NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MEGAN LINDSEY JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0355

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-147084-002 DT

The Honorable William R. Wingard, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-30-2019
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Megan Lindsey Johnson appeals her convictions and 

sentences for one count of possession or use of dangerous drugs, one count 

of possession or use of narcotic drugs, two counts of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and one count of possession or use of marijuana. Johnson

argues the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial sua sponte after a 

witness on cross-examination mentioned the presence of weapons in the 

motel room where police officers had been called and found the drugs and 

drug paraphernalia attributed to her. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 In October 2016, Johnson, who was on probation for two prior 

felony convictions2 and had been staying at a low-budget motel for ten to 

twelve days, missed the deadline to pay the daily room rental fee and failed 

to check-out. Phoenix Police Officers Blunt and O’Connor responded to a 

“trespasser” call from the motel, and after being directed to Johnson’s room, 

knocked and announced themselves as police officers. Johnson opened the 

door and tried to immediately walk out of the room and close the door 

behind her, but due to officer safety concerns, Officer O’Connor put his foot 

in the doorjamb to keep her from closing the door. Through the open 

doorway, the officers saw a man sitting on the bed trying to hide a piece of 

aluminum foil marked with black lines, which the officers immediately 

recognized as an indicator of heroin use. The officers told Johnson why 

they were there and asked her to sit. Although Johnson initially refused,

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Johnson. See State v. 

Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 64 (App. 1994).

2 See Maricopa County Case No. CR2014-005430-002.
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

3

and she and the man became argumentative, the officers eventually 

detained them and entered the room.

¶3 Inside the room, both officers immediately observed in plain 

view what appeared to be crystal methamphetamine and marijuana in clear 

plastic bags on the nightstand. They also observed several weapons in the 

room, including three handguns and a twenty-gauge shotgun. Inside the 

nightstand, the officers found syringe needles typically used for injecting

heroin, a bulbous glass meth pipe, an electronic scale, cigarette papers, a 

cannister for storing marijuana, additional aluminum foil wrappings and 

clear plastic baggies, and substances that appeared to be methamphetamine 

and heroin.

¶4 After advising Johnson of her rights pursuant to Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Officer O’Connor collected and inventoried the 

items discovered in the motel room, while Officer Blunt escorted Johnson

and the man to the officers’ patrol cars. As he did so, Officer Blunt asked 

Johnson who the drugs belonged to, and she denied knowing, but admitted 

she was a “drug user” and, specifically, a “heroin addict.” Subsequent field 

testing and forensic testing at the Phoenix Police Department’s Crime 

Laboratory confirmed the substances discovered in Johnson’s room were 

what the officers believed them to be—usable quantities of 

methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana.

¶5 A grand jury indicted Johnson on seven counts, including:

Counts I and II, misconduct involving weapons, each a class four felony, in 

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-3102(A)(4); 

Count III, possession or use of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine), a 

class four felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3407(A)(1); Count IV, possession 

or use of a narcotic drug (heroin), a class four felony, in violation of A.R.S. 

§ 13-3408(A)(1); Counts V and VI, possession of drug paraphernalia, each a 

class six felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3415(A); and Count VII, 

possession or use of marijuana, a class six felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-

3405(A)(1). Before trial, the State filed allegations of two historical prior 

felony convictions, aggravating circumstances, and offenses committed 

while on release from confinement, as well as a request for a Rule 609 

hearing. See Ariz. R. Evid. 609.
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

4

¶6 Counts I and II (the misconduct involving weapons counts) 

were severed from Counts III through VII (the drug-related counts),

3 and

as relevant to this appeal, the drug-related counts proceeded to trial. 

Johnson’s defense at trial centered on her theory that the contraband 

present in her motel room was the property of the man sitting on the bed 

(her boyfriend) and she lacked the requisite knowledge to possess the drugs 

or drug paraphernalia because she was unaware of those items and was 

merely present in the room. The court instructed the jury on mere presence 

and the elements of the crimes, including the requirement that, to find 

Johnson guilty, the jury must find that Johnson possessed or used each of 

the drugs at issue.

¶7 The jury found Johnson guilty on all five counts. The trial 

court accepted her admission that she was on felony probation at the time 

of the offenses, and after Johnson rejected any further probation, the court 

sentenced her to concurrent, presumptive sentences, with the longest being 

ten years’ imprisonment, on Counts III through VII.

4

¶8 Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

ANALYSIS

¶9 Johnson argues the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial 

sua sponte after Officer Blunt mentioned on cross-examination the presence 

of weapons in the motel room where the police officers found the drugs and 

paraphernalia attributed to Johnson.

I. Standard of Review

¶10 When a witness unexpectedly offers an inadmissible 

statement at trial, the action called for rests largely within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, which must decide if a remedy short of mistrial 

 

3 Trial was first held on the misconduct involving weapons counts, 

but resulted in a hung jury, and the court declared a mistrial. Later, before 

sentencing on the drug-related counts, the court dismissed Counts I and II

without prejudice on the State’s motion.

4 For Johnson’s two convictions and probation violations in Maricopa 

County Case No. CR2014-005430-002, the court sentenced her to 

concurrent, presumptive one-year sentences, to be served consecutively to 

the sentences imposed in Counts III thorough VII.
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

5

will cure the error. See State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32 (2000); State v. 

Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 (1983). “A declaration of a mistrial is the most 

dramatic remedy for trial error and should be granted only when it appears 

that justice will be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial 

granted.” Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 262 (citation omitted). In deciding whether 

a mistrial is warranted, the court must consider “(1) whether the testimony 

called to the jurors’ attention matters that they would not be justified in 

considering in reaching their verdict and (2) the probability under the 

circumstances of the case that the testimony influenced the jurors.” State v. 

Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 439, ¶ 40 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶11 “If a party wants a mistrial, it ordinarily must ask for one.” 

State v. Laird, 186 Ariz. 203, 207 (1996). A defendant who fails to either 

request that testimony be stricken, with limiting instructions given, or 

request a mistrial has generally waived her objection absent fundamental 

error. See State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 133, ¶ 61 (2006). Under fundamental 

error review, a defendant must first establish trial error exists, and then 

show the error was fundamental because it (1) went to the foundation of 

her case, (2) took from her a right essential to her defense, or (3) was so 

egregious that she could not possibly have received a fair trial. State v. 

Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018). A defendant who establishes

fundamental error under prongs one or two must make a separate showing 

of prejudice, which requires proof that a reasonable jury could have reached 

a different verdict. Id. at 142, 144, ¶¶ 21, 29 (citations omitted).

II. Factual Background

¶12 Johnson’s claim stems from testimony elicited during defense

counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Blunt. Defense counsel began asking

Officer Blunt about the various things he saw in Johnson’s motel room, and 

the positioning of the people and items in that room. The following 

exchange then occurred:

Q. What other items were there in terms of clothes, boxes, 

bags?

A. There was just -– there was [sic] weapons.

Defense counsel objected to the statement and asked to approach the bench. 

The trial court immediately sustained the objection and ordered the 

testimony “stricken from the record” before conducting a bench conference 

with the attorneys.
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

6

¶13 During the bench conference, defense counsel argued the 

statement was “highly prejudicial” and the officer had been “admonished 

not to say anything about weapons.” The prosecutor disputed the officer 

had been so admonished, but offered to do so at that time. The trial court 

agreed to take a recess to decide how to proceed and offered Johnson a 

curative instruction, while cautioning that the instruction “may just draw 

more attention to [the testimony].” Defense counsel simply responded, “I 

want to make sure he knows not to say anything.”

¶14 The trial court dismissed the jury for the afternoon recess, and 

the prosecutor requested argument on the issue because Johnson had not 

made a “formal motion in limine.” Defense counsel replied, “Judge, I 

would ask that the officer be admonished not to mention anything about 

weapons.” The prosecutor argued that, given Johnson’s defense that she 

was unaware of the drugs and drug paraphernalia in the motel room, her 

knowledge of other items in the room (i.e., weapons) was “germane to the 

issue of whether she had knowledge” of the drugs and paraphernalia at 

issue. Defense counsel disagreed, arguing it was “getting into the trial 

about the guns.”

¶15 Noting the misconduct involving weapons counts had been 

severed, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion to admonish the officers 

not to mention the guns, repeated the evidence was stricken from the 

record, and again offered Johnson a curative instruction. Defense counsel 

declined the offer, stating, “I don’t plan to request a curative instruction.” 

Before concluding the matter, the prosecutor requested “permission to 

readdress this issue after the defendant testifies, should it become 

relevant,” and the trial court agreed.

¶16 Johnson later chose to testify at trial and admitted having two 

prior felony convictions. She also admitted she was a heroin addict from 

“about 2013 to 2014” but claimed she was “clean” at the time of her arrest. 

She further admitted her boyfriend was a drug addict with whom she had 

gotten high “[a]bout six months before this incident.”

¶17 Johnson characterized the incident as a domestic dispute for 

which her boyfriend was to blame. She claimed she had checked into and 

was staying at the motel alone because she was trying to break up with her 

boyfriend, who was “financially trapping” her. She had chosen that motel 

because it was “what [she] could afford.”

¶18 On the day of her arrest, she left the room between 

approximately 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. to get money to pay her motel bill. 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

7

When she returned approximately fifteen to thirty minutes later, her 

boyfriend was in the room without her permission. From that time until 

police officers arrived at 12:50 p.m., she was in the room with her boyfriend.

She knew her boyfriend “had brought some items with him,” including his 

backpack, which she noticed was blue, closed, and “at least half full,” but

claimed she never noticed any illicit items, including the tinfoil on the bed. 

She claimed she tried to close the door on the officers to keep her five dogs 

from getting out of the room, not because she knew what illegal items were 

inside. She did not dispute the officers found methamphetamine, heroin, 

and marijuana in her motel room, as well as each of the numerous items of 

drug paraphernalia, but claimed she didn’t see any drugs or drug 

paraphernalia in the room until the officers “started pulling it out of the 

[nightstand] drawer.”

¶19 Near the end of Johnson’s cross-examination, the prosecutor 

asked to approach the bench, and a brief bench conference ensued. The 

prosecutor requested “permission to introduce the weapons that were in 

the room,” including “a 20-gauge shotgun, an instrument that is in excess 

of three feet long that she is saying that she had no reason to look around 

the room and consider whether there were things there that she shouldn’t 

have.” Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor continued, “The issue 

is not whether she possessed the guns. The issue is whether she had reason 

to believe that it would be prudent to look around and see what was in the 

room. I believe that, in the rebuttal, the officer outside could testify that the 

meth was located next to a firearm.” The court expressed its concern that 

what “we are getting into[] is the fact that she would need to look for them 

because she is on probation.” The prosecutor replied, “Well, the reason we 

severed [Counts I and II from Counts III through VII] is not because the 

guns are prejudicial to the drugs. The reason we severed them is because 

the introduction of the defendant’s prior felony convictions are [sic] 

prejudicial to the drugs as the necessary element to misconduct involving 

weapons. The defendant’s priors are already out there, she is on the stand. 

So the prejudice that leads the Court to sever the counts is actually 

evaporated at this point.” After further discussion, the court stated it 

wished to consider the matter further and asked the prosecutor to continue 

with her cross-examination.

¶20 After concluding her cross-examination, the prosecutor 

renewed her motion, defense counsel objected, and the court dismissed the 

jury for a mid-afternoon recess. The court then denied the motion, 

explaining, “[T]he State wanted to inquire as to the presence of the shotgun 

and . . . a handgun that were found in the [m]otel room,” and though 

“clearly relevant,” “the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

8

the probative value.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 403. The court asked defense 

counsel if he had “anything else” to say, and defense counsel replied, “No, 

thank you, Judge.”

III. The Merits

¶21 Johnson argues the trial court erred in deciding “to not do 

anything about what the jury had just heard [Officer] Blunt say” about the 

presence of weapons in Johnson’s motel room. Her argument is 

contradicted by the record, however, because the trial court (1) sustained

defense counsel’s objection, (2) struck Officer Blunt’s testimony, (3) directed 

the prosecutor to admonish the officers not to further mention weapons 

during their testimony, and (4) repeatedly offered Johnson a curative jury 

instruction.

¶22 Further, at the beginning of trial, the court cautioned the jury 

that it must not consider for any purpose any evidence rejected or struck 

from the record, and the court reiterated this instruction in its final 

instructions to the jury, stating, “If the Court sustained an objection to a 

lawyer’s question, you must disregard it and any answer given. Any 

testimony stricken from the court record must not be considered.” The 

court also instructed the jury that it must follow all the instructions given 

it. We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. State v. Newell, 

212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶¶ 68-69 (2006).

¶23 Moreover, Johnson’s counsel repeatedly declined the trial 

court’s offers of an additional curative jury instruction and did not request 

a mistrial; accordingly, Johnson must demonstrate not only that Officer 

Blunt’s testimony was error, but that the error was fundamental and

prejudicial. See Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 133, ¶ 61; State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 

561, 567-69, ¶¶ 19-26 (2005). On this record, Johnson has demonstrated 

neither. Johnson received a fair trial, has not shown the jury was influenced 

by the stricken testimony, and has not shown that a reasonable jury could 

have reached a different result. See Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, 144, ¶¶ 21, 

29. The evidence against her was overwhelming, and we find no 

fundamental, prejudicial error.5

 

5 Also, Johnson’s argument that the prosecutor improperly attempted 

to further “tarnish” her character by arguing that Officer Blunt’s statement 

was admissible—and ostensibly by arguing that further statements about 

the weapons should be admissible as impeachment evidence—is a non 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

9

CONCLUSION

¶24 Johnson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

 

sequitur because the court struck the testimony and instructed the 

prosecutor to admonish the officers to not further mention weapons during 

their testimony. Neither Officer Blunt nor Officer O’Connor provided any 

further testimony regarding weapons.