[Cite as State v. Jewell , 2021-Ohio-32.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT AUGLAIZE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 2-20-11

v. BRADLY J. JEWELL, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2019 CR 0058 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: January 11, 2021

APPEARANCES: 

### Peter Galyardt for Appellant 

### Reed D. Searcy for AppelleeCase No. 2-20-11

-2- ZIMMERMAN, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Bradly J. Jewell (“Jewell”) appeals the Ma rch 16, 2020 judgment entry of sentencing of the Auglaize County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. {¶2} On February 27, 2019, the Auglaize County Grand Jury indicted J ewell on thirteen criminal charges including ten counts of Rape, in v iolation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), all first-degree felonies and three counts of Gross Sexual Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), all third-degree felonies. (Doc. No. 1). Jewell pled not guilty to the charges. (Doc. No. 11). {¶3} On January 21, 2020, Jewell withdrew his pleas of not guilty an d entered guilty pleas to the Gross-Sexual-Imposition counts of t he indictment and entered guilty pleas to three counts of Rape, per a bill of inf ormation, under a negotiated-plea agreement. 1 (Doc. Nos. 61, 62, 63); (Jan. 21, 2020 Tr. at 3-7). The plea agreement also included a sentencing recommendation and th e ten Rape counts in the original indictment, which carried potential life senten ces were dismissed. ( See Doc. No. 64). (Jan. 21, 2020 Tr. at 3-7, 40-42). The trial co urt accepted

1 The State filed a bill of information with three counts of Rap e in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), all firstdegree felonies, pursuant to plea negotiations. (Doc. No. 61); (Jan. 21, 2020 Tr. at 3-7). Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the indictment and Counts One, Two, and Three of the bill of information involved three different minor-child victims (two males ages 7 and 10 as well as a 3-year old female) all from different time frames. (Jan. 21, 20 Tr. at 35-39); (PSI).Case No. 2-20-11

-3- Jewell’s guilty pleas and ordered the preparation of a presente nce-investigation report (“PSI”). (Doc. No. 64); (Jan. 21, 2020 Tr. at 40-42). {¶4} On March 13, 2020, the trial court sentenced Jewell to 60-month s in prison on each of the three Gross-Sexual-Imposition charges, tw o 11-year prison terms on the two Rape charges, and a 7-year prison term on the third Rape charge. 2 (Doc. No. 74). (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 25-26). The two 11-year prison terms (in Counts One and Two) were ordered to run concurrently to one ano ther. ( Id. ); ( Id. at 27). The 7-year prison term (in Count Three) was ordered to be served consecutively to the 11-year terms. ( Id. ); ( Id. at 27). Further, the trial court ordered the 60-month prison terms in Counts Nine, Ten, and Eleven to ru n consecutively to one another and consecutive to the prison terms in Counts One, Two, and Three for a total stated prison term of 33 years, 18 of which is mandator y. ( Id. ); ( Id. at 28). {¶5} Jewell timely filed his notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 90). He r aises one assignment of error for our review. Assignment of Error The trial court erred when it sentenced Bradly Jewell to a multiple-offenses consecutive sentence that is not clearly and convincingly supported by the record at each level of enhancement. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); State v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, paragraphs one, two, and three of the syllabus; State v. Gwynne , 158 Ohio St.3d 279. 2019-

2 Jewell’s prison terms as to his Rape charges are mandatory. ( Doc. No. 74). (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 25-26). Jewell was given 388 days’ jail-time credit, determined to be a Tier III sex offender, ordered to register pursuant to that determination for life, and notified of his re gistration requirements. (Doc. No. 74). ( See Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 13-14).Case No. 2-20-11

-4- Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 17. March 13, 2020 Sentence Tr. 26-28; March 16, 2020 Journal Entry. {¶6} In his assignment of error, Jewell argues that the record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and therefore, his sentence is contrary to law. Standard of Review {¶7} “Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a se ntence ‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that th e record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or t hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Nienberg , 3d Dist. Putnam Nos. 12-16-15 and 12-16-16, 2017-Ohio-2920, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. “Clear and convincing evidence is that ‘“ which will produce

in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction a s to the facts sought to

be established.”’” Id. , quoting Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Analysis {¶8} Initially, we note, Jewell does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Indeed, we conclude that the tr ial court appropriately indicated its consideration of these statutory se ctions prior to imposing sentence, and reiterated such findings in its sentenci ng entry. (Doc. No. 74); (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 25). Further, the record is clear t hat the trial court’sCase No. 2-20-11

-5- sentences fall within the statutory range for the applicable fe lony degrees at issue

under the facts before us. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(1) (2018) (current version at R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a)-(b) (2019)) (“For a felony of the first degree , the prison term shall be three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven y ears.”); 2929.14(A)(3)(a) (2018) (current version at R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) (2019)) (“For a felony of the third degree that is a violation of section * * * 2907.04 * * * the p rison term shall be twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six, forty-two, f orty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.”). {¶9} Moreover, even though the trial court made the requisite consec utivesentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), Jewell argues tha t his sentence constitutes a prohibited sentencing package , and that the trial court was required to engage in a multi-leveled review of multiple consecutive senten ces as set forth in

State v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245 and State v. Gwynne , 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761. 3 {¶10} Sentence packaging is “a federal doctrine that requires the cou rt to consider the sanctions imposed on multiple offenses as the comp onents of a single, comprehensive sentencing plan.” State v. Saxon , 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio1245, ¶ 5. In Saxon , the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected a sentence-packaging

3 We decline to address Jewell’s argument to the extent he relie s upon State v. Gwynne , 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, a plurality opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohi o. Gwynne , although persuasive authority, is not binding on this court or anyone beyond the parties of th at case since it failed to receive the support of the majority of the court. See State v. Cassell , 4th Dist. Highland No. 16CA15, 2017-Ohio-769, ¶ 17.Case No. 2-20-11

-6- approach, finding the federal doctrine to have “no applicabilit y to Ohio sentencing

laws.” Id. at ¶ 10. Under Ohio law, a sentencing court “must consider ea ch offense individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2929.11 through 2929.19. A sentencing court thus “lacks the au thority to consider the offenses as a group and to impose only an omnibus sentence for the group of

offenses.” Id. Simply put, sentencing courts in Ohio may not impose a single “lump” sentence for multiple offenses. Id. at ¶ 8. {¶11} Jewell’s sentence-packaging argument is misplaced because the t rial

court considered each offense individually and imposed a separate sentence for each offense. (Doc. No. 74); (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 25-27). See R.C. 2929.11 through 2929.19. Thus, the record does not support that the trial cour t imposed “only an

omnibus sentence” for Jewell’s convictions in violation of the sentence-packaging

doctrine. See Saxon at ¶ 9. {¶12} Next, we address Jewell’s assertion that the record does not su pport the trial court’s findings. Specifically, Jewell argues that h is consecutive sentences were not clearly and convincingly supported by the record, and thus, contrary to law because the trial court imposed consecutive sentences (totaling 33 years) that exceeded the State’s joint-sentencing recommendation (of 26 yea rs). The crux of his argument centers around the trial court’s decision to run t he 7-year Rape-prison term (in Count Three) consecutive to the 11-year Rape-prison te rms (in Counts OneCase No. 2-20-11

-7- and Two), rather than, running all of the Rape sentences concur rently to one another in conformity with the joint-sentencing recommendation. ( See Doc. Nos. 61, 62, 63, 74); (Jan. 21, 2020 Tr. at 15, 21, 24-25); (Mar. 13, 2020 T r. at 25-26). {¶13} R.C. 2929.41(A) provides, in pertinent part: “Except as provide d in * * * division (C) of section 2929.14, * * * a prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state * * * .” R.C. 2929.14(C)

states: (4) * * * [T]he court may require the offender to serve the pri son terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service i s necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionat e to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the off ender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the fol lowing: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929. 18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or m ore of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual t hat no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of t he offender’s conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.Case No. 2-20-11

-8- R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) (2018) (current version at R.C. 2929. 14(C)(4)(a)-(c) (2019)). {¶14} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific find ings on the record when imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites , 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11; State v. Peddicord , 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-12- 24, 2013-Ohio-3398, ¶ 33, citing Hites at ¶ 11. Specifically, the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect the public or punish the offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate t o the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies.

Id. ; Id. {¶15} Additionally, the trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp , 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-01, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50, citing State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the wo rds of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37. {¶16} In the case before us, the trial court adhered strictly to the language of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when ordering its consecutive sentences as t o the Rape-prisonCase No. 2-20-11

-9- terms. The following exchange that occurred in open court at J ewell’s sentencing hearing demonstrates the trial court’s compliance with R.C. 292 9.14(C)(4): [Trial Court] The Court orders that,- first of all, the Court m ake findings that CONSECUTIVE service is necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender, and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and the court also finds that at least two (2) of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

one or more courses of conduct and the harm caused by two (2) or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflect the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; and the Court also finds that the offender’s history of

criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.Case No. 2-20-11

-10- (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 27). {¶17} Here, the record establishes that Jewell sexually abused three minor children on numerous occasions over the course of several years exploiting their vulnerabilities based on age, lack of knowledge, and inability to engage in selfprotection. ( See Doc. Nos. 1, 61); (Mar. 13, 2020 Tr. at 24). We conclude that this alone supports the trial court’s findings as to a course of con duct under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). See State v. Smith , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28265, 2019-Ohio5015, ¶ 72 (“defendant’s repeated sexual abuse of the same mino r victim amounted to a ‘course of conduct’ justifying consecutive sentences.”). {¶18} Under the facts presented, the trial court’s consecutive senten ce findings are supported by the record. Therefore, we conclude t hat there is not clear and convincing evidence that Jewell’s sentence is not supported by the record or that his sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Nienberg , 2017-Ohio-2920, at ¶ 23. {¶19} For these reasons, Jewell’s sole assignment of error is overrul ed. {¶20} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in th e particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judgment Affirmed WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. /jlr