Mr. Hakiem Johnson 

#60389-066 

USP Hazelton - Camp 

P.O. Box 2000 

Bruceton Mills, WV 26525 

AECENED \~A~ t 20& 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) 

) 

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT ) 

) 

vs ) 

) 

HAKIEM JOHNSON ) 

) 

DEFENDANT/PETITIONER ) 

) 

Case: 05-440-09 

Civil: 14-7127 

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 

GOVERNMENT § 2255 RESPONSE 

NOW RETURNS the petitioner, HAKIEM JOHNSON (hereinafter "petitioner" or "Johnson"), filing pro 

se, respectfully clinging tenaciously to the 

Court Order dated February 12, 2015 germane to 

filing this Memorandum in Reply to the government's answer to his recharacterized Section 

2255 with "equitable tolling" in allowance, so 

he can proceed in collateral attack on the merits 

of his petition. This denial has been repugnantly 

meandering. 

The petitioner has labored eight long years having 

never wavered from his "actual innocence" position, whereby he entered a plea of guilty to 

a criminal char.ge that asserts a double jeopardy 

claim in a collateral attack upon the sentence. 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 1 of 20
(2) Only one conspiracy breathes herein, as the double 

jeopardy principles require the conviction and 

sentence on the second ·conviction to be set aside. 

For eight long years, this government has managed 

to keep "equitable tolling" suppressed and has 

benefited in full by disallowing any court from 

set ting the record straight that Hakiem Johnson 

has been inappropriately detained in Federal 

prison for all the wrong reasons. 

STATEMENT OF CASE 

On August 8, 2008, Johnson entered a guilty plea 

to Count 1, of the fifth superseding indictment 

charging conspiracy to distribute five kilograms 

or more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack 

cocaine in viola ti on of 21 U.S. C. § 846 and § 

841 (a)(l)(A). 

Additionally, he pled guilty to Count 65, charging 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug 

trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924)c). 

On June 29, 2009, Johnson was sentenced to 120 

months on Count 1, and a consecutive term of 

60 months on Count 65. 

The petitioner did not file a direct appeal, 

and on January 21, 2014, he filed a § 2241 in 

the 

with 

the 

Northern District of West Virginia conjoined 

the "savings clause". He was then afforded 

opportunity to recharacterize his § 2241 

into a· motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

The honorable court in West Virginia issued a 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 2 of 20
(3) not.ice of conversion. 

On November 18, 

t.hat. he elect.ed 

2014, Johnson notified the Court 

to convert the motion to a § 

2255 which is now before this court. 

The government was quick to object citing it 

as "untimely" with support in argument this honorable court saw fit to deny. 

The petitioner appears as ordered by this 

tribunal with "equitable tolling" as he now takes 

steps with due diligence. 

Nonetheless, 

superficially 

the government's five 

broaches the merits 

page answer 

of this case 

conveniently suppressed eight years ago. 

Only 14 lines of declamation address those merits, 

while the balance of its reply lingers where 

the government has always spent its time during 

the past eight years 

petitioner's motions, 

constant as "untimely". 

in rejoinder to the 

with reasoning being 

With "equitable tolling, the petitioner now brings 

to bear with point of concentration on his 

singular contention that "double jeopardy" 

deprived him of a fair trial eight years ago. 

From the government's "answer" to the recharacterized § 2255, it becomes plainly visible it 

presents two arguments in opposition. 

First, it makes the bold and inaccurate statement 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 3 of 20
(5) and if they raise disputed issues of fact a 

hearing must be held. (Machibroda v United States, 

368 U.S. 487, 494, 495 - 1962) (Romero v United 

States, 327 F.2d 711, 712 5th Cir 1964). 

"The answer must address the allegations in the 

motion." Thus, if an allegation is not so 

addressed, it must be determined to mean the 

government holds no concern over its validity 

or statement as acceptable. 

Heretofore, 

forward in 

are several issues 

Johnson's petition. 

being brought 

1. The petition reads, "the stated indictment 

subjected him to double jeopardy in violation 

of the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment ... he 

now maintains he has been prosecuted twice for 

the same offense after conviction ... the government 

violated the Double Jeopardy Clause .. . 

2. The instant action satisfies the "Blockburger" 

test which pro hi bi ts successive prosecutions 

for the same criminal act. 

3. The elements in the instant case and the state 

case in 2004 are identical. With deception, the 

government has compounded Count #58 with Count 

#1. 

4. The government 

defective indictment 

literally created 

by design for 

action from the state case in 2004. 

a 

the 

fatally 

instant 

5 . The government should have employed the 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 4 of 20
(6) Blockburger Test, which would have 

demonstrated the state indictment in 

clearly 

2004 and 

the federal offense in 2008 lacked any hint at 

multiple offenses. (Blockburger v United States, 

284 U.S., 299, 301 1932) (Rutledge v United 

States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 - 1996). 

This test would have clearly shown there was 

a substantial overlap in the evidentiary showings 

for the two offenses. (United States v Felix, 

503 U.S. 378, 386 1992). And this is not a 

mere overlap between two prosecutions. The court 

need only look at the two conspiracies as they 

contain overlapping 

offense deductible 

circumstances test 

geographic location, 

proof. They state the same 

by the totality of the 

that considers the timing, 

participation, overt acts 

committed, and statutory provisions invoked in 

each alleged conspiracy. With deceptive 

advertising, the government vindicated Count 

#58 so it could charge Count #1 to the petitioner 

veiling the impropriety of double jeopardy (United 

States v Gerhard, 615 F.3d 7, 19-20 1st Cir 

2010). This was the fifth superseding 

indictment, clear-cut evidence 

was experiencing difficulty in 

with a criminal charge. 

the government 

labeling Johnson 

6. The governm,ent noticeably dismisses Count 

#58, which in revelation confirms double jeopardy 

was part and parcel to the case at bar. This 

dismissal was in violation of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. 

7. The government simply replaced Count #58 in 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 5 of 20
(7) the Fifth Superseding Indictment with Count #1, 

still establishing an essential element of the 

second crime by proving the conduct for which 

the defendant was convicted in the first 

prosecution. 

Fairly, the government makes no mention of any 

of the aforesaid in its "answer". An "answer" 

by rule must address all the allegations. Since 

the government presented no dissent on all the 

allegations, the court must accept the petitioner's statements as factual. 

With that now in evidence, let us direct our 

attention to what the government did address 

in its answer. In 14 lines of narrative it alleged 

two points. 

For eight years, the petitioner has patiently 

forestalled to see justice served, where "justice" 

saw fit to impose 180 months of imprisonment 

on him. For eight years, he has tried desperately 

to convince the judiciary to hear his cry for 

help ... he has been convicted twice for the same 

crime. At large, he has finally attained the 

venue and forum essential, and he describes 

sound facts of reason and law to substantiate 

his double jeopardy violation. The government 

begins its course of reasoning saying he waived 

his double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty 

and t..he "dual sovereignty doctrine compels the 

con cl usi on that successive prosecutions by "two 

stat es for the same conduct" are not barred by 

the Double Jeopa~dy Clause. So be it! 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 6 of 20
(8) The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 

states that no person shall be subject to the 

same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life 

or limb. This includes imprisonment. (Yeager 

v United States, 557 U.S. 110, 117 2009). In 

the instant action the clause protects against 

"a second prosecution for the same offense after 

a conviction. (Ohio v Johnson., 467 U.S. 493, 

498 - 1984). 

The petitioner acknowledges that double jeopardy 

does not prevent a defendant from being subjected 

to both a criminal punishment and a civil 

sanction. Rather, it protects only against the 

imposition of multiple criminal punishments for 

the same offense. (Hudson v United States, 522 

U.S. 93, 99 - 1997). 

In its "answer" the government makes the bold 

and inaccurate statement, 

double jeopardy claim 

"First, Johnson waived 

any by pleading guilty." 

The government is far too cavalier with this 

statement in misdirection for the court. Although 

a guilty plea waives most constitutional claims 

(Tollett v Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 - 1973), 

it usually does not waive 

jeopardy. (Menna v New York, ~~~~---~---~---...-...-. 

& n.2 1975). In "Tollett", 

a claim of double 

423 U.S. 61, 62-63 

the court reasoned 

that because a guilty plea is an admission of 

factual guilt, the defendant may not subsequently 

raise "independent claims relating to the 

deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 

prior to the entry of the guilty plea." (id 411 

u .. s. at 267). 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 7 of 20
(9) The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, prohibits 

the government from convicting the 

regardless of the defendant's factual 

Menna, 423 at 62) (United States v 

F.3d 323,329 - 1st Cir - 1997). 

defendant 

guilt (See 

Grant, 114 

To support it's point, the government cites 

"Broce", void any specific application therein. 

In view, the government presents this court with 

a "beginning and an end". Noticeably absent, 

however, 

reasoning 

contention 

is the 

that 

that 

"middle", 

supports 

"Broce" 

the 

the 

and 

step-by-step 

government's 

"Johnson" are 

compatible in denial. We think not. 

In "Broce", the Supreme Court held that a def endant who voluntarily and intelligently pleads 

guilty to two separate conspiracy indictments 

in a single proceeding relinquishes the opportunity for a factual hearing on a subsequent 

double jeopardy claim. (United States v Broce 

citations omitted). The government misses the 

mark in its attempt to deny Johnson because of 

"Broce" law. It took five indictments to prefer 

charges against Hakiem Johnson. This honorable 

court is beseeched to note the following issues, 

now being resurrected eight years later. 

The "Broce" case involved two indictments dealing 

with double jeopardy. Both indictments were 

discussed during plea negotiations and purportedly 

they were subject to separate sentences. 

Here, there were two respondents and both had 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 8 of 20
(10) counsel at. all st.ages, t.here were no allegat.ions 

t.hat. counsel was ineffect.ive. 

Beachner won acquit.t.al, Broce t.ried t.o benefit. 

from t.hat. occurrence. This case was reheard en 

bane. The "Blackledge" and "Menna" cases came 

int.o play. A divided en bane court. concluded 

t.hat t.he respondent.s were ent.i t.led t.o draw upon 

factual evidence out.side t.he original record 

t.o support. t.heir claim of a single conspiracy. 

Two significant. 

court. rej ect.ed 

respondent.s had 

double jeopardy 

rulings occurred. The en 

t.he government.'s argument 

waived the right. to raise 

claim by pleading guil t.y 

bane 

t.hat. 

t.heir 

(which 

is t.he government.' s singular reason for affixing 

"Broce" wit.h "Johnson", i.e., "Johnson waived 

any double jeopardy claim by pleading guilt.y"). 

The en bane court. furt.her held t.hat. t.he Double 

Jeopardy Clause "does not constit.ut.e an individual 

right. which is subject. t.o waiver." It. furl.her 

reject.ed t.he Government.'s cont.ent.ion t.hat. t.he 

respondent.s guilt.y pleas 

admissions t.hat. t.here had 

acies. 

must. 

been 

In f urt.her observat.ion t.hat. 

be const.rued as 

separat.e conspirthe government.'s 

referral to t.he "Broce" court in support of its 

at.tack on "Johnson", this court. is int.roduced 

herein t.o "Kaiser". (Unit.ed St.at.es v Kaiser, 833, 

F.2d, 1019 - llt.h Cir - 1987) 

Here, it. was concluded t.hat. Kaiser's guilt.y plea 

did not. waive his right. t.o raise t.he double 

jeopardy claim -and t.hat. his convict.ions in his 

case were a violat.ion of t.he Double Jeopardy 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 9 of 20
(11) Clause. It must be noted, the Supreme Court has 

recognized that there are exceptions to the rule 

barring collateral attacks on a guilty plea. 

One such exception involves the "Menna" and 

'!JD.ackledge" courts. This exception occurs when 

a charge against a defendant, judged on the basis 

of the record that existed at the time the guilty 

plea was entered, is one the State may not 

constitutionally prosecute. "Broce" clearly did 

not fit the "Menna/Blackledge" exception, "Kaiser 

and Johnson" do, and therefore Johnson's plea 

did not waive his right to challenge his conviction. 

In "Broce" the defendants pled guilty to an 

indictment that, on its face, described separate 

offenses (two different conspiracies). The court 

concluded the defendants' guilty pleas admitted 

guilt for two conspiracies. This established 

that their cumulative convictions and punishments 

violated double jeopardy, without relying on 

factual evidence outside the guilty plea record. 

The defendants were therefore barred from 

challenging their convictions. 

In the instant action, this court does not have 

to rely on evidence outside the guilty plea record 

to determine that Johnson's punishment violated 

the Double Jeopardy Clause. This Clause prohibits 

punishing a person twice for the same offense. 

(Brown v Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 

2225, 53 L.Ed 2d 187 - 1977). 

The Double Jeop·ardy Claim affords Johnson three 

basic protections, "It protects against a second 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 10 of 20
(12) prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 

it protects against a second prosecution for 

the same offense after conviction (£!..§.. the case 

at bar), 

punishments 

at bar). 

and 

for 

it 

the 

protects multiple 

same offense (as the case 

against 

-------

The Blockburger test itself should suffice. The 

Supreme Court held that the applicable rule is 

that where the same act or transaction constitutes 

a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, 

the test to be applied to determine whether there 

are two offenses or only one is whether each 

provision requires proof of an additional fact 

which the other does not. " Here, Johnson asserts 

neither the case in 2008 or 2004 requires a single 

additional fact to change it into two separate 

charges. 

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson may not be 

convicted and sentenced for his 2008 conviction 

as double jeopardy is applicable. There was only 

one conspiracy and subsequent criminal offense. 

In reference, the court is directed to these 

significant case highlights, all applicable to 

demonstrate that the second indictment in 2008 

could not 

duplicative 

go 

of 

forward as 

the earlier 

it 

offense 

was 

in 

facially 

2004 and 

Johnson's guilty plea could not conceivably be 

construed to extend beyond a redundant confession 

to the earlier offense. 

superseding indictment 

petitioner ... there was a 

It took a 

to charge 

suppression 

fifth 

the 

hearing 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 11 of 20
(13) for the Bill of Particulars which the government 

made certain would not surface ... a Franks Hearing 

was sought because the petitioner was convinced 

his neighbor's house was searched in error so 

the government could use that 

search his house where 

excuse to unlawfully 

two firearms 

discovered (both introduced at his 

were 

first 

conviction) ... before securing a court ruling 

for the Franks Hearing, the government admitted 

the wrong house had been searched ... the petitioner 

knew the fifth superseding indictment was 

d uplici to us in error ... the same evidence in the 

state case was used to satisfy his indictment 

in the federal case ... The Bill of Particulars 

would have proven this government duped the grand 

jury with disallowable evidence to bar the double 

jeopardy claim ... 

In 

in 

furtherance, 

support in 

there 

this 

remains nothing to prove 

case here and now. The 

government immediately prior to the fifth 

superseding indictment dismissed Count #58, saying 

almost apologetically, " ... it would be in the 

interests of justice to dismiss the count .•. " 

This was dismissed on May 22, 2008, and clearly 

saved the government a mistrial in the instant 

action. 

Dismissal, however, was too late. The Grand Jury 

had already seen Count #58, which was used to 

construct Counts #1 and #65, the only two counts 

eventually charged to Johnson. 

Let's not forge.t there were 21 people named in 

this conspiracy with 194 indictments. The 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 12 of 20
(14) government admitted Count #58 

but when 

was then 

it was used to create 

branded in -duplicity. 

was defective, 

Count #1 it 

Count # 1 and 

Count #58 are mirrored creating a duplicative 

prosecution. 

To any reasonable finder of fact, what doubt 

can coexist? Counts #1 and #58 rest on precisely 

the same factual predicate. 

With blatant vindictiveness and disregard for 

within its rights to 

C:;;..;o::..u=n.::.t __ #"-=-5 =-8 of the 

law, this government was 

motion for dismissal of 

indictment, it could not modify or change that 

indictment, which it did with Count #1. Both 

counts were interactive. The Grand Jury had to 

be revisited with "new evidence" and the process 

had to recommence. This never happened! 

With all due respect, 

court with redundancy, 

this court to page 19 

§ 2255. It explains all! 

so as not to detain this 

the petitioner refers 

of his recharacterized 

Now determinative, the government clearly reviewed 

data from the state case, presented it to the 

grand jury in his federal case to support Counts 

#1 and #65. 

Rule 5(c) of Section 2255 states with conviction, 

II If 

of 

the answer refers to briefs 

the prior proceedings that are 

or transcripts 

not available 

in the court's records, the judge must 

the government to furnish them ... " Clearly, 

order 

those 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 13 of 20
(15) Bill of Particulars would serve justice in the 

case at bar. 

Would an Evidentiary Hearing serve justice? Rule 

8(a) suggests, "If the motion is not dismissed, 

the judge must review the answer .•. and any 

materials submitted under Rule 7 to determine 

whether an Evidentiary Hearing is warranted." 

Or, via Rule 8(b), is it appropriate to " .•. refer 

the motion to a magistrate judge to conduct 

hearings and to file proposed finding of fact 

and recommendations for disposition." 

Johnson contends reversal of Count #1 will require 

reversal of Count #65 due to the prejudicial 

spillover effect. 

"It is only in those cases in which evidence 

is introduced on the invalidated count that would 

otherwise be inadmissible on the remaining counts, 

and this evidence is presented in such a manner 

that tends to indicate that the jury probably 

utilized this evidence in reaching a verdict 

on the remaining counts, that spillover prejudice 

is likely to occur." (United States v Rooney, 

437 F.3d, 847, 856 2nd Cir 1994) (Uni_ted 

States v Gore, 184 F. 3d 34, 48-49 2nd Cir 

1998).Herein, a reversal of Count #1 compels 

reversing the remaining count. 

The second and last remaining argument in the 

government's "answer" was "the dual sovereignty 

doctrine". 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 14 of 20
(16) The dual sovereignty doctrine allows the federal 

government and a state government to bring 

successive prosecutions for off ens es. arising 

from the same criminal act. The exception 

recognizes that two sovereigns often have 

separate, legitimate interests in prosecuting 

the def end ant. (Abbate v United States, 359 U.S. 

187, 195 1959). The petitioner acknowledges 

that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit 

successive prosecutions by different sovereigns 

because logically a sovereign with lesser interest 

might proceed first and preclude prosecution 

by sovereign with greater interest, like possibly 

in the instant action. (United States v Frunebto, 

563 F.2d 1083, 1088 - 3rd Cir - 1977). 

The government uses one case to support its 

shallow argument, that being Heath vs Alabama 

(citations omitted). Here, the Supreme Court 

held that two entities seeking to prosecute a 

defendant for the same criminal act must be 

sepa.-rate sovereigns that derive their authority 

from distinct sources of power. However, local 

governments are not considered sovereigns for 

double jeopardy purposes. Consequently, successive 

prosecutions by a local government and a state 

in which it is located are prohibited. In the 

spirit of this understanding, the D.C. Circuit 

has affirmed that defendants are entitled tb 

double jeopardy protection in the case of 

successive prosecutions by D.C. and the federal 

government. (United States v Weathers, 186 F.3d 

948, 951 n.3 DC Cir - 1999). Law bars subsequent 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 15 of 20
(17) prosecution for same 

vice versa because 

Congress. 

crime under federal law and 

both codes were adopted by 

The dual sovereignty doctrine has two limitations. 

First, al though mere cooperation between federal 

and state will not preclude a subsequent federal 

prosecution, the Supreme Court has suggested 

that federal and state authorities may not 

manipulate a ~ystem to achieve the equivalwent 

of a second prosecution, as in the instant 

action. (Bartkus v Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 122-

24 1959). Notwithstanding, "Bartkus" brings 

to mind existence of a "sham prosecution". 

Short of imputation of blame, the petitioner 

contends this government employed a "sham 

prosecution" to meet its objective, that being 

to find something, anything that could satisfy 

a Grand Jury for an indictment. In the case at 

bar, it took five superseding indictments. 

The entire history of litigation and contention 

over the question of the imposition of a bar 

to a second prosecution by a government other 

than the one first prosecuting is a manifestation 

of the evolutionary unfolding of law. A "sham 

prosecution" is, in essence, a 

dual-sovereignty doctrine; Under 

a defendant's protection against 

misuse of the 

that doctrine, 

double jeopardy 

does not provide protection against a prosecution 

by a different sovereignty. For example, if the 

defendant was first tried in federal court and 

acquitted, that· fact would not forbid the state 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 16 of 20
(18) authorities from prosecuting the defendant in 

a state court. In the case at bar, Johnson was 

convicted in state court in 2004. Isn't it \ 

possible the 2008 prosecution for the federal 

authorities used the state-court prosecution 

to dominate 

tool in its 

and 

own 

manipulate the ~facts 

case so it would not_ 

as a mere 

withstand 

not only 

contends 

a double-Jeopardy challenge? It's 

possible, it's probable, and Johnson' 

that is precisely what happened. 

Second, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has 

adopted an internal practice known as the "petite 

policy" which allows the federal government to 

bring a successive prosecution only when there 

are compelling reasons to do so and the 

prosecuting attorney obtains foregoing approval 

from the appropriate United States Assistant 

Attorney General (US Attorney's Manual § 9-2. 031 

2009). The "petite policy" applies only if 

the defendant was actually brought to trial in 

state court. (United States v Gomez, 776 F. 2d 

542, 550 - 5th Cir - 1985). No such action was ever 

employed. 

CONCLUSION 

Quasi, 

quite 

not to 

the exact meaning 

basal, " ... you are 

be tried twice for 

of double 

guaranteed 

the same 

jeopardy is 

the right 

offense ... " 

All the same, add the wrong words in the right 

place, shelter it with accessible ambiguity in 

law, and double jeopardy has ever so many liberal 

interpretations. 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 17 of 20
(19) With certitude, 

starting a new 

the government 

criminal trial 

is barred from 

after the first 

court action has commenced, inclusive of appealing 

a verdict of acquittal. 

In the instant action, "double prosecution" was 

apparent in 2008 when this government exhausted 

the "written accusation process" by creating 

five superseding indictments in order to "get 

their man", Hakiem Johnson. 

Regrettably, the indictment was factually predicated on a previous state conviction, so named 

herein. If justice was the target, the government 

missed the mark. Otherwise, the defense would 

have been allowed to review the Bill of 

Particulars which clearly would have shown n all 

the duplicity used by the government to convince 

a Grand Jury to issue an indictment. 

In furtherance, one need travel no greater 

distance to conclude 

of justice. 

this case was a miscarriage 

Herein, the state government 

Johnson for the same crime 

did a short time later. 

tried and convicted 

federal authorities 

To start, Johnson's state charges cover the exact 

same time span as does his federal charge, the 

period from 1 9 9 8 through 2 0 0 3 . Co u·n t # 1 of the 

instant action is permanently recessed as 

duplicative. It reads in part, " ... The Grand 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 18 of 20
(20) Jury charges that from or about a date unknown 

to the Grand Jury, beginning at least in January 

1998 through in or about Au~ust 10' 2005, in 

Philadelphia, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, defendants, •.. conspired 

and agreed ... knowingly and intentionally distributed controlled substances ... " 

The duplication is void any possible argument 

since the record shows the petitioner's state 

case covered a timef rame from 1998 through 2003, 

therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be 

disputed in argument. 

The petitioner prays this honorable court will 

accept, for the foregoing reasons, that Hakiem 

Johnson may not be convicted and sentenced for 

both the state and federal crimes so stated, 

because they are one in the same. 

Thus, the conviction and sentence for the case 

at bar must be vacated and the judgment of this 

court must be modified accordingly. 

##### 

Respectfully submitted by, 

%k d-0~1~ MR. HAKIEM JOHNSON 

#60389-066 

USP Hazelton - Camp 

P.O. Box 2000 

Bruceton Mills, WV 26525 Date : /\11l'fC~ W clD I S 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 19 of 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on the date indicated below, \ 

the foregoing document. MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 

GOVERNMENT § 2255 RESPONSE, was mailed by United 

States Postal Service to the following participant: 

Mr. Robert A. Zauzmer 

Asst U.S. Attorney 

U.S. Dept of Justice 

US Attorney's Office 

615 'Chestnut Street (#1250) 

Philadelphia, PA 19106-4476 

~Jtry~ MR. HAKIEM Jb;NSON 

#60389-066 

USP Hazelton - Camp 

P.O. Box 2000 

Bruceton Mills, WV 26525 Date: rl.C\rGh (;, a.o lS 

Case 2:05-cr-00440-RBS Document 1646 Filed 03/09/15 Page 20 of 20