Filed 6/30/15 Turner v. Bd. of Civil Service Commissioners of the City of Los Ang e les CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

LAWRENCE TURNER ,

Plaintiff and Appella nt,

v.

BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES ,

Defendant and Respondent ;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Real Party in Interest

. B 256973
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS 143 304 )

APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. James
Chalfant
, Judge. Affirmed

.
Lawrence Turner, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appella nt.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Vivienne A. Swanigan, Assistant City Attorne y, and Janis Levart Barquist, Deputy City Attorney, f or Defendant and Responde nt

.

* * * * * * * * * *2

Plaintiff Lawrence Tur ner, a former Traffic Officer with the Department of Transportation of the City of Los Angeles (Department) , was discharged on May 17,
2012 , for sexually harassing two supervisors. He appealed his termination to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners (Board), and the Board upheld the Department’s
termination decision. Plaintiff sought a peremptory writ of mandate in the superior court for reinstatement and backpay. The trial court denied plaintiff ’s writ petition, and plaintiff has appealed. On appeal, plaintiff contends his due process rights were violated because he was “never allowed to appear at his Skelly 1 hearing” and the Department did not comply with its policy requiring service of a “ ‘completed and unsigned copy of the Notice of Suspension, probationary Termination of Discharge’ ” as part of plaintiff ’s Skelly package. He also contends that there was insufficient evid ence of sexual harassment, and that the discipline imposed was excessive. 2 We affirm, finding that p laintiff failed to supply any citations to the administrative
record
, failed to fairly summarize the evidence, and failed to support his contentions on

a ppeal with reasoned analysis and citation to supportive authority. And, in any event, our
limited review of the record demonstrates no error

.

FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND As we shall discuss below, p laintiff has failed to support his appeal with ci tations to the administrative record. Accordingly, the following factual summary has been gleaned from a limited review of the record before us and the parties’ representations in their appellate briefs : Plaintiff worked for the c ity for over 32 years, a nd as a Traffic

1 Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 ( Skelly )

.
2 Plaintiff also newly argued , in his reply brief, that collateral estoppel bars a finding that he committed sexual harassment because one of the investigators of the incident concluded that no harassment had occurred. New issues raised for the first t ime in a reply brief need not be considered in the absence of good cause. ( Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) We note, however, that plaintiff is not correct that the conclusion of the initial investigator had collateral estoppel effec t.3

Officer for the Department for over 20 years. In March 2010, Sergeant Fawnda Sparks

saw plaintiff “grind[] his body on ” Sergeant Cheryl Lloyd’s “ back side ” Sergeant Lloyd was “very upset.” Sergeant Sparks reported the incident to Lieuten ant Cheryl Johnson, who told Sergeant Sparks that she had also been touched inappropriately by Plaintiff

. Lieutenant Johnson told Sergeant Sparks that she never reported the incident because

p laintiff “gets away with everything. You know, the Department is not going to do anything to him.” Sergeant Sparks filed a complaint with the Office of Discrimination and Complaint Resolution . The matter was initially assigned to Janice Wood, who
concluded that the incidents did not rise to the level of sexual hara ssment as they were not “severe and pervasive.” Ultimately, Wood referred the complaint to the Department
for further investigation. Sergeant Lloyd told investigators that p laintiff touched her from behind in an inappropriate manner. Lieutenant Johnson also confirmed that in March 2010, p laintiff pressed his “front side” against her “backside

. ” She also reported that p laintiff had later apologized about the incident. Plaintiff denied the incidents, and when confronted about the apology, claimed he apo logized in response to rumors “that he made an inappropriate

statement to [Lieutenant Johnson] .” After the matter was investigated, a cting Personnel Director Don Harrahill
recommended that p laintiff be discharged. The Skelly report proposed termination based on two incidents of “sexual harassment: unwelcome physical contact in sexual areas including but not limited to breasts, buttocks, or genita lia.” The Department’ s Man ual of
Policies and Procedures recommended a penalty of “20 days suspension to dis charge” for a first offense, and “discharge” for a s econd offense of this nature. The Skelly report also noted that plaintiff had a history of work discipline. In December 1990, plaintiff received
a 10

- day suspension for his “ [ r ] epeated refusal to perfor m properly given work assignment” and his “disrupting the work of other employees.” He was suspended again for five days in May 1997 for “ [ u ] sing threats of harm toward other employees or the public; failure to cooperate with or using abusive language tow ard other emp loyees or the public; misconduct on the job unfavorably or seriously reflecting on the City or its4

employees.” Plaintiff was again suspended for 10 days in March 2004 for “ [ l ] eaving assigned work area without proper approval or appropriate re ason; failure to cooperate with supervisors or management in the performance of job duties; violating safety rules and practices which endanger the employee or others or damages City property or equipment.”
Plaintiff ’s union representative received not ice of the proposed discharge, and provided a Skelly response to that notice denying the allegations. Plaintiff ’s discharge was approved on May 2, 2012, and became effective on May 17, 2012. Plaintiff appealed his discharge, and an evidentiary hearing to ok place on August 2 and 16, 2012. At that hearing, Sergeants Sparks and Lloyd and Lieutenant Johnson testified consistent with their earlier reports. Plaintiff introduced evidence that sexual horseplay was pervasive in the Department, and that the Depar tment was fraught with sexual relationships between coworkers. The hearing officer recommended sustaining the discharge and found that p laintiff ’s Skelly due process rights were met. At the January 10, 2013 hearing before the Board, p laintiff ’s counsel a dmitted that the union “accepted
service

. . . of the Skelly package and responded to the Department with a categorical
blanket denial of the charges

. I’m obliged at that point to stipulate to Skelly .” T he Board
sustained the recommendation.
Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate, seeking reinstatement and backpay. The petition urged that relevant evidence concerning the p laintiff ’s and the victims ’ work schedules was not presented to the hearing officer, that the penalty of discharge was

exc essive, and that the discharge was effected in contravention of the Department’s manual of policies and procedures. The petition also argued that the hearing officer’s administrative findings were not supported by the weight of the evidence.
The trial c ourt denied the petition for a writ of mandate , finding that p laintiff “stipulated that all Skelly procedures had been satisfied

. . . . ” The trial court also found that “the weight of the evidence, I mean, it’s

– it’s pretty clear that he did these thing s. His denials are not credible.” The court also found that the penalty was appropriate. “The things he did, you can’t do anywhere. And the fact that he did it to two supervisors5

shows

. . . a dismissive attitude toward his job and to the authority of the people that he
worked for.” After it entered its order, the trial court returned the administrative record

to p laintiff ’s counsel. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION We will briefly summarize the standard of review, to illustrate that p laintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating error on appeal

. Because the Board’s order affirming p laintiff ’s discharge affected a fundamental vested right, the trial court was required to exercise its independent judgment in reviewing the adm inistrative record. ( Davis v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist

. Personnel Com. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130 ( Davis ).) The independent judgment test required the trial court to examine the administrative record for errors of law, and to exercise its i ndependent judgment upon the evidence in a limited trial de novo. ( Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143 ( Bixby ).) The trial court was free to draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. ( Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Bd. of Comrs. ( 2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 860, 868 ( Morrison ).) However , the trial court was also required

to afford a strong presumption of correctness to the administrative findings
, and p laintiff was required to demonstrate that such findings were contrary to the weight of the evidence. ( Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)
Our task on appeal is to conduct a limited review of the record to determine only
whether the trial court’s findings ( ra ther than the administrative agency ’s findings) are supported by substantial evidence. ( Bixby
, supra , 4 Cal.3d at p. 143, fn. 10; Davis , supra , 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1130

- 1131; Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 52.) We resolve all evi dentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the trial court ’ s decision. ( Valiyee v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031.) “Where the evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, we are not at liber ty to substitute our deductions for those of the trial court.” ( Morrison , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 868.)6

1. Procedural Bars to Review This appeal suffers from a number of deficiencies that prevent meaningful appellate review

. Plaintiff requested a clerk ’ s transcript pursuant to his notice designating the record on appeal

. At about the same time plaintiff filed his opening appellate brief, he filed a motion in this court to augment the record on appeal to include
several excerpts from the administrative record
, which was not part of the clerk’ s transcript

. On January 8, 2015, we denied his motion “without prejudice to file the entire
administrative record.” On January 22, 2015, one volume of the administrative record was lodged with this court by p lain tiff

. The record included a certification by the Civil Service Commission, that it “provided copies of the Civil Service Commission Administrative Record and certified transcripts

. . . in the Turner Case to Appellant’s representative and Department’s rep resentative in connection with its appeal of the Civil Service Commission’s decision. [¶] I hereby certify that the contents of the Administrative Record and Certified Transcripts, sequentially numbered 0001 through and including
00493 are true and corre ct copies of the Civil Service Commission’s record of Lawrence Turner’s disciplinary appeal.” The certification was dated April 29, 2013. Nevertheless, the record lodged with this court consist ed only of pages 0001 through 00371, and did not include pag es 00372 through 00493 of the administrative
record

. Omitted from the record were the Department’s Manual, various memoranda, emails, subpoenas, proofs of service, and the notice of discharge and appeal

. When we
alerted p laintiff to the deficiency of the record, he promptly filed the missing portions with this court. Accordingly, the motion to augment the record on appeal to include the administrative record is granted. Nevertheless, p laintiff ’s appellate briefs fail to include any citation to the
admi nistrative record. He instead relies on portions of the clerk’s transcript, such as his briefs filed in the trial court, and their discussion of the administrative record. These briefs and the representations within them are not evidence, and do not supp ort the
factual assertions in p laintiff ’s appellate briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court,7

rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We are not required to make an independent search of the record and may disregard any claims when no appropriate reference is furnished. ( Nwosu v.
Ub a (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) Moreover, p laintiff ’s briefs provide an incomplete statement of the relevant facts.
Plaintiff must recite in the opening brief all “significant facts” included in the record, not just the evidence favorable to his po sition . (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) ; Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency ( 1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274

. ) Plaintiff ’s opening brief
summarizes the evidence adduced at the administrative hearing as follows: “Turner appeared along with numerous witnesses giving testimony about the incident and climate
at LADOT.” He provides a very limited description of the investigation leading up to the decision to discharge him.
Mo reover, p laintiff ’s very limited discussion of the evidence is distorted. For example, p laintiff explains that Sergeant Lloyd “answered [the investigation] with a memorandum, stating that [plaintiff] had only ‘brushed up against her,’ and not grinded

or g rop ed her as Sparks had told Janice Woods.” However, our review of the record
discloses that Sergeant Lloyd reported “ [plaintiff] walked up behind me and brushed up against me in an inappropriate manner” and did not deny that p laintiff “grinded” her

. Pla intiff also failed to dis close that he stipulated that the requirements of Skelly had been
satisfied. Plaintiff ’s limited and biased discussion of the evidence waives any claim of error on appeal. ( Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon
, supra , 3 Cal.3d at p. 8 81; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency
, supra , 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274 .) Lastly, p laintiff has failed to support his arguments with any discussion of the standard of review, and scant relevant authority in light of these standards. A br ief must contain reasoned argument and legal authority to support its contentions or the court may treat the claims made on appeal as waived. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 8 36, 852.) That a party is self

- represented does not excuse compliance
with t hese requirements. ( Stokes v. Henson (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 187, 196.)8

For these reasons, p laintiff ’s claims are not cognizable on appeal. And, in any
event, p laintiff ’s briefs make clear that he is merely asking this court to reweigh the
evidence and to resolve conflicts in the evidence in his favor. This we cannot do. ( Morrison , supra , 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 868 .) T here was ample evidence that he touched female coworkers inappropriately , and that discharge was an appropriate remedy under Department guidelines and given plaintiff’s history of misconduct

. Moreover, the record supports a finding that p laintiff stipulated that the due process requ irements of Skelly
were satisfied.

DISPOSITION The j udgment is affirmed

. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

RUBIN , J.