### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 4, 200 5 S es sio n H eard a t K noxv ill e
JANI CE W. PURKEY, ET AL 

### . v. AMERI CAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY d/b/ a AI G I NSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL 

### .

Rule 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law United States Distr ict Court for the Eastern Distr ict of Tenn essee No. 3:04-C V-331 Jam es H. Jarvis, II, Judge

No. M2005- 00044-SC-R23- CQ - F iled Septem ber 30, 2005

We acc epted thre e q u es t i o n s certified to this C ourt from the U nited States District Court for the Ea ste rn Di stric t of

Te nn e sse e c on c e rn ing wh e the r p ro vis ion s in a uto mob ile ins ur a nc e li ability policies that exclude cove rag e for bodily injury to household or familymembers of the insured a

re void as ag ainst Tennesse e law or public policy . We conclude that such provisions are valid.
Tenn. S up. Ct. R. 23 Cer tified Q uestion of Law

E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.

A. J ames Andr ews a nd Sidney W. Gilrea th, Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the Plaintiff/Petiti oner, Janice W

. P u rk e y.
Melinda Meador and Erica Gre ene, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, and Sy lvia H. Walbolt, Tampa, Florida , f o r t h e D e f e n d a n t /R e s p o n d e n t , A m e ri c anH o m eA s s u r an c eC o mp a n y d/ b / a A IG In s u r a n c e C o m p a n y.
R. L ay ne Holley , Germantown, Tennessee, for t he Amicus Curiae , The Property Casualty I nsurer s Association of Ame rica

.-2- OP IN ION

Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, the United States District Court f or the Eastern District of Tenne ssee has certified three questions to this Court. The que stions arose in the
c ou rs e of a la ws uit bro ught by

pe tit ion e r Ja nic e W. Pu rk e y (“ Pur ke y ” ) a g a ins t he r a

uto mob ile insurer, r espondent Ame rica n Home Assura nce Company (“A HA”)

. Bac kgr ound Purkey ’s complaint alleg ed the following fac ts. Purkey purcha sed an automobile insurance polic y fr o m an ag ent of AH A. The policy included liability

cover ag e. On June 24, 2003, Purkey
was a passeng er in he r insured ve hicle when the driver neg lige ntly

lost control of the ca

r and struc k a g uardr ail, injuring Purke y . Purkey submitt ed a claim to A HA seeking cover ag e for the injury

she sustained in the ac cident. AHAref used the c laim, citing a n exclusion i n the policy which provide d,

“ We d o n ot p ro vid e lia

bil ity Cov e ra g e fo r any

‘i ns ur e d’ fo r ‘ bo dil y

inj ury ’ t o y ou or

a ny ‘f a mil y member.’ ” This type of e x clusion is refe rre d to as a “ household” or “ family ” exclusion. Purkeyf il e d a c la s s a c ti o n c o mp lain t i n K n o x Co u n ty Ci r c u it Co u r t s e e k in g c la s s action
certification, inju n ct i v e relief, and a de clar atory judgme nt that the exclusion was void as contrary to T ennesse e law and public policy

. AHA remove d the ca se to the United States District Court, and the parties submitt ed cross motions for summ ary judgme nt. Prior to entering a ruling , the District Cou rt iss ue d a c e rt if ic a tio n o rd e r c e rt if

y ing the fo llo wi ng qu e sti on s o f l a w t o th is C ou rt : (1) Whether provis i o n s in automobile insurance liabilitypolicies that exclude
cover ag e for

bodily injury to household or family members of the insured a re void as contra

ry to Tennesse e law or publ ic pol icy as a result of the 1997 and 20 01 a me nd me nts to the Te nn e sse e F inanc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty Ac t. (2) I f the a nsw er t o (1 ) i s y es , is covera g e only require d up to the specifie d statut ory lim its or to the po lic y

lim its ? (3) I f the a nswer to ( 1) is y es, on what date did these pr ovisions become void?

We acc epted the certified questions. Be cause we answer the first question in the neg ative,
we do no t r e a c h th e se c on d a ndthi rdqu e sti on s.
Ana lys is

Th is C ou rt

ha s tw ic e he ld tha t ho us e ho ld andfamil y ex clu sio n c laus e s in a uto mob ile insuranc e co ntrac ts are va lid and enfor cea ble. Dockins v. B alboa Ins. Co., 764 S.W .2d 529, 530 (Tenn. 1989) ; Holt v. St ate F arm Mut. Auto. I ns. Co., 486 S.W .2d 734, 735 (Tenn. 1972) . Purkey
arg ue s th a t su c h h ou se ho ld a ndfamil y e xclu sio ns are no lon g e r c omp a tib le wi th T e nn e sse e pu bli c policy as expressed in the Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw, Tennessee Code Annotated se ctions 55-12--3-

101 to -140 (2004), in lig ht of a two-ste p devel o p m en t

. First, Purkey notes that this Court has abolished intraf

amily tort immuni ty

. Br oadwe ll by Br oadwe ll v. Holmes, 871 S.W .2d 471, 476-77 (Tenn. 1994) (g reatly abrog ating pare nt-child immunit y ); Davis v. Da vis, 657 S.W .2d 753, 757-58 (Tenn. 1983) (abolishing interspousal tort immunity ). Second, Purkey ar gu es t hat bec ause the L e g isl a tur e faile d in its 19 97 a nd 20 01 a me nd me nts to the F inanc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty L a w t o p e rm it ho us e ho ld o r f

a mil y e xclu sio ns a ft e r o ur

abo lit ion of

int ra famil yimm un ity , s uc h e xclu sio ns mus t be held invalid. AHA c ounters that household a nd family exclusions do not violate long -established T e n n e s s e e l a w o r

p u b l i c p o l i c y.
I nsuranc e policies a

re c ontrac ts betwee n the insurer and the insured a nd as such a re subjec t to ordinary

rules of c ont ra ct i n t er preta tion. Am. J ustice I ns. Reciproc al v. Hutchison, 15 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Tenn. 2000) . Contract provisions that are contra ry to public policy

may be invalidated. Alcazar v. Hay es, 982 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tenn. 1998).

I t is well-settled that the public p o l i cy o f T en nessee “is to be found in its constitution, statutes, judicial decisions and a pplicable r

ules of common law.” I d. (quotation and c i t at i ons omitted). Be cause the determination of public policy is primarily a func tion of the L eg islature, the judiciary may only determine public policy “in t h e abse nce of

any constitutional or statutory decla ration.” I d. (citation omitted). The G ener al Assembly has leg islated extensively in the ar ea of automobile insurance . See, e.g ., Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 12-122 (2004) ; id. §§ 56-7-1101 to -1305 (2000). Be fo re turning to an ana ly sis of the pertinent statutes, howe ver, w e re view brie fly the abolition of intrafa milytort immuni ty upon which Purkey

predic ates he r ar g ument.
Ab oli tio n o

f I ntr afa mi lyTor t I

mm un ity Until relatively rec ently , the common law prevented family members f rom suing e ach othe r in t ort. Inte rs po us a l to rt

imm un ity

wa s p red ic a te d o n th e lon g sta nd ing c on c e pt that th e re wa s a “unity of interest of husband and w ife in ea ch other ’s re spective rights a nd duties . . . .” Da vis, 657 S.W. 2da t 754 ( qu oti ng To bin v. Ge lr ic h, 34 S.W. 2d 10 58 , 1 05 8 ( Te nn . 1 93 1) ). Pare nt- c hil d immunit y , a more rec ent deve lopment, was base d upon the notion of prese rving family peac e coupled with the pa

rent’s right to discipline and control his or her c hild. See Ba

rra nco v. Jackson, 690 S.W .2d 221, 223 (Tenn. 1985) (Drow ota, J ., dissenting)

. Following the modern trend, this Court eliminated interspousal tort im munityin 1983 in Davis, 657 S.W .2d at 757-58, a nd g reatly limit ed pare nt-child immunit y

eleve n y ear s later in B roadw ell, 871 S.W .2d at 476-77. One practica l eff

ect of intrafa mily tort immunit y was to act a s a sort of e x clusionary clause

. I f a husba nd’s neg lige nt opera tion of the family auto inflicted injuries on the wife , for e x ample, the wi fe simply

c ou ld n ot b ri ng su it a g a ins t th e hu sb a nd to c oll e c t on the a uto lia bil ity po lic y . In D a vis , this Court acknowledg ed that abolition of spous al i mmunitywould aff ect insura nce c overa g e, sug g esting that, “t o the extent that insurance c ompanies may fea r collusive ac tions, they

have the ri g ht t o p ro te c t th e mse lve s b y e ith e r r e stric tin g the sc op e of the ir c ov e ra g e or

a dju sti ng pr e miu ms acc ording ly .” 657 S.W .2d at 758 (quoting Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W .2d 893, 897 (Tenn. 1983) ); see al s o Do ck i n s , 7 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d at 5 3 0 (“ t h e L egi s l at u re h a[ s ] n o t re q u i re d t h e c arri ert o p ro v i d e c o v er age-4-

in situa t i o n s t h at it unquestionably could exclude from liability cover ag e, name ly , injuries to the insured ca

used by his own neg lige nce or

that of a f

amily member or

permittee.” ). Notwithstanding this Court’s statements in Davis a nd Do ckins, Purkey arg ues that the
abo lit ion of

int ra fa mi ly to rt imm un ity

make s it imp e rm iss ibl e to t

re a t f a mil y me mbe rs a s a

sin g le unit f o r a u to mo b il e tort purpose s. Be cause household and familyexclusions i n automobile insurance po lic ie s e sse nti a lly re sto re the imm un ity be tw e e n famil y me mbe rs , s he arg ue s th a t th e y mus t be vo id in light of Da vis and Br oadwe ll, unless the L eg islature has acte d specific ally to permit them. She arg ues that bec ause the L eg islature has not so ac ted, the exclusions violate Tennesse e public policy as expressed in the F inancial ResponsibilityL aw. We turn ne x t to an examination of that law. Financial Responsibility Law

Tenne ssee first enac ted a Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw in 1949. 1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 75 (ef fec tive J uly 1, 1949); see also The Tenne ssee Motor Ve hicle F inancial ResponsibilityAct, 21 Tenn. L . Rev. 341, 342 (1950). The c urre nt law was e nacte d in 1977, see Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-12- 101, but its core provisions are larg ely unchang ed from the 1949 law. Compare 21 Tenn. L . Rev. at 342-43 with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-12-104- 05.

Briefly , the Fina ncial ResponsibilityL aw r equire s motorists who have bee n involved in an
a c c ide nt w he re a ny on e is kill e d o r i nju re d, or a n a c c ide nt r e su lti ng in m or e than $ 40 0 in dam a g e to the prope rty

of any one per son, to show proof of f inancial r esponsibility

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12- 10 5; s e e a lso id. § 5 5- 12 -1 39 . F a ilu re to c omp ly c a n re su lt in re vo c a tio n of the mot orist ’s lic e ns e and re g istration. I d. § 55-12-105. As a mended in 2001, the law require s drivers to provide proof of financ ial responsibilityto an office r at the scene of an acc ident or a moving violation. I d. § 55-12- 139(b). F ailure to c omply is a Class C misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $100. I d. § 55-12- 139(c)

. The purpose of Tenne ssee’ s Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw is to prote ct innocent membe rs of the public from the neg lige nce of motorists on t he roa ds and hig hway s. Specifica lly , “[t] he fina ncial responsibilitylaws of this State are conce rned w ith the abilityof an automobile driver to pay for bodily injury and prope rty

damag e for

which he may

be leg ally

liable.” Schultz v. Tenn. Fa rmers Mu t. Ins . Co ., 40 4 S. W.2 d 4 80 , 4 84 (T e nn . 1 96 6) . T he F inanc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty L a w i s n ot, ho we v er , a compulsory

insurance law. McMa nus v. State Fa rm Mut. Auto. I ns. Co., 463 S.W .2d 702, 703 (Tenn. 1 971). Althoug h the law a pplies to “eve ry

vehicle subje ct to the re g istration and
certificate of

title provisions,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 5 5 -12-139(a) ( eff . J ul. 1, 2005), as we have previously

explained,

the L eg islature stopped short of re quiring public liabilityinsurance as a condition pre cede nt to the owning or operating of a motor vehic le. The sanc tions of this st atute ar e not involved unless and until the
ow ne r o r o pe rat or is inv olv e d in a n a c c ide nt r e su lti ng in b od ilyO r , u n der t h e 2001 a men dmen t s , u n t i l t h e dr i v er i s c h ar g ed wi t h a mov i n g v i ol at i on
. T en n
. Code An n
. § 55- 1 1 2

- 1 3 9 (b).
-5-

injuries or property damag e in ex cess of $[400.00] ; until s uch occ urs

1 a per son is at liberty

to own and oper ate a motor vehicle w ithout any insurance cover ag e or w ith as litt le insuranc e cove rag e as de sired.

I d.

Al tho ug h the F ina nc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty L a w do e s no t, b y its e xpre ss t e rm s, re qu ir e drive rs to ob ta in l ia bil ity ins ur a nc e in o rd e r t o c omp ly , th e L a w c le arl y con tem pl a te s th a t mo st d ri ve rs wi ll
c omp ly by pu rc ha sin g lia

bil ity ins ur a nc e . F or thi s re a so n, the F inanc ia l Resp on sib ili ty L a w a lso se ts forth re quirements for the contents of motor vehicle liability policies. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 12-122. The law require s that motor vehicle liabilit y policies “shall i nsure the person named t here in, and any other pe rson using any

such motor vehicle or motor vehicle s with the express or implied permission of such na med insured, a g ainst loss from the liability imposed by law for damag es arising out of the
owner ship, maintenance , or use of such motor vehicle . . . .” I d. § 55-12-122( a).

Pur ke y arg ue s th a t be c a us e the F inanc ial Re sp on si bility L a w s e ts f

orth a pu bli c po lic y

in favor of compe nsating a llinnocent victims of motorists’ neg lige nce, it contr avene s that public policy to ex cl u de fr om liabilit y

insurance policies an innoce nt class of victims, namely , the fa milyand household members of

a neg lige nt driver. Althoug h the Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw e stablishes a public policy

in favor of

compensa ting innoce nt victims, i t does not establish a policy in favor of all-inclusive insuranc e cove rag e for the following rea sons.
F ir st, a lth ou g h th e F ina nc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty L a w e vin c e s a pr e fe re nc e fo r l ia bil ity po lic ie s, as we have stated, it does not by its plain terms require them. Rather , it requires drivers involved in acc idents or cited f

or moving violations withi n the terms of the statute to show proof of financ ial
re sp on sib ili ty . A s o f Ja nu ary 1, 19 90 , p ro of

of fi na nc ia l r e sp on sib ili ty

is d e fi ne d a s: ( i ) A w r i t t e n p r o o f o f l i ab i l i t y i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e p r o v i d e d b y a single limit policy

with a limit of not l ess than six ty thousand dollars ($ 60 ,0 00 ) a

pp lic able to o ne (1 ) a c c ide nt; (i i) A s pli t- lim it p oli c y

wi th a lim it o f n ot le ss than tw e nty -f ive tho us a nddo lla

rs ($ 25 ,0 00 ) f

or bo dil y injury to or dea th of one (1) person, not less than f ifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for bodily injury to or dea th of two (2) or

more pe rsons in any one (1) a ccide nt, and not less than ten thousand dollars ($ 10 ,0 00 ) f

or da ma g e to p ro pe rt y

in a ny on e (1 ) a c c ide nt; (i ii) A d e po sit

of c a sh wi th the c omm iss ion e r in the a mou nt o f s ixty thousand ($60,000); or-6- (iv) The execution and filing of a bond w ith the commissioner in the amount of six ty

thousand dollars ($60,000)

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-12-102( 12)(C). As this statute demonstrates, it is not necessary to prove that
on e has cov erage for a ll p os sib le vic tim s. Ra the r, it i s si mpl y ne c e ssa ry to p ro ve that on e ha s a policy or other me ans of sa tisfy ing the abo v e provisions. Doing so puts a motorist in compli ance with the Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw f or all purpose s, including compliance with the misdemeanor pr ov isi on s. Second, the F inancial ResponsibilityL aw is not the only source of public policy with reg ard to insurance contra cts. The F inancial Responsibility L aw resides i n Title 55 of t he Tennessee Code, wh ic h c ov e rs “ Mo tor a nd Othe r Ve hic le s. ” Ho we ve r, a uto mob ile ins ur a nc e is a lso c ov e re d b y Ti tle 56 of the Te nnessee Code, which is applicable to a ll insurance c ontrac ts in the state of Tenne ssee, i n cl u d i n g au t o m o b i l e l i ab i l i t y p o l i ci es
. Am o n g i t s m an y p ro v i s i o n s , T i t l e 5 6 i n cl u d es t h e f o l l o wi n g: Notwithstanding a ny

other provision of law to the contra ry , an insurer may exclude cover ag e pursua nt to a contractua l ag ree ment; provided, that such exclusion complies with thi s titl e.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-121 (2000). This se ction was initially enac ted in 1995, one y ear afte r our de c isi on in B ro a dw e ll co mpl e te d the e lim inatio n of i ntr a famil y tort im mun ity . We se e no thi ng in Title 56, and Purkey

points us to no provisi on in Title 56, that allows us to conclude that family or household exclusions do not comply with that titl e. Purkey nonetheless a

rg ues that permitting family or household exclusions contrave nes the express terms of sec tion 55-12-122(a ) that liability policies “shall insure the pe rson named the rein,
a n d a n y o th e r p e r s o n u s in g a n y s u c h mo to r v e h ic le o r mo to r v e h ic le s w ith th e e xp r e s s o r implied pe rm iss ion of

su c h n a me d in su re d, a g a ins t lo ss f ro m th e lia

bil ity imp os e d b y

la w. ” (E mph a sis added.) She also arg ues that bec ause the Financ ial Responsibili ty L aw spe cifica lly excludes from its covera g e employ ees a nd those cove red by worke rs’ c ompensation, s ee id. § 55-12-122(d) , we must infer under the doctrine of ex pressio uni s est exclusio alterius (the expression of some is the exclusion of others) that no other e x clusions are permitted.

Whil e we ag ree with Purkey that family

and h ousehold exclusions m ight a rg uably seem c on tr ary to the le g isl a tiv e int e nt e xpre sse d in the F inanc ia l Re sp on sib ili ty L a w, we are ne ve rthe le ss constraine d by

section 56-7- 121. The wor ding of that sec tion is particularly strong : exclusi ons are permitted “[n]ot withstanding a ny other provision of law to the contra ry .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7- 121 (empha sis added). Mor eover , the provision is not li mited by its terms to Titl e 56. I d. By s tating that section 56-7-121 c ontrols “notwithstanding” any contra ry provisions, the L e g is latu r e c le ar ly

in te n d e d f

o r th is p r o v is io n to tr

u mp a ll o th e r s
. Re p r e s e n tati v e Rh in e h art e xpla ine d th e e ff

e c t of the se c tio n w he n th e bil l in wh ic h it wa s c on ta ine d c a me be fo re the Ho us e for a final vote:T h e l eg i s l at u r e ag ai n a men ded t h e Fi n an ci al Res pon s i bi l i t y Act , a f t er t h i s c as e was b ri ef ed an d a r g u ed. 2
H o wever, t he am end m ent s are not rel evant t o our anal y si s. See 2 0 0 5 P ub

. A ct s ch. 40 1 (ef f

. Jul

. 1, 20 0 5 ) ( p rovidi ng t hat A ct ap p l i es t o al l vehi cl es s ub ject t o regi st rat i o n and t i t l e p rovis i o ns a n d p ro v id i ng a grace peri o d fo r s o l d i ers
re tur n ing fro m d u ty o v e rs e a s)

. -7-

the [section] maintain s aff ordability of insuranc e by

aff irming the validity of cover ag e. I t f

urthers D epartment of I nsuranc e anti-f raud eff orts and it prese rves the fre edom t o contra ct. This is an important piece of leg islation if we ar e to maintain af forda ble ra tes for h o m eowne rs and automobile insurance

. I nsuranc e contra cts have a
common-sense exclusion designed spe cifica lly to c ombat fraud and collusion and to keep pr emiums affor dable. Tape H-67, 99th Ge n. Assem., 1995 (Apr . 26, 1995) (State m en t of Rep. Rhinehart re: HB 1303). This statement bolsters our c onclusion that section 56-7-1 2 1 wa s intended to permit the very exclusions P urkey

challeng es her e.
The L eg islature ame nded the F inancial ResponsibilityL aw in 1997 and ag ain in 2001. None of the a m en d m en t s re lated in any way to household exclusions . See 1997 Pub. Acts ch. 394, § 1 (re stricting insure rs from cance lling a policy based on an accident in which theinsured wa s not at fault); 2001 Pub. Acts ch. 292, § 1 (various provisions int ended to incr ease compliance with the law, in clu di ng makin g failu re to c omp ly a mis de me a no r)

. Pur

ke y re a so ns that be c a us e the se 2 amendments we re the first cha ng es to the Financial Responsibi lity L aw after this C ourt’s dec isions in Davis and B roadw ell, and bec ause the L eg islature did not enac t provisions specific ally permitting household and fa milyexclusions, t he L eg islature intended to disallow them. We disag ree
. This Court and the appe llate courts of this state have consistently held that fa milyexclusions
are valid and not contra

ry to public policy . Dockins, 764 S.W.2d at 530; Holt , 486 S.W .2d at 735;
see a lso Nat’l I ns. Ass’n. v. Simpson, 155 S .W.3d 134, 138 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 2004) (pe rm. app. denied De c. 6, 2004); Setters v. Permanent Ge n. Assuranc e C orp., 937 S .W.2d 950, 952-53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Dressler v. State Fa rm Mut. Auto I ns. Co., 376 S.W .2d 700, 702 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963). Additionally , section 56-7-121, which g ives broad a uthority for e x clusionary

clause s, was enac ted in 1995, prior to the 1997 and 2001 amendments upon which P u rk ey relies. B eca

use we assume that the L eg islature is awa re of the state of the law, Still v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A

. , 900 S.W .2d 282, 285 (Tenn. 1995) , we must also assume that, rathe r than silentlyintending to wor k a major cha ng e in this state’s insuranc e law, the L eg islature by its sil ence intended t o prese rve the status qu o p e rm itt ing fa mil y a ndho us e ho ld e xclu sio ns. Cf

. id

. at 28 4 ( ho ldi ng that w he re statut e conflicte d with pr eviously -ena cted statute which controlled “notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contra

ry ,” later statute did not repea l ear lier statute by implication).

Fa ced w ith the above Te nnessee statutory and case law, Purkey urg es this Court to adopt the
ratio na le of

ma ny of ou r s ist e r s ta te s that ha ve he ld famil y a nd ho us e ho ld e xclu sio ns vo id a s a g a ins t public policy . See, e.g ., Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. C o
. v
. W i s co mb, 643 P.2d 441, 444-45 (Wash.-8-

19 82 ) ( e xclu sio ns vo id b e c a us e the y “ e xclu de [] fr om pr ote c tio n a n e nti re c la ss o f i nn oc e nt v ic tim s fo r no g oo d re a so n” a ndbe c a us e su c h c laus e s a re no t tr uly ba rg a ine d- fo r; rathe r, the y

are a “ take -i tor-lea ve-it proposition”); see also Kaiama v
. AIG Hawa i’i I ns. Co., 930 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Haw. 19 97 ); Es te p v . St a te F arm Mu t. Au to. I ns . Co., 70 3 P.2d 88 2, 88 5- 87 (N .M . 198 5)

. Ho we ve r, wh ile we do not find the reasoning in these ca ses to be without merit, we simply are not at liberty

to ignor e the clea r policy articula ted by

the Gene ral Asse mbly

in favor of

exclusions i n section 56-7- 121.

F ina lly , Pu rk e y arg ue s that fa mil y a nd ho us e ho ld e xclu sio ns ha ve the e ff e c t of sh if tin g he a lth
car e costs for household members from automobile insurer s to private hea lth insurers and Te nnCare. AH A a nda mic us c ou nte r tha t fo rc ing a uto ins ur e rs to c ov e r c ur re ntl y e xclu de d me dic a l c os ts w ill dr ive up a uto ins uran ce prem iums. Th e c ho ic e of wh o w ill be ar the bu rd e n f or me dic a l c os ts a sso c ia te d w ith a uto mob ile a c c ide nts is, ho we ve r, a po lic y c ho ic e fo r the L e g isl a tur e a ndno t f or thi s Cou rt . We mus t a ssu me that th e L e g isl a tur e c on sid e re d the imp a c t of e xclu sio ns on ins ur e ds a s w e ll as on insurer s and dec ided th at t he public policy of this state is best serve d by broadly permitting exclusions i n insurance contra cts.
Conclusion

After considering the applicable authority and the arg uments of t he parties, we conclude that family or household exclusions in automobile liability insurance policies do not violate Tenne ssee law or public policy . We the re fo re an s we r the first ce rtified question in the neg ative and do not
re a c h th e se c on d a ndthi rdqu e sti on s. Costs of the ap p eal shall be assessed e qually among the parties, J anice W. P urkey and A m e r i c a n H o m e A s s u r a n c e C o m p a n y.

___________________________________ E. RILEY AN DE RSO N, JUSTI CE