IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-11262

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ROBERTO RENE RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:07-CR-328-1

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Roberto Rene Rodriguez has appealed the 30-month term of 

imprisonment imposed by the district court following the revocation of his 

supervised release period. He asserts that the sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court improperly considered factors listed in 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Additionally, he maintains that the district court’s 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 2, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-11262

2

consideration of those factors rendered his sentence substantively 

unreasonable.

Ordinarily, we review revocation sentences under a plainly unreasonable 

standard. United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2013). 

However, because Rodriguez did not object at the revocation hearing to the 

district court’s consideration of improper factors, we review his challenge to 

the procedural and substantive unreasonableness of his sentence for plain 

error only. See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Rodriguez concedes that his argument that he did not need to object to the 

reasonableness of his sentence in order to properly preserve the issue for 

appellate review is foreclosed by current circuit precedent. 

Because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) omits from its directive the sentencing 

factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A), which include the need for the sentence “to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 

provide just punishment for the offense,” § 3553(a)(2)(A), a district court may 

not rely on these factors in its imposition of a revocation sentence. United 

States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011). Here, the district court 

expressly disclaimed reliance on the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A). To the 

extent that the district court considered the seriousness of the domestic 

violence assault giving rise to Rodriguez’s revocation proceedings or the need 

to promote respect for the law or provide just punishment, these were not the 

dominant factors in the court’s sentencing decision; rather, the dominant 

factors in determining the length of the sentence were the district court’s 

consideration of other, permissible factors. See § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), (2)(C); 

United States v. Rivera, 784 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 2015).

A revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court 

did not take into account a factor that should have received significant weight, 

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gave significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or made a clear 

error in judgment when balancing the sentencing factors. Warren, 720 F.3d at 

332. Rodriguez has not shown that the court gave significant weight to the 

improper factors of the seriousness of the violation, the need to promote respect 

for the law, or the need for just punishment. See id. His 30-month sentence, 

which does not exceed the statutory maximum, is substantively reasonable. 

See id. at 326, 332; Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 259, 265.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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