerned with the rising U.S. presence in Colombia and the associated 

costs of the aerial eradication program. At the time, the embassy began 

developing a 3-year plan to have the Colombian National Police assume 

increased operational control over the program. But for various reasons, 

the police did not agree to the plan. Since then, contractor involvement 

and the associated costs have continued to rise and the Colombian 

National Police are not yet able to assume more control of the aerial 

eradication program. 

As shown in table 2, in fiscal year 1998, the Office of Aviation reported that 

the direct cost for a U.S. contractor providing aircraft maintenance and 

logistical support and many of the pilots was $37.8 million. In addition, 

NAS provided $10.7 million for fuel, herbicide, and related support, for a 

total of $48.5 million. For fiscal year 2003, the comparable estimates for 

contractor and NAS-provided support were $41.5 million and $44.8 million, 

respectively, for a total of $86.3 million. Most of this increase occurred 

between fiscal years 2002 and 2003 and is for the most part to support the 

additional spray aircraft, multiple operating locations, and the anticipated 

continuation of spray operations throughout Colombia. According to NAS 

and Office of Aviation officials, these costs are expected to remain 

relatively constant for the next several years. 

 10GAO-01-26. 

Colombian National Police 

Have Not Assumed Control 

over Aerial Eradication 

Operations 
Page 14 GAO-03-820T 

Table 2: U.S. Support for the Aerial Eradication Program, Fiscal Years 1998-2004 

Dollars in millions 

Fiscal years 

Cognizant office 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

2003 

(estimated) 

2004 

(proposed) Total

Office of Aviation 

$37.8 $36.8 $52.5a$38.0 $38.2 $41.5 $45.0 $289.8

Narcotics Affairs Section 

10.7 14.1 20.9 11.1 17.6 44.8b

44.2 $163.4

Total $48.5 $50.9 $73.4 $49.1 $55.8 $86.3 $89.2 $453.2

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Office of Aviation. 

a

Includes $20 million for additional spray aircraft. 

b

In addition, NAS paid $38.8 million for a contractor to support the Colombian National Police Aviation 

Service. NAS could not readily identify the proportion of this contract that is related to aerial 

eradication. NAS officials stated that they expect this expenditure to continue for the next 2 years and 

possibly up to 4 years. 

The Colombian National Police do not provide funding per se for the aerial 

eradication program and, therefore, the value of its contributions is more 

difficult to quantify. In recent years, the police have provided helicopters 

and fixed-wing aircraft for spray mission support and the use of many of 

its facilities throughout Colombia. In addition, the police have about 3,600 

personnel assigned to counternarcotics missions and estimate that 84 are 

directly supporting the aerial eradication program. 

To help the Colombian National Police increase its capacity to assume 

more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, NAS has initiated 

several efforts. 

In February and March 2002, the Office of Aviation conducted an Aviation 

Resource Management Survey of the Colombian National Police Aviation 

Service. According to Office of Aviation officials, these surveys are 

intended to provide a stringent on-site assessment of flight operations 

from management and safety to logistics and maintenance. The survey 

team made a number of critical observations. For example, 

• The Aviation Service’s organizational structure, lines of authority, and 

levels of responsibility were not clear. Relying on an overly centralized 

command structure resulted in unnecessary delays and the cancellation of 

some planned aerial eradication missions because the commanding 

general could not be reached. 

U.S. Efforts to Improve 

Police Capacity for Aerial 

Eradication 
Page 15 GAO-03-820T 

• The Aviation Service did not have a formal flying hour program to help 

forecast its budgetary requirements and enhance maintenance scheduling. 

• About 35 percent of the maintenance staff were inexperienced. According 

to the survey team, this could result in improper maintenance procedures 

being performed, which could adversely affect flight safety and endanger 

lives. 

• Management of items needing repair and control of spare parts were 

deficient. The survey team found 230 items awaiting repair—some from 

August 1998—and more than $4 million in UH-1H helicopter blades and 

parts stored outside and unprotected. 

As a result of the survey, in July 2002, a NAS contractor (a $38.8 million, 

1-year contract with options for 4 additional years) began providing 

on-the-job maintenance and logistical training to the Aviation Service and 

helping the police address many of the issues raised by the Aviation 

Resource Management Survey team. Embassy officials noted that a more 

formal flying hour program has improved the availability rates of many of 

the Aviation Service’s aircraft. For example, the availability rate of the 

Aviation Service’s UH-II helicopters—often used to support aerial 

eradication missions—increased from 67 percent in January 2002 to 

87 percent in December 2002. According to these officials, improved 

availability rates made it easier to schedule and conduct spray missions. 

In addition, NAS has begun a program for training pilots to fly T-65 spray 

planes and plans to start training for search and rescue personnel who 

accompany the planes. U.S. officials stated that the contractor presence 

should decline and the police should be able to take over more of the 

eradication program by 2006, when NAS estimates that coca and poppy 

cultivation will be reduced to “maintenance levels”—30,000 hectares and 

5,000 hectares, respectively. 

The U.S.-supported counternarcotics program in Colombia has recently 

begun to achieve some of the results envisioned in 1999-2000. However, 

Colombia and the United States must continue to deal with financial and 

management challenges. 

• Under the original concept of Plan Colombia, the Colombian government 

had pledged $4 billion and called on the international community to 

provide $3.5 billion. Until recently, Colombia had not provided any 

significant new funding for Plan Colombia and, according to U.S. embassy 

Financial and 

Management 

Challenges Continue 

to Complicate Efforts 

to Reduce Illicit Drug 

Activities 
Page 16 GAO-03-820T 

and Colombian government officials, anticipated international assistance 

for Plan Colombia—apart from that provided by the United States—did 

not materialize as envisioned. But because of overall poor economic 

conditions, the government of Colombia’s ability to contribute more is 

limited. 

• The Colombian government has stated that ending the civil conflict is 

central to solving Colombia’s problems—from improving economic 

conditions to stemming illicit drug activities. A peaceful resolution to the 

long-standing insurgency would help stabilize the nation, speed economic 

recovery, help ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the 

authority and control of the Colombian government in the coca-growing 

regions. The continuing violence limits the government’s ability to institute 

economic, social, and political improvements. 

• For U.S. assistance to continue, Colombia faces continuing challenges 

associated with the need to ensure that the army and police comply with 

human rights standards, that the aerial eradication program meets certain 

environmental conditions, and that alternative development is provided in 

areas subject to aerial eradication. 

Overall, neither the Colombian Army nor the Colombian National Police 

can sustain ongoing counternarcotics programs without continued U.S. 

funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future. According to 

U.S. embassy officials, these programs alone may cost up to $230 million 

per year, and future costs for some recently initiated programs have not 

been determined. In addition, we note that this estimate does not include 

future funding needed for other U.S. programs in Colombia, including 

other aerial and ground interdiction efforts; the police Aviation Service’s 

U.S.-funded contractor; and alternative development, judicial sector 

reform, and internally displaced persons programs. 

In recent years, world events—from the global war on terrorism to the 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—have diverted scarce U.S. resources and 

made it paramount that the United States fully consider the resources 

committed to its overseas assistance programs. As we noted in 2000, the 

total costs of the counternarcotics programs in Colombia were unknown. 

Nearly 3 years later, the Departments of State and Defense have still not 

developed estimates of future program costs, defined their future roles in 

Colombia, identified a proposed end state, or determined how they plan to 

achieve it. 
Page 17 GAO-03-820T 

In conducting our work, we reviewed pertinent planning, implementation, 

and related documentation and met with cognizant U.S. officials at the 

Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Southern 

Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, 

Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military, police, and 

government officials and visited the Colombian Army bases at Larandia, 

Tolemaida, and Tres Esquinas and other sites in the primary coca-growing 

regions of Colombia. In addition, we observed a Colombian Army 

counternarcotics brigade airlift operation and several aerial eradication 

missions. 

We also discussed this testimony with cognizant officials from State’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and its 

Office of Aviation and State’s Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs. 

They generally concurred with our treatment of the issues presented. 

We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 

prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford at (202) 

512-4268 or Albert H. Huntington, III, at (202) 512-4140. Individuals making 

key contributions to this testimony included Jocelyn Cortese, Allen 

Fleener, Ronald Hughes, Jose Pena, George Taylor, Kaya Taylor, and Janey 

Cohen. Rick Barrett and Ernie Jackson provided technical assistance. 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320142) 
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