a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Finance, U.S. Senate, and to the 

Chairman, Committee on Ways and 

Means, House of Representatives

April 2003 FREE TRADE AREA 

OF THE AMERICAS

Negotiations Progress, 

but Successful 

Ministerial Hinges on 

Intensified U.S. 

Preparations

GAO-03-560
USTR, which is responsible for co-chairing the Free Trade Area of the 

Americas negotiations and hosting the November 2003 ministerial meeting, 

faces challenges to its readiness to assume these responsibilities. During the 

current negotiating phase, achieving improved market access for the 34 

nations is paramount. It may be difficult, however, for participants to make 

ambitious offers to lower tariffs and other trade barriers. Another challenge 

involves the resolution of issues such as subsidies for agriculture. The 

resolution of this issue has been linked to ongoing negotiations at the World 

Trade Organization, but these talks are bogged down. A further challenge is 

ensuring the momentum and the political will of the United States and Brazil 

to move the process forward to a timely completion by January 2005. 

As co-chair of the negotiations, USTR also faces risks to assuring its 

readiness as host of the November ministerial. First, USTR has little 

experience in hosting a major ministerial meeting, and its staff remains small 

and is stretched thin. Second, plans for the meeting are at an early stage, and 

much remains to be done. Third, USTR is counting on funding that has not 

yet been secured. And finally, USTR is likely to encounter protestors at the 

November ministerial. Factoring security for the invited participants into the 

logistical arrangements for the ministerial is a prime concern. 

Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Time Frames and Milestones, 2002-2005 

Establishing a 34-nation Free Trade 

Area of the Americas agreement 

has been under negotiation since 

1998. This agreement would 

eliminate tariffs and create 

common trade and investment 

rules for these nations. Most 

recently, the United States, along 

with Brazil, assumed the leadership 

of the negotiations. GAO was asked 

to analyze (1) the challenges for the 

current negotiating phase, which 

will include a ministerial meeting in 

Miami, Florida, in November 2003; 

and (2) the U.S.’s readiness to serve 

as co-chair of the negotiations and 

host of the November 2003 

ministerial. 

The Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative (USTR) should 

intensify preparations and regularly 

evaluate whether current resources 

and plans are sufficient to carry out 

the tasks and mitigate the risks 

associated with its responsibilities 

as co-chair of the negotiations and 

host of the November ministerial. 

These are related to USTR’s (1) 

increased workload, (2) planning 

for the ministerial, (3) funding 

sources, and (4) security needs at 

the ministerial. 

USTR and the Department of State 

generally agreed with GAO's 

message but sought amplification 

on certain issues. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-560.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Loren Yager at 

(202) 512-4347, or YagerL@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-560, a report to the 

Chairmen, Senate Committee on Finance, 

and House Committee on Ways and 

Means 

April 2003

FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS 

Negotiations Progress, but Successful 

Ministerial Hinges on Intensified U.S. 

Preparations 
Page i GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Progress Achieved in Certain Areas Before and After Quito, but 

Extent and Pace of Movement on Substantive Issues a Concern to 

Some Participants 9

Key Challenges Exist for the Current Negotiating Phase 19

Gaps in U.S. Preparations for Co-chairmanship and Hosting of Miami 

Ministerial May Pose Risks 28

Conclusions 43

Recommendation for Executive Action 43

Agency Comments and Our Response 44

Scope and Methodology 44

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative 47

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State 50

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 52

GAO Contacts 52

Staff Acknowledgments 52

Related GAO Products 53

Figures Figure 1: Organization of the FTAA Negotiations 6

Figure 2: Political and Economic Events in South America, 

December 2001–April 2003 8

Figure 3: History of the FTAA Negotiations, 1994–2002 10

Figure 4: Tariff Reduction Schedule under Different Base Tariff 

Scenarios, 2005–2015 13

Figure 5: FTAA Time Frames and Milestones, 2002–2005 17

Figure 6: Relationship Between FTAA and WTO Agriculture 

Negotiations 24

Figure 7: Keys to a Successful Ministerial 35
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Abbreviations

ATPA Andean Trade Preference Act

CAFTA U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CARICOM Caribbean Community

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Agreement

FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas

HCP Hemispheric Cooperation Program

Mercosur Common Market of the South

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

OMB Office of Management and Budget

TNC Trade Negotiations Committee

TPA Trade Promotion Authority

USTR Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

WTO World Trade Organization

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Page 1 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 11, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Charles Grassley

Chairman 

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

The Honorable William H. Thomas

Chairman 

Committee on Ways and Means 

House of Representatives

Negotiations toward establishing a Free Trade Area of the Americas 

agreement among the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere 

have formally been under way since 1998. Such an agreement would 

eliminate tariffs and create common trade and investment rules for these 

nations. If completed, the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement 

would cover about 800 million people and about $13 trillion in production 

of goods and services. Work on this agreement is the most significant of 

ongoing regional trade negotiations for the United States, and the Bush 

administration has made establishing the Free Trade Area of the Americas 

one of its top trade priorities. Indeed, the United States assumed leadership 

of the process when it became co-chair, with Brazil, of the current and final 

phase of negotiations. This phase began in Quito, Ecuador, during the 

ministerial meeting on November 1, 2002, and will conclude with the 

completion of the agreement. 

Because of the significance of the Free Trade Area of the Americas 

initiative, you asked us to update our previous work for you on the current 

status of the negotiations. In this report, we analyze the (1) progress made 

in the negotiations on creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas and the 

outcome of the Quito ministerial meeting; 1 (2) key challenges for the 

current and final negotiating phase, which will include a ministerial in 

Miami, Florida, in November 2003; and (3) readiness of the United States to 

successfully perform as co-chair (with Brazil) of the Free Trade Area of the 

1

The ministerial meeting, composed of the trade ministers of all the countries that are 

members of the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, is the highest decision-making 

body in the ongoing negotiations. Ministerial meetings are intended to evaluate the progress 

and overall status of the trade negotiations to date and to set the agenda for future work. 

The meetings result in a ministerial declaration setting forth agreed decisions and 

directions.
Page 2 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Americas negotiations process and host of the November 2003 ministerial.

Our analysis is based on our past and ongoing work on the Free Trade Area 

of the Americas negotiations process.2

Results in Brief Progress on creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas had occurred in a 

number of technical and procedural areas by the time of the November 

2002 ministerial meeting in Quito, Ecuador. For example, participants had 

defined the timetable for completing the negotiating process and drafted 

versions of the agreement text. Participants also had set ground rules for 

conducting negotiations on liberalizing access to their markets and dates 

for exchanging offers on liberalizing market access. At the Quito 

ministerial, participants reaffirmed their willingness to continue Free Trade 

Area of the Americas negotiations while stressing the need for a balanced 

outcome that provides benefits to all participants. The negotiators also 

launched a Hemispheric Cooperation Program to help lesser-developed 

countries participating in the Free Trade Area of the Americas talks obtain 

the expertise and resources they need to negotiate, implement, and benefit 

from the agreement. However, trade-offs did not begin, because negotiators 

had made limited progress in resolving substantive differences in the 

agreement’s text and developing concrete proposals to improve market 

access.

Three key challenges are of primary concern during the current phase of 

the negotiations. First, resolution of issues such as subsidies for 

agriculture, which are important for most countries of the hemisphere, 

have been linked to ongoing global negotiations at the World Trade 

Organization.3 However, there is concern that global talks are bogged down 

on issues such as agriculture subsidies and that this situation could cause 

Free Trade Area of the Americas talks to slow down or deadlock. World 

Trade Organization negotiators have already missed several interim 

2

See U.S. General Accounting Office, Free Trade Area of the Americas: Negotiators Move 

Toward Agreement That Will Have Benefits, Costs to U.S. Economy, GAO-01-1027

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2001); U.S. General Accounting Office, Free Trade Area of the 

Americas: April 2001 Meetings Set Stage for Hard Bargaining to Begin, GAO-01-706T

(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2001); U.S. General Accounting Office, Free Trade Area of the 

Americas: Negotiations at Key Juncture on Eve of April Meetings, GAO-01-552

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001). 

3

The World Trade Organization, established in January 1995, consists of 146 members and 

provides the institutional framework for the multilateral trading system.
Page 3 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

deadlines, including one specifically related to agriculture. Second, 

improved market access is the single most important goal for most Free 

Trade Area of the Americas participants, and the quality of offers the 34 

nations make will set the tone for ongoing negotiations. Offers to 

significantly reduce trade barriers could provide momentum to the 

negotiations, but it may be difficult for participants to make ambitious 

offers. Third, ensuring the momentum and the political will of the United 

States and Brazil, two of the key participants in the negotiations, to move 

the process vigorously forward to a timely completion is a key challenge. 

As co-chair of the negotiations, the United States faces several risks to its 

readiness to ensure the successful conclusion of the final phase of Free 

Trade Area of the Americas negotiations. First, the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative, which handles the negotiations, has assumed the increased 

responsibilities associated with chairing the Free Trade Area of the 

Americas negotiations without a significant addition in staff. Second, the 

co-chair arrangement with Brazil is a novel situation that could involve 

additional time and effort for the U.S. Trade Representative. Third, certain 

aspects of the current U.S. plans for hosting the Eighth Free Trade Area of 

the Americas Trade Ministerial in Miami in November 2003 pose risks, 

including acquiring expertise in hosting a ministerial, working on planning 

the ministerial with the host city, arranging financing, and ensuring the 

security of ministerial participants. Failure to mitigate similar risks 

ultimately caused serious logistical and security problems at the last major 

trade ministerial hosted by the United States, the 1999 Seattle World Trade 

Organization ministerial. 

In this report, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative intensify 

preparations and promptly and regularly evaluate whether its current 

resources and plans are sufficient to carry out the tasks and mitigate the 

risks associated with co-chairing the Free Trade Area of the Americas 

negotiations and hosting the November 2003 ministerial meeting.

In commenting on our draft report, the U.S. Trade Representative and the 

Department of State agreed with our overall message. However, the U.S. 

Trade Representative asked us to amplify on the steps it has taken to 

address the challenges ahead for the Free Trade Area of the Americas 

negotiations and upcoming November 2003 ministerial in Miami and 

stressed that it believes plans for hosting the ministerial are at an 

appropriate stage of development. The Department of State addressed the 

issue of its assistance to the U.S. Trade Representative by saying that it is 

trying to be as helpful as it can within the constraints of its resources. We 
Page 4 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

have noted these positions in the report and added new information about 

several specific steps that the U.S. Trade Representative and State have 

taken to bolster U.S. readiness. Nevertheless, we maintain our basic 

findings and recommendation that U.S. preparations should be intensified 

and plans be kept under regular review.

Background Building on a decade of expanding trade and investment ties and increasing 

economic integration in the region, the leaders of 34 countries in the 

Western Hemisphere pledged in December 1994 to form a Free Trade Area 

of the Americas (FTAA) no later than 2005. The agreement would 

progressively eliminate barriers to trade and investment. The FTAA 

involves a diverse set of countries,4

 from some of the wealthiest (the United 

States and Canada) to some of the poorest (Haiti) and from some of the 

largest (Brazil) to some of the smallest in the world (St. Kitts and Nevis). 

The large disparities in size and economic development in the hemisphere 

mean that countries come to the negotiating table with different and 

sometimes widely divergent interests and goals. For example, the United 

States seeks broad improvements in trade rules and market access, while 

the smaller economies seek assurances that their economies will not be 

overwhelmed by larger ones. Many nations are participating in certain 

aspects of the negotiations as subregional groupings such as the Caribbean 

Community (CARICOM)5

 and the Common Market of the South 

(Mercosur)6

 to facilitate their participation in FTAA talks. 

Between December 1994 and the formal launch of negotiations on March 

1998, the FTAA negotiators agreed on several principles to guide them: (1) 

All decisions would be reached by consensus; (2) The final FTAA 

agreement would be consistent with the rules and practices of the World 

4

The 34 countries participating in FTAA negotiations are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, 

the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, 

Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 

Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, 

St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, 

Uruguay, and Venezuela.

5

CARICOM is a regional bloc whose members are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 

Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat (overseas 

territory of the United Kingdom), St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 

Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 

6

Mercosur includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
Page 5 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Trade Organization (WTO); (3) The final agreement would be able to 

coexist with other subregional free trade and customs union agreements7

such as Mercosur and the North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA)8

; (4) Special consideration would be given to differences in levels 

of development and sizes of economies; and (5) An eventual FTAA 

agreement will be implemented as a single undertaking. A single 

undertaking implies that the FTAA is a package deal that must be accepted 

in its entirety by each signatory country in order for the country to benefit 

from the agreement’s provisions. It also means that “nothing is agreed until 

everything is agreed,” meaning that concluding the agreement could 

involve trade-offs across chapters of the proposed FTAA text agreement to 

achieve the desired balance.

Additionally, the negotiators agreed to the overall structure, scope, and 

organization of the negotiations, including establishing nine negotiating 

groups on particular areas. (See fig. 1.) The nine negotiating groups are (1) 

Market Access; (2) Agriculture; (3) Services; (4) Government Procurement; 

(5) Investment; (6) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR); (7) Competition 

Policy; (8) Dispute Settlement; and (9) Subsidies, Antidumping, and 

Countervailing Duties.9

 The completed FTAA agreement is to include trade 

rules, which each of the nine designated negotiating groups is currently 

working to establish; market-opening schedules; and a general text to cover 

overarching and institutional issues.

7

Free trade agreements generally eliminate tariff duties and other barriers on substantially 

all trade between the member countries and may include other provisions covering subjects 

such as investment and government procurement. Customs unions go beyond free trade 

agreements by not only eliminating duties between partners but also by setting common 

external tariffs applied to countries not party to the agreement.

8

NAFTA consists of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.

9

A subsidy is generally considered to be a financial contribution provided by a government 

that gives a benefit to a specific company, industry, or group of industries for the 

production, manufacture, or distribution of goods or services. Antidumping duties are 

imposed on “dumped imports” (i.e., imports sold at a price lower than normal value). 

Countervailing duties are imposed on subsidized imports.
Page 6 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 1: Organization of the FTAA Negotiations

Notes:

Current chairs of the various FTAA entities are in parentheses. The general objectives of each 

negotiating group and the Trade Negotiations Committee appear in italics.

The venue for the negotiating group discussions is Puebla, Mexico.

a

The Tripartite Committee, which provides technical support to the negotiations, is comprised of the 

Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Investment

(Panama)

Establish a fair and

transparent legal

framework to promote

investment

Dispute settlement

(Canada)

Establish a fair,

transparent, and

effective dispute

settlement mechanism

Intellectual property rights

(Dominican Republic)

Promote and ensure

adequate and effective

protection of intellectual

property rights

Services

(Caribbean Community)

Progressively

liberalize

trade in services

Subsidies, antidumping,

countervailing duties

(Argentina)

Enhance WTO compliance

and improve application of

trade remedy laws

Competition policy

(Peru)

Ensure anticompetitive

business practices

do not undermine

FTAA benefits

Market access

(Colombia)

Progressively eliminate

tariffs and nontariff

trade barriers

Government procurement

(Costa Rica)

Expand access to

government procurement

markets

Agriculture

(Uruguay)

Eliminate export subsidies;

address tariffs and other

trade-distorting practices

and SPSc measures

Committee of Government Representatives

on the Participation of Civil Society

(Bolivia)

Consultative Group on Smaller Economies

(Ecuador)

Co-chair of the negotiations

(Brazil and the United States)

Tripartite Committeea

Technical Committee

on Institutional Issues

(Chile)

Trade Negotiations Committee

Vice-ministers of Trade

(Brazil and the United States)

Guide negotiating groups and develop 

overall framework for the agreement

Ministers responsible for trade

Source: GAO.

Negotiating groups Other FTAA entities

Administrative Secretariatb
Page 7 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

b

The Administrative Secretariat supports the FTAA ministers, the Trade Negotiations Committee, 

negotiating groups, and other FTAA entities.

c

SPS stands for sanitary and phytosanitary measures. These measures are taken to protect human, 

animal, or plant life or health.

Until November 2002, the chairmanship of the entire negotiating process 

rotated in approximately 18-month cycles, with the beginning and end of 

each cycle marked by a ministerial meeting. Ecuador served as chair for 

the most recent cycle of negotiations, which began in April 2001 and ended 

with the November 1, 2002, FTAA ministerial in Quito, Ecuador. Brazil and 

the United States assumed the co-chairmanship of the FTAA process at the 

conclusion of the November meeting and are expected to remain in that 

role until the FTAA negotiations conclude in January 2005. Handling the 

negotiations as well as the co-chairs’ responsibility for the U.S. side is the 

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). In between ministerials, the FTAA 

negotiations are overseen by the vice ministerial-level Trade Negotiations 

Committee (TNC). The FTAA Administrative Secretariat, located in Puebla, 

Mexico, is the entity responsible for providing logistical and administrative 

support to the FTAA.

The Quito FTAA ministerial meeting took place during an uncertain 

economic and political period for the region. Countering perceived threats 

to U.S. security became a central focus of the Bush presidency in the wake 

of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. economy had 

already slowed by the time the terrorist attacks occurred and has 

performed unevenly since then. As for Latin America, it faces poor 

economic conditions and political instability (see fig. 2). Moreover, the 

International Monetary Fund expected regional output to fall in 2002 by 

0.6 percent, in part due to the economic crisis in Argentina. In addition, 

several countries elected new leaders in 2002, and the leaders have placed 

a priority on confronting domestic issues such as rising poverty. Finally, 

political instability in countries such as Venezuela, and ongoing violence in 

Colombia continued. This uncertainty has caused some hemispheric 

leaders to question the economic and social impacts of market-oriented 

reform. On the other hand, the need to increase exports has become even 

more imperative to Latin American countries’ growth and development. 
Page 8 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 2: Political and Economic Events in South America, December 2001–April 2003

Although the single most important goal for most FTAA participants is 

improving market access to other nations’ markets, achieving substantial 

liberalization will be difficult. Barriers to trade remain high: The tariffs of 

many FTAA participants are generally twice as high as the average U.S. 

tariff of 4.8 percent. Moreover, several indicators suggest trade within the 

region is lower than it could be. Intraregional trade within several regional 

subgroups remains relatively low (7.1 percent of total trade in CARICOM 

Dec

'01

Jan

'02

April

'02

May

'02

June

'02

Aug

'02

Oct

'02

Nov

'02

Dec

'02

July

'02

April 

'03

Argentine President 

Fernando de la Rua 

resigns. 

Eduardo Duhalde 

becomes President 

of Argentina. 

Interim President Adolfo Rodríguez Saá 

officially suspends payment on 

Argentina's international debt obligations.

Argentina ends 

its peso's 

decade-long 

link to the dollar.

Uruguay 

allows 

the peso 

to float 

freely.

Withdrawals from Argentine depositors 

in Uruguayan banks force Uruguay to 

temporarily suspend banking operations.

The Brazilian currency 

(the real) hits an all-time low.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez

remains in office after attempted coup.

Alvaro Uribe 

elected 

President 

of Colombia.

Gonzalo Sanchez 

de Lozada 

becomes 

President

 of Bolivia.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 

elected President of Brazil.

Col. Lucio Gutierrez 

elected President 

of Ecuador.

Ongoing protests 

by Venezuelans 

call for the 

resignation 

of President 

Hugo Chavez.

Argentina will elect a 

new President to take 

office at the end of May.

Source: GAO.
Page 9 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

and 10 percent in the Andean Community10 versus 46.9 percent in NAFTA). 

Certain nations, such as Brazil, export significantly less as a share of 

national income than other nations with similar-sized economies 

(13 percent versus 28 percent in Mexico). In addition, tariff revenue is an 

important source of government income for many FTAA nations 

(56 percent of total government revenue in the Bahamas and 43 percent in 

the Dominican Republic, versus just 1 percent in the United States and 

Canada).

Progress Achieved in 

Certain Areas Before 

and After Quito, but 

Extent and Pace of 

Movement on 

Substantive Issues a 

Concern to Some 

Participants

Before the Quito ministerial, FTAA participants had succeeded in laying a 

technical foundation for an eventual FTAA agreement by making progress 

in defining the remaining negotiating timetable, consolidating the draft 

text, and establishing the ground rules for liberalizing market access. (See 

fig. 3.) At Quito, negotiators achieved a number of positive procedural and 

political outcomes, such as confirming the schedule for upcoming market 

access negotiations and other negotiating meetings; reaffirming the 

political willingness to go forward; and launching a program to help 

developing nations negotiate, implement, and benefit from an FTAA. 

However, procedural progress on market access was not generally 

matched by substantive agreement on text-related issues, and some key 

deadlines were missed or only met by postponing or avoiding difficult 

decisions. 

10The Andean Community is a subregional organization endowed with an international legal 

status. The community consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The 

Andean Community is also a free trade area.
Page 10 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 3: History of the FTAA Negotiations, 1994–2002

Progress Made on Defining 

Timetable and Text

Since the formal launch of FTAA negotiations in 1998, the 34 participating 

countries have laid a technical foundation for concluding an FTAA 

agreement by setting a final deadline for completing the FTAA as well as 

establishing interim milestones to ensure steady progress toward that goal. 

By November 1999, the nine negotiating groups had prepared annotated 

outlines of chapters of an agreement. By April 2001, the negotiating groups 

had produced a draft text containing proposed trade rules on diverse 

subjects ranging from agriculture to competition policy. This draft was 

435 pages long, and it contained a compilation and consolidation of 

proposals for legal text received from FTAA participants. Participants 

described its production as marking important progress, because the draft 

laid the necessary groundwork and participants have agreed to use the 

draft as the basis from which negotiations will proceed. In addition, in 

publicly releasing the text, ministers responded to public calls for greater 

transparency (openness) and sought to build public understanding of and 

support for the FTAA.

In the 18 months leading to the Quito ministerial, the nine FTAA negotiating 

groups made progress in consolidating the draft text. Decision-makers 

clarified their policy choices by removing redundant language and 

consolidating similar proposals. For example, they shortened the 

intellectual property rights chapter from 106 pages to 53 pages. Moreover, 

the Technical Committee on Institutional issues, a special drafting 

1994 1996 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Develop structure, scope, and organization of negotiations Prepare annotated outlines Prepare draft text

Set ground rules for market 

access negotiations

Source: GAO.

December 1994

Summit of the Americas

Miami, Florida

March 1996

Second ministerial

Cartagena, Colombia

April 2001

Sixth ministerial

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Third summit

Quebec City, Canada

Initiation of

trade negotiations

March-April 1998

Fourth ministerial

San José, Costa Rica

Second summit

Santiago, Chile

June 1995

First ministerial

Denver, Colorado

May 1997

Third ministerial

Belo Horizonte, Brazil

November 1999

Fifth ministerial

Toronto, Canada

November 2002

Seventh ministerial

Quito, Ecuador
Page 11 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

committee created by the TNC for that purpose, submitted a draft text on 

general institutional issues. This draft text covers such topics as the 

purposes, objectives, and principles of the FTAA agreement as a whole; the 

scope and coverage of the FTAA’s obligations; and the institutional bodies 

that will provide political, administrative, and technical oversight for an 

FTAA. However, much of the text in the draft chapters remains within 

“brackets,” denoting lack of agreement among participants. This lack of 

substantive movement is a concern to some observers, given that only 

20 months remain until the January 2005 deadline for concluding an FTAA. 

Resolving these disagreements will require considerable work and hard 

bargaining to turn the accumulation of proposals currently on the table into 

a mutually agreed-upon, legally binding document. As we noted in our 

March 2001 report, the sheer scope and complexity of the trade rules 

contemplated will make this work difficult.11

Ground Rules for 

Liberalizing Market Access 

Established

A key goal of the Quito phase of FTAA negotiations was to set the ground 

rules (“modalities”) that would apply to negotiations on opening markets 

among FTAA members. These negotiations will be conducted in five of the 

nine FTAA negotiating groups: Agriculture, Government Procurement, 

Investment, Market Access, and Services. For example, FTAA nations 

needed to establish the starting point from which reduction of tariffs would 

begin (base tariff rates) and the time periods that would be used to 

progressively eliminate tariffs (phaseout periods). In order to speed the 

pace of liberalization, the United States sought to attain agreement to 

negotiate tariffs downward from existing (that is, currently applied) rates, 

rather than the higher rates that the WTO allows. Ministers set an April 1, 

2002, deadline for the five groups negotiating market opening to finalize 

recommendations on ground rules. Although most of those groups met this 

deadline, several presented the TNC with multiple options for 

consideration, rather than recommending one. For example, in the area of 

tariffs, the market access group noted that several options for base tariff 

rates had been proposed, including use of currently applied rates and use 

of WTO bound rates. (Bound rates are legal limits on tariff rates, and WTO 

members have agreed not to apply tariffs that exceed these rates. These 

rates are generally higher than currently applied rates).

11See GAO-01-552.
Page 12 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

With so many options to choose from, attaining consensus on the ground 

rules by the vice-ministerial-level TNC proved difficult. With a May 15, 2002, 

deadline for launching negotiations on market access looming, an April 

meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee was unsuccessful in 

finalizing agreement on ground rules. The meeting was reconvened on May 

12-13, 2002, and resulted in issuance of some of the required decisions, 

including the following on tariffs:

• All tariffs are subject to negotiation.

• Tariffs will be phased out over four time periods—immediate, no more 

than 5 years, no more than 10 years, and more than 10 years. Tariffs with 

shorter phaseouts will decline more rapidly, whereas tariffs placed in 

longer phaseout categories will be reduced at a slower pace.

• Tariff reductions will generally be linear. This means that tariffs will be 

lowered in equal amounts per year until they reach zero.

• The base tariff will be notified by October 15, 2002. (CARICOM was 

given until December 14, 2002).

Regarding nontariff issues, for services, the United States secured 

agreement that FTAA market access offers should be based on current laws 

and regulations and on international obligations or existing or improved 

opportunities. This means that offers will start from the status quo in terms 

of market access. For investment, the United States secured agreement 

that only exceptions to liberalization would be negotiated (known as a 

“negative” list approach).

However, the modalities package could not be finalized because of a 

disagreement over base tariff rates. In particular, CARICOM members 

argued that they could not agree to use current tariff rates as the base from 

which liberalization would begin, citing their dependence on tariff 

revenues and the vulnerability of their economies’ undiversified agriculture 

sectors to imports. Because FTAA negotiations decisions require all

34 participating nations to agree, the effect of the CARICOM objection was 

to defer a decision on base tariff rates.

After considerable efforts to cajole Caribbean nations into agreement, in 

late August 2002 the TNC finally agreed that, as a rule, the base tariff would 
Page 13 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

be the current tariff rates.12 The implication of this decision is that the 

actual lowering of most tariffs should begin immediately upon 

implementation of an eventual FTAA, rather than being delayed, as 

illustrated in figure 4. This is a significant change from the way tariff 

negotiations are negotiated in the WTO and should result in meaningful 

increases in market access as soon as the FTAA agreement is implemented.

Figure 4: Tariff Reduction Schedule under Different Base Tariff Scenarios, 2005–

2015

Note: As the dotted line indicates, if tariffs were being phased out over 10 years for a product currently 

subject to a 15-percent bound rate and a 10-percent applied rate, and the 15-percent bound rate were 

used as the basis for phasing out that tariff under the FTAA, no tariff reduction would occur for the first 

3 years after the agreement entered into force. The tariff rate also would be higher under the 15-

percent bound rate in years 4-10 than it would have been if a base rate of 10 percent had been used.

12Specifically, the TNC agreed that the base rate from which tariff liberalization will be 

negotiated is the most-favored-nation applied rate as of October 15, 2002. Regional 

subgroupings, such as Mercosur, that apply common external tariffs, were given until 

December 14, 2002, to present their base tariffs and until April 15, 2003, to adjust these 

tariffs; the base rate was set at the applied tariff rate as of January 1, 2004.

0

5

10

15

20

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: GAO.

Tariff rate

Year

Applied rate of 10 percent

Bound rate of 15 percent
Page 14 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

However, CARICOM was granted an exception to using the current tariff 

rates, which will allow it to use the higher WTO bound rate for a limited list 

of mainly agricultural goods.

Some Progress Made on 

Other Issues

In addition, during the months leading to the Quito ministerial, negotiators 

made some progress on other issues. Specifically, the negotiators agreed to 

hold regional outreach seminars for private interests such as 

environmental, consumer, and business. The first regional seminar for such 

“civil society” groups was for North America and was held in Mexico. 

(Other regional seminars for Mercosur and the Andean countries were 

scheduled but have been postponed due to regional economic crises and 

funding constraints, respectively.) Recognizing their responsibility to take 

the needs of smaller economies into account during the negotiating 

process, FTAA governments also adopted guidelines that direct 

participants to assess their needs on a case-by-case basis. Also, the United 

States began required consultation and advice procedures, including those 

required by Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation.13

Some Substantive Goals Not 

Fully Realized

Despite technical progress in consolidating the bracketed text and setting 

ground rules, the Quito phase of FTAA negotiations did not result in major 

movement in terms of substantive trade-offs. Much of the text remains in 

brackets, signifying lack of consensus. Negotiators made little real progress 

in resolving the many substantive differences among FTAA participants 

that we identified in our September 2001 report.14 In addition, although 

FTAA ministers set a goal to begin market access negotiations on May 15, 

2002, negotiations on specific market access commitment schedules did 

not begin at all during the phase ending at Quito on November 1, 2002.15

13Specifically, USTR solicited public input, requested advice from the U.S. International 

Trade Commission, conducted a public hearing, notified Congress of objectives for an FTAA 

agreement, and continued its environmental assessment of the FTAA.

14See GAO-01-1027.

15Most countries were required to notify their base tariff rates by October 15, 2002, and did 

so.
Page 15 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Instead, market access negotiations are now anticipated to begin in earnest 

after the presentations of initial offers in early 2003.16

Finally, the ground rules that were established for negotiations on topics 

such as services, investment, and government procurement leave 

important questions unanswered. For example, the services negotiating 

group had recommended that the TNC decide whether negotiations on 

services would proceed from a top-down or negative-list approach 

(whereby only exceptions to liberalization are negotiated) or, alternatively, 

from a bottom-up or positive-list approach (whereby only specifically 

negotiated items would actually be liberalized). However, the TNC decision 

on modalities is silent on this matter. Subsequent guidance indicates that 

FTAA nations can present offers in either manner. This lack of a uniform 

approach is expected to complicate the process of preparing and 

comparing offers and could thereby slow down future negotiations.

Some Positive Outcomes 

Achieved at Quito 

Ministerial

Ministers achieved most of their goals at the Quito ministerial. For 

example, ministers agreed upon specific timetables and instructions for 

FTAA negotiating bodies. Moreover, ministers reiterated their political 

commitment to continue FTAA negotiations and took steps to address 

concerns that civil society and smaller economies raised.

Procedural Basis Set The Quito ministerial meeting settled certain procedural matters and set 

goals and directions for the next 12 months of negotiations. Specifically, 

the ministers 

• set the schedule for negotiating group meetings for the first 2 months of 

the negotiating cycle;

• agreed to hold future ministerial meetings in the fourth quarter of 2003 

(in the United States) and in 2004 (Brazil);

• agreed that there will be at least three TNC meetings before the 2003 

ministerial meeting;

16The deadline for presenting initial offers was February 15, 2003. For a discussion on the 

status of the presentation of offers, see Market Access Offers Important for Momentum, but 

Substantial Liberalization Difficult section below.
Page 16 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

• named a slate of chairs for negotiating group committees that is 

considered strong by U.S. negotiators; and 

• provided other directions, such as requesting that the TNC develop a 

stocktaking report of overall progress made in the FTAA negotiations 

before the next ministerial meeting occurs.

On substantive matters, ministers set two key goals for the coming year. 

First, they confirmed that market access bargaining will begin with the 

putting forth of initial offers between December 15, 2002, and February 15, 

2003. They also set deadlines for initial requests and revised market access 

offers for June 15 and July 15, 2003, respectively. Second, negotiators were 

charged with “achieving consensus on the greatest possible number of 

issues” in the draft chapters containing the text of FTAA rules and 

institutional provisions. They also have responsibility for producing a 

revised version of the draft text chapters no later than 8 weeks before the 

next ministerial meeting in late 2003. The overall timetable for FTAA 

negotiations and key milestones for the current phase are depicted in 

figure 5. 
Page 17 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 5: FTAA Time Frames and Milestones, 2002–2005

Note: The TNC refers to the Trade Negotiations Committee. The TNC guides the work of the 

negotiating groups and other committees and groups and decides on the overall architecture of the 

agreement and institutional issues. The TNC is also responsible for ensuring the full participation of all 

the countries in the FTAA process, and transparency (openness) in the negotiations, as well as 

overseeing the Administrative Secretariat and overseeing the identification and implementation of 

business facilitation measures.

Political Willingness to Go 

Forward Restated

As we stated in our May 2001 report,17 the ultimate success or failure of 

efforts to establish the FTAA rests on meeting several long-term challenges, 

notably summoning the political will of participants to conclude a deal. On 

the political level, with the exception of Venezuela, at Quito all 34 FTAA 

nations restated their political will to move forward with an FTAA and to 

conclude it by January 2005.18 This political impetus was particularly 

noteworthy, given that it occurred at a time of economic uncertainty and 

November 2002

Quito, Ecuador:

Seventh FTAA

ministerial

November 2002–December 2005

January 2005

Deadline to conclude

FTAA negotiations

December 2005

Entry into force

of FTAA

February 2003

Deadline for 

submission of 

initial market

access offers

June 2003

Deadline for

submission of

requests for

improvements

to offers

September 2003

Submit a new

version of the 

chapters to the TNC

November 2003

Miami, Florida:

Eighth 

FTAA ministerial

2004

Brazil:

Ninth 

FTAA ministerial

(Date to be determined)

Source: GAO.

July 2003

Initiate the process for the

presentation of revised offers 

and subsequent negotiations

on improvements

Deadline for stocktaking 

report on agriculture

Submit to the TNC a revised 

version of the FTAA

text chapters

17See GAO-01-706.

18Venezuela reserved its position on the question of concluding FTAA negotiations by 2005, 

reiterating a reservation taken at the conclusion of the April 20-22, 2001, Summit of the 

Americas. 
Page 18 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

heightened political tensions, and with a new Brazilian administration. The 

Brazilian people elected this administration on October 27, 2002, 5 days 

before the Quito ministerial. However, numerous ministerial participants 

stressed the need for balanced progress and an equitable outcome. In 

particular, numerous participants used the forum provided by the Quito 

ministerial to say that the FTAA will go nowhere without meaningful 

agricultural liberalization and disciplines (rules) on subsidies and other 

practices that distort agricultural trade.

For its part, the United States made clear the importance it places on 

expanded hemispheric trade as a means of fueling growth, creating jobs 

and opportunity, and alleviating poverty. The USTR noted that it is already 

moving toward that goal bilaterally with Chile and five Central American 

nations as part of a U.S. strategy to foster competition in trade 

liberalization. Furthermore, the USTR stated that the United States is also 

prepared to move step by step toward hemispheric free trade if others turn 

back or simply are not ready. At Quito, the USTR urged all participants to 

consider how they can contribute to progress as FTAA negotiations enter a 

particularly serious phase. The USTR also urged other ministers to foster 

greater understanding and democratic debate on the FTAA.

Our March 2001 report identified securing greater public support as a key 

issue for FTAA negotiators, and at Quito, FTAA ministers signaled greater 

interest in doing so by taking several steps.19 To address concerns over 

transparency and to provide the public with a clear view of the proposals 

under discussion, the draft text of the FTAA agreement was publicly 

released in all four FTAA languages (English, French, Portuguese, and 

Spanish) immediately after the Quito ministerial’s conclusion. Moreover, 

the opening and closing sessions of the Quito ministerial were open to the 

public for the first time. Ministers also instructed the TNC to ensure a 

substantial increase in the quality of information provided to the public as 

negotiations progress and to identify and foster the use of best practices for 

outreach and consultation with civil society.

In addition, participants attempted to intensify and make more interactive 

ministers’ input from civil society. As host of the Quito meetings, Ecuador 

supported cooperative efforts by two Ecuadorian environmental groups to 

prepare constructive recommendations by organizing a 2-day forum. 

Ecuador also hosted a meeting at which those and other civil society 

19See GAO-01-552.
Page 19 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

representatives could present their recommendations directly to ministers. 

However, the breakdown in order at that meeting showed that civil 

society’s involvement in the FTAA is still a “work in progress.” Identifying 

civil society representatives and creating an atmosphere for constructive 

input and meaningful dialogue between civil society and the FTAA 

ministers are challenges the United States will face at the 2003 FTAA 

ministerial in Miami.

Hemispheric Cooperation 

Program Launched 

In March 2001, we reported that the FTAA faced a challenge in dealing with 

the varying resource capacity among participants.20 To deal with this 

challenge, the Quito ministerial announced and launched a Hemispheric 

Cooperation Program (HCP). This program will provide technical 

assistance to smaller economies for negotiating, implementing, and 

benefiting from an FTAA. It is intended to allay the concerns of the lessdeveloped FTAA economies over the impacts of trade liberalization. 

Several trade experts see this move as an important confidence-building 

measure for many FTAA participants. The purpose of the HCP is to create a 

framework for planning, prioritizing, and funding technical assistance in a 

more coordinated fashion. Countries such as Brazil have also expressed 

interest in providing in-kind support on such topics as conducting trade 

analysis. The next step is the development of national strategies to identify 

and prioritize capacity-building needs. According to USTR, each of the 

Central American countries engaged in bilateral negotiations with the 

United States has already prepared national strategies for capacity 

building. 

Key Challenges Exist 

for the Current 

Negotiating Phase

Despite progress made at Quito, current negotiations for an FTAA face 

three short-term challenges. First, there is a risk that lack of progress in 

negotiations at the WTO, particularly on agriculture, could cause a 

deadlock in FTAA talks. Second, an unambiguous demonstration of 

participants’ good faith through making meaningful offers to liberalize 

access to their markets is viewed by negotiators as critical to giving 

momentum to all aspects of the FTAA talks. However, this element may be 

difficult to achieve. Finally, there are concerns about the ability of the 

United States and Brazil to muster the political commitment necessary to 

see the FTAA process through to completion.

20See GAO-01-552.
Page 20 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Agriculture Progress 

Depends on WTO

The treatment of subsidies and other support for agriculture is a critical 

part of the FTAA trade agenda. A key issue is that of domestic support---

payments made to farmers that raise prices or guarantee income. Progress 

on this issue depends on the WTO negotiations, but there is concern that 

these talks are bogging down. Any delay at the WTO could make it difficult 

to achieve progress in the FTAA and ultimately imperil its conclusion by 

January 2005.

Agriculture Crucial to FTAA 

Negotiations

Agriculture is an important issue to all FTAA participants. As a major 

component of income in some Latin American countries such as Dominica, 

Guatemala, and Haiti, agriculture constituted approximately 17, 23, and

28 percent, respectively, of the gross domestic product in 2000. Other FTAA 

participants such as Argentina, Brazil, and the United States are major 

world producers of commodities such as coffee, oilseeds, sugar, soy, and 

beef, making agriculture an important item in their national trade agenda as 

well. Because of their interest in agriculture, many nations of the 

hemisphere were strong proponents of the new round of global trade talks 

launched in November 2001 that aim to achieve comprehensive agricultural 

reform at the WTO.

Agriculture is also an important component of an overall FTAA package. 

Several foreign officials with whom we spoke emphasized that the entire 

FTAA negotiations rested on making progress in agriculture negotiations. 

Furthermore, officials informed us that Latin American leaders do not want 

their constituents to perceive them as giving ground on issues of 

importance to the United States such as intellectual property rights and 

services without obtaining key concessions on priority issues for their 

countries, such as agriculture.

Among the agriculture issues on the FTAA trade agenda, domestic 

support21 — and U.S. domestic agriculture support in particular— seems to 

be a source of concern for many FTAA participants. In 1999, the United 

States provided $16.9 billion of trade-distorting domestic support, 

21The WTO agriculture agreement classifies agricultural domestic support into three 

categories identified by “boxes”: green (permitted), amber (trade-distorting subsidies that 

must be reduced), and blue (production-limiting programs). For the WTO, most of the 

domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade fall into the amber 

box. Thirty WTO members, eight of whom are FTAA participants (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 

Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, the United States, and Venezuela), have commitments to 

reduce their trade-distorting amber box supports. One proposal within the FTAA draft text 

would eliminate some of these supports.
Page 21 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

according to the most recent WTO member notifications. To put this in 

context, Antigua, Barbados, the Bahamas, and Jamaica all had national 

incomes (gross domestic products) of less than $8 billion in 1999. 

Furthermore, other large FTAA countries such as Brazil, Canada, and 

Mexico all spend considerably less in trade-distorting domestic support. 

Finally, with the passage of the U.S. Farm Bill in 2002,22 which covers farm 

spending until the end of 2007, U.S. domestic support for agriculture is 

projected to increase. 

Many FTAA participants believe that domestic agriculture support needs to 

be placed under stricter rules to ameliorate the U.S. advantage. 

Accordingly, certain countries are insisting that domestic agriculture 

subsidies be addressed in both the FTAA and the WTO negotiations. The 

current draft FTAA chapter on agriculture also includes a proposal to 

require countries that provide trade-distorting domestic support to 

eliminate it. 

The United States, by contrast, argues that the WTO is the appropriate 

forum to negotiate domestic support because, unlike tariffs, it is not 

possible to reduce domestic support on solely a regional basis. The U.S. 

rationale for relying on the outcome of WTO negotiations is that two 

primary users of domestic support in agriculture, the European Union (EU) 

and Japan, are not FTAA participants. Therefore, domestic support reform 

must take place in a forum like the WTO, where the EU and Japan are 

present, to avoid putting FTAA countries that subsidize farmers at a 

disadvantage in world markets. With such WTO negotiations now ongoing, 

the official U.S. position is that although all agricultural issues are still on 

the table for the FTAA negotiations, the FTAA countries must not do 

anything now that will prejudice their respective positions in these 

important global talks with extra-hemispheric trading partners. Canada 

also concurs with the U.S. position.

The Quito ministerial declaration highlights the link between FTAA and 

WTO negotiations and underscores the importance of making progress in 

all areas of the agriculture agenda. The Quito ministerial declaration also 

recognized the divergent positions among FTAA participants in 

22The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171, May 13, 2002).
Page 22 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

agriculture.23 In the declaration, ministers accepted the U.S. positions that 

(1) markets are global, (2) significant results in the WTO are necessary, and 

(3) third-country practices24 that distort trade must be taken into account. 

Ministers also recognized other countries’ positions that progress in FTAA 

agricultural market access negotiations depends on progress on domestic 

support, export subsidies, and other nontariff barriers.

However, the declaration also set a date to revisit overall progress in FTAA 

agriculture negotiations. Specifically, to ensure balanced progress and a 

timely conclusion of FTAA negotiations, ministers charged the FTAA 

Negotiating Group on Agriculture with preparing a report on progress 

achieved on all subjects on the FTAA’s agricultural negotiating agenda for 

presentation before the TNC’s fourteenth meeting. This meeting is 

scheduled for early July 2003. 

Outcome of WTO Negotiations 

Uncertain

The timing of the WTO negotiations represents a dilemma for FTAA 

negotiators because there is concern that WTO negotiations are behind 

schedule. Although interim deadlines were set to keep WTO negotiations 

on track, the December 2002 deadlines for agreeing on access to medicines 

and special and differential treatment for developing countries were 

missed. Moreover, a March 31, 2003, deadline to establish modalities, or the 

rules and guidelines for the negotiations on agricultural liberalization, was 

missed. The deadline was important, because participants were to have 

submitted comprehensive draft commitments for agriculture at the fifth 

WTO ministerial in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003 based on the rules 

and guidelines established in March. Additionally, we noted in a September 

2002 report on the WTO25 that meeting the deadline for establishing 

23Specifically, the Quito ministerial declaration states:

We recognize that, in a global market, we must have significant results in the negotiations on 

agriculture, both in the FTAA and in the WTO. In this context, we must also take into 

account the practices by third countries that distort world trade in agricultural products. We 

also recognize that our respective evaluation by country or group of countries, of the results 

in the market access negotiations in agriculture in the FTAA will depend on the progress we 

can reach in other subjects that are part of the agriculture agenda.

24Those practices by countries that are not FTAA signatories, yet distort intrahemispheric 

trade. For example, if a good exported from Japan to Brazil with the benefit of export 

subsidies caused U.S. exports to Brazil of the same good to decline, that transaction would 

be a trade-distorting practice by a third party. 

25See U.S. General Accounting Office, World Trade Organization: Early Decisions Are Vital 

to Progress in Ongoing Negotiations, GAO-02-879 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2002).
Page 23 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

agriculture modalities was a crucial indicator of the likelihood of success in 

the overall negotiations. USTR officials have noted that they and other 

countries’ delegations are currently working to minimize any negative 

impact missing the modality establishment deadline has on the overall 

negotiations.

A key factor hindering progress in the WTO agricultural negotiations is the 

pace and extent of reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).26

Current arrangements of the CAP are set to expire at the end of 2006, and 

the concern is that the European Commission27 will not have the flexibility 

to establish modalities without significant reform of the CAP. The 

Commission has recently unveiled a reform proposal for the European 

Council to consider that calls for decoupling subsidies from production to 

make them less trade distorting. However, opinions among EU members 

over CAP reform are divided, with countries such as Great Britain 

supporting ambitious reform and countries such as France vigorously 

opposing substantive changes. 

Because both the FTAA and WTO agreements are to be concluded as single 

undertakings, failure to conclude agreement in January 2005, in any of the 

areas of the WTO, could imperil the timely conclusion of an FTAA. In 

addition, the failure of WTO negotiators to establish agricultural modalities 

in March 2003 could have a large impact on the agricultural agenda 

assessment that the FTAA Negotiating Group on Agriculture expects to 

conduct in July 2003. At the FTAA Miami ministerial in November 2003, 

countries of the hemisphere will have a chance to evaluate the progress in 

agriculture made at the September 2003 WTO ministerial to determine if 

sufficient progress has been achieved. If progress is insufficient, key FTAA 

nations may be unwilling to move forward in other areas of the FTAA 

agreement. U.S. officials report that they are working to avoid this 

outcome. (See fig. 6 for an illustration of the linkage between the FTAA and 

the WTO agriculture negotiations.) 

26The CAP is a set of rules and regulations governing agricultural production in the EU. CAP 

rules cover most aspects of agricultural activity, including support to farmers, production 

methods, marketing, and controls over quantities of food that different agriculture sectors 

can produce.

27The European Commission is the EU’s executive body. It is responsible for implementing 

the European legislation (directives, regulations, decisions), budget, and programs adopted 

by Parliament and the European Council. The Commission negotiates international 

agreements on behalf of the EU and has the right to propose legislation to the European 

Council and the Parliament, the primary decision-making bodies.
Page 24 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 6: Relationship Between FTAA and WTO Agriculture Negotiations

Market Access Offers 

Important for Momentum, 

but Substantial 

Liberalization Difficult

Now that the ground rules for negotiating market access have been set, the 

current phase of FTAA negotiations will formally launch the exchange of 

liberalizing offers and requests. Many view this give-and-take as the true 

start of real negotiations. Initial offers, which negotiators presented in 

February 2003, will set the tone for this phase, and maintaining or 

increasing momentum is seen as critical to making progress.

Several hemispheric opinion leaders had expressed hope that the United 

States would make a good faith gesture, by presenting a significant offer, to 

give momentum to FTAA talks. The United States is the largest trading 

partner for virtually all of the countries in the FTAA. Preparing the U.S. 

offer involved developing tariff lists by the executive branch, in 

consultation with Congress and the private sector.

The U.S. offer was announced on February 11, 2003. The USTR believes 

that the U.S.’s initial market access offers are bold and provide a strong 

incentive for other countries to be equally ambitious. According to the 

USTR, about 65 percent of U.S. imports of consumer and industrial goods 

2003 2004 2005

July 2003

Negotiating Group on Agriculture progress 

report to Trade Negotiations Committee

November 20-21, 2003

Eighth FTAA ministerial in Miami, Florida

Stocktaking on all issues including agriculture

January 2005

Negotiations to conclude

March 31, 2003

Agriculture modality deadline

September 10-14, 2003

Fifth WTO ministerial in Cancun, Mexico

Draft commitments based on modalities established

January 1, 2005

Negotiations to conclude

FTAA deadlines

WTO deadlines

Source: GAO.
Page 25 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

from the hemisphere (not already covered by NAFTA) would be duty free 

immediately under the U.S. offer. U.S. imports of textiles and apparel 

would be duty free in 5 years, so long as other countries reciprocate. To 

further encourage reciprocal liberalization, the United States offered 

immediate elimination of tariffs on a reciprocal basis in key sectors such as 

chemicals, paper, steel, and wood. Although certain agricultural products 

such as sugar were placed in the longest phaseout category, the USTR 

emphasized that these products remain on the table for negotiation. 

Indeed, all U.S. tariff lines were included in the U.S. offer.

The U.S. market access offers differentiate among FTAA participants, 

meaning that the United States would apply different rates of duty to 

different FTAA partners during the transition to free trade. The bottom line 

is that some FTAA nations would be allowed quicker phaseouts of U.S. 

tariffs than others. The United States argues that this approach would 

allow it to accord smaller economies better treatment, a goal agreed to in 

principle by other FTAA nations, as well as provide greater leverage to 

negotiate market-opening concessions in large, lucrative markets. Others, 

notably Brazil, oppose this idea. Brazil’s concerns include the belief that 

Brazil would be placed in a relatively worse bargaining position compared 

with the United States under a strictly bilateral negotiating approach and 

that, at the end of the day, it would suffer disadvantageous treatment of its 

products with respect to other FTAA partners. Indeed, the initial U.S. offer 

would provide CARICOM with immediate duty-free access for 91 percent of 

its exports, versus 58 percent for Mercosur, the trading bloc that includes 

Brazil. Others have expressed concerns about potential losses of regional 

and subregional synergies in production, administrative complexity, and 

lack of transparency. On the other hand, nations that currently benefit from 

U.S. preference programs28 want to retain their preferential access to U.S. 

markets and thus welcome differential treatment.

All of the 33 other FTAA countries also met the February 15, 2003, deadline 

for submitting initial offers on industrial and agricultural market access. A 

USTR official welcomed the universal completion of this first step as 

important progress. However, he expressed hope that, with the U.S. offer 

on the table, others would be more forthcoming in the months ahead. Many 

FTAA countries made conservative initial market access offers. For 

example, contrary to the U.S. offer, several placed sizeable shares of their 

28These preference programs provide preferential duty-free entry into the United States for 

certain products.
Page 26 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

trade into the longest phaseout category or excluded some key items from 

liberalization. In addition, Mercosur and CARICOM nations indicated that 

they were not yet ready to present offers on government procurement and 

services. Regarding investment, Mercosur members Uruguay and Paraguay 

made offers, but Brazil and Argentina did not.

Questions of Commitment to 

FTAA by the United States and 

Brazil Remain 

Critical to the successful completion of this phase of negotiations is a clear 

political commitment to achieving an FTAA. During the course of our work 

on the FTAA, a number of participants have stressed that an FTAA 

agreement could be successfully concluded if the key Western Hemisphere 

leaders demonstrate that they have the political will to finalize the 

agreement. However, some observers have concerns about how competing 

priorities will affect key FTAA countries, notably the United States and 

Brazil.

Interpretation of U.S. Actions Is Mixed 

While the United States has taken some steps widely viewed in the 

hemisphere as positive, other actions have been perceived as inconsistent 

with FTAA goals. In our May 2001 report, we noted that President Bush said 

at the April 2001 Summit of the Americas that he would seek to complete 

three concrete steps by the end of 2001 to demonstrate the U.S.’s political 

commitment to the FTAA: (1) secure Trade Promotion Authority, (2) 

finalize a Free Trade Agreement with Chile, and (3) renew the Andean 

Trade Preference Act (ATPA).29 All three things have now been 

accomplished, although somewhat later than President Bush anticipated.

Other FTAA nations viewed the passage of TPA by the 107th Congress in 

August 2002 as a very positive development. Under this authority, the 

executive branch is required to consult regularly with Congress, and solicit 

advice from advisory committees and the public, as trade agreements are 

being negotiated. In return, Congress agrees not to amend legislation 

implementing trade agreements, voting up or down on these agreements. In 

addition, the law sets out parameters for negotiations dealing with such 

issues as agriculture, antidumping, labor, the environment, and investment. 

In some cases, the law places formal limits on the President’s flexibility to 

negotiate. However, none of these issues, which were already sensitive 

29The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) is a program providing for the duty-free entry of 

merchandise from designated beneficiary countries. ATPA was first enacted into law by the 

United States on December 4, 1991.
Page 27 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

domestically and are relevant to the FTAA, were taken off the table for 

negotiation. In some cases, such as investment, the guidance TPA provided 

has actually made it easier for the United States to negotiate, U.S. officials 

report.

Since TPA was secured, the United States has pushed forward on 

multilateral, regional, and bilateral fronts, including trade negotiations to 

establish a U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). In 

December 2002, the United States announced the substantive conclusion of 

free trade area agreements with Singapore and Chile as well. These 

agreements contain important breakthroughs in such areas as intellectual 

property rights and services. In addition, President Bush signed a 

presidential proclamation restoring and expanding benefits under the 

Andean Trade Preference Act.

While this renewed U.S. engagement in trade liberalization efforts is 

generally seen as energizing FTAA talks, and is viewed by USTR as 

complementary, there is some concern that such other considerations may 

affect U.S. leadership within the FTAA. First, some FTAA nations have 

complained about other U.S. trade actions taken in 2002, notably 

imposition of restrictions on steel imports and passage of a new farm bill 

(P. L. 107-171) that substantially increases subsidies to American farmers 

through 2007. Second, some FTAA participants view the many bilateral 

negotiations the United States has engaged in, both within and outside the 

hemisphere, as indicative of a lack of U.S. commitment to the FTAA itself. 

Brazil’s Commitment Unclear

FTAA participants are also looking to Brazil to affirm its political 

commitment to FTAA negotiations. Even before Brazil’s recent presidential 

election, concerns existed about Brazil’s commitment to the FTAA process. 

Although Brazil has actively participated in the negotiations, observers say that 

Brazil has appeared reticent to decisively embrace an FTAA. Brazilian officials 

admit that Brazil has held back during the negotiations because they believe the 

United States is not ready to negotiate on issues of greatest interest to Brazil, such 

as high tariffs on key Brazilian exports and trade remedies. Moreover, according 

to press reports, before his election as President of Brazil in October 2002, Luiz 

Inacio Lula da Silva made this comment about the FTAA: “As it is being 

proposed by the United States, the FTAA is not an integration proposal, it is 

annexation politics, and our country won’t be enclosed.” Since being 

elected, however, the new Brazilian administration has pledged to continue 

to negotiate in good faith to conclude a mutually beneficial FTAA and has 
Page 28 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

promised to honor all commitments made. Nevertheless, perhaps because 

of the newness of the administration, Brazilian participation in the FTAA 

process has slowed down, and Brazil has announced that it needs 

additional time to prepare market access offers on services, investment, 

and government procurement. 

Gaps in U.S. 

Preparations for Cochairmanship and 

Hosting of Miami 

Ministerial May Pose 

Risks 

The United States faces several risks as it takes on the responsibility, 

together with Brazil, of guiding the FTAA process forward to a successful 

conclusion. These risks include (1) handling an increased workload as cochair with the pace of negotiations intensifying, and without a 

commensurate increase in resources; (2) serving as co-chair with Brazil, a 

novel situation; and (3) hosting a November 2003 ministerial meeting for all 

the trade ministers of the hemisphere and their delegations, which requires 

expertise, planning, funding, and security preparations. 

Workload and Negotiating 

Pace to Increase, but 

Resources Not 

Commensurate

As the USTR assumes the co-chairmanship of the FTAA negotiations, it 

faces a heavy expansion of its workload. At the same time, its resources, in 

particular the staff dedicated to the co-chairmanship, are not expected to 

increase commensurately. Some past chairs have warned that this situation 

may lead to a slowdown in the FTAA process.

Workload and Negotiating Pace 

to Increase

A major challenge for the USTR as it assumes responsibility as co-chair of 

the FTAA process will be handling the increased workload without an 

increase in staff. Demands on USTR’s resources will be particularly high in 

the fall of 2003, when USTR’s responsibilities as co-chair of the 

negotiations and host of the ministerial will intensify. The co-chair’s formal 

tasks are considerable. They include

• coordinating with Brazil on a daily basis;

• providing guidance and management coordination to the FTAA 

Administrative Secretariat; 

• providing guidance to the negotiating groups and committees; 

• co-chairing TNC meetings; 

• co-chairing the TNC Subcommittee on Administration and Budget, 

including setting the calendar of meetings; and 
Page 29 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

• vice-chairing the Technical Committee on Institutional Issues. 

In addition to the roles and responsibilities of the co-chair, another factor 

placing additional demands on the USTR is the intensifying pace of the 

negotiations during the final phase of negotiations. The goals for this final 

phase are ambitious. In order to meet FTAA completion time frames, 

participants aim to conclude negotiations in all nine trade negotiating 

groups. However, initial market access offers are just starting. FTAA 

participants must also agree on all issues currently under brackets in the 

draft text. The U.S.’s goal is to have a largely clean text by the end of 2003. 

To reach these goals, negotiations have been scheduled for practically 

every day during the next 6 months.

Competing negotiating priorities, and their commensurate resource needs, 

may also affect the USTR’s resources. Several U.S. negotiators told us that 

what they primarily require to conclude an FTAA successfully is to be able 

to focus on it with single-minded energy and determination. But other 

negotiations are competing for their time and attention. For example, the 

USTR has notified Congress of its intent to pursue Free Trade Agreements 

(FTA) with Central America, Australia, the South African Customs Union,30

and Morocco and has started negotiations toward this end. Meanwhile, the 

Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations involving 146 nations and a 

similarly broad set of issues will officially be at the midpoint at the 

September 2003 WTO ministerial. This ministerial is to be held in Cancun, 

Mexico, only 2 months before the FTAA ministerial in Miami. Some of the 

same USTR staff are involved in these concurrent negotiations. In addition, 

negotiations with Chile and Singapore officially concluded at the end of 

2002, but the agreements must still be finalized and undergo congressional 

approval.

Resources May Not Be Adequate In terms of resources, the U.S. team negotiating the FTAA—though 

perceived as highly capable—is small and stretched thin. Other nations we 

have contacted have had eight or more staff working to fulfill FTAA 

chairmanship responsibilities. These staff handle such demands as drafting 

negotiating schedules and documents and providing regular coordination 

with other FTAA nations, negotiating groups, and the FTAA Administrative 

Secretariat. According to a USTR official, Brazil currently has six staff 

dedicated to the co-chair function and plans to hire an additional three in 

early 2003. Ecuador had eight people working on substantive issues and 

30A customs union including South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland.
Page 30 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

additional people working on logistics. Canada had eight people, with 

access to others for special projects. Like past chairs, USTR has dedicated 

some staff specifically to the co-chair function, while other USTR staff 

work on advancing the U.S. position in the negotiations. Presently, USTR 

has two staff working full-time on the day-to-day FTAA co-chairmanship 

tasks. Two other staff members currently devote some of their time to the 

co-chair function. USTR has been given an additional slot for an FTAA 

director and plans to fill it with a permanent staff member working fulltime on the co-chairmanship soon. In terms of support by other agencies, 

the USTR presently is receiving little direct or indirect assistance in 

fulfilling the U.S.’s co-chair responsibilities, although a Justice Department 

detailee (person on loan to USTR) is one of the two part-time co-chair staff 

and also helps with leading the U.S. delegation, and a Department of State 

economic officer in Brazil has been made available to assist in coordinating 

with Brazil on FTAA co-chairmanship issues. As well, the Department of 

Commerce is temporarily staffing one of the two full-time co-chair USTR 

positions.

With respect to overall personnel, USTR as a whole is relatively small—

having been set up to coordinate policy among and draw expertise from 

executive branch agencies such as the Departments of State, Commerce, 

Agriculture, and the Treasury. As past negotiations have become more 

intense, other agencies have often provided staff on a nonreimbursable 

“detail” (on loan) basis to augment USTR staff quickly. For example, 

according to a USTR official, at the height of the Uruguay Round of WTO 

negotiations, 45 staff from other agencies were detailed to USTR, versus 

30 staff on detail now. These agencies have also given other support, such 

as assigning staff to handle major aspects of USTR negotiations while 

residing at their own agencies. USTR is hoping to resume the practice of 

using such support and has begun seeking additional details from other 

agencies. In mid-March, USTR announced that a senior Department of 

State official will be loaned to the agency effective June 23, 2003, and will 

advance U.S. positions in the negotiations as head of the U.S. delegation to 

the FTAA’s TNC. Another State detailee is expected to be provided this 

summer, to work full-time in the co-chair function. However, caps on their 

funding and other concerns may make other agencies reluctant to detail 

additional people to USTR on a nonreimbursable basis. These agencies also 

need lead time to make arrangements and identify staff with the requisite 

expertise.

In discussions with us, several past FTAA chairs have warned that the 

consequence of U.S. failure to adequately staff the co-chairmanship could 
Page 31 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

be a slowdown of FTAA negotiations, which are, with the launch of market 

access talks on February 15, 2003, reaching a critical juncture. Any 

slowdown could make it difficult to achieve substantial results by the 

November 2003 Miami ministerial.

Co-chairing with Brazil Is 

Novel Situation

Many officials and trade experts view the idea of the United States serving 

as co-chair with Brazil as a bold and useful way of providing the leadership 

and commitment needed from two of the most important players at a 

crucial time in the FTAA negotiations. At the same time, however, cochairing is expected to be more difficult than chairing by a single country. 

All decisions, both mundane and substantive, will have to be agreed to by 

both countries. The co-chairmanship arrangement is novel because up until 

now, only individual countries have acted as chairman of the FTAA process. 

Officials at USTR told us that the operating vision is that the cochairmanship will be a true partnership, with both countries making 

decisions based on achieving consensus on every aspect of the process 

throughout the 2 remaining years of negotiations. Such a true U.S.-Brazil 

co-chairmanship may have certain advantages. For example, the fact that 

Brazil and the United States will be guiding the process simultaneously as 

co-chairs during the final phase of negotiations could facilitate consensus 

building. If either the United States or Brazil had singly undertaken this 

responsibility, some members might not have perceived their stewardship 

as balanced. 

Some FTAA participants told us, however, that co-chairing will be more 

difficult than chairing by a single country. One foreign official speculated 

that if all decisions require consensus, the co-chair structure would double 

the work and the time necessary to reach decisions or perform tasks. A 

USTR official confirmed this view and stated that even every letter has to 

be signed by both countries. Former FTAA chairs told us that the two 

countries have very different interests in the FTAA and, if such political 

considerations play a role in decision-making, stalemates or further delays 

could result. Another foreign official told us that differences in 

governmental structures and bureaucratic systems in which the USTR and 

Brazil’s foreign ministry operate may also create difficulties.

In addition to the operating difficulties, U.S. working relations with Brazil 

are still uncertain. Brazil had been unwilling to discuss anything more than 

the technicalities of the co-chairmanship until its new President took office 

in January 2003. More recently, however, there have been several working 

meetings in an effort to clarify Brazil’s views and solidify working relations. 
Page 32 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Moreover, the U.S. and Brazil co-chairs have taken steps to provide active 

leadership and coordination of the negotiating process by, for example, 

meeting with the chairmen of each FTAA negotiating group well in advance 

of the April TNC meeting to identify issues requiring decisions or guidance.

In meeting its responsibilities as co-chair for moving the process forward, 

the United States will need to keep separate the interests of the 

34 countries, or the process as a whole, from those of the United States as 

negotiator. Brazil, for its part, will have three roles to keep in mind — its 

own negotiating positions, those of Mercosur, and that of the FTAA.

Risks to Successfully 

Hosting November 2003 

Miami Ministerial Have Not 

Been Fully Mitigated 

The United States will host the Eighth FTAA Trade Ministerial in Miami in 

November 2003, just 7 months from now, a considerable responsibility. This 

ministerial is particularly significant because it occurs just a year before 

the slated conclusion of FTAA and WTO negotiations. The responsibilities 

of an FTAA host are numerous and include several elements critical for a 

successful event. Preparations for the ministerial are at an early stage, 

however, and, if left unfilled, gaps in the current U.S. plans for hosting the 

ministerial pose risks to achieving a successful event. Risks that the USTR 

has not yet fully mitigated include its inexperience in hosting a major 

ministerial meeting, working with plans that have not been fully defined, 

counting on funding that has not been secured, and arranging security for 

numerous participants and protesters. Failure to address any of these risks 

could undermine the success of the meeting. These same kinds of risks also 

contributed to serious problems at the last major trade ministerial that the 

United States hosted, the 1999 Seattle WTO ministerial. USTR and the 

Miami organizers recognize that intense U.S. efforts will be necessary to fill 

these gaps.

To evaluate USTR’s readiness to perform as host, we undertook a three-part 

analysis. First, we obtained information about the formal responsibilities of 

FTAA host countries from USTR. We also obtained official documents of 

the FTAA and held conversations with past FTAA hosts, the results of 

which are reported in the first section below. Second, we solicited advice 

from persons with experience in planning and conducting such meetings, 

including responsible officials of past FTAA host nations, former USTR 

officials involved in planning the Seattle WTO ministerial, and officials at 

the State Department’s Office of International Conference Planning and 

Economics Bureau. These officials had been involved in planning past 

trade ministerials hosted or attended by the United States, as well as other 

international conferences. Through these interviews with “cognizant 
Page 33 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

officials,” we identified factors critical for success as well as suggestions 

for steps USTR could take to adequately prepare for its responsibilities as 

host of the November FTAA ministerial. Third, we obtained information 

about the state of USTR preparations for the November FTAA ministerial 

through interviews with responsible officials and reviews of available 

documentation from USTR and Miami concerning timelines, plans, 

budgets, guidance, and organization. In addition, as it became clear that 

USTR was relying heavily on the Miami organizing group for fulfilling key 

requirements, we discussed the status of their efforts with both the 

executive director and the chairman of the board of that group, as well as 

with officials of Florida FTAA. This information on the actual status of U.S. 

FTAA ministerial plans follows our initial discussion of responsibilities and 

requirements for hosting the ministerial.

Responsibilities of the Host of an 

FTAA Ministerial Are Numerous

Executing the many responsibilities of an FTAA ministerial host is critical, 

given the importance of ministerial meetings in the negotiations. These

meetings of trade ministers from the 34 FTAA member countries provide 

political guidance and impetus to the negotiating process. The November 

meeting in Miami is particularly important, because it is the last ministerial 

before the talks’ conclusion and will occur just 13 months before the 

January 2005 deadline set for FTAA nations to conclude the talks. At the 

Miami ministerial, the range of issues facing ministers may be complex, 

requiring political guidance from the ministers in order to move forward. 

Furthermore, because issues that are important to key FTAA participants, 

such as agriculture, are tied up in WTO talks, the extent of progress at the 

WTO ministerial in September 2003 may result in an overall reassessment 

of the FTAA’s scope and timeline.

The host of an FTAA ministerial has numerous complex responsibilities. 

These responsibilities are detailed in a 29-page, single-spaced document 

that the FTAA Administrative Secretariat prepared. The host is generally 

responsible for providing facilities, transportation, and security for both 

the ministerial and the Trade Negotiations Committee meeting, a meeting 

of vice ministers that precedes the ministerial. In addition, a separate 

forum for the business community typically accompanies FTAA 

ministerials. Civil society groups also held a forum at the Quito ministerial. 

Each of these events involves hundreds of people, including many highlevel officials requiring appropriate protocol and special security measures. 

Further, hosts are required to provide simultaneous translation during all of 

the negotiations and the other meetings, including immediate distribution 

of written documents to delegates.
Page 34 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Coordination and security during all these activities is complex. For 

example, the business community and civil society groups were given the 

opportunity to provide input to the ministers at Quito. However, managing 

the participation of the business community and civil society groups and 

ensuring consideration of their views remain challenges. For example, at 

the Quito ministerial, both the business community and civil society groups 

prepared recommendations to be presented to the ministers. The structure 

and length of the business community presentation, however, made it 

difficult for ministers to take in all the input that the business community 

had prepared. Nevertheless, compared with the business community’s 

presentation, the civil society groups’ presentations were chaotic. 

Protesters in the audience disrupted the presentation, and serious security 

concerns arose, as many protesters were very vocal and, in one case, 

threatened a presenter. In fact, the final presenter was unable to speak over 

the noise, and the presentation ended with an unceremonious exit of the 

ministers out a side door. A key goal of the Miami organizers is to make the 

presentations at this November’s separate business and civil society forums 

more targeted, timely, and orderly so they can be factored into ministerial 

deliberations.

The task of the United States as host is especially complex, because it is 

now standard practice to rely on host cities to supply most of the resources 

associated with conducting international meetings held here, according to 

a Department of State official. As a result, USTR must coordinate actively 

with local officials and oversee host city preparations to ensure they are 

satisfactory. It is also essential to begin planning early for the ministerial, 

according to officials with experience in planning similar events. 

Several Factors Critical to 

Success; Certain Steps 

Recommended

Our discussions with cognizant officials suggest that hosts must have 

several basic factors in place to fulfill the responsibilities outlined above 

(see fig. 7). Particularly important is having (1) experienced staff capable of 

bringing together all the different components including logistics, 

budgeting, and procurement; (2) a plan that clearly sets forth roles, 

responsibilities, and timelines; (3) access to funds to pay for expenses; and 

(4) assurance of adequate security. This latter item must be paramount, 

given the antiglobalization protests that have accompanied past FTAA and 

other trade ministerials, and the heightened concerns over terrorism.
Page 35 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Figure 7: Keys to a Successful Ministerial

The U.S. Department of State does not have written guidance on how to 

plan such events, according to a State official. However, in discussing the 

November FTAA meeting, cognizant officials with experience in planning 

similar meetings, including former USTR officials, have offered the 

following suggestions for hosting a successful event. Essential to such an 

event would be

• consulting previous FTAA hosts in order to define requirements and 

responsibilities;

• clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the host city and the 

federal government, preferably through a memorandum of 

understanding; 

• creating a budget for the event; 

• assuring that adequate funding is available through monitoring of host 

city fund-raising and requesting agency appropriations if necessary; and

• getting assistance from the Department of State, other federal agencies, 

and/or a management firm with experience in planning major events.

Gaps in USTR Preparations Pose 

Risks

Successful U.S. execution of the November 2003 FTAA ministerial requires 

intense preparations to fill remaining gaps in current U.S. preparations in 

the areas of expertise, planning, funding, and security. While USTR has lead 

responsibility for the ministerial, USTR has little experience in planning 

Keys to a Successful Ministerial

Experienced and capable staff

A plan that clearly set forth roles,

responsibilities, and timelines

Access to adequate funds

Ample security for participants

Source: GAO.
Page 36 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

trade ministerials, and it is receiving limited assistance from other agencies 

with expertise in planning major international diplomatic events, due to 

resource constraints. Funding has not been secured: As of March 27, a final 

budget for the event does not exist, local fund-raising has just begun, and 

no federal agencies have received funding for the FTAA ministerial meeting 

in Miami. As well, security will be critical because the estimated number of 

protesters ranges from 20,000 to 100,000 people. Although the USTR’s 

current plans for hosting the ministerial address several of these 

challenges, they do not fully mitigate the risks we identify.

USTR Lacks Experience, but Miami Organizers Have Track Record 

as Host

USTR has never had sole responsibility for planning a major trade 

ministerial hosted by the United States. The last trade ministerial that the 

United States hosted was the Seattle WTO ministerial in 1999. There, USTR 

received substantial assistance from Department of State officials with past 

experience in planning major international meetings as well as from the 

WTO’s Conference Services Department. Even so, financial and security 

concerns not fully mitigated before the event caused serious logistical and 

security problems and higher-than-expected costs. These problems 

included bitter disagreements with the host city over roles and 

responsibilities, jeopardizing key logistical arrangements such as 

transportation and build-out of the convention center; costs that far 

exceeded initial estimates; and security lapses that delayed sessions, put 

delegates at risk of physical harm, and caused extensive property damage.

Furthermore, the agency has relatively little experience in this area. 

Currently, USTR has four permanent staff working part-time on planning 

the FTAA ministerial, with others at USTR assisting. One of these staff has 

significant experience in logistics, security, and administration, and that 

person has been put in charge of these areas for the Miami FTAA 

ministerial. Although other USTR staff have been involved in arranging U.S. 

participation in trade ministerials held abroad, hosting a trade ministerial is 

much more complicated than arranging U.S. participation. The host is 

responsible for all aspects of the meeting, not just its own delegation.

Furthermore, this gap in experience is not being overcome by receiving 

assistance from other agencies with the necessary expertise, according to 

USTR officials. The USTR has requested State’s assistance in planning the 

Miami ministerial, and discussions on specific assistance State can provide 

are ongoing. The State Department reports that it is trying to respond 
Page 37 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

positively to assistance requests where possible, given its own budgetary 

constraints. One of the reasons for State’s reluctance to help is that its 

budget for participation in international conferences has been cut. In fiscal 

year 1995, State was receiving $6 million for participation in international 

conferences. By fiscal year 1999, this appropriation had been discontinued, 

with no commensurate increase to USTR’s budget for trade meetings. The 

Department of State has suggested that USTR consider hiring a 

management firm, but USTR has not budgeted for that expense and does 

not believe that hiring an outside firm would provide cost benefits for the 

agency.

With little assistance from State or elsewhere,

31 and limited experience in 

hosting major events, USTR plans to rely heavily on Miami’s expertise to 

carry out the November 2003 meeting. Miami has considerable expertise in 

hosting major events. The city has hosted numerous major sporting events 

such as Super Bowls and Orange Bowls. Importantly, Miami hosted the 

1994 Summit of the Americas, which involved 34 heads of state and started 

the process of creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas. According to the 

Miami organizing group, the summit was successful. The organizers of that 

meeting used an arrangement similar to that of the upcoming Miami 

ministerial, where a combination of private and public funds paid for the 

summit and local organizers took the lead in making logistical 

arrangements. The person responsible for planning the Summit of the 

Americas is the same one who is leading the Miami organizing group for the 

November FTAA ministerial. This individual also coordinated U.S. 

participation in the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City. He 

is familiar with FTAA events by virtue of attendance at several of the FTAA 

ministerials that have been held thus far as well as the associated Americas 

Business Forums. He recently held a 2-day meeting in Miami with all seven 

previous FTAA/Americas Business Forum hosts to obtain information and 

advice, and these past hosts have also agreed to provide the Miami 

organizers with ongoing advice. Moreover, Miami also has the necessary 

infrastructure in place to host major events, according to the organizing 

group. In addition to having experienced staff, Miami also served as the site 

of FTAA negotiations from 1998 to 2001. However, this experience was not 

entirely positive, and lessons learned from this experience have been 

31The State Department has committed to providing one administrative officer for 2 weeks 

prior to the conference and to provide an administrative officer to assist during the 

ministerial meeting. It has also agreed to providing advice and guidance to USTR and to 

share lessons learned from past experience.
Page 38 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

incorporated into the planning for the Miami ministerial, according to 

USTR. 

While Miami does have expertise, an official from the Miami organizers 

informed us that they would like a full-time staff person from the federal 

government to be detailed to Miami in a liaison capacity as soon as possible 

to work with the Miami organizers (as had been done for the Summit of the 

Americas). The liaison would, among other things, formalize the shared 

responsibility for the event and augment coordination between federal and 

local authorities. The desire for a locally based federal liaison was based on 

the assumption that the workload, and hence need for intense 

coordination, would increase as the ministerial drew closer.

Plans for Ministerial in Early 

Stages

Both the federal government’s and Miami’s plans for hosting the November 

2003 ministerial are in early stages as of March 1, 2003. To get a sense of the 

general timeline to keep in mind when planning the November FTAA 

meeting in Miami, we interviewed cognizant officials who served as former 

hosts at FTAA ministerial meetings, officials at State, and former USTR 

officials. These officials indicated that planning for a November ministerial 

usually begins in January. Implementation of the plan should begin in 

March, with an acceleration of plans in October shortly before the 

ministerial. USTR officials responsible for planning the FTAA ministerial 

agreed on this general timeline, and, citing specific areas of progress, 

believe they are “on track” as of March 26, 2003.

On the federal government side, USTR has obtained a guide that the FTAA 

Administrative Secretariat prepared for host countries detailing the basic 

logistical requirements of a ministerial. USTR is using this guide to plan the 

FTAA ministerial in Miami. USTR has also prepared a timeline for security, 

logistical, and administrative services for Miami to use in planning the 

event. A rough division of labor between the federal government and the 

host city appears to have been agreed upon, whereby the host city will take 

care of most logistical arrangements, and USTR staff will provide guidance 

and oversight of security, logistics, and administrative issues through 

regular contact with and visits to Miami. In addition, USTR plans to draft 

some guidance documents, such as the memorandums of understanding 

that will be signed between the host committee and the entities to be 

contracted with for services.

On the host city side, Miami has formed a group to organize the ministerial 

and the Americas Business Forum. This group became operational in 

February 2003 and has hired an executive director for the FTAA ministerial 
Page 39 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

planning effort. Several staff for the organization are now on board, and 

more are expected. The executive director has put together a management 

committee to organize the meeting. The Miami organizing group reports 

that it has established an extensive support network of partners from both 

the public and the private sectors and is already receiving in-kind staff 

support from several municipalities. It plans to utilize contractors and 

volunteers to supplement these resources as appropriate. The group has 

also created a fund-raising committee specifically to raise funds for the 

Miami ministerial, according to a Miami organizer.

Some of the specific tasks identified in the FTAA guidelines have been 

accomplished, and more are in process. For example, in terms of 

accommodations for delegates and meeting space, locations have been 

selected and reserved, rates negotiated, and registration arrangements 

established. Several transportation arrangements have been made, 

although important details must still be ironed out.

Despite this progress, the USTR and Miami both agree that much remains 

to be done between now and the November 2003 ministerial. Among other 

things, a budget that clearly outlines funding sources and responsible 

parties must be finalized; meeting space configured; a security plan 

developed; and arrangements for providing credentials, translation, 

administrative support, and other services made. For example, 

requirements for telecommunications, computer, audiovisual, and related 

equipment must be finalized and needed equipment and services obtained. 

The FTAA Administrative Secretariat requires the United States to provide 

it and delegates with details of the U.S. arrangements for the November 

FTAA ministerial by late September 2003. Making all of the required 

arrangements by then will require intense preparations on the part of both 

the USTR and Miami officials, both agree. Executing the plan and updating 

it as necessary will occupy officials between mid-September and November 

2003.

Funding Has Not Been Secured, and Funding Responsibilities Are 

Still Unclear 

Serious risks are involved in the USTR’s plans to rely on the host city to 

assume responsibility for the majority of the costs. Although some 

requirements can be met through in-kind contributions, securing necessary 

funds generally requires considerable lead time, and expenses that require 

an outlay of funds are expected to be incurred within the next 2 months. No 

federal agency has received funding for this event. The organizing group 
Page 40 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

does not yet have a final budget and has just begun fund-raising, although 

USTR and the Miami organizers anticipate that a budget will be finalized 

and funding responsibilities will be clarified by mid-April. 

Relying on the host city to pay the majority of the costs is a model the 

United States has followed at past summits and trade ministerials where a 

host committee, or an organizing group composed of local representatives 

associated with the host city, paid for the majority of the costs. Miami 

worked with this model when it hosted the 1994 Summit of the Americas. 

Some experiences with host committees have been unsuccessful, however. 

For example, at the 1999 Seattle WTO ministerial, decisions to rely on the 

host committee and the committee’s ultimate failure to raise sufficient 

funds caused problems at the meeting. In addition, costs kept escalating as 

year-long planning efforts continued, ultimately reaching $24 million. This 

amount is considerably higher than the December 1998 budget of 

$9 million. Financial shortfalls resulted in part from inherent difficulties 

that USTR encountered in having a private group fund the Seattle 

ministerial. For example, the Seattle organizers were not permitted to sell 

tickets to donors or recognize contributions (similar rules will apply for the 

host committee in Miami). The Seattle host committee ultimately fell far 

short of its fund-raising goals and only paid for one-fourth of associated 

costs. The local, state, and federal governments paid the remainder, with 

the local and state governments covering the bulk of these costs, or around 

$17 million. To satisfy the federal government’s share, the USTR requested 

a $1.3-million supplemental appropriation that was shared between USTR 

and the State Department. The State Department paid an additional 

$1.2 million, and the city of Seattle also received a $3.8-million partial 

reimbursement from the federal government to help defray its substantial 

costs; these costs were for security only. Thus, all told, the federal 

government ended up paying $6.3 million for the Seattle WTO ministerial, 

an event that is admittedly larger in scale than the FTAA ministerial.

No federal agency has yet received funding for the FTAA ministerial. The 

USTR has only requested $200,000 for the FTAA ministerial, but this is in 

the fiscal year 2004 budget year that begins October 1, 2003. At a minimum, 

USTR will have to pay for the expenses of its staff participating in the 

event, for setting up and staffing a fully equipped “control room”— an 

office in which U.S. delegates can work—for basic translation services, and 

for certain aspects of security. To minimize some expenses, USTR will 

utilize computers and other equipment procured for the Cancun WTO 

ministerial to set up control rooms at the Miami FTAA ministerial. USTR 

has asked the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to submit a request 
Page 41 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

for a $1.3-million supplemental appropriation for this WTO-related 

procurement, but OMB has not yet approved this request.

Furthermore, USTR has no back-up plan in the event that its costs exceed 

the amount it has requested or the host city does not meet its fund-raising 

goals. For example, the USTR plans to ask other federal agencies 

participating in the ministerial to pay for their own expenses. This 

approach has been used in past ministerials, such as the Doha WTO 

ministerial, with mixed success. At Doha, for example, USTR ultimately 

absorbed nearly $1 million in costs after other agencies withdrew or failed 

to provide pledged funding. In terms of the financial support expected from 

Miami, USTR has sought to forestall any possible funding difficulties 

through an agreement with the Miami organizers on a series of fund-raising 

principles and periodic status reports from Miami on the amounts of money 

raised. Miami will rely on its business community as well as on state and 

local government contributions in kind and in cash to meet its fund-raising 

goals. The four municipalities involved have drafted a memorandum of 

understanding regarding their financial support of the meeting under which 

they agree to provide in-kind and cash support according to a yet-to-be 

specified formula.32 However, this agreement allows signatories to 

withdraw from the arrangement if they determine that they can no longer 

financially participate. As yet, the Miami organizing group has not finalized 

its fund-raising goals or begun fund-raising in earnest. However, the USTR 

and the Miami organizers have told us that the committee has a strategy for 

raising needed contributions and will meet its fund-raising goals.

Another key risk facing USTR at the Miami meeting is unclear funding 

responsibilities. USTR has stated that Miami will provide the vast majority 

of funds for the ministerial. One Miami official said that in broad terms they 

agree Miami will shoulder the majority of costs. However, the Miami 

organizers believe the federal government will also assume some financial 

responsibility for the ministerial because, in their view the ultimate host of 

the ministerial is the federal government, not the Miami organizers. One 

way to clarify these misunderstandings over responsibilities is through a 

memorandum of understanding. Department of State officials involved in 

the Seattle WTO ministerial and other major events emphasized the 

importance of documenting financial responsibilities in order to avoid 

disagreements over costs later on. However, USTR has decided not to sign 

32The four municipalities involved are the city of Miami, the county of Miami-Dade, the city 

of Coral Gables, and the city of Miami Beach.
Page 42 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

a memorandum of understanding with the Miami host committee assigning 

financial responsibilities. Instead, it plans to rely on Miami’s desire to be 

the site of the permanent FTAA Administrative Secretariat as incentive 

enough to raise the necessary funds and carry out the logistical and 

security requirements for hosting the ministerial. The Miami organizers 

also do not feel that a memorandum of understanding with the federal 

government is necessary. Instead, both parties have agreed to use the 

budget development process to identify funding sources and apportion 

financial and logistical responsibilities. This breakdown has not been 

prepared but is being worked on.

Security Is Critical

Another key risk the United States will face in Miami is ensuring the 

security of participants, given the extensive security requirements of 

previous trade ministerials and the protests encountered at these and other 

events that have attracted opponents of globalization. At Genoa, Italy, for 

example, a protestor was killed during antiglobalization protests. Also, at 

the FTAA ministerial in Quito, a child was killed during the protests.

Estimates for the number of protesters expected at Miami range from 

20,000 to 100,000 people, according to both the USTR and the Miami 

organizers. USTR expects around 6,000 participants, compared to

9,000 participants and 50,000 protesters at the Seattle WTO ministerial. In a 

February 2000 report on the November 1999 Seattle WTO ministerial,33 we 

noted that protests interfered with the Seattle ministerial by causing delays 

and disrupting the proceedings. Protesters also threatened and in some 

cases assaulted delegates. Furthermore, protesters, police officers, and 

bystanders were injured, and property was damaged. In Seattle, the city’s 

decision to stop providing security was a factor in forcing the meeting to 

close before its scheduled conclusion. 

According to USTR officials, the need to link logistics and security is an 

important lesson learned after the security problems experienced at the 

Seattle ministerial and is a critical component of the planning for the Miami 

event. At the Seattle ministerial, security costs accounted for 

approximately half of the expenses incurred, in part because security had 

not been factored into logistical arrangements from the beginning, 

according to the USTR. USTR’s present goal is to have a security plan 

33See U.S. General Accounting Office, World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: 

Outcomes and Lessons Learned, GAO-00-86 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2000).
Page 43 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

finalized by May 30, 2003. However, the plan will remain flexible thereafter 

as it is updated to reflect the latest information. Security staffing for the 

event will also need to be arranged. So far, the USTR reports that local 

police will provide security at the event. According to the Miami organizers, 

police security services will be provided in kind, using existing staff and 

resources rather than relying on fund-raising to pay for security. Other 

entities involved in providing security include the U.S. Coast Guard and the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. If certain high-level 

officials attend, the Secret Service and Homeland Security will need to be 

involved. Further, the federal government will be responsible for providing 

information security.

Conclusions Negotiations toward achieving an FTAA face an important test in the 

coming year. Despite 4 years of talks and an acceleration of progress by the 

time of the November 2002 Quito ministerial, considerable work remains in 

order to culminate an initiative that the region’s 34 democratically elected 

leaders once embraced as key to integrating their economies; improving 

growth and equity; and strengthening nascent democratic institutions. With 

a January 2005 deadline for completion, the FTAA faces numerous 

challenges in the current phase. These include making progress on key 

issues such as agriculture and starting market access negotiations in 

earnest. Ensuring that negotiations have sufficient political support from 

key players such as the United States and Brazil also remains a challenge. 

Our work suggests that the U.S.’s readiness to co-chair the negotiations and 

host a major trade ministerial in Miami 7 months from now is not assured 

because, to date, the plans and human and financial resources are not in 

place to complete the required duties and to counter likely risks. Filling 

these gaps is critical to success and will require intense preparations on the 

part of USTR and Miami organizers between now and November.

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

In order to successfully carry out the responsibilities involved in cochairing the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations and hosting the 

November 2003 Miami ministerial, we recommend that the USTR intensify 

U.S. preparations and promptly and regularly evaluate whether current 

resources and plans are sufficient to carry out the tasks and mitigate the 

risks associated with these two responsibilities. The risks we have 

identified are (1) handling the increased workload associated with cochairing the negotiations and hosting the Miami ministerial with limited 

staff at USTR, (2) resolving procedural and substantive issues through the 
Page 44 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

co-chairmanship, (3) acquiring sufficient expertise in planning major 

events, (4) clarifying and further developing plans for the Miami 

ministerial, (5) securing sufficient funding for the ministerial, and (6) 

ensuring the security of participants at the ministerial. Several of these 

resources and plans involve allowing significant lead time, which the USTR 

should take into consideration.

Agency Comments and 

Our Response

We provided draft copies of this report to the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative and the Department of State and received formal comments 

from both agencies (see apps. I and II). They also provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated in the report as appropriate.

USTR and State generally agreed with our overall message. USTR stressed 

that it is committed to successfully concluding an FTAA by January 2005 

and hosting the November 2003 ministerial and expressed belief that plans 

for the ministerial are at an appropriate stage of development. USTR also 

noted various steps it has recently taken to address the challenges ahead in 

the FTAA negotiations and for ministerial preparations. Accordingly, we 

have updated our report, citing specific progress that USTR has made in 

this regard. For example, we noted that the USTR is working with Brazil to 

provide more active leadership and coordination to the negotiating process 

and that venues for the ministerial and associated events have now been 

reserved. We also noted that the Miami organizing group has established an 

extensive network of partners from the public and the private sectors to 

provide support. Nevertheless, we maintain our basic findings and 

recommendation.

The Department of State addressed the issue of assistance to USTR by 

saying that it is trying to be as helpful as it can within the constraints of its 

available resources. We have noted that in our report. 

In addition to formal agency comments, the Miami host committee was 

invited to provide comments on the report. It generally agreed with our 

findings and provided several clarifications, which we incorporated.

Scope and 

Methodology

To conduct our analysis of the progress made in the negotiations on 

creating a Free Trade Area of the Americas and the outcome of the Quito 

ministerial meeting, the key challenges for the current negotiating phase, 

and the U.S. challenges associated with co-chairing the FTAA process and 
Page 45 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

hosting the November 2003 Miami ministerial meeting, we reviewed FTAA 

and executive branch documents on the FTAA negotiations and the U.S. 

preparations for roles as co-chair of the negotiations and host of the Miami 

ministerial, and budget documents from USTR for 2002 and 2003. We also 

reviewed academic and economic literature related to the negotiations. We 

conducted interviews with U.S. negotiators and with foreign government 

officials, including officials who have chaired the FTAA negotiations in the 

past. We also held discussions with multilateral institutions that provide 

technical assistance to the FTAA negotiations, including the Organization 

of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. We attended 

public hearings on the FTAA and spoke with professional scholars and 

other experts familiar with the negotiations. In November 2002, we traveled 

to Quito, Ecuador, to attend the Americas Business Forum and a civil 

society group meeting associated with the FTAA ministerial. This report is 

also based on our past work on the FTAA negotiations in the Western 

Hemisphere (see Related GAO Products).

We conducted our work from July 2002 through March 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of 

State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 

the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the 

Secretary of Commerce. We also will make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 46 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-4347. Additional GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are 

listed in appendix III.

Loren Yager

Director,

International Affairs and Trade
Page 47 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Appendix I

Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade Apendxies

Representative ApendxiI
Appendix I

Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative

Page 48 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas
Appendix I

Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative

Page 49 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas
Page 50 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of State

Page 51 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas
Page 52 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contacts Kim Frankena (202) 512-8124

Venecia Rojas Kenah (202) 512-3433

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individuals named above, R. Gifford Howland, Rona 

Mendelsohn, Kirstin Nelson, Jon Rose, and Marc Molino made key 

contributions to this report.
Page 53 GAO-03-560 Free Trade Area of the Americas

Related GAO Products

Free Trade Area of the Americas: Negotiators Move Toward Agreement 

That Will Have Benefits, Costs to U.S. Economy. GAO-01-1027. 

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2001.

World Trade Organization: Early Decisions on Key Issues Vital to 

Progress in Ongoing Negotiations. GAO-02-879. Washington, D.C.: 

September 4, 2002.

Free Trade Area of the Americas: April 2001 Meetings Set Stage for Hard 

Bargaining to Begin. GAO-01-706T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2001.

Free Trade Area of the Americas: Negotiations at Key Juncture on Eve of 

April Meeting. GAO-01-552. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001.

World Trade Organization: Progress in Agricultural Trade Negotiations 

May Be Slow. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-122. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2000.

World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes and Lessons 

Learned. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-86. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2000.

World Trade Organization: Seattle Ministerial: Outcomes and Lessons 

Learned. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-84. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2000.

Agricultural Trade: Changes Made to Market Access Program, but 

Questions Remain on Economic Impact. GAO/NSIAD-99-38. Washington, 

D.C.: April 5, 1999.

(320139)
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