alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ZIP FILES NOT IN ELECTRONIC DOCKET FOR NEBRASKA RH PROPOSAL EPA- R07 - OAR - 2012 - 0158 February 28, 2012 The following files are a part of the docket for this rulemaking, but were in file formats which could not be uploaded into the electronic docket . If you would like copies of these files, please contact Chrissy Wolfersberger, EPA Region 7, at 913 - 551 - 7964 or Wolfersberger.chris@epa.gov . **Ch apter**  **8 ,**  **Appendix 8.1 :**  **2002 Emissions Inventory** Access Dat abases:  AREA_2002_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  FIRE_2002_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  MOBILE_2002_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  OTHER_2002_SMOKE_REPORTS. zip  POINT_2002_S MOKE_REPORTS[1].zip  SMOKEREPORTS_2002.zip **Ch apter**  **8 ,**  **Appendix 8.2 :**  **2018 Emissions Inventory** Access Databases:  ALL_SE CTORS_2018_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  AREA_2018_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  FIRE_2018_REPORTS.zip  MOBILE_2018_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  OTHER_2018_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip  POINT_2018_SMOKE_REPORTS.zip **Ch apter**  **10 ,**  **Appendix 10.5 :**  **Modeling Results** CALPOST files for Gerald Gentleman Station and Nebraska City Station:  MODELING CD – GGS.zip  MODELING CD – NCS.zip
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 1 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 2 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 3 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 4 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 5 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 6 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 7 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 8 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 9 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 10 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 11 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 12 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 13 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 14 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 15 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 16 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 17 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 18 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 19 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 20 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 21 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 22 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 23 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 24 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 25 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 26 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 27 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 28 of 29
Case 2:05-cv-05500-MMB Document 1 Filed 10/21/05 Page 29 of 29
Número i dentificador

RES20 2 3

_

_________________ ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO TRIBUNAL DE APELACIONES

PANEL V

PAOLA SANTIAGO ACOSTA

,

Recurrida

,

v.

MUNICIPIO DE SAN JUAN; OPTIMA SEGUROS; AUTORIDAD DE ACUEDUCTOS Y ALCANTARILLADOS; MANUEL DURÁN RODRÍGUEZ y FULANA DE TAL

, por sí y en representación de la sociedad legal de gananciales compuesta por ambos; MANUEL VILLA PRIETO y FULANA DE TAL

, por sí y en representación de la sociedad legal de gananciales compuesta por ambos; FULANO DE TAL y FULANA DE TAL

, por sí y en represe ntación de la sociedad legal de gananciales compuesta por ambos 1

- 8; MAPFRE PRAICO INSURANCE COMPANY ; TRIPLE S PROPIEDAD; ASEGURADORAS 1

- 8; CORPORACIONES 1

- 10; DEMANDADOS DESCONOCIDOS 1

- 10

,

Peticionari a

. KLCE2 02 3 01063 CERTIORARI procedente de l Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala Superior de San Juan

.

C ivil n úm.: SJ2022CV03585

.

Sobre: daños y perjuicios.

Panel integrado por su president e , e l j uez Hernández Sánchez , la j ueza Romero García y la jueza Martínez Cordero

. Romero García, jueza ponente.
RESOLUCIÓN

En San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 30 de octubre de 2023

.

E l 25 de septiembre de 2023, la parte peticionaria, MAPFRE

PRAICO Insurance Company, presentó este recurso discrecional de

certiorari , con el fin de que revocásemos la Resolución emitida por elKLCE 20 2 301063 2

Tribunal de Primera Instancia, Sala Superior de San Juan, el 8 de agosto

de 2023

, notificada e l 10 de agosto de 2023 1

.
Conforme le ordenásemos, la parte recurrida, señora Paola

Santiago Acosta, presentó su oposición a la expedición del recurso el 10

de octubre de 2023.

Evaluadas los sendos escritos de las partes comparecientes, la

resolución objeto de revisión, así como el derecho apl icable, este Tribunal

concluye que la parte peticionaria no pudo establecer que el foro primario

hubiera incurrido en error alguno , que justifique nuestra intervención

. Así pues, en virtud de lo dispuesto en la Regla 52.1 de las de

Procedimiento Civil, 32 LPRA Ap. V, y de la Regla 40 del Reglamento de

este Tribunal de Apelaciones, 4 LPRA Ap. XXII

- B, resolvemos denegar la

expedición del auto de certiorari

.

N otifíquese

. Lo acordó el Tribunal y lo certifica la s ecretaria del Tribunal de

Apelaciones.

Lcda. Lilia M. Oquendo Solís

Secretaria del Tribunal de Apelaciones

1 En su bien fundamentada Resolución , el foro primario declaró sin lugar la solicitud de desestimación presentada por la co demandada, aquí peticionaria, que planteaba que la acción en su contra estaba prescrita. Véase , apéndice del recurso, a las págs. 1

- 6.
#### Leland STAUCH; Audrey Stauch; Matthew Stauch, Plaintiffs—Appellees, v. CITY OF COLMBIA HEIGHTS, Defendant—Appellant, Patrick Hentges; Charles Kewatt; Lowell Demars; Evelyn Nygaard; Gary Gorman; Matthew Field, Defendants. Leland Stauch; Audrey Stauch; Matthew Stauch, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. City of Columbia Heights, Defendant—Appellee, *436Patrick Hentges; Charles Kewatt; Lowell Demars; Evelyn Nygaard; Gary Gorman; Matthew Field, Defendants.

No. 00-2123, 00-2245.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 2001.

Filed June 22, 2001.

Before BYE, LAY, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The City of Columbia Heights appeals from an order of the district court1 awarding attorneys’ fees to the Stauehs. The City claims that the district court erred in awarding $275,000 in attorneys’ fees in this action where plaintiffs recovered only $120,000 in damages. *See Stauch v. City of Columbia Heights,*212 F.3d 425 (8th Cir.2000) (affirming judgment). We affirm the judgment of the district court.

The order of the district court contains a very detailed recitation of the facts. The City did not dispute fee rates of $200 and $165 per hour for the attorneys, $80 per hour for a law clerk, and $80 per hour for legal assistants. The Stauehs claimed that 2,074.95 hours were spent prosecuting the action, and they sought a total fee award of $350,662.25. The court held that certain categories of tasks, such as photocopying, picking up documents, or *437delivering documents, are frequently done by outside vendors for much less than a paralegal’s hourly rate. The court eliminated these items or allowed messenger rates for them. Other specific items were also deducted from the time. The court rejected the City’s argument that the plaintiffs had obtained only a technical or pyrrhic victory and held that the victory served the important public purpose of encouraging the City to take seriously its obligation to properly notify citizens of their procedural rights before depriving them of property. The court also rejected the City’s argument that the fee award should be reduced by seventy-five percent because the Stauehs only succeeded on twenty-five percent of their claims. The court found that it could not extract from the billing records what time was spent on the unsuccessful claims and reduced the award by twenty percent, resulting in a fee award of $275,580.70. The court rejected plaintiffs’ request for an enhancement based on risk and awarded costs in the amount of $22,477.90, but denied prejudgment interest.

The district court has thoroughly and in detail analyzed the issues supporting the award of fees and costs. Its discussion indicates convincingly that no error of law or abuse of discretion infects the proceedings, nor are the court’s findings of fact clearly erroneous.

We affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects on the basis of its carefully reasoned opinion.

1

. The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
VO. 4182

TRICT OF VIRGINIA
teieian CLERK. U.S, DISTRICT iT
Division ALEXANORIA, vagina

:

v. ) nal No. 01-455-A
}

ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUT, } UNDER SEAL

a/k/a “Shagil’ j

a/k/a “Abu )
}
}

Defendant, }
ORDER

For the reasons st

anch during a closed

hearing held on January 36, 2003 to be supplemented by a

ferthcoming memorandum spin: defense — |

extent that they x

motions seak to compel the irial apDearancas o:

and GRANTED to the e = that they seek te compel the

scvordingly, it ig hereby

: -

‘the form of a videoteped

P. 15 under the fellowing



“4,

9.2003) 4. 50%M

The deposition must b& completed by April 30, 2003.
Because the witness’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 deposition
testimony will be in lieu of live trial testimony, it is hareby :
ORDERED that counsel for the United States and standby
defense ‘counsel submit @ proposed schedule _ Pursuant to the

\ co

Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), 18 U.S.C. App. 3,°

‘for the prompt resolution df any CIPA issues concerning this

witness by Wednesday, February 5, 2003. -

At the end of the heating, Standby counsel orally moved for

copies of the classified ag reports summarized in the

January: 21, 2003 discovery’ production, and requested that the

Court order

For the reasons |

stated from the bench, both motions are DENIED.

The Clerk is dizected to forward copies of this Order t the’
L$

defendant, exo sa) counsel for the United States standby defense

counsel; ‘and the Court ‘Security 6. fficer.

Ent ered this 31s day of denuary, 2003.

/S/

Leonie M. Brinkema
eR ee United States District Judge

pence

Lele ee OC Me

-
Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merrill Lynch Preferred
Capital Trust III (the "Trust") and Merrill Lynch Preferred Funding III, L.P.
for the period ended September 26, 2003 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Linda L. Lowry,
Regular Trustee of the Trust, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
    of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
    respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Trust.





                              MERRILL LYNCH PREFERRED CAPITAL TRUST III


                              By:  /s/ LINDA L. LOWRY
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                              Name:    Linda L. Lowry *
                              Title:   Regular Trustee









Dated: November 6, 2003
_______________________

* Linda L. Lowry functions as the equivalent of the Chief Executive Officer
  and Chief  Financial  Officer of the Trust for  purposes  of Section  906
  of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
#### Jerry Lynn HIGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY; Mike Grimes, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 00-6801.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 14, 2000.

Decided Dec. 21, 2000.

Jerry Lynn High, pro se.

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Jerry Lynn High appeals the district court’s order and judgment summarily dismissing his complaint challenging the forfeiture of his boats and other property. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s order and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. *See High v. Drug Enforcement Agency,*No. CA-00-5H (E.D.N.C. May 30, 2000).* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

*

 Although the district court's judgment is marked as "filed” on May 25, 2000, the district court's records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on May 30, 2000. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court's decision. *See Wilson v. Murray,*806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir.1986).
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>     5

<MULTIPLIER>     1,000



<S>                                <C>

<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-1999

<PERIOD-START>                                       JAN-01-1999

<PERIOD-END>                                         DEC-31-1999

<PERIOD-TYPE>                      12-MOS

<CASH>                                                     7,409

<SECURITIES>                                                   0

<RECEIVABLES>                                            364,442

<ALLOWANCES>                                              19,057

<INVENTORY>                                              285,395

<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         671,900

<PP&E>                                                   545,634

<DEPRECIATION>                                           247,888

<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         1,288,834

<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    153,864

<BONDS>                                                  535,100

<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0

<PREFERRED>                                                    0

<COMMON>                                                  52,277

<OTHER-SE>                                               120,326

<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           1,288,834

<SALES>                                                2,088,112

<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                       2,088,112

<CGS>                                                  1,498,622

<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          1,498,622

<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                               0

<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           2,362

<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        37,577

<INCOME-PRETAX>                                          176,764

<INCOME-TAX>                                              64,854

<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      111,910

<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0

<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0

<CHANGES>                                                      0

<NET-INCOME>                                             111,910

<EPS-BASIC>                                                 2.20

<EPS-DILUTED>                                               2.14



</TABLE>
#### Adolphus Hunter LEE and Reiko S. Lee, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Counter-defendants-Appellees, v. Lynol AMERO and Annette Holly Amero, husband and wife, in their personal capacities, and the marital community they comprise, Defendants-Counter-claimants-Appellants.

No. 00-35384.

D.C. No. CV-98-05692-JKA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2001.

Decided June 27, 2001.

*612Before BROWNING, WALLACE, and T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

The collateral order doctrine confers jurisdiction upon this court to hear an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity when the appeal is limited to questions of law.1 Amero’s argument that firing Lee was objectively reasonable because Lee performed his job so poorly is a factual one. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review that claim.2

By contrast, Amero’s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity because Lee failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation is a legal one properly subject to our review. We reject this argument because it conflates Lee’s threshold burden with his ultimate burden. To survive a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, Lee does not have to demonstrate that Amero’s putative reasons for firing him were pretextual. As *Huskey v. City of San Jose*makes clear, Lee merely needs to *“allege[*] facts which, *if true,*would constitute a deprivation of a constitutional right,”3 and that right must be clearly established.4 Both criteria are met here. Lee stated a constitutional violation by alleging that he was “fired by the defendant in December 1995 because of the defendant’s racial animosity.” The right not to be fired based on race has long been clearly established.5 Thus, Lee’s factual assertion fulfills his threshold burden and enables him to survive summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.

We decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Amero’s other claims. Lee is awarded his costs on appeal. Ap-pellee’s request for sanctions is denied.

AFFIRMED in part and DISMISSED in part.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. *Watkins*v. *City of Oakland,*145 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir.1998); *Collins v. Jordan,*110 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir.1996).

2

. The determination of whether a reasonable [official] could have believed his conduct was lawful given the totality of the circumstances is a determination of law that can be decided on summary judgment *if*the material facts are undisputed. If, however, there is a material dispute as to ... the facts regarding what the [official] or the plaintiff actually did, the case must proceed to trial.

> *Collins,*110 F.3d at 1369-70 (emphasis in original).

3

. 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).

4

. *Id.*at 899.

5

. *See Lowe v. City of Monrovia,,*775 F.2d 998, 1011 (9th Cir.1986).
. .
**OFFICE OF**  **THE AlTORNEY**  **GENERAL OF**  **TEXAS AUSTIN**  **QLIILD c.**  **UIlcN Ane**  **”W alwnA&**  &norablo John D. Riod Comirrioner Bureau **or** Labor statl*h3r Allstln, Texas Dear sir: :



### -Tour

nornt 

### letter requesting 6iu opinion reads

queatlon are emties am prlmarlly

ed when Congress aotr in ouoh l t 

# its pu rpo8 e



# to l xe r ol e r

1 ti 00 1 1 . 

### rity,the ngulatlng power of the hate oaaaee*to edst. . , l m -1 the Titl. 

### 39 ot the United Stat.8 Cod; regulator in doemmplo 8~tiona 

### 117, ent and hour8 

### 0r rrrvior 

### 0r portal ekBploye~r.



### r13 M4 629 

### 0r **said** Title **)p** ngulato 

### 8p00iri0- Uly the 

### type **or** epglopmnt rota-red to in your lottor.

.. -.. 

### 4m

Emorablo JobaDe Rood, Oommbelonor,

P8go 2 Obvloudj Coqrur ha8 

### eatedla such a nay a8 to 

### mdr08t ltr purporo to l 

### xarol80

It8 eon8titutlonal authority 

### in reguting 

### thehour8 or 8orvlor 

## or rmlrf0 0~10~000 La ttm 

### poEta 

### 88rvlOO.You an thordon 

### ro8peotiully adrlud that 

### r08iu0.employ008 or theFnltad State8 Po8t 

## orri088 do 

### not 00~8within

tho.prorirlonr 

### of Artlolo 1569through 

### Art10 01. 1572oi the Peml Cod. 

### oi Tua8. Tour8torytruly ;yIFy$ym B. 0. Pbarr



## As81 atant

..
December 17, 1942

No. 47832.

Suit 4383.

#### United *States*v. *Nippon Import & Trading Co., Inc.*

C. D. 575 affirmed November 2, 1942. C. A. D. 220.
```

                                                        Exhibit 4

                 NAVISTAR FINANCIAL CORPORATION
                        AND SUBSIDIARIES

        INSTRUMENTS DEFINING RIGHTS OF SECURITY HOLDERS,
                      INCLUDING INDENTURES

The following instruments of Navistar Financial Corporation
defining the rights of security holders are incorporated herein
by reference:

4.1     Credit  Agreement for  $820,000,000  Revolving Credit and
        Competitive  Advance  Facility  dated as of  December  8,
        2000,  between the  Corporation,  Arrendadora  Financiera
        Navistar,  S.A. de C.V., Servicios  Financieros Navistar,
        S.A. de C.V. and  Navistar  Comercial,  S.A. de C.V.,  as
        borrowers,  lenders  party  hereto,  The Chase  Manhattan
        Bank  as   Administrative   Agent,  Bank  of  America  as
        Syndication   Agent   and   Bank   of  Nova   Scotia   as
        Documentation   Agent.   Filed   as   Exhibit   10.05  to
        Navistar   Financial   Corporation's   Form  10-Q   dated
        March  15, 2001.  Commission  File  No. 1-4146-1.

4.2     Guarantee,   dated  as  of  December  8,  2000,  made  by
        Navistar,  in  favor  of The  Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  as
        Administrative  Agent,  for the  lenders  parties  to the
        Credit  Agreement,  dated as of December  8, 2000,  among
        Navistar    Financial    Corporation    and   Arrendadora
        Financiera Navistar,  S.A. DE C.V., Servicios Financieros
        Navistar,  S.A. DE C.V. and Navistar  Comercial,  S.A. DE
        C.V., the Lenders, Bank of America,  N.A., as syndication
        agent, The Bank of Nova Scotia,  as documentation  agent,
        and the  Administrative  Agent. Filed as Exhibit 10.07 to
        Navistar   Financial   Corporation's   Form  10-Q   dated
        March 15, 2001.  Commission  File  No. 1-4146-1.

4.3     Indenture  dated as of March  25,  2002 by and  among the
        Corporation,  Navistar and The BNY Midwest Trust Company,
        as Trustee,  for 4.75%  Subordinated  Exchangeable  Notes
        due 2009 for  $200,000,000.  Filed as Exhibit 4.1 to Form
        S-3  dated  May  7,  2002.   Filed  on  Registration  No.
        333-87716.

4.4     Registration  Rights  Agreement,  dated as of  March  25,
        2002,  by and among the  Corporation,  Navistar,  Salomon
        Smith Barney, Inc. and Banc of America  Securities,  LLC.
        Filed as  Exhibit  4.2 to Form  S-3  dated  May 7,  2002.
        Filed on Registration No. 333-87716.
```
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-10284 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. KEVIN JEROME VINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 7:97-CR-17-7-X

- - - - - - - - - - December 22, 1998 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Kevin Jerome Vinson has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Vinson has filed a response. Our independent review of the brief, the record, and Vinson’s response discloses no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.