IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GRACE LAWRENCE 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TRANS UNION LLC 

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 

Defendant. 

C.A. NO: 02-CV-4440 

TRANS UNION LLC’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S 

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 Trans Union LLC (“Trans Union”), by and through its undersigned attorneys, states as 

follows in Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Trans Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff’s Opposition makes three material misstatements. First, Plaintiff misstates the 

appropriate grounds for reconsideration; the evidence need not be “new,” if it was properly 

before the Court and overlooked. Second, Plaintiff misstates the nature of the screen print which 

Plaintiff provided Trans Union with her dispute; it was not reasonable to rely on this document to 

determine the status of the judgment where the “original” (Cerbus Dep. p.155) court records 

were available (and actually used). Third and most important, Trans Union’s verification of the 

disputed information was based on “original” court records; Plaintiff’s unfounded statement that 

Trans Union had no basis to verify this information is simply without merit and without basis in 

the record. 

 Based on the evidence before this Court, no reasonable jury could conclude that Trans 

Union willfully violated the FCRA. Accordingly, Trans Union is entitled to summary judgment 

on Plaintiff’s willfulness and state law claims. 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 45 Filed 01/09/2004 Page 1 of 6
II. ARGUMENT 

A. Standard for Reconsideration

Plaintiff unfairly characterizes footnote 4 of this Court’s opinion as “innocuous,” as if the 

court actually read the materials, but chose to state otherwise. The Court stated that “[t]he details

of what Superior did or failed to do in investigating Lawrence’s disputes are therefore 

unknown.” Order, FN4 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff’s statement that this plain oversight is 

“innocuous” is unfounded. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that reconsideration is inappropriate because the evidence 

before the Court is not “new” is simply incorrect. The evidence was properly before this Court 

at the time of its ruling on summary judgment, but overlooked. See e.g., Selaras v. M/V

Cartagena De Indias, 959 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D. PA 1997) (reconsidering grant of summary

judgment based on evidence properly before the Court, but overlooked). 

Instantly, the testimony of Cerbus was properly before this Court. See Docket #40, 

granting leave to supplement summary judgment record.1

 Accordingly, because this was

overlooked, and because the deposition conclusively demonstrates Trans Union did not willfully

violate the FCRA, this Court should reconsider its denial of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s 

punitive damages and state law claims. 

B. The Screen Print

Despite the evidence, Plaintiff persists in her unfounded assertion that the computer 

screen print Lawrence sent with her dispute was relevant to the reinvestigation. She asserts that

Cerbus’ “testimony simply is not tantamount to TU’s proposition that Superior would have 

 

2

1 Plaintiff claims Trans Union “neglects to mention” that this motion was granted. Opposition, p.2. This is

wrong; the instant motion for reconsideration is based on the fact that the motion to supplement was granted, and the

deposition was properly before the Court, but unfortunately overlooked. See Reconsideration, pp.1-2. 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 45 Filed 01/09/2004 Page 2 of 6
absolutely no use for a computer generated docket sheet...” Reconsideration Opp. p.5. To the

contrary, Cerbus testified unequivocally that the document would not be used by Superior in 

connection with a reinvestigation:

9 A. I do hear your question. Now, 

10 what you'll need to remember is that when 

11 Nicholas [Palmer, investigator] goes to the court, he pulls the 

12 original copies, so he's not looking at 

13 this. This is what the people at the 

14 court -- they're terminal looks like. 

15 Q. Okay. 

16 A. So he wouldn't be looking at this 

17 sheet anyway. 

(Exhibit “A” to Trans Union’s Reconsideration Motion, p.155 (emphasis supplied)) 

Plaintiff’s citation to the record conveniently avoids this testimony, and misleadingly 

construes the Cerbus testimony as supporting Plaintiff’s position that the screen print established 

no judgment was entered against Lawrence. See Reconsideration Opp., pp.6-8, citing Cerbus

Dep., pp.156, 159, 162-163. Instead, the testimony cited by Plaintiff simply highlights that the 

document was highly ambiguous and not the sort ever used by Superior. Thus, the document 

was not reliable and only the “original” court records are the appropriate source for 

reinvestigating the dispute. 

In this connection, Plaintiff’s reliance on Soghomonian v. United States, Trans Union, et

al, 278 F.Supp. 1151 (E.D.CA 2003) is misplaced. In that matter, the Court found the document 

the consumer included with his dispute (a “CNA”), demonstrated the disputed item was

inaccurate and would have affected the outcome of the reinvestigation. 278 F.Supp at 1156. The

record here demonstrates that the screen print would not have altered the outcome of the 

reinvestigation and does not demonstrate inaccuracy. As such, plaintiff’s counsel’s contrary 

assertions are irrelevant attorney argument without factual support in the record. 

3

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Because the screen print had no bearing on or use for Trans Union’s the reinvestigation, 

Crane is inapposite. Simply put, the sole evidence of record demonstrates the screen print had no, 

and could have no, bearing on the outcome of the reinvestigation of Plaintiff’s disputes. 

C. Superior’s Role in the Reinvestigation

Plaintiff’s reliance on Cushman and Crane to establish Trans Union willfully violated the 

FCRA is inapposite. Trans Union did not “parrot” Superior’s response to Plaintiff’s dispute. See 

Reconsideration Opp. p.4. Despite Plaintiff’s contentions, Superior is not the “furnisher” of 

information. Instead, Superior obtained the information from the Philadelphia Municipal Court. 

Trans Union did not “parrot” a response from that Court. Instead, it contracted with Superior to 

obtain and analyze the underlying “original” court records regarding the item. Unlike Cushman

or Crane, the source was not the entity which responded to Trans Union’s communication of 

Plaintiff’s dispute. Instead, Superior affirmatively obtained and analyzed the original court 

records of the disputed item. 

Further, as the deposition of Nancy Cerbus establishes, Nicholas Palmer, a senior 

Prothonotary with 23 years experience, reviewed the actual court records. Trans Union’s review 

of such Court records was done by a highly qualified person without regard to the original tape 

source. In this context, “parroting” might have been reliance on Superior’s internal records, but

not the review of the Court’s original records. 

As explained previously, Trans Union, as is standard in the industry, uses a public 

records vendor which specializes in interpreting court records for Trans Union. See Trans

Union’s opening brief, and deposition of William Stockdale. Clearly, the fact that Trans Union

uses a contractor instead of internal employees cannot itself be the basis of a willfulness claim 

4

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and Plaintiff does not assert otherwise. See Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply, p.2.2

 Plaintiff’s argument fails

because she asserts Trans Union “parroted” its vendor where, instead, the vendor inspected

original court records on behalf of Trans Union. The judgment was reported to Superior (on 

behalf of Trans Union) by a tape from the Municipal Court. The reinvestigation did not consist 

of a parroting of this tape. Trans Union did not willfully violate the FCRA. 

Trans Union did not “‘knowingly and intentionally commit[] an act in conscious 

disregard for the rights of others...’” Cushman, 115 F.3d at 226 (quoting Philbin, 101 F.3d at 

970). A grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s willfulness claims is entirely consistent with 

the Court of Appeals’ decision in Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries, Inc., 257 F.3d.409, 

415 (4th Cir. 2001)3: 

A showing of malice or evil motive is not required to prove 

willfulness under the Act. The plaintiff must only show that the 

defendant "knowingly and intentionally committed an act in

conscious disregard for the rights" of the consumer. Even though 

summary judgment is "seldom appropriate" on whether a party 

possessed a particular state of mind, evidence that CAI acted 

willfully is wholly lacking. Dalton has not shown, for example, 

that CAI was aware that its subvendors relied upon informal legal 

opinions from court clerks. There is no evidence that other 

consumers have lodged complaints similar to Dalton's against CAI. 

Indeed, CAI had used SafeHands for about a year and had found 

the firm to be reliable. Further, CAI corrected its mistake one day

after Dalton challenged the accuracy of the report. Accordingly, no 

reasonable jury could conclude that CAI acted willfully in

violating § § 1681e(b) or 1681k. Nevertheless, a jury could 

properly conclude that CAI acted negligently. CAI had no 

procedures in place to instruct its subvendors on the appropriate 

sources for reliable information on criminal records. A reasonable 

 

2

 Plaintiff acknowledged in her Sur-Reply that “... the Superior declarations indicate that Superior employs 

the highest standards and provides accurate information regarding public records to TU.” Following the depositions, 

Plaintiff has not retracted this statement. Indeed, she could not, as Superior employs the highest standards in the

industry. See Stockdale Dep. 

5

3

 As explained in Trans Union’s opening brief, Dalton involves a similar action where a public records 

vendor improperly characterized a conviction as a felony on behalf of the consumer reporting agency defendant.

See Trans Union’s Opening brief, p.19.

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jury could conclude that CAI's failure to have such procedures was 

a negligent violation of FCRA. (internal citations omitted.) 

 The record before this Court is clear and it should follow the authority of Cushman, 

Philbin and Dalton. Trans Union has in place extensive procedures to assure the gathering and 

verification of public records is accomplished through highly qualified personnel who are subject 

to rigorous screening, training and auditing. While negligence might remain a jury question, 

willfulness does not. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For all the above reasons and authorities, Trans Union respectfully requests this Court 

reconsider its December 11, 2003 Order denying summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s punitive 

damages and state common law claims. 

 Respectfully Submitted, 

 

 SATZBERG, TRICHON, 

 KOGAN & WERTHEIMER, P.C. 

 ___________________________________ 

 MARK E. KOGAN (10186) 

 BRUCE S. LUCKMAN (38636) 

 TIMOTHY P. CREECH (81728) 

 1818 Market St., 30th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 (215) 575-7600; Fax: (215) 575-7688 

 Counsel for Defendant, 

 Trans Union LLC 

DATED: January 9, 2004 

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