An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-713

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 18 February 2014

TERRY WAYNE WOOD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. Forsyth County

No. 09 CVS 3520

JEREMY NUNNERY, NORTH CAROLINA 

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE

COMPANY and FIREMEN’S INSURANCE 

COMPANY OF WASHINGTON, D.C.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal by Defendant Jeremy Nunnery from order entered 11 

February 2013 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, 

Forsyth County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 2013.

Maynard & Harris, Attorneys at Law, PLLC, by C. Douglas 

Maynard, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Van Laningham Duncan PLLC, by L. Cooper Harrell; Smith 

Moore Leatherwood LLP, by James G. Exum, Jr.; and Bennett & 

Guthrie, PLLC, by Rodney A. Guthrie and Roberta King 

Latham, for Defendant-Appellant Jeremy Nunnery.

Pinto Coates Kyre & Bowers, PLLC, by Deborah J. Bowers, for 

North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus 

curiae.

Brown Moore & Associates, PLLC, by Jon R. Moore; and White 

& Stradley, PLLC, by J. David Stradley, for North Carolina 

Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.

McGEE, Judge.
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Terry Wayne Wood (“Plaintiff”) was injured on 10 May 2006, 

in an automobile accident in Harnett County, as a result of the 

negligence of Jeremy Nunnery (“Defendant”). At the time of the 

accident, Plaintiff was driving a truck owned by Plaintiff’s

employer, in the course of his employment. Plaintiff filed a 

complaint on 30 April 2009 against Defendants North Carolina 

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”), and 

Firemen's Insurance Company of Washington, D.C. (“Firemen's”).

Farm Bureau was dismissed from the action and is not a 

party to this appeal. Firemen's is the underinsured motorist 

carrier for Plaintiff's employer. Defendant was insured at the 

time of the accident by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company (“State Farm”). 

At trial, the jury determined that Defendant’s negligence 

caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and awarded Plaintiff $300,000.00

in compensatory damages on 11 August 2010. The trial court 

entered judgment on 31 August 2010, directing that Plaintiff 

recover from Defendant damages in the amount of $300,000.00,

along with interest at the statutory rate of eight percent (8%)

from 30 April 2009. State Farm paid its policy limit of 

$30,000.00 into the office of the Clerk of Court of Forsyth 

County on 2 September 2010. Firemen's paid $202,627.58 into the 
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office of the Clerk of Court of Forsyth County on 13 September 

2010, in fulfilment of its obligations as the underinsured 

motorist carrier. Plaintiff introduced evidence at trial that 

he had received workers' compensation benefits totaling more 

than $148,000.00. The amount of the lien of Plaintiff’s 

employer’s workers’ compensation carrier was reduced, by 

agreement, to $50,000.00, leaving a net benefit in workers’

compensation benefits of $98,000.00.

Defendant filed a motion for credit upon and satisfaction 

of the judgment on 1 December 2010. The trial court entered an 

order on 29 December 2010, ruling that the payments of 

$30,000.00 by State Farm, $202,627.58 by Firemen's, and 

$98,000.00 by Plaintiff’s employer’s workers’ compensation 

carrier, a total amount of $330,627.58, constituted payment in 

full of the judgment and that the judgment was satisfied.

Plaintiff appealed, and this Court entered an opinion on 7 

August 2012 affirming in part and reversing and remanding in 

part. Wood v. Nunnery, __ N.C. App. __, 730 S.E.2d 222 (2012)

(Wood I). In Wood I, and relevant to the current appeal, this 

Court stated:

The trial court held that the $30,000.00 

from State Farm, $202,627.58 from Firemen's, 

and the net benefit of $98,000.00 in 

workers' compensation benefits ($148,000.00 

less the reduced lien of $50,000.00) 

constituted a recovery to . . . [P]laintiff 
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of at least $330,627.58. The trial court 

went on to hold that “the collective 

payments paid into the Office of the Clerk 

of Court of Forsyth County constitute full 

payment and satisfaction of the final 

Judgment entered herein.”

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224. This Court went on to say:

We initially note that the trial court 

conflated the concepts of the amounts owed 

by [D]efendant as the tortfeasor in this 

matter and the amount owed by Firemen's as 

an underinsured motorist carrier (UIM). 

Plaintiff instituted this action against 

[D]efendant, seeking monetary damages for 

personal injuries proximately caused by the 

negligence of [D]efendant. The jury found 

that [P]laintiff's injuries were proximately 

caused by the negligence of [D]efendant and 

awarded damages to [P]laintiff of 

$300,000.00. The trial court entered 

judgment against only [D]efendant. This 

judgment was based upon [D]efendant's 

negligence and was a tort recovery.

The liability of Firemen's is based in 

contract, not in tort.

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224. This Court held that Defendant

was not “entitled to a credit against the judgment for payments 

made by Firemen's as a UIM carrier.” Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at

225. We further held: “The only payment to which [D]efendant 

is entitled to a credit against the judgment is the $30,000.00 

paid by State Farm, [D]efendant's liability insurance carrier.” 

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 226.

However, in remanding to the trial court, this Court 

instructed:
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The trial court erred in declaring that the 

judgment against [D]efendant had been paid 

and satisfied in full. The portion of the 

trial court's order so declaring is vacated, 

and this matter is remanded to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. At such a hearing, the 

trial court may consider whether [D]efendant 

is entitled to additional credits against 

the judgment, other than the $30,000.00 paid 

by State Farm.

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 226.

Upon remand, the trial court, by order entered 11 February 

2013, ruled that Defendant was only entitled to a credit for the 

$30,000.00 paid by State Farm, his liability carrier, and that 

Defendant was not entitled to any credit for monies paid by 

either Firemen’s or by the workers’ compensation carrier. 

Defendant appeals the 11 February 2013 order.

In Defendant’s first argument, he contends the trial court 

erred in “refusing to reduce the judgment against [him] to 

account for the UIM payment [made by Firemen’s] and net workers’ 

compensation benefits that were received by [Plaintiff] as 

compensation for his injuries.” We disagree.

In the prior appeal in this case, this Court held: “We hold 

that [D]efendant is not entitled to a credit for payments made 

by Firemen's into the Office of the Clerk of Superior Court for 

Forsyth County.” Wood I, __ N.C. App. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 225. 

We have no authority to revisit that holding. Weston v. 
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Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 415, 417, 438 S.E.2d 751, 

753 (1994) (citations omitted) (“According to the doctrine of 

the law of the case, once an appellate court has ruled on a 

question, that decision becomes the law of the case and governs 

the question both in subsequent proceedings in a trial court and 

on subsequent appeal.”).

Less clear is the holding in Wood I concerning the workers’

compensation payments made to Plaintiff. However, the Wood I

opinion considered the credit given Defendant by the trial court 

for the net workers’ compensation payout in stating: “The trial 

court held that . . . the net benefit of $98,000.00 in workers’

compensation benefits ($148,000.00 less the reduced lien of 

$50,000.00) constituted a recovery to . . . [P]laintiff[.]” 

Wood I, __ N.C. App. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224. The trial court 

then credited that amount (along with payments made by Firemen’s 

and State Farm) against Defendant’s recovery. This Court held 

that the trial court had erred, stating:

We initially note that the trial court 

conflated the concepts of the amounts owed 

by defendant as the tortfeasor in this 

matter and the amount owed by Firemen’s as 

an underinsured motorist carrier (UIM). 

Plaintiff instituted this action against 

[D]efendant, seeking monetary damages for 

personal injuries proximately caused by the 

negligence of [D]efendant. The jury found 

that [P]laintiff’s injuries were proximately 

caused by the negligence of [D]efendant and 

awarded damages to [P]laintiff of 
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$300,000.00. The trial court entered 

judgment against only [D]efendant. This 

judgment was based upon [D]efendant’s 

negligence and was a tort recovery.

The liability of Firemen’s is based in 

contract, not in tort.

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 224. Though this Court did not include 

the workers’ compensation carrier in that discussion, its 

liability, like that of Firemen’s, was in contract, not tort. 

Plaintiff instituted this action in tort against Defendant, not 

the workers’ compensation carrier. In Wood I, this Court

continued:

“The party against whom a judgment for the 

payment of money is rendered by any court of 

record may pay the whole, or any part 

thereof, in cash or by check, to the clerk 

of the court in which the same was 

rendered[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–239 

(2011).

In this case, the judgment was entered only 

against [D]efendant. It was not entered 

against Firemen’s. By the plain language of 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–239, [D]efendant is 

responsible for satisfying the judgment 

entered against him.

The only payment to which [D]efendant is 

entitled to a credit against the judgment is 

the $30,000.00 paid by State Farm, 

[D]efendant’s liability insurance carrier.

Id. at __, 730 S.E.2d at 225-26. Though the workers’

compensation payment is not specifically mentioned in this 

analysis, we find no distinguishing difference between the 
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relative positions of Firemen’s and the workers’ compensation 

carrier in this matter. Within this context, we hold that our 

holding in Wood I: “The only payment to which [D]efendant is 

entitled to a credit against the judgment is the $30,000.00 paid 

by State Farm, [D]efendant’s liability insurance carrier[,]”

id., applied to all potential credits that had been argued on 

appeal, including the workers’ compensation payment. The trial 

court, having found that Defendant was not entitled to any 

additional credits not addressed in Wood I, did not err in 

denying Defendant credit for payments made to Plaintiff by 

Firemen’s or by the workers’ compensation carrier.

Defendant’s policy arguments are not for us to decide, as 

we are bound by this Court’s holding in Wood I. The same 

applies to Defendant’s collateral source argument.

Affirmed.

Judges BRYANT and STROUD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).