This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,168 9 KRISTEN BOZE, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Kenneth H. Martinez, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 17 Santa Fe, NM 18 Lisa Bozone, Assistant Public Defender 19 Albuquerque, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 Defendant appeals the district court’ s judgment affirming Defendant’s first 232 offense DWI conviction from metropolitan c ourt, entered pursuant to a conditional 1 plea. We issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. 2 Defendant has filed a response to our notice. We have considered the arguments in 3 Defendant’s response, and remain unpersuaded. We affirm. 4 On appeal, Defendant asks whether th e evidence should have been suppressed 5 because Defendant was unreasonably detain ed in violation of the police-team 6 qualification to the misdemeanor arrest ru le where the officer, who initially stopped 7 her, waited for a second officer to arrive , rather than conduct a DWI investigation 8 himself. [DS 6] On appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, 9 findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial 10 evidence and legal conclusi ons are reviewed de novo. See State v. Leyba , 1997- 11 NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 159, 935 P.2d 1171. 12 Our notice expressed the difficulty we had identifying the violation or the harm 13 Defendant alleges she suffered from the enc ounter with the officers. We noted that 14 Defendant did not argue thather detention was impermi ssibly delayed or expanded 15 when Officer Locke waited for Officer Rodriguez to investigate her for DWI. We 16 pointed out that Defendant’s challenge focu sed only on the officers’ satisfaction of the 17 police-team qualification to the presence requirement. [CN 2] Defendant’s response 18 makes it clear that she believes that th e police-team exception was not satisfied 193 because there was no exigency nor any reason for the second officer to conduct the 1 DWI investigation, and there was insu fficient evidence of a cooperative effort 2 between the officers. [MIO 4, 7-10] Defendant does not set forth any factual or legal 3 argument to persuade us that the analys is proposed in our notice was incorrect. 4 The police-team qualification to the presence requirement was adopted to 5 address the requirement that an officer must be present for the commission of a 6 misdemeanor in order to make a warrantle ss arrest for a misdemeanor offense. See 7 State v. Lyon , 103 N.M. 305, 308, 706 P.2d 516, 519 (C t. App. 1985). “The purpose 8 of the presence requirement is to preven t warrantless arrests based on information 9 from third parties.” Id. To satisfy the presence requ irement but avoid “shackl[ing] 10 police efficiency and the use of modern communications equipment,” Id. at 309, 706 11 P.2d at 520, the police-team qualification wa s developed to permit “a member of the 12 police-team [to] arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the presence of another 13 member of the police-team.” Id. at 308, 706 P.2d at 519. 14 In the present case, the officer who performed the traffic stop was the officer 15 who observed Defendant speedi ng, and the officer who arrested Defendant for DWI 16 was the officer who performed the DWI i nvestigation. [RP 91] Therefore, each 17 officer had sufficient information to act as he did. Defendant seems to argue that 18 nevertheless the police team qualificati on was not satisfied because it was not 194 necessary for Officer Locke to have Offi cer Rodriguez conduct the DWI investigation. 1 This is not the harm that the present requi rement is intended toaddress. We see 2 nothing unconstitutional about the cooperation of police officers in an investigation 3 that a defendant finds to be anunnecessary collaborative effort. See State v. Warren , 4 103 N.M. 472, 477, 709 P.2d 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1985) (“Generally, ‘police-team’ 5 cases fall into one of two categories: first, situations in which the police officer must 6 call in assistance for such reasons as inherent danger or criminal flight and, second, 7 situations involving cooperative police efforts.”). 8 To the extent that Defendant argues that there was insufficient police 9 cooperation or collaboration to satisfy the police-team qualification to the presence 10 requirement, we are not pers uaded. Officer Rodriguez observed what he thought was 11 obviously a car chase involving two cars th at were eluding Officer Locke. [RP 91] 12 Officer Rodriguez called Officer Locke to determine whether he wanted assistance, 13 and he responded that he did want assistan ce. [Id.] Officer Rodriguez pulled over 14 the vehicle in the lead, performed a DWI inve stigation, and arrested the driver. [Id.] 15 With the arrestee in his patrol car, OfficerRodriguez drove to where Officer Locke 16 stopped the other vehicle. Officer Locke believed that Defendant was driving after 17 having consumed alcohol and asked Officer Rodriguez, a member of the Albuquerque 18 Police Department’s DWI Unit, to complete the DWI investigation. [Id; DS 2-3] 195 Officer Rodriguez conducted a DWI investig ation and arrested Defendant for DWI. 1 [RP 91] 2 To the extent the police team qualificati on is even required to establish Officer 3 Rodriguez’s presence for events indicating probable cause to arrest Defendant for a 4 misdemeanor, we fail to see why these facts do not indicate a cooperative police 5 effort. These facts are di stinguishable from those in Warren , which did not involve 6 a collective investigation or collective perceptions that combined to constitute 7 probable cause, where an officer patrolling a park called an off-duty officer to report 8 that he saw the defendant drinking in the park and the off-duty officer arrested the 9 defendant without the first officer and without witnessing behavior that furthered the 10 other officer’s probable cause to arre st the defendant for a misdemeanor. See Warren , 11 103 N.M. at 474, 478, 709 P.2d at 196, 200. In contrast, a collective police effort 12 developed in the current case when Officer Rodriguez saw the car chase, offered his 13 assistance in stopping the cars he could see were evading Officer Locke, and assisted 14 in the DWI investigation as a specialis t. Characterizing Officer Rodriguez’s 15 assistance to Officer Locke in the DWI i nvestigation as having been borne out of 16 convenience rather than necessity, without more, does not make the police team 17 qualification less applicable under these facts. 18 We affirm the district court’s judgment and sentence. 196 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

___________________________________ 2 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 3 WE CONCUR : 4

____________________________ 5 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 6

____________________________ 7 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 8