Unless otherwise indicated, all facts are taken from 1

Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Second Motion

for Summary Judgment. (Doc. no. 56.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM McKNIGHT, : CIVIL ACTION

: No. 05-4566

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

BUCKS COUNTY DEP’T OF :

CORRS., et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. OCTOBER 29, 2008

Defendants, Bucks County Department of Corrections

(“Bucks County Corrections”) and several Bucks County Corrections

officers file this motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(b). (Doc. no. 54.) For the reasons that follow, summary

judgment will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND1

A. Facts

On August 31, 2005, Plaintiff William McKnight filed a

complaint alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 that occurred while he was an inmate at Bucks County

Correctional Facility in Doylestown, Pennsylvania (“Bucks County

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 1 of 19
Plaintiff’s complaint does not name a specific 2

Defendant responsible for his lack of proper dental treatment. 

The Court treats Bucks County Corrections as the named Defendant

for this alleged adverse action.

Plaintiff’s complaint does not name a specific 3

Defendant responsible for these urinalysis tests. The Court

treats Bucks County Corrections as the named Defendant for this

alleged adverse action.

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Prison”). (Doc. no. 3.) Plaintiff’s overarching claim is that

Defendants, individually and in concert, engaged in a pattern of

conduct to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising his

constitutionally protected right to petition the government for

redress in connection with Defendants’ failure to accomodate his

dietary restrictions. Plaintiff alleges that the retaliation

took four forms: (1) the seizure and destruction of his court

papers; (2) lack of proper dental treatment; (3) unwarranted 2

confinement to Bucks County Prison’s Restricted Housing Unit

(“RHU”); and (4) two intrusive urinalysis tests that were

designed to harass and antagonize Plaintiff.3

B. Procedural History

On November 2, 2005, Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or, in the alternative, for an order requiring Plaintiff

to file a more definite statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(e). (Doc. no. 12.) On December 8, 2005, the Court denied the

motion. The same day, the Court ordered Defendants to take

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 2 of 19
Plaintiff was also afforded the opportunity to obtain 4

additional discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) 

(doc. no. 57), but he sought none.

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Plaintiff’s deposition and file a motion for summary judgment.

On April 6, 2006, Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. no. 35.) However, because Plaintiff was

involved in an ongoing criminal trial, the Court placed the

matter in civil suspense on May 3, 2006. 

The case was removed from civil suspense and returned

to active status on August 23, 2007. The Court granted

Defendants additional time to depose witnesses newly-identified

in Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file supplemental pleadings,

which sought to add additional defendants to the complaint.4

(Doc. no. 43.) As a result, the Court denied Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment, without prejudice. (Doc. no. 45.) The

Court then granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint

(doc. no. 50), but Plaintiff has not done so. Thereafter,

Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. It is

this motion for summary judgment that is before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 3 of 19
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that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if its existence or

non-existence would affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986). An issue of fact is “genuine” when there is

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in

favor of the non-moving party regarding the existence of that

fact. Id. at 248-49. “In considering the evidence, the court

should draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.” 

El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). 

“Although the initial burden is on the summary judgment

movant to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,

‘the burden on the moving party may be discharged by showing-that

is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case’ when the

nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof.” Conoshenti

v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004)

(quoting Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2

(3d Cir. 2001)). Once the moving party has thus discharged its

burden, the nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations

or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must--by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56]--set out

specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e)(2).

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 4 of 19
“Every person who, under color of any statute, 5

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or

Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

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B. Section 1983

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code

provides a cause of action for an individual whose constitutional

or federal rights are violated by those acting under color of

state law. See generally Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 5

273, 284-85 (2002) (recognizing that Section 1983 provides a

remedy for violations of individual rights “secured by the

Constitution and laws” of the United States). Defendants concede

that they were acting under color of state law during the events

giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint. The only remaining

question is whether Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff in

violation of the Constitution or federal law.

C. Retaliation

In order to prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff 

must prove the following elements: (1) the conduct which led to 

the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) he 

suffered some adverse action at the hands of prison officials, 

one sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 5 of 19
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exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) a causal link 

between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse 

action against him. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 

2001). The Third Circuit has incorporated the burden-shifting

framework first set forth in Mount Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), in the prison context. Accordingly, to

show a causal link, the prisoner plaintiff bears “the initial

burden of proving that his constitutionally protected conduct was

‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision to

discipline him. Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (quoting Mount Healthy,

429 U.S. at 287). If he does so, the “burden then shift[s] to

the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it

would have taken the same disciplinary action even in the absence

of the protected activity.” Id.

Here, Defendants do not contest that prisoners have a

constitutionally protected right to petition the government for

the redress of grievances. Thus, Plaintiff survives the first

element of his retaliation claim. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539

U.S. 126, 137 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987)). However, Defendants do contest

Plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the second and third element of

his retaliation claim. The individual Defendants’ liability

under § 1983 will be addressed ad seriatim.

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 6 of 19
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III. DISCUSSION

A. Bucks County Corrections

Plaintiff premises his § 1983 claim against Bucks

County Corrections on the basis of respondeat superior. While

local governments are “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983,

liability is limited to constitutional violations that occurred

as a result of a government’s policy or custom. Langford v. City

of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978)). The Supreme Court has also foreclosed the

ability to hold a local government liable under § 1983 solely on

the basis of respondeat superior. Langford, 235 F.3d at 847

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). Here, Plaintiff fails to

provide evidence, or even allege, that the actions against

Plaintiff occurred as a result of Defendant Bucks County

Corrections’ policy or custom. Under these circumstances,

Defendant Bucks County Corrections’ motion for summary judgment

will be granted.

B. Willis Morton

Plaintiff premises his § 1983 claim against Willis

Morton, Warden of Bucks County Prison, under a supervisory

liability theory. A supervisor can be held liable if he or she:

(1) participated in violating Plaintiff’s rights; (2) directed

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 7 of 19
For the first time in his memorandum in opposition to 6

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 56), Plaintiff

has “tentatively identified” John Doe as “Sergeant Lorenzo.” 

Pl.’s Mem. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2 n.1 (doc. no. 56). For

the purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the

Court will accept Plaintiff’s substitution of John Doe for

Sergeant Lorenzo.

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others to violate them; or (3) as the person in charge, had

knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations. 

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Ctr.,

372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50

F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Plaintiff’s only allegation is that his multiple

requests to Defendant Morton for the return of his court papers

were not successful. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 21 (doc. no. 3). Plaintiff

fails to provide evidence, or even allege, that Defendant Morton

participated in the disappearance of his court papers, directed

others to take them or that Defendant Morton had knowledge of or

acquiesced to the taking of Plaintiff’s court papers. Under

these circumstances, Defendant Morton’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted.

C. Sergeant Lorenzo6

Plaintiff premises his § 1983 claim against Sergeant

Lorenzo, a corrections officer at Bucks County Prison, on the

basis of retaliation. Plaintiff claims that he was “confronted

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 8 of 19
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by [D]efendant [Sergeant Lorenzo on one occasion] in connection

with a complaint he submitted to [Defendant] Morton about his

ongoing dietary concerns.” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 25 (doc. no. 3).

Allegations of verbal abuse or harassment are generally

not actionable under § 1983. S.M. v. Lakeland Sch. Dist., 148 F.

Supp 2d 542, 551 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Maclean v. Secor, 876 F.Supp.

695, 698-99 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see also Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero,

830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (reasoning allegation of

vulgarity did not state constitutional claim); Collins v. Cundy,

603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding allegations that

sheriff laughed at prisoner and threatened to hang him did not

state claim for constitutional violation). However, Plaintiff

may obtain relief under § 1983 if the verbal threats are

accompanied by a reinforcing act. Northington v. Jackson, 973

F.2d 1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding an actionable claim

when guard put revolver to inmates head and threatened to shoot);

Douglas v. Marino, 684 F.Supp. 395, 398 (D. N.J. 1988) (stating

claim where prison employee threatened inmate with knife).

Here, the Court does not find that the single and brief

confrontation with Sergeant Lorenzo alleged by Plaintiff rises to

the level of an adverse action sufficient to deter a person of

ordinary firmness from petitioning the government for the redress

of grievances. Plaintiff admits that he was never physically

threatened nor did he ever suffer physical harm at Bucks County

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 9 of 19
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Corrections. Ex. 2, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no. 54); Pl.’s

Dep. 33:14-24, 34:1-9. Under these circumstances, Defendant

Sergeant Lorenzo’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.

D. Defendant Budd

Plaintiff premises his first § 1983 claim against

Defendant Budd, Deputy Warden of Bucks County Prison, under a

supervisory liability theory. Plaintiff’s only allegation is

that his multiple requests to Defendant Budd for the return of

his court papers were not successful. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 21 (doc.

no. 3). Plaintiff fails to provide evidence, or even allege,

that Defendant Budd participated in the disappearance of his

court papers, directed others to take them or that Defendant Budd

had knowledge of or acquiesced to the taking of Plaintiff’s court

papers. Under these circumstances, Defendant Budd’s motion for

summary judgment as to this claim will be granted.

Plaintiff premises his second § 1983 claim against

Defendant Budd on the basis of retaliation. According to

Plaintiff, he was summoned to Defendant Budd’s office as a result

of his involvement with other inmates in a complaint against a

corrections case manager. While in Defendant Budd’s office,

Plaintiff claims Defendant Budd “implicitly warned” him against

initiating any further complaints about the issues and events

that were taking place at Bucks County Prison. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 31

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 10 of 19
Defendant Gauntt denies Plaintiff’s allegation. Defs.’ 7

Ans. ¶ 20 (doc. no. 20). He also renounces knowledge of the

existence of Plaintiff’s legal documents. Ex. 9, Defs.’ Mot.

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(doc. no. 3). Verbal abuse or harassment is actionable under §

1983 if conducted in retaliation. Bieros v. Nicola, 860 F.Supp.

226, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Prisoners’ Legal Ass’n v.

Roberson, 822 F.Supp. 185, 189 (D. N.J. 1993); Murray v.

Woodburn, 809 F.Supp. 383, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Hodgin v. Agents

of Montgomery County, 619 F.Supp. 1550, 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1985);

Ricketts v. Derello, 574 F.Supp. 645, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1983)). In

this case, however, even assuming the truth of the averments and

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the

Court finds that the single and brief incident of “implied”

future retaliation does not rise to the level of an adverse

action. A.M ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586 (stating elements

for supervisory liability). Under these circumstances, Defendant

Budd’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim will be

granted.

E. Defendant Gauntt

Plaintiff premises his first § 1983 claim against

Defendant Gauntt, a corrections officer at Bucks County Prison,

on the basis that he was denied access to his legal documents in

retaliation for submitting complaints about his dietary

concerns. However, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that 7

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 11 of 19
Summ. J. (doc. no. 54).

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Defendant Gauntt had knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior complaints

about his dietary concerns to the authorities. Even assuming the

truth of the averments and drawing all reasonable inferences in

favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to make

a claim for retaliation absent evidence that Defendant Gauntt had

knowledge of Plaintiff’s complaints. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333

(requiring a causal link to prevail in a retaliation claim). 

Under these circumstances, Defendant Gauntt’s motion for summary

judgment as to this claim will be granted.

Plaintiff premises his second § 1983 claim against

Defendant Gauntt on the theory that he was denied access to the

courts in retaliation for submitting complaints about his dietary

concerns. According to Plaintiff, his legal folder, which was

allegedly discarded by Defendant Gauntt, contained statements

made by other individuals for use in this litigation, which would

be impossible to recreate. Ex. 2, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no.

54); Pl.’s Dep. 25:19-22, 27:7-11.

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the

courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The Supreme

Court in Bounds held that the right of access to the courts

includes assistance in preparing and filing meaningful legal

papers and providing inmates with adequate law libraries or

adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. Id. at 828. 

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 12 of 19
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There is also a requirement that an inmate alleging a Bounds

violation must suffer an “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (holding that a claimant “must demonstrate

that the alleged” deprivation of legal documents “hindered his

efforts to pursue a legal claim”); Zillich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d

694, 695 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding a due process violation where an

inmate was denied access to his legal documents).

Relief for an unconstitutional violation of the right

of access to the courts can be sought in one of two ways. First,

[P]laintiff can allege “loss or inadequate settlement of a

meritorious case, . . . the loss of an opportunity to sue, . . .

or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of

relief.” Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law and

Public Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir.

2005) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414 (2002)). 

Second, Plaintiff can assert that the conduct resulted in

litigation “end[ing] poorly, or could not have commenced, or

could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable.” Gibson,

411 F.3d at 441 (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415). 

“Therefore, ‘the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated

or lost, is an element that must be described in the Complaint,

just as much as allegations must describe the official acts

frustrating the litigation. It follows, too, that when the

access claim [like this one] looks backward, the Complaint must

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 13 of 19
The proper spelling is Roque, not Roovre as set forth 8

in Plaintiff’s complaint (doc. no. 3).

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identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not

otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought.” Id.

at 442.

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that his

inability to recreate the legal folder led to the loss of a claim

or remedy necessary to seek relief. To the contrary, Plaintiff

admits that he was allowed to file a complaint in the instant

case. Ex. 2, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no. 54); Pl.’s Dep.

47:5-10. He admits that he had regular access to the law library

at Bucks County Prison. Id. at 51:10-18. He also does not

contest the adequacy of the law library at Bucks County Prison

nor his ability to obtain assistance from persons trained in the

law. In fact, Plaintiff’s typical day at Bucks County Prison

included an hour and a half to two hours in the law library. Id.

at 13:20-22. Under these circumstances, Defendant Gauntt’s

motion for summary judgment as to this claim of retaliation will

be granted.

F. Defendants Roque and Martin

Plaintiff premises his § 1983 claim against Defendants

Roque and Martin, corrections officers at the Bucks County 8

Prison, on the basis of retaliation for submitting complaints

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 14 of 19
It is not clear how much time Plaintiff spent in RHU. 9

Based on Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, he was only sentenced

to 10 days in RHU. Ex. 2, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no. 54);

Pl.’s Dep. 32:12-21.

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about his dietary concerns. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Roque and Martin “manipulated” former Defendant

Ulysses Moore (“Moore”), an inmate at Bucks County Prison, into

providing false statements about Plaintiff at a disciplinary

hearing. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 26 (doc. no. 3). The disciplinary

hearing was held on May 23, 2004, and relates to an alleged

assault upon Moore in the kitchen. Ex. 5, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

(doc. no. 54). Defendant Roque saw the alleged assault. Id. 

Defendant Martin was the hearing officer at the disciplinary

hearing.

Plaintiff was called at the disciplinary hearing where

he explained that he thought the misconduct report was

retaliatory because of prior complaints about his dietary

concerns. Ex. 2, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no. 54); Pl.’s Dep.

30:1-10. After Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell, Moore

testified that he was hit with a tray that Plaintiff threw

through the tray slot. Ex. 6, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no.

54); Id. at Ex. 2; Pl.’s Dep. 30:10-19. According to Plaintiff’s

complaint, he was not permitted to be present during Moore’s

testimony. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 28 (doc. no. 3). At the conclusion of

the hearing, Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 days in RHU.9

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 15 of 19
Plaintiff cites Moore’s answers to interrogatories to 10

support his retaliation claim against Defendants Roque and

Martin. Moore’s statements are as follows:

[Question #1:] Did you testify at an institutional

misconduct hearing that plaintiff assaulted you with a

meal tray?

Answer: I did not testify at any disciplinary hearing

that I was assaulted by Mr. McKnight.

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An inmate can state a claim for violation of his

constitutional rights where he was falsely accused in retaliation

for the exercise of a constitutional right. Smith v. Mensinger,

293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002); Flanagan v. Shively, 783

F.Supp. 922, 931-32 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993). The Third Circuit has

even recognized that placement in RHU is an adverse action

sufficient to deter someone of ordinary firmness from exercising

his First Amendment rights. Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 653 (citing

Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). 

Here, there is no evidence that either Defendants Roque

or Martin were aware of Plaintiff’s prior complaints. Absent

such evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to

demonstrate that his confinement to RHU was in retaliation for

submitting complaints about his dietary concerns rather than for

assault. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333 (requiring a causal link to

prevail in a retaliation claim). Nor has Plaintiff provided

evidence that Moore was “manipulated” into making false

statements about him at the disciplinary hearing. Under these 10

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 16 of 19
[Question #2:] Did you see plaintiff assault you with a

meal tray?

Answer: No, I did not.

Ex. B, Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (doc. no. 56). 

Notwithstanding Moore’s statement, Defendant Roque saw Plaintiff

assault Moore. Moore does not deny that an assault occurred; he

merely stated that he did not “see” Plaintiff assault him. 

Defendant Roque filed a misconduct report against Plaintiff

because he witnessed an assault. Moreover, even if Moore did not

testify against Plaintiff at the disciplinary hearing, there is

no evidence that manipulation by Defendants Roque or Martin

occurred.

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circumstances, Defendants Roque’s and Martin’s motion for summary

judgment as to this claim will be granted.

Plaintiff premises his second § 1983 claim against

Defendant Martin on the basis that he was denied due process in

retaliation for submitting complaints about his dietary concerns. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Martin did not

permit him to be present during Moore’s testimony at his

disciplinary hearing.

When an inmate is subject to discipline, he is afforded

constitutional protections if the alleged discipline imposes an

“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In essence, Plaintiff claims he was denied

an opportunity to confront or cross-examine Moore. Even if the

Court were to assume that confinement to RHU for 30 days is an

“atypical and significant hardship” within the scope of Sandin,

an inmate does not have a constitutional right to confrontation

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 17 of 19
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and cross-examination. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 540-41

(1974). Under these circumstances, Defendant Martin’s motion for

summary judgment as to this claim will be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion for summary

judgment will be granted. An appropriate order follows.

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 18 of 19
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILLIAM McKNIGHT, : CIVIL ACTION

: No. 05-4566

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

BUCKS COUNTY DEP’T OF :

CORR., et al., :

:

Defendants. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 29th day of October 2008, it is hereby

ORDERED that, for the reasons stated in the accompanying

memorandum, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 54)

is GRANTED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

 S/Eduardo C. Robreno 

 EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

Case 2:05-cv-04566-ER Document 58 Filed 10/30/08 Page 19 of 19