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*********************************************** 
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HAROLD H.

BURBANK II

(AC 41805)

Prescott, Bright and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the

trial court suspending him from the practice of law for one year. The

respondent, who was admitted to practice law in both Maine and Connecticut, had been involved in civil litigation in Maine involving waterfront property that he owned in joint tenancy with several members of

his family. After the trial court rendered judgment in that action, the

respondent appealed as a self-represented party to the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Maine Superior Court

and concluded that the respondent had engaged in misconduct while

prosecuting the appeal. Accordingly, sanctions were imposed against

the respondent in the form of an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Subsequently, Maine’s Board of Overseers of the Bar suspended the

respondent from practicing law in Maine for one year on the ground

that he had violated Maine’s Rules of Professional Conduct. Thereafter,

in the present case, the petitioner, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed

an application seeking commensurate disciplinary action against the

respondent pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-39). Subsequently, the trial court found that commensurate discipline was appropriate with respect to the respondent’s Connecticut law license and

ordered the respondent suspended from the practice of law in Connecticut for one year. On appeal, the respondent claimed, inter alia, that

because he was a self-represented party at the time he engaged in the

alleged misconduct that led to his suspension in Maine, the disciplinary

action against his law license in Maine, and by extension, in Connecticut,

violated his right as a citizen to petition the government for a redress

of grievances as protected by the first amendment to the federal constitution and violated his rights to due process and equal protection under

the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Held:

1. The trial court did not err in determining that the respondent failed

to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the reciprocal

suspension of his law license was a violation of his federal constitutional

rights to petition the government without the fear of reprisal; the respondent failed to cite to any legal authority in which a court has ruled that

the enforcement of attorney disciplinary rules on an attorney engaging

in self-representation before a court implicates that attorney’s right to

petition as protected by the first amendment, nor did he cite to any

authority for the proposition that an attorney acting as a self-represented

litigant should be held to a different standard of professional conduct

than that applied to an attorney acting on behalf of a client, and the

respondent’s attempt to differentiate for disciplinary and constitutional

purposes between an attorney’s actions taken on behalf of a client

and actions taken in representing himself in his role as a citizen was

unavailing, as this court has recognized that an attorney, as an officer

of the court, must always conduct himself or herself in accordance

with the Rules of Professional Conduct, the respondent had the same

professional obligation to the court when representing himself as when

representing a client, and the fact that he appeared in a self-represented

capacity did not lesson his duty to comply with those rules.

2. The respondent could not prevail on his claim that the trial court’s finding

that he failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a cognizable defense to the Maine disciplinary proceedings was clearly erroneous;

although the failure to receive due process in a disciplinary proceeding

in another jurisdiction would be a proper defense to the imposition of

reciprocal discipline in Connecticut, there was nothing in the record to

demonstrate that the respondent raised a colorable claim that he was

denied due process in the Maine disciplinary proceedings, nor did he

make any credible claim that he lacked sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard, the respondent’s arguments and reasoning, both in
his pleadings before the trial court and to this court on appeal, were

circuitous, repetitious, and lacked a cogent discussion that was logically

and legally tethered to the issue under consideration, which made it

difficult to evaluate whether his claim was properly raised and preserved

for appellate review, and even if the claim were deemed to be preserved,

much of the veritable laundry list of constitutional arguments and alleged

violations of rights, including fleeting references to the ninth amendment, the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, and the full faith

and credit clause of the United States constitution, consisted of no more

than generalized statements of legal propositions, devoid of any cogent

analysis or application of the facts to any of the asserted constitutional

doctrines relative to the subject matter at hand, namely, the reciprocal

enforcement of rules governing attorney professional misconduct.

Argued October 17, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020

Procedural History

Presentment by the petitioner for alleged professional misconduct by the respondent, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and

tried to the court, Sheridan, J.; judgment suspending

the respondent from the practice of law for twelve

months, from which the respondent appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Harold H. Burbank II, self-represented, the appellant (respondent).

Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, for the

appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The present appeal arises out of a

reciprocal disciplinary proceeding commenced pursuant to Practice Book § 2-39 by the petitioner, the Chief

Disciplinary Counsel, against the respondent, Harold

H. Burbank II, who had been suspended from the practice of law in Maine for one year due to his actions as a

self-represented appellant before the Supreme Judicial

Court of Maine. The respondent appeals from the judgment of the trial court, which found that commensurate

discipline was appropriate with respect to the respondent’s Connecticut law license and ordered the respondent suspended from the practice of law in Connecticut

for one year.1

The respondent, relying principally on the fact that

he was not acting on behalf of a client but as a selfrepresented party at the time he engaged in the misconduct that led to his suspension in Maine, claims on

appeal that the disciplinary action against his law

license in Maine and, by extension, in Connecticut, (1)

violated his right as a citizen to petition the government

for a redress of grievances as protected by the first

amendment of the United States constitution, and (2)

violated his rights to due process and equal protection

of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United

States constitution.2 We disagree and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history.3 The respondent is an attorney

admitted to the practice of law in Connecticut and

Maine. The genesis of the underlying grievance proceeding was civil litigation before the Superior Court in

Maine concerning waterfront property in Northport,

Maine, that the respondent owned in joint tenancy with

his father, two siblings, and ten other members of his

family (Burbank property).4 Several neighboring property owners (neighbors) commenced the litigation

against the owners of the Burbank property seeking,

inter alia, a prescriptive easement over the Burbank

property, a declaratory judgment, and damages for conversion and trespass. At trial, the respondent represented himself, his father, and his siblings (Burbank

defendants). The remaining co-owners of the Burbank

property (co-owners) sought to settle the dispute with

the neighbors and later filed a cross claim against the

Burbank defendants seeking a partition by sale of the

Burbank property. The trial court, after a bench trial,

rendered judgment in favor of the neighbors on their

claims for a prescriptive easement, a declaratory judgment, and conversion, and also found for the ten coowners on their cross claim and ordered a partition by

sale. The court found against the neighbors on their

trespass count.

The respondent was the only party who appealed
from the trial court’s decision. Although the appeal was

filed initially by another attorney, she later withdrew

her appearance, and the respondent continued prosecuting the appeal as a self-represented party. The Maine

Supreme Judicial Court issued an opinion in which it

affirmed the judgment of the Maine Superior Court and,

more importantly for the issues now before this court,

concluded that the respondent had engaged in misconduct while prosecuting the appeal. The court determined that this misconduct warranted the imposition

of sanctions against the respondent in the form of an

award of attorney’s fees and costs.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court summarized its

decision as follows: ‘‘The trial court issued a thorough,

carefully considered judgment, supported by extensive

findings and conclusions and accurate legal analysis.

Because the court did not err when it granted a prescriptive easement or ordered partition by sale of the property, and because the remainder of [the respondent’s]

arguments are either improperly raised, meritless, or

both, we affirm the judgment and, on separate motions

of the [n]eighbors and the [c]o-owners, we order sanctions against [the respondent] pursuant to [Me. R. App.

P. 13 (f)].’’5 Lincoln v. Burbank, 147 A.3d 1165, 1169

(Me. 2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1338, 197

L. Ed. 2d 520 (2017).

In discussing its decision to sanction the respondent,

an action that the court indicated it reserved for only

‘‘egregious cases’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

id., 1176; the Maine Supreme Judicial Court made the

following findings regarding what the court viewed as

the respondent’s ‘‘repeated misconduct in prosecuting

[the] appeal.’’ Id., 1179. ‘‘[The respondent] initiated the

handling of this appeal with the same cavalier attitude

that he demonstrated in his handling of the steps at

issue in this case. He did not communicate with the

appellees in order to reach some agreement on the

contents of the [a]ppendix; he attempted to include in

the [a]ppendix documents that were not part of the

record below; he failed to respond to a direct order

requiring him to explain how he, as the appellant, could

purport to represent some of the appellees; he filed a

brief ‘bound’ with twine; and as noted above, he failed

to comply with [Maine’s rules of appellate procedure

by] filing a second reply brief without permission.

‘‘[The respondent’s] brief on appeal demonstrated

this same contumacious attitude, a fact he apparently

recognized, as, in his request for oral argument, Burbank asserted that some of his filings before us ‘were

not properly edited before being submitted to the court,’

and argued for a chance to ‘correct and clarify these

errors, so the court may be certain that [the a]ppellant

certainly did not intend them or to offend the dignity

and authority of the court.’

‘‘[The respondent]’s request for oral argument
included statements that further highlight the impropriety of his actions in this appeal. Beyond conceding the

impropriety of some statements in his several appellate

briefs . . . he proposed to represent the views of the

other Burbank [d]efendants [who had] declined to have

[the respondent] represent them on appeal and are not

participating in this appeal. [The respondent], as a member of the Maine bar, must understand that he cannot

represent on appeal persons who have declined to

appeal and declined to have him represent them on

appeal6

. . . .

‘‘In his request for oral argument, [the respondent]

also proposed to testify or otherwise present facts to

clarify [trial testimony that] the trial court found, in

part, to be contradictory and not credible. There can

be no question that presenting new facts or other evidence by brief or oral argument is not proper appellate

advocacy. . . . [The respondent’s] several briefs

include a number of statements about facts that do not

appear in the trial court record and thus are improperly

offered for consideration on appeal. . . . [The respondent] also filed a ‘‘Supplement of Legal Authorities’’

that includes evidentiary materials and fact statements

not in the trial court record, including an advocacy

document that [the respondent] had filed with a private

mediator that, as a document apparently used in settlement efforts, could not have been used at trial pursuant

to [Maine’s Rules of Evidence §] 408 (b), and, consequently, was improperly filed with the appeal documents.

‘‘Beyond his purported representation of people who

do not wish to be represented by him, his failure to

comply with the logistical rules, his attempt to present

new evidence at an appellate proceeding, and his contentious and unprofessional tone, [the respondent]

makes several arguments in support of his appeal that

are frivolous and devoid of legal authority to support

them.

‘‘Asserting propositions of law not supported by statute or precedent, absent a good faith effort to evolve the

law, is an indication of frivolousness that can subject

a party to sanctions. . . .

* * *

‘‘Throughout the various stages of this appeal, in his

briefs, his Supplement of Legal Authorities, his request

for oral argument, and his responses to opposing parties’ motions, [the respondent] has consistently disregarded standards of law and practice that govern appellate review. He has asserted legal arguments that are

frivolous and baseless, and, contrary to governing precedent, he has sought to have us consider and decide

the appeal on new facts and new evidence that were

not part of the trial court record on appeal. [The respondent]’s efforts have been disrespectful to the proper
role of the trial court, unfair to and expensive for the

other parties, and contrary to Maine appellate law. [The

respondent]’s frivolous and baseless actions are egregious conduct that has confused the issues on appeal,

delayed final resolution of this matter, and significantly

driven up the costs to other parties. Although the

actions taken by [the respondent] would be concerning

if he were a litigant unschooled in law, we note that

[the respondent] is not only an attorney, but an attorney

who is licensed to practice in Maine. He is, therefore,

presumed to be familiar with our case law, our statutes,

and our [r]ules; his actions demonstrate either a complete lack of understanding or an intentional flouting

of those guides.

* * *

‘‘As with other rules, the rules regarding sanctions

and determinations that an appeal is frivolous are

applied equally to represented and unrepresented parties. . . . Although he purports to speak for or represent the interests of parties who are not participating

in this appeal, and although he is an attorney, we consider [the respondent] to be unrepresented for purpose

of our consideration of sanctions. However, attorneys

who represent themselves on appeal are assumed to

be aware of court rules and their ethical obligations

in prosecuting their own appeals.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote added.) Lincoln v. Burbank, supra, 147 A.3d

1176-79. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded

on the basis of what it described as ‘‘repeated misconduct in prosecuting this appeal’’ that the respondent

should be sanctioned, and it ordered the respondent to

pay each of the plaintiff neighbors and nonBurbank

defendant co-owners of the property $5,000 toward

their attorney fees incurred to defend the appeal as

well as treble costs. Id.

On the basis of this conduct and following a review

of those findings by a Maine grievance commission

panel, Maine’s Board of Overseers of the Bar (board)

filed an information in accordance with Rule 13 of

Maine’s Disciplinary Rules of Procedure in which it

alleged that the respondent had violated multiple provisions of Maine’s Rules of Professional Conduct. In

accordance with Maine procedural rules, on October 18,

2017, Justice Robert Clifford, an active retired justice

of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, conducted a de

novo testimonial hearing. Justice Clifford, on January

25, 2018, filed a memorandum of decision suspending

the respondent from practicing law in Maine for a period

of twelve months. See Board of Overseers of the Bar

v. Burbank, BAR-17-12 (January 29, 2018) (Clifford, J.).

Justice Clifford found on the basis of the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court’s factual findings and conclusions in Lincoln v. Burbank, supra, 147 A.3d 1165, and

on the additional evidence presented at the testimonial

hearing, that the board had proven that the respondent
had violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 3.1, 3.4 and 8.4 of Maine’s

Rules of Professional Conduct, which, like Connecticut’s rules, adopt with modifications the American Bar

Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.7

See 1 & 2 G. Hazard, W. Hodes & P. Jarvis, The Law

of Lawyering, (4th Ed., 2019), § 1.15 & Appendix B.

In his opinion, Justice Clifford also observed that

the respondent’s actions continued ‘‘to be problematic’’

during the disciplinary proceedings. Board of Overseers

of the Bar v. Burbank, supra, BAR-17-12. Specifically,

the court found the following: ‘‘In his answer to the

within information in this case, [the respondent] has

admitted to making errors in applying and interpreting

the applicable rules of court, but has asserted that some

rules were not published, and thus he could not interpret or apply them; some rules were ambiguous; and his

failure to file timely responses was due to his suffering

a stroke. [The respondent] has failed to pay the $10,000

in sanctions imposed on him by the [Maine Supreme

Judicial Court], nor has he fully paid the $20,000 judgment against him imposed by the [Maine Superior

Court] in the underlying litigation, and has since filed

a Chapter 7 bankruptcy action in the Bankruptcy Court

in Connecticut. [The respondent] also did not properly

offer all the exhibits at this bar discipline hearing that

he made reference to in his post hearing submission.

In short, he does not appear to have a good grasp of

the procedural rules of litigation.’’8

In determining the appropriate sanction to impose

for the respondent’s violations of the identified rules of

professional conduct, Justice Clifford considered both

aggravating and mitigating factors. Specifically, the

court stated: ‘‘There are many aggravating factors in

this case. The misconduct at issue is very serious. [The

respondent’s] conduct in the underlying litigation, and

especially in the appeal in Lincoln [v. Burbank, supra,

147 A.3d 1165], has caused substantial injury to the

parties involved in the litigation as well as a waste of

judicial resources. Although this court does not find

that all of [the respondent’s] misconduct was deliberate,

as a practicing attorney, he certainly should have known

that his conduct was far afield from the standards

expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and that

his actions constituted misconduct.

‘‘There are some mitigating factors that the court feels

compelled to consider. [The respondent] has no prior

disciplinary record in Maine, he was under great stress

due to his father’s poor health, and he himself has suffered from a stroke and is not in good health. There is

also evidence that [the respondent] provided competent

legal representation in Maine in the past, namely, in the

effort by Ralph Nader to be placed on the Maine ballot

as a presidential candidate in the early 2000s.

‘‘The main purpose of imposing a sanction in these

disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public.
The sanction to be imposed must be significant because

of the serious misconduct that is involved here, and

must require that [the respondent] file a petition for

reinstatement in order for him to be reinstated as an

attorney in good standing.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.

Having considered both the aggravating and mitigating

factors, Justice Clifford imposed a twelve month suspension from the practice of law in Maine, effective as

of the date of the decision, with the attendant obligation

that the respondent must petition for reinstatement in

accordance with Maine’s Disciplinary Rules of Procedure.

On February 6, 2018, having learned of the respondent’s suspension in Maine, Connecticut’s Chief Disciplinary Counsel filed an application in the Connecticut

Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book § 2-399

seeking commensurate disciplinary action against the

respondent’s Connecticut law license. The application

alleged that the respondent was admitted to the Connecticut bar on June 10, 1994, and that, on January 24,

2018, he had been suspended from the practice of law

in Maine for a period of twelve months. A copy of the

Maine order was attached to the application.

The respondent filed an answer in response to the

application in accordance with Practice Book § 2-39,

which he later amended. He also filed a number of

exhibits with the court. In his amended answer, the

respondent admitted to his twelve month suspension in

Maine but argued that reciprocal action by Connecticut

was unwarranted. The respondent principally argued

that he should never have been subject to disciplinary

proceedings in Maine because he had appeared before

the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Lincoln as a selfrepresented Connecticut citizen, not as a licensed attorney, and that any application of the rules of professional

responsibility to his conduct while prosecuting the

appeal as a self-represented party necessarily implicated and violated his rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution to

petition the government without threat of punishment,

reprisal or prior restraint. According to the respondent,

any reciprocal disciplinary proceeding in Connecticut

stemming from the allegedly unconstitutional Maine

disciplinary action similarly would be unconstitutional.

The matter was assigned for a hearing before the

court, Sheridan, J. At the hearing, the court afforded

the respondent ample opportunity to present witnesses

as well as additional evidence pertaining both to the

underlying litigation in Maine and to the resulting disciplinary proceedings. On June 4, 2018, the court issued

a decision concluding that the respondent’s arguments

largely were without merit or inconsequential, and that

he most certainly fell short of establishing by clear and

convincing evidence any of the defenses advanced in his
answer. The court found that commensurate discipline

was appropriate under the circumstances and ordered

the respondent suspended from the practice of law in

Connecticut for a period of twelve months, retroactive

to January 24, 2018. The court further ordered that,

to be reinstated to the bar at the conclusion of his

suspension, the respondent was required to apply for

reinstatement in accordance with Practice Book § 2-53.

This appeal followed.10

We begin with governing principles of law, including

our standard of review. ‘‘Attorney disciplinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving the courts of

justice from the official ministration of persons unfit

to [practice] in them. . . . An attorney as an officer of

the court in the administration of justice, is continually

accountable to it for the manner in which he exercises

the privilege which has been accorded him. His admission is upon the implied condition that his continued

enjoyment of the right conferred is dependent upon his

remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it, so that

when he, by misconduct in any capacity, discloses

that he has become or is an unfit or unsafe person to

be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations

of an attorney, his right to continue in the enjoyment of

his professional privilege may and ought to be declared

forfeited. . . . Therefore, [i]f a court disciplines an

attorney, it does so not to mete out punishment to an

offender, but [so] that the administration of justice may

be safeguarded and the courts and the public protected

from the misconduct or unfitness of those who are

licensed to perform the important functions of the legal

profession.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance

Committee v. Spirer, 247 Conn. 762, 771–72, 725 A.2d

948 (1999).

Practice Book § 2-39 sets forth the procedures by

which Connecticut courts may impose commensurate

reciprocal discipline on an attorney admitted to the

Connecticut bar who has been disciplined for professional misconduct in another jurisdiction. See footnote

9 of this opinion; In re Weissman, 203 Conn. 380, 383,

524 A.2d 1141 (1987). Section 2-39 compels disciplinary

counsel, upon learning of an attorney’s discipline

occurring in another jurisdiction, to file a copy of the

disciplinary order with the Superior Court, which then

serves an order to show cause directing the attorney

to file an answer ‘‘admitting or denying the action in

the other jurisdiction and setting forth, if any, reasons

why commensurate action in [Connecticut] would be

unwarranted.’’ Practice Book § 2-39 (b). The certified

copy of the other jurisdiction’s disciplinary order constitutes prima facie evidence that the order entered ‘‘and

that the findings contained therein are true.’’ Practice

Book § 2-39 (b). After conducting a hearing, the court

‘‘shall take commensurate action unless it is found that

any defense set forth in the answer has been established
by clear and convincing evidence.’’ Practice Book § 2-

39 (c).

‘‘[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of

belief that lies between the belief that is required to

find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an

ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to

find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden]

is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier

a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly

probably true, that the probability that they are true or

exist is substantially greater than the probability that

they are false or do not exist. . . . Our Supreme Court

has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a

demanding standard that should operate as a weighty

caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids

relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 85 Conn. App. 440, 443–44, 857 A.2d 432 (2004),

aff’d, 277 Conn. 99, 890 A.2d 104 (2006).

Because whether a respondent has established a

defense to a disciplinary order by clear and convincing

evidence presents a question of fact for the trier, it

follows that our review of a court’s finding that a respondent has failed to meet that high burden of persuasion

is limited to whether that finding is clearly erroneous.11

See, e.g., Melillo v. New Haven, 249 Conn. 138, 150,

732 A.2d 133 (1999) (reviewing under clearly erroneous

standard court’s finding that appellant failed to meet

burden of proof); Jazlowiecki v. Cyr, 4 Conn. App.

76, 77, 492 A.2d 516 (1985) (same); Ruggiero v. East

Hartford, 2 Conn. App. 89, 96, 477 A.2d 668 (1984)

(same).12 Under this highly deferential standard, ‘‘[w]e

do not examine the record to determine whether the

trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than

the one reached. Rather, we focus on the conclusion

of the trial court, as well as the method by which it

arrived at that conclusion, to determine whether it is

legally correct and factually supported. . . . A finding

of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence

to support it . . . or when although there is evidence

in the record to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’’ Depart. of

Transportation v. Cheriha, LLC, 155 Conn. App. 181,

191–92, 112 A.3d 825 (2015).

Next, before turning to our discussion of the claims

raised by the respondent on appeal, it is helpful to

acknowledge what claims the respondent has chosen

not to raise and, thus, what is not properly before us.

The respondent has not claimed that the misconduct

in which he was found to have engaged by the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court either did not occur or, in some

manner, was insufficient to support his violations of the

particular rules of professional conduct he was found
to have violated by Justice Clifford. He has not claimed

that the same misconduct or actions, if taken in Connecticut, would not have constituted violations of Connecticut’s corresponding rules of professional conduct

and, thus, that reciprocal discipline would be inappropriate. Finally, the respondent does not claim that the

trial court, having concluded that reciprocal discipline

was warranted in this jurisdiction, abused its discretion

by imposing a one year suspension rather than some

lesser sanction.13 The respondent argues only that the

court should not have imposed any reciprocal discipline because, by doing so, it allegedly violated a myriad

of constitutional rights.

Finally, to the extent that the respondent seeks to

attack collaterally the underlying Maine disciplinary

judgment, we, of course, have no appellate jurisdiction

to alter the Maine judgment. See General Statutes § 51-

197a (limiting appellate jurisdiction of this court to

appeals from final judgments of our Superior Court

unless otherwise provided by statute). Here, our review

is limited as to whether the trial court properly rendered

its judgment in accordance with the dictates of Practice

Book § 2-39 (c). Although the respondent was free to

seek appellate review of the Maine disciplinary judgment by filing an appeal with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court; see Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Condon,

940 A.2d 1065 (Me. February 5, 2008); it does not appear

from the record presented to us that the respondent

availed himself of such review, arguably waiving any

appellate review he may have had with respect to the

Maine disciplinary judgment. See Sousa v. Sousa, 322

Conn. 757, 771–72, 143 A.3d 578 (2016) (‘‘collateral

attack on a judgment is a procedurally impermissible

substitute for an appeal’’).

I

The respondent first claims that the court improperly

determined that he had failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the reciprocal suspension of

his law license, which was based on his actions while

prosecuting an appeal as a self-represented party, effectively violated his first and fourteenth amendment rights

to petition the government without the fear of reprisal.

As part of this claim, the respondent also suggests that

his statements and arguments made while prosecuting

the appeal before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

were protected political speech that could not have

formed a proper basis for disciplinary proceedings. In

other words, the respondent has raised arguments

implicating both the petition and the free speech clause

of the first amendment.14 The petitioner responds that

we should decline to review this claim entirely because

the respondent has not adequately briefed it. The petitioner notes that the respondent has provided no direct

authority that his presentation of legal issues that the

Maine Supreme Judicial Court found to be ‘‘meritless,’’
‘‘frivolous,’’ and ‘‘devoid of legal authority to support

them,’’ was protected speech exempt from the application of disciplinary rules, or that his status as a selfrepresented party should have precluded any finding

that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. On

the basis of the briefing and record provided, we conclude that the respondent’s arguments are unpersuasive

and, for the reasons that follow, the court’s finding that

the respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a defense to the Maine disciplinary proceeding by

clear and convincing proof was not clearly erroneous.

At their core, the respondent’s constitutional arguments, to the extent that they are discernable, primarily

focus on the fact that he was representing himself

before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in the Lincoln

matter and that, because he allegedly was not acting

in his capacity as an attorney but, rather, in his capacity

as a private citizen, he simply was not accountable to

the rules of professional conduct or related disciplinary

procedures. According to the respondent, under these

circumstances, holding him accountable to standards

applicable to attorneys unfairly infringed on first

amendment rights held by ordinary citizens.

There is no dispute that a person’s ability to have

access to courts to litigate civil disputes is among the

rights protected under the first amendment’s petition

clause. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S.

379, 387, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2494, 180 L. Ed. 2d 408 (2011)

(‘‘the [p]etition [c]lause [of the first amendment] protects the right of individuals to appeal to courts and

other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes’’]. In raising his first amendment

arguments before the trial court, however, the respondent failed to cite to any case, from any jurisdiction,

in which a court has ruled that the enforcement of

attorney disciplinary rules on an attorney engaging in

self-representation before the court implicates that

attorney’s right to petition as protected by the first

amendment. The respondent has not remedied this deficiency in his appellate brief.15 Additionally, the respondent cites no authority for the proposition that an attorney acting as a self-represented litigant should be held

to a different standard of professional conduct than

that applied to an attorney acting on behalf of a client.

Contrary to the assertions of the respondent, this

court previously has stated that the ‘‘Rules of Professional Conduct bind attorneys to uphold the law and

to act in accordance with high standards in both their

personal and professional lives.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Egbarin, 61 Conn.

App. 445, 450, 767 A.2d 732, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949,

769 A.2d 64 (2001). In support of that statement, we

relied on language found in the preamble to our Rules

of Professional Conduct, which provides in relevant

part that ‘‘[a] lawyer, as a member of the legal profes-
sion, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal

system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.’’ (Emphasis added.)

In In the Matter of Presnick, 19 Conn. App. 340,

345–46, 563 A.2d 299, cert. denied, 213 Conn 801, 567

A.2d 833 (1989), an en banc panel of this court considered whether we had the authority to suspend an attorney from filing papers and appearing before this court

for disobeying an order in a case in which the attorney

was representing himself. We concluded that we had

the authority to discipline an attorney despite the fact

that the underlying behavior of the attorney resulting

in the sanction occurred while the attorney was

appearing as a self-represented party. Id., 341–42. In so

holding, we indicated that ‘‘[a]lthough misconduct of

an attorney may be unconnected with representation

of another as a member of the bar, punishment may be

imposed for that misconduct because it is an indication

of a general unfitness to practice law. . . . Whether an

attorney represents himself or not, his basic obligation

to the court as an attorney remains the same. He is

an officer of the court no matter who is the client.

Disciplinary proceedings not only concern the rights of

the lawyer and the client, but also the rights of the

public and the rights of the judiciary to ensure that

lawyers uphold their unique position as officers and

commissioners of the court.’’ Id., 344-45.

Our statements in Egbarin and In the Matter of Presnick recognize that an attorney always must conduct

himself or herself in accordance with professional standards and belie the respondent’s arguments that seek

to differentiate for disciplinary and constitutional purposes between an attorney’s actions taken on behalf of

a client and actions taken in representing himself in his

role as a citizen. Our Supreme Court similarly has stated

that an attorney, as an officer of the court, ‘‘is continually accountable to [the court] for the manner in which

he exercises the privilege which has been accorded

him’’ and attorney disciplinary proceedings are appropriate with respect to ‘‘misconduct in any capacity,’’

which necessarily encompasses actions taken by attorneys who are engaged in self-representation. (Emphasis

added.) Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer,

supra, 247 Conn. 771–72. Said another way, it is the

unique position attorneys enjoy that makes it important

that they, at all times, conduct themselves in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct; see

Statewide Grievance Committee v. Rozbicki, 211 Conn.

232, 237–38, 558 A.2d 986 (1989); and the mere fact that

an attorney may be appearing before a tribunal in a

self-represented capacity does not lessen his duty to

comply with such rules. If, through his actions, an attorney demonstrates that he cannot be ‘‘entrusted with

the responsibilities and obligations of an attorney, his

right to continue in the enjoyment of his professional

privilege may and ought to be declared forfeited.’’ State-
wide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, supra, 772.

Our conclusion that the respondent had the same

professional obligation to the court when representing

himself as when representing a client undermines the

central construct in his first amendment challenge to

the imposition of reciprocal discipline on him in this

case. He advances no factual or legal basis for reaching

any other conclusion. To avoid reciprocal discipline, it

is the respondent who has the burden to demonstrate

the validity of some defense; it is not the duty of the

court or bar counsel to negate every posited defense.

His arguments on appeal unquestionably fall short of

convincing us that the trial court’s finding that he failed

to prove by clear and convincing evidence a defense

premised on a violation of first amendment rights was

clearly erroneous.

II

The respondent also claims that, under the circumstances of this case, the Maine court’s disciplinary proceedings violated his rights to due process and equal

protection as protected by the fourteenth amendment

to the constitution of the United States, and that this

violation should have barred the imposition of reciprocal discipline by the Connecticut trial court. The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to raise this

claim in the trial court and, even if raised, that he failed

to provide the trial court with a complete record adequate to review the claim. Similar to the respondent’s

prior claim, he has failed to demonstrate with respect

to this claim that the trial court’s finding that he failed

to prove any defense raised in his answer by clear and

convincing evidence was clearly erroneous.

‘‘Because a license to practice law is a vested property

interest, an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to

due process of law. . . . In attorney grievance proceedings, due process mandates that [b]efore discipline

may be imposed, an attorney is entitled to notice of the

charges, a fair hearing and an appeal to court for a

determination of whether he or she has been deprived

of these rights in some substantial manner.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Statewide

Grievance Committee v. Egbarin, supra, 61 Conn. App.

456. Accordingly, if proven by clear and convincing

evidence, the failure to receive due process in a disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction certainly

would be a proper defense to the imposition of reciprocal discipline in Connecticut.

Here, however, nothing in the record before us suggests that the respondent raised even a colorable claim

that he was denied due process in the Maine disciplinary

proceedings. The respondent makes no credible claim

that he lacked sufficient notice or an opportunity to be

heard. The respondent’s arguments and reasoning, both

in his pleadings before the trial court and to this court
on appeal, are circuitous, repetitious, and lack a cogent

discussion that is logically and legally tethered to the

issue under consideration. This makes it all the more

difficult to evaluate whether his claim properly was

raised and preserved for appellate review. For example,

a significant portion of his answer to the application

for reciprocal discipline focused on the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court’s resolution of the merits of the Lincoln

matter rather than discussing the court’s findings of

misconduct by the respondent that formed the basis of

the court’s sanction orders and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Further, as the petitioner argues,

the respondent failed to provide the trial court with a

complete record of the appellate proceedings before

the Maine Judicial Court.16

Even if we deem his claim preserved, however, much

of the veritable laundry list of constitutional arguments

and alleged violations of rights, including fleeting references to the ninth amendment, the supremacy clause,

the commerce clause, and the full faith and credit clause

of the United States constitution, consists of no more

than generalized statements of legal propositions,

devoid of any cogent analysis or application of the facts

to any of the asserted constitutional doctrines relative

to the subject matter at hand: the reciprocal enforcement of rules governing attorney professional conduct.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the briefs,

we are unpersuaded that the court’s finding that the

respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a cognizable defense to the Maine disciplinary proceedings was clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United

States District Court for the District of Connecticut each subsequently

imposed a one year reciprocal suspension of the respondent’s right to practice before them on the basis of the same Maine disciplinary action. See In

re Burbank, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No. 19-8010 (1st Cir.

Oct. 28, 2019); In re Burbank, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:18-

GP-00006 (MPS) (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2018).

2 The respondent also claims that the disciplinary proceedings violated

various rights afforded to him under the Connecticut constitution. The

respondent, however, has failed to analyze adequately his state constitutional

claims because, in his appellate brief, he has not ‘‘functionally address[ed]

in detail the subject matter of most of the factors’’ set forth in State v.

Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), which our Supreme Court has

made clear is necessary for any independent state constitutional analysis.

See State v. Santiago, 305 Conn. 101, 250–51, 49 A.3d 566 (2012), superceded

in part on other grounds by State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 122 A.3d 1 (2015).

Because the respondent has not briefed adequately his state constitutional

claims, we deem them abandoned. See Wasko v. Farley, 108 Conn. App.

156, 164, 947 A.2d 978, 985, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 922, 958 A.2d 155 (2008).

3 The trial court effectively adopted the factual findings set forth in the

opinions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and the retired justice who

oversaw the Maine disciplinary proceeding, stating that it ‘‘[would] not revisit

the factual findings made by the various courts in Maine that have fully

reviewed, analyzed, and vetted the evidence.’’ See Lincoln v. Burbank, 147

A.3d 1165, 1169 (2016), cert. denied, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1338, 197 L. Ed.

2d 520 (2017); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Burbank, BAR-17-12 (January

29, 2018) (Clifford, J.). Accordingly, we rely on those opinions in setting

forth the facts and procedural history underlying the present appeal.
4 The crux of the litigation was aptly described by the United States Court

of Appeals for the First Circuit in its own reciprocal disciplinary action

against the respondent. See In re Burbank, supra, United States Court of

Appeals, Docket No. 19-8010. ‘‘The neighbors had been using for decades,

without issue or objection, beach access stairs adjacent to [the Burbank

property] to descend an embankment—they would then cross a small portion

of [the Burbank property] in order to get to the beach. [The respondent]

took it upon himself to report the stairs as a zoning violation and, ultimately,

he removed the stairs (contrary to an advisement from the town and against

the wishes of his fellow co-owners), giving rise to this lawsuit.’’ Id.

5 Subsection (f) of Rule 13 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure

provides: ‘‘If, after a separately filed motion or a notice from the court and

a reasonable opportunity to respond, the Law Court determines that an

appeal, motion for reconsideration, argument, or other proceeding before

it is frivolous, contumacious, or instituted primarily for the purpose of delay,

it may award to the opposing parties or their counsel treble costs and

reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by such action.’’

6 The respondent did not withdraw as counsel for the remaining Burbank

defendants until the Supreme Judicial Court had ordered the respondent to

show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned for attempting to represent

three appellees while simultaneously representing himself as the appellant.

7 The text and numbering of the relevant Maine and Connecticut rules of

professional conduct are virtually identical. The following are Connecticut’s

rules, which govern with respect to the reciprocal disciplinary ruling

under review.

Rule 1.1, titled ‘‘Competence,’’ provides: ‘‘A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal

knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for

the representation.’’

Rule 1.3, titled ‘‘Diligence,’’ provides: ‘‘A lawyer shall act with reasonable

diligence and promptness in representing a client.’’

Rule 3.1, titled ‘‘Meritorious Claims & Contentions,’’ provides in relevant

part: ‘‘A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert

an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that

is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,

modification or reversal of existing law. . . .’’

Rule 3.4, titled ‘‘Fairness to Opposing Party & Counsel,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘A lawyer shall not . . . (3) knowingly disobey an obligation

under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion

that no valid obligation exists . . . .’’

Rule 8.4, titled ‘‘Misconduct,’’ provides in relevant part: ‘‘It is professional

misconduct for a lawyer to: (1) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do

so through the acts of another. . . .’’

8

It is unclear from Justice Clifford’s decision what rule of professional

conduct, if any, the court deemed implicated by an attorney’s having filed for

bankruptcy or his resulting inability to satisfy a civil judgment or monetary

sanction. The respondent, however, has not raised any specific claim on

appeal regarding these findings or suggested that they provide support for

any of the constitutional claims that he raises. Furthermore, even if we were

to conclude that these particular findings were irrelevant or improper factual

predicates on which to base a finding of attorney misconduct, any such

error likely was rendered harmless in light of the extensive other findings

supporting the violations asserted. See Henry v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 111 Conn. App. 12, 27–28, 957 A.2d 547 (2008) (holding any impropriety in relying on allegedly irrelevant factual findings in finding violations

of rules of professional conduct necessarily harmless if other evidence

existed sufficient to support court’s ultimate findings).

9 Practice Book § 2-39 provides: ‘‘(a) Upon being informed that a lawyer

admitted to the Connecticut bar has resigned, been disbarred, suspended

or otherwise disciplined, or placed on inactive disability status in another

jurisdiction, and that said discipline or inactive disability status has not

been stayed, the disciplinary counsel shall obtain a certified copy of the

order and file it with the Superior Court for the judicial district wherein

the lawyer maintains an office for the practice of law in this state, except

that, if the lawyer has no such office, the disciplinary counsel shall file the

certified copy of the order from the other jurisdiction with the Superior

Court for the judicial district of Hartford. No entry fee shall be required for

proceedings hereunder.

‘‘(b) Upon receipt of a certified copy of the order, the court shall forthwith
cause to be served upon the lawyer a copy of the order from the other

jurisdiction and an order directing the lawyer to file within thirty days of

service, with proof of service upon the disciplinary counsel, an answer

admitting or denying the action in the other jurisdiction and setting forth,

if any, reasons why commensurate action in this state would be unwarranted. Such certified copy will constitute prima facie evidence that the

order of the other jurisdiction entered and that the findings contained therein

are true.

‘‘(c) Upon the expiration of the thirty day period the court shall assign

the matter for a hearing. After hearing, the court shall take commensurate

action unless it is found that any defense set forth in the answer has been

established by clear and convincing evidence.

‘‘(d) Notwithstanding the above, a reciprocal discipline action need not

be filed if the conduct giving rise to discipline in another jurisdiction has

already been the subject of a formal review by the court or Statewide

Grievance Committee.’’ (Emphasis added.)

10 Although, as of the date of oral argument before this court, the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law in Connecticut had expired by

its terms on January 24, 2019, the respondent’s license remains suspended

according to the Judicial Branch’s website. Even if the suspension order

under consideration no longer were in effect, however, that fact alone would

not render the present appeal moot because an expired suspension continues

to have adverse collateral consequences on an attorney’s reputation and

professional standing. See Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227

Conn. 829, 837–38 n.13, 633 A.2d 296 (1993) (holding that because prior

misconduct of attorney may be considered in subsequent disciplinary proceeding, expiration of suspension during pendency of appeal from suspension order did not render appeal moot due to potentially prejudicial collateral consequences).

11 ‘‘The concept of a burden of persuasion ordinarily applies to questions

of fact, and ordinarily is expressed in one of three ways: (1) a preponderance

of the evidence; (2) clear and convincing evidence; or (3) proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.’’ Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town

Council, 249 Conn. 566, 580, 735 A.2d 231, 240 (1999).

12 The respondent argues that he is entitled to de novo review because

‘‘whether the court held the parties to the proper standard of proof is a

question of law.’’ The respondent is not arguing on appeal, however, that

the court made a legal error by choosing and applying an incorrect burden

of persuasion in evaluating his defenses. Rather, acknowledging that he

bears the burden of proving a defense by clear and convincing evidence,

he challenges the court’s factual finding that he failed to meet that standard.

13 ‘‘[C]ommensurate action under [Practice Book § 2-39] (c) does not mean

identical action. The trial court ha[s] inherent judicial power, derived from

judicial responsibility for the administration of justice, to exercise sound

discretion to determine what sanction to impose in light of the entire record

before it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Weissman, supra, 203

Conn. 384. Accordingly, appellate review of the terms of any sanction

imposed is limited to whether the court abused its discretion. In the present

case, the respondent argues only that the court was precluded from imposing

any discipline with respect to his Connecticut license. The respondent

does not claim that the court abused its discretion by imposing a yearlong

suspension rather than some lesser sanction.

14 The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that ‘‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech . . . or the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for

a redress of grievances.’’ U.S. Const. amend. I. ‘‘These two guarantees are

known, respectively, as the Speech Clause and the Petition Clause.’’ Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2017). ‘‘[T]he core value of the Free

Speech Clause of the First Amendment’’ is ‘‘[t]he public interest in having

free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance.’’ Pickering v.

Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 573, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811

(1968). ‘‘The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes,

and concerns to their government and their elected representatives . . . .’’

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 180 L.

Ed. 2d 408 (2011).

15 Although the respondent quotes extensively from the dissenting opinion

in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984), he

fails to elaborate how the dissent’s discussion of the special nature of the

protections and freedoms afforded to speech under the first amendment

are applicable to the facts of the present case.
16 For example, he did not provide the court with copies of any transcripts

of the proceedings before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court or with copies

of the relevant appellate pleadings and briefs that the Maine Supreme Court

identified as having ‘‘consistently disregarded standards of law and practice

that govern appellate review.’’ Lincoln v. Burbank, supra, 147 A.3d 1179.