IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 19, 2007

JACOB EDWARD CAMPBELL v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2001-B-896 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge

No. M2006-02727-CCA-R3-PC - Filed November 30, 2007

The Appellant, Jacob Edward Campbell, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction

relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. After a jury trial in 2002, Campbell was convicted

of first-degree murder and robbery, and he was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of life

imprisonment and ten years. On appeal, Campbell argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment

right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record on appeal and the

arguments of the parties, we affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

DAVID G. HAYES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JERRY L. SMITH and THOMAS T.

WOODALL, JJ., joined.

J. Chase Gober, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Jacob Edward Campbell. 

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Alice B. Lustre, Assistant Attorney General;

Victor S. Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Katrin Miller, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual Background

A brief summary of the facts underlying the Appellant’s convictions were recited by this

court on direct appeal:

This case involves the death of eighty-two year old William Satterfield, whose body

was found in the basement of his east Nashville home on July 17, 2000, after

intruders bound his hands and ankles with a telephone cord and duct tape, stuffed his

mouth with a wad of paper towels, taped his mouth with duct tape, placed a plastic

grocery bag over his head and sealed the bag around his neck with duct tape. The

intruders stole the victim’s car, guns, jewelry and other items from his home. The
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Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the [Appellant] . . . [and co-defendant Jarret

Guy] for premeditated first degree murder, felony murder and robbery for the crimes

committed against the victim. 

. . . .

. . . Angela Guy testified that she overheard the [Appellant] and her husband, Jarret

Guy, talking about “making some money,” and the [Appellant] “mentioned that he

knew where to make some money. A friend of his grandfather’s kept large sums of

money because he didn’t believe in banks. . . . He mentioned that he was an old

man.” Angela Guy testified that the [Appellant] stated that the victim lived in the

Englewood area near a Kroger’s grocery store. . . .

Angela Guy testified that the [Appellant] and her husband left the apartment on July

16, 2000, and at about 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., “Jarret [Guy] called and said he was going

to go to Kroger’s. . . . That meant that they were going to go break into the house.”

She stated that the [Appellant] and Jarret Guy returned to her home later that day in

. . . [the victim’s] new white Oldsmobile and that they ran back and forth taking

property out of the car, including guns, money, pills, shotgun shells and bullets. She

explained that the [Appellant] and Jarret Guy discussed which items they could sell

to make the most money and that they split a large amount of cash between them. .

. . Andrew Parker, who was the [Appellant’s] roommate for a few days at the

Criminal Justice Center in Nashville, testified that the [Appellant] confessed to him

that he had robbed and murdered the victim.

The evidence established that the [Appellant] participated in the robbery of the

victim, split some of the proceeds of the robbery, and then tried to sell some of the

stolen goods. The [Appellant] was arrested in a motel room where police found

some of these stolen goods. . . . 

State v. Jacob Edward Campbell, No. M2003-00597-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville,

Mar. 15, 2004), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2004). On August 15, 2002, the Appellant

was convicted by a Davidson County jury of premeditated first degree murder, felony murder, and

robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions into a single offense of first degree

murder, and the Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and ten years

in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal to this court, we affirmed the

judgments of the trial court. Id. 

In 2005, the Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the Davidson

County Criminal Court. He was appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on June 29, 2006,

asserting a denial of his constitutional rights based upon the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

A hearing was held on November 2, 2006, at which the Appellant and trial counsel provided
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testimony. On December 1, 2006, the post-conviction court entered an order denying the petition

for post-conviction relief. The Appellant timely appealed to this court. 

Analysis

On appeal, the Appellant contends that trial counsel was deficient in the following respects:

(1) by failing to throughly investigate several shoe prints found at the murder scene; (2) by failing

to thoroughly investigate the availability of a purported alibi witness, Tracy Garrett, for the purposes

of her testifying at trial; (3) by failing to fully investigate the background of Mike Singleton, who

was a caregiver for the victim and a witness for the prosecution; (4) by failing to locate a potential

defense witness, Brian Bryant, before trial; and (5) by failing to request a change of venue based

upon publicity that the trial received by local media. 

In order to prevail on a post-conviction petition, the petitioner must establish that his

conviction or sentence is void or voidable due to the abridgement of a constitutional right. T.C.A.

§ 40-30-103 (2003); Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 460 (Tenn. 2004). In a post-conviction

proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence.

T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f) (2003). Clear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no

serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.

Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992).

Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the

Tennessee Constitution guarantee a criminally accused the right to representation by counsel. State

v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). Both the United States Supreme Court and our supreme

court have recognized that the right to such representation encompasses the right to “reasonably

effective” assistance, that is representation within the range of competence demanded of attorneys

in criminal cases. Id. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner bears the burden

of proving both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

defense. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Overton v. State, 874 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994);

Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990)).

To prove a deficiency in representation, the petitioner must show that counsel’s acts or

omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at

2065; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). To establish that a deficiency resulted

in prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 370 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068)). This court has held:

Where a claim of incompetency of counsel is alleged, this Court will not reverse the
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finding of the trial judge dismissing such petition if the action of trial counsel was

based upon legitimate trial tactics and strategy. State v. Martin, 627 S.W.2d 139

(Tenn. Cr. App. 1981). However, if the record shows the action of trial counsel, in

the circumstances shown, has no rational or logical basis, then the legitimacy of the

tactics employed must be scrutinized under the requirement of Baxter v. Rose, 523

S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975).

State v. Buford, 666 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). 

In reviewing counsel’s conduct, a “fair assessment . . . requires that every effort be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn. 2001). The fact that a

particular strategy ortactic failed or hurt the defense does not, standing alone, establish unreasonable

representation. However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the

choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation. Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 579

(Tenn. 1997); Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982).

 

The issues of deficient performance by counsel and possible prejudice to the defense are

mixed questions of law and fact. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461. A trial court’s findings of fact underlying

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed on appeal under a de novo standard,

accompanied with a presumption that those findings are correct unless the preponderance of the

evidence is otherwise. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Tenn. R. App. P.

13(d)). However, conclusions of law are reviewed under a purely de novo standard with no

presumption of correctness. Id.

I. Failure to Investigate Shoe Prints at Crime Scene 

The Appellant first contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate certain

shoe prints discovered in the house where the victim was found murdered in the basement. His

statement of the facts summarizes his testimony from the post-conviction hearing in this regard:

During testimony, [the] Appellant confirmed that he had discussed with [t]rial

[c]ounsel that according to discovery seven separate shoe prints were discovered at

the house where the murder occurred. . . . Appellant further testified that as far as he

is aware, none of the shoe prints were ever compared to the shoes he and his codefendant were wearing at the time of their arrest. . . . Although [the] Appellant was

not made aware of any positive identification regarding his shoes or the shoes his codefendant was wearing, [the] Appellant testified that State’s witness Mike

Singleton’s prints were found throughout the house, including the doorjamb to the

basement. 

A petitioner who asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his

attorney’s failure to investigate a case properly bears the burden at the post-conviction hearing of
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demonstrating what that investigation would have revealed. Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 756

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). The Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden on this issue. 

The post-conviction court clearly accredited the testimony of trial counsel that he did not

believe that the discovery of Singleton’s shoe print would benefit the defense because Singleton was

a caretaker of the elderly victim and, therefore, his presence in the house would not have been out

of the ordinary. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel effectively investigated and

prepared for trial on this issue and, further, that the Appellant had failed to demonstrate any

prejudice from any alleged lack of investigation of the shoe prints. After review, we agree that the

post-conviction court appropriately denied relief on this basis. 

II. Failure to Investigate Alibi Witness

At the post-conviction hearing, the Appellant testified that around 11:00 a.m. on the day that

the murder occurred, he was at the home of his co-defendant, Jarrett Guy, talking on the phone with

his friend Tracy Garrett. He testified that he tried to raise the issue of this purported alibi witness

with trial counsel, but counsel was not convinced that this evidence would aid the defense. On crossexamination, the Appellant conceded that there had not been a “stated time” that the homicide and

robbery had taken place. Contrarily, trial counsel testified that he had no recollection of a discussion

regarding Garrett as an alibi witness, but he stated that he would have advised the Appellant against

putting on proof that he had been at the Guy residence on the day in question, “because there was

much more evidence linking Mr. Guy to the commission of the offense . . . than [the Appellant].”

In its order denying relief, the post-conviction court summarized the testimony from the

evidentiary hearing on this issue and found that the proposed testimony of Garrett “would only

account for the [Appellant]’s activities and whereabouts for a minimal period of time during the day

the victim was murdered.” The post-conviction court found trial counsel’s reasoning, that such

testimony would not be beneficial to the defense, was valid and concluded that the Appellant had

failed to show any prejudice as a result of the failure to call Garrett as a witness. 

“When a petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or present

witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should be presented by the petitioner at the

evidentiary hearing.” Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); see also Scott

v. State, 936 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). As a general rule, this is the only way the

petitioner can establish that: (1) a material witness existed who could have been discovered but for

counsel’s negligent investigation of the case; (2) a known witness was not interviewed; (3) the

failure to discover or interview the witness caused him prejudice; or (4) the failure to present a

known witness or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence which caused

the petitioner prejudice. Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. 

Clearly, the Appellant did not call Garrett as a witness at the post-conviction hearing, and

the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court on this issue.

We, therefore, conclude that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate resulting prejudice on this issue.

Accordingly, the issue is without merit. 
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III. Failure to Investigate Background of State Witness

The Appellant next contends that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to investigate

the background of State witness Mike Singleton, who had acted as a live-in caregiver for the victim

for several months in 1999, prior to the victim’s murder in 2000. The Appellant testified that he

asked trial counsel to interview Singleton, whose “fingerprints were all over the house,” but that he

did not believe trial counsel followed up on this request. The post-conviction court found that

Singleton was effectively cross-examined by trial counsel during the trial and, further, that the

Appellant had failed to present any proof at the post-conviction hearing that would establish that

Singleton’s background would have benefitted the defense. When a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel is predicated upon a failure to investigate, the petitioner is obligated to show what a

reasonable investigation would have revealed. Owens, 13 S.W.3d at 756. The sole basis for the

Appellant’s argument on this issue is his own testimony from the post-conviction hearing that the

witness “was supposedly a bum that was living off of [the victim]” and that “he stole from [the

victim] all the time.” This self-serving testimony was clearly insufficient to satisfy the Appellant’s

burden for such a claim. Therefore, we conclude that this issue is without merit. 

 

IV. Failure to Locate a Potential Defense Witness Before Trial

The Appellant alleges that trial counsel was deficient in failing to locate a potential defense

witness, Brian Bryant, who he claims could have provided testimony contradictory to that of State

witness Angela Guy. Bryant’s proposed testimony related to an alleged conversation between

Bryant, the Appellant, his co-defendant Jarret Guy, and Guy’s wife Angela, prior to the murder. The

Appellant testified at the post-conviction hearing that an investigator was hired to locate Bryant on

the first day of trial but that he was never found. The Appellant testified that Bryant should have

been easily located, because he was in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction at the

time of trial. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he considered Bryant a risky

defense witness, because his testimony would have again placed the Appellant in close proximity

to his co-defendant near the time of the murder. Trial counsel stated that he had a subpoena issued

for Bryant, which had not been served by the time of trial. He additionally recalled that an

investigator had been hired to locate Bryant, but these efforts were also unsuccessful. He further

testified that he had tried to elicit some of the information that Bryant might have provided through

his cross-examination of Angela Guy at trial. 

The post-conviction court accredited the testimony of trial counsel on this issue and found

that the decision not to present Bryant as a witness was a tactical one, not to be second-guessed. It

further determined that the Appellant failed to demonstrate resulting prejudice from the absence of

Bryant’s purported testimony. Again, we note that “[w]hen a petitioner contends that trial counsel

fails to discover, interview, or present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should

be presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing.” Black, 794 S.W.2d at 757. It is clear that

the Appellant failed to establish prejudice on this issue, and, accordingly, it is without merit.

V. Failure to Request Change of Venue
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The Appellant alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial

counsel’s failure to move for a change of venue “due to the amount of publicity the case had

received.” At the post-conviction hearing, he testified that his co-defendant’s trial was held a month

prior to his own and that “it was on the news every night . . . it was all in the newspaper . . . [a]nd

it said [the Appellant] was convicted before [the Appellant] even walked in the courtroom . . . .”

Trial counsel testified that he did not recall any discussions with the Appellant as to pretrial publicity

or requesting a change of venue and, further, that he did not recall any juror having been excused

for exposure or knowledge of the case. 

“Venue may be changed . . . if it appears to the court that, due to undue excitement against

the defendant in the county where the offense was committed or any other cause, a fair trial probably

could not be had.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 21(a). The ultimate test is whether the jurors who actually sat

and rendered verdicts were prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176,

187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). 

We conclude that the Appellant failed to satisfy his burden to establish that trial counsel’s

acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under

prevailing professional norms. Moreover, the evidence does not preponderate against the finding

of the trial court that the Appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s

failure to move for a change of venue, which was based upon the testimony of the Appellant and trial

counsel at the post-conviction hearing. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.

CONCLUSION 

Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is affirmed.

___________________________________ 

DAVID G. HAYES, JUDGE