F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT February18 , 2 003 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H]
IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T
N os. 00- 1365 7 and 0 0- 1485 9
D
. C. D oc ke t N o. 98- 0005 2- CR -O RL -1 9C UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
ve rs us W ILLIAM J . McCOR KLE, a. k. a. W ill ia m

T
. Mc Co kle D ef en dant, F. LEE BAILEY, Cl ai m an t- Appe llant.

Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida (F eb ru ar y 18 , 200 3)The jury convicted the McCorkles (a nd others involved) of

executing a

telemar keting 1 sc he me in v iol atio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § § 1 34 1 ( ma il f ra ud ) a nd 13 43 (w ir e fr a

ud ), of c on sp ir ingto launder the proc eeds of

the sche me in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and of la underingsuch pr oc e e ds in v iol atio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § §1 95 6( a )( 2) (B ) a nd 19 57 (a ). Th e te le mark e tin gsc he me is descr ibed in our opinion in United States v. McCorkle, 296 F .3d 1284, 1286-89 (11th Cir. 2002), which af firmed the Mc Corkles’ convic tions. Although we vacated the McCorkle s’ sentenc es and rema nded the c ase f

or re sentenc ing, id. at 1294, we lef t intact the orde r of f

orfe iture, since the err ors the cour

t committed in im posing se ntence had no bea ringon the forf

eiture a spects of the case . Th e se $2 mil lio n w e re pr oc e e ds of the te le mark e tin gsc he me and thu s w e re su

bje c t to 2 fo rf e iture un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 98 2( a )( 1) , whic h s tate s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

Th e c ourt , in

imp os ingse nte nc e on

a pe rs on c onvic te d o f a

n o ff e ns e in violation of . . . [18 U.S .C. §§ 1956 or 1957] shall order that the per son forf eit to the United States any proper ty , rea l or persona l, involved in such o f f e n s e , o r an y p r o p e rty tr a c e a

b l e t o s u c hp r o p e rty. Th e se izur e of

pr op e rt y fo rf e ite d und e r § 98 2( a )( 1) and any jud ic ia l pr oc e e din gre latin gto the forf eiture a re g overne d by

21 U.S.C. § 853 and (e) -(p) . 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1). Under se ction 853(c) , the McCorkles’ interest in the proc eeds of the telemar

ketingscheme vested in the United States the moment they

launder ed such pr ocee ds. A transfe ree of launde red pr ocee ds may be 2 Be fo re T JO FL A T , RO N E Y a nd C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:

I. A ft er f ind ing W ill ia m

a nd C hanta l M cC orkle gui lty of launde ri ng the proceeds of a f

raudulent telem arketing schem e, the j ury returned a specia l verdict 1 fo rf ei tin g to the U nit ed

S ta te s th e Mc Co rk le s’ int er es ts i n vari ous as se ts. A m ong the se a sse ts w er e $2 m ill ionthat ha d be enpla ce d intr ust by the Mc Co rk le s inthe Caym anI slands fo r the paym en t of the ir law y er s’ f

ee s and transf

er re d by the tr ust to F
. L ee Ba ile y , W ill ia m Mc Co rk le ’ s a tto rn ey . A t the January 25, 199 9 2su

bje c t f o a “ sp e c ia l ve rd ic t of

fo rf e iture ” (r e tur

ne d at th e de fe nd ant’ s tr ia l) and or de re d to fo rf

e it such proc eeds to the United States, “unless the tra nsfer ee e stablishes in a hea ringpursuant to [21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)( B) ] t hat “he is a bona fide purcha ser f or value of such pr operty

who at the tim e of the purc ha se wa s r e a so na bly wi tho ut c a

us e to b e lie ve that th e pr op e rt y wa s su bje c t to forf eiture unde r [18 U.S.C . § 982(a) (1) a nd 21 U.S.C. § 853] .” 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) . In this case, the jury returne d a spec ial verdic t of forf eiture w ith respec t to the “$2 million i n leg al trust fund [cr e ate d b y

the Mc Cor

kle s] and tr ans fe rr e d f

ro m th e tr us t to F . L e e B a ile y .” In r e tur nin gthi s specia l verdict, the jury

nece ssarily

found (1) that the McCorkles ha d transfe rre d $2 milli on of launder ed proc eeds to the “ leg al trust fund,” which they had set up to pay

Ba iley ’s fe es (a

nd th o s e o f o th e r at t o r n e ys ) an d ( 2 ) th atth e tr

u s t e e s h a d , i ntur

n , tr an s f e r r e d s u c hp r o c e e d s t o B a i l e y. 3 sentencing, the district court, as a part of the McC orkles’ sentencing package,
en te re d an or de r of

f or fe iture w hic h c onve y ed suc h in te re sts to the U nit ed S ta te s. T he j ur y , in re tur nin g it s f or fe iture ve rd ic t, f

ound that B ai le y

w as a transfere e of the laundered procee ds that belon ged to the Unite States. T o defeat the G ove rn m en t’ s r igh t t o su chpr oc ee ds – that i s, to av oid

be ing sue d by

the G ove rn m en t f

or c onve rs ionof

it s pr ope rty

– B ai le y ha d to f ile ape tit ionw iththe district court and prove that he had received the m oney as a bona fide purchaser for value w ithou t cause to believe that the m oney wa s subject to forf

eiture (“ BF P” ). S ee 21 U
. S. C. §§8 53( n) (6 )( B)
. B ai le y f ile d hi s pe tit ionon F eb ru ar y 16, 19 99
. The district court r efer red Bailey ’ s petition to a m agistrate j udge. O n March 5, 1999, the G overnm ent m oved the court for an order to show ca use why Bailey sh ou ld no t b e h el d i n c iv il co nt em pt forfai li ng to tu rn ov er t he fun ds wit hd rawnOn Dec ember 16, 1998, the district court, a ctingpursuant to Fe d. R. Crim. P . 32(d), 3 enter ed a pr eliminary

order of for feiture , which author ized the Attorney Gene ral to seize the forf eited asse ts. A Dec ember 18, 1998 order

direc ted the U.S. Marsha l to “seize the $2 milli on in leg al trust fund and tra nsfer red f rom trust to F. L ee B ailey .” The Marsha l served the order on Ba iley on J anuar

y 15, 1999, but Ba iley

ref used to turn over

the funds, statingthat “he did not have the money .” By this ti me, B ailey

had instructed the trustees of the fund to disburse $1,94,301 fr om the tr us t f un d. Ab out ha lf

we nt t o B a ile y

and his wi fe ; th e oth e r h a lf

we nt t o th e oth e r d e fe ns e lawy ers. The se disbursements we re a ppare ntly in violation of the mag istrate judg e’s admonishment, when the Mc Corkles made the ir initial appear ance (followingindictment) on Marc h 10, 1997, that no money was to be r emoved f

rom the trust pendingthe completion of the c ri min a l f or fe iture pr oc e e din g s. Th e Go ve rnme nt w a s n ot w ith out r e c ours e , h ow e ve r, be c a us e the fo rf e iture statut e a llo ws the Go ve rnme nt t o r e c ov e r, in t he c ours e of

an a nc ill ary thi rd -p art

y proce eding , all assets that ar e tra cea ble to the forf

eited asse ts. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Moreove r, as the district c ourt noted in its J une 29, 2000 orde r re g ardingBa iley ’s sec tion 853(n) pe tit ion , th e fi na l de te rm inatio n th at th e Go ve rn me nt ( and

no t B a ile y

) h a d c le ar t itl e to t

he tr us t fund asse ts enabled the Gover nment to pursue a c ommon law action ag ainst Ba iley for conver sion. 4 fr om the tr ust . O n M ar ch30, 199 9, the m ag istrate j udge , in advanc e of the 3 hearing on the m erits of Ba iley ’ s section 85 3(n) petition, entered a pr elim inary
or de r in whic h he a ddr es se d th e G ove rn m en t’ s m oti on. H e or de re d B ai le y to ei the r de posi t $2 m ill ionint o th e re gis tr y of the c ourt or , by

May 3, 199 9, pos t a $2 m illion bond
. Bailey

did neith er. O n O ct obe r 18, 199 9, the m ag istrate j udge he ld a he ar ing to ad

j udi cate the
m er its of Ba ile y ’ s pe tit iona nd t o pe rm it Ba ile y to showc au se w hy

he sho uld

not be cited for c ontem

pt for failing to com

ply with the Mar ch 20 order. On January 14, 200 0, the m ag istrate j udge f or w ar de d hi s r ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n to the dis tr ic t c ourt. H e re co m

m en de d th at

the c ourt r ej ec t B ai le y ’ s se ct ion853 (n )We n ote that th e B F P sta nd ard re qu ir e s th at tr ans fe re e s o f f or fe ite d p ro pe rt

y int e re sts , 4 such as de fense attorney s, be “bona fide purc haser [s] for va lue of the r ight, title, or intere st in the pr op e rt y .” 21 U. S.C. § 8 52 (n )( 6) (B ). Th is m e ans that th e on ly a sse ts that are po te nti a lly immuniz ed fr om forfe iture ar e those for which value has be en give n . The “ value” g iven by an attorney is the perf

ormanc e of le g al servic es that have alre ady been r ender ed whe n the attorne y rec eives pa

y ment. This case does not prese nt a close que stion, because the appr ox imately $2 milli on paid to Ba iley

was pa id for the r endition of futur e le g a l se rv ic e s. The point is this: a cr iminal defenda nt cannot pay

an attorne y

for the r endition of future leg al servic es with the expectation that the e ntire pay ment will be immune from forf eiture. Rather, the c ourt would have to pro rate the value of service s that have be en re ndere d by the attorney , immuniz ing f

rom forf eiture only

those fee s ear

ned while mee ting the B FP test. For example, if an attorne y

rec eives a

n up-fr ont pay

ment of $5 million for his future leg al servic es and the attorney

loses his BF P status a week later (sa y , beca use the c lient is indi cate d and the attorney lear ns additional information about his client’s guilt), the attorney may keep only

the rea sonable va lue of his servic es prior to losinghis BF P status; he may not keep the e ntire $5 milli on. 5 pe tit ionon the gr ound

that B ai le y

ha d no t sh ow n th at

he w as aBF P, a nd tha t the 4
co urt r equir e Ba ile y

to showc au se w hy

he sho uld

not be he ld i n c ivi l c ont em

pt f or fa ili ng t o pay

$2 m ill ionint o th e co urt’ s r eg istry or , in lie u of

the de posi t, pos t a bo nd
. O n June 29, 200 0, the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d an or de r ad opt ing the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ec om

m en datio n th at

Ba ile y ’ s pe tit ionbe de nie d, thu s gi vin g th e G ove rn m en t c le ar

ti tle to the $2 m ill iontr

ust f und earm ar

ke d f or a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s, includi ng the $1 ,994,301 that had been dis bursed as Bailey directed. T he court al so a gr ee d th at

Ba ile y sho uld be r equir ed

to showc au se w hy

he sho uld

not be he ld i n c ont em

pt, a nd i t sc he dul ed

ahe ar ing f

or A ugus t 17 , 200 0. Me an w hil e, the court reduced to $700 ,000 the am ount of the bond th e m agistrate j udge hadThe “ forf eitable pr operty” in the hands of a tra nsfer ee, a ccor ding to the district c ourt’s 5 interpre tation of 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), includes only the prope rty

that is directly

“tra cea ble” to the ta int e d f un ds and no t “ su bs tit ute ” a sse ts. Thus , to re a c h a thi rd -p art

y tr ans fe re e ’s su

bs tit ute assets, the Gove rnment is left to a c ommon law action for conver sion; the criminal forf eiture proce edingcannot be used to rec over the forf eited intere sts. 6 required Bailey

to post ; the court found th at $1,300,000 of the trust fund had been dis sip at ed

a nd tha t the bon d “ shou ld b e re duc ed to re fl ec t and am ount

that the G ove rn m en t m ay

sti ll be able to law fu lly

se iz e fr om

Mr
. Ba ile y

in the f orm of fo rfei tabl e p ro pe rty.” 5 A t the A ugus t 17 sho wc au se he ar ing , Ba ile y r ep re se nte d th at

he la ck ed

the fi nanc ia l a

bil ity to post a$70 0, 000 bond
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sa gr ee d, a nd i t ad j udge d hi m

in co nte m

pt o f co urt. I n it s S ep te m be r 14, 200 or de r m em or ia liz ing the a dj udi catio n, how ev er , the c ourt de cl ine d to im pose asanc tio n ( suc h a s af ine
or inc ar ce ratio n) that w oul d gi ve Ba ile y the opp ortun ity

to pur ge him se lf

of the
co nte m pt. T he c ourt r ea sone d th at abon d w as no l onge r ne ed ed
. H av ing ad j udge d B ai le y

in co nte m

pt, tho ugh, the c ourt a

ppare ntl y f el t tha t i t ha d to take
som e ac tio n, a nd i t the re fo re r ef er re d hi m to the F lor ida

Bar fo r co nsi de ratio n of dis ci pli nary

a ct ion
. Ba ile y nowse parate ly

appe al s ( 1) the de nia l of his se ct ion853 (n ) pe tit ion and (2) the contem

pt adjudication. W e consider his appeals in order.The “ signa ls” Ba iley rec ites are as follows: (1) the Gover nment failed to see k pre- 6 indictment injunctive relief ( to free ze the McCorkles’ ba nk acc ounts) on May

9, 1997; (2) the Gover nment failed to file a

petition for injunctive re lief on May 12, 1997, and no re straint was imme d iate ly

s o u g h t i nth e Ca

y ma nI s la n d s ( a lt h o u g hth e G o v e r

n me n t e v e n tu a ll y

s o u g h t t o f

r e e ze the McCorkles’ Cay

man I sland ac counts); (3) a fter the Cay man I slands trial court r

uled that the trust fund could be use d to pay costs relating to the Cay

man litigation, the Gove rnment did not oppose the ruling ; (4) Assistant U.S. Attorney DeMa rco told Mar

k Horwitz, Chantal McCorkle’s lawy er, that the Gover

nment would not be see king f orfe iture of the tr

ust fund; (5) the Gover nment failed to pursue sever al ava ilable options after the Cay man I slands appellate court aff irmed the trial c ourt’s ruling , such as f iling an a ppeal with the Privy

Council in L ondon or seekinga re strainingorder in the district court; (6) the Gover nment neg lected to se ek a c ourt or de r p ro hib iti ngde fe ns e c ouns e l f ro m ob ta ini ngfe e s f

ro m th e tr us t f un d p ri or to t he Mc Cor

kle s’ eig ht week tr ial; and (7) A ssistant U.S. Att orney By ron, the Gove rnment’s lea d prosec utor, a lle g e dly tol d H or wi tz th at he kn e w that tr ans fe rs we re be ingma de fr om t he tr us t f un d b ut s a id nothing a bout the Gover

nment’s intent to seek their f orfe iture. 7 II. It is clear that the McCorkles used $2 m illion in laundered, and theref ore fo rf ei ta ble , f unds to cr eate the tr

ust f und fo r paym en t of

a tto rn ey ’ s f

ee s. I t i s a lso cl ear t ha t Ba il ey

kn ew fro m

th e o ut se t t ha t t he fun ds were s ub ject t o fo rfei tu re. Assum ing th at he cannot m eet the BF P test of 21 U. S. C. § 853 (n)(6)( B), Bailey
co n t en d s t h at h e s h o u l db e ab l e t o k ee p t h e mon ey b ec au s e t h e G o v ern m en t ’s conduct in duced him

to provid e legal service s that he would not h ave provided h a dh e kn o w n th a tth e Go v e rn men ti n t e n d e dt o p u r s u e t h e mo n e y. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Bailey contends th at the G overnm ent sent him seven “ signals ” that he w as entitled to the oth er

w ise f or fe ita ble m one y , a nd tha t the sig na ls “ w oul d have inc lin ed a ny 6
re as ona ble law y er

to be lie ve that he or

she w as sa fe a nd l eg al ly

c or re ct in
re ce ivi ng and s pe ndi ng f

unds f ro m the ‘ de fe nse f

und. ’ ” T he re fo re , Ba ile y a rg ue s,8

the G ove rn m en t sh oul d be e sto ppe d f ro m c la im ing tho se f

unds
. Even if Bailey

we re per m itted, as a m atter of law, to invo ke the estoppel doc tr ine in thi s c ri m ina l f or fe iture c ont ex t, he ha s no t e sta bli she d th e el em en ts o f
es top pe l. T o m ak e out

ac la im of e sto ppe l a ga ins t the G ove rn m en t, aparty m ust adduce evidence of the following: (1) w ords, conduct, or a cquiescence that ind uc es r el ianc e; ( 2) w ill fu lne ss o r ne gli ge nc e w ithr eg ar d to the a ct s, c ondu ct , or
ac qui es ce nc e; ( 3) de tr im en ta l r el ianc e; a nd ( 4) a ff irm at ive m isc ondu ct

by the Gov ern m en t. See Tefel v. Re no , 18 0 F .3d 12 86 , 13 02 -0 4 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 9)
. A ff irm at ive m isc ondu ct

r equir es m or e than go ve rn m en ta l ne gli ge nc e or ina ct ion ; oth er w ise , pr ong tw o and p ro ng f our w oul d be r ed

undant. Mos t of the “ sig na ls” to w hic h B ai le y poi nts c oul d no t po ssi bly ha ve ind uc ed r ea sona ble r el ianc e. S ign al s on e, tw o, thr ee , f ive , a nd s ix ( fi ve of

the seven sign als asserted by Bailey ) focus upon th e G overnm ent’ s failure to seek injunctive relief

at various tim es. This is an odd argum ent, beca use the statuto ry
sc he m e ex pr es sly

gr an ts the G ove rn m en t dis cr et ion w he the r to e m plo y the pr ot ect iv e m eas ur es Bai le y says sh ou ld ha ve be en em pl oyed. See 21 U.S.C. § 853( e) ; c f. Ca

pli n & D ry sda le v. U nit ed S ta te s, 491 U
. S. 617 , 622 -2 3, 109 S
. Ct
. 2 6 4 6 , 2 6 5 0 -5 1 , 1 0 5 L. Ed . 2 d5 2 8 (1 9 8 9 ) ( co n cl u d i n g t h at a d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s
ex er ci se of

dis cr et ionnot

to en te r a pr etri al r es tr ai nin g or de r doe s no t “9

‘ im m unize’ nonrestrained assets from subsequ ent forfe iture under § 853(c), if they
ar e tr an sf er re d to a n a tto rn ey

to pay le ga l f ee s” ). Mo re ove r, G ove rn m en t i na ct ion doe s no t gi ve r ise to ane sto ppe l c la im ; the G ove rn m en t m ust e nga ge in af fi rm at ive m isc ondu ct . S ee T ef el , 180 F
. 3d a t 13 03- 04. B ai le y ’ s “ sig na l se ve n” – the Governm ent’ s failure to w arn defe nse counsel th at it would seek forfe iture uponac onvi ct ion– do es not giv e ri se to ane sto ppe l c la im f or the sa m e re as on. This leaves “ signal four,” in w hich Bailey asserts that prosecutor De Marco
re pr es en te d to H or

w itz – e ith er

e xpl ic itl y

or im pli ci tly – tha t the G ove rn m en t
w oul d no t se ek

f or fe iture . E ve n if

thi s w er e tr

ue , it w oul d on ly

f ulf ill the f ir st el em en t of

a n e sto ppe l c la im

– nam el y , c ondu ct

that i nduc es r el ianc e. I t c er ta inl y doe s no t m ee t the r equir em en t tha t B ai le y de m onstrate a ff

irm at ive m isc ondu ct

by the G ove rn m en t. S ee Mo ntanav. K en ne dy , 366 U
. S. 308 , 314 -1 5, 81 S
. Ct
. 133 6, 1340 -4 1, 6 L
. E d. 2d 3 13 ( 1961 ). T he re , the Co urt c onsi de re d ac as e in whic h a G ove rn m en t of

fi ci al e rr one ousl y

a dvi se d th e pe tit ion er ’ s m oth er that sh e co uld

not
re tur n to the U nit ed

S ta te s f ro m abr oa d be ca

use she w as pr eg nant, thu s c au sin g pe tit ion er to be bor n ou tsi de of

the U nit ed

S ta te s – a

f ac t l at er c ru ci al in de ny ing the pe tit ion er

c iti ze nshi p. T he Co urt he ld tha t this c ondu ct f el l “ far shor

t” of the af fi rm at ive c ondu ct

that m igh t j ust if

y e sto ppe l. Fi na lly , Ba ile y

ha s no t sh ow n th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt c om

m itt ed c le ar e rr or10

wh en i tfo u n dt h at h e c o u l dn o th av e r ea s o n ab l y re l i ed u p o n t h e G o v ern m en t ’s sig na ls i n li ght

of the m an y c ount er -s ign al s by

the G ove rn m en t, the m ag istrate j udge , a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt tha t f or fe iture w oul d be sou ght
. O n M ar ch10, 199 8,
w he n th e Mc Co rk le s m ad e the ir ini tia l a ppe ar an ce be fo re the m ag istrate j udge , f or
exam ple, prosecutor By

ron told Bailey : “ In term s of whether or not the asset fo rf ei tur e uni t of

the U
. S. A tto rn ey ’ s O ff

ic e w oul d a gr ee to giv e m one y up t o
w hic h th ey

ha ve ac la im , I c er

ta inl y c an not spe ak f or that a lth oughI a m

ha ppy to put c ouns el in co nta ct

w iththe appr opr ia te auth or ity to m ak e tha t ki nd o f
re pr es en ta tio n. ” T hus, By ro n m ad e cl ear tha t he did not ha ve auth or ity

to ab an don
a cl ai m of f or fe iture – a

c la im sou ght f ro m the ve ry be gin nin g. S im ilarl y , the
m ag istrate j udge m ad e cl ear to B ai le y a t the ba il he ar ing the ne xt d ay that the
ow ne rs hip of

the tr ust f und w as dis put ed

a nd p ote nti al ly

f or fe ita ble w he n he sa id:

“ I’ m sur e no c ouns el of

r ec or d w oul d do a nythi ng t o tr an sf er a w ay a ny portio n of that two m illion dollar attorney fund . .
. until we ’ ve had a chance to m ake a determ ination on that.” T he j udge ult im ately found that th e U nited States “ has al w ay s a ct ive ly

sou ght f or fe iture of

the $2, 000, 000 fund” a nd tha t B ai le y ’ s c la im of de tr im en ta l r el ianc e w as “ not c re dib le
. ” T his f

ind ing of f ac t i s no t c le ar ly erroneous. S ee Marine T ransp. S erv. Sea -Bar ge Gr oup v . P ython High Per f. Mari ne Co rp . , 16 F
. 3d 1 133, 113 8 ( 11th C ir
. 199 4) ( not ing that the c onst itu en t11

elem ents of an equitable estopp el claim are question s of fac t that can be re versed onlyupon a showing of clear err or). Insum , w e af

fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of Ba ile y ’ s se ct ion853 (n ) pe tit ion
. W e nowtur

n to the c ont em

pt a dj udi catio n.

III
. Th e mag i s tra t e ju d g e o rd er ed Ba i l ey t o d ep o s i t$ 2 m i l l i o n i n t o t h e c o u rt ’s
re gis tr y or pos t a bon d inthat am ount

pe ndi ng a dj udi catio n of

his se ct ion853 (n ) petition
. Bailey

failed to com

ply with the court’ s order. T he j udge thereafter
re co m m en de d th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt or de r Ba ile y to showc au se w hy

he sho uld

not be he ld i n c ont em

pt. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a gr ee d and o rd er ed Ba ile y to showc au se for the disobedience; the court, however , m odified the m agistrate j udge’s order , re qui ri ng B ai le y

to post a$70 0, 000 bond
. B ai le y did not pos t the bon d. A t the showc au se he ar ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound una cc ep ta

ble Ba ile y ’ s r ea sons f

or his
nonc om pli an ce , a nd i t the re fo re a dj udge d hi m in “ co nte m

pt. ” T he c ourt di d no t, how ev er , im

pose a n on -g oin g c oe rc ive sanc tio n th at w oul d have giv enBa ile y the ch an ce to pur ge him se lf

of the c ont em

pt. I nst ea d, the c ourt f

ound that the bon d
wo u l ds er v e n o p u rp o s e a n dt h at Ba i l ey’s o n l y “ s an ct i o n ” w o u l db e t h e c o u rt ’sThe c ourt’s basis for this conclusion was its belief that the G overnme nt was not making 7 a g ood faith attempt to ac quire the f orfe itable assets.

12 re fe rr al of

Ba ile y to the F lor ida

Bar fo r dis ci pli nary

pr oc ee din gs. 7 A m er e re pr im an d and r ef er ra l t o astate bar dis ci pli nary c om m itt ee is not

a
co nte m pt a dj udi catio n. T he S upr em e Co urt de sc ri be d ava lid c ont em pt o rd er in In te rn at ion al U nio n, U MWA v. Ba gw el l: Crim inal contem

pt is a crim e in the ordinary sense, and crim inal penalties m ay

not be im

posed on som eone who has not been afforded the protections th at the Constitu tion requires of such crim inal pr oc ee din gs. . . . I n c ontra st, c ivi l c ont em pt s an ct ion s, or

tho se penalties design ed to com pel future com

pliance with a c ourt order, ar e co nsi de re d to be c oe rc ive a nd avoi dable thr oughobe die nc e, a nd thu s m ay be im pose d ina n or din ar

y pr oc ee din g . . . . [ A ] c ont em pt sanc tio n is c onsi de re d c ivi l i f it is r em ed ia l, a nd f or the be ne fi t of

the co m pla inant. B ut i f it is f

or c ri m ina l c ont em

pt the se nte nc e is puni tiv e, to vin dic at e the auth or ity of the c ourt. 512 U.S . 821-28, 114 S. Ct. 2552 -56, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1994) (internal quotes and citations o m itted). I n sum , the line betw een civil and crim inal contem pt is that the form er c onsis ts of a sanction design ed to com pensate a party

or coerc e future
ac t i o n ; t h e l at t eren t ai l s p u n i s h m en ti n t h e n ame o f v i n d i ca t i n g t h e c o u rt ’s authority
. See also 17 C.J.S . § 64 (1999). Inthi s c as e, the c ourt di d no t i m pose ac oe rc ive sanc tio n. I nde ed , the district court did n ot im

pose any sanction at all – the court’ s theory being that post ing abon d w oul d se rv e no p ur pose . W e ar e at

alos s a s to howaparty

c anbe13

ad j udge d inc ivi l c ont em

pt whe n th e unde rl y ing ba sis f or the c ont em

pt c itatio n is
m o o t . C l ea rl y t h e c o u rt m ea n to n l y t o re p ri m an dBa i l ey fo r h i s p as tco n du ct . We
acce pt Bailey ’ s rece nt concession that the district court’ s order is not an ap pe al ab le j udgm en t of

c ont em pt. T he appe al of

the c ont em

pt a dj udi catio n is the re fo re dis m iss ed

f or la ck of a n a ppe al ab le or de r. W e re ac h th e m er its onl y a s to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of Ba ile y ’ s se ct ion853 (n ) pe tit ion
. T ha t de ci sio n is AFFIR MED.