Filed 9/12/23 Riley v. County of Los Angeles CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

NATHANIEL VAUGHN 

RILEY,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

 Defendant and Respondent.

 B317901

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 18STCV06789)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Reversed.

Alon, Edward E. Alon and Jonathan A. Alon, for Plaintiff 

and Appellant.

Collins + Collins, Tomas A. Guterres, David C. Moore, and 

Christian M. Chung, for Defendant and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

Angela Connor went into cardiac arrest while in the 

custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). 

She was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced 

dead. Connor’s son, plaintiff Nathaniel Vaughn Riley (plaintiff), 

brought a wrongful death and survivor action1 against defendant 

County of Los Angeles (defendant) and others.

2 The trial court 

granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, ruling that 

defendant was immune from liability under the public entity 

immunities for injuries to prisoners in Government Code sections 

844.6, subdivision (a)(2) and 845.6.

3 Plaintiff appeals and we 

reverse.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on June 28, 2016, 

Connor pleaded no contest to petty theft and was placed on 

deferred entry of judgment for 12 months, subject to certain 

1 Plaintiff later dismissed his survivor action without 

prejudice.

2 The other named defendants were LASD, LASD Sheriff 

Jim McDonnell, the City of Long Beach, the Long Beach Police 

Department, and Long Beach Police Department Chief Robert 

Luna. At some point, these defendants were dismissed from 

plaintiff’s action. Only plaintiff and defendant are parties to this 

appeal.

3 All further statutory references are to the Government 

Code unless otherwise stated.
3

terms and conditions. On October 28, 2017, Long Beach Police 

Department officers arrested Connor for a diversion violation in 

her petty theft case. When arrested, Connor possessed a 

hypodermic needle with heroin.

After her arrest, Connor complained that she felt “ill, cold, 

and discomfort.” Despite knowing or having reason to know that 

Connor needed immediate medical care, defendant failed to take 

reasonable action and summon medical care.

On November 2, 2017, Connor appeared in the trial court at 

the Bellflower Courthouse for sentencing on her diversion 

violation (the sentencing court). Connor had been in custody 

from her October 28 arrest until her November 2 sentencing 

hearing.

At the November 2 hearing, the sentencing court “proposed 

to place [Connor] on probation for 24 months with time served

. . . .” The court stated that it was sentencing Connor to 12 days 

in county jail and giving her credit for 12 days served. Connor 

asked the court, “I have credit for 12?” The court responded, 

“Yes. Six, plus six, so that’s why I said twelve.” Connor asked 

the court, “What does that mean?” The court responded, “That 

means you’re done with the jail time.” The court then suspended 

imposition of Connor’s sentence and placed her on 24 months of 

summary probation on various terms and conditions including 

that she serve 12 days in Los Angeles County Jail with 12 days of 

credit.

Following her court appearance, Connor was taken to a 

holding cell at the courthouse. Two other women were in the cell. 

Connor “complained of feeling cold and vomiting.” Thereafter, 

Connor became unresponsive, went into cardiac arrest, and was 

later pronounced dead. The “County of Los Angeles Department 
4

of Medical Examiner—Coroner” identified Connor’s death as an 

accident and “listed ‘heroin addiction,’ ‘methamphetamine,’ and 

‘possible heroin withdrawal syndrome’ as ‘conditions contributing’ 

to her cause of death.”

Connor was in defendant’s exclusive custody from her 

arrest on October 28, 2017, until her death on November 2, 2017. 

Defendant knew of Connor’s serious medical condition that 

required immediate medical care, but failed to take reasonable 

action to summon medical care. Connor died as a result.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant moved for summary judgment, or alternatively 

summary adjudication.

4 It argued it was entitled to summary 

judgment on plaintiff’s wrongful death action because it was a 

public entity immune from liability under sections 844.6 and 

845.6 because, respectively, Connor was in LASD custody and a 

“prisoner” “at the time of the alleged incident,” and defendant’s 

employees took reasonable actions to summon medical care for 

Connor, a prisoner, after they knew or had reason to know she 

was suffering a potentially “‘serious and obvious medical 

conditions requiring immediate medical care’ with the ‘man 

down’ notification on November 2, 2017 at the Bellflower 

Courthouse.”

Plaintiff opposed defendant’s summary judgment motion in 

part on the ground that there was a triable issue of fact about 

whether defendant’s employee knew or had reason to know that 

4 Because plaintiff dismissed his second cause of action for 

survival action prior to defendant’s motion, the trial court treated 

the motion as a summary judgment motion only.
5

Connor was in need of immediate medical care and failed to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care. For this 

asserted triable fact, plaintiff relied on video footage of the area 

around the holding cell in which Connor was held that purported

to show that Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Custody Assistant 

Maria Rivera, who was working outside of the cell, delayed over 

three minutes in responding to knocks on the holding cell door 

indicating a need for assistance.

In granting defendant’s summary judgment motion, the 

trial court ruled that defendant “proffered sufficient evidence to 

show that the custody personnel took reasonable actions to 

summon medical care after the ‘man down’ notification was 

received.” “No evidence has been proffered to show that 

[defendant] had knowledge that [Connor] was suffering from a 

serious and obvious medical condition requiring immediate 

medical care prior to receipt of the ‘man down’ notification. 

Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to the timeliness of the custody 

personnel’s response are based on speculation and conjecture, not 

controverting facts. Evidence that gives rise to no more than 

speculation, conjecture, or guesswork is insufficient to establish a 

triable issue of material fact.”

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting 

summary judgment based on the public entity immunities for 

injuries to prisoners in sections 844.6 and 845.6. He asserts, in 

part, there is a triable issue of fact about whether an employee of 

defendant knew or had reason to know that Connor was in need 
6

of immediate medical care and failed to take reasonable action to 

summon such medical care. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

“‘“A trial court properly grants a motion for summary 

judgment only if no issues of triable fact appear and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subd. (c); see also id., § 437c, subd. (f) [summary 

adjudication of issues].)”’” (State of California v. Allstate Ins. Co.

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1017.) “We review the trial court’s 

decision [on a summary judgment motion] de novo, considering 

all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the 

motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the 

uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports.

[Citation.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) 

“[I]n moving for summary judgment, a ‘defendant . . . has met’ his 

‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’ he ‘has 

shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot 

be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of 

action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or 

more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense 

thereto. The plaintiff . . . may not rely upon the mere allegations 

or denials’ of his ‘pleadings to show that a triable issue of 

material fact exists but, instead,’ must ‘set forth the specific facts 

showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that 

cause of action or a defense thereto.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 

subd. (o)(2).)” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

826, 849.)
7

B. Background

On October 29, 2017, while in custody, Connor informed a 

nurse that she was “‘kicking heroin’” and had high blood 

pressure. Defendant knew that Connor was on medication for 

methamphetamine and heroin withdrawal and high blood 

pressure. On October 30, 2017, Connor complained that she felt 

cold, weak, and nauseous and that she had thrown up her food 

and medications. On October 31, 2017, Connor signed a form 

declining medication or treatment because she was “[n]ot kicking 

anymore.” On November 1, 2017, Connor complained of 

headaches and insomnia and was treated by a doctor who cleared 

her to attend a court hearing.

In a declaration in support of defendant’s summary 

judgment motion, Custody Assistant Rivera stated she was 

working at the Bellflower Courthouse on November 2, 2017. 

Connor was being held in Cell D. Danielle Silva was the only 

inmate in Cell D with Connor.

At about 12:18 p.m. that day, Rivera assisted in giving 

lunch to the inmates in Cell D. Connor did not then appear to be 

in distress and did not complain that she was in distress.

At about 12:38 p.m., Rivera heard a knocking coming from 

Cell D. She asked, “[W]hat do you need[?]” “[T]here was no 

response after the initial knock.” (In her deposition testimony, 

Rivera testified she heard multiple sequences of multiple knocks.) 

She again asked, “[W]hat do you need[?]” Rivera heard a voice 

inside Cell D respond, “[H]elp.” Rivera characterized that 

response as a “‘“man down” notification.’”

Rivera went to Cell D and opened the window flap. She 

saw Silva and asked her what was wrong. Silva responded that 
8

Connor had been lying on the bench and had rolled over and 

fallen to the floor.

Rivera opened the door to Cell D and stepped into the cell’s 

sally port.5 She again asked Silva what had happened and Silva 

responded that Connor had fallen off the bench and onto the 

floor. Rivera called out to Connor who did not respond. Rivera 

stepped out of the sally port and into the main lockup area and 

informed a Deputy Sheriff that there was a “‘man down’” in Cell 

D and they needed “‘rescue’” to respond to their location.

In an interview with homicide detectives, Silva said that 

after Connor fell to the floor she (Silva) first attended to Connor 

and then “knocked on the door and . . . asked for help, but it took 

them a minute to come.” When no help was forthcoming, Silva 

returned to check on Connor. Silva could not find Connor’s pulse 

and determined Connor was not breathing, so Silva “knocked 

again,” “asked for help,” and said “medic.” Silva did not “know 

why they [took] so long to come and check . . . .”

Video footage of the lockup area outside Cell D depicts 

what a factfinder can readily conclude was Rivera turning her 

head and attention toward Cell D at least two times in the three 

and a half minutes before she walked over to that cell.

C. Analysis

Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) provides immunity from 

liability to the State for injuries to prisoners. (Castaneda v. 

Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 

Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070 (Castaneda).) Section 844.6, subdivision 

5 A “sally port” is a caged area outside a cell that allows 

Sheriff’s Department personnel to see inside the cell.
9

(a)(2) provides, “(a) . . . except as provided in this section and in 

Section[] . . . 845.6, . . . a public entity is not liable for: [¶] . . . 

[¶] (2) An injury to any prisoner.”

6

Section 845.6 creates an exception to the State’s immunity 

under section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2). (Castaneda, supra, 212 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.) Section 845.6 provides in relevant part, 

“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury 

proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or 

obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as 

otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, 

and the public entity where the employee is acting within the 

scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has 

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical 

care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such 

medical care.”

Section 845.6 imposes a duty on public employees to 

summon medical care when “there is actual or constructive 

knowledge that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical 

care.” (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.) Whether 

a public employee has “reason to know” a prisoner is in need of 

immediate medical care is judged by the objective standard.7 

(Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 288.)

6 For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding 

that Connor was a “prisoner” within the meaning of sections 

844.6 and 845.6 while held in Cell D.

7 The objective standard looks at an issue from a reasonable 

person’s perspective. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 

637, 649.)
10

Rivera’s declaration suggests she heard knocking from Cell 

D at 12:38 p.m. After she inquired about the knocks to the cell’s 

inmates and received a call for help, she responded. Silva’s 

statement to the homicide detectives is inconsistent with Rivera’s 

declaration. Silva stated that she knocked on the door and asked 

for help. When she did not receive help, she returned to check on 

Connor. After determining that Connor was not breathing, she 

again knocked and asked for help and said “medic.” Silva 

believed that it took a long time for someone to “come and check.” 

The video footage outside Cell D permits a factfinder to conclude

Rivera turned her head and attention toward Cell D more than 

once beginning at least three and a half minutes before she 

walked over to Cell D. Defendant and the trial court characterize 

plaintiff’s reliance on the videotape evidence as speculative and 

conjectural. Instead, it is concrete, time-specific evidence upon 

which a factfinder could conclude that defendant delayed in 

responding when Silva attempted to summon aid for Connor. 

Accordingly, there is a triable issue of fact about whether an 

employee of defendant knew or had reason to know that Connor 

was in need of immediate medical care and failed to take 

reasonable action to summon such medical care and the trial 

court erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion.
11

V. DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff is awarded his costs on 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.