Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

International Relations, House of 

Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

September 2003 U.N. PEACEKEEPING

Transition Strategies 

for Post-Conflict 

Countries Lack 

Results-Oriented 

Measures of Progress 

GAO-03-1071 
The United Nations has developed a transition strategy for its peacekeeping 

operations that takes a comprehensive and long-term view and focuses on 

the causes of the conflict. The U.N. strategy for making effective 

peacekeeping transitions has three elements: (1) establishing conditions for 

sustainable peace, (2) coordinating efforts among the United Nations and 

other international organizations to establish these conditions and sustain 

assistance after peacekeepers withdraw, and (3) developing objectives and 

results-oriented measures of progress to help manage and decide when a 

country’s conditions warrant the withdrawal of peacekeepers.

U.N. Troops and Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East Timorese Police

The United Nations is attempting to apply the elements of this strategy to 

help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

transition from conflict to sustainable peace, but it faces enormous challenges. Establishing security often takes longer and can be more expensive 

than originally planned in countries where rival factions may continue to 

fight. Developing participatory governance is also difficult in countries with 

little experience of accountable government. Coordinating with independent 

international organizations and donor nations with different priorities is also 

a challenge. The United Nations has not yet developed results-oriented 

measures of progress for the three peacekeeping operations. 

Although the United Nations uses some indicators to manage the withdrawal 

of peacekeeping troops, they did not have results-oriented measures to 

assess the security situations in Sierra Leone and East Timor and subsequent 

events in each country showed that the situation was not as secure as 

available measures indicated. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations acknowledges that it needs better indicators by which to 

measure the progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining 

sustainable peace. However, the department has not yet developed these 

indicators.

The United Nations responded to 

the failure of some past 

peacekeeping operations by 

developing a strategy to help 

peacekeeping operations move a 

country from conflict to 

sustainable peace. It has attempted 

to apply this strategy to the large 

and costly peacekeeping 

operations in Sierra Leone, East 

Timor, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo since 2001. 

As a contributor of over 25 percent 

of the cost of U.N. operations, the 

United States has a stake in the 

successful application of this 

strategy. The strategy also has 

implications for the conduct of 

international peace operations in 

other post-conflict countries. GAO 

was asked to (1) identify the 

elements of the U.N. transition 

strategy; (2) assess the extent to 

which the United Nations has 

applied the strategy to operations; 

and (3) assess the challenges to 

implementing the strategy in these 

three countries. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1071.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-1071, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on International 

Relations, House of Representatives 

September 2003

U.N. PEACEKEEPING 

Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict 

Countries Lack Results-Oriented 

Measures of Progress 
Page i GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Strategy Consists of Three Elements 7

United Nations Is Trying to Apply the Transition Strategy 11

United Nations Confronts Significant Challenges to Implementing 

Transition Strategy 22

Conclusions 35

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 37 

Appendix II U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress, by 

Mission 39 

Appendix III Crises and International Response in Sierra Leone, 

East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo 44 

Sierra Leone 44

East Timor 48

Democratic Republic of the Congo 51

Appendix IV Comments from the U.N. Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations 56 

Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

GAO Contacts 58

Staff Acknowledgments 58

Tables 

Table 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives 12

Table 2: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and 

Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone 30

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice 

Program for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and 

Training 33

Table 4: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone 39

Table 5: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor 41

Table 6: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 42

Figures 

Figure 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East 

Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of 

June 30, 2003 6

Figure 2: U.N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security 

Checkpoint with East Timorese Police 14

Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U.N. Peacekeepers 

in Sierra Leone 20

Figure 4: Revisions in U.N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police 

Drawdown Schedule in East Timor 21

Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo 24

Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border 

with Liberia 25

Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone 45

Figure 8: Map of East Timor 49

Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila 

Government in 1998, and the Location of Major 

Antigovernment Groups and Natural Resources in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003 53
Page iii GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Abbreviations 

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo 

ETPS East Timor Police Service 

RUF Revolutionary United Front 

U.N. United Nations 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

September 26, 2003 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 

Chairman, Committee on International Relations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The United Nations, in partnership with other international organizations, 

has undertaken peace operations to establish security and the rule of law 

in war-torn countries such as Somalia, Cambodia, and Bosnia. However, 

years after these operations began, some of these countries do not have a 

sustainable peace or fully abide by the rule of law.1

 The U.N. Security 

Council has since authorized other peace operations that have challenges 

comparable to previous efforts. By June 2003, U.N. costs for operations in 

East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

exceeded $6 billion, with the United States contributing over 25 percent of 

these funds. To ensure greater success in such peace operations, the U.N. 

Secretary General developed a strategy for effective peacekeeping 

transitions—the process peace operations use to move a country from 

immediate conflict toward long-term sustainable peace. This strategy was 

to apply to countries with complex emergencies—countries confronting 

civil war, a humanitarian crisis, and a breakdown of civil order. 

You asked us to assess the U.N. strategy for peacekeeping transitions in 

countries with complex emergencies. In this report, we (1) identify the 

elements of the U.N. transition strategy; (2) assess the extent to which the 

United Nations is attempting to apply the strategy in Sierra Leone, East 

Timor,2

 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (3) assess the 

challenges to implementing the strategy in these countries. 

 1

For example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Cambodia: Governance Reform 

Progressing, but Key Efforts Are Lagging, GAO-02-569 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2001); 

and Bosnia: Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of Dayton Peace 

Agreement, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-219 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2000). 

2

East Timor officially became the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste upon attaining 

independence in May 2002. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

To identify the elements of the peacekeeping transition strategy, we 

reviewed U.N., GAO, and other organizations’ reports about peacekeeping. 

We met with officials at the United Nations, the World Bank, and other 

international organizations to discuss their peacekeeping and assistance 

strategies in countries with complex emergencies. We performed 

fieldwork at U.N. operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone, which are in 

the initial drawdown phase. We conducted limited work at the U.N. 

operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is expanding 

operations. We selected these peace operations because they are the only 

U.N. operations begun in countries with complex emergencies since the 

United Nations developed a new peacekeeping strategy. Appendix I details 

our scope and methodology. 

The U.N. Secretary General’s strategy for making effective peacekeeping 

transitions focuses on achieving tangible results within a country and 

consists of three elements that U.N. peacekeeping operations and other 

international stakeholders are to carry out, including 

• establishing conditions for sustainable peace in the country, including 

adequate security, rule of law and participatory governance, and economic 

and social reform; 

• coordinating efforts among the United Nations and other international 

organizations to establish these conditions and sustain assistance after 

peacekeepers withdraw; and 

• specifying objectives (linked to the country conditions sought) and 

developing results-oriented measures of progress toward achieving these 

conditions to help manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers.3

The U.N. Security Council has noted its support for the strategy but 

decides on a case-by-case basis whether to authorize the peacekeepers 

and resources required to implement it. 

 3

We define results-oriented or outcome measures as the results of programs and activities 

compared with their intended purpose. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Managing for 

Results: EPA Faces Challenges in Developing Results-Oriented Performance Goals and 

Measures, GAO/RCED-00-77 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2000), and Performance 

Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, GAO/GGD-98-26

(Washington, D.C.: April 1998). 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The United Nations Secretariat is attempting to apply the elements of this 

strategy to help Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo transition to sustainable peace. First, to establish the conditions 

for sustainable peace, the United Nations and other stakeholders have 

deployed thousands of peacekeepers, police, and international 

administrators in Sierra Leone and East Timor to establish security, 

reform government institutions, and undertake economic reforms. In the 

Congo, efforts are less extensive, but in July 2003 the Security Council 

began expanding U.N. activities. Second, the United Nations, World Bank, 

and donor countries are trying to coordinate their work through joint 

planning and other mechanisms. Third, U.N. peacekeeping operations 

have developed objectives and results-oriented measures to a limited 

extent to plan drawdowns of peacekeepers. The Security Council, 

however, makes the final decisions on the drawdown or termination of 

peacekeeping operations based on factors such as political and budgetary 

considerations. 

The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each 

element of the new strategy. First, establishing the conditions for 

sustainable peace has taken longer and been more costly than expected. 

Achieving adequate security in Sierra Leone and East Timor took more 

time than expected because rival factions opposed the peace operation 

and continued fighting. Continued fighting remains a problem in the 

Congo. And developing rule of law and participatory governance has 

proved difficult because the countries had limited experience with 

democratic governance, traditions, and institutions. Second, the United 

Nations must effectively coordinate efforts with other international 

organizations working in complex emergencies, but each has its own 

priorities. Third, the United Nations has not developed meaningful resultsoriented measures of progress for most objectives. For example, a primary 

measure for East Timor’s capacity to provide internal security has focused 

on the number of police to be trained, rather than how well they control 

crime and violence. U.N. mission staff in the field stated that they had not 

been directed to develop or use results-oriented measures. Moreover, they 

stated they lacked the staff resources necessary to gather the needed data 

and report it to U.N. headquarters. 

This report contains no recommendations. We provided a draft of this 

report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; the U.S. Agency 

for International Development; and the United Nations. We received verbal 

comments from the State Department and written comments from the 

U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The remaining agencies did 

not provide comments. The State Department generally agreed with our 
Page 4 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

findings and provided technical comments and clarifications, which we 

incorporated where appropriate. 

The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key 

issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations further 

commented that the report (1) did not fully discuss its efforts to apply 

results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did not 

acknowledge numerical measures of progress in mission reporting, and (3) 

did not fully explain the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the 

Congo or progress made. In response, we added information to the report 

about recent and ongoing U.N. efforts to develop results-oriented 

performance measures. We state in the report that the peacekeeping 

operations use numerical measures of progress but note that most of these 

are measures of output or tasks rather than measures of results. We 

discuss the broader security and economic objectives of the U.N. mandate 

in the Congo in several locations in the report, including table 2. We report 

on progress made in the Congo, particularly in appendix III, however, 

much of the progress is very recent.

The U.N. Security Council authorizes all peacekeeping operations as a 

means to further international peace and security.4

 The U.N. Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the planning, 

management, and logistical support of U.N. peacekeeping operations 

worldwide. From 1948 through August 2003, the Security Council 

authorized 56 peacekeeping operations. Fourteen of these operations were 

ongoing as of August 2003. 

Most current U.N. peacekeeping operations have relatively narrow 

mandates that authorize peacekeepers to monitor or supervise cease-fires 

and peace agreements between formerly warring parties. Three ongoing 

operations—those in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo—have broader, multidimensional mandates that 

address complex emergencies. 

 4

The 15-member Security Council authorizes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation 

and determines its mandate. Such decisions require at least nine votes in favor and are 

subject to a veto by the negative vote of any of the council’s 5 permanent members—China, 

France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U.N. 

Secretary General makes recommendations on how the operation is to be launched and 

carried out and reports on its progress. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

is responsible for providing political and executive direction to operations in the field. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Earlier multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Cambodia, 

and Bosnia tried to address governance, human rights, and humanitarian 

affairs, but they initially lacked long-term transition strategies. For 

example, the peace operation in Somalia did not clearly link security with 

efforts to rebuild the country. In Bosnia, a coalition of nations led by the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization formed an international force to 

provide security, which was initially planned to last 1 year. But 2 years 

later, troop withdrawal was linked to the achievement of broad objectives 

for the overall peace operation. In Cambodia, there was no clear plan for 

effectively developing the rule of law after the peacekeeping operation 

left. The Security Council recognized the shortcomings in these operations 

and began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for 

sustainable peace. 

In 1999, the need to address such shortcomings gained greater urgency as 

the Security Council mandated new U.N. operations to address complex 

emergencies in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo. (App. III describes in more detail the crisis each of these 

countries faced and the United Nations’ response.) The council debated 

the need for a new approach to planning, conducting, and concluding 

multidimensional peacekeeping operations in countries with complex 

emergencies. The council examined the lessons learned from these past 

failures and the process for closing a peacekeeping operation. In 2000, the 

council requested that the Secretary General make recommendations 

about how to effectively launch, close, or significantly alter a U.N. 

peacekeeping operation. Figure 1 provides more information on each 

country and the U.N. operation there. 
Page 6 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Figure 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as of 

June 30, 2003 

Note: U.N. fiscal years begin July 1 and end June 30 of the following calendar year. 

Sierra

Leone

Democratic

Republic

of the

Congo

East Timor

Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web sites; MapArt.

Baucau

Makeni

Bo Kenema

Koindu

KoiduSefadu

Freetown

Population (July 2003 estimate): 5,732,681 

Area: 71,740 sq. km. 

Total peacekeepers: 13,219

Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004: $2.6 billion

Population (July 2003 estimate): 56,625,039 

Area: 2,345,410 sq. km.

Total peacekeepers: 6,886

Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004 $1.9 billion

Kinshasa

Population (July 2003 estimate): 997,853 

Area: 15,007 sq. km.

Total peacekeepers: 4,014

Total estimated mission costs, 1999-2004 $1.8 billion

U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone

U.N. Mission in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo U.N. Missions in East Timor

West Timor

(Indonesia)

Dili

Kisangani

Goma 

Mbuji-Mayi

Bunia

0 50 miles 0 500 miles 0 20 miles
Page 7 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Since the late 1990s, the United Nations has developed a general strategy 

for peacekeeping transitions in complex emergency countries. The U.N. 

strategy consists of three elements: 

• establishing the conditions for sustainable peace, including security, rule 

of law, and economic and social reform; 

• coordinating and sustaining the efforts of international organizations and 

donor states; and 

• developing objectives and results-oriented measures of progress to 

manage the peace operation and make troop withdrawal decisions. 

The Security Council has stated that it is supportive of this strategy but 

also notes that it decides whether to authorize the troops and resources 

needed to carry it out on a case-by-case basis. The U.N. Secretariat, 

particularly DPKO, has strengthened its planning and management to help 

implement this strategy. 

In 2001, the U.N. Secretary General stated that the ultimate purpose of 

peacekeeping is to help countries achieve sustainable peace. To do this, 

the U.N. transition strategy for complex emergency countries guides the 

United Nations, other international organizations, and donor countries to 

(1) establish and maintain security, (2) develop institutions that provide 

rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) create conditions for 

economic and social recovery and reform. 

Establishing and maintaining security are priorities for U.N. peacekeeping 

operations. However, when armed interventions have been necessary, the 

United Nations generally has authorized alliances—such as the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization—or coalitions of nations to undertake 

military operations to restore security. U.N. peacekeepers then have 

responsibility for maintaining secure conditions so that other aspects of 

the peace operation, including humanitarian efforts, can move forward. In 

the longer term, maintaining security may include demobilizing and 

reintegrating ex-combatants into society, training a fair and impartial 

police force, and building a professional army that is accountable to the 

national government. 

The transition strategy emphasizes that sustainable peace is most likely if 

the country establishes rule of law and participatory governance. To 

support this, the peacekeeping operation and many other partners 

U.N. Peacekeeping 

Transition Strategy 

Consists of Three 

Elements 

Strategy Focuses on 

Achieving Security, Rule of 

Law, and Economic 

Reform 
Page 8 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

undertake programs to reform a country’s justice system so that it is fair, 

transparent, and equitable. Other activities include strengthening or 

building government institutions to ensure transparency, equal access, and 

accountability to all citizens. Other efforts, when authorized by the 

Security Council, may include supporting broad-based political parties, 

overseeing or administering free and fair elections, and supporting efforts 

to combat corruption. 

Creating the conditions for economic and social recovery and reform is 

also important in the transition strategy. Efforts to create these conditions 

include reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities and activities to 

promote national reconciliation and human rights, such as supporting war 

crimes tribunals or truth and reconciliation panels. Other efforts in this 

area include support for resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. 

Several studies have similarly found that the earlier operations did not 

focus on obtaining comprehensive results needed for sustainable peace. 

For example, a Department of Defense-sponsored study determined that 

past failures in restoring peace were highly correlated with the failure to 

restore public security, political rights, and honest government and with 

the facilitation of economic reconstruction. A 2002 guide developed as a 

tool for U.S. policy makers reached similar conclusions.5

 The guide noted 

that a peacekeeping operation must undertake a range of military and 

political tasks to achieve a sustainable outcome in a complex emergency 

situation. These tasks include demobilizing armed groups, reforming the 

police, establishing rule of law, and rehabilitating the economy. The guide 

concludes that assessment of progress toward restoring stability in the 

country should identify measures to be relied upon (such as disarming excombatants or holding elections) and/or transforming conditions on the 

ground (such as reducing the level of violence in the country and 

increasing confidence in elected officials). Our observations on lessons 

learned from our survey of 32 previous reports on peacekeeping 

operations in 16 countries came to similar conclusions about the need for 

comprehensive transition planning in complex emergency situations.6

 The 

Security Council recognized the shortcomings in the earlier missions and 

 5

See Len Hawley, Generic Political-Military Plan for a Multilateral Complex Contingency 

Operation (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2002). 

6

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Issues in Implementing International Peace 

Operations, GAO-02-707R (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002). 
Page 9 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

began to consider better strategies to plan and manage operations for 

sustainable peace. 

In February 2001, the Security Council endorsed this broad approach for 

effective transitions. The council stated that achieving a sustainable peace 

requires a comprehensive approach that includes political, humanitarian, 

and human rights programs to foster sustainable development, eradication 

of poverty, and transparent and accountable government and rule of law.7

However, the council qualified this endorsement by noting that it decides 

on a case-by-case basis the extent to which to authorize the troops, 

funding, and other resources needed to carry out these activities. 

The transition strategy recognizes that U.N. peacekeeping operations 

cannot undertake all transition activities. Thus, transition efforts must be 

closely coordinated among U.N. peacekeeping offices; U.N. development, 

humanitarian, and human rights agencies; international financial 

institutions; bilateral agencies; host nation governments; and 

nongovernmental organizations. The Secretary General has observed that 

peacekeepers should establish close working relationships with these 

other stakeholders and begin transition planning during the operation’s 

earliest stages. The Security Council has also strongly encouraged 

cooperation among all stakeholders to monitor and develop an integrated 

response to the specific conditions in each country. 

As part of the transition strategy, other international organizations and 

individual donor countries are expected to lead some efforts. For example, 

the host government; international financial institutions, such as the World 

Bank; and bilateral development agencies have responsibility for 

economic recovery. These stakeholders continue efforts after the peace 

operation ends. 

 7

Several U.S. government studies support this approach. For example, see DFI 

International, Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace

(Washington, D.C.: September 1997). Moreover, the Special Coordinator of the Stability 

Pact for Southeastern Europe noted that the pact, a multinational effort to implement a 

comprehensive, long-term regional conflict prevention strategy, was also based on this 

approach. 

Strategy Emphasizes 

Coordination with Other 

Organizations and Donor 

States 
Page 10 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The U.N. transition strategy also calls for developing objectives, linked to 

the country conditions sought, and measures of progress toward achieving 

those conditions. The objectives and results-oriented measures are 

intended to help manage the peace operation and help make decisions 

about drawing down the numbers of peacekeepers based on objective 

data. The emphasis on using objectives and results-oriented measures is 

part of the U.N. decision to implement results-based budgeting. Approved 

by the General Assembly in 2000, results-based budgeting links program 

objectives, outputs (the final product or service delivered to the client or 

users), outcomes (the results of a program compared with its intended 

purpose), and measures of impact (the result from achieving the program’s 

objectives). According to the Secretary General, this approach is intended 

to ensure that U.N. programs are designed to achieve results and to ensure 

that the United Nations can measure performance. 

The U.N. Secretariat has begun to reform its planning and management 

capabilities to more effectively carry out peacekeeping operations and 

transitions. These initiatives were adopted based on recommendations 

made by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, a group of experts 

convened by the Secretary General in 2000 to assess the shortcomings of 

the existing system for managing peace operations.8

 Some key initiatives 

included the following: 

• In 2002, the United Nations consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities 

into DPKO. Previously, the Department of Political Affairs was responsible 

for developing and proposing the mandates of potential peace operations, 

and DPKO was responsible for planning and logistical support. 

• In 2001, the U.N. General Assembly approved a 50 percent increase in staff 

for DPKO, allowing it to better plan and manage operations. By January 

2003, DPKO had largely met its recruiting goals in key areas. For example, 

it had increased the military planning group from 7 to 18 and increased the 

civilian police division from 2 to 9 staff, which enabled it to provide useful 

input in planning individual operations. 

• DPKO revised its overall process and guidance for planning peace 

operations. This revised guidance requires planners to clarify long-term 

 8

The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly referred to as the 

“Brahimi Report,” made recommendations to the Secretary General in November 2000 to 

improve the strategic direction, planning, organization, and conduct of peace operations. 

Strategy Focuses on 

Developing Objectives and 

Results-Oriented Measures 

U.N. Reforms Support 

Implementation of 

Strategy 
Page 11 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

aims in the country and develop plans that identify objectives, tasks to be 

undertaken, resources required, expected timetables, and criteria for 

measuring success. 

• As recommended by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, DPKO 

has begun using integrated mission task teams to plan operations. The task 

force membership varies but should include core military and police 

planners from DPKO and representatives of all involved U.N. humanitarian 

and development agencies. Representatives of the World Bank and the 

International Monetary Fund would also be invited to participate as 

appropriate. 

• In 2001, DPKO merged two existing analysis units to create a best 

practices unit and attached it directly to the Under Secretary General for 

Peacekeeping Operations. The new unit’s mission is to analyze past 

experiences and apply the results of that analysis to new operations. The 

unit is also supposed to help develop guidelines and recommendations for 

the conduct, management, and support of these operations. Unit officials 

stated that they are beginning to make recommendations on the 

implementation of the United Nations’ revised approach to transition 

planning. 

The United Nations is trying to apply all the elements of the transition 

strategy to help move countries from conflict to sustainable peace. First, 

the United Nations and other stakeholders have provided thousands of 

peacekeeping troops and other international workers to establish and 

maintain secure environments in East Timor and Sierra Leone and to help 

develop rule of law. U.N. peacekeepers have also supported efforts by the 

World Bank and others to begin development planning and to address 

human rights issues. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. efforts 

are more limited, but as of July 2003, the Security Council authorized more 

peacekeepers and approved other efforts. Second, the United Nations and 

international organizations have tried to coordinate transition efforts with 

each other, host country governments, and donor countries. Third, each 

U.N. peacekeeping operation has begun to identify objectives and resultsoriented measures of progress and, to a limited extent, uses these to 

manage drawdowns of operations. The Security Council, however, makes 

the final decision on the drawdown and withdrawal of a peace operation. 

United Nations Is 

Trying to Apply the 

Transition Strategy 
Page 12 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

In countries with complex emergencies, U.N. peacekeeping operations and 

other stakeholders seek to establish basic conditions for sustainable peace 

by (1) providing and maintaining security, (2) developing institutions that 

provide rule of law and participatory governance, and (3) creating 

conditions for social and economic reforms. Table 1 illustrates the 

transition objectives associated with U.N. and other stakeholder efforts to 

achieve these conditions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo. 

Table 1: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Objectives 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Establish and maintain security • Ensure security, freedom 

of movement 

• Strengthen police 

capacity, accountability, 

and loyalty 

• Strengthen Sierra Leone 

armed forces 

• Support reintegration of 

ex-combatants 

• Restore control over 

diamond mining 

• Address external security 

challenges (Liberia and 

Guinea) 

• Establish secure 

environment 

• Provide executive 

policing authority 

• Develop local police 

capacity 

• Support 

strengthening of 

external security 

capability 

• Assist in 

development of 

border control 

• Support the cease-fire agreement 

• Support border security and national 

sovereignty 

• Assist with the disarmament, 

repatriation, or reintegration of foreignand Congolese-armed groups 

• Strengthen local police training capacity 

• Support reform of security forces 

Develop institutions that ensure 

rule of law and participatory 

governance 

• Consolidate state authority

• Restore local governance 

• Strengthen rule of law 

• Create and support 

national government 

and rule of law 

• Supervise and 

support elections 

• Support 

development of 

public administrative 

capacity 

• Develop local 

governance 

• Assist in the creation of a unified national 

government 

• Support establishment of an interim 

government 

• Foster political reconciliation 

U.N. Peacekeeping 

Operations Seek to 

Establish Conditions for 

Sustainable Peace 
Page 13 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Sierra Leone East Timor Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Create conditions for economic 

recovery and social reform 

• Facilitate reintegration of 

refugees and internally 

displaced persons 

• Reduce poverty, 

encourage economic 

growth 

• Encourage national 

reconciliation 

• Promote human rights and 

justice 

• Help institute 

national 

development plan 

• Support international 

poverty reduction 

efforts 

• Assist in 

investigations of and 

proceedings for 

serious crimes 

• Facilitate provision 

of humanitarian 

assistance 

• Support reopening of internal waterways 

for free movement of goods and people 

• Facilitate humanitarian assistance and 

human rights monitoring 

Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews. 

The Security Council mandates for the U.N. peace operations in Sierra 

Leone, East Timor, and the Congo made establishing and maintaining 

security a priority to facilitate other mission objectives, such as 

reestablishing government authority. For example, to assist in carrying out 

provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the initial mandate for the U.N. 

Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone authorized 6,000 military personnel to 

provide security at key locations, government buildings, and disarmament 

sites.9

 The mission also facilitated the free flow of people, goods, and 

humanitarian assistance. In May 2000, the Security Council expanded the 

U.N. mission’s mandate in response to renewed violence and by March 

2001 had increased the military force to 17,500 troops. According to the 

force commander, the operation’s priorities since the election of a new 

government in May 2002 have shifted from maintaining security to 

improving the capacity of the local police and government officials.10 The 

British government has also played a major role in achieving these 

objectives. It deployed 4,500 troops to the region in 2000 to support the 

government and U.N. peacekeepers and is helping to train Sierra Leone’s 

armed forces and police. 

 9

The July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement between the parties stipulated that the primary 

rebel group would maintain a cease-fire, disarm and demobilize, transform itself into a 

political party, and participate in a government of national unity. 

10Another key task is to complete the reintegration of about 57,000 ex-combatants into 

society by the end of 2003. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 

Make Establishing and 

Maintaining Security a Priority 
Page 14 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The Security Council applied similar measures in East Timor. In 

September 1999, the council sanctioned the deployment of an 

international force led by 5,400 Australian troops to stop the widespread 

violence perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias. According to members of 

the Australian parliament, the government led the coalition because it had 

a strong national interest in ensuring a stable East Timor. The Security 

Council subsequently authorized (1) the U.N. Transitional Administration 

in East Timor in October 1999, with an authorized force level of 9,150 

troops and 1,640 international police, and (2) the U.N. Mission of Support 

in East Timor in May 2002, with a force level of 5,000 troops plus 1,250 

police. According to the deputy force commander and other U.N. officials, 

these missions have suppressed sporadic violence and have continued to 

patrol along the boundary with Indonesian West Timor, begun training a 

local police force, and supported donor nation efforts to train a small East 

Timor military force (see fig. 2). 

Figure 2: U.N. Troops and Civilian Police Man a Security Checkpoint with East 

Timorese Police 
Page 15 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The Security Council has not yet applied similar security measures in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. As of May 2003, the U.N. force had 

about 4,600 troops; the mission was mandated to monitor the cease-fire 

and oversee the disarmament and repatriation of foreign fighters. In May 

2003, the council authorized the French government to lead a separate 

1,500-strong force on a limited mission to protect U.N. peacekeeping 

troops and suppress violence between rival militias fighting in and around 

the city of Bunia in the northeastern district of Ituri. In July 2003, the 

council increased the strength of the U.N. force to 10,800 and for the first 

time authorized peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians in selected 

locations. 

U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor have 

undertaken tasks to begin establishing the rule of law and participatory 

governance. In Sierra Leone, the peacekeepers, in coordination with the 

U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and others, have worked 

with the Sierra Leone government to reestablish the court system, rebuild 

courtrooms throughout the country, and develop projects to train judges 

and prosecutors. In 2002, the U.N. operation provided transportation, 

supplies, and security and monitored the conduct of national elections that 

observers characterized as “free and fair.” Mission officials also plan to 

provide security, logistics, and technical assistance for local government 

elections in 2004. Furthermore, according to U.N. plans and reports, the 

priority is to improve the work of government officials in structures 

throughout the country. 

In East Timor, U.N. efforts to develop the rule of law and participatory 

governance have been extensive. For example, in 1999, the Security 

Council empowered the peacekeeping operation to exercise all legislative 

and executive authority for the country, including the administration of 

justice. In this capacity, the operation established a national consultative 

council to help make decisions about the future government and set up a 

transitional judicial commission. According to U.N. officials, international 

staff and advisors also provided on-the-job training to allow the East 

Timorese to gradually assume more responsibility for running the 

government. The U.N. mission also supervised East Timor’s first popular 

election of members to the constituent assembly in 2001 and the 

presidential elections in 2002. Since East Timor attained independence 

and the end of the U.N. transitional administration in May 2002, the followon peace operation has focused on advising and training government 

officials and on extending a national system of justice to outlying districts. 

U.N. Efforts to Develop Rule of 

Law and Participatory 

Governance 
Page 16 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the U.N. peacekeeping 

operation’s support for governance has been largely limited to supporting 

the intermittent peace negotiations between the warring parties to 

establish an interim government. A new government of National Unity and 

Transition was formed in June, and, on July 28, 2003, the Security Council 

expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to help the government 

restore stability, including support for security sector reform, elections, 

and rule of law, in coordination with other international actors. 

U.N. peacekeeping operations assist other stakeholders in working toward 

conditions for economic and social recovery. For example, in 2002 in East 

Timor, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the U.N. 

peacekeeping operation, and the U.N. Development Program helped the 

government develop a 20-year national development plan. The plan 

described short- and medium-term strategies for the country’s economic 

recovery and growth, and was used by the international community to 

determine their economic support programs. Although the U.N. 

peacekeeping operation provided funding for some projects, other donors 

provided major funding for programs to reduce poverty, increase power 

generation, and support private sector development. 

U.N. peacekeeping operations also support efforts to provide social 

reconciliation in both Sierra Leone and East Timor. In both countries, the 

government, United Nations, and donor countries decided that leaders of 

rival factions had to be held accountable for human rights violations. In 

Sierra Leone, the United States and other donors helped establish and 

fund an independent Sierra Leone international tribunal to prosecute those 

bearing “greatest responsibility” for violations of international 

humanitarian law during that country’s civil war.11 The U.N. operation 

assists the tribunal by providing security, transportation, and supplies. In 

East Timor, the U.N. operation established a unit to assist in the 

investigation of the most serious atrocities committed in 1999. The United 

Nations also provides technical support and other assistance to 

commissions in both countries investigating human rights violations and 

fostering reconciliation. Similarly, the U.N. High Commissioner for 

Refugees coordinates refugee repatriation and return efforts in Sierra 

Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. The peace operations assist these 

efforts by providing security and logistical support. 

 11The court’s draft budget for the fiscal year beginning in July 2003 was approximately $35.3 

million. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 

Support Economic and Social 

Recovery Efforts 
Page 17 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The U.N. peacekeeping operations have undertaken several efforts to try 

to coordinate with other international organizations and donor nations. 

These include early planning efforts, donor meetings and conferences, and 

the establishment of a high-level position in the mission to coordinate 

security and economic recovery efforts. 

In East Timor, attempts to coordinate efforts among donor countries and 

international organizations occurred before the peacekeeping operation 

deployed. A joint assessment mission began in the autumn of 1999, 8 

months before the start of the peacekeeping operation. The assessment 

mission included members from five donor countries, four U.N. agencies, 

the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank, and the World 

Bank. The International Monetary Fund also conducted a concurrent 

mission to assess East Timor’s budgeting capabilities. DPKO used the core 

plans for reconstruction and budgeting from the joint assessments in its 

planning. The joint assessment mission was a response to experiences in 

other post-conflict countries, where lack of coordination had delayed 

efforts and caused inefficiencies and duplication in the use of external 

resources. 

The U.N. peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and East Timor also 

coordinated with other international organizations through regular donor 

meetings and conferences. For example, during 2002, the government of 

Sierra Leone, the World Bank, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs, and the peacekeeping mission completed revised 

strategic plans for that country. U.N. organizations working in Sierra 

Leone (including the peacekeeping mission and the World Bank) 

subsequently collaborated in preparing an overall strategy for their 

national recovery and peace-building efforts. At an international donors 

conference in November 2002, U.N. organizations and other donors agreed 

to work together to support the government’s comprehensive national 

recovery strategy, restructure the government unit responsible for national 

aid monitoring and coordination, and hold bimonthly coordination 

meetings. 

Several mechanisms are used in the field to increase coordination among 

U.N. agencies and other international organizations in carrying out 

peacekeeping transitions. The Secretary General created the position of 

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, the second 

highest ranking position at each mission, to ensure coordination between 

security and economic reform efforts. According to the deputy 

representative in East Timor, his dual responsibilities for peacekeeping 

operations and U.N. development programs allow him to better manage 

U.N. Peacekeeping 

Operations Attempt to 

Coordinate and Sustain 

Assistance 
Page 18 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

the process of transitioning the mission’s emphasis from peacekeeping to 

longer term peace building. 

DPKO has specified objectives for its peacekeeping operations and 

identified some results-oriented measures of progress. The operations in 

Sierra Leone and East Timor are using the measures to a limited extent to 

plan the drawdown of troops and other activities, but the Security Council 

makes the final transition decisions. 

The U.N. operations in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo have specified their objectives, based on mandates 

from the Security Council, and have developed measures of progress, 

some of which are results oriented. (App. II lists the objectives and 

measures for the three missions.) For example, in Sierra Leone, one 

objective is to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. Measures 

of progress include increasing (1) the percentage of households with 

access to safe drinking water, (2) the percentage of women who are AIDS 

aware, and (3) the growth in gross domestic product (to 6 percent 

annually). Another objective is to ensure security and freedom of 

movement. Measures of progress for this objective include minimizing and 

containing cease-fire violations and opening roads and removing 

roadblocks. Although some measures for the peacekeeping operations are 

quantifiable, the United Nations faces challenges in developing resultsoriented measures about conditions in the country that the peace 

operations are supposed to improve. This issue will be discussed in the 

last section of this report. 

The Security Council weighs political and budgetary considerations as 

well as the conditions in each complex emergency country when making 

the final decision to draw down and withdraw peacekeeping forces. 

Nonetheless, the United Nations has to a limited extent used some 

measures to plan the withdrawal of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone and East 

Timor. (The operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not at a 

stage to begin withdrawing.) U.N. officials in Sierra Leone developed and 

modified plans for withdrawing peacekeepers based on an evaluation of 

progress in strengthening the police and armed forces, reintegrating excombatants, and restoring government control over diamond mining. 

Mission staff used some of these measures when they reviewed the 

security risks and capabilities of Sierra Leone security forces in each 

region to ensure that peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from lower 

United Nations Is 

Beginning to Use 

Objectives and 

Results-Oriented Measures 

in Peacekeeping 

Operations 

Peace Operations Are Making 

Efforts to Specify Objectives 

and Measures 

Peace Operations Use 

Measures of Progress to a 

Limited Extent in Planning 

Drawdown 
Page 19 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

security risk areas first and retained longer in higher risk areas along the 

Liberian border. U.N. military staff acknowledged, however, that the force 

was being drawn down more quickly under the current plan because of the 

council’s budgetary and political pressure to end the peacekeeping 

mission and not because the mission’s measures pointed to a reduced 

threat to the country’s security and stability. In March 2003, the council 

requested that the Secretary General provide faster and slower options for 

the drawdown based on the security situation and the ability of Sierra 

Leone security forces to take responsibility for external and internal 

security functions. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed timetable for 

withdrawal that the Secretary General presented to the council in 

September 2002, as well as a revised drawdown option recommended by 

the Secretary General based on his review of these factors and adopted by 

the council in July 2003. 
Page 20 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Figure 3: Modified Timetable for Drawdown of U.N. Peacekeepers in Sierra Leone 

In East Timor, the Secretary General and Security Council have used 

measures to plan the drawdown of its peacekeepers. However, although 

the United Nations is retaining greater numbers of peacekeepers and 

international police in response to unexpected security threats and lack of 

sufficient progress in developing the capabilities of the East Timor police 

service, the Security Council did not change the final withdrawal date of 

June 2004. (Fig. 4 illustrates the alterations in the drawdown schedule for 

the troops and police.) According to U.N., U.S., and Australian officials, 

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000 Projected

U.N. troops

Original

Modified

Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified

Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.

2002 2003 2004 2005

Sept. Jan. May Nov. June Oct. Dec. July
Page 21 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

this end date is a political compromise developed in consultation with the 

United States and key council members. Senior military officers in the 

peacekeeping mission said that the failure to meet objectives, such as 

having a judicial system in place by mid-2003, will not change the 

withdrawal date. 

Figure 4: Revisions in U.N. Peacekeeping Troops and Police Drawdown Schedule in 

East Timor 

U.N. police

May Nov. June Jan. May

Projected

Original

Modified

Comparison of original plan to how it has been modified

Source: GAO, based on information from the United Nations.

U.N. troops

2002 2003 2004

2002 2003 2004

0

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

May Nov. May July Oct. Dec. June

Projected

0

400

800

1,200

1,000
Page 22 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Although objectives and measures of progress provide information to help 

manage the withdrawal of peacekeepers, other factors influence council 

decisions. According to U.N. officials, U.S. officials, and members of the 

council, the following factors are involved in these decisions: 

• Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide a limited window for 

countries to resolve internal differences and take advantage of the 

opportunity to rebuild their country with broad international support. 

• The United Nations must set deadlines to maintain pressure on the 

country’s leaders and political factions to take responsibility for their 

country and fulfill their commitments. 

• Each peacekeeping mission must compete for the attention of the Security 

Council, which often must respond to new crises and emergencies as it 

devotes resources to ongoing operations.12

• The cost and resources needed for peacekeeping operations are high. 

Security Council members face domestic pressures to limit their support, 

particularly if an operation is not a priority national interest. 

The United Nations confronts significant challenges to implementing each 

element of the transition strategy. First, achieving the conditions for 

sustainable peace establishing the conditions necessary for sustainable 

peace is a challenge. Maintaining security is difficult because the rival 

factions in a country may oppose the peacekeepers or continue their 

internal disputes, regardless of the peacekeepers’ presence. Further, 

establishing rule of law and democratic governance is problematic in 

countries with little or no tradition of accountable government and 

democratic principles. In this regard, peacekeeping transitions have taken 

longer and have been more costly than initially expected. Second, the 

United Nations has not been able to coordinate its efforts and priorities 

with those of other independent international organizations and donor 

states to the extent necessary to meet transition objectives. Third, 

developing clear objectives and meaningful results-oriented measures of 

progress is difficult. DPKO acknowledges that it needs better measures by 

which to assess the progress that peacekeeping operations are making in 

 12The Security Council has addressed calls for initiating peacekeeping operations in 

Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Iraq, and other locations in the past 2 years. 

Security Council Bases 

Transition Decisions on Several 

Factors 

United Nations 

Confronts Significant 

Challenges to 

Implementing 

Transition Strategy 
Page 23 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

attaining sustainable peace. However, the department has not made 

developing or using these measures a priority. 

Establishing security in war-torn countries is difficult because of uncertain 

and volatile environments. For example, despite peace agreements among 

opposing factions in Sierra Leone, peacekeepers were initially threatened 

by one of the rival groups in the country, which restricted their 

movements, took more than 400 peacekeepers hostage, and continued to 

commit human rights atrocities. The armed intervention of 4,500 British 

troops was needed to help establish security. Through June 2003, 49 

peacekeepers had died through accidents or hostile acts. Similarly, in East 

Timor, despite a free and fair referendum rejecting integration with 

Indonesia in favor of independence, the pro-integration militia created 

widespread violence to stop East Timor from becoming independent. A 

military coalition of 8,000 troops led by Australia was necessary to restore 

security. Through June 2003, 19 peacekeepers had died. 

Establishing security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proven 

extremely difficult. Despite numerous cease-fire agreements, the two large 

rebel groups; five foreign governments with armed forces within the 

country; and numerous foreign and domestic armed groups, many aligned 

with neighboring states, did not cooperate with the U.N. peace operation. 

The operation has not maintained a secure environment, and cease-fires 

frequently have been violated. The government’s forces only have control 

over half of the country’s territory. After violations of several cease-fire 

agreements, France led a coalition force to help U.N. peacekeepers control 

large-scale violence in the northeastern city of Bunia in the Ituri region 

(see fig. 5). 

Achieving Security, Rule of 

Law, and Economic and 

Social Reform Is Difficult 
Page 24 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Figure 5: French Soldier in Bunia in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Maintaining security in war-torn countries is also a problem. In East 

Timor, pro-Indonesian militia groups conducted armed attacks from 

Indonesian West Timor in January and February 2003, even after U.N. 

military officials stated that the militia no longer posed a threat to East 

Timor. The Secretary General concluded that U.N. peacekeeping troops 

should be maintained along the border.13 In April 2003, Sierra Leone 

peacekeepers expressed concern about ongoing violence in Liberia, a state 

that recently supported Sierra Leone rebels. (Fig. 6 illustrates Sierra Leone 

 13The boundary between East and West Timor is known as the Tactical Coordination Line, 

pending the outcome of negotiations between East Timor and Indonesia in establishing an 

international border. 
Page 25 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

soldiers on duty near the border with Liberia.) U.N. officials also noted 

that large concentrations of ex-combatants, unemployed youths, 

corruption, and illegal mining in Sierra Leone’s diamond mining areas 

continue to be ongoing threats to security. 

Figure 6: Sierra Leone Soldiers on Guard near the Volatile Border with Liberia 

Developing rule of law and participatory governance is difficult because 

countries with complex emergencies may have little or no experience with 

transparent accountable governments or democratic traditions and 

institutions. For example, the U.N. strategy for restoring local government 

to Sierra Leone included reestablishing both hereditary chieftaincies and 

elected district councils. According to a British government analysis, 

however, Sierra Leone’s reliance on hereditary chieftains has always 

compromised transparency and accountability and provided a means for 

the central government to control local affairs. Moreover, this reliance 

limits democratic participation because only candidates meeting 

hereditary lineage requirements were eligible to run in recent elections to 

fill 61 tribal chieftaincies left vacant during the war. Additionally, local 

civic leaders in one district stated that the Speaker of the National 

Limited Progress in 

Establishing Rule of Law 
Page 26 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Parliament arbitrarily replaced the locally selected candidate for chief. A 

2002 U.K. study characterized the Sierra Leone justice system as 

unresponsive, unaccountable, and corrupt. Furthermore, the AntiCorruption Commission, a body specifically created in 2000 to investigate 

corrupt practices among government officials, has been ineffective, 

according to U.S. and U.K. officials. In light of these serious deficiencies, 

the World Bank and the U.K. government are planning a 5-year effort to 

improve the justice system beginning in late 2003. 

In East Timor, U.N. and other international officials told us that years of 

mistrust of the Indonesian-imposed court system and the rural 

population’s isolation have created reliance on traditional laws and 

informal courts. These courts show little regard for the rights of women, 

according to U.N. and other international officials. These issues present a 

significant obstacle to applying Western norms of judicial conduct and 

respect for human rights. In addition, the East Timor government has not 

passed laws identifying the number of locations or the villages that will 

serve as political jurisdictions, nor has it extended authority and services 

beyond the capital. We saw limited evidence of government services or 

representation in villages beyond Dili, the national capital. 

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, government and rule of law have 

almost completely collapsed after years of warfare, according to U.S. 

government and U.N. officials. In 1999, the Secretary General noted that 

the substitution of armed force for the rule of law in much of the territory 

was a key factor in making the Democratic Republic of the Congo a 

difficult environment for peacekeeping. In June 2003, the parties to the 

peace agreement formed a national unity government with the assistance 

of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. 

U.N., international agency, and host and donor government officials have 

noted that the time frames for peacekeeping operations are shorter than 

those for economic recovery programs. Australian officials estimated that 

developing the economy of East Timor and redressing its serious poverty 

will take 20 to 50 years. As of December 2002, a study by the U.N. 

Children’s Fund estimated that 25 percent of the East Timorese population 

is below the poverty level. The most recent U.N. health survey indicated 

that 30 percent of children below age 5 were malnourished. 

Economic stabilization objectives can be difficult to achieve. In Sierra 

Leone, for example, the government has made limited progress in 

regaining legal and regulatory control over the diamond trade, a vital 

sector in its economy. The value of legal exports of diamonds (as opposed 

Economic Recovery Is a LongTerm Effort 
Page 27 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

to smuggling) has increased from just over $1 million in 1999 to $41 million 

in 2002. A January 2003 analysis commissioned by the British government 

estimated that the annual value of diamond exports could rise to as much 

as $180 million by 2006 if the industry was properly regulated and effective 

anticorruption measures were implemented. However, Sierra Leone 

government, U.N., and other international officials agree that government 

systems for regulating the diamond industry remain weak and impractical. 

Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace, 

overall peace efforts in countries with complex emergencies take more 

time and are more costly than originally planned. In Sierra Leone, 

international efforts to restore stability have been under way since the 

early 1990s. Recent efforts have also taken longer than originally planned. 

Although signatories of the Sierra Leone peace accord (July 1999) 

anticipated holding an election in 2001, conditions for a free and fair 

election were not achieved until May 2002, and peacekeepers will not exit 

until the end of 2004. In East Timor, the United Nations approved a limited 

operation in June 1999 to oversee a referendum to determine whether the 

nation would become an autonomous but integrated part of Indonesia or 

an independent country.14 The U.N. mission of 325 civilian police and 

military observers was expected to last about 4 months, but following 

violence over the results of the vote in favor of independence, the United 

Nations sanctioned intervention by a multinational force and later 

deployed thousands of U.N. peacekeeping troops to oversee the transition 

to independence. The peace operation is now scheduled to end in 2004. In 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a U.N. observer and peace mission 

has been ongoing since 1999, but numerous cease-fire violations have 

occurred. Congolese parties to the conflict did not form the interim 

government called for in the 1999 peace agreement until June 2003. In July 

 14Under the agreement governing the referendum (formally termed a “popular 

consultation”), the people of East Timor could choose to accept or reject autonomy. 

However, a vote to reject autonomy, coupled with the Indonesian President’s promise to 

seek to have Indonesia’s Supreme People’s Consultative Assembly reverse the territory’s 

annexation in the event of such an outcome, was essentially a vote for independence. The 

agreement stipulated that, if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy, the United 

Nations would administer East Timor until it assumed full independence. 

Implementing Overall 

Transition Takes Longer and Is 

More Costly than Originally 

Planned 
Page 28 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

2003, the Security Council expanded the mandate to support the new 

government and increased the authorized force level to 10,800 troops.15

Because of the difficulties in achieving conditions for sustainable peace, 

implementing the transition strategies in these countries has cost over 

$6 billion: 

• The estimated total cost of the operations in Sierra Leone is over $2.6 

billion through June 2004. Annual costs have risen from $263 million for 

the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to $670 million for the U.N. fiscal 

year ending June 2003. This increase reflects the Security Council’s 

decision to almost triple the size of the peacekeeping force in response to 

continued fighting and other problems. The estimated cost for the current 

fiscal year is about $544 million. 

• The estimated total cost of the operations in East Timor is about 

$1.8 billion through June 2004. The initial U.N. observer mission sent to 

organize and conduct the referendum in East Timor in 1999 was expected 

to cost about $53 million. The current operation’s annual cost is $292 

million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2003, and the estimated cost 

for the current fiscal year is $193 million. 

• The estimated annual cost for the operations in the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo is about $1.9 billion through June 2004. Annual costs have 

risen from $55 million for the U.N. fiscal year ending June 2000 to an 

estimated $608 million for the current fiscal year. However, the latter 

estimate does not include costs associated with the Security Council’s 

recent decision to expand the operation’s mandate and authorize a larger 

U.N. force. 

There are also costs above and beyond the peacekeeping operation that 

are needed to fund overall transition efforts. These costs are often not 

funded. For example, in 2002, the United Nations requested about 

$69 million for humanitarian assistance in Sierra Leone, including the 

reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people and improved 

access to health, water, and education services. International donors 

funded less than 50 percent of this request. Similarly, the peacekeeping 

 15Experiences in the Balkans further demonstrate that transitions take longer than 

expected. In 1995, U.S. and international leaders stated that the NATO-led peacekeeping 

forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina would require a 1-year deployment and then withdraw. 

As of June 2003, 13,000 international peacekeeping troops remain in the country with some 

remaining for the foreseeable future. 
Page 29 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

operation in East Timor faced a significant shortfall in additional donor 

resources. In 2002, the East Timor government and the U.N. Development 

Program identified the need for 228 donor-funded international advisers to 

begin to help manage government and economic development programs 

once the U.N. operation withdraws. As of April 2003, donors had provided 

48 advisers and promised another 83, leaving a shortfall of nearly 100 

positions. 

Despite the numerous efforts at coordination—early planning, donor 

conferences, and other field representation—the United Nations, 

international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and donor 

nations face difficulties in effectively working together on the ground. Part 

of the problem results from the multiple independent agencies in the 

country, each with its own mandates, funding, and priorities. This can 

create a variety of problems on the ground. 

In Sierra Leone, for example, officials of several agencies commented that 

efforts to coordinate the work of numerous development and 

humanitarian agencies were not effective. One donor agency official 

described donor efforts to work together as chaotic. Donor officials and 

Sierra Leone government representatives stated that neither the 

government nor the United Nations has an adequate system to track the 

amount and the impact of external aid, especially aid provided through 

nongovernmental organizations. Nor did any organization have the overall 

authority to direct the work of donors and thereby avoid duplication or 

overlap in specific locations. 

In East Timor, early efforts to coordinate U.N. peacekeeping operations 

with donors did not address critical needs in the governance and security 

areas. According to World Bank officials and assessments, U.N. officials 

planned activities to rebuild East Timor’s governance and security sectors 

largely outside of the coordinated needs assessments conducted by the 

international community in 1999. This situation contributed to some 

conflicts and hindered overall efforts. For example, one of the first World 

Bank projects was to help villagers in outlying regions establish local 

governing councils using traditional law. However, according to the 

Deputy Special Representative, this effort complicated outreach efforts by 

the peace operation, as it began establishing central government authority 

and providing consistent regulations throughout East Timor. 

Coordination among 

Multiple Organizations Is 

Sometimes Ineffective 
Page 30 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The United Nations has had difficulty in developing results-oriented 

measures to help manage and make decisions about its peacekeeping 

transitions. In addition, the United Nations has not fully staffed DPKO’s 

Best Practices Unit, which is charged with developing tools for 

peacekeeping transitions, such as meaningful and quantifiable resultsoriented measures of progress. 

Although U.N. missions are using measures of progress for their 

operations, most measures are tasks and outputs rather than measures of 

underlying conditions in the country that the peace operation is to 

improve. For example, a U.K.-led coalition of donor nations in Sierra 

Leone is working to strengthen the armed forces. Some measures of 

progress in this area are the number of troops trained, reorganization of 

the armed forces, and restructuring the Ministry of Defense. (Table 2 

shows some objectives and measures for security in Sierra Leone.) 

Table 2: U.N. Peacekeeping Transition Security Objectives and Measures of 

Progress in Sierra Leone 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress 

Establish and maintain 

security 

Strengthen police 

capacity, accountability, 

loyalty 

• Progress toward increasing force 

to pre-war level (from current 

6,500 to 9,500 personnel) 

• Strengthen strategic 

management 

• Enhance training, expand police 

training school capacity 

• Provide essential transport and 

communication equipment 

• Rehabilitate key infrastructure 

 Strengthen Sierra Leone 

armed forces 

• Accelerate training 

• Restructuring of armed forces 

and Ministry of Defense 

• Ensure sustainability of army 

deployments 

• Reduce combined government 

and rebel force to 10,500 

 Support reintegration of 

ex-combatants 

• Offer reintegration opportunities 

to all registered ex-combatants 

(57,000) 

 

 

Developing Meaningful 

Results-Oriented Measures 

Poses Difficulties 

Measures of Progress Often 

Focus on Tasks Rather than 

Conditions 
Page 31 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress 

 Address external security 

challenges (Liberia and 

Guinea) 

• Accelerate training and 

restructuring of armed forces, 

and the Ministry of Defense 

• Encourage regional political 

dialogue and collaboration 

• Enhance national capacity to 

respond to refugee influxes 

• Develop regional arms collection 

and destruction program 

Source: United Nations documents. 

According to U.K. military trainers in Sierra Leone, other measures, such 

as ensuring the sustainability of army deployments, are not clearly defined 

or taken into account. These military trainers also said that measures for 

this area do not provide meaningful indications of the capability of the 

Sierra Leone armed forces. For example, military trainers noted that while 

the U.N. operation focuses on such performance measures as the speed at 

which units can deploy, it overlooks such measures as troop discipline, 

loyalty to the government, and the effectiveness of unit leadership. 

Subsequent events revealed problems in troop discipline, loyalty, and 

effectiveness. The Secretary General reported in December 2002 that the 

armed forces were “much improved” and were effectively patrolling the 

country’s border. He also stated that U.N. troops were supporting army 

units deployed along the Liberian border. However, the Secretary General 

reported in March 2003 two incidents that took place in January 2003 that 

lowered public confidence in the security forces and exposed 

shortcomings in their capability and training. First, Sierra Leone army 

troops retreated and left behind some of their equipment when about 70 

Liberian raiders attacked a village near the border. Second, a police 

investigation into an attack by former soldiers and civilians on an armory 

implicated several active-duty soldiers in a plan to destabilize the 

government and prevent the operation of the international tribunal. 

A key objective of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, East 

Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the increased 

capacity of the national police force to provide internal security. However, 

these missions use output-oriented measures. For example, in East Timor, 

the peace operation originally intended to train 2,830 police by 2004. 

However, the operation established this target using a standard European 

police-to-population ratio and relied on outdated population estimates. 

Moreover, the number of police does not measure the quality of their 

training and whether they are improving security in the country. In 
Page 32 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

December 2002, riots occurred in the capital city, Dili, but the fully staffed 

police force could not restore order. In the aftermath of the riots, the 

United Nations resumed direct control over crowd control units, 

lengthened and revised its training program to incorporate more human 

rights and crowd control training, and increased the number of East Timor 

police officers by 500. 

The missions also use output measures to measure progress in creating 

governance and restoring the economies. In Sierra Leone, the number of 

district officials and magistrates placed in office is a measure of progress 

toward consolidating state authority. In addition, U.N. analysts in Sierra 

Leone reported that the reestablishment of courts in many areas was 

having a positive impact on public attitudes toward the rule of law. 

However, these analysts did not indicate that evaluations of the operations 

of these institutions had applied any systematic measures or criteria, such 

as the ability of those filing suit to obtain satisfactory resolution of their 

cases within a reasonable period of time. 

In 2002, DPKO tried to use the missions’ objectives and measures to 

develop results-based budgets for peacekeeping but was unable to do so. 

U.N. officials said that the missions’ measures were process-oriented and 

did not measure changes in country conditions that the peacekeeping 

operations were working to improve. A U.N. report in late 2002 

acknowledged that it was difficult to shift from inputs and outputs to 

objectives and measures. Our past reports have also noted the difficulties 

in developing results-oriented measures.16

An example drawn from a Department of Justice international assistance 

program could be useful, however. Justice’s framework for overseas 

prosecutorial training and development identifies an overall objective of 

strengthening judicial independence, lists several subobjectives such as 

decreasing corruption, lists tasks such as getting legislative approval for 

an anticorruption task force, and then identifies several measurable 

measures of progress. The measures include an output, funding for the 

 16See U.S. General Accounting Office, Agencies Annual Performance Plans Under the 

Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking, 

GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18 (Washington, D.C.: February 1998); Managing for Results: 

Agencies’ Annual Performance Plans Can Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges, 

GAO/GGD-98-44 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 1998); and The Government Performance and 

Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven, GAO/GGD-97-109

(Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1997). 
Page 33 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

corruption task force. They also include measures of actual results, 

including the percentage increases in convictions for corruption and 

percentage increases in public confidence in judicial honesty. Such 

measures help demonstrate that program objectives are being met (see 

table 3). 

Table 3. Objectives and Measures for the Department of Justice Program for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and 

Training 

Sample strategic 

objective 

Objectives/Results 

soughta

Sample measures of 

outputa

Sample measures of 

outcome/impacta

Sample measures of 

impact on underlying 

conditionsa

Strengthen judicial 

independence in a host 

country 

Identify needs of the host 

country: 

• Decreased organized 

crime and corruption 

• More efficient case 

processing 

• Increased regard for 

human rights 

• Justice for victims of 

mass crimes 

Facilitate development of 

anticorruption task force 

by: 

• Securing legislative 

approval 

• Assisting task force 

formation 

• Delivering joint 

courses on corruption 

and surveillance 

• Percentage increase 

in host country budget 

for anticorruption 

efforts 

• Percentage increase 

in corruption 

complaints filed, 

investigated, and 

leading to convictions 

Percentage increase in 

public confidence in 

government and judicial 

honesty 

Source: Excerpted from the Department of Justice Handbook for Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training. 

a

Definitions (under the terms of the Government Performance and Results Act): 

Output measure: A tabulation, calculation, or recording of activity or effort that can be expressed in a 

quantitative or qualitative manner. 

Outcome measure: An assessment of the results of a program compared with its objective. 

Impact measure: Measures of the net effect or consequences of achieving program objectives. 

U.N. officials stated that identifying measures of progress useful in past 

missions would be helpful in developing results-oriented measures for 

future missions. Moreover, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping 

Operations stated that to develop and apply the transition strategy, his 

department needed to develop better measures by which to assess the 

progress peacekeeping operations are making in attaining sustainable 

peace. He also stated that developing systematic measures of results was 

an important task. 

Despite the importance of developing results-based measures, the 

peacekeeping operations in East Timor; the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo; and, to a lesser extent, Sierra Leone have not developed these 

measures. Although DPKO’s revised planning process for peace operations 

would require mission planners to clarify long-term aims in the country 

United Nations Has Not Yet 

Developed Results-Oriented 

Measures of Progress 
Page 34 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

and identify criteria for measuring success, the head of the DPKO military 

planning group stated that it would be up to the individual missions to 

develop results-oriented measures. Mission staff and DPKO desk officers 

for each of the three operations noted that they have received only general 

guidance on developing results-oriented measures. Moreover, they stated 

they lacked the staff resources necessary to develop such measures and 

collect the data. Status reports from the missions that we reviewed were 

largely narrative accounts of daily or weekly events and did not use 

results-oriented measures. Beginning in late 2002, DPKO and mission staff 

attempted to implement results-based budgeting for peacekeeping 

operations for fiscal year 2003-04. According to one DPKO official, 

however, this effort to did not succeed because peacekeeping operations 

staff had not made it a priority to develop results-oriented measures linked 

to their peacekeeping mission strategies. U.N. officials noted that DPKO 

and mission staff are working to develop results-oriented measures in 

order to implement results-based budgets for most peacekeeping 

operations by fiscal year 2004-05. They also indicated that the lessons 

learned and best practices from this planning and budget preparation 

process will be reflected in the 2005-06 budget. Nevertheless, DPKO has 

only recently begun to provide the resources necessary to develop these 

measures. In 2001, DPKO combined its units for policy and analysis and 

peacekeeping lessons learned and to create a best practices unit to 

systematically review the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and 

develop guidelines and general measures of progress to better plan and 

conduct future operations. DPKO did not provide a director for the unit 

until April 2003, however, nor had it fully staffed the unit as of August 

2003. 

State Department officials in the Bureau of International Organization 

Affairs and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations are responsible for 

providing oversight of peacekeeping operations and budgets. For example, 

they monitor the progress of the 14 U.N. peacekeeping missions and track 

the budgetary costs, of which the United States contributes 27 percent. 

They also brief Congress monthly on these peacekeeping missions. 

According to these State officials, they have not focused on U.N. efforts to 

develop results-based measures. However, they follow the progress of the 

missions through U.N. reports and U.S. intelligence. Nonetheless, they said 

more systematic measures of results would be useful to monitor the 

progress of peacekeeping operations and would help in deciding whether 

they were helping a country move toward sustainable peace. They 

cautioned, however, that results were difficult to quantify and that the 

United Nations was not responsible for all aspects of rebuilding a country 

and helping it move toward sustainable peace. 
Page 35 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

The United Nations and other international stakeholders face an enormous 

challenge in helping countries that have been recently involved in internal 

conflicts and that have no rule of law or experience of accountable 

government transition to sustainable peace. The development of a general 

transition strategy for U.N. peacekeeping operations is a positive step in 

overcoming this challenge. The strategy takes a comprehensive and longterm view and focuses on addressing the causes of the conflict. The 

strategy further recognizes that the peacekeeping operation must specify 

results-oriented measures of progress to effectively manage operations 

and the withdrawal of peacekeepers. 

However, the United Nations has not yet developed quantifiable resultsoriented measures of progress to help the Security Council make 

peacekeeping transition decisions. Although the United Nations uses 

output measures to manage the drawdown of peacekeepers, these 

measures did not provide useful information about results, such as 

progress in improving security in Sierra Leone and East Timor. The U.N. 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations has not yet developed resultsoriented measures. It created a best practices unit to systematically review 

the results of past U.N. peacekeeping operations and develop measures of 

progress to plan and conduct future operations, but the unit did not have 

the resources necessary to begin these tasks until recently. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Justice, 

and State; the U.S. Agency for International Development; and the United 

Nations. We received verbal comments from the State Department and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development, and written comments from 

the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see app. IV). The 

remaining agencies did not provide comments. 

The State Department generally agreed with our findings and provided 

technical comments and clarifications, which we incorporated where 

appropriate. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided 

technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate. 

The United Nations also generally agreed that the report identified key 

issues facing peacekeeping operations. The United Nations was 

concerned, however, that the report (1) did not fully recognize its efforts 

to apply results-oriented performance measures for its operations, (2) did 

not acknowledge numerical measures of progress included in routine 

peacekeeping operations reports to headquarters, (3) did not fully explain 

the mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, and (4) did not 

Conclusions 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 36 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

reflect progress made in the Congo over the past year and a half. We have 

added information to the report about recent and proposed U.N. efforts to 

develop results-oriented performance measures. We describe in the report 

a number of instances where the peacekeeping operations have used 

numerical measures in their reporting, but these are largely measures of 

tasks or outputs rather than the measures of outcomes called for by the 

United Nations’ results-based budgeting system. The report provides an 

accurate portrayal of the comparatively narrow focus of mandate of the 

peacekeeping operation in the Congo as it pertains to U.N. efforts to 

develop rule of law and participatory governance. Nonetheless, the report 

fully explains the mandate for the operation in the Congo in table 1 and 

appendix II. The report also notes that in July 2003 the Security Council 

voted to expand the operation's mandate. However, this operation's 

limited focus is especially clear compared with the other two operations 

we examined in detail for this report. Our report discusses the progress 

attained in the Congo to date, but notes that it is very recent. The 

Congolese parties to the conflict only formed a government in late June 

2003, for example, and as of September 2003, the United Nations had yet to 

fully execute its plans to disarm, demobilize, and repatriate Rwandan excombatants. 

We are sending this report to interested congressional committees, the 

Secretary of State, the Administrator for the Agency for International 

Development, and the U.N. Secretary General. We will also make copies 

available to other parties on request. In addition, this report will be made 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8979, or at christoffj@gao.gov. Other GAO 

contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix V. 

Sincerely yours, 

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 37 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

To identify the elements of the U.N. transition strategy, we obtained and 

examined documentation on Security Council deliberations on 

peacekeeping policies and reform initiatives, including relevant reports to 

the council from the United Nations’ Secretary General. To obtain 

additional detail, we interviewed and obtained documents on planning and 

operational management from officials of the U.N. Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations, as well as officials in the Department of 

Political Affairs who are responsible for contributing to planning peace 

operations. We also interviewed and obtained documents from officials 

from other U.N. bodies, such as the Office for the Coordination of 

Humanitarian Affairs and the U.N. Development Program, that contribute 

to overall U.N. efforts to restore stability in complex emergency countries. 

To obtain other perspectives on U.N. policies and initiatives and 

peacekeeping operations in general, we interviewed and/or obtained 

critical evaluations and analyses from government and nongovernment 

analysts, including officials from the U.S. mission to the United Nations; 

the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the U.S. Agency for 

International Development; the World Bank; the Organization for 

Economic Cooperation and Development; the Henry L. Stimson Center; 

and others. 

To assess the extent to which the United Nations is attempting to apply 

the strategy in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, we obtained information from the Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations on the substance and status of initiatives to strengthen its 

operations in these countries. We reviewed efforts by this department to 

implement the United Nations’ commitment to applying results-based 

budgeting principles as a management tool. We performed fieldwork in 

Sierra Leone and East Timor to examine peacekeeping operations in those 

countries. These trips included visits to U.N. and national government 

military and police posts, ex-combatant reintegration centers, justice 

institutions, and reconstruction projects. We interviewed and obtained 

documentation from U.N. and host government officials, bilateral and 

multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations supporting U.N. 

peace efforts, and local citizens participating in or observing 

internationally supported programs. In conjunction with these trips, we 

visited and interviewed government officials in the United Kingdom and 

Australia, the major bilateral supporters of the peace operations in Sierra 

Leone and East Timor, respectively. Our work in these two countries 

allowed us to assess overall transition planning and actual execution of 

initial troop reductions, since the operations in these countries have 

completed substantial portions of their work and are beginning to 

withdraw. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we interviewed U.N. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 38 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

peacekeeping officials about the demobilization and reintegration 

programs and their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. However, 

due to unsettled security conditions and the early stage of the United 

Nations’ activities, our fieldwork in the Congo was not as extensive as it 

was in Sierra Leone and East Timor. 

To assess challenges faced in applying the U.N. strategy in these countries, 

we reviewed our own substantial body of work on peacekeeping 

operations over the last decade (including reviews of U.N. operations in 

Cambodia and the Balkans) and included discussion about relevant issues 

in our interviews with U.N. headquarters and field-level staff, U.S. 

government officials, and other experts in the United States and abroad, as 

previously described. Our findings regarding U.N. efforts to develop 

meaningful measures and criteria for assessing progress were informed by 

our prior work on U.S. government efforts to develop and apply similar 

frameworks, including efforts to apply the principles advanced by the 

Government Performance and Results Act. To examine whether consistent 

and quantifiable measures were used to assess progress, we examined 

progress reports sent from the U.N. missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor, 

and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations headquarters in New York between November 

2002 and May 2003. 

We conducted our work from October 2002 through August 2003, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 

Page 39 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Table 4: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in Sierra Leone 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress 

Establish and maintain 

security 

Ensure security and freedom of 

movement 

• Cease-fire violations minimized and contained 

• Roads opened, checkpoints removed 

 Strengthen police capacity, 

accountability, and loyalty 

• Progress toward increasing force to prewar level (9,500) 

• Strengthen strategic management 

• Enhance training 

• Provide essential equipment, rehabilitate key infrastructure 

 Strengthen Sierra Leone armed 

forces 

• Restructure and reduce combined government and rebel forces to 

10,500 troops 

• Forces accept responsibility for security in areas vacated by U.N. 

peacekeepers 

 Support reintegration of excombatants 

• Offer reintegration opportunities to all registered ex-combatants 

(57,000) 

 Restore control over diamond 

mining 

• Support for enforcement of mining regulations 

• Increase value of legal exports 

 Address external security 

challenges (Liberia and Guinea) 

• Accelerate training, restructuring of armed forces, Ministry of 

Defense 

• Ensure sustainability of army deployments 

• Encourage political dialogue, collaboration in the Mano River Uniona

• Enhance national capacity to respond to refugee influxes 

• Develop regional arms collection and destruction program 

Develop institutions that 

ensure rule of law and 

participatory governance 

Consolidate state authority • Restore basic administrative capacity 

• Increase number of District officials in office 

 Restore local governance • Enhance decentralization for improved public service delivery 

• Enhance decentralization for community participation in decision 

making, oversight 

• Build capacity 

• Hold local chieftain and district council elections 

 Strengthen rule of law • Support rebuilding of impartial, transparent, and independent 

judiciary 

• Rehabilitate courts 

• Train magistrates 

• Judicial coverage, legal aid in all districts 

• Rehabilitate essential elements of penal system 

• Support anticorruption measures (accountability, transparency) 

Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 

Page 40 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Results needed for 

sustainable peace Objective Measures of progress 

Create conditions for 

economic recovery and 

social reform 

Facilitate reintegration of 

refugees, internally displaced 

persons 

• Facilitate return of Sierra Leonean refugees 

• Support completion of assisted resettlement program for Internally 

Displaced Persons 

• Numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons returned 

home 

• Support shelter programs 

• Improve food security 

• Strengthen child protection 

 Reduce poverty and encourage 

economic growth 

• Increase in percentage of households with access to safe drinking 

water to 63 percent 

• Increase in percentage of children enrolled in primary school 

• Stimulate economic revival—increase annual gross domestic 

product growth to 6 percent 

• Malaria: Increase in treated bed net use by pregnant women and 

children 

• Health care: Increase in percentage of health units rehabilitated and 

functional 

• HIV: Increase in percentage of women who are AIDS aware to 20 

percent aware 

 Encourage national reconciliation • Land disputes mechanism functioning 

• Foster policy of inclusion at local level 

• Promote reconciliation initiatives 

• Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioning 

 Promote human rights, justice • Reinforce national human rights institutions 

• Increase capacity of local human rights groups 

• Harmonize domestic and international human rights instruments 

• Promote culture of peace, tolerance, and human rights 

• Special Court functioning 

• Observed decrease in human rights violations 

Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews. 

a

The Mano River Union is a customs and economic union between Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. 
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 

Page 41 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Table 5: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in East Timor 

Results needed for sustainable 

peace Objective Measures of progress 

Establish and maintain security Establish secure environment • Reduction and containment of militia threat 

 Continue to provide executive policing 

after independence 

• Gradual handover of executive policing by district 

• Hand over five districts, eight specialized units by 

the end of 2002 from U.N. to Timorese authority, 

remaining districts by November 2003 

• U.N. review and monitoring of handed over 

districts 

• Hand over headquarters by January 2004 

• Downsize U.N. police from 1,250 to 325 in 

January 2004 

 Support the development of the East 

Timor Police Service (ETPS) 

• Train 3,330 police officers (including 230 border 

police) at Police College 

• On-the-job mentoring by international experts 

• ETPS is able to provide all basic functions 

• Specialized training for ETPS in human rights and 

management skills 

 Support external security and territorial 

integrity 

• East Timor defense force at full operational 

capability by June 2004 

• June 2004 defense force assumes responsibility 

for external security 

 Assist in the development of border 

security and control 

• Border demarcated by June 2003; ETPS to 

assume patrolling and immigration responsibilities 

• National government to normalize its customs 

service 

Develop institutions that ensure 

rule of law and participatory 

governance 

Supervise and support elections • Presidential elections conducted April 2002 

 Support development of the postindependence public administration and 

rule of law 

• Civilian Support Group to assist in 100 core 

functions of government administration 

• Civilian Support Group to complete essential 

services and legal systems activities by November 

2003 and remaining functions by May 2004 

• Ensure application of general public service 

standards and systems throughout the public 

administration 

 Create local governance • Government established in all 13 districts 

Create conditions for economic 

recovery and social reform 

Facilitate provision of humanitarian 

assistance 

• Refugees returned home and reintegrated 

 Support international poverty reduction 

efforts 

• U.N. Development Program coordinating 228 

donor-funded international social and economic 

development advisers to the national government 

 Help institute national development plan • 10-year plan adopted in 2001; interim targets met 
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 

Page 42 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Results needed for sustainable 

peace Objective Measures of progress 

 Assist in the conduct of serious crimes 

investigations and proceedings 

• Conclude investigations in 10 priority cases and 5 

other investigations by the end of 2002 

• Successful completion of trials throughout 2003 

Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews. 

Table 6: U.N. Objectives and Measures of Progress in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Results needed for sustainable 

peace Objective Measures of progress 

Establish and maintain security Support cease-fire agreement • Parties to conflict participate in Joint Military 

Commission 

• Cease-fire violations investigated 

 Assist disarmament and repatriation or 

reintegration of foreign and Congolese armed 

groups 

• Up to 90,000 Rwandan combatants and 

dependents voluntarily disarmed and 

repatriated 

• Congolese combatants disarmed and 

reintegrated 

• Establish ban on supply of weapons or any 

military assistance to armed groups in Ituri 

and Kivus areas in northeastern Congo 

 Support border security and integrity and 

national sovereignty 

• Verify withdrawal and monitor continued 

absence of Rwandan, Ugandan, and other 

foreign military forces from the Congo 

• Establish functional joint Uganda-Congo 

Pacification Commission to halt hostilities, 

create administrative authority, and restore 

law and order in Ituri area 

 Strengthen local police capacity • Complete national assessment of police 

capabilities and needs 

• Provide limited police training and material 

support to Kisangani training program 

 Foster political reconciliation • All major parties participate in U.N.-

sponsored Inter-Congolese dialogue 

• All parties agree on power-sharing plan 

• Support the Ituri pacification commissiona

 Assist in creation of unified national security 

forces 

• Establish high command of unified national 

armed forces 

• Form initial unified police unit in one city or 

area 
Appendix II: U.N. Objectives and Measures of 

Progress, by Mission 

Page 43 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Results needed for sustainable 

peace Objective Measures of progress 

Develop institutions that ensure 

rule of law and participatory 

governance 

Assist in creation of unified national government • Transitional constitution approved by parties 

• Transitional government formed by parties 

• Election plans for a democratic government 

finalized 

• Peacekeeping operation coordinates 

activities of U.N. system and other actors in 

supporting the transitional government and 

rule of law 

Create conditions for economic 

recovery and social reform 

Support reopening of major riverways for free 

movement of goods and people 

• Obtain agreements among parties to conflict 

permitting commercial and other traffic along 

the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani 

Source: GAO analysis of United Nations documents and official interviews. 

a

The commission, which includes the United Nations and all parties to the conflict in the Congo’s 

northeastern Ituri region, was created to develop and implement new structures to restore law and 

order and effective administration in this region along the Ugandan border. 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 44 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

From 1991 through 2000, Sierra Leone experienced a devastating series of 

armed conflicts between the government and rebel groups, brought on by 

decades of poor governance, economic mismanagement, and corruption. 

The conflict was exacerbated by external support for the rebels, primarily 

from Liberia. The international community attempted unsuccessfully to 

restore peace for nearly a decade. In 1999, the government and primary 

rebel groups signed a peace agreement, and the United Nations deployed a 

peacekeeping operation to support efforts to create a sustainable peace. In 

2000, international efforts to restore the peace intensified after rebels took 

about 500 peacekeepers hostage. The United Kingdom intervened and 

ultimately deployed about 5,500 troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and 

other nationals and to support the government and international 

peacekeepers. The United Nations strengthened its mandate and by 2001 

had nearly tripled the size of its military force to 17,500 troops. After the 

rebel leader was captured in May 2000, the hostages were released or 

rescued, and the rebel groups were largely disarmed and demobilized. In 

May 2002, the former rebels participated in national elections conducted 

with U.N. support and characterized by observers as free and fair. The 

U.N. peacekeeping force currently assists the government of Sierra Leone 

in its efforts to maintain security and restore law and order throughout the 

country. 

Sierra Leone, a small West African country with an estimated population 

in 2001 of approximately 6 million was founded as a refuge for freed slaves 

by the United Kingdom in the late 1800s. It has been an independent 

country since 1961 (see fig. 7). Although endowed with substantial mineral 

resources, most notably diamonds mined in the eastern portion of the 

country, over 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s prewar population lived in 

poverty. 

Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Sierra Leone 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 45 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Figure 7: Map of Sierra Leone 

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 with a relatively small-scale 

revolt against the government by a group known as the Revolutionary 

United Front (RUF). With the help of Liberian faction leader (and later 

president) Charles Taylor, the rebels gained control of Sierra Leone’s 

diamond mining areas, enabling them to sustain prolonged and destructive 

struggle against relatively weak and divided government opposition. 

Independent militias and elements of the armed forces fought each other, 

the RUF, and West African forces deployed as peacekeepers in a series of 

conflicts. By the late 1990s, damage and disruption from the ongoing 

conflict had reduced Sierra Leone to the extent that the United Nations’ 

Makeni

Bo

Bonthe

Lungi

Kenema

Koindu

Kailahun

KoiduSefadu

Freetown

0 50 miles

LIBERIA

GUINEA

SIERRA

LEONE

North Atantic

Ocean

Source: MapArt.
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 46 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

global Human Development Index ranked it last place in the world. Much 

of the nation’s infrastructure was destroyed, and about half of the 

population was displaced from their homes. Approximately 500,000 people 

fled the country, including an estimated 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s 

professionals. 

Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations and other elements of the 

international community made a number of unsuccessful attempts to end 

the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Economic Community of West African 

States,1

 with the support of the United Nations and the Organization of 

African Unity, attempted to achieve settlements through negotiated 

agreements, sponsorship of democratic elections, and military 

intervention. These attempts failed because of weaknesses in Sierra 

Leone’s civilian and military institutions, continuing rebel resistance, 

limitations of the international military forces operating in the country, 

and competing international commitments to the region. The government 

was overthrown by a military coup in 1992. The military relinquished 

power to a new president and parliament elected in February 1996, but the 

RUF did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. 

In November 1996, the United Nations helped negotiate a peace agreement 

(known as the Abidjan Accord) between the government and the RUF. 

This agreement was derailed when the government was overthrown in 

1997 by another military coup, and the army and the RUF formed a ruling 

junta. The government was restored in 1998 after West African forces 

drove the junta from power. In January 1999, an unsuccessful attempt to 

overthrow the government by the RUF resulted in massive loss of life and 

destruction in Freetown and the surrounding area. 

In July 1999, the parties to the conflict signed a peace agreement (known 

as the Lomé Agreement because it was signed in Lomé, Togo) negotiated 

with the assistance of the United Nations. Under the agreement, the RUF 

agreed to maintain a cease-fire, transform itself into a political party, and 

join a government of national unity. In return, the agreement granted 

pardon and amnesty to all combatants, including those from the RUF, for 

actions before the agreement was signed. In October 1999, the Security 

Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to, among 

other things, assist in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, assist in 

 1

The member states of the Economic Community of West African States are Benin, Burkina 

Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 

Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 47 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

the disarmament demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, 

and monitor the cease-fire. The council’s resolution authorized the 

deployment of up to 6,000 military peacekeepers. Despite having signed 

the Lomé Agreement, RUF forces attacked population centers and 

engaged in a series of armed confrontations with African peacekeeping 

forces and, subsequently, with U.N. troops. In May 2000, the RUF took 

about 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage. U.N. and other assessments 

concluded that insufficient military strength and other shortcomings 

contributed to the peacekeeping force’s inability to deter and repel RUF 

attacks and stabilize the country.2

The hostage-taking and other incidents prompted a significant change in 

the United Nations’ and the international community’s approach to the 

crisis in Sierra Leone. The international community applied greater 

military and diplomatic pressure, which succeeded in overcoming RUF 

resistance and restoring the peace. Beginning in May 2000, the United 

Kingdom deployed troops to protect and evacuate U.K. and other nationals 

and secure the area around Freetown and the airport. This deployment 

boosted confidence in the government and allowed the United Nations to 

redeploy peacekeepers to other areas. At the same time, the United 

Nations began increasing the strength of its peacekeeping force in a series 

of steps from 6,000 to 17,500 troops. The Security Council augmented the 

mission’s mandate to clarify its right to self-defense and tasked it to help 

extend government authority throughout the country, including areas 

controlled by the RUF and other armed groups. In addition, Guinean 

armed forces defeated RUF incursions into that country, and the United 

Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia to reduce that country’s support for 

the RUF. The arrest and imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in 

mid-2000 enhanced RUF cooperation. 

The United Nations reported that, through May 2002, the U.N. 

peacekeeping operation supported the extension of government authority 

throughout the country, the disarmament and reintegration of excombatants, and the conduct of free and fair national elections. According 

to U.N. reports, by December 2001, U.N. troops had been deployed to all 

districts of Sierra Leone, and, by June 2002, government administrators 

and police had also been deployed to all districts with the support of the 

 2

These shortcomings included a serious lack of cohesion within the mission; confusion 

about the mandate and rules of engagement; and problems in command and control, 

leadership, planning, information sharing, and logistics. 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 48 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

U.N. forces, the U.N. Development Program, and international groups. In 

January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the United 

Nations declared the disarmament process complete. Having disarmed, the 

RUF participated as a political party in national presidential and 

parliamentary elections in May 2002. The U.N. operation played an 

important role in supporting these elections, which international and local 

observers characterized as free, transparent, and generally free of 

violence. 

In the spring and summer of 2002, having achieved these basic milestones, 

U.N. officials began to develop plans to gradually reduce the size of the 

mission. In accordance with Security Council guidance, U.N. officials 

identified and articulated strategic goals for key areas where progress 

would affect the security threat facing Sierra Leone and its ability to 

maintain security and stability without substantial assistance from U.N. 

peacekeepers.3

A former Portuguese colony, East Timor experienced years of intermittent 

conflict following its 1975 occupation by Indonesia. Low-level 

international efforts to resolve this conflict were unsuccessful until 1998, 

when Indonesian-Portuguese negotiations finally produced agreement on a 

referendum to decide the territory’s political future. The ensuing vote for 

independence in August 1999 provoked a violent response from militias 

favoring integration with Indonesia. The international community 

intervened to end the fighting and established a U.N. transitional 

administration in 2000 to run the country and oversee international 

assistance efforts until a new national authority was elected and 

independence declared in May 2002. A U.N. peacekeeping operation 

remains in East Timor in support of the government and ongoing 

international efforts to create sustainable peace in the new country. 

East Timor is a small country with a population ranging between 800,000 

and about 1 million occupying the eastern portion of the island of Timor 

(see fig. 8). First colonized by Portugal in the 1500s, Timor was divided 

between the Netherlands and Portugal in 1859. While the Dutch side 

became part of Indonesia after World War II, East Timor remained under 

 3

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1436 and 1470, adopted in September 2002 and March 

2003 respectively, instructed U.N. officials to base plans for withdrawing the operation on 

an evaluation of the security situation in Sierra Leone and the capacity of the country’s 

security sector to take responsibility for internal and external security. 

East Timor 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 49 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Portuguese rule. In 1975, Portugal finally withdrew and East Timor 

declared independence. However, armed conflict among domestic factions 

provided Indonesia with a pretext for occupation. For the ensuing quarter 

century, Indonesia conducted an unsuccessful campaign to incorporate 

East Timor, with intermittent warfare claiming 100,000 to 250,000 lives. By 

1999, years of violence and disruption had reduced East Timor to last 

place among Asian countries on the United Nations’ Human Development 

Index. 

Figure 8: Map of East Timor 

Although the United Nations refused to recognize Indonesia’s annexation 

and called for self-determination for East Timor, these calls did not 

achieve results until the government of Indonesia changed hands in 1998 

and the new administration decided to enter U.N.-mediated discussions 

with Portugal about the territory’s political future. 

In 1999, these talks resulted in agreement to hold a popular vote on 

whether East Timor would accept or reject a proposal to remain affiliated 

with Indonesia as an autonomous entity. To ensure a free and fair 

Liquica Baucau

WEST TIMOR

Timor Sea

Banda Sea

Dili

INDONESIA

INDONESIA

EAST TIMOR

0 20 miles

Source: MapArt.

Pante

Makasar
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 50 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

referendum, the Security Council created a small observer mission, the 

U.N. Mission in East Timor, to monitor campaigning and voting and to 

oversee the result of the vote. However, Indonesia retained responsibility 

for maintaining peace and security. On August 30, 1999, the population 

voted overwhelmingly against the proposal, voting in effect for U.N. 

administration and eventual transition to full independence. In response, 

militias favoring integration with Indonesia went on a rampage with the 

support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, killing hundreds of 

people, displacing 500,000 more—many of whom fled or were forcibly 

removed to West Timor—and destroying much of the country’s already 

damaged infrastructure and housing. Those leaving included most of the 

country’s professional class, who were predominantly Indonesian in 

origin. 

Despite diplomatic pressure from the Secretary General and others, 

Indonesian authorities did little to end the violence; Indonesian security 

forces in fact provided considerable support to pro-union militias. In 1999, 

the Secretary General noted that the potential for post-vote discord was 

widely acknowledged and Indonesian authorities had not done an effective 

job of quelling prereferendum violence. The U.N. mission then in the 

country, however, had not been provided with the means for taking 

effective action to restore stability. 

In the aftermath of the violence, the United Nations authorized a series of 

interventions in East Timor that were intended to end the violence, create 

a national government, and consolidate a stable environment that would 

permit devolution of all responsibilities to the new national government 

and withdrawal of U.N. forces. In September 1999, the Security Council 

authorized an Australian-led international force of approximately 8,000 

military personnel to intervene in East Timor, end the violence, and 

facilitate humanitarian operations. With Indonesian consent, this force 

quickly entered East Timor and restored order. About 500,000 East 

Timorese were displaced from their homes. About half of the displaced 

went to West Timor, in some cases forced to go by fleeing pro-Indonesia 

militiamen. The following month, the council authorized creation of the 

U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor that would assume 

responsibility for maintaining security from the Australian-led force, 

administer an interim government, and work to develop East Timor’s 

capacity for self-government. In the ensuing months, the mission oversaw 

development of a national consultative council, began training a police 

force, assisted with the return of most of the refugees, helped other 

international organizations create the conditions for economic 

development, and patrolled the boundary with Indonesia. Between August 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 51 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

2001 and April 2002, the people of East Timor elected a constituent 

assembly, adopted a constitution, and elected a president. 

On May 20, 2002, East Timor became an independent country, and the U.N. 

transitional administration turned over responsibility for governance to 

Timorese authorities. Recognizing this change in circumstances, the 

Security Council created a U.N. Mission in Support of East Timor to 

pursue a mandate that supports the new government as it works to 

establish stability and security in the country. The mission has developed 

implementation plans for its activities, identified security and governance 

“milestones” to be achieved, and developed a proposed timetable for 

reducing its presence in East Timor over a 2-year period, with the final 

withdrawal of the peacekeepers to be completed by mid-2004. 

Since suffering foreign invasion and overthrow of the government in 1996-

97 and again in 1998-99, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has 

been divided by conflict among shifting alliances of foreign and domestic 

armed groups, including troops from seven other countries sent to support 

or oppose the government. International initiatives aimed at restoring 

peace, including a U.N. peacekeeping operation, have made some progress 

since 1999, but violence continues to occur. The Security Council 

established a peacekeeping operation, the U.N. Organization Mission in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo, in support of a 1999 peace agreement 

signed in Lusaka, Zambia. The parties to the agreement largely failed to 

meet their commitments until late 2002, making it difficult for the U.N. 

mission to plan a comprehensive approach to restoring stability. Foreign 

troops were withdrawn by May 2003, and the Congolese factions formed a 

transitional government in June 2003. In July 2003, the council expanded 

the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the new government’s 

efforts to provide security and rule of law. In addition, the council 

authorized a substantial increase in the size of the peacekeeping force. 

The DRC occupies the core of central Africa. Approximately equivalent in 

size to the United States east of the Mississippi River, the country shares 

borders with nine other nations and has a population of about 55 million. 

The country is rich in natural resources, with substantial deposits of gold, 

diamonds, coltan, and other minerals; ample timber; and enormous 

potential for hydroelectric power generation.4

 A colony of Belgium until 

 4

Coltan, or colombite-tantalite, is a metallic ore used in laptop computers and other 

common electronic devices. 

Democratic Republic 

of the Congo 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 52 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

1960, the new country dissolved into a multisided war shortly after 

declaring independence. The government of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, in 

power from 1965 to 1997, eventually restored order but failed to channel 

the country’s considerable wealth into economic and social development. 

Corrupt government officials became wealthy while the population 

remained poor, politically disenfranchised, and willing to support 

opposition groups and coup attempts. The economy suffered a near-total 

collapse during the early 1990s. By 1997, the central government could do 

little to resist rebels and outside forces. 

The political and economic tensions in the DRC were exacerbated by the 

1994 conflict and associated genocide in neighboring Rwanda. More than 1 

million ethnic Hutus fleeing Tutsi reprisals inside Rwanda became 

refugees in eastern DRC. Ethnic tension and fighting involving Congolese 

Tutsis, the army, and exiled Rwandan Hutu militias ensued, leading 

eventually to a 1997 uprising by domestic rebel groups that succeeded in 

deposing Mobutu with support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. The 

successor government under rebel leader Laurent Kabila was challenged 

in 1998 by a new coalition of internal rebels and Rwandan and Ugandan 

troops. With support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, and Chad, 

the Kabila government pushed its challengers back to eastern DRC before 

losing the initiative. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their respective 

rebel client groups remained in control of large portions of the country 

(see fig. 9). According to International Rescue Committee estimates, the 

continuing conflict has cost more than 3 million lives since 1998. 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 53 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Figure 9: Location of Countries Aligned with and against the Kabila Government in 1998, and the Location of Major 

Antigovernment Groups and Natural Resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as of 2003 

MLC

RCD-N

RCD

Ituri 

Armed 

Groups

Government-controlled

RCDK/ML

RWANDA

SUDAN

TANZANIA

ANGOLA

CENTRAL

AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CHAD

Congo River

UGANDA

BURUNDI

REPUBLIC 

OF THE 

CONGO

GABON

Atlantic

Ocean

ZAMBIA

MALAWI

ZAMBIA

NIGERIA

CHAD

CAMEROON

Valuable Minerals

 Area demilitarized by agreement

 Location of current ethnic clashes in the Ituri region

GDRC: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MLC: Movement for the Liberation of the Congo

RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy

RCD-N: Colgolese Rally for Democracy – National

RCD-K/ML: Congolese Rally for Democracy – Kisangani/Liberation Movement

Gold Diamonds Coltan

Kinshasa

0 500 miles

Pro-GDRC

countries

Anti-GDRC

countries

DRC

500 miles

Namibia

Pro-GDRC countries

Anti-GDRC countries

Angola

Chad

Sudan

Zimbabwe

Rwanda

Uganda

0

Kisangani

Goma 

Bunia

Sources: GAO, based on information from the United Nations' and other Web sites; MapArt.
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 54 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

In July 1999, the main parties to the DRC conflict agreed to honor a ceasefire and begin a national dialogue to lead to the creation of a transitional 

government and national elections. The Security Council authorized a U.N. 

peacekeeping operation to support the cessation of hostilities, oversee the 

withdrawal of foreign forces, and encourage talks sponsored by the United 

Nations and the African Union to create a new national government that 

included the current government and foreign-supported rebel groups in 

eastern DRC. The peacekeeping operation would then support the new 

government’s efforts to restore peace, including a timetable calling for 

agreement on the formation of a unified transitional government within 3 

months, withdrawal of all foreign forces within 6 months, and 

reestablishment of state administration throughout the DRC within 9 

months, that is, by April 2000. 

The parties were slow to meet their commitments and were unable to 

implement a comprehensive plan to restore peace. The formation of a 

national government was also substantially delayed. The parties 

committed numerous violations of the cease-fire, and it was not until 

December 2002 that the Kinshasa government and major rebel groups 

from eastern Congo5

 signed a power-sharing agreement that would permit 

the creation of the transitional government. Foreign troops have been slow 

to withdraw in part because they want to retain control of mineral 

resources.6

 Rwanda withdrew its troops in late 2002, while Uganda 

removed the last of its units in May 2003. As of August 2003, fighting has 

continued among rebel militias seeking to control Ituri and other 

northeastern regions. In Ituri, local, ethnic militias began fighting after 

foreign troops vacated the area. 

Since 1999, the Security Council has gradually increased the strength and 

mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping operation that supported the peace 

process. In 2001, the council authorized the mission to train police for the 

 5

The two major rebel groups participating in peace-building efforts are the Rwandansupported Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Ugandan-supported Movement for the 

Liberation of the Congo. Splinters of these two groups and other rebel groups have also 

been involved in the fighting and in recent negotiations to form a transitional government. 

6

A U.N. panel concluded in late 2002 that the conflict in the DRC had evolved into a dispute 

about control over minerals. The panel observed that disintegration of civil authority in the 

DRC, combined with incursion by foreign armies, had fostered the formation of criminal 

networks linked to the armed forces of Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe and to the DRC 

government. These networks realized large profits from trade in the country’s natural 

resources and had built up a “self-financing war economy” that is likely to remain a 

challenge to establishing an effective national government. 
Appendix III: Crises and International 

Response in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Page 55 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

eastern rebel-occupied city of Kisangani and help reopen the Congo River 

to commercial traffic. In 2002, it inaugurated a program to disarm and 

repatriate ethnic Hutu militiamen and their families from the DRC to 

Rwanda. The council approved a number of increases in the size of the 

peacekeeping force, raising its authorized strength from 90 military 

liaisons in August 1999 to 8,700 troops by December 2002. The actual 

forces provided by member states to the operation have been significantly 

below the ceiling because the country’s unstable political environment, 

great size, and poor transportation network make it costly to deploy 

troops. Consequently, the number of U.N. troops actually deployed to the 

DRC totaled about 6,200 soldiers and 76 police as of June 2003. In May 

2003, the council also authorized the deployment of a separate French-led 

force of about 1,500 international troops to the Ituri region to end fighting 

and restore order in the city of Bunia. 

The Congolese parties to the peace agreement formed the National Unity 

and Transition government in June 2003. On July 28, 2003, the Security 

Council expanded the peacekeeping operation’s mandate to assist the 

government in developing a more comprehensive approach to restoring 

stability, including efforts to support security sector reform, elections, and 

the establishment of the rule of law, in coordination with other 

international actors. The council also authorized the mission to use force 

to stabilize Ituri and other northeastern regions and expanded its force 

level to 10,800 troops. The U.N. operation will also assume control over 

international forces in the Ituri region in September 2003. The new 

resolution extended the mission for 1 year but did not set a date for 

elections. However, the Secretary General suggested in May 2003 that the 

holding of free and fair national elections might serve as an appropriate 

time to end the current peacekeeping operation. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N. 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

Page 56 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N. 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.N. 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

Page 57 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-03-1071 U.N. Peacekeeping 

Tetsuo Miyabara, (202) 512-8974 

B. Patrick Hickey, (202) 512-3163 

In addition to those named above, Ann Baker, Lynn Cothern, Martin De 

Alteriis, Michael McAtee, and Claire van der Lee made major contributions 

to this report. 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320144) 
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