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August 2014

THE

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Welcome to this installment of The Federal Law Enforcement Informer (The Informer). The Legal Training Division of the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ Office of Chief Counsel is dedicated to providing law enforcement officers with 

quality, useful and timely United States Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals reviews, interesting developments in 

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This edition of The Informer may be cited as 8 INFORMER 14.
The Informer – August 2014

Case Summaries

Circuit Courts of Appeals...................................................................5

First Circuit

U.S. v. Arnott: Reasonable suspicion to support a Terry frisk; removal of a hard object from 

suspect’s pocket; whether suspect was in custody for Miranda 

purposes..............................................................................................................5

Seventh Circuit

U.S. v. Burgess: Reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop after a report of 

 gunshots.......................................................................................................... 6

Eighth Circuit

U.S. v. Hayden: Reasonable suspicion to justify Terry stop concerning a burglary..................6

Williams v. Decker: Whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity for an alleged 

 unlawful Terry stop...................................................................................7

Gladden v. Richbourg: Whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity after a man

 to whom they had voluntarily given a ride died................................. 8

U.S. v.Williams: Whether suspect was in custody for Miranda purposes..................................8

U.S. v. Salgado: Whether trooper’s offer of assistance to a stranded motorist and 

 subsequent interaction constituted an unreasonable seizure...........................9

Ninth Circuit

U.S. v. Edwards: Whether anonymous phone tip established reasonable suspicion to

 support a Terry stop......................................................................................10

Tenth Circuit

Stonecipher v. Valles: Whether federal agents were entitled to qualified immunity in

a Bivens action concerning the arrest of the plaintiff and search 

 of his house...........................................................................................11

U.S. v. Salas: Whether officer had reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop 

 based on driver’s single violation of a traffic statute........................................12

Leatherwood v. Welker: Whether a probation officer’s warrantless search of 

 plaintiff’s house violated the Fourth Amendment............................13

Eleventh Circuit

U.S. v. Watkins: Whether a complete search of the defendant’s computers was within 

 the scope of the consent granted by the defendant’s wife.............................14

2
CASE SUMMARIES

Circuit Courts of Appeal

1st Circuit

United States v. Arnott, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12538 (1st Cir. Me. July 2, 2014)

While conducting a wiretap, police officers intercepted a call between Brichetto and Leavitt, in which 

Leavitt sought to purchase oxycodone pills. After Brichetto and Leavitt agreed to meet in a parking 

lot to conduct the transaction, officers set up surveillance. The officers saw Brichetto arrive in a pickup truck and park next to a car. A man, later identified as Leavitt, got out of the passenger side of the 

car and got into Brichetto’s truck. After a few minutes, Leavitt returned to the car, and both vehicles 

drove away. The surveillance officers followed the car containing Leavitt. After the officers saw the 

car roll through a stop sign, they requested a patrol officer conduct a traffic stop. The patrol officer 

stopped the car and requested identification from the driver, Arnott, and Leavitt, who was in the 

passenger seat. Leavitt told the officer his name was “William Young,” and that he did not have any 

identification. Arnott, appearing extremely nervous, gave the officer his driver’s license, but gave 

vague answers in response to the officer’s questions. The officer ordered Arnott out of the car and 

conducted a Terry frisk for weapons. The officer felt a hard object in Arnott’s pocket, which the 

officer believed was a knife. The officer reached into Arnott’s pocket and removed a bag of tightly 

wrapped pills that Arnott admitted were oxycodone. When the officer asked Arnott if there were any 

other drugs in the car, Arnott told the officer there was marijuana in the trunk. The officer arrested 

Arnott and the government indicted him for two drug related offenses. 

Arnott filed a motion to suppress the oxycodone pills, arguing the Terry frisk was unlawful because 

the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous. Arnott also 

argued his incriminating statements should have been suppressed because the officer failed to advise 

him of his Miranda rights. 

The court disagreed. After speaking with the surveillance officers, the patrol officer knew it was 

likely the occupants of the car had just completed a drug transaction. In addition, when questioned by 

the officer Arnott appeared extremely nervous and could barely hold onto his driver’s license because 

his hands were shaking so badly. Finally, the court commented, “the connection between drugs and 

violence is legendary.” Consequently, the court found the totality of the circumstances supported 

reasonable suspicion to believe Arnott might be armed; therefore, the Terry frisk was justified. 

The court further held the seizure of the oxycodone pills was reasonable. After the officer felt a hard 

object he believed was knife, the officer was allowed to remove that object from Arnott’s pocket. 

Even though the hard object turned out to be tightly packaged oxycodone pills and not a knife, 

contraband discovered during a lawful Terry frisk is not subject to suppression. 

Next, the court held the officer’s questions concerning the presence of other drugs were within the 

scope of the Terry stop because they related to the discovery of the oxycodone pills. 

Finally, the court held Arnott was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the 

incriminating statements. During the brief period of questioning, prior to arrest, Arnott was on a 

public roadway, being questioned by a single officer who made no show of force. 

3
Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

7th Circuit

United States v. Burgess, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13774 (7th Cir. Ill. July 17, 2014)

At approximately 10:45 p.m., numerous 911 callers reported hearing five to nine gunshots in their 

neighborhood. Based on these reports, police officers were dispatched to the intersection of Wabansia 

and Karlov Avenues. Less than two minutes later, the dispatcher told the officers additional callers 

had reported shots had been fired from a black car traveling south on Karlov Avenue. While 

responding to the call, two officers saw a black car driving away from the area where the gunshots had 

been reported. The officers stopped the black car approximately one mile from the intersection of 

Wabansia and Karlov Avenues. During the stop, the officers found a revolver, with five of its six 

rounds spent, on the seat where Burgess had been sitting. Burgess was arrested for being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. Just over four minutes elapsed from the initial dispatch about the gunshots 

until the officers arrested Burgess. 

Burgess argued the revolver should have been suppressed because the officers did not have reasonable 

suspicion to justify the traffic stop.

The court disagreed. First, over the course of a few minutes, numerous 911 callers independently 

reported gunshots in the same area. The court noted that corroboration from multiple sources 

describing the general area and nature of the same crime can be considered reliable and support a 

finding of reasonable suspicion. Second, some of the 911 callers reported the shots were fired from a 

black car traveling on Karlov Avenue. When the officers saw a black car, two or three minutes later, 

drive past them, away from the area where the shots were fired, it was reasonable for the officers to 

believe the black car was involved in the shooting. As a result, the officers had reasonable suspicion 

to conduct a traffic stop on the black car. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

8th Circuit

United States v. Hayden, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13512 (8th Cir. Mo. July 16, 2014)

Two police officers saw two men standing near a vacant house in a high-crime area at approximately 

9:00 p.m. The officers saw one man looking up and down the street while the second man walked 

closer to the home and looked in a window. The officers were told before their shift there had been an 

increase in burglaries and robberies involving weapons in the vicinity. When the officers pulled their 

vehicle next to the men, one of the officers got out of the car, shined his flashlight on the men and 

said, “Police.” One of the men later identified as Hayden turned away from the officer and put his 

hand inside his jacket pocket. The officer told Hayden to remove his hand from his pocket and 

Hayden complied. The officer frisked Hayden and found a loaded handgun in Hayden’s jacket pocket. 

The government indicted Hayden for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Hayden argued the handgun should have been suppressed because the officers did not have reasonable 

suspicion to justify a Terry stop.

4
The court disagreed. First, the court held Hayden was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes 

when the officer got out of his car, shined his flashlight on Hayden and said “Police.” The court found 

the officer pulled his vehicle next to Hayden, while the other officer identified himself as a police 

officer. At no time did the officers impede Hayden’s freedom of movement, touch him or display their 

weapons. The court ruled identifying oneself as “Police” does not effect a seizure of an individual 

who stops to listen or talk, as self-identification is not a command to stop. 

The court held the officer seized Hayden after Hayden complied with the officer’s command to 

remove his hand from his jacket pocket. However, by this time, the court found the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop as the officers had reasonable suspicion Hayden was 

about to commit a burglary. First, it was late at night, and the officers knew there had been an increase 

in burglaries in the area. Second, the officers knew from experience it was unusual to find people on 

the street after dark in this particular high-crime area. Third, based on their actions, Hayden and the 

other man appeared to be casing the house for burglary. Finally, when the officers approached, 

Hayden turned away from them and reached into his jacket pocket, as if he were reaching for a 

weapon.

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

Williams v. Decker, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13727 (8th Cir. Mo. July 18, 2014)

While conducting motorcycle training in the parking lot of a city park, three police officers 

approached a car containing two men that was parked diagonally across two parking spaces in their 

training area. One of the officers saw the driver drinking from a container wrapped in a paper bag and 

both men upon seeing the officers began moving around while keeping their hands from the officers’ 

view. The offices drew their firearms and ordered both men to show their hands, but neither 

immediately complied. The officers removed the men from the car and handcuffed them. The officers 

discovered two containers of beer and a firearm in the glove compartment. After learning there were 

no outstanding warrants for Porter, the passenger, the officers allowed him to leave. However, the 

officers learned from their dispatcher that Williams, the driver, had a felony conviction. After twice 

confirming Williams’ conviction with the dispatcher, the officers arrested him for unlawful possession 

of a firearm. Approximately one-hour into the stop, the officers discovered Williams had pled guilty 

to a misdemeanor and released him. Williams and Porter sued the officers, claiming the officers 

violated the Fourth Amendment by exceeding the scope of a Terry stop.

The court held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. First, the officers’ observations of 

what they believed to be alcohol consumption, combined with the errant parking of Williams’ car 

established reasonable suspicion that Williams was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Second, the 

court held the officers acted reasonably when they drew their weapons, handcuffed Williams and 

Porter, and removed the gun from the car. Finally, the court held the officers had probable cause to 

arrest Williams, although they ended up releasing him. The officers arrested Williams based on 

information from a police dispatcher, which they confirmed twice. The court found it was objectively 

reasonable for the officers to rely upon Williams’ criminal history as reported and confirmed to them 

by a police dispatcher. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

5
Gladden v. Richbourg, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13959 (8th Cir. Ark. July 23, 2014)

Gladden died of hypothermia after two police officers transported him from a restaurant to an isolated 

off-ramp outside the city. Gladden had asked the officers for a ride to his sister’s house in the next 

county, but the officers instead left Gladden at the county line, which marked the end of their 

jurisdiction, and told Gladden to seek assistance from the guard shack of a nearby factory. Gladden’s 

estate sued the officers and their chief for a variety of constitutional and state law torts.

The court affirmed the district court, which granted qualified immunity to the officers, official 

immunity to the officers and the chief, and dismissed the state-law claims. 

The court noted private individuals generally do not have a constitutional right to police assistance. 

However, the court recognized a person might be constitutionally entitled to police assistance when in 

custody or when placed in a position of danger by a police officer. Here, the court ruled that neither of 

these special relationships existed. First, Gladden was not in custody because he freely accepted the 

ride to the county line. The officers were attempting to do Gladden a favor and at no point during the 

trip would a reasonable person have believed that he was not free to leave the officers’ presence. 

Second, Gladden’s mild signs of intoxication were not enough to alert the officers to the possibility 

that Gladden might not be able to make decisions for himself and might not be able to find his way to 

the guard shack, which was a short distance from where the officers left him. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Williams, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14159 (8th Cir. Minn. July 25, 2014)

After federal agents identified Williams as a potential purchaser of child pornography, approximately 

seven armed and uniformed agents executed a search warrant at his house. When no one answered 

their knock, agents used a battering ram to enter. Williams arrived home while the search was 

ongoing and agreed to speak with one of the agents. The agent told Williams he was not under arrest, 

and that Williams’ decision whether to speak with law enforcement was voluntary. Williams and the 

agent sat in the living room, ten to fifteen feet from the door and their conversation lasted thirty to 

forty-five minutes. During this time, the agent did not raise his voice, make any threats or promises to 

Williams or use deception. In addition, Williams was not restrained and he was allowed to use the 

restroom and get a glass of water. Williams admitted to viewing child pornography on the internet and 

gave the agent consent to retrieve his laptop computer from his car. The agent did not advise Williams 

of his Miranda rights during the interview. At the conclusion of the search, the agent did not arrest 

Williams. The government later indicted Williams for receipt and distribution of child pornography.

The district court held Williams was in custody for Miranda purposes and suppressed Williams’ 

incriminating statements and his laptop computer. The government appealed.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding Williams was not in custody for Miranda 

purposes. First, when the agent asked Williams if he would agree to answer some questions, the agent 

told Williams that he was not under arrest. Second, the agent questioned Williams in his own home 

near the front door. Third, the agent did not physically restrain or handcuff Williams, and Williams 

was allowed to get a glass of water and move unsupervised through his home. Fourth, only one agent 

questioned Williams and the interview lasted only short time. Finally, the agent did not use deceptive 

strategy or threats and the agent did not arrest Williams at the end of the interview. Considering the 

totality of the circumstances, the court concluded a reasonable person in Williams’ position would 

6
have felt that he was free to terminate the interview with the agent and leave; therefore, Williams was 

not in custody for Miranda purposes.

The court further held Williams’ statements to the agent were voluntary as well as Williams’ consent 

to search. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Salgado, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14633 (8th Cir. S.D. July 31, 2014)

At approximately 1:40 a.m., a state trooper saw a disabled vehicle on the side of the road. The trooper 

parked behind the vehicle and got out of his patrol car to assist the occupants. As the trooper 

approached, Salgado and another man immediately walked from the front of their vehicle and told the 

trooper they did not need his assistance. Based on his prior experience, the trooper found this behavior 

to be unusual. When the trooper shined his flashlight on the back seat of the vehicle, he saw a third 

person, and a jacket embroidered with a large marijuana leaf partially covering some electronic 

equipment. Salgado told the trooper he had been driving the vehicle, but he could not produce a 

driver’s license. The trooper tried to conduct a record check, but no records in the state databases of 

South Dakota or Minnesota matched the information provided by Salgado. When the trooper asked 

Salgado about the other occupants in the vehicle, Salgado was only able to identify one of the 

passengers as “Homie.” While the trooper continued to try to identify Salgado, he asked Salgado for 

consent to search the vehicle for drugs. After Salgado refused to consent at 1:55 a.m., the trooper 

called an off-duty trooper, who lived forty-five miles away, and asked him to bring his drug detection 

dog to the scene. Approximately fifty minutes later, the off-duty trooper arrived and the drug 

detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Salgado’s vehicle. The officer searched Salgado’s 

vehicle and found methamphetamine, trace amounts of marijuana and a glass pipe. The officers 

arrested Salgado and the two passengers. 

Salgado argued that once he declined the trooper’s offer of assistance, the trooper’s investigation 

became an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

The court disagreed. Once Salgado identified himself as the driver of the vehicle and admitted he did 

not have a driver’s license, the trooper had probable cause to issue Salgado a citation for a traffic 

violation. At this point, the trooper was allowed to detain Salgado in order to write the citation, 

confirm Salgado’s identity and check Salgado’s criminal history. During this time, the trooper could 

not match the name and date of birth provided by Salgado to the state databases, and the trooper saw a 

jacket with an embroidered marijuana leaf on it inside Salgado’s vehicle. In addition, the trooper 

found it unusual that a potentially stranded motorist so adamantly declined his offer for assistance and 

was only able to identify one of his passengers as “Homie.” Consequently, the court concluded these 

facts provided the trooper reasonable suspicion to detain Salgado. 

The court further held Salgado’s nearly one-hour detention until the off-duty trooper arrived with the 

drug detection dog was reasonable. The court noted the trooper first tried to locate an officer with a 

dog that was nearby, and then when that failed, the officer attempted to obtain Salgado’s consent to 

search. The court concluded the remote location attributed to the delay, not a lack of diligence or 

unnecessary delay by the trooper. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

7
9th Circuit

United States v. Edwards, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14817 (9th Cir. Cal. July 31, 2014)

An unidentified man called 911 and reported a “young black male” at the corner of West Boulevard 

and Hyde Park Boulevard was shooting at passing cars, including the caller’s car. The caller also 

reported the shooter was between 5 feet 7 inches and 5 feet 9 inches in height, approximately 19 or 20 

years old, and wearing a black shirt and gray pants. Finally, the caller reported the shooter had a black 

handgun and was entering “Penny Pincher’s Liquor” store. Two police officers responded within five 

minutes and saw a man who matched the description, later identified as Edwards, approximately 75 

feet from the liquor store. The only other person the officers saw in the area was an Hispanic male 

wearing a black and green heavy jacket and blue jeans. After two additional officers arrived, the four 

officers, with weapons drawn, ordered the two men to their knees and handcuffed them. One of the 

officers frisked Edwards and felt a hard object above Edward’s right knee, inside the pant leg. The 

officer pulled on Edwards’ pants and a silver .22 caliber revolver fell out onto the ground. The 

government indicted Edwards for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

Edwards argued the firearm should have been suppressed, claiming the initial stop amounted to an 

arrest without probable cause. Edwards further argued if the initial stop was not an arrest, the 

anonymous 911 call did not provide the officers reasonable suspicion to detain him. 

The court disagreed. First, the court held the officers’ actions when they first encountered Edwards 

were reasonable and did not convert Edwards’ detention into an arrest. Edwards was the only person 

near the liquor store who fairly matched the description of a man who reportedly had been shooting at 

passing cars just minutes before the officers arrived. Under these circumstances, the court reasoned, 

legitimate safety concerns justified the officers’ drawing their weapons, ordering Edwards to his knees 

and handcuffing him. Second, the court held the information provided by the anonymous 911 caller 

was sufficiently reliable to provide the officers reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop on 

Edwards. Although he was anonymous, the caller reported firsthand information concerning an 

ongoing emergency while providing a detailed description of the suspect and location of the incident. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

10th Circuit

Stonecipher v. Valles, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12384 (10th Cir. N.M. July 1, 2014)

Federal agents working in an undercover capacity purchased a firearm and two explosives from 

Stonecipher. The agents also confirmed Stonecipher bought and sold firearms, gun parts, and 

ammunition online without having a federal firearms license. In addition, agents discovered that 

Stonecipher had pleaded guilty in 2007 to a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in Missouri. 

The agents learned from Missouri court documents that Stonecipher received a suspended sentence, 

which required him to serve one year of probation, and that Stonecipher was discharged from 

probation after serving the one-year term. The agents obtained a report from the National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System (NICS) that indicated Stonecipher had been convicted of a 

misdemeanor crime of domestic violence in 2007. The agents also obtained a National Criminal 

Information Center (NCIC) report that noted Stonecipher’s guilty plea to the Missouri domestic assault 

charge. However, summary portions of the NICS and NCIC reports indicated that Stonecipher had 

8
“0” convictions. In addition, at the end both reports there was a sentence stating, “Suspended 

imposition of sentence dispositions are not convictions and are closed record when probation is 

completed or finally terminated.”

The agents sought legal advice from an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who determined 

Stonecipher was prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) which makes it 

unlawful for anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. 

The agents drafted an application for a search warrant for Stonecipher’s house, in which they alleged 

Stonecipher was likely in violation of § 922(g)(9) based on his 2007 Missouri domestic violence 

conviction. The search warrant application also claimed Stonecipher was likely in violation of two 

other federal firearm statutes. The AUSA reviewed and approved the final version of the warrant 

application, which was submitted to a magistrate judge who issued the search warrant. 

Upon arriving at Stonecipher’s house, the agents arrested him. While conducting their search, the 

agents allowed Stonecipher to show them a letter drafted by his criminal defense attorney concerning 

the 2007 Missouri domestic violence conviction. The letter stated, in part, that under Missouri law 

once Stonecipher completed his probation, he would not have a “conviction” for domestic violence on 

his record. The agents disregarded the letter because it conflicted with the AUSA’s legal advice. The 

next day, the agents told the AUSA about the letter, but the AUSA advised the agents to proceed with 

their case. As a result, the agents prepared a criminal complaint, which was filed in federal district 

court. Five days later, federal prosecutors discovered Stonecipher’s 2007 Missouri conviction did not 

disqualify him from possessing firearms because under Missouri law a suspended sentence, under the 

circumstances, did not amount to a conviction. 

Stonecipher filed a Bivens action against the federal agents claiming a variety of constitutional 

violations regarding the search of his house and arrest. The district court held the agents were entitled 

to qualified immunity because they reasonably concluded on the facts available to them that they had 

probable cause to search Stonecipher’s house, arrest and then file charges against him. 

On appeal, Stonecipher argued the agents submitted the search warrant application, in reckless 

disregard for the truth. Specifically, Stonecipher argued the agents falsely stated Stonecipher had been 

“convicted” of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, while omitting that Stonecipher had 

received a suspended sentence. 

The court of appeals disagreed, holding the agents did not act in reckless disregard for the truth. First, 

the Missouri court documents established Stonecipher pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic 

violence. Even though the documents showed Stonecipher received a suspended sentence, and that his 

probation was completed, the documents did not reveal the legal significance of these facts. The court 

concluded it was reasonable for a non-legally trained officer to assume a conviction and sentence were

two separate things, and that the type of sentence would not invalidate a conviction. Second, the court 

held the NICS and NCIC reports contained conflicting information to the extent that it was reasonable 

for the agents to believe Stonecipher had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic 

violence. Finally, the agents did not act in reckless disregard for the truth when they sought legal 

advice from the AUSA and provided the AUSA with all the materials he used to make his 

determination.

The court further held the agents were not required to forego arresting Stonecipher after he gave them

the letter from his attorney during the execution of the search warrant. The court stated there was no 

way to verify the authenticity of the letter, confirm that Stonecipher had completed his probation or 

9
determine the legal implications of a Missouri conviction for the purposes of § 922(g)(9). The court 

noted the agents acted reasonably by providing Stonecipher’s letter to the AUSA.

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

United States v. Salas, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12387 (10th Cir. Okla. July 1, 2014)

A police officer stopped Salas after the officer saw Salas’ car twice cross the fog line on the right side 

of the highway. After issuing Salas a warning ticket for failure to stay in his lane, the officer returned 

Salas’ documents and told him he was “good to go.” Salas thanked the officer for giving him a 

warning, shook the officer’s hand and began to leave. The officer asked Salas if he had time for a few 

more questions, and Salas replied, “Sure.” After Salas denied having drugs in his car, the officer 

asked if he could search the vehicle. Salas consented to the search. The officer opened the trunk, 

which contained a suitcase. Inside the suitcase, the officer found approximately twenty pounds of 

methamphetamine. Salas was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. 

Salas argued the methamphetamine should have been suppressed because the officer did not have 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him. Salas also argued he did not voluntarily give the 

officer consent to search the car. 

The court disagreed. Okla. Stat. § 11-309 provides that “a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as 

practicable entirely within a single lane.” The Tenth Circuit has held that a single violation of a traffic 

statute virtually identical to § 11-309 can provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. Here, 

the district court found that the officer saw Salas’ vehicle cross the fog line twice. Consequently, the 

officer had reasonable suspicion that Salas violated § 11-309 and was justified in conducting a traffic 

stop.

Next, the officer’s dash camera video showed that when the officer asked Salas if he could search the 

car, Salas replied, “Sure.” The officer then asked Salas, “You sure you don’t mind?” Salas replied, 

“No.” Salas’ relaxed demeanor and lack of physical coercion or intimidating body language or tone 

by the officer led the court to conclude Salas voluntarily consented to the search of his car. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

Leatherwood v. Welker, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12813 (10th Cir. Okla. July 8, 2014)

Leatherwood was convicted of crimes in Oklahoma and placed on probation. Leatherwood’s ex-wife 

called his probation officer, Welker, and told Welker she had personal knowledge that Leatherwood 

had raped Woods, who was Leatherwood’s current girlfriend. Leatherwood’s ex-wife also told 

Welker that Leatherwood might have firearms inside his house and in his truck. The conditions of 

Leatherwood’s probation prohibited him from possessing firearms and committing crimes. 

An assistant district attorney forwarded Welker two e-mails he received from a confidential informant. 

In the emails, the confidential informant relayed information from an anonymous source who claimed 

personal knowledge that Leatherwood had sent e-mails of a sexual nature to Woods and that 

Leatherwood had sexual materials in his home. The conditions of Leatherwood’s probation prohibited 

him from possessing pornography or sexually oriented material. 

10
Based on her telephone conversation with Leatherwood’s ex-wife and the e-mails from the assistant 

district attorney, Welker received permission from her supervisor to conduct a warrantless search of 

Leatherwood’s home. 

Leatherwood subsequently sued Welker and the other law enforcement officers, claiming the 

warrantless search of his house violated the Fourth Amendment.

The court held Welker and the other law enforcement officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment

because they had reasonable suspicion Leatherwood violated the conditions of his probation. 

Individuals on probation have a diminished expectation of privacy, and Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections policy allows warrantless probation searches when there is reasonable suspicion of a 

probation violation or crime. Here, the court held the tips received by Welker were sufficiently 

reliable to establish reasonable suspicion. First, Welker knew the identity of Leatherwood’s ex-wife 

and spoke directly with her on the phone. Second, the ex-wife claimed personal knowledge that 

Leatherwood committed rape, the offense for which he was serving supervised release, and provided 

the name of Leatherwood’s current girlfriend who was the alleged victim. Third, while the content of 

the allegations in the e-mails came from an anonymous source, Welker knew the assistant district 

attorney who forwarded the e-mails to her. Finally, the anonymous source claimed he had access to 

Leatherwood’s house, thereby providing a reliable basis of knowledge for the information contained in 

the e-mails. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

11th Circuit

United States v. Watkins, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14261 (11th Cir. Fla. July 28, 2014)

Watkins agreed to assist police officers in a murder investigation after the body of a seven-year old 

girl was found in a landfill. During an interview, Watkins told a police officer the victim often visited 

his house to play online computer games with his grandchildren. As the interview progressed, 

Watkins admitted he had downloaded and viewed child pornography on his computers. Consequently, 

Watkins consented to a search of the three computers in his house, but only after the officer told 

Watkins he was only interested in searching the computers for evidence related to the ongoing murder 

investigation, not child pornography. However, when the officer went with Watkins to his house to 

retrieve the computers, Mrs. Watkins, who had joint access to the computers, signed a form consenting 

to a full search of the three computers. During this time, Watkins was present and did not object when 

his wife granted consent. The government discovered evidence of child pornography on one of the 

computers and charged Watkins.

The district court held the search of computers exceeded the scope granted by Watkins’ consent 

because Watkins believed he was only consenting to a search of the computers to find evidence related 

to the murder investigation. However, the district court held the full search of the computers was 

within the scope of the consent granted by Mrs. Watkins. As a result, the court concluded the 

evidence of child pornography was admissible against Watkins. 

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. A person who has common authority over property 

can consent to a search of that property by police officers. However, if another person with common 

authority is present and objects to the search, the police may not search the property. In this case, Mrs. 

Watkins consented to an unlimited search of the computers by the officers. Although Watkins was 

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present during this time, he did not object nor suggest to his wife that her consent might be limited by 

a previous agreement he had with the officer. In addition, the court noted Watkins’ previous consent 

to a limited search did not qualify as a “present” objection to his wife’s later consent to a broader 

search. 

Click HERE for the court’s opinion.

*****

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