Report to the Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on

Armed Services, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2002 NUCLEAR

NONPROLIFERATION

U.S. Efforts to Help

Other Countries

Combat Nuclear

Smuggling Need

Strengthened

Coordination and

Planning

GAO-02-426
Page i GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries

Combat Nuclear Smuggling 6

U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated

Approach 11

U.S. Assistance Has Helped Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling,

but Problems with Equipment Undermine Efforts 15

Conclusions 24

Recommendations 25

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26

Scope and Methodology 28

Appendix I Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents 31

Incidents Involving Weapons Usable Nuclear Material 31

Luch Scientific Production Association (Russia), 1992 34

Vilnius, Lithuania, 1993 34

Murmansk, Russia, 1993 35

Murmansk, Russia, 1993 35

St. Petersburg, Russia, 1994 35

Tengen, Germany, 1994 36

Landshut, Germany, 1994 36

Munich, Germany, 1994 36

Prague, Czech Republic, 1994 37

Rousse, Bulgaria, 1999 37

Kara-Balta, Kyrgyzstan, 1999 38

Batumi, Georgia, 2000 38

Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000 38

Germany, 2000 38

Greece, 2001 38

France, 2001 39

Appendix II U.S. Government Assistance Programs 40

Department of Energy 40

Department of State 43

Department of Defense 45

U.S. Customs Service 46

U.S. Coast Guard 48

Federal Bureau of Investigation 48

Contents
Page ii GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 50

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Energy 54

Appendix V Comments from the U. S. Customs Service 56

Tables

Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and

Expenditures through Fiscal Year 2001 9

Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable

Material since 1992 33

Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures

through Fiscal Year 2001 42

Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

Program Funding, Fiscal Year 1998-2001 45

Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through

Fiscal Year 2001 46

Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source,

through Fiscal Year 2001 48

Figures

Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors 16

Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border

Guards 17

Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van 18

Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport

in Moscow 19
Page 1 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

May 16, 2002

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats

 and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Senator Roberts:

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials

occurs worldwide and has reportedly increased in recent years. According

to the International Atomic Energy Agency1

 (IAEA), as of December 31,

2001, there had been 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear

material since 1993. (See app. I for more information about nuclear

smuggling cases.) A significant number of the cases reported by IAEA

involved material that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a

device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (“dirty

bomb”) to spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear

material can be smuggled across a country’s border through a variety of

means: it can be hidden in a car, train, or ship, carried in personal luggage

through an airport, or walked across an unprotected border.

Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that

originated in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The United States,

through the Department of Energy’s Material Protection, Control, and

Accounting (MPC&A) program,2

 has helped these countries secure nuclear

material at civilian and defense facilities—this effort is considered the first

line of defense against potential theft and/or diversion of nuclear

 1

IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and has 133 member states, including the United

States. Its objectives are to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to verify that

nuclear material under its supervision or control is not used to further any military

purpose.

2

This review will only focus on U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling at countries’

borders. We recently reported on the Department of Energy’s MPC&A program and found

that the program is reducing the risk of theft of nuclear material but hundreds of metric

tons of nuclear material still lack improved security systems and are vulnerable to theft.

See Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further

Enhancements Needed (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United

States is helping these countries improve their border security—a second

line of defense—but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges.3

 For

example, Russia alone has almost 12,500 miles of borders with 14

countries, including North Korea. It is also in close geographical proximity

to Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.

As agreed with your office, this report addresses U.S. efforts to combat

nuclear smuggling by (1) identifying the U.S. federal programs tasked with

combating the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and the

amount of U.S. funding spent on this effort; (2) determining how well the

U.S. assistance is coordinated among federal agencies; and (3) assessing

the effectiveness of the equipment and training provided by the United

States. We visited four countries to obtain a first hand look at U.S.

radiation detection equipment installed at different border crossings and

meet with officials responsible for border security, law enforcement, and

export controls.

U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six

federal agencies—the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S.

Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S.

Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six

agencies spent about $86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the

former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of

smuggling of nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of

mass destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance,

including radiation detection equipment and training, technical exchanges

to promote the development and enforcement of laws and regulations

governing the export of nuclear-related equipment and technology, and

other equipment and training to generally improve countries’ ability to

interdict nuclear smuggling. The Department of Energy (DOE) has two

programs to combat nuclear smuggling and primarily focuses on Russia.

Energy has installed radiation detection monitors at eight border

crossings, including at an airport in Moscow, and plans to install similar

equipment at close to 60 sites in Russia. The State Department has

provided radiation detection monitors, mobile vans equipped with

 3

 While some of the assistance specifically targets nuclear smuggling, a portion of the

assistance is intended to improve countries’ ability to interdict any weapons smuggling—

nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional.

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance to

about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of

Defense (DOD) has two programs that have provided radiation detection

monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20 countries.

With funding provided by the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S.

Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Coast

Guard have provided a variety of training and equipment to customs,

border guard, and law enforcement officials in numerous countries.

U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall

governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired

by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the

six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their

efforts through this group. As a result, the Departments of Energy, State,

and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation

detection equipment at other countries’ border crossings; consequently,

some countries’ border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear

smuggling than others. Specifically, the Department of Energy is installing

equipment at border sites in Russia and the Department of Defense is

installing equipment in another country that is better able to detect

weapons-usable nuclear material, while the State Department has installed

less sophisticated radiation detection monitors in other countries.

Coordination problems also exist within agencies. For example, the

Department of Energy’s Second Line of Defense program does not

coordinate its efforts with another office within the Department that also

provides radiation detection equipment because that office receives

funding from and installs equipment on behalf of the State Department.

Officials of the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense have

acknowledged that U.S. assistance efforts lack adequate planning and

need better coordination among all the agencies. In addition, these

officials told us that the roles and responsibilities of each agency in the

overall U.S. assistance effort should be better clarified. This report makes

recommendations to improve the planning and coordination of U.S.

assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.

While U.S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling

of nuclear and other radioactive materials, serious problems with

installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have

undermined U.S. efforts. Representatives of 17 recipient countries told us

that U.S. assistance has provided needed radiation detection equipment at

border sites and training for border security guards and other law

enforcement personnel. Without U.S. assistance, some countries would

not have any radiation detection equipment at their borders or training in
Page 4 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

how to inspect vehicles, luggage, and people and investigate nuclear

smuggling cases. In other countries, U.S. assistance has bolstered existing

nuclear smuggling detection programs. We observed at border sites in

countries we visited that U.S.-provided equipment was working and was

being used for the purposes intended. However, we also found serious

problems with some of the equipment provided to various countries. For

example, about one-half of the stationary radiation detection monitors

funded by the Department of Defense to one country in the former Soviet

Union was never installed; numerous portable radiation detectors could

not be accounted for; and radiation detection equipment provided by the

State Department to Lithuania was stored in the basement of the U.S.

embassy for about 2 years because of a disagreement between the

department and the recipient country about the need for a power supply

line costing $12,600. These and other problems are largely a result of the

lack of oversight and follow-up by the agencies providing the assistance.

U.S. officials are attempting to correct some of these problems by, among

other things, stationing advisors in countries receiving U.S. assistance.

Another problem affecting U.S. assistance efforts is that recipient

countries do not systematically report incidents of nuclear material

detected at their borders, which limits the ability of U.S. agencies to

measure the effectiveness of the equipment they are providing. This report

makes several recommendations designed to improve management of

U.S.-provided radiation detection equipment and to secure recipient

country assurances that information about detected nuclear materials is

shared in a timely basis.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,

Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The

Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided

technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

The agencies agreed with the facts presented in the report and State

specifically said that it agreed with the report’s conclusions and

recommendations. Customs suggested that we reword our

recommendation to specifically include it as one of the agencies to

develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling, which we

did. DOE did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.

Over the past decade, the United States has paid increased attention to the

threat that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material in the countries of

the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, could be stolen and fall into

the hands of terrorists or countries seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Background
Page 5 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

By some estimates, the former Soviet Union had about 30,000 nuclear

weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material when it

collapsed about 10 years ago. Several cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear

material in Germany and the Czech Republic in the early to mid-1990s

underscored the proliferation threat. The United States responded to the

threat by providing assistance to increase security at numerous nuclear

facilities in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia, in order to

prevent weapons-usable nuclear material from being stolen. In addition,

the United States has provided portal monitors (stationary equipment

designed to detect radioactive materials carried by pedestrians or

vehicles) and smaller, portable radiation detectors at border crossings in

many countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern

Europe. The equipment, which is installed at car and truck crossings,

railroad crossings, seaports, and airports, can serve two purposes:

deterring smugglers from trafficking in nuclear material and detecting

cases of actual nuclear smuggling.

Radiation detection equipment can detect radioactive materials used in

medicine and industry, patients who have recently had radiological

treatment, commodities that are sources of naturally occurring radiation

such as fertilizer, and—of primary concern in terms of nonproliferation—

nuclear material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. Nuclear material

includes radioactive source materials--such as natural uranium, low

enriched uranium used as fuel in commercial nuclear power reactors, and

plutonium and highly enriched uranium--that are key components of

nuclear weapons. The capability of the equipment to detect nuclear

material depends on a number of factors including the amount of material,

the size of the detection device, and whether the material is shielded from

detection. For example, a small amount of material shielded by a lead

container would likely escape detection while a large amount of material

with no shielding would be more likely to cause an alarm. Detecting actual

cases of illicit trafficking in weapons-usable nuclear material is

complicated because one of the materials that is of greatest concern in

terms of proliferation—highly enriched uranium—is among the most

difficult materials to detect due to its relatively low level of radioactivity.

In contrast, medical and industrial radioactive sources, which could be

used in a radiological dispersion device or “dirty bomb,” are highly

radioactive and therefore easier to detect. Because of the complexity of

detecting nuclear material, the customs officers or border guards who are

responsible for operating the equipment must also be trained in how to

use handheld radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm,

identify false alarms, and respond to cases of illicit nuclear smuggling.
Page 6 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received

$140 million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear

smuggling in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the

former Soviet Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern

Europe. The Departments of State and Defense provide funding to four

other agencies, and some agencies have carried over millions of dollars in

program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have received more

funding than they have been able to spend.

The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service;

the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard have

provided assistance to about 30 countries’ customs, border, and law

enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear

smuggling. Radiation detection equipment is one of the many types of

assistance that the U.S. agencies are providing. Other equipment ranges

from simple hand tools for taking apart and searching different

compartments of a vehicle for hidden contraband to boats and vehicles for

conducting patrols. Similarly, training ranges from hands-on instruction in

using the equipment and conducting searches to high-level technical

exchanges on establishing the legal and regulatory basis for preventing

illicit trafficking and trade in sensitive goods and materials that could be

used in a nuclear weapon. U.S. assistance began in the mid-1990s under

DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and then expanded to

State, DOE, and other DOD programs.

While DOE, DOD, and State receive their own funding for their assistance

programs, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard receive their funding

from State and/or DOD. DOE also receives part of its funding from State.

DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear

material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the

International Export Control Program (IECP). The Second Line of

Defense Program focuses on providing radiation detection equipment to

Russia. From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, DOE spent $11.2 million,

including $2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70

portal monitors at eight sites in Russia, including a Moscow airport. DOE

has identified close to 60 sites in Russia where it plans to install portal

monitors over the next decade at a total cost of about $50 million and has

begun work at 19 of these sites. In addition, DOE may expand the program

beyond Russia to include other countries of the former Soviet Union.

DOE’s International Export Control Program spent $22 million, including

U.S. Government Has

Spent about

$86 Million to Help

Countries Combat

Nuclear Smuggling

U.S. Assistance Is Divided

Among Six Federal

Agencies

Departments of Energy,

State, and Defense Have

the Primary Role in

Delivering U.S. Assistance
Page 7 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

$2.4 million provided by State, from fiscal year 1992 through 2001 to help

countries of the former Soviet Union control the export of goods and

technologies that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons.

Whereas the Second Line of Defense program focuses on the nuclear

material needed to manufacture a nuclear bomb, the IECP focuses on the

other high-technology components needed for a bomb such as equipment

for enriching uranium. The program provides assistance to prevent

legitimate enterprises, such as businesses that were affiliated with the

Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons complex, from intentionally or

unintentionally engaging in illicit trade in such goods and technologies.

DOE also spent $1.8 million to support State and DOD programs to combat

nuclear smuggling.

The State Department has received the largest amount of funding through

the end of fiscal year 2001 for assistance to combat nuclear smuggling in

about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and

Eastern Europe. State spent $11.4 million primarily through two

programs—the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export

Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. Through the

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, State spent $8.5 million from

fiscal year 1994 through 2001 to, among other things, install portal

monitors in countries other than Russia. In addition, State provided

handheld radiation detectors, dosimeters (to measure levels of radiation),

and mobile vans equipped with x-ray machines and radiation detectors

that can be driven among a number of border crossings. From fiscal year

1998 through 2001, State’s Export Control and Related Border Security

Assistance program spent $2.7 million to, among other things, purchase

three vans equipped with radiation detectors for Russia and another van

for Poland. State’s Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement

program (implemented by Customs) also spent $0.2 million to provide

radiation detection equipment as part of its assistance to strengthen

Georgia’s overall border infrastructure and security against any type of

crime, including nuclear material smuggling. State also provided

$58.8 million to DOE, Customs, and the Coast Guard to fund their

assistance activities.

DOD has provided assistance to combat nuclear smuggling under two

programs—the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the

International Counterproliferation program. From fiscal year 1993 to 2001,

the Cooperative Threat Reduction program spent $16.3 million to assist

five countries. The assistance included $1 million for radiation detection

equipment—36 pedestrian portal monitors (to screen people) and 100

handheld radiation detectors for one country and an additional 100
Page 8 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

handheld detectors for another country—and about $10 million for other

equipment to enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct

searches for smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. In

addition, as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, in fiscal

year 2001 DOD began to work with DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory to install seven portal monitors at three border crossings in

another country. DOD has begun site surveys at about eight additional

border crossings in that country where it plans to install portal monitors.

As part of the International Counterproliferation program, DOD spent

$10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 to provide Customs and

FBI training and equipment to 17 countries of the former Soviet Union and

Central and Eastern Europe.

The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by

State and DOD, spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on

assistance to combat nuclear smuggling. Customs has provided training

and equipment to customs agencies and border guards in close to 30

countries. The equipment includes radiation pagers (small detectors that

can be worn on a belt to continuously monitor radiation levels or used as a

handheld device to pinpoint the location of radioactive material detected

by a portal monitor) as well as a variety of other high- and low-tech tools

to conduct searches and detect sensitive goods and materials, such as

fiber optic scopes for examining fuel tanks for contraband. Training

includes assistance in operating the x-ray vans equipped with radiation

detectors; providing hands-on instruction in using equipment to detect

nuclear smuggling; teaching techniques for investigating smuggling

operations; tracking the movements of smugglers between ports of entry,

including through rough terrain; and providing “train-the-trainer” courses

to enable countries to train more personnel than the U.S. assistance can

reach. In addition to equipment and training, Customs has stationed 22 incountry advisors covering 25 countries on behalf of State to help

implement and coordinate the assistance.

From fiscal year 1997 through 2001, the FBI spent $0.4 million as part of

the DOD International Counterproliferation program. The DOD/FBI effort

trained and equipped law enforcement agencies to investigate and respond

to actual seizures of smuggled nuclear or other material. Training included

seminars for high-level officials and courses on conducting investigations

and managing a crime scene where a seizure has taken place. Equipment

provided as part of the training included protective equipment, such as

HAZMAT suits to make handling of seized material safer; evidence

collection and sampling kits; and chemical detection equipment. In

U.S. Customs Service,

Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and U.S.

Coast Guard Implement

Assistance with Funding

from the Departments of

State and Defense
Page 9 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

addition, the FBI recently expanded the equipment list to include radiation

pagers.

From fiscal year 1999 through 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard spent

$1.6 million in funding received from the State Department Export Control

and Related Border Security Assistance program. The Coast Guard has

provided assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to

countries of the former Soviet Union. Assistance provided to one country

includes two boats with spare parts and stationing of an in-country Coast

Guard advisor.

Table 1 lists each program and activity, expenditures through fiscal year

2001, and the general nature of the assistance provided. For additional

details about each of the six agencies’ programs and expenditures, see

appendix II.

Table 1: Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Expenditures through Fiscal Year 2001

Dollars in millions

Programs/activities Program/activity description Expenditures Funding source

DOE Second Line of

Defense

Install radiation detection portal monitors at Russian border

crossings.

$11.2 Includes $8.5 million in

DOE funds and

$2.7 million from State

DOE International

Export Control

Program

Provide nuclear-specific export control assistance to

countries of the former Soviet Union.

22.0 Includes $19.6 million in

DOE funds and $2.4

million from State

DOE Install radiation detection equipment in countries of the

former Soviet Union (other than Russia) and Central and

Eastern Europe.

1.8 Includes $0.5 million from

State and $1.3 million from

DOD

State Dept.

Nonproliferation &

Disarmament Fund

Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance

for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union

and Central and Eastern Europe.

8.5

State Dept. Export

Control & Related

Border Security

Assistance

Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance

for interdicting nuclear smuggling to the former Soviet Union

and Central and Eastern Europe. (Took over Nonproliferation

and Disarmament Fund radiation detection assistance

beginning in FY 2002.)

2.7

State Dept. Georgia

Border Security & Law

Enforcement

Provide wide range of assistance to Georgia border guards

and customs service to interdict nuclear smuggling, fight

other crimes such as drug smuggling, and develop border

infrastructure.

0.2

DOD Cooperative

Threat Reduction

Provide radiation detection equipment and other assistance

for interdicting nuclear smuggling to 5 countries, and install

radiation detection portal monitors in one country.

16.3

DOD International

Counterproliferation

program

Train and equip customs officers, border guards, and law

enforcement officials to detect, interdict, and respond to

nuclear smuggling.

10.2
Page 10 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Dollars in millions

Programs/activities Program/activity description Expenditures Funding source

U.S. Customs Service Train and equip customs officers and border guards in the

former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe to

detect and interdict nuclear smuggling.

11.1 Includes $8.8 million from

State and $2.3 million from

DOD

Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Train and equip law enforcement officials in the former Soviet

Union and Central and Eastern Europe to investigate and

respond to nuclear smuggling incidents.

0.4 Includes $0.4 million from

DOD

U.S. Coast Guard Provide assistance for maritime interdiction of nuclear

smuggling.

1.6 Includes $1.6 million from

State

Total $86.1

Source: Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Coast Guard, and

Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Funding for State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance

program grew over tenfold, from $3 million allocated in fiscal year 1998 to

$40.1 million allocated in fiscal year 2001. Due to the rapid increase, some

agencies receiving funds from State have carried over millions of dollars in

program funds into fiscal year 2002 because they have received more

funding than they have been able to spend. For example, Customs’

program expenditures have not kept pace with its growth in funding, and it

carried over $33.1 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002, including

$6.5 million in obligated but unspent funds and $26.5 million in funds that

had not been obligated or spent. Customs officials attributed the carryover

to not receiving funds from State until late in the fiscal year and not

obtaining agreements from the recipient countries under which the

assistance would be provided. Furthermore, according to Customs and

State officials, carryover is to be expected because State provides the

funds to Customs under agreements to spend the funds over a 2 to 3 year

period.

After September 11, 2001, State received an emergency supplemental

appropriation of $24.7 million. State Department officials said that they

have designated $21.5 million of the emergency supplemental for

assistance (including detection equipment) to six countries.

Some Agencies’

Expenditures Have Not

Kept Pace with Growth in

Funding
Page 11 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Because U.S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of

Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing

other countries’ border crossings, with the result that some countries’

border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others.

While DOE and DOD have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at

border sites in Russia and another country, the State Department has

installed less sophisticated portal monitors in other countries. In addition,

no governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies’ programs together,

which exacerbates the coordination problems.

The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat

nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency

group chaired by the State Department. The group, which includes

representatives from all the U.S. programs that are providing assistance,

meets about once a month to discuss such issues as funding and financial

management of the agencies’ various programs, upcoming assistance

activities, and results of program personnel’s recent trips to recipient

countries. In addition, program managers of the various agencies work

together to implement the programs. For example, DOD officials said that

they regularly meet with Customs and FBI program managers to

implement assistance and that they participate in the FBI and Customs

training courses that DOD funds.

A number of agency officials said that coordination has improved since

State established a separate office in November 2000—the Office of

Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions—to manage and coordinate

U.S. assistance. For example, the new office provided funding to Customs

to station 22 in-country advisors, covering 25 countries, that are

responsible for coordinating the assistance for all of the six agencies

within a country. DOD and DOE officials said that the advisors play an

important role in implementing their programs. In addition, the new office

has assumed responsibility for much of the Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Fund assistance related to nuclear smuggling. For instance,

the office has taken over responsibility for providing and maintaining

radiation detection equipment to countries other than Russia.

Despite these coordination efforts, no one agency is in charge of the

overall U.S. effort to provide assistance to combat nuclear smuggling;

consequently, the agencies have implemented their programs without

always coordinating their efforts through the interagency group. For

example, DOD installed portal monitors at three sites in one country of the

former Soviet Union before the State official who chairs the interagency

U.S. Assistance to

Combat Nuclear

Smuggling Lacks a

Coordinated

Approach

Efforts to Coordinate

Assistance Have Been

Inadequate
Page 12 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

group learned of the project. According to a DOD official, the project was

coordinated with other State Department officials. Similarly, although

State provides its radiation detection assistance through DOE, the DOE

office that works with State is completely separate from the Second Line

of Defense program, and a Second Line of Defense official said that his

program and the other office do not communicate with each other.

According to the official, a few years ago the two offices were discussing

the possibility of merging, but the discussions ended after a new director

took over the other office even though Second Line of Defense officials

still believe that the two offices should be merged. Even within the State

Department, different offices implement their programs without full

coordination. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund

approved a project to install portal monitors in a country after agreeing

that the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions would take

over State’s radiation detection assistance, and a separate office at State

has oversight over the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement

program even though one of the objectives of the program is to strengthen

Georgia’s ability to interdict nuclear smuggling. Finally, even though it

funds much of the assistance provided by other agencies, State could not

provide accurate information on the other agencies’ program expenditures

during the course of our review. For example, State’s records did not

match Customs’ financial data on expenditures of funds provided to

Customs by State. State officials said that they have now developed a

financial database to track how the other agencies have spent State’s

funds.

In addition, DOE, DOD, and State do not share the same views on the

appropriate role of each agency. For example, while State sees itself as the

agency that is leading the coordination effort and setting policy, a DOD

official said that State does not have the necessary expertise or resources

to manage the overall U.S. effort. In contrast, DOE officials said that State

should have a lead role in coordination and diplomatic support for the

assistance programs and that DOE would depend on State to establish the

diplomatic basis that would allow the Second Line of Defense program to

expand into other countries. However, DOE officials questioned whether

State and DOD are the appropriate agencies for installing portal monitors

in countries other than Russia.
Page 13 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

As a result of ineffective coordination, DOE, DOD, and State have installed

portal monitors that have different levels of capability to detect

weapons-usable nuclear material, leaving some border crossings more

vulnerable to nuclear material smuggling than others. While DOE and DOD

have installed more sophisticated portal monitors at border sites in Russia

and another country, State has installed less sophisticated portal monitors

in other countries. In addition, in the mid-1990s, the DOD Cooperative

Threat Reduction program provided less sophisticated portal monitors to

another country in the former Soviet Union.

The more sophisticated portal monitors detect two types of radiation—

gamma and neutron—whereas the portal monitors installed by State and

the DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction program detect only gamma

radiation. The ability to detect neutron radiation translates into a greater

ability to detect weapons-usable plutonium, one of the materials of

greatest concern in terms of nonproliferation. In addition, according to

DOE officials, due to their configuration and sensitivity the State

Department portal monitors are less likely to detect small quantities of

highly enriched uranium, the other material that is of greatest

nonproliferation concern, or material that is shielded, for example by a

lead container or certain parts of a vehicle. DOE’s office that installs the

portal monitors on behalf of State acknowledged that the less

sophisticated portal monitors have a limited capability to detect

weapons-usable nuclear material and said that the portal monitors serve

mostly as a deterrent to smuggling. In addition, DOE and DOD have taken

different approaches even though the two agencies have installed the same

Russian-manufactured portal monitors. For example, DOE officials said

that the Second Line of Defense program has calibrated the monitors in

Russia to detect a smaller quantity of material than the monitors installed

by DOD in another country. In contrast, a DOD official said that DOE’s

approach runs the risk of a high rate of false alarms, which can lead to

complacency among officials in charge of responding to alarms.

State Department officials with the Nonproliferation and Disarmament

Fund said that they used less sophisticated portal monitors because of

their lower cost and the difficulty many countries would have in

maintaining sophisticated equipment. For example, some countries lack

even the basic infrastructure to operate and maintain portal monitors,

such as a source of electricity. Because of the different circumstances

existing in each country, State officials said that radiation detection

assistance should be tailored to each country’s needs. The Director of

State’s Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that State

is reevaluating its approach to providing radiation detection equipment,

Ineffective Coordination

Has Resulted in Some

Border Crossings Being

More Vulnerable to

Nuclear Smuggling Than

Others
Page 14 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

including installing better equipment where appropriate. Second Line of

Defense officials expressed concern about using less sophisticated portal

monitors at border crossings on potential smuggling routes leading to

countries seeking nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Second Line of Defense

officials said that because of the differences in the portal monitors, DOE

would replace State’s portal monitors with more sophisticated equipment

if the Second Line of Defense program expands into another country and

perhaps use the old portal monitors at lower-priority sites. Overall, Second

Line of Defense officials said that the U.S. government assistance to

provide radiation detection equipment is diffuse and lacks a single,

coherent approach and that the portal monitors should meet a minimum

standard for detecting weapons-usable nuclear material.

The three agencies have also pursued different approaches to providing

handheld radiation detection equipment. With support from DOD and

State, the U.S. Customs Service has provided customs and border officials

with radiation pagers. In contrast, DOE’s Second Line of Defense program

provides larger handheld detectors but not radiation pagers, and DOE

officials said that they view the pagers as personal safety devices that are

ineffective at detecting weapons-usable nuclear material. According to

State and Customs officials, pagers are a useful part of a radiation

detection system at border crossings. Customs officials also said that

pagers are just one part of a multi-layered radiation detection system used

by border personnel.

No governmentwide plan links all of the six agencies’ programs together

through common goals and objectives, strategies and time frames for

providing assistance, and performance measures for evaluating the

effectiveness of assistance. The in-country customs advisors have

developed country-specific plans, and DOD has developed a plan for its

International Counterproliferation program that includes threat

assessments and a prioritization of countries into three levels of weapons

of mass destruction proliferation risk in the context of border security and

customs enforcement. Similarly, DOE has developed a list of close to 60

border crossings where it plans to install radiation detection equipment as

part of the Second Line of Defense program and estimated the cost and

timeframe for completing the program. On the other hand, the State

Department has no plan for providing radiation detection equipment that

details how many portal monitors it plans to install, in what countries, and

at which border crossings. Furthermore, the six agencies have not

developed a joint assessment of the nuclear smuggling threat and the best

mix and location of radiation detection equipment to address the threat.

Need Exists for Plan to

Guide U.S. Assistance

Efforts
Page 15 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

While DOE conducted an in-depth assessment of the smuggling threat to

prioritize the border crossings where it is installing portal monitors, State

and DOD have not conducted a similar assessment to prioritize the

countries or border crossings to which they are providing radiation

detection equipment. Numerous agency officials acknowledged that the

U.S. effort to improve countries’ ability to combat nuclear smuggling lacks

adequate planning. For example, the director of State’s Office of Export

Control Cooperation and Sanctions said that ideally the U.S. government

would have a process for determining how much funding to allocate to

each country and what to spend the funds on. Similarly, a DOD official

said that the U.S. effort requires a centralized and integrated leadership

and a redefinition of the role of each agency in order to overcome

coordination issues.

U.S. assistance has, in general, strengthened the ability of numerous

countries throughout the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern

Europe to deter and detect illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. However,

serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and maintaining

radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts. These

problems are largely the result of the lack of oversight and follow-up by

some of the U.S. agencies providing the equipment. Another problem is

that many countries that have received radiation detection equipment are

not reporting information about nuclear materials detected by

U.S.-supplied equipment. Recently, the United States began stationing

advisors in many of the countries receiving the assistance to, among other

things, correct equipment problems.

Officials from 17 recipient countries receiving U.S. assistance to combat

nuclear smuggling told us that the assistance had provided much needed

radiation detection equipment and training. According to officials from

several countries, U.S.-supplied portal monitors installed at border

crossings and handheld detection equipment represent the only assistance

of this type that their countries have received. In other countries the U.S.

assistance has supplemented equipment and training received from other

countries. For example, Latvia has received radiation detection equipment

from Finland, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark, and Estonia has received

equipment from Finland and Germany.

In one country, we visited two border crossings with Russia and saw that a

U.S.- furnished portal monitor and U.S.-supplied handheld detectors and

radiation pagers were being used to inspect cargo and other materials.

U.S. Assistance Has

Helped Countries

Combat Nuclear

Smuggling, but

Problems with

Equipment

Undermine Efforts

Recipient Country Officials

Cite Benefits of U.S.

Assistance
Page 16 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

According to this country’s officials, the U.S.- supplied portal monitors

installed at several border crossings are well-maintained and serviced

regularly. See figures 1 and 2 for U.S. equipment in that country.

Figure 1: U.S.-Installed Portal Monitors

Note: The arrows indicate the location of the portal monitors.
Page 17 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 2: Typical Handheld Radiation Detector Used by Border Guards

In another country we visited, we saw a U.S. Customs Service-furnished

mobile x-ray van equipped with a radiation detector being used to inspect

luggage and other small items entering the country from Russia A few

hours later, the van was driven to another crossing point along the border

where passengers and their possessions were screened at a train station.

Passengers’ bags and other personal items were passed through an x-ray

machine that was part of the van’s screening apparatus. Occasionally, the

border guard who was operating the x-ray machine would examine the

contents of the items that had been x-rayed to determine their exact

content. Figure 3 shows the x-ray van.
Page 18 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Figure 3: U.S.-Supplied Mobile X-Ray Van

Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment

funded by DOE’s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate

Russia’s plans to improve border security. According to these officials, as

of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about 15 percent of

Russia’s 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment is manufactured

in Russia and is subject to site acceptance testing conducted by DOE

national laboratory personnel. This testing is designed to ensure that

portal monitors are placed in an optimal configuration (to maximize

detection capability) and that the equipment is being used as intended.

According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE on

ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment. Russian

customs officials also told us that DOE has done a very credible job of

making follow-up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it is

recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.

During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded pedestrian

portal monitors that were installed at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport

(see fig. 4) as well as a control room that included video equipment and a
Page 19 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected

to the portal monitors. DOE’s detection equipment installed throughout

Russia is monitored by closed circuit cameras. Russian officials tested the

equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. They “planted”—with our

knowledge—a radioactive source in an attaché case that we carried past a

pedestrian portal monitor, which activated an alarm. A computer screen in

the control room displayed our movements past the portal monitor.

Figure 4: U.S.-Funded Portal Monitors at the Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow

U.S. assistance includes training, which U.S. and recipient country officials

told us is part of an integrated approach that is needed to combat nuclear

smuggling. This approach should include equipment, training, and

intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Training is a critical

component of combating nuclear smuggling. For example, border

personnel need to be trained in inspection techniques, laboratory

specialists need to be able to analyze and properly identify material that is

detected and law enforcement officials need to be able to conduct

investigations in order to prosecute, when appropriate, individuals

apprehended in nuclear smuggling cases. U.S. agencies have trained more
Page 20 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

than 3,500 border security and law enforcement personnel in a broad

range of weapons of mass destruction interdiction programs. The U.S.

Customs Service trained over 2,970 customs and law enforcement officers

from more than 25 countries during 1996-2001, and the FBI trained

approximately 600 foreign country personnel during a similar period. DOE

has funded the development of a guidebook printed in Russian for 300

customs officers to help identify equipment that could be used to develop

a nuclear weapon. In addition, DOE, in concert with the Russian Customs

Academy, implemented a mobile training program that provides training to

customs agents in remote locations.

U.S. agency officials provided several examples to show how

U.S.-provided equipment and training have strengthened countries’ ability

to detect and deter nuclear smuggling.

• In July 2001, portal monitors furnished by DOD to one country detected

radioactive material that had been driven in a truck across the border.

According to DOD and country officials, the equipment at the border

crossing had only been operational for 2 days when the incident occurred.

• According to DOE officials, U.S. equipment in Russia has detected more

than 275 instances involving radioactive material. These cases include

contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive

materials that could pose a proliferation concern.

• In 1999, customs officials in a country that had received DOD/Customs

training on inspecting vehicles and passengers for smuggled nuclear

materials seized weapons-usable material that had been hidden inside the

trunk of a car. According to U.S. Customs officials, this case shows the

importance of providing training that combines general border inspection

techniques with specialized training in nuclear materials.

We found numerous problems with various types of radiation detection

equipment that has been provided by DOD, the State Department, and the

U.S. Customs Service. According to officials from these agencies and a

DOE office responsible for installing portal monitors in some countries,

U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling has lacked effective followup to ensure that equipment delivered was properly maintained and used

for the purposes intended. Several officials told us that there has been

inadequate funding for maintenance and training on the use of the

equipment in many countries of the former Soviet Union. U.S. officials

frequently described this practice as “drop and run.” A State Department

official told us that it had always been the responsibility of the recipient

countries to alert the United States when equipment needed to be

Problems with Equipment

Undermine U.S. Assistance

Efforts
Page 21 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

repaired. This official noted, however, that country officials did not

systematically report problems and, as a result, malfunctioning equipment

was sometimes left unrepaired for extended periods of time. He also

noted that until recently there was no consolidated list of all the

equipment that different agencies had provided. He compiled such a list

but could not be certain that all equipment provided under DOD’s

Cooperative Threat Reduction program was included.

At a January 2002 IAEA conference, a DOD official provided information

about problems with U.S.-supplied equipment. He noted that audits found

that detection equipment in several countries had never been used and

remained in storage; expensive high-technology equipment was only used

in the presence of visiting U.S. delegations; and equipment was going

unused because it needed battery replacement, very minor repairs, or

major repairs that required out-of-country servicing. The DOD official

noted that recipient country officials offered numerous reasons why the

equipment was being underutilized or not used at all, including (1) the

equipment was too difficult to use; (2) nobody was trained to use it; (3) the

equipment would be broken; (4) use of the equipment could cause injuries;

(5) repairs were too difficult; (6) no funds had been provided for new

batteries; and (7) a lack of knowledge about where or how to send the

equipment for repairs.

During the course of our work, we also found numerous problems with

U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to many countries, including

the following examples, which are based on, among other things,

discussions with U.S. program officials and representatives of countries

receiving U.S. assistance:

• The condition of equipment provided by the United States at a border

crossing in one country in Eastern Europe has been described as

deplorable, and the equipment was not being used, according to a

November 2001 U.S. embassy memorandum. Another memorandum noted

that according to a customs official from this recipient country, the portal

monitors were not being used because they emitted too much radiation

and posed a health and safety hazard. According to a U.S. official, the

incident indicates how little some recipient country officials know about

the equipment, because the portal monitors do not emit radiation. In

addition, based on a recent inventory, a U.S. official was unable to locate

many radiation pagers furnished to that country. In another country, the

whereabouts of several dozen handheld radiation detectors could not be

determined.
Page 22 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

• About half of the pedestrian portal monitors provided to one country in

the former Soviet Union were never installed or are not operational.

Officials from this country told us that they were given more equipment

then they could use. In addition, the equipment had limited capability to

detect nuclear material.

• Portal monitors delivered to Lithuania were stored in the U.S. embassy

basement for about 2 years because the State Department and the

Lithuanian border organization disagreed about the need for a power

supply that cost $12,600 to operate the equipment. In February 2002, the

monitors were finally installed.

• Equipment worth about $80,000, including radiation protection suits and

pagers, could not be given to Estonia as part of a DOD/FBI training

program because an agreement governing the release of such equipment

had not been finalized. The equipment was placed in an embassy garage

for about 7 months before it was transferred to Estonia in December 2001.

• A portal monitor furnished by the State Department to Bulgaria a couple

of years ago was installed on an unused road that is not expected to open

for another 1-1/2 years. Plans are underway to relocate the equipment.

• In November 2001, a U.S. official visited a border crossing in one country

of the former Soviet Union where a portal monitor had been disconnected.

Country officials told him that it had been shut off because it was

lunchtime and no traffic was being allowed to pass. The monitor is

designed to be operated continuously.

We also found problems with the mobile vans equipped with radiation

detection equipment furnished by the State Department. These vans have

limited utility because they cannot operate effectively in cold climates or

are otherwise not suitable for conditions in some countries. For example,

customs officials from one country told us that the vans (which had a total

cost of about $900,000) they received within the last 2 years had to be

moved to a warmer part of the country. Nevertheless, they told us that the

vans could only be operated about 9 months each year and that even when

operational, they are very fuel inefficient. Officials from another country

told us the van they received about 1 year ago has rarely been used

because of the cold weather and the expense associated with its

operation. They said that the van is now stored in a shipping crate at

customs’ headquarters.

In the past 2 years, the State Department has placed advisors in many of

the countries receiving U.S. assistance to improve program effectiveness.

These advisors, generally retired U.S. Customs Service officials, are

responsible for, among other things, developing, coordinating, and

Country Advisors Trying to

Improve Delivery of U.S.

Assistance
Page 23 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

updating recipient country border security requirements. In addition, they

seek to ensure that the appropriate foreign officials attend training

courses; track the assistance that countries receive from various programs

to avoid duplication of equipment; meet with government ministries in the

recipient countries; and inventory equipment and determine how it is

being used, including assessing its effectiveness. In addition, State is using

the advisors to improve equipment sustainability and facilitate routine

maintenance and equipment repair. Although the State Department funds

them, the advisors work on behalf of all the programs, and DOE and DOD

officials said that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing their

assistance programs. Country officials we met with also said that the

advisors have been effective at identifying program needs and resolving

problems with equipment.

According to DOE, State, and other U.S. officials, in many cases countries

that have received U.S. radiation detection equipment are not

systematically providing information about nuclear materials detected by

U.S.-supplied equipment. As a result, it is difficult to determine the overall

impact and effectiveness of the equipment. While agencies are receiving

feedback on the performance level of equipment, such as whether the

equipment is properly calibrated or performing according to technical

specifications, limited information is provided about the impact of the

equipment—namely to what extent is it detecting weapons-usable and

other types of radioactive material. Two U.S. advisors told us that

recipient country officials have ignored their requests for this type of

information. An official from DOE’s office that installs portal monitors in

some countries told us that his program does not have the means to verify

the effectiveness of portal monitors due to the lack of incident reporting

by some countries. He noted that information about nuclear smuggling

cases varies from country to country and depends on good relationships

between the recipient country’s border security organization and the U.S.

embassy. Officials from DOE’s Second Line of Defense program told us

that they receive information about incidents from their Russian

counterparts on a voluntary basis. However, the reporting is not consistent

and they are not confident that there has been a complete sharing of

information about nuclear materials detected with U.S.-funded equipment.

DOE is seeking to formalize the reporting of information as part of an

overall agreement with Russia on the Second Line of Defense program.

In addition to the problems with the equipment, there are other factors

that impact U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including corruption

in countries’ border organizations and the amount of territory, including

Lack of Consistent

Reporting Hampers U.S.

Efforts to Measure Impact

of Radiation Detection

Equipment

Other Challenges to

Border Security
Page 24 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

borders that are not clearly marked, that requires protection. According to

officials from several recipient countries, corruption is a pervasive

problem within the ranks of border security organizations. For example,

approximately 1,500 Russian customs officers were fired in 1998 for

corruption. Russian customs officials noted that efforts are underway to

root corruption out but that this is a slow process. An official from one

country told us that border security personnel turned off radiation

detection equipment at one border crossing in exchange for a bottle of

alcohol. In fiscal year 2002, the U.S. Customs Service started providing a

new anti-corruption training course. Regarding the challenge posed by the

expanses of territory, numerous recipient country officials told us that it is

impossible to secure every border crossing. Every country has green

borders—expanses of territory that are not patrolled or regulated by

border security personnel. These areas are very attractive to smugglers in

general. In addition, borders are not always clearly marked or well

established following the breakup of the former Soviet Union. A high-level

official from one country’s border guard told us that the biggest problem

he faces is the lack of agreement with Russia over boundaries.

Furthermore, a border security official from another country told us that a

dedicated nuclear smuggler has a 90-percent chance of successfully

defeating his country’s border controls. A customs official from Russia

told us that equipment is a deterrent and must be supported by trained

border personnel, effective law enforcement, and intelligence gathering

operations. He stated that the most effective approach to combating

nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at civilian

and military facilities.

The current multiple-agency approach to providing U.S. assistance to

combat nuclear smuggling is not, in our view, the most effective way to

deliver this assistance. To date, the efforts of the six U.S. agencies

participating in these programs and activities have not been well

coordinated, and there is no single agency that leads the effort to

effectively establish funding priorities and thoroughly assess recipient

country requirements. Coordination is also a problem within agencies

providing assistance. We question why, for example, there are two offices

within the Department of Energy that are providing radiation detection

equipment and two offices within the Department of State that have

funded similar types of equipment for various countries. To ensure the

efficient and effective delivery of assistance and the timely and effective

expenditure of program funds, we believe that the development of a

governmentwide plan is needed. Such a plan could identify a unified set of

program goals and priorities and define agency roles and responsibilities;

Conclusions
Page 25 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

determine program cost estimates; establish time frames for effectively

spending program funds; develop strategies to maintain and sustain the

operation of equipment; and develop exit strategies for each country

receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for

equipment maintenance to the countries.

We are also concerned about how U.S. equipment is being used by the

recipient countries. While foreign officials told us that U.S.-provided

equipment had improved their ability to detect radioactive material, some

equipment has not been well maintained, adequately accounted for, or

installed on a timely basis. A fundamental issue surrounding nuclear

smuggling is the sharing of information about incidents that occur in each

country. Currently, the agencies that are providing the equipment have

limited access to this type of information. There is currently no systematic

effort to obtain this data, and the United States depends on the willingness

of the countries to voluntary provide information. It is difficult to assess

the impact and effectiveness of the U.S.- supplied equipment unless data

are routinely obtained and analyzed. We believe that U.S. agency

personnel must continue to make the case to each country that sharing

such data is of critical importance to the success of the U.S. program and

countries’ efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.

We recommend that the Secretary of State take the lead in facilitating the

development of a governmentwide plan to help other countries develop an

integrated approach to combat nuclear smuggling. The plan should be

developed in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy

(working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security

Administration), and the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, as

well as the heads of other federal agencies participating in this effort. The

plan should, at a minimum, identify (1) a unified set of program goals and

priorities, including defining participating agencies’ roles and

responsibilities; (2) overall program cost estimates; (3) time frames for

effectively spending program funds; (4) performance measures;

(5) strategies to maintain and sustain the operation of the equipment,

including cost estimates; and (6) an exit strategy for each country

receiving assistance, including a plan for transferring responsibility for

equipment maintenance to the host country.

In concert with the development of the plan, we believe there are other

steps that could be taken immediately to improve U.S. efforts. We think

that this is an opportune time for agencies with duplicative or overlapping

Recommendations
Page 26 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

responsibilities to consolidate their efforts under a single agency program

office. To that end, we recommend that the

• Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Administrator of the National

Nuclear Security Administration, consolidate radiation detection

equipment activities in one DOE office, preferably within the Second Line

of Defense program and

• Secretary of State consolidate all border security and nuclear smuggling

efforts under one program office.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, in consultation

with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,

and the Secretaries of State and Defense

• strengthen efforts to obtain a full accounting of the equipment that is in

each country, including the handheld radiation detection equipment;

• ensure that equipment is installed in a timely fashion and is adequately

maintained; and

• seek recipient country assurances that information about nuclear

materials detected by U.S.-supplied equipment is shared with U.S. agencies

on a timely basis.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State,

Energy, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; and

the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their review and comment. The

Coast Guard and FBI had no comments on the draft report. DOD provided

technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate.

State’s, DOE’s, and Customs Service’s written comments are presented in

appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively. The agencies agreed with the facts

presented in the report and State specifically said that it agreed with the

report’s conclusions and recommendations. Customs suggested that we

reword our recommendation to specifically include it as one of the

agencies to develop a governmentwide plan to combat nuclear smuggling.

DOE did not comment on the conclusions and recommendations.

In commenting on the report, the Department of State agreed that

interagency coordination to help other countries combat nuclear

smuggling can be strengthened. The State Department noted that, per our

recommendation, it is taking the lead in facilitating the development of a

governmentwide plan to provide detection equipment and maintenance

support. State also commented, however, that the report gave insufficient

weight to the progress that has been made in the past 1-1⁄2 years to improve

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 27 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

coordination and planning. Specifically, State cited its establishment of

the Office of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which is

responsible for, among other things, managing and coordinating U.S.

government export control and related border security programs. In

addition, the Office chairs an interagency working group that evaluates,

prioritizes, and approves projects that U.S. agencies undertake to improve

countries’ export control and related border security capabilities. The

Department also stated that it has taken steps to improve internal

coordination as well as accountability for equipment previously provided

to other countries and noted that the country advisors play a prominent

role in these matters. Regarding these points, we recognized in the draft

report that State had improved coordination through an interagency group

that it chairs. Further, we noted that recipient country officials told us

that the advisors play a valuable role in implementing their assistance

programs. In addition, we recognized in the draft report that the Office of

Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions has improved coordination.

However, we continue to believe that interagency coordination has been

inadequate and needs to be improved. State acknowledged this point in its

comments and said that a more coherent, better coordinated approach to

providing radiation detection equipment is needed. The Department

concurred with all of our recommendations and said that it will work with

other agencies to implement them.

In its comments, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security

Administration agreed that it is difficult to assess the impact and

effectiveness of U.S.-supplied equipment unless data from the recipient

countries are routinely obtained and analyzed. DOE believes that sharing

data is critical to the success of the U.S. program and countries’ efforts to

combat nuclear smuggling. DOE also endorsed the need for a more

uniform approach to radiation monitoring at countries’ borders. The

Department wanted to clarify that it has three programs that operate in

this area: the Second Line of Defense program that has historically focused

on Russia; the International Export Control program that deals with

equipment that has both civilian and military applications, material and

technology; and a program that uses Department of State funding to

maintain and install equipment outside of Russia. DOE also pointed out

that radiation detection monitors installed by other U.S. agencies are not

as sensitive to special nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched

uranium) as the monitors funded by DOE, and have limited or no ability to

detect shielded plutonium. Regarding DOE’s point about its different

programs, we noted in the draft report that DOE has three separate

programs under way to combat nuclear smuggling. We highlighted the

Second Line of Defense program, however, because it is DOE’s primary
Page 28 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Regarding DOE’s comment about the

limitations of equipment installed by other U.S. programs, we recognized

in the draft report that DOE has installed more sophisticated portal

monitors in Russia and that the State Department has installed less

sophisticated equipment in other countries.

The U.S. Customs Service noted that the U.S. government’s

nonproliferation efforts are not limited to nuclear materials, but instead

cover the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, including

chemical and biological weapons. Customs also noted that although our

report focused on the use of technology to detect nuclear or radioactive

materials, the importance of highly skilled and trained border inspection

personnel should not be underestimated. Finally, because Customs has

been the largest recipient of funds appropriated for nuclear smuggling

assistance, it suggested that our recommendation be reworded to include

Customs specifically as one of the agencies to develop a governmentwide

plan to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling. While we agree

with Customs’ assertion that U.S. nonproliferation activities are aimed at a

broad range of threats, our review focused only on the nuclear material

smuggling component of this effort. We agree with Customs’ point about

highly skilled and trained personnel, and we recognized in the draft report

that training is a critical component and should be part of an integrated

approach to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, we have reworded our

recommendation to specifically identify Customs as one of the agencies

that should develop a governmentwide plan to help other countries

combat nuclear smuggling.

To determine program expenditures, we obtained budget, obligation and

expenditure data through fiscal year 2001 from the six agencies

participating in the program—the Departments of Energy, State, and

Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. Our task was complicated because each agency

collects and reports its financial data differently. We attempted to

standardize the reporting format for each agency and verify the accuracy

of the data by crosschecking financial records maintained by each agency.

When we found discrepancies, we brought them to the attention of the

agencies. The agencies’ data did not allow us to aggregate cost on a

country-by-country basis because data was generally reported on a

project, not country, basis. Our task was further complicated because the

Department of State, which is responsible for tracking funds it has

received for border security assistance, did not have an adequate financial

management system in place to report program expenditures. Department

Scope and

Methodology
Page 29 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

of State officials responsible for monitoring program expenditures are

aware of this deficiency and are taking steps to improve its current

financial management system.

To assess how well U.S. assistance is coordinated, we met with program

officials from each of the agencies providing assistance and reviewed

pertinent documents, including individual agency’s assistance plans, as

available. We assessed coordination through the interagency group headed

by the Department of State and met with the lead official of that effort--

the Director of Export Control Cooperation and Sanctions--and members

of his staff. We also discussed coordination issues with U.S. advisors

stationed in countries receiving U.S. assistance including Azerbaijan,

Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Several of these advisors were responsible for tracking assistance efforts

in more than one country. For example, the advisor stationed in Latvia

was also responsible for Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland.

We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the

effectiveness of the U.S. assistance. We visited Estonia, Latvia, Poland,

and Russia to obtain a first hand look at U.S. radiation detection

equipment installed at different border crossings and meet with officials

responsible for border security, law enforcement, and export controls. We

also attended a technical conference on radiation detection equipment

sponsored by the IAEA in January 2002, where we met with officials from

13 additional countries that had received U.S. assistance: Azerbaijan,

Belarus, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Republic of

Macedonia, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.

We also met with representatives from the IAEA, the U.S. Mission to

International Organizations in Vienna, and the U.S. embassies in Latvia,

Estonia, Poland, and Russia to discuss nuclear smuggling. We obtained

technical information on radiation detection equipment from DOE;

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos National

Laboratory; the Savannah River Site; and one equipment manufacturer,

TSA Systems Ltd.

We conducted our review between May 2001 and April 2002 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the

Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Page 30 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Administration; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the

Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; the Director, Federal Bureau of

Investigation; the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; the Director, Office of

Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We

will make copies available to others upon request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at

(202) 512-3841. Major contributors to this report include Gene Aloise,

Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis.

Sincerely yours,

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 31 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

This appendix provides information about nuclear material smuggling

incidents over the past decade. It focuses primarily on 20 incidents

involving weapons-usable nuclear material. The information was obtained

from, among other sources, data provided by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA)1

 and the Department of Energy.

Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit

trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to

IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural

uranium, depleted uranium, thorium,2

 plutonium, and uranium enriched in

the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium3

—

known as weapons usable material—are considered to pose the greatest

proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In

1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit

trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of

IAEA’s member states, currently participate in the database. As of

December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the

illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material.

According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the information

has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact from the

reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents

reported by IAEA, 17 involved either highly enriched uranium or

plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons-usable

material occurred during 1993-95. The remaining cases occurred during

1999-2001.

IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. officials provided us with information about

20 cases involving the smuggling of weapons-usable material since 1992.

Officials told us that the actual number of smuggling cases involving

weapons-usable material is probably larger than what is currently being

reported because countries are not always willing to share sensitive

 1

 IAEA is an autonomous organization affiliated with the United Nations. Its objectives are

to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to verify that nuclear material under its

supervision or control is not used to further any military purpose.

2

 Thorium is a radioactive material that is used in a wide array of products and processes.

Handling and disposing of thorium is a challenge because it is radioactive and produces

radon gas when it decays.

3

 Highly enriched uranium means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope

U-235. Uranium enriched in U-235 above the level found in nature (.071 percent) but less

than 20 percent is called low enriched uranium.

Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Incidents Involving

Weapons Usable

Nuclear Material
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 32 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

nuclear smuggling information. Furthermore, the premature public

disclosure of information could undermine an ongoing criminal

investigation or could be politically embarrassing. Another factor that

affects the number of cases reported is the credibility of the information.

DOE officials who analyze smuggling cases told us that a significant

amount of time must be spent analyzing a particular incident before it can

be deemed credible, and many of the reported incidents turn out to be

unsubstantiated. For example, several reported cases over the years have

been scams whereby a “smuggler” has been apprehended trying to sell

material that is purported to be weapons-usable but is not. Regardless of

the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials stated that the

threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not be underestimated.

The head of IAEA’s Office of Physical Protection and Material Security

told us that every reported case should be taken seriously. Further, she

noted that countries need to more systematically report smuggling

incidents so that better assessments can be performed.

Officials from IAEA, DOE, and other U.S. agencies provided several

observations about the 20 incidents involving weapons-usable nuclear

material.

• Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the

former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.

• From the early 1990s through about 1998, the nuclear material was seized

primarily in Russia and eastern and western Europe. In the past few years,

there appears to have been an increase in trafficking in nuclear material

through the Caucasus (Georgia), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan), Greece, and

Turkey. According to IAEA, it is uncertain whether the increase represents

more trafficking in this material or better detection and reporting of

activities that may have been going on in earlier years.

• Most of the smuggling incidents involved relatively small quantities of

weapons-usable material that were insufficient to construct a nuclear

bomb. In some cases, the small quantities of material involved may

indicate that that the seller was trying to attract a potential buyer with a

“sample size” quantity of material. In other cases, it appears doubtful that

the traffickers had or claimed access to larger quantities of nuclear

material.

• The incidents do not appear to be part of an organized criminal or terrorist

activity or organization.

• In most of the incidents, the weapons-usable material was seized as a

result of a police investigation. The material was not detected by

equipment or personnel stationed at border crossings. One notable

exception involved material detected by customs agents at a Bulgarian
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 33 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

border crossing. In addition, the Bulgarian incident represents one of a

few reported instances where the nuclear material was shielded or

protected to avoid detection.

Table 2 provides information about the 20 incidents involving the

smuggling of weapons-usable material since 1992. A brief discussion of

some of the significant incidents follows the table.

Table 2: Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material since 1992

Date Source of material

Country where

material seized Material/quantity How material was found

May 1992 Russia (Luch

Scientific Production

Association)

Russia 1.5 kilograms (90 percent highly

enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

May 1993 Russia Lithuania 0.1 kilogram (50 percent highly

enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

July 1993 Russia Russia 1.8 kilograms (36 percent highly

enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

November 1993 Russia Russia 4.5 kilograms (20 percent highly

enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

March 1994 Russia Russia 3.05 kilograms (90 percent

highly enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

May 1994 Unspecified Germany 0.006 kilograms plutonium-239 Discovered by police

investigation

June 1994 Russia Germany 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent

highly enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

July 1994 Russia Germany 0.00024 kilograms plutonium Discovered by police

investigation

August 1994 Russia Germany 0.4 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police

investigation

December 1994 Russia Czech Republic 2.7 kilograms (87.7 percent

highly enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

June 1995 Russia Czech Republic 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent

highly enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

June 1995 Russia Czech Republic 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent

highly enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

June 1995 Russia Russia 1.7 kilograms (21 percent highly

enriched uranium)

Discovered by police

investigation

May 1999 Russia Bulgaria 0.004 kilograms of highly

enriched uranium

Interdiction at border by

Bulgarian customs.

October 1999 Unspecified Kyrgyzstan 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police

investigation

April 2000 Unspecified but

Russia suspected

Georgia 0.9 kilograms of highly enriched

uranium (30 percent)

Possible combination of

radiation detection equipment

at border and police

investigation

September 2000 Possibly Russia

and/or Ukraine

Georgia 0.0004 kilograms of plutonium Discovered by police

investigation
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 34 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Date Source of material

Country where

material seized Material/quantity How material was found

December 2000 Germany Germany Less than 1 milligram of

plutonium

Radioactive contamination

disclosed in a test.

January 2001 Unspecified Greece Approximately 0.003 kilograms

of plutonium

Discovered by police

investigation

July 2001 Unspecified France About 0.005 kilograms of highly

enriched uranium

(approximately 80 percent

enriched)

Discovered by police

investigation

Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered weapons-usable material.

One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about

0.04 ounces, or the weight of a paperclip.

Source: Various U.S. agencies and international organizations.

This incident involved a chemical engineer and long-time employee of the

State Research Institute, Scientific Production Association (also known as

Luch) which is located 22 miles from Moscow.4

 Beginning in May 1992,

over a 5-month period, the individual smuggled out of the institute small

quantities of highly enriched uranium totaling 1.5 kilograms. In October

1992, the engineer was arrested because police suspected him of stealing

equipment from the Luch facility. Once in custody, the police discovered

the nuclear material that he had stolen. The individual did not have a

specific buyer in mind, but was trying to determine if there was a market

for the stolen nuclear material. He was tried before a Russian court and

received 3 years’ probation.

In May 1993, Lithuanian authorities recovered 4.4 tons of beryllium in a

smuggling investigation. Beryllium is a metal that is used in the production

of, among other things, x-ray tubes, lasers, computers, aircraft parts,

nuclear reactors, and nuclear weapons. When Lithuanian authorities

seized the material, they discovered that some of the beryllium

(141 kilograms) was contaminated with approximately 0.1 kilogram of

highly enriched uranium. There was no evidence that the individuals

involved were aware that the beryllium contained the enriched uranium.

Some reports indicated that the beryllium originated at the Institute of

Physics and Power Engineering in Russia. This institute is involved in the

 4

 This institute is involved in developing space and mobile reactors, including the TOPAZ

reactor used in Russian satellites. Luch has several tons of weapons-usable material on site.

Luch Scientific

Production

Association (Russia),

1992

Vilnius, Lithuania,

1993
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 35 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

research and development of nuclear power reactors and employs about

5,000 people and possesses several tons of weapons-usable material.

In July 1993, two Russian naval enlisted personnel stole two fresh fuel

rods from a storage facility in Murmansk, Russia. These rods were for

Russian naval propulsion reactors that power submarines and contained

36-percent enriched uranium. (Uranium enriched at 20 percent or greater

is considered to be weapons usable material.) The amount of material

totaled about 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Russian security

officers discovered the missing material and apprehended the individuals

before the material left the Murmansk area. One of the individuals arrested

was a guard at the facility and was suspected by authorities after the

material was missing. The two enlisted personnel who were caught

implicated two Russian naval officers in the plan. However, at the ensuing

trial only the two enlisted personnel were convicted and sentenced to

prison terms of 4 and 5 years.

In November 1993, approximately 4.5 kilograms of 20-percent enriched

uranium, intended for use in submarine propulsion reactors, was stolen

from a fuel storage facility in the Sevmorput shipyard near Murmansk,

Russia. Three individuals were arrested in connection with the theft,

including two naval officers. The group stored the fuel rods in a garage for

several months while they were looking for a prospective buyer. The three

individuals were arrested and two of the men received 3-1/2-year

sentences while the third person was acquitted.

In March 1994, three men were arrested in St. Petersburg, Russia for trying

to sell approximately 3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90 percent. The

material was allegedly smuggled from the Elektrostal Production

Association which is located in the Moscow suburbs. The facility produces

low-enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power reactors and also has

the capacity to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear powered

icebreakers and submarines. The material was smuggled out of the facility

and approximately 500 grams of the material were found inside a glass jar

in a refrigerator in one of individual’s homes.

Murmansk, Russia,

1993

Murmansk, Russia,

1993

St. Petersburg, Russia,

1994
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 36 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

In May 1994, German police discovered a lead container containing 0.006

kilograms of highly concentrated plutonium-239 in the home of a German

citizen. The material found in the container was a mixture of many

components, including aluminum, silicon, mercury, zirconium, broken

glass, and brush bristles as well as the plutonium. The presence of

mercury in the mixture suggests that the material may have been used as

part of a red mercury scam. 5

 In November 1995, the German national was

sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison for violating arms control laws. The

sentence was added onto a 3-year term he was already serving time for

counterfeiting.

In June 1994, less than 0.001 kilogram of highly enriched uranium was

recovered in Landshut, Germany, a city near Munich. This material, along

with 120 low enriched uranium fuel pellets, was found as a result of a

police undercover operation. The material was seized in an undercover

police operation. Three individuals apprehended were citizens of the

Slovak Republic and one was a resident of Germany. A German court

sentenced several of the individuals to probationary terms but one of the

group’s leaders was sentenced to 2 years in prison.

In 1994, undercover German police acting as prospective buyers

intercepted approximately 0.4 kilograms of plutonium at the Munich

Airport. It is believed that the material originated in Russia’s Institute of

Physics and Power Engineering. The institute, which is operated by

Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy, is involved in the research and

development of nuclear power reactors and possesses several tons of

weapons-usable material. The material was in a suitcase that had arrived

on a flight from Moscow. The individuals involved in the smuggling case

were from Colombia and Spain. A German court sentenced the Colombian

national to almost 5 years in prison and the Spanish nationals received

prison sentences of between 3 and 4 years. All of the individuals were

expelled from Germany after serving half of their sentences. By February

1996, Russian authorities had arrested several Russian accomplices,

including a key figure involved in the theft of the material from the

institute.

 5

 According to DOE, red mercury has been used in over 50 scams since 1979. Red mercury

is a material that would-be smugglers have tried to sell claiming that the material can be

used to produce a nuclear weapon.

Tengen, Germany,

1994

Landshut, Germany,

1994

Munich, Germany,

1994
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 37 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

In December 1994, police in Prague, Czech Republic, seized approximately

2.7 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. The material is believed to have

been stolen from the Russian Institute of Physics and Power Engineering.

The individuals involved included a Tajikistan national, a former Russian

nuclear institute worker, and at least one Czech national. The material was

brought into the Czech Republic on a train and then hidden for about

6 months while the individuals involved tried to sell it. They were arrested

after Czech authorities received an anonymous tip and a Czech judge gave

several members of the group prison sentences ranging from about 18

months to 8 years.

Two related incidents were reported in June 1995 and involved the seizure

of highly enriched uranium in the Czech Republic. According to available

information, the composition of the material and its location were linked

to the 1994 Prague and Landshut incidents. In both instances, the small

quantities of material involved indicated that it was a sample that could be

used to attract a potential buyer.

In May 1999, Bulgarian customs officials at the Rousse border checkpoint

seized a vial containing about 0.004 kilograms of highly enriched uranium

on the Bulgarian/Romanian border. Rousse is a city that serves as

Bulgaria’s principal river port and is a transportation hub for road and rail

traffic. The material was hidden in a shielded (lead) container inside the

trunk of a car being driven by a Turkish citizen. The driver attempted to

sell the material first in Turkey and then traveled through Bulgaria on his

way to Romania, where he planned to find a buyer. A Bulgarian customs

agent, using standard profiling techniques, suspected that the driver was a

smuggler. A search of the driver’s papers revealed a document describing

uranium. When the driver attempted to bribe the customs officer, his car

was thoroughly inspected and the officer eventually discovered the vial

containing the weapons-usable nuclear material. Bulgarian scientists

concluded that the material was highly enriched uranium. Although the

source of the material is not certain, it is probable that it came from the

Mayak Production Association in Russia. This large complex produces

special isotopes used for industrial, agricultural, and medical purposes and

also reprocesses naval and civil nuclear power reactor fuel for plutonium

and uranium recovery.

Prague, Czech

Republic, 1994

Rousse, Bulgaria,

1999
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 38 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

In October 1999, two persons were arrested in the act of selling a small

metallic disk containing 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium. The item was

analyzed by the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Kazakhstan and the two

individuals arrested were convicted and sentenced to prison.

In April 2000, Georgian police arrested four persons in Batumi, Georgia,

for unauthorized possession of 0.9 kilogram of highly enriched uranium

fuel pellets. Batumi is a seashore resort at the Black Sea located along the

Georgia-Turkey border. According to one press report, the material may

have been smuggled from Russia. The pellets mass and shape, together

with the reported enrichment level, suggest that the pellets were produced

for use in a commercial or experimental fast breeder reactor. Another

report also stated that the smugglers were detected when they crossed the

Russian border into Georgia, possibly by radiation monitoring equipment

and were then trailed to the city of Batumi, where they were apprehended.

It is believed that the individuals were trying to smuggle the material into

Turkey.

In September 2000, three persons were arrested at Tbilisi airport for

attempting to sell a small quantity of mixed powder containing about

0.0004 kilograms of plutonium and 0.0008 kilograms of low enriched

uranium, as well as a 0.002 kilogram sample of natural uranium. According

to press reports, an official in the Georgian Ministry of State Security said

that two individuals arrested were Georgian citizens, and the third was

from Armenia. The individuals said they had brought the uranium and

plutonium from Russia and Ukraine to sell it.

In December 2000, a worker at a closed spent fuel reprocessing plant

removed radioactively contaminated items from the facility, deliberately

evading radiation safety monitors. The contaminated items, described as

rags and a test tube filled with aging waste material, contained a very

minute amount of plutonium.

In January 2001, police found a cache of about 300 metallic plates buried

in a forest in northern Greece. The material in the plates was determined

to be plutonium and a radioactive source known as americium. According

to one report, the material had been smuggled into Greece either from one

of the countries of the former Soviet Union or Bulgaria. Each plate

contained a small quantity of plutonium but the total amount was about

Kara-Balta,

Kyrgyzstan, 1999

Batumi, Georgia, 2000

Tbilisi, Georgia, 2000

Germany, 2000

Greece, 2001
Appendix I: Information on Nuclear

Smuggling Incidents

Page 39 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

0.003 kilograms. An official from Greece’s atomic energy commission said

that the quantity of nuclear material found was insufficient to build a

nuclear weapon but the material posed a health hazard. A law

enforcement officer speculated that the individuals who buried the metal

plates were probably waiting for a potential buyer.

In July 2001, police seized several grams of highly enriched uranium and

arrested three suspects in Paris, France. According to preliminary reports,

the enrichment level was about 80 percent, but results of laboratory

analysis have not yet been reported to the IAEA. One of the suspects had

recently completed a prison sentence for fraud charges, and the other two

reportedly were citizens of Cameroon. According to one press account,

French police found the material encased in a glass bulb that was stored in

a lead cylinder.

France, 2001
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 40 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

This appendix provides additional information about each of the six

agencies that are providing assistance to combat nuclear smuggling.

DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear

material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the

International Export Control program. From fiscal year 1997 through 2001,

DOE spent $11.2 million on the Second Line of Defense program, including

$2.7 million provided by the State Department, to install 70 portal monitors

at eight border crossings in Russia and provide 20 handheld radiation

detectors. The eight border crossings include an airport in Moscow, six

seaports and one railroad crossing. The eight border crossings are the first

of close to 60 sites that DOE has included in the Second Line of Defense

program based on a study in which DOE evaluated the need for radiation

detection equipment at over 300 border crossings in Russia. DOE

prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase the

risk that potential smugglers would use those border crossings to smuggle

nuclear material out of Russia. For example, the study placed a higher

priority on border crossings that are close to Russian facilities that store

weapons-usable nuclear material or to potential markets for smuggled

nuclear material. DOE began work at two additional border crossings in

Russia in fiscal year 2001 and 17 additional border crossings in fiscal year

2002. DOE expects that it will complete 12 of the sites in fiscal year 2002.

DOE officials said that they have taken a number of steps to ensure that

radiation detection equipment is operated and maintained and that Russia

is using the equipment for the intended purpose. First, DOE uses

equipment manufactured in Russia by a Russian contractor in order to

facilitate equipment installation and maintenance. Then, after the Russian

contractor installs the systems, DOE tests the equipment at the border

crossings to ensure that the portal monitors are placed in an optimal

configuration and calibrated correctly and that they are installed as

agreed. For example, DOE conducted testing in October 2000 and found

that some portal monitors were not configured optimally or calibrated

correctly and that some pedestrian and vehicle crossings did not have

radiation detection equipment. DOE officials said that they withheld final

payment for installation until the contractor submitted evidence showing

that any problems had been resolved.

According to DOE officials, the Russian government is strongly committed

to the Second Line of Defense program and has provided DOE with good

access to the border crossings where equipment is being installed. For

example, in October 2000, Russian officials allowed DOE to participate in

Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Department of Energy
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 41 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

a search of a truck that set off an alarm at one of the portal monitors

provided by DOE. (The search revealed that the truck was transporting

fertilizer, which can cause a false alarm.) In addition, DOE estimated that

Russia spent $300,000 to install 14 pedestrian portal monitors at another

terminal of the airport in Moscow.

DOE budgeted $10 million for the Second Line of Defense program and

spent $8.5 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001, and the program

received $12 million in fiscal year 2002 appropriations.1

 The State

Department provided a total of $7.5 million to support the Second Line of

Defense program—$5.1 million to pay the Russian enterprise that

manufactures and installs the portal monitors and $2.4 million that it

provided to DOE. Of the $5.1 million for the Russian contractor, State

spent $2.6 million through fiscal year 2001.2

 Of the $2.4 million that it

received from State (through the Export Control and Related Border

Security Assistance program), DOE spent $0.1 million through fiscal year

2001 and carried over $2.3 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

DOE spent $22 million from fiscal year 1992 through 2001, including

$2.4 million from the State Department, on assistance to countries of the

former Soviet Union—primarily Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—to

improve their ability to control the export of goods that could be used in

the development of nuclear weapons. The assistance provided under this

program falls into three general categories: export licensing, industry

awareness and compliance, and border enforcement. The export licensing

assistance helps establish the regulations and procedures for issuing

licenses to enterprises that allow them to export their goods and

technologies. For example, DOE is providing Ukraine and Kazakhstan with

computerized export control licensing systems that are specific to nuclear

goods. Industry awareness and compliance consists primarily of

workshops for enterprises that need training in understanding the export

control system and complying with export control laws and regulations.

DOE officials estimate that about 1,000 or so enterprises in Russia, most of

 1

 DOE carried over $0.9 million in unspent funds into fiscal year 2002 and transferred

$0.7 million from Second Line of Defense to the International Export Control Program in

fiscal year 2001 when DOE made the Second Line of Defense program part of the Material

Protection, Control, and Accounting program.

2

 The $5.1 million includes $3 million from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and

$2.1 million from the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program. The

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has a contract with the Russian enterprise and

manages the entire $5.1 million in funding.
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 42 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

which are spin-offs of the nuclear weapons complex, need such training.

Border enforcement assistance consists of equipment and training to help

customs officials stationed at border crossings recognize nuclear-related

good and technologies that require an export license before they can be

exported from the country.

Table 3 shows a breakdown of International Export Control Program

expenditures by country and source of funding. State’s Export Control and

Related Border Security Assistance program provided a total of $4.9

million through fiscal year 2001 to support the program, of which DOE

spent $2.4 million through fiscal year 2001 and carried over $2.5 million in

unspent funds into fiscal year 2002.

Table 3: International Export Control Program Expenditures through Fiscal Year

2001

Dollars in millions

Country DOE funds State funds Total

Russia $4.6 $0.5 $5.1

Ukraine 2.1 0.4 2.4

Kazakhstan 1.3 0.6 1.9

Baltic states < 0.1 0.2 0.2

Regional/other 11.7 0.8 12.5

Total $19.6 $2.4 $22.0

Note: Regional/other expenditures includes $9.3 million spent from fiscal years 1992 through 1997

that DOE was not able to break down by country.

Source: DOE.

In addition to the Second Line of Defense program and the International

Export Control Program, DOE spent $0.5 million on the Special

Technologies Program to install portal monitors in countries other than

Russia with funding from the State Department Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Fund. State’s Export Control and Related Border Security

Assistance program also provided $0.5 million to this office to repair and

maintain portal monitors already installed, but DOE had not spent any of

this funding as of the end of fiscal year 2001. DOE also spent $1.3 million

in DOD funds to support DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

For example, DOE’s Los Alamos National Laboratory helped to install

portal monitors in one country in the former Soviet Union.
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 43 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

The State Department has provided assistance to combat nuclear

smuggling primarily through two programs—the Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and Related Border Security

Assistance program. In addition, the Georgia Border Security and Law

Enforcement program has a small radiation detection component. State

established the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund in 1994 to

provide funding for unexpected needs or opportunities in U.S.

nonproliferation efforts. Of the $115 million the fund received from fiscal

year 1994 through 2001, State spent $8.5 million on assistance to combat

nuclear smuggling. State provided radiation detection equipment and other

assistance to 22 countries including vehicle portal monitors, mobile vans

equipped with

x-ray machines and radiation detection equipment, handheld radiation

detectors, dosimeters, and radiation pagers.3

 The projects also provided

customs officials and border guards with other equipment such as fiber

optic scopes to search fuel tanks, special equipment to detect chemicals

and metals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction, night vision

equipment, and radios.

Other Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund projects included

assessments of countries’ ability to interdict nuclear smuggling,

multinational conferences on the threat of nuclear material smuggling and

techniques for analyzing seized nuclear material, and course development

for hands-on training in interdicting nuclear smuggling offered at Pacific

Northwest National Laboratory. Although State has begun to consolidate

assistance for combating nuclear smuggling under the Export Control and

Related Border Security Assistance program, it continues to provide some

assistance through the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. In

particular, in fiscal year 2001, State approved a $1.3 million

Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund project to install vehicle portal

monitors at up to 16 sites in one country, and a $0.5 million project to

assist another country upgrade their domestically produced portal

monitors to better detect weapons-usable nuclear material. State also

provided $4.3 million from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to

DOE and the U.S. Customs Service to implement part of the assistance—

$3 million to DOE’s Second Line of Defense Program in Russia, $0.5

million to DOE’s Special Technologies Program to install the portal

 3

 The countries included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia,

Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland,

Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Department of State
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 44 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

monitors provided by State, and $0.8 million to the U.S. Customs Service

to help State provide equipment and training to the recipient countries.

From fiscal year 1998 through 2001, the State Department allocated

$86.6 million for the Export Control and Related Border Security

Assistance program. State spent $2.7 million of that amount and provided

$40.2 million to the U.S. Customs Service, $4.4 million to the U.S. Coast

Guard, $4.9 million to DOE’s International Export Control Program,

$4.5 million to DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, and $0.5 million to

DOE’s Special Technologies Program, which installs and maintains portal

monitors in countries other than Russia on behalf of State.4

 After

September 11, State received an emergency supplemental appropriation of

$24.7 million for the program. State’s own $2.7 million in expenditures

included $0.9 million for three vans equipped with radiation detectors and

x-ray machines for Russia, $0.2 million for a van for another country, and

$0.4 million to support a multinational conference on export controls and

travel expenses of program personnel. State also spent $0.7 million to hire

outside firms to conduct audits of the funding it provided to other

agencies and evaluations of assistance provided to three countries that

State considers more advanced in terms of their ability to interdict nuclear

smuggling. To provide criteria for evaluating the capability of countries

receiving U.S. assistance to interdict smuggling, State’s Office of Export

Control Cooperation and Sanctions, which manages the program,

developed a list of export control system standards by which to evaluate

export control systems in host countries. The standards include criteria

for evaluating the ability of countries to interdict smuggling using

radiation detection equipment at border crossings.

State has allocated funds for the Export Control and Related Border

Security Assistance program primarily from the FREEDOM Support Act,

which is targeted to the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet

Union, and from the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and

Related Programs account. Table 4 shows funding levels and sources for

export control and related border security assistance from fiscal year 1998

through 2001.

 4

 State also used the Export Control program to provide $15.9 million to Department of

Commerce assistance to improve countries’ export control systems and $0.8 million to

DOD to update an export control computer system that the Cooperative Threat Reduction

program provided to one country.
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 45 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Table 4: Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program Funding,

Fiscal Year 1998-2001

Dollars in millions

1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,

Demining and Related Programs

$3.0 $5.0 $14.5 $19.1 $41.6

FREEDOM Support Act 0 0 15.0 21.0 36.0

Other 0 4.0 5.0 0 9.0

Emergency supplemental appropriation 0 0 0 24.7 24.7

Total $3.0 $9.0 $34.5 $64.8 $111.3

Source: State Department.

In addition to the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export

Control and Related Border Security Assistance program, State’s Georgia

Border Security and Law Enforcement program provides some radiation

detection assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling. The Georgia

program focuses more broadly on developing the country’s border

infrastructure, assisting it to gain control of its border including its

seacoast, and strengthening border security against any type of crime such

as drug smuggling. One of the objectives of the program is also to

strengthen the country’s border security against nuclear smuggling.

Customs, which manages the program for State, received a total of

$71.1 million from State and spent $38.3 million through fiscal year 2001,

of which $0.2 million was for radiation detection equipment including two

portal monitors and 44 handheld radiation detectors.

From fiscal year 1993 to about 1998, the DOD Cooperative Threat

Reduction program spent $16 million on assistance to five countries. In

addition, DOD provided $1.3 million to DOE and $1.1 million to the U.S.

Customs Service to implement some of the assistance. Of the $16 million,

DOD spent $1 million on radiation detection equipment including

$0.9 million for 36 pedestrian portal monitors and 100 handheld radiation

detectors for one country in the former Soviet Union and $0.1 million for

100 handheld radiation detectors for another country. The $10.2 million

worth of other equipment that DOD provided consisted a range of items to

enable the countries to better patrol their borders, conduct searches for

smuggled contraband, and equip their border posts. For example, DOD

provided vans equipped with x-ray systems (but not radiation detectors) to

search cargo to two countries, boats to two other countries for patrolling

their coasts, and 50 contraband detection kits to another country with

tools such as fiber optic scopes to search fuel tanks. See table 5 for a

Department of

Defense
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 46 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

breakdown of expenditures by country and category of assistance to

combat nuclear smuggling.

Table 5: Cooperative Threat Reduction Expenditures through Fiscal Year 2001

Dollars in millions

Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus Georgia Total

Radiation detection

equipment

0 0 $0.1 $0.9 0 $1.0

Other equipment 0 $2.3 4.2 2.6 $1.0 10.2

Program

management

<0 .1 2.1 0.4 2.2 0.1 4.8

Total $<0.1 $4.4 $4.7 $5.7 $1.1 $16.0

Source: DOD.

DOD spent $10.2 million from fiscal year 1997 through 2001 on the

International Counterproliferation Program to provide training and

equipment to customs, border guard, and law enforcement personnel in

17 countries. The International Counterproliferation Program includes a

program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service, which received

$2.1 million from DOD to provide assistance, and another program in

cooperation with the FBI, which received $1 million. The DOD/Customs

program provides instruction on the detection, identification, and

investigation of nuclear smuggling. The training comes with equipment

packages that include radiation pagers and tools for searching persons and

vehicles. The DOD/FBI program provides training and equipment with an

emphasis on investigating and responding to nuclear smuggling incidents.

Also under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DOD spent

$0.3 million to install portal monitors at three border crossings in one

country in the former Soviet Union. DOE installed the equipment in

cooperation with DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which

has begun site surveys at about eight additional border crossings.

Although DOD provided the same Russian portal monitors to the country

that DOE is providing to Russia under the Second Line of Defense

program, DOD has also worked with that country to develop an

indigenous capability to manufacture and maintain portal monitors.

The U.S. Customs Service, the largest recipient of funding provided by

State and DOD, received a total of $44.2 million from the two agencies and

spent $11.1 million from fiscal year 1993 through 2001 on assistance to

combat nuclear smuggling. Specifically:

U.S. Customs Service
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 47 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

• Customs received $40.2 million from State’s Export Control and Related

Border Security Assistance program and spent $8.1 million from fiscal year

1999 through 2001 for equipment and training for close to 30 countries.

Assistance under this program includes stationing advisors in many of the

countries to help coordinate and implement assistance from all of the

programs to combat nuclear smuggling.

• Customs received $0.8 million from State’s Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Fund and spent $0.6 million for Project Amber from fiscal

year 1994 through 2001. Project Amber provided equipment and training to

the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and

Slovakia. Customs also provided assistance to Cyprus and Malta with

funding from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.

• Customs received $2.1 million from DOD’s International

Counterproliferation Program and spent $1.6 million from fiscal year 1997

through 2001 for assistance to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia,

Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,

Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

• Customs received $1.1 million from DOD’s Cooperative Threat Reduction

program and spent $0.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through 1999 for

assistance to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Customs returned

$0.4 million in unspent funds to DOD.

Customs’ assistance included radiation pagers that border officials wear

on their belts and that can also be used as handheld devices to pinpoint

the location of radioactive material that caused a portal monitor alarm.

Customs provided a variety of other high- and low-tech tools ranging from

very basic items such as flashlights and tools for opening containers where

smuggled goods may be hidden to more sophisticated equipment such as

fiber optic scopes for searching fuel tanks. Training includes operation of

the x-ray vans equipped with radiation detectors; hands-on instruction in

using equipment to detect nuclear smuggling; techniques for investigating

smuggling operations; tracking the movements of smugglers who avoid

legal border crossings by going through rugged and remote areas between

ports of entry; and “train-the-trainer” courses to enable countries to train

more personnel than the U.S. assistance can reach. Hands-on training

includes a 2-week course at DOE’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

on interdicting smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, including

nuclear materials. Officials from several countries that have received U.S.

assistance told us that the training improved their border security

interdiction and investigation skills and promoted better understanding of

how to operate radiation detection equipment. For example, one country’s

border security and customs personnel told us that the U.S. Customs

Service-sponsored training at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory was
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 48 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

particularly beneficial because it provided for “hands-on” training to detect

nuclear materials hidden in vehicles. Table 6 shows a breakdown of U.S.

Customs Expenditures.

Table 6: U.S. Customs Service Expenditures, by Funding Source, through Fiscal

Year 2001

Funding Expenditures Obligations Balance

State Export Control and Related

Border Security Assistance

$40.2 $8.1 $6.3 $25.8

State Nonproliferation and

Disarmament Fund

0.8 0.6 <0 .1 0.1

DOD International

Counterproliferation program

2.1 1.6 0.2 0.3

DOD Cooperative Threat

Reduction

1.1 0.7 0 0.3

Total $44.2 $11.1 $6.5 $26.5

Source: U.S. Customs Service.

Through the end of fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Coast Guard received

$4.4 million from the State Department Export Control and Related Border

Security Assistance program and spent $1.6 million to provide assistance

for maritime interdiction of nuclear smuggling to countries of the former

Soviet Union. The Coast Guard used $1.5 million of that amount in one

country to provide two boats with spare parts, station a Coast Guard

advisor in country, and provide training. In addition, the Coast Guard

provided some assistance to four countries and budgeted funds for

assistance to four other countries.

The FBI has provided assistance to 13 countries of the former Soviet

Union and Central and Eastern Europe as part of the DOD International

Counterproliferation program. DOD managed the program and paid all the

FBI travel expenses associated with delivering the training. The FBI’s only

expenditures have been for developing the curriculum for the training

courses. Through fiscal year 2001, the FBI received approximately

$1 million from DOD and spent $0.4 million. Until fiscal year 2001, FBI

assistance consisted only of an awareness seminar for high-level

government officials on weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation at

the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest, Hungary. In

fiscal year 2001, the FBI began providing additional courses with more

detailed training geared toward the law enforcement officers who

investigate and respond to smuggling incidents. One of the new courses,

U.S. Coast Guard

Federal Bureau of

Investigation
Appendix II: U.S. Government Assistance

Programs

Page 49 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

which the DOD/FBI effort had provided only to one country as of the end

of fiscal year 2001, trains law enforcement and emergency management

personnel through practical exercises simulating a seizure of nuclear or

other smuggled material. As part of the course, the DOD/FBI effort

provides equipment packages worth $240,000 to outfit three 30-man

response teams with a variety of equipment including HAZMAT suits to

facilitate the safe handling of seized material, evidence collection and

sampling kits, chemical detection equipment, and also radiation pagers.

(The FBI originally planned to provide equipment packages worth $70,000,

but it increased the amount of equipment because it received additional

funding from DOD.) Other new courses that were initiated in fiscal year

2001 include crime scene management and crisis management, which

trains different government agencies to work together to respond to a

smuggling incident.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 50 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix III: Comments from the

Department of State
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 51 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 52 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix III: Comments from the Department

of State

Page 53 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department

of Energy

Page 54 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix IV: Comments from the

Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department

of Energy

Page 55 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Appendix V: Comments from the U. S.

Customs Service

Page 56 GAO-02-426 U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Appendix V: Comments from the U. S.

Customs Service

(360093)
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