Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MARK S. LENYO GREGORY F. ZOELLER

South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ERIC P. BABBS

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CARLTON P. WILSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 71A03-1108-CR-384

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable J. Jerome Frese, Judge

Cause No. 71D03-1102-FB-17

 

June 12, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAILEY, Judge
2

Case Summary

Carlton P. Wilson (“Wilson”) was convicted of Arson, as a Class A felony.1 He now appeals.

We affirm.

Issues

Wilson raises two issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the elevation of the 

offense to a Class A felony; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

Facts and Procedural History

During the evening of January 28, 2011, and the early morning hours of January 29, 

2011, Wilson was at a home in South Bend that his eighty-three year-old mother, Bertha 

Smith (“Smith”), shared with Gail Mink (“Mink”); Mink’s boyfriend, Darrie DeBury 

(“DeBury”); and Leo Williams (“Williams”).2 Wilson would also stay at the home from time 

to time. 

At some point that night, Wilson and Smith began to argue after Wilson demanded 

money from Smith. When Smith protested that she did not have the amount Wilson 

demanded, he became angry and said he was “going to show [Smith] something.” Trial Tr. 

at 16. Wilson then retrieved a red gasoline can and poured gasoline near the entrance of 

Smith’s room and in the hallway just outside the bedroom’s door.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-1-1(a).

2 Williams was not present during the events described here.
3

After waking Mink and DeBury to tell them to leave the house because he was 

planning to set it on fire, Wilson ignited the gasoline in Smith’s room and fled. Mink and 

DeBury escaped to a neighbor’s house, and 911 was called. Smith, however, was unable to 

move around without a walker or wheelchair and remained in the home, trapped in her 

bedroom by the fire.

Officers John Gast (“Officer Gast”) and Davin Hackett (“Officer Hackett”) and 

Corporal James Aters (“Corporal Aters”) of the South Bend Police Department were the first 

individuals on the scene. While Officer Gast attempted to enter the house through a side 

door, Officer Hackett attempted to kick open the front door of the residence. Neither officer 

was able to enter the home far enough to reach Smith, but each heard her calling for help 

from the bedroom. 

Officers Gast and Hackett rushed to Smith’s bedroom window, which was closed 

when they arrived, but through which Smith was then attempting to escape. Smith had used 

her telephone to break away some of the glass from the window, and eventually used her 

head to force out a flexible storm windowpane so that, by the time Officer Hackett arrived at 

the window, Smith’s head and upper torso were protruding outside. Officers Gast and 

Hackett helped Smith onto the ground, moved her away from the house, and eventually took 

her to Corporal Aters’s patrol car to await an ambulance. Upon assessing Smith’s physical 

condition, Officers Gast and Hackett each noticed blood in several places on her body, 

including her head and legs. Smith had also suffered a cut to her finger. 

On February 1, 2011, Wilson was charged with Arson, as a Class B felony, and a 
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warrant was issued for his arrest the same day. Wilson was arrested on February 3, 2011. On

February 17, 2011, the charging information was amended to add a count of Arson, as a 

Class A felony. 

On April 8, 2011, Wilson waived a jury trial. A bench trial was conducted on April 18

and 19, 2011, at the conclusion of which the trial court found him guilty of both counts and 

entered judgment of conviction against Wilson for Arson, as a Class A felony. 

A sentencing hearing was conducted on July 21, 2011. At the hearing’s conclusion, 

the trial court sentenced Wilson to fifty years imprisonment. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Wilson challenges his conviction for Arson, arguing that there was insufficient 

evidence of bodily injury to support the elevation of his offense to a Class A felony. We 

disagree.

Wilson was convicted after a bench trial, and our standard of review in such cases is 

well settled:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Henley 

v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). “We consider only the evidence 

supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

such evidence.” Id. We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of 

probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the 

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).
5

The State charged Wilson with Arson, as a Class A felony. To convict him of the 

offense, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wilson, by means of 

fire, knowingly damaged Smith’s dwelling without her consent, resulting in bodily injury to 

Smith, namely lacerations to her hand. I.C. § 35-43-1-1(a); App. at A-15.

Wilson argues that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove that 

Smith incurred bodily injury as a result of his offense. Thus, he argues, his conviction for 

Arson, as a Class A felony, should be vacated, and he should instead have been convicted of 

Arson, as a Class B felony.

“‘Bodily injury’ means any impairment of physical condition, including physical 

pain.” I.C. § 35-41-1-4. “‘Medical treatment, bloodshed or visible wounds are not necessary 

to a finding of bodily injury.’” Faulisi v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 

(quoting Gebhart v. State, 525 N.E.2d 603, 604 (Ind. 1988)), trans. denied. Whether an 

individual has suffered bodily injury is a question of fact for the jury or fact-finder. Id.

Here, Smith testified that she incurred a laceration to her finger and had cuts on her 

body, was taken by ambulance to a hospital, and required continued treatment in the form of 

ongoing physical therapy. Officer Gast testified that Smith used her head to break window 

glass and escape the fire that had engulfed her bedroom, and that there were several spots of 

blood on her. Corporal Aters testified that Smith had abrasions on her head and injuries to 

one of her hands. Finally, Officer Hackett testified that he saw Smith bleeding from her head 

and legs. 

Simply put, Wilson invites us to reweigh evidence; we decline the invitation. The 
6

State produced sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he committed Arson, as charged, and we therefore affirm his conviction.

Sentencing

Wilson also argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Under Appellate Rule 7(B), this 

“Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial 

court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender.” It is the defendant’s burden to persuade this court 

that his sentence “has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Anglemyer v. State, 

868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 

2006)), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

In Reid v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court reiterated the standard by which our state 

appellate courts independently review criminal sentences:

Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in 

determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana 

Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a sentence 

through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court may revise a 

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offense and the character of the offender. The burden is on the 

defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate.

876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation and citations omitted).

The Court more recently stated that “sentencing is principally a discretionary function 

in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. 

State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial 
7

courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. One 

purpose of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. “Whether we 

regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of 

the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors 

that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

Here, Wilson was convicted of Arson, as a Class A felony. The sentencing range for 

this offense runs from twenty to fifty years, with a statutory advisory sentence of thirty years. 

I.C. § 35-50-2-4. The trial court sentenced Wilson to the maximum term of fifty years 

imprisonment, which he now argues is inappropriate.

We look first to the nature of Wilson’s offense. Here, Wilson set ablaze a house 

occupied by Smith, his mother, and three other individuals after engaging in a dispute with 

Smith over money. Smith was eighty-three years old at the time and relied upon a walker or 

wheelchair to move about the house. Wilson informed the other occupants of the house that 

he planned to set the fire so that they could leave the house, but lit the fire near the door of 

Smith’s room with the stated intent of showing her the consequences of failing to do what he 

demanded. The fire’s location cut off a ready escape path for Smith, who was forced to 

break a storm window and attempt to jump out a window to flee the fire. All this sets 

Wilson’s offense apart from other acts of arson that might otherwise lead to an advisory 

sentence.

Nor does Wilson’s character speak well of him. His first contacts with the criminal 

justice system occurred as a juvenile in 1967, and he was adjudicated a delinquent on at least 
8

five occasions. As an adult, Wilson has been convicted of numerous felonies and 

misdemeanors, including armed robbery, burglary, assault, sexual battery, malicious 

destruction of a building, battery, violation of a protective order, driving while intoxicated, 

and intimidation. These offenses were committed in Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois. Wilson 

has also violated parole, probation, and bond on numerous occasions, and has had numerous 

and continuous other contacts with law enforcement from his initial contacts as a juvenile in 

1967 through the present offense. He has a substantial delinquency on child support 

obligations, a spotty employment history, a history of intermittent substance abuse, and a 

long history of alcohol abuse. 

In sum, Wilson has not persuaded us that the statutory maximum sentence of fifty 

years is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Conclusion

Wilson has not persuaded us that there was insufficient evidence from which the trial 

court could conclude that his act of arson caused bodily injury. Nor has he persuaded us that 

his fifty-year sentence is inappropriate.

Affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.