Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Friday, July 18, 2003 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Observations on 

Post-Conflict Assistance 

in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan 

Statement of Susan S. Westin, Managing Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-03-980T 
Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistanas well as in Iraqis part of a broader, long-term assistance 

effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and 

democracy-building measures. While the post-conflict situations in these 

countries have varied, they have certain conditions in commonmost 

notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance 

operations take place. 

During years of work on post-conflict situations, GAO found that three key 

components are needed for effective implementation of assistance efforts: 

• a secure environment where humanitarian and other civilian workers are 

able to perform their tasks; 

• a strategic vision that looks beyond the immediate situation and plans 

for ongoing efforts; and 

• strong leadership with the authority to direct assistance operations. 

GAO also observed a number of challenges to implementing assistance 

operations, including the need for sustained political and financial 

commitment, adequate resources, coordinated assistance efforts, and 

support of the host government and civil society. 

Finally, GAO found that the international community and the United States 

provide a number of mechanisms for accountability in and oversight of 

assistance operations. 

World Food Program Assistance in Afghanistan 

The circumstances of armed 

conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan differed in many 

respects, but in all three cases the 

United States and the international 

community became involved in the 

wars and post-conflict assistance 

because of important national and 

international interests. Over the 

past 10 years, GAO has done 

extensive work assessing postconflict assistance in Bosnia and 

Kosovo and, more recently, has 

evaluated such assistance to 

Afghanistan. GAO was asked to 

provide observations on assistance 

efforts in these countries that may 

be applicable to ongoing assistance 

in Iraq. Specifically, GAO assessed 

(1) the nature and extent of postconflict assistance in Bosnia, 

Kosovo, and Afghanistan; (2) 

essential components for carrying 

out assistance effectively; (3) 

challenges to implementation; and 

(4) mechanisms used for 

accountability and oversight. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-980T. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Susan Westin 

at (202) 512-4128 or westins@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-980T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, House Committee 

on Government Reform 

July 18, 2003 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

Observations on Post-Conflict 

Assistance in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan 
Page 1 GAO-03-980T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s observations on assistance 

efforts that followed military conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. 

Although circumstances differed in many respects, in all three cases the 

United States and the international community became involved in the 

military conflicts and post-conflict assistance efforts in pursuit of 

important national and international interests, such as the need to prevent 

conflict in the Balkans from destabilizing Europe or to combat terrorists 

and their supporters in Afghanistan. 

My comments today will cover observations on (1) the nature and extent 

of post-conflict assistance in these three locations; (2) the essential 

components for carrying out assistance effectively; (3) challenges to 

implementation; and (4) mechanisms used for accountability and 

oversight. My testimony is based primarily on GAO reports over the past 

10 years on post-conflict assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent 

report on post-conflict food aid and agricultural assistance to Afghanistan.1

(See app. I.) These comments should provide useful context in the 

subcommittee’s oversight of post-conflict assistance to Iraq. 

Summary 

Humanitarian assistance following armed conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 

Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, is part of a broader, long-term assistance 

effort comprising humanitarian, military, economic, governance, and 

democracy-building measures. The post-conflict situations in these 

locations have varied, but they have certain conditions in commonmost 

notably the volatile and highly politicized environment in which assistance 

operations take place. We found that a secure environment, a strategic 

vision, and strong leadership are the key components needed for effective 

implementation of assistance efforts. In addition, we observed a number of 

challenges to these efforts, including the need for sustained political 

commitment, adequate human and financial resources to carry out 

operations, coordinated assistance, and the support of the host 

government and civil society. Our work also showed that the international 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and 

Obstacles to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability, GAO-03-607

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003). 
Page 2 GAO-03-980T 

community and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for 

accountability and oversight with regard to assistance operations. 

In Bosnia, conflict raged from 1992 through 1995 and involved the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups. 

All were fighting for control of specific territories tied to each group’s 

definition of its own state. During this time an estimated 2.3 million people 

became refugees or were internally displaced. NATO forces intervened in 

the conflict to support international humanitarian and peacekeeping 

operations beginning in 1993, culminating in a month-long bombing 

campaign against Bosnian-Serb forces in July 1995. This pressure and U.S.-

led negotiating efforts resulted in a cease-fire and negotiation of the 

Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. About 54,000 NATO-led 

troops were deployed beginning in late 1995 to enforce the military 

aspects of the agreement and provide security for humanitarian and other 

assistance activities. Currently, about 12,000 international troops remain in 

Bosnia to provide security, including 1,800 U.S. soldiers. 

The conflict in and around the Serbian province of Kosovo between 

Yugoslav security forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents fighting for 

Kosovo’s independence took place from early 1998 through mid-1999. 

NATO initiated a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999 to 

end Yugoslav aggression and subsequently deployed about 50,000 troops 

to enforce compliance with cease-fire and withdrawal agreements. 

Currently, there are about 25,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops in 

Kosovo, including about 2,500 U.S. soldiers. 

The conflict in Afghanistan extends back to the Soviet Union’s 10-year 

occupation of the country that began in 1979, during which various 

countries, including the United States, backed Afghan resistance efforts. 

Three years after Soviet forces withdrew, the communist regime fell to the 

Afghan resistancebut unrest continued. The Taliban movement emerged 

in the mid 1990s, but was removed by coalition forces in late 2001 for 

harboring al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States on 

September 11. In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement was signed, which 

provided for interim governance of the country. Currently, about 4,600 

International Security Assistance Force troops provide security for the city 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-03-980T 

of Kabul and the surrounding area and approximately 11,000 U.S.-led 

coalition forces continue to fight remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.2

GAO’s work over the past 10 years on Bosnia and Kosovo, and our recent 

work on Afghanistan, indicate that post-conflict assistance is a broad, 

long-term effort that requires humanitarian, security, economic, 

governance, and democracy-building measures. For Bosnia and Kosovo, 

forces led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided overall 

security, and the international community developed country-specific and 

regional frameworks for rebuilding the country and province, respectively. 

Bosnia’s plan included the 3- to 4-year, $5.1 billion Priority Reconstruction 

Program, which provided humanitarian, economic, and other assistance 

based on needs assessments conducted by the World Bank and other 

international organizations.3

 A number of international organizations 

involved in the Bosnia peace operation, including the Office of the High 

Representative, the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, helped develop government institutions and 

supported democracy-building measures and police training. In Kosovo, a 

U.N. peace operation oversaw assistance through (1) the United Nations 

and other donors for housing winterization, refugee relief, and other shortterm needs; (2) the medium-term Reconstruction and Recovery Program 

devised by the European Commission and the World Bank; and (3) 

programs to build a judiciary, a police force, and government institutions. 

The Bosnia- and Kosovo-specific programs were complemented in 1999 by 

the Stability Pact, which focused on encouraging democratization, human 

rights, economic reconstruction, and security throughout the region. 

For Afghanistan, the World Food Program’s (WFP) food assistance effort 

constituted the largest portion of humanitarian assistance in the postconflict period. To determine the needs of the Afghan people, WFP 

conducted and continues to undertake periodic rapid food needs 

assessments and longer-term food and crop supply assessments. Based on 

 2

NATO has agreed to lead the International Security Assistance Force beginning in August 

2003. 

3

The Priority Reconstruction Program: From Emergency to Sustainability, prepared by 

the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 

the Central Europe Department of the World Bank for the Donor Information Meeting, vols. 

1, 2, and 3 (November 1996), and Implementation of the Priority Reconstruction Program 

in 1996, prepared by the European Commission and the Central Europe Department of the 

World Bank (March 1997).

Nature and Extent of 

Post-Conflict 

Assistance 
Page 4 GAO-03-980T 

the results of these reviews, WFP designs short-term emergency 

operations focusing on free distribution of food, as well as longer-term 

recovery operations including health, education, training, and 

infrastructure projects. Owing to the size of WFP’s effort and its years of 

experience in Afghanistan, WFP provided much of the logistics support for 

other organizations operating in Afghanistan during 2002 and 2003. A 

range of humanitarian and longer-term development assistance is being 

provided through broad assistance programs developed by the United 

Nations and other multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental 

organizations. These programs include infrastructure rehabilitation, 

education, health, agriculture, and governance projects, among others. 

Post-conflict assistance efforts differ in the extent of multilateral 

involvement. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization is responsible for enforcing the military and security aspects 

of peace operations under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 

1031 and 1244, respectively. The United Nations, the European Union, and 

other international organizations are responsible for rebuilding political 

and civic institutions and the region’s economies under U.N. resolutions 

and the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Afghanistan, the United States is one 

of many bilateral and multilateral donors of aid helping to implement the 

Bonn Agreement. In contrast, in post-conflict Iraq, the United States and 

Britain are occupying powers under international law and are recognized 

as such in U.N. Security Resolution 1483. The obligations of occupying 

forces as enumerated in international conventions include respecting the 

human rights of the local population; ensuring public order, safety, and 

health; protecting property; and facilitating humanitarian relief operations, 

among others.4

While the post-conflict situation in each location has varied, certain 

similarities are apparent, chief among them that assistance efforts 

continue to be provided in volatile and highly politicized environments 

where local parties have competing interests and differing degrees of 

support for the peace process. In Bosnia, the Bosnian Serb parties 

continue to oppose terms of the peace agreement, such as the freedom of 

ethnic minority refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their 

prewar homes. In Kosovo, groups of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs retain 

unauthorized weapons and commit acts of violence and intimidation 

 4

The obligations of an occupying force, as specified in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 

the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Page 5 GAO-03-980T 

against ethnic minorities in violation of the peace agreements. In 

Afghanistan, warlords control much of the country and foster an 

illegitimate economy fueled by the smuggling of arms, drugs, and other 

goods. They also withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in customs 

duties collected at border points in the regions they control, depriving the 

central government of revenue to fund the country’s reconstruction. 

Our work has consistently shown that effective reconstruction assistance 

cannot be provided without three essential elements: a secure 

environment, a strategic vision for the overall effort, and strong 

leadership. 

In Bosnia and Kosovo, humanitarian and other civilian workers were 

generally able to perform their tasks because they were supported by large 

NATO-led forces. In Bosnia, the NATO-led forces enforced the cease-fire, 

ensured the separation and progressive reduction of the three ethnically 

based armies from more than 400,000 soldiers and militia to 20,000 by 

2003, and disbanded paramilitary police units. In Kosovo, the NATO-led 

force provided security by (1) ensuring that uniformed Yugoslav security 

forces withdrew from Kosovo as scheduled and remained outside the 

province and (2) monitoring the demilitarization and transformation of the 

Kosovo Liberation Army. Despite the relative security in these two 

locations, various paramilitaries continued to operate, and sporadic 

violent incidents occurred against international workers and the local 

population. From 1996 through 2002, eight humanitarian workers were 

killed in Bosnia and from 1999 to 2002, two humanitarian workers were 

killed in Kosovo as a result of hostile action. 

In contrast, throughout the post-conflict period in Afghanistan, 

humanitarian assistance workers have been at risk due to ongoing security 

problems caused by domestic terrorism, long-standing rivalries among 

warlords, and the national government’s lack of control over the majority 

of the country. The 4,600-troop International Security Assistance Force 

operates only in Kabul and surrounding areas, while the mission of the 

approximately 11,000-troop (9,000 U.S. and 2,000 non-U.S. troops), U.S.-led 

coalition force is to root out the remnants of the Taliban and terrorist 

groupsnot to provide security. In 2002 and 2003, the deteriorating 

security situation has been marked by terrorist attacks against the Afghan 

government, the Afghan people, and the international 

communityincluding humanitarian assistance workers. Among the 

incidents were attempted assassinations of the Minister of Defense and the 

Essential Components 

for Effective PostConflict Assistance 

Secure Environment 
Page 6 GAO-03-980T 

President; rocket attacks on U.S. and international military installations; 

and bombings in the center of Kabul, at International Security Assistance 

Force headquarters, and at U.N. compounds. On June 17, 2003, the U.N. 

Security Council expressed its concern over the increased number of 

attacks against humanitarian personnel, coalition forces, International 

Security Assistance Forces, and Afghan Transitional Administration 

targets by Taliban and other rebel elements. These incidents have 

disrupted humanitarian assistance and the overall recovery effort. Since 

the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, four assistance 

workers and 10 International Security Assistance Force troops were killed 

due to hostile action. 

In our years of work on post-conflict situations, a key lesson learned is 

that a strategic vision is essential for providing assistance effectively. In 

Bosnia, the Dayton Agreement provided a framework for overall 

assistance efforts, but lacked an overall vision for the operation. This 

hindered both the military and civilian components of the peace operation 

from implementing the peace agreement. For example, the Dayton 

Agreement determined that the military operation in Bosnia would 

accomplish its security objectives and withdraw in about 1 year but did 

not address the security problem for the ongoing reconstruction efforts 

after that time. Recognizing this deficiency, NATO, supported by the 

President of the United States, subsequently provided an overall vision for 

the mission by first extending the time frame by 18 months and then tying 

the withdrawal of the NATO-led forces to benchmarkssuch as 

establishing functional national institutions and implementing democratic 

reforms. 

In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement sets out a framework for establishing 

a new government. In addition, multilateral, bilateral, and 

nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance and 

longer-term development assistance have each developed independent 

strategies, which have resulted in a highly fragmented reconstruction 

effort. To bring coherence to the effort, the Afghan government developed 

a National Development Framework and Budget. The framework ’provides 

a vision for a reconstructed Afghanistan and broadly establishes national 

goals and policy directions. The budget articulates development projects 

intended to achieve national goals. However, despite the development of 

these documents, donor governments and assistance agencies have 

continued to develop their own strategies, as well as fund and implement 

projects outside the Afghan government’s national budget. 

Strategic Vision 
Page 7 GAO-03-980T 

Our work also highlights the need for strong leadership in post-conflict 

assistance. In Bosnia, for example, the international community created 

the Office of the High Representative to assist the parties in implementing 

the Dayton Agreement and coordinate international assistance efforts, but 

initially limited the High Representative to an advisory role. Frustrated by 

the slow pace of the agreement’s implementation, the international 

community later strengthened the High Representative’s authority, which 

allowed him to annul laws that impeded the peace process and to remove 

Bosnian officials who were hindering progress. 

In Afghanistan, WFP recognized the need for strong leadership and 

created the position of Special Envoy of the Executive Director for the 

Afghan Region. The special envoy led and directed all WFP operations in 

Afghanistan and neighboring countries during the winter of 2001–2002, 

when the combination of weather and conflict was expected to increase 

the need for food assistance. WFP was thus able to consolidate control of 

all resources in the region, streamline its operations, and accelerate 

movement of assistance.5

 WFP points to creation of the special envoy as 

one of the main reasons it was able to move record amounts of food into 

Afghanistan from November 2001 through January 2002. In December 2001 

alone, WFP delivered 116,000 metric tons of food, the single largest 

monthly food delivery within a complex emergency operation in WFP’s 

history. 

Among the challenges to implementing post-conflict assistance operations 

that we have identified are ensuring sustained political and financial 

commitment, adequate human resources and funds to carry out 

operations, coordinated assistance efforts, and local support. 

Ensuring sustained political and financial commitment for post-conflict 

assistance efforts is a key challenge because these efforts take longer, are 

more complicated, and are more expensive than envisioned. In Bosnia, 

reconstruction continues after 8 years, and there is no end date for 

withdrawing international troops, despite the initial intent to withdraw 

them in 1 year. Corruption is difficult to overcome and threatens 

successful implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. In Kosovo, 

 5

The special envoy’s term ran from November 2001 to May 2002. A second envoy was not 

appointed. 

Strong Leadership 

Challenges to 

Implementing 

Assistance Operations 

Sustained Political and 

Financial Commitment 
Page 8 GAO-03-980T 

after 4 years, there is still no agreement on the final status of the 

territory—whether it will be a relatively autonomous province of Serbia or 

a sovereign entity. This makes it impossible to establish a time frame for a 

transition in assistance efforts. Moreover, providing this assistance costs 

more than anticipated. Total U.S. military, civilian, humanitarian, and 

reconstruction assistance in Bosnia and Kosovo from 1996 through 2002 

was approximately $19.7 billiona figure that significantly exceeded 

initial expectations. 

In Afghanistan, the preliminary needs assessment prepared by the 

international community estimated that between $11.4 billion and $18.1 

billion in long-term development assistance would be needed over 10 

years to rebuild infrastructure and the institutions of a stable Afghan state. 

Others have estimated that much more is required. For January 2002 

through March 2003, donors pledged $2.1 billion. However, only 27 

percent, or $499 million, was spent on major development projects such as 

roads and bridges; the remainder was spent on humanitarian assistance. 

Consequently, more than a year and a half of the 10-year reconstruction 

period has passed and little in the way of reconstruction has begun. For 

fiscal year 2002, U.S. assistance in Afghanistan totaled approximately $717 

million. The Department of Defense estimates that military costs in 

Afghanistan are currently about $900 million per month, or $10.8 billion 

annually. 

Another challenge to effectively implementing assistance efforts is 

ensuring sufficient personnel to carry out operations and follow-through 

on pledged funds. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community has 

had difficulties providing civilian staff and the specialized police for 

security in the volatile post-conflict environment. For example, operations 

in Bosnia had a 40 percent shortfall in multinational special police trained 

to deal with civil disturbances from returns of refugees or from efforts to 

install elected officials. These shortfalls sometimes threatened security in 

potentially violent situations. In Kosovo, U.N. efforts to establish a civil 

administration, create municipal administrative structures, and foster 

democracy were hindered by the lack of qualified international 

administrators and staff. Delays in getting these staff on the ground and 

working allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to temporarily run 

government institutions in an autocratic manner and made it difficult to 

regain international control. 

In Afghanistan, inadequate and untimely donor support disrupted WFP’s 

food assistance efforts. When the operation began in April 2002, WFP had 

Shortfalls in Providing 

Resources 
Page 9 GAO-03-980T 

received only $63.9 million, or 22 percent, of required resources. From 

April through June—the preharvest period when Afghan food supplies are 

traditionally at their lowest point—WFP was able to meet only 51 percent 

of the planned requirement for assistance. WFP’s actual deliveries were, 

on average, 33 percent below actual requirements for the April 2002 

through January 2003 period. Lack of timely donor contributions forced 

WFP to reduce rations to returning refugees and internally displaced 

persons from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms.6

 Lack of donor support also 

forced WFP and its implementing partners to delay, in some cases for up 

to 10 weeks, compensation promised to Afghans who participated in the 

food-for-work and food-for-asset-creation projects. WFP lost credibility 

with Afghans and nongovernmental organizations as a result. Similarly, 

resource shortages forced WFP to delay for up to 8 weeks in-kind 

payments of food in its civil service support program, which aimed to help 

the new government establish itself. 

Coordinating and directing assistance activities between and among 

multiple international donors and military components has been a 

challenge. In Bosnia, 59 donor nations and international 

organizationsincluding NATO, the United Nations, the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the World Bank, 

and nongovernmental organizationshad a role in assistance activities 

but did not always coordinate their actions. For example, the United 

Nations and NATO initially could not agree on who would control and 

reform the Bosnian special or paramilitary police units. For the first year 

of post-conflict operations, these special police forces impeded assistance 

activities. The NATO-led force finally agreed to define these special police 

forces as military units and disbanded them in 1997. In Kosovo, the need 

for overall coordination was recognized and addressed by giving the 

United Nations a central role in providing overall coordination for 

humanitarian affairs, civil administration activities, and institution 

building. 

In Afghanistan, coordination of international assistance in general, and 

agricultural assistance in particular, was weak in 2002. From the beginning 

of the assistance effort, donors were urged to defer to the Afghan 

government regarding coordination. According to the United Nations, 

 6

These rations are intended to provide sustenance to these groups until they reestablish 

their lives. 

Coordinated Assistance 

Efforts 
Page 10 GAO-03-980T 

Afghan government authorities were responsible for coordination, and the 

international community was to operate and relate to the Afghan 

government in a coherent manner rather than through a series of disparate 

relationships.7 The Afghan government’s attempt to exert leadership over 

the reconstruction process in 2002 was largely ineffective primarily 

because the bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental assistance 

agenciesincluding the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture 

Organization, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and othersprepared 

individual reconstruction strategies, had their own mandate and funding 

sources, and pursued development efforts in Afghanistan independently. 

In addition, according to the international community, the Afghan 

government lacked the capacity and resources to be an effective 

coordinator, and thus these responsibilities could not be delegated to it. In 

December 2002, the Afghan government instituted a new coordination 

mechanism, but this mechanism has not surmounted conditions that 

prevented effective coordination throughout 2002. 

Another challenge is ensuring that local political leaders and influential 

groups support and participate in assistance activities. In Bosnia, the 

Bosnian-Serb leaders and their political parties opposed the Dayton Peace 

Agreement and blocked assistance efforts at every turn. For example, they 

tried to block the creation of a state border service to help all Bosnians 

move freely and obstructed efforts to combat crime and corruption, thus 

solidifying hard-line opposition and extremist views. In mid-1997, when 

donor nations and organizations started linking their economic assistance 

to compliance with the Dayton Agreement, some Bosnian-Serb leaders 

began implementing some of the agreement’s key provisions. 

Although Afghanistan’s central government is working in partnership with 

the international community to implement the Bonn Agreement and 

rebuild the country, warlords control much of the country and foster an 

illegitimate economy. They control private armies of tens of thousands of 

armed men, while the international communityled by the U.S. 

militarystruggles to train a new Afghan national army. Meanwhile, the 

Taliban regime was not party to the Bonn Agreement, and remnants of the 

regime continue to engage in guerilla attacks against the government and 

the international community. 

 7

Immediate and Transitional Assistance Program for the Afghan People, January 17, 2002. 

Ensuring Local-Level 

Support and Participation 
Page 11 GAO-03-980T 

Over the course of our work, we found that the international community 

and the United States provide a number of mechanisms for accountability 

in and oversight of assistance operations. 

First, the international community has monitored the extent to which postconflict assistance achieved its objectives through reports from the United 

Nations and the international coordinating mechanisms. Individual donors 

and agencies also have monitored their respective on-the-ground 

operations. For example, the United States monitors aid through the U.S. 

Agency for International Development and USAID’s inspector general. 

In Bosnia, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—a group of 59 

countries and international organizations that sponsors and directs the 

peace implementation process—oversaw humanitarian and reconstruction 

programs, set objectives for the operation, monitored progress toward 

those goals, and established mission reconstruction and other benchmarks 

in the spring of 1998. The High Representative in Bosnia, whose many 

responsibilities include monitoring implementation of the Dayton 

Agreement, reports to the Peace Implementation Council on progress and 

obstacles in this area. 

In Kosovo, the High-Level Steering Group (comprised of Canada, France, 

Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the 

European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International 

Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 

Development) performed a similar guidance and oversight role. It set 

priorities for an action plan to rebuild Kosovo and to repair the economies 

of the neighboring countries through the Stability Pact. Moreover, the U.N. 

interim administration in Kosovo was responsible for monitoring and 

reporting on all aspects of the peace operation, including humanitarian 

and economic reconstruction efforts. 

In Afghanistan, WFP has used a number of real-time monitoring 

mechanisms to track the distribution of commodities. Our review of WFP 

data suggested that food distributions have been effective and losses 

minimal. WFP data indicated that in Afghanistan, on average, 2.4 

monitoring visits were conducted on food aid projects implemented 

between April 2002 and November 2003. 

In addition to WFP monitors, private voluntary organization implementing 

partners who distribute food at the local beneficiary level make 

monitoring visits in areas where WFP staff cannot travel due to security 

Mechanisms Used for 

Accountability and 

Oversight 
Page 12 GAO-03-980T 

concerns. During our visits to project and warehouse sites in Afghanistan, 

we observed orderly and efficient storage, handing, and distribution of 

food assistance. (Because of security restrictions, we were able to conduct 

only limited site visits in Afghanistan.) WFP’s internal auditor reviewed its 

monitoring operations in Afghanistan in August 2002 and found no 

material weaknesses. USAID has also conducted periodic monitoring of 

WFP activities and has not found any major flaws in its operations. 

Over the past 10 years, GAO has evaluated assistance efforts in 16 postconflict emergencies, including those in Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, 

and Afghanistan. Specifically, these evaluations have focused on 

governance, democracy-building, rule of law, anticorruption, economic, 

military, food, agriculture, demining, refugee, and internally displaced 

person assistance projects. In broader terms, our work has examined the 

progress toward achieving the goals of the Dayton Peace Agreement and 

the military and political settlements for Kosovo, as well as the obstacles 

to achieving U.S. policy goals in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

respond to any questions you or other members may have. 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Susan Westin at 

(202) 512-4128. Key contributors to this testimony were Phillip J. Thomas, 

David M. Bruno, Janey Cohen, B. Patrick Hickey, Judy McCloskey, Tetsuo 

Miyabara, and Alexandre Tiersky. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 13 GAO-03-980T 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles 

to Agricultural Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability. 

GAO-03-607. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Rebuilding Iraq. GAO-03-792R. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2003. 

Cambodia: Governance Reform Progressing, But Key 

Efforts Are Lagging. GAO-02-569. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 

2002. 

Issues in Implementing International Peace Operations. 

GAO-02-707R. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002. 

U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal 

Years 1996-2001. GAO-02-294. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2002. 

Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful 

Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 

T-NSIAD-00-219. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000. 

Bosnia Peace Operation: Crime and Corruption Threaten 

Successful Implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. 

GAO/NSIAD-00-156. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2000. 

Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting 

Regional Stability. NSIAD-00-125BR. Washington, D.C.: April 

24, 2000. 

Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and 

Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-19. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 1998. 

Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton 

Accelerated as International Involvement Increased. 

GAO/NSIAD-98-138. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 1998. 

Former Yugoslavia: War Crimes Tribunal’s Workload 

Exceeds Capacity. GAO/NSIAD-98-134. Washington, D.C.: 

June 2, 1998. 

Appendix I: Selected GAO Reports on Postconflict Situations 
Page 14 GAO-03-980T 

Bosnia: Military Services Providing Needed Capabilities 

but a Few Challenges Emerging. GAO/NSIAD-98-160. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 1998. 

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the Dayton 

Agreement's Goals—An Update. T-NSIAD-97-216. 

Washington, D.C.: July 17, 1997. 

Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the 

Dayton Agreement's Goals. GAO/NSIAD-97-132. Washington, 

D.C.: May 5, 1997. 

United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions 

Requiring Force to Restore Peace. NSIAD-97-34. Washington, 

D.C.: March 27, 1997. 

Bosnia: Costs Are Uncertain but Seem Likely to Exceed 

DOD's Estimate. GAO/NSIAD-96-120BR. Washington, D.C.: 

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