CASE STUDIES IN EMERGENCY ELECTION LITIGATION

Federal Judicial Center 9/12/2023 1

Strict Application 

of Campaign Filing Requirements 

Somers v. All Improperly Filed Candidates (3:12-cv-1191) 

and Smith v. South Carolina State Election Commission 

(3:12-cv-1543) (Cameron McGowan Currie, Clyde H. 

Hamilton, and J. Michelle Childs) and Williams v. South 

Carolina State Election Commission (Henry F. Floyd, David 

C. Norton, and Richard Mark Gergel, 2:12-cv-2760) (D.S.C.) 

Many candidates were disqualified from primary-election ballots 

following a state supreme court’s strict interpretation of a candidacy filing statute. A candidate who was not disqualified filed a federal 

action attacking the disqualifications. The district court determined 

that a candidate who was not disqualified and who was not suing as 

a voter lacked standing for the suit. In a related case, disqualified 

candidates filed a federal action arguing that the state supremecourt decision could not have effect without preclearance pursuant 

to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court 

determined that the state court’s interpretation of the statute comported with the statute’s plain meaning, so it could not be a change 

requiring preclearance. Another section 5 complaint alleged that 

preclearance was required for a state supreme-court decision approving a special primary election after it was determined that the 

only candidate in the original primary election was not exempt 

from the filing requirements at issue in the previous cases. A new 

three-judge court determined that the state supreme court’s decision was an application of existing law rather than a change in voting procedures. 

Subject: Getting on the ballot. Topics: Getting on the ballot; 

campaign materials; section 5 preclearance; three-judge court; 

recusal; case assignment; intervention; laches. 

On May 2, 2012, South Carolina’s supreme court adopted a strict interpretation of a candidacy filing statute, an interpretation that conflicted with common practice, so many candidates were disqualified from the state’s June 12 

primary election.1 The statute required candidates to “file a statement of economic interests for the preceding calendar year at the same time and with the 

same official with whom the candidate files a declaration of candidacy or petition for nomination.”2

1. Anderson v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 397 S.C. 551, 725 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. 2012); see Florence Cty. Democratic Party v. Florence Cty. Republican Party, 398 S.C. 124, 727 S.E.2d 418 

(S.C. 2012) (rejecting arguments to relax the strict interpretation); see also Tim Flach, 50 

Local Candidates May Be Off Ballot, Columbia State, May 4, 2012; Tucker Mitchell, Supreme 

Court Ruling Knocks Nearly 100 Off S.C. Ballots, Florence Morning News, May 3, 2012. 

2. S.C. Code § 8-13-1356(B) (emphasis added). 
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2 Federal Judicial Center 9/12/2023 

On May 4, Amanda Somers, a candidate who was not disqualified, filed a 

federal complaint in the District of South Carolina on behalf of herself and 

on behalf of (1) all other properly filed candidates and (2) all persons entitled 

to vote under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 

1986 (UOCAVA).3

 In addition to South Carolina’s election commission and 

other election officials, Somers named as defendants all improperly filed 

candidates involved in the primary election.4

The court assigned the case to Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.,5

 who 

recused himself because of family connections to elective offices.6 On May 7, 

the case was reassigned to Judge Cameron McGowan Currie.7 On the following day, Judge Currie entered into the case’s docket sheet a text order reminding the plaintiff, “No decision on the merits may be made until all Defendants are served and have an opportunity to respond. Service is a responsibility which rests on Plaintiff and which Plaintiff is directed to accomplish 

as quickly as possible.”8 The plaintiff subsequently dropped all improperly 

filed candidates as defendants.9

Judge Currie held a status conference on the afternoon of May 10.10 On 

the day of the conference, a candidate stricken from the ballot moved to intervene as a plaintiff.11 Judge Currie granted intervention,12 but the motion 

was withdrawn on the following day.13 Also on May 11, the circuit’s Chief 

Judge William B. Traxler, Jr., named a three-judge district court to hear the 

plaintiff’s claimed violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.14 South 

3. Complaint, Somers v. All Improperly Filed Candidates, No. 3:12-cv-1191 (D.S.C. May 

4, 2012), D.E. 1 [hereinafter Somers Complaint]; Somers v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 871 

F. Supp. 2d 490, 491 (D.S.C. 2012); see 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311; see also Candidate Sues, 

Lawmakers Offer Fix, Greenville News, May 5, 2012. See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, 

Overseas Voting: The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (Federal Judicial Center 2016). 

4. Somers Complaint, supra note 3. 

5. Docket Sheet, Somers, No. 3:12-cv-1191 (D.S.C. May 4, 2012) [hereinafter Somers

Docket Sheet] (D.E. 10). 

6. Interview with Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie, Sept. 6, 2012. 

Tim Reagan interviewed Judge Currie for this report by telephone. 

7. Somers Docket Sheet, supra note 5; Transcript at 7, Somers, No. 3:12-cv-1191 (D.S.C. 

May 10, 2012, filed May 11, 2012), D.E. 27 [hereinafter Somers Transcript]. 

8. Somers Docket Sheet, supra note 5; see Somers Transcript, supra note 7, at 9.

9. Somers v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 871 F. Supp. 2d 490, 495 (D.S.C. 2012). 

10. Somers Transcript, supra note 7. 

11. Intervention Motion, Somers, No. 3:12-cv-1191 (D.S.C. May 10, 2012), D.E. 17; Somers Transcript, supra note 7, at 3, 11–12. 

12. Somers Docket Sheet, supra note 5 (D.E. 18). 

13. Intervention Withdrawal, Somers, No. 3:12-cv-1191 (D.S.C. May 11, 2012), D.E. 20. 

14. Order, id. (May 11, 2012), D.E. 21; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 

§ 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439, as amended, 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (requiring preclearance of changes to 

voting procedures in jurisdictions with a certified history of discrimination and requiring 

that preclearance disputes be heard by a three-judge district court); see also Somers Transcript, supra note 7, at 56 (statement by Judge Currie that she would request a three-judge 

court). 

On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court declined to hold section 5 unconstitutional, but the 
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Carolina had decided to comply with UOCAVA by sending overseas absentee ballots for federal offices by the statutory deadline of forty-five days before the election and to send overseas absentee ballots for South Carolina offices later, after the repercussions of the state supreme court’s decision had 

been worked out.15 The plaintiff alleged that this was an election change requiring section 5 preclearance.16

The three-judge court—Judge Currie, Circuit Judge Clyde H. Hamilton, 

and District Judge J. Michelle Childs—heard the action on May 14.17 Two 

days later, it dismissed the case for lack of standing.18 “Counsel for Somers 

failed to articulate any concrete and particularized injury that Somers has 

incurred or was likely to incur as a result of the transmission of separate federal and state ballots. Somers, therefore, has no standing as a candidate to 

pursue a Section 5 claim.”19 Nor had she shown a relationship with 

UOCAVA voters close enough to sue on their behalf; the courts were open 

for them to seek relief on their own.20 Judge Currie observed that standing is 

often an important issue in an election case and one that the court should 

consider early in the case.21

A second action was filed on June 11, the day before the primary election.22 Five candidates stricken from the ballots alleged that the state supreme 

court’s decision was without current effect because it had not received section 5 preclearance and that the statute in question violated equal protection.23 The statute exempted incumbents: “This section does not apply to a 

public official who has a current disclosure statement on file . . . .”24 With 

their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.25

The court assigned this case to Judge Currie as related to the Somers

case.26 Filing errors by the plaintiff’s attorney caused a delay in the case’s 

opening by the clerk’s office, so there was a delay in Judge Currie’s learning 

Court did hold unconstitutional the criteria for which jurisdictions require section 5 preclearance. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 

15. Somers v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 871 F. Supp. 2d 490, 493–94 (D.S.C. 2012). 

16. Id. at 494. 

17. Somers Docket Sheet, supra note 5 (D.E. 31). 

Judge Hamilton died on September 2, 2020, and Judge Childs was elevated to a seat on 

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on July 25, 2022. Federal Judicial 

Center Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, www.fjc.gov/history/judges. 

18. Somers, 871 F. Supp. 2d 490; see Reagan, supra note 3, at 16–17. 

19. Somers, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97 (footnote omitted). 

20. Id. at 497–98. 

21. Interview with Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie, Sept. 6, 2012. 

22. Docket Sheet, Smith v. S.C., No. 3:12-cv-1543 (D.S.C. June 11, 2012) [hereinafter 

Smith Docket Sheet]. 

23. Complaint, id. (June 11, 2012), D.E. 1; Smith v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 874 F. Supp. 

2d 483, 491 (D.S.C. 2012). 

24. S.C. Code § 8-13-1356(A). 

25. Motion, Smith, No. 3:12-cv-1543 (D.S.C. June 11, 2012), D.E. 4. 

26. Smith Docket Sheet, supra note 22; Interview with Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie, 

Sept. 6, 2012. 
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4 Federal Judicial Center 9/12/2023 

that she had the case.27 The clerk’s office subsequently established procedures 

by which assigned judges are notified more promptly of emergency cases assigned to them even if there are delays in the processing of the cases’ filings.28

On the day that the case was filed, Judge Traxler referred it to the same 

three-judge court for the section 5 claim as he empaneled for the first case.29

With Judges Hamilton and Currie in the courtroom and Judge Childs appearing by telephone midway through the hearing, after conducting a court 

proceeding in another case, the three-judge court conducted a telephonic 

hearing that same day.30 The court denied the plaintiffs immediate relief.31

The court concluded that the state court’s interpretation of the statute comported with the statute’s plain meaning, so it could not be a change requiring 

preclearance.32 The court found no equal-protection violation in different 

financial filing requirements for incumbents and nonincumbents,33 and the 

plaintiffs’ claim for immediate relief was further burdened by the doctrine of 

laches.34 An amended complaint filed on September 2135 did not persuade the 

court to reach a different result.36

On September 20, South Carolina’s supreme court reached another conclusion37 that resulted in a section 5 complaint alleging that the court’s opinion required preclearance before it could go into effect.38 The state courts’ 

challenge was to resolve a state senate primary election in which it was discovered after the election that the only candidate who qualified for the ballot 

qualified in error because election authorities mistakenly thought that he was 

entitled to the incumbent exemption from the dual filing requirement.39

South Carolina’s supreme court approved a special primary election as a 

remedy.40 The subsequent section 5 complaint was filed by a voter on September 24, while an October 2 special primary runoff election was pending.41

27. Interview with Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie, Sept. 6, 2012. 

28. Id. 

29. Order, Smith, No. 3:12-cv-1543 (D.S.C. June 11, 2012), D.E. 7; Transcript at 3, id.

(June 11, 2012, filed Aug. 8, 2012), D.E. 12 [hereinafter Smith Transcript]. 

30. Smith Transcript, supra note 29. 

31. Smith v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 874 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.S.C. 2012). 

32. Id. at 495. 

33. Id. at 497. 

34. Id. at 498–99. 

35. Amended Complaint, Smith v. S.C., No. 3:12-cv-1543 (D.S.C. Sept. 21, 2012), D.E. 

18. 

36. Opinion, id. (Oct. 3, 2012), D.E. 42, 2012 WL 4741636 (dismissing the case). 

37. Tempel v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 400 S.C. 374, 735 S.E.2d 453 (S.C. 2012); see

The District 41 Roller Coaster, Charleston Post & Courier, Sept. 22, 2012, at A10. 

38. Complaint, Williams v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, No. 2:12-cv-2760 (D.S.C. Sept. 

24, 2012), D.E. 1 [hereinafter Williams Complaint]. 

39. Tempel, 400 S.C. at 376–79, 735 S.E.2d at 454–56. 

The candidate was disqualified pursuant to a state judge’s ruling. See Robert Behre, Senate 41 Election Finally in Voters’ Hands, Charleston Post & Courier, Oct. 14, 2012, at B19. 

40. Tempel, 400 S.C. at 386, 735 S.E.2d at 457. 

41. Williams Complaint, supra note 38; see Dist. 41 Primary Heads to Runoff, Charleston 

Post & Courier, Sept. 19, 2012, at B17. 
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The injunction he requests would, among other things, prevent [the candidate whose disqualification created the need for a special election] or any 

other person from appearing on the general election ballot as the Republican Party nominee for the District 41 Senate seat, and effectively ensure the 

election of the Democratic Party nominee by default.42

Judge Traxler named Circuit Judge Henry F. Floyd and District Judges 

David C. Norton and Richard Mark Gergel as the three-judge court to hear 

the new section 5 claim.43 Judges Floyd and Gergel held a telephone conference with the parties on September 27 and set the case for hearing on October 16.44 On September 28, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint45 and a 

motion for a preliminary injunction.46

The victor of the aberrant primary election won the special primary runoff election on October 2.47 On October 18, the court concluded that the state 

supreme court’s opinion was an application of law to an unusual factual situation and not a change in election procedures.48

The twice victorious primary-election victor won the general election.49

42. Opinion at 2, Williams, No. 2:12-cv-2760 (D.S.C. Oct. 18, 2012), D.E. 52 [hereinafter 

Williams Opinion]. 

43. Order, id. (Sept. 27, 2012), D.E. 11. 

44. Order, id. (Sept. 28, 2012), D.E. 8 (noting Judge Norton’s assignment to the case as 

the judge to preside over matters not requiring three judges); Docket Sheet, id. (Sept. 24, 

2012) (D.E. 7); see Robert Behre, Dis. 41 Lawsuit Heard, Charleston Post & Courier, Oct. 17, 

2012, at B18. 

45. Amended Complaint, Williams, No. 2:12-cv-2760 (D.S.C. Sept. 28, 2012), D.E. 12. 

46. Preliminary-Injunction Motion, id. (Sept. 28, 2012), D.E. 13. 

47. Williams Opinion, supra note 42, at 5–6; see Robert Behre, Thurmond Wins Dist. 41 

GOP Runoff, Charleston Post & Courier, Oct. 3, 2012, at B19. 

48. Williams Opinion, supra note 42, at 10–13; see Thurmond to Remain on Ballot, Judges 

Rule, Charleston Post & Courier, Oct. 18, 2012, at B1. 

49. See Robert Behre, Final Election Results Are Becoming Clear, Charleston Post & Courier, Nov. 8, 2012, at A4.