[Cite as In re L.C., 2016-Ohio-8188.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

IN RE: L.C. and R.C. : 

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C.A. CASE NOS. 27174 and 27175 

T.C. NOS. 2014-5781 and 2013-6439 

(Civil Appeal from Common Pleas 

 Court, Juvenile Division) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the ___16th___ day of _____December_____, 2016. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MEAGAN D. WOODALL, Atty. Reg. No. 0093466, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 301 

W. Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Appellee, Montgomery County Children’s Services 

 

JAMES S. ARMSTRONG, Atty. Reg. No. 0020638, 131 N. Ludlow Street, Suite 386 

Talbott Tower, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Appellant, D.C. 

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FROELICH, J. 

{¶ 1} Father appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which granted permanent custody of two children, R.C. 

and L.C., to Montgomery County Children Services (MCCS). For the following reasons, 
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the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

I. Procedural History 

{¶ 2} R.C. and L.C. share the same parents, who were not married. In October 

2013, R.C., who was then four months old, was placed in the temporary custody of MCCS 

when Mother was arrested for child endangering due to her drug and alcohol use. In 

January 2014, R.C. was adjudicated dependent and neglected and was placed in the 

temporary custody of his paternal grandmother. L.C. was born in July 2014 and tested 

positive for drugs at birth. He was adjudicated to be abused and neglected and was 

placed in the temporary custody of MCCS. 

{¶ 3} In August 2014, Grandmother lost her housing, and R.C. was placed in 

foster care; L.C. was placed in the same foster home. 

{¶ 4} MCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of R.C. on January 3, 2015. 

On March 13, 2015, Father filed a motion for legal custody of R.C. and L.C.; in the 

alternative, he requested that custody be given to Grandmother. Grandmother also filed 

a motion for permanent custody of the children. MCCS filed a motion for permanent 

custody of L.C. on April 6, 2015. 

{¶ 5} On April 24, 2015, a permanent custody hearing was held for both children. 

Neither Father nor Mother was present, but both were represented by counsel; Father 

was incarcerated in the Montgomery County Jail at that time, having been charged with 

three counts of rape of a child under the age of ten. (Tr. 30.) At the hearing, Father’s 

attorney requested that his client be conveyed to the courtroom, but the request was 

denied due to counsel’s failure to properly and timely make the request and due to the 

Sheriff’s Department’s insufficient staffing to bring Father to the hearing and stay with him 
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during the hearing that day. Father’s attorney also requested a continuance, which was 

denied. Grandmother, the foster mother, the caseworker, and Mother’s psychologist 

testified at the hearing. The guardian ad litem filed several reports that were before the 

magistrate and responded to Father’s objections, consistently recommending that the 

children remain in the custody of MCCS, but she did not testify at the hearing. 

{¶ 6} On June 12, 2015, the magistrate granted MCCS’s motion for permanent 

custody of the children and denied Father’s and Grandmother’s motions for legal custody. 

Father and Mother filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On June 8, 2016, the 

trial court overruled the objections and granted permanent custody to MCCS. 

{¶ 7} Father appeals, raising two assignments of error. (Neither Mother nor 

Grandmother is a party to this appeal.) Father’s assignments are directed to alleged due 

process errors in the proceedings, rather than the court’s ultimate resolution of the 

custody issue. Specifically, Father claims that he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel due to his attorney’s failure to have him conveyed from jail to the permanent 

custody hearing and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a 

continuance of that hearing. 

II. Parental Rights in Permanent Custody Proceedings 

{¶ 8} The United States Supreme Court has held that the fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner” prior to being deprived of a liberty or property interest. Mathews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), citing Armstrong v. 

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). The “right to be heard 

before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not 
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involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our 

society.” Id., citing Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168, 71 S.Ct. 

624, 646, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This standard has frequently 

been applied to cases involving the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re 

W.E.E., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-167, 2016-Ohio-4552; In re R.L., 2d Dist. Greene 

Nos. 2012 CA 32 and 2012 CA 33, 2012-Ohio-6049; In re G.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

83994, 2004-Ohio-5607. 

{¶ 9} Mathews held that determining whether “the specific dictates of due 

process” have been satisfied generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 1) 

the private interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value 

of additional safeguards; and 3) the governmental burden of additional procedural 

requirements. Id. at 334-335. 

{¶ 10} Applying Mathews to hearings involving the termination of parental rights, 

Ohio courts have recognized that parents have a constitutionally-protected right to be 

present at permanent custody hearings, but they have also recognized that such a right 

is not absolute if the parent is incarcerated. See, e.g., In re A.L.W., 9th Dist. Summit No. 

27312, 2016-Ohio-911; In re M.M., 4th Dist. Meigs No. 14 CA 6, 2014-Ohio-5111. With 

the due process considerations set forth in Mathews in mind, a trial court has discretion 

to decide whether to hold a permanent custody hearing without having an incarcerated 

parent conveyed to the hearing. In re R.L. at ¶ 27; In re R.D., 2d Dist. Clark No. 08-

CA-26, 2009-Ohio-1287, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 11} A parent’s due process right to be heard prior to termination of parental 

rights can be satisfied by arranging for his or her presence at the permanent custody 
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hearing or by an alternate method of meaningful participation. See In re S.A., 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 07-CA-110, 2008-Ohio-2225, ¶ 12; In re Roque, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-

T-138, 2006-Ohio-7007, ¶ 18. A parent’s attorney has a duty to protect the parent’s due 

process rights by ensuring meaningful participation at the permanent custody hearing. 

In re Joseph P., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1385, 2003-Ohio-2217, ¶ 52; In re S.A., 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 07-CA-110, 2008-Ohio-2225, ¶ 5; In re K.T., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14 CA 010646, 

2015-Ohio-2304, ¶ 16. The failure to transport a parent from prison to a permanent 

custody hearing does not violate a parent’s due process rights when: 1) the parent is 

represented at the hearing by counsel; 2) a full record of the hearing is made; and 3) any 

testimony that the parent wishes to present is presented by deposition or by other means. 

In re M.R., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010 CA 64, 2011-Ohio-3733, ¶ 15, citing In re Joseph 

P. at ¶ 51. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶ 12} The test for ineffective assistance of counsel used in criminal cases is 

equally applicable to permanent custody proceedings. In re J.P., 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 27093, 2016-Ohio-5351, ¶ 65. Under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the represented party 

must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an objective 

standard of reasonable representation, and that he or she was prejudiced by counsel’s 

performance. See also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). 

Proof of both parts of the test is necessary to establish the claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. Bradley at 142. 

{¶ 13} The standards for ineffective assistance of counsel “do not establish 
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mechanical rules”; rather, the focus is the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose 

result is being challenged. Strickland at 670. To establish the first prong of ineffective 

assistance, there must be “a substantial violation” of one of counsel’s essential duties to 

his or her client, Bradley at 141, and the adequacy of counsel’s performance must be 

viewed in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the trial court proceedings. 

Strickland at 688. Trial counsel is entitled to a presumption of competency. State v. 

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). To establish the second prong 

of ineffective assistance, the represented party must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s 

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been 

different. Strickland at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

{¶ 14} With these standards in mind, we will examine whether Father’s due 

process rights were violated and whether he was denied the effective assistance of 

counsel. 

IV. Denial of Motion to Convey 

{¶ 15} In In re S.A., 2d Dist. Clark No. 07-CA-110, 2008-Ohio-2225, the trial court 

refused to return Mother from prison to testify at a permanent custody hearing related to 

her child and denied a three-month continuance so that she could testify after her release. 

Mother was represented by counsel at the hearing, but “the only evidence that counsel 

offered on her behalf was a brief questionnaire that she had completed for counsel early 

in his representation.” On appeal, we held that counsel’s representation had been 

deficient, because he had failed to obtain more meaningful input from Mother, such as a 

sworn statement, deposition, or participation via telephone, in lieu of her live testimony, 
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and because “[t]he bare statements offered in the questionnaire begged further 

explanation, which only [Mother] could provide.” Id. at ¶ 11-12. We further held that 

counsel’s failure to protect Mother’s right to meaningful participation rendered the 

proceedings “fundamentally unfair.” Thus, both prongs of Strickland had been satisfied, 

and Mother was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 

{¶ 16} In In re K.T., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14 CA 010646, 2015-Ohio-2304, counsel 

for an incarcerated Father did not file a motion to transport Father to the permanent 

custody hearing because, with a previous motion involving a different type of hearing, the 

court had denied such a motion. Counsel also did not arrange for Father’s meaningful 

participation in the hearing by some other means. The appellate court found that counsel 

acted deficiently in failing to ensure Father’s meaningful participation. 

{¶ 17} The court in K.T. also found that Father was prejudiced by counsel’s 

ineffectiveness because the evidence in favor of terminating parental rights had not been 

overwhelming, there was a relative who was willing to take custody of the child (and 

Father supported such an arrangement), the guardian ad litem “wrestled with” whether 

the relative should be given legal custody, and Children Services pointed to no obvious 

problems with the relative. There were also discrepancies between the evidence 

presented at trial and the trial court’s written decision, which undermined the appellate 

court’s confidence in that decision. The appellate court found that Father had been 

denied the effective assistance of counsel in the proceedings that resulted in the 

termination of his parental rights. 

{¶ 18} In other cases, we have held that it was appropriate for the trial court to 

deny an incarcerated parent’s request to be conveyed to a permanent custody hearing. 
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In In re R.L., 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2012CA32 and 2012CA33, 2012-Ohio-6049, Mother 

and Father were serving lengthy, mandatory prison sentences. Their wishes (favoring 

placement with a relative) were known to the court, they had not requested to conduct 

depositions and had not filed affidavits with the court, and they had not identified any 

testimony they would have provided that would have materially affected the outcome of 

the hearing. We found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s 

request to be conveyed from prison to the hearing. 

{¶ 19} In In re M.R., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2010 CA 64, 2011-Ohio-3733, the trial 

court denied Father’s requests to be transported to the hearing or for the hearing to be 

continued until he was released from prison (approximately five months later). He was 

represented by counsel, who made a statement on his behalf. Father did not identify 

what additional testimony, if any, he would have provided beyond the statement made by 

his attorney. On appeal, we rejected Father’s argument that the trial court had abused 

its discretion in denying his request to be transported to the hearing. 

{¶ 20} At the hearing regarding permanent custody of R.C. and L.C., Father’s 

attorney acknowledged that Father was in the Montgomery County Jail, as he had been 

for some time. Counsel indicated that he had sent an email to court personnel 

requesting that Father be conveyed to the court for the hearing, but he acknowledged 

that the email had been sent to an incorrect address. The record is unclear as to when 

the email was sent and when the attorney became aware that it did not reach the intended 

recipient. Counsel noted that Father had been conveyed to the courtroom on a previous 

occasion without the filing of a motion and stated that Father wished to be present at the 

hearing. In response, the court stated that the appropriate method for requesting a 
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conveyance is by motion, and that, if an email had previously been effective for this 

purpose, it was “luck.” The court also noted that conveying a person from jail to court for 

a hearing involves not only the transportation by a deputy, but also the presence of a 

deputy throughout the hearing, and that staffing issues require at least three days’ notice 

to accommodate such a conveyance.1

{¶ 21} Moreover, because he apparently believed that Father would be allowed 

to be present at the hearing, Father’s attorney had not made arrangements to offer 

Father’s input by another means, such as a deposition, affidavit, or video or telephone 

conferencing. Counsel did request a continuance, but the trial court denied the request, 

citing “proper notice” of the hearing; it is also apparent from the record that numerous 

other attorneys and witnesses were present for the hearing. 

{¶ 22} Under these circumstances, we agree with Father that counsel’s 

representation and, in particular, his efforts to have Father present at the hearing or 

otherwise to ensure his meaningful participation fell below an objective level of 

reasonableness. However, to find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must find not 

only that counsel’s representation was deficient, but also that his client suffered prejudice 

as a result of that deficiency. 

{¶ 23} Father’s mother (Grandmother), who had cared for the older child for one 

year before he was placed in foster care, testified that she and her son (Father) had lived 

together with the child, that Father had a “great relationship” with the child, and that Father 

 

1 The court referred to a “local rule” that requires a minimum of three days’ notice prior to 

a requested conveyance, but it did not specifically cite the rule. Although there is a local 

rule related to the filing of continuances, Mont. Juv. Ct. Rule 5.8.2 and 5.8.3, we are not 

aware of a local rule addressing a local prisoner’s conveyance. 
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had helped to care for him. Grandmother also testified that Father “tries hard to be a 

dad,” that he had been employed until his arrest, that he and the children would be able 

to live with her upon his release from incarceration (contingent upon her finding housing), 

and that Father had a job to which he could return if/when he was released. 

Grandmother also testified to her belief that Father was not using drugs and had no 

mental health issues. 

{¶ 24} Testimony from the case worker and guardian ad litem cast some doubt 

on Grandmother’s assertions. For example, the caseworker testified that Father was not 

close to satisfying the case plan objectives, that his visitation with the children prior to his 

incarceration had been “very sporadic,’ and that he had not provided any evidence of his 

alleged employment or clean drug screens. She also testified that a “lack of housing and 

stability on [Grandmother’s] end” prevented placing the child with her. The children were 

“happy,” “bonded” and “engaged” with their foster family, and the foster family was willing 

to adopt them. 

{¶ 25} The guardian ad litem’s reports also stated that Father had not completed 

drug and alcohol assessments, had not provided pay stubs or verification of the results 

of his drug screens at work, had not obtained housing, and had visited with his children 

less than 25% of the time prior to his incarceration. Further, the guardian ad litem stated 

that Father had previously been thrown out of Grandmother’s house due to his drug 

activities. 

{¶ 26} Father’s brief does not suggest what evidence he might have offered if he 

had participated more meaningfully in the hearing, or how that evidence might have 

affected the outcome of the proceedings. It appears that Grandmother advocated for 
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Father’s interests. In the absence of any evidence or even suggestion that Father’s input 

would have shed more light on certain issues or would have differed from Grandmother’s 

testimony, we cannot conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the result 

would have been different had counsel made arrangements for Father to participate more 

fully. Thus, he failed to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective 

assistance of counsel, i.e., that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency. Without such 

a showing, we cannot find ineffective assistance of counsel. 

{¶ 27} The first assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Denial of Continuance 

{¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, Father asserts that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying his request for a continuance. 

{¶ 29} The granting or denial of a continuance is a matter entrusted to the broad, 

sound discretion of the trial judge, which will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981); In re S.F., 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 26865, 2016-Ohio-521, ¶ 17. The term “an abuse of discretion” is 

used to indicate that a court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary and unconscionable. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). When 

considering whether the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance, any 

potential prejudice flowing from the denial of the requested continuance must be weighed 

against the court’s right to control its docket and the public’s interest in the efficient 

administration of justice. State v. Woods, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-667, 2010-Ohio-1586, ¶ 

24, quoting Unger at 67. 

{¶ 30} The local rules state that a continuance will be granted only for good cause 
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and that a request for continuance should be made in writing “within three days” of the 

hearing. Mont. Juv. Ct. Rule 5.8.2 and 5.8.3. 

{¶ 31} There were two bases for counsel’s request for a continuance at the 

hearing. The first was an effort to secure Father’s presence at the hearing, because 

counsel realized that his email request had been ineffectual. We discussed this issue 

above. Although counsel was deficient in failing to properly and timely request the 

conveyance, counsel did not assert to the magistrate, in the objections, or in this appeal 

whether or how Father would be prejudiced by his absence, nor did he suggest what 

evidence Father would have presented that differed from, questioned, or enhanced the 

evidence other witnesses, including his mother, were prepared to present. The court did 

not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a continuance due to Father’s absence. 

{¶ 32} The second basis for Father’s requested continuance was that MCCS “just 

filed for permanent custody [of L.C.] two weeks ago.” While it is true that MCCS’s motion 

for permanent custody with respect to L.C. was filed only 18 days before the hearing, the 

trial court noted that the notice of the hearing was issued “within the proper time 

limitations.” Moreover, MCCS’s motion with respect to permanent custody of R.C. -- in 

which the issues would have been nearly identical – had been filed more than 3 months 

earlier, and Father’s own motion for permanent custody of both children had been filed 

six weeks before the hearing. And, again, Father does not allege any facts 

demonstrating any prejudice caused by the timing of the hearing. The trial court could 

have reasonably concluded that Father had sufficient notice that his fitness as a parent 

and the best interests of both children would be addressed at the hearing and that a 

continuance was not justified by the recent MCCS motion with respect to L.C. 
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{¶ 33} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a 

continuance. 

{¶ 34} The second assignment of error is overruled. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 35} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

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DONOVAN, P.J. and FAIN, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Meagan D. Woodall 

James S. Armstrong 

H.H. 

Marcy Vonderwell 

Hon. Nick Kuntz