This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 31,315 9 JONATHAN STANDIFER, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROOSEVELT COUNTY 12 Drew D. Tatum, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Acti ng Chief Public Defender 17 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Appellate Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 VANZI, Judge. 222 Defendant appeals his convictions arising from a domestic dispute. In 1 particular, he attacks the sufficiency of th e evidence to support the conviction for false 2 imprisonment. In our notice, we proposed to affirm. Defendant has timely responded. 3 We have considered his arguments and notbeing persuaded, we affirm. In our 4 notice, we identified the standard of review and pointed to the evidence that we 5 believed supported the conviction. After Defendant punched Victim, she left their 6 residence. [MIO 2] She got in a truck and attempted to drive away, but the truck got 7 stuck. [MIO 2] Victim got out of the truc k, intending to walk, but Defendant grabbed 8 her by the hair and pulled her back into the house. [MIO 3] 9 Defendant makes two arguments in response. First, he contends that this 10 conduct did not rise to the level of “res traint” called for by the false imprisonment 11 statute. He argues that although he did pull her back into the house, that is not the 12 reason that she stayed in the house. [MIO 5] We do not believe that Defendant needed 13 to be the cause of Victim st aying in the house. Rather, the element of restraining or 14 confining was met by Defendant ’s actions of pulling her b ack to the residence when 15 she did not want to go there. The fact that Defendant wa s trying to smooth things over 16 while he was pulling her back to the house does not change the fact that she did not 17 want to go, and he was making her do so. That is all that is required by the term 18 “restrain.” 193 Second, Defendant argues that the restraint was incidental to the battery, and 1 thus, there is no independent evidence to support the charge of false imprisonment. 2 In making this argument, Defendant relies on State v. Garcia , 2009-NMCA-107, 147 3 N.M. 150, 217 P.3d 1048, and State v. Mares , 112 N.M. 193, 812 P.2d 1341 (Ct. App. 4 1991). Both of those cases were argued as unit of prosecution double jeopardy issues 5 where a defendant was convicted of multiple violations of the same criminal statute. 6 The question in such cases is “whether th e defendant’s acts are separated by sufficient 7 indicia of distinctness to justify multiple punishments under the same statute.” 8 Garcia , 2009-NMCA-107, ¶ 8. Those cases are not persuasive where the question 9 here is whether there is sufficient evid ence to support an entirely different crime. 10 Defendant appears to be conflating double jeopardy jurisprudence with 11 sufficiency of the evidence claims. Although unit of punishment double jeopardy 12 analysis requires a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence of separate 13 acts, we will not use double jeopardy jurisp rudence to determine whether there is 14 sufficient evidence to support a conviction. 15 Defendant argues, citing several out of st ate authorities, that restraint that is 16 incidental to an underlying offense is not sufficient to support a separate kidnaping or 17 false imprisonment charge. [MIO 7-8] He argues that the restraint should have a 18 significance of its own, and the jury should beso instructed. Defendant argued to the 194 jury that his pulling Victim back to th e house was simply a continuation of the 1 physical contact establishing the battery charge and that there was no separate 2 evidence to support false imprisonment. The jury was unconvinced as it convicted 3 him of false imprisonment. 4 We do not believe that the facts support Defendant’s argument that the restraint 5 was simply incidental to the battery. The battery had occurred in the residence. 6 Victim left the residence, got into her truc k, and attempted to drive away. The battery 7 was concluded at that point. Defendant’s action of grabbing Victim’s hair and pulling 8 her back into the residence when she atte mpted to walk away is separate from the 9 battery that had occurred earlier in the house. 10 For the reasons stated herein and inthe notice of proposed disposition, we 11 affirm. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

__________________________________ 14 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

_________________________________ 17 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 185 _________________________________ 1 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 2