PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-1667

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GERMAN QUILES,

Appellant

 

No. 09-1686

 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

GLORIA QUILES,

Appellant
2

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Crim. Nos. 07-391-1 and 07-391-3)

Honorable Jan E. DuBois, District Judge

 

Argued June 23, 2010

 

BEFORE: SMITH, FISHER and 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 17, 2010)

Jonathan J. Sobel (argued)

Law Offices of Jonathan J. Sobel

1420 Walnut Street, Suite 1420

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorney for Appellant German Quiles

John J. Griffin (argued)

Law Office of John J. Griffin

239 South Camac Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Attorney for Appellant Gloria Quiles
3

Michael L. Levy

United States Attorney

Robert A. Zauzmer

Assistant United States Attorney, 

Chief of Appeals

Andrea G. Foulkes (argued)

Assistant United States Attorney

Frank A. Labor, III

Assistant United States Attorney

Office of the United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Attorneys for Appellee

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes on before this Court on appeal from

judgments of conviction and sentence entered against two

defendants in the District Court in which the government’s

case relied heavily on the testimony of an undercover

informant. After the jury found defendants guilty at the trial,

a state grand jury indicted the informant in an unrelated

matter on charges of child rape and other heinous sexual
German Quiles was the president of the company and Maria 1

Quiles was its co-president. Gloria and German Quiles were coowners of the property.

4

crimes. Once defendants learned about the informant’s

indictment, they sought a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.

The District Court denied their request and they now appeal to

this Court. For the reasons we give in this opinion, we will

affirm the District Court’s order denying the motions for a

new trial. We also reject defendants’ individual challenges to

the sufficiency of the evidence, the procedure used in

sentencing, and the substantive sentence imposed.

II. BACKGROUND

German Quiles and Maria Quiles, husband and wife,

owned Aruba, Inc., a money-servicing business operating as

“Aruba Check Cashing and Auto Tags” in North

Philadelphia. Their daughter Gloria Quiles also worked at 1

Aruba Check Cashing and served as the company’s secretary.

The company offered services such as money wires, money

orders, and check cashing. The business was subject to

federal regulations relating to money laundering with German

Quiles being responsible for its compliance with these

regulations.

A. The Government’s Investigation
Some transactions took multiple visits to complete. The 2

government charged 16 independent acts of money laundering

between September 20, 2006, and January 12, 2007. The parties

laundered several thousand dollars during each transaction for

a total of $175,900.

5

In July of 2006, the government began an investigation

into possible money laundering at Aruba Check Cashing.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Special Agent Steven

Galambos, who relied on an undercover informant named

Hector Ayala, led the investigation. Galambos instructed

Ayala to enter Aruba Check Cashing and identify himself as a

drug dealer’s assistant who needed money laundered, making

sure to ask for the name of the employee assisting him. For

each visit, Galambos gave Ayala a bag full of small bills and

told Ayala to request large bills, money orders, and wire

transfers. Ayala could offer up to 10% of the money that

Aruba was laundering as a “fee” in exchange for the

laundering. After he exited the store, Ayala told Galambos

what occurred, and Ayala’s recitation would be confirmed by

a recording device that Galambos had concealed inside

Ayala’s jacket or pants pocket. Ayala turned over the newly

laundered bills, money orders, and wire transfer receipts to

Galambos. 

Operating under Galambos’s instructions, Ayala

entered Aruba Check Cashing as a confidential informant 30

different times. On his first visit Ayala explained his 2

criminal purpose, and on the remaining visits he brought

money for laundering or picked up laundered money. Ayala

reported that German Quiles, Maria Quiles, and Gloria Quiles
The District Court in its opinion denying defendants’ motions 3

for an acquittal stated that “Ayala was paying defendants

extraordinary fees. A typical customer at Aruba paid no more

than $.99 per money order, but Ayala was paying hundreds of

dollars for the same service.” United States v. Quiles, No. 07-

391, 2008 WL 3561618, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2008)

(citations to trial transcript omitted).

The conversations were in Spanish but were translated to 4

English for the jury.

6

all performed money laundering transactions for him while

knowing that they were helping to launder drug money.

Ayala also reported that the Quileses accepted “fees” well

above normal for the type of transactions involved in their

services. When Ayala delivered the laundered money to 3

Galambos he gave him a summary of the events that occurred

in Aruba Check Cashing. Unfortunately, Ayala’s recollection

is the best evidence of what had taken place inside Aruba

Check Cashing as the recordings produced from the hidden

recording device are of extremely poor quality and entire

sections of them in some instances are inaudible. However,

there are some audible incriminating statements on the tapes.

E.g., Supp. App. 75 (Ayala states that he has “drug money”);

id. at 68 (man Ayala identifies as German Quiles asks if

Ayala wants “money laundry, money” [sic]).4

B. Trial and Conviction
7

After the government concluded its investigation, a

grand jury charged German Quiles, Maria Quiles, and Gloria

Quiles with conspiracy to commit money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count One) and 16 separate

acts of money laundering or aiding and abetting money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1956(a)(3) (Counts

Two through Seventeen). Defendants pled not guilty and the

case proceeded to a jury trial. 

At trial, the government’s case rested primarily on the

testimony of three witnesses. The first witness, IRS employee

Ted Cunningham, explained the money laundering

requirements that applied to Aruba Check Cashing.

Galambos was the second witness and he recounted the

details of his investigation and his interactions with the

undercover informant. Galambos, however, could not testify

about most of what had occurred inside of Aruba Check

Cashing because he remained outside the business during

Ayala’s excursions. The government called Ayala as the third

of these witnesses. Ayala described his actions and gave a

step-by-step analysis of the events that his hidden device

recorded. For example, Ayala explained where he was

standing in the store and identified the voices heard on the

recordings. He also testified to non-verbal actions that

defendants took, such as smiling or nodding, and to

unrecorded conversations such as his introduction to German

Quiles at which Ayala explained that he was there to launder

drug money.

It is obvious that Ayala’s testimony was essential to

the government’s case. Without his explanations, the secret

recordings would have been barely usable snippets of sounds
8

and partial conversations. Understandably, therefore,

defendants built their strategy around discrediting Ayala.

Thus, in his opening statement, the attorney for German

Quiles told the jury they would see an informant “run amok,”

by accusing innocent people in order to get paid. App. at 260.

The government, in contrast, stated that Ayala had worked as

a confidential informant for over 20 years, doing “good, old

fashioned” undercover work. Id. at 252. The trial focused on

this chasm.

The jury returned its verdict on January 17, 2008,

convicting German Quiles and Maria Quiles on all the counts

charged. The jury, however, found Gloria Quiles not guilty of

conspiracy to commit money laundering (Count One) and of

ten specific acts of money laundering (Counts Two through

Eleven). But it convicted her of the remaining six specific

acts of money laundering (Counts Twelve through

Seventeen). Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal or

a new trial but the District Court denied their requests on

August 13, 2008, in an order entered on August 14, 2008.

United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2008 WL 3561618 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 13, 2008).

C. Post-Trial Events

Soon after the District Court denied defendants’ posttrial motions for acquittal or a new trial, a grand jury in

Pennsylvania indicted Ayala on multiple counts of statutory

sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a

minor under the age of 13 years, and other similar crimes.
Maria Quiles filed the motion and the other defendants joined 5

in it.

Inasmuch as Maria Quiles and Gloria Quiles or for that matter 6

the government did not appeal from their sentences, we will not

discuss their sentencings any further. In fact, Maria Quiles did

9

After learning of Ayala’s indictment, all three defendants

moved for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. On 5

February 24, 2009, the District Court denied defendants’

motions in an order entered on February 25, 2009, holding

that the new evidence was inadmissible impeachment

evidence. United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2009 WL

466283, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2009). 

The District Court then sentenced defendants. The

Court calculated a guideline sentence for German Quiles of

78 to 97 months based on a guideline offense level of 28 and

a criminal history category of I. German Quiles, however,

requested leniency, contending that he had led an exemplary

life, worked for many years, served in the national guard and

in public office, and was 70 years old and infirm. The

government, in contrast, emphasized that money laundering is

necessary for drug dealing to survive, a fact German Quiles

apparently understood. On February 25, 2009, the District

Court sentenced German Quiles to a custodial term of 60

months to be followed by three years of supervised release

and it imposed a $100,000 fine on him. The Court

subsequently sentenced both Maria Quiles and Gloria Quiles

to terms of five years on probation with six months of home

confinement. 

6
not appeal at all.

10

German Quiles and Gloria Quiles now appeal to this

Court asking us to reverse the District Court’s order of

February 24, 2009, denying their Rule 33 motions for a new

trial. In addition, Gloria Quiles argues that the evidence was

not sufficient for her conviction and asks us to reverse the

District Court’s order of August 13, 2008, denying her motion

for a judgment of acquittal. Finally, German Quiles argues

that the sentence the Court imposed on him on February 25,

2009, was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We

now will refer to German Quiles and Gloria Quiles as

“appellants,” excluding Maria Quiles who has not appealed.

III. JURISDICTION

The District Court had jurisdiction because the

indictments charged violations of federal criminal law. 18

U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction because appellants filed

timely notices of appeal after their conviction and sentencing.

28 U.S.C. § 1291; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. The Interest of Justice Does Not Require a New Trial
In a sense the new evidence to the extent that it was the 7

returning of the indictment against Ayala was not newly

discovered. Rather, it was newly created. See Saada, 212 F.3d

at 216. Nevertheless, we will treat it as though it was newly

11

Rule 33 provides that a district court “may vacate any

judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so

requires.” There are five requirements that must be met

before a court may grant a new trial on the basis of newly

discovered evidence:

(a) the evidence must be in fact newly

discovered, i.e. discovered since trial; (b) facts

must be alleged from which the court may infer

diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the

evidence relied on must not be merely

cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be

material to the issues involved; and (e) it must

be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new

trial, the newly discovered evidence would

probably produce an acquittal.

United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 2000)

(quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d

1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985)).

When the District Court denied appellants’ motions for

a new trial on February 24, 2009, it gave two reasons for its

decision. First, the Court said that the newly discovered

evidence regarding Ayala would not produce an acquittal

during a new trial because it would not be admissible. When 7
discovered.

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in not 8

conducting an evidentiary hearing on their motions. But we

reject this contention as they did not request such a hearing in

the District Court and even if they had they would not have been

entitled to it as the Court adjudicated the matter on bases not

requiring resolution of a factual dispute at an evidentiary

hearing. In any event, even now we see no issue that an

evidentiary hearing could have resolved as we are deciding the

case on the basis of a set of facts that treats Ayala as having

committed and having been convicted of the sexual offenses for

which the state charged him.

12

the Court made its ruling, Ayala had not been convicted of his

crimes and the evidence likely would have proven too

inflammatory to be admitted. See Fed. R. Evid. 609

(impeachment of witness allowed using evidence of

conviction of crime) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Evid. 403

(evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).

Second, the Court said that the newly discovered evidence

was mere impeachment evidence and thus could not form the

basis for granting a new trial “under the plain language of

Saada.” Quiles, 2009 WL 466283, at *4. At the same time, 8

the Court distinguished a case in which another court granted

a new trial solely on the basis of impeachment evidence. See

United States v. Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. 864 (D.N.J. 1976).

When distinguishing Lipowski, the Court noted that arguably

Lipowski may no longer be good law in light of Saada.
Of course, we realize that the District Court ruled on the basis 9

of the facts at the time of its decision denying the new trial

motions as it did not have a crystal ball and thus could not

foresee the outcome of the state proceedings. It is significant

that the state court trial at which the jury convicted Ayala took

place after appellants were convicted and sentenced and had

appealed to this Court. The appeal terminated the District

Court’s jurisdiction to consider a new trial motion. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 33(b)(1).

After appellants appealed Rule 33(b)(1) would have required 10

them to move for a remand in this Court to the District Court to

file new Rule 33 motions.

The District Court jury returned the verdict on January 17, 11

2008, and it therefore appears that the three-year window for a

13

We think that we should focus on the District Court’s

second reason for denying the new trial because its first

reason has lost some of its persuasive power inasmuch as five

months after the District Court issued its February 24, 2009

opinion denying a new trial, a state jury convicted Ayala of

the offenses charged against him. Convictions, unlike 9

indictments, may be admissible under Federal Rule of

Evidence 609, and the bare fact of a conviction is normally

not so inflammatory that it should be excluded under Fed. R.

Evid. 403. Moreover, we see no reason why after Ayala’s

state conviction appellants could not have filed new Rule 33

motions in the District Court seeking a new trial though they

did not do so. Thus, we will focus on the permanent, not 10

transient, features of the Court’s decision.11
new trial motion under Rule 33(b)(1) is still open. We,

however, do not say definitively that it is open as none of the

defendants have filed another motion for a new trial and there

might be other procedural bars to such a motion.

14

1. Standard of Review

A determination of whether it should grant a new trial

is left to the discretion of a district court. United States v.

Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we

normally review a district court’s determination of a new trial

motion under the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.

United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 511 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“We will reverse a denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial

based on newly discovered evidence only if we conclude that

the district court abused its discretion in denying the

motion.”). At certain points, however, the District Court

suggested that it was bound as a matter of law to deny

appellants’ Rule 33 motions. See Quiles, 2009 WL 466283,

at **2, 4 (noting the “requirements” of Saada and then

denying defendants’ motions because “the plain language” of

Saada required it to do so). Also, when ruling on a later

motion to stay appellants’ sentences pending appeal, the

District Court referred to its earlier Rule 33 decision and

stated, “[t]he Court’s exercise of discretion . . . in ruling on

the defendant’s Rule 33 Motion, was cabined by controlling

precedent—the Federal Rules of Evidence and Third Circuit

case law.” United States v. Quiles, No. 07-391, 2009 WL

764306, *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2009). To the extent that we

are reviewing a legal rather than discretionary decision of the

District Court, we will apply a de novo standard of review.
The government introduced this signed statement at trial when

12

explaining the procedure for employing a confidential informant. (Of

course, the statement also served to bolster Ayala’s credibility.) The

government asked Ayala a few questions about the statement, but did

not spend much time addressing it.

We do not understand why we should categorize the agreement as 13

false merely because Ayala did not live up to his obligations under it.

To the contrary, it would seem that to show that an agreement was

false a party making that claim would have to demonstrate that the

person making the agreement intended to violate it when he made it.

15

But the distinction between the two standards of review

makes no difference on this appeal because we would affirm

the District Court exercising complete de novo review.

2. The Evidence Relied on Must Not Be Merely

Cumulative or Impeaching

Appellants say that they are not relying on mere

impeachment evidence in seeking a new trial and thus our

opinion in Saada that we quote above does not require that we

deny them a new trial. Rather, they point out that when the

government hired Ayala as a confidential informant he signed

several statements acknowledging limitations on his conduct,

including one reciting that he was “not permitted to violate

any laws.” Supp. App. 1536–43. Appellants say that 12

Ayala’s false written pledge not to commit any crimes,

combined with his commission of serious crimes, demonstrate

that there was a sufficient basis for granting a new trial.13
Though we recognize that Ayala may have had that very intent, we

are not aware of any evidence in the record supporting a conclusion

that he intended to do so other than his actual conduct. Moreover,

Ayala’s commission of crimes before the execution of the agreement

would not have made the agreement false as his agreement not to

violate any laws was prospective in nature. But we will not linger on

that point and instead will accept appellants’ characterization of the

agreement as false.

16

Appellants admit that their new evidence could be classified

as impeachment evidence, but they assert that they

nevertheless are entitled to a new trial because the new

evidence “goes to the foundation of the government’s case.”

Appellant Gloria Quiles’s br. at 43–44.

We agree with appellants that in certain unusual

circumstances a court should not deny a new trial that a

defendant seeks on the basis of newly discovered evidence

merely because the evidence is impeaching in character. In

stating our limited agreement with appellants we observe that

Rule 33(a) as written permits courts to grant a new trial when

the interest of justice requires it and does not distinguish

between newly discovered circumstantial and direct evidence

as a basis for granting such a motion. Yet we recognize that

notwithstanding Rule 33’s language, there are opinions that

say that a court should not grant a motion for a new trial on

mere impeachment evidence. But these cases do not seem to

give enough significance to the wording of Rule 33 which, as

we have indicated, makes clear that the interest of justice

guides the courts on deciding Rule 33 motions and does not

suggest that a court should distinguish between impeachment

and direct evidence in making that determination.
17

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that the court in

United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1991),

indicated that the statements that a new trial should not be

granted on the basis of newly discovered impeachment

evidence cannot 

be taken at face value. Nothing in the text or

history of Rule 33 . . . supports a categorical

distinction between types of evidence; and we

cannot see the sense of such a distinction. If the

government’s case rested entirely on the

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness

who was discovered after trial to be utterly

unworthy of being believed because he had lied

consistently in a string of previous cases, the

district judge would have the power to grant a

new trial in order to prevent an innocent person

from being convicted. The ‘interest of justice,’

the operative term in Rule 33, would require no

less . . . 

The judicial language that seems to

exclude impeaching testimony from the scope

of Rule 33 thus illustrates the tendency to

overgeneralize. It is easy to confuse a practice

with a rule. The practice has been to deny new

trials where the only newly discovered evidence

was impeaching. But the practice should not be

taken to imply a rule that even if the defendant

proves that his conviction almost certainly rests

on a lie, the district judge is helpless to grant a

new trial. District judges do not in fact consider
18

themselves helpless in such circumstances, and

they are right not to.

Id. at 415–16. 

We agree with this statement from Taglia and we do

not believe that Saada requires us to reject it. District courts

do not and should not ignore a claim that there has been a

miscarriage of justice just because the newly discovered

evidence supporting the claim could be categorized as

impeachment in character. Taglia is not alone in recognizing

this point. E.g., United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 825

(9th Cir. 1992) (“In some situations . . . the newly-discovered

impeachment evidence may be so powerful that, if it were to

be believed by the trier of fact, it could render the witness’

testimony totally incredible.”); United States v. Leary, 378 F.

Supp. 2d 482, 492 (D. Del. 2005) (“[T]here is precedent

indicating that impeachment evidence alone may sometimes

be a basis for a new trial.”); Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. at 868-69

(granting new trial after discovering key witness was

untruthful in closely related matters). 

At the same time long experience has shown that

newly discovered evidence that is merely impeaching is

unlikely to reveal that there has been a miscarriage of justice.

There must be something more, i.e. a factual link between the

heart of the witness’s testimony at trial and the new evidence.

This link must suggest directly that the defendant was

convicted wrongly. See Saada, 212 F.3d at 216 (describing

this link as a necessary “exculpatory connection”). When this

connection is not present, then the new evidence is merely
If a witness at the trial gave a physical description of the 14

criminal that matched the defendant but newly discovered

evidence from other persons who saw the crime gave a

completely different description of the same criminal, there

would be an exculpatory connection between the new evidence

and the charge. Of course, the mere presence of that connection

would not compel a court to grant a motion for a new trial, as,

among other bases for denying the motion, the court might

regard the new evidence as unreliable or might believe that other

evidence of the defendant’s guilt should lead it to deny the

motion.

19

impeaching and its revelation does not warrant granting a new

trial.14

When asked to grant a new trial solely on the basis of

new impeachment evidence, a court carefully should examine

whether the defendant has demonstrated the necessary

exculpatory connection between the evidence and the offense

or has demonstrated that the newly discovered evidence

totally undermined critical inculpatory evidence. And courts,

in practice, have done so. In Lipowski, the prosecution relied

on several tape recordings that the primary government

witness had made. After the trial, it was discovered that the

witness, in effect, had manufactured a tape recording that

threatened him and that he intended the threats to be attributed

to an unknown person. While this evidence did not prove that

the defendants had been convicted wrongly, and in any event

was not used at the trial, the court found it had “serious

implications regarding the truth and veracity of [the witness’s]

testimony” and the evidence “casts serious doubt over the
In both Taglia and Davis, however, the courts of appeals found 15

other reasons to affirm the convictions.

20

authenticity of the tapes introduced into evidence.” Lipowski,

423 F. Supp. at 867-68. 

Similarly, in Taglia the key government witness was

an FBI informant. After the jury convicted the defendants, it

was discovered that the informant had given false testimony

in an earlier case. The court of appeals in limiting earlier

cases indicating that a new trial cannot be granted on the basis

of newly discovered impeachment evidence, stated that a trial

court has discretion to grant a new trial when it is shown that

the witness “lied consistently in a string of previous cases.”

Taglia, 922 F.2d at 415. And in Davis, a jury convicted the

defendants on drug charges in part on the basis of testimony

of an undercover police officer. Some months later the same

officer was convicted of stealing drug money that the

government had confiscated as evidence. The court in Davis

said that “[i]f newly-discovered evidence establishes that a

defendant in a narcotics case has been convicted solely on the

uncorroborated testimony of a crooked cop involved in

stealing drug money, the ‘interest of justice’ would support a

new trial under Rule 33.” Davis, 960 F.2d at 825. 

15

In each of the cases that we have described, the courts

focused on what we believe was the correct question: was

there a strong exculpatory connection between the newly

discovered evidence and the facts that were presented at trial

or did the newly discovered evidence strongly demonstrate

that critical evidence at the trial against the defendant was
21

very likely to have been false? Of course, these standards

must be applied strictly and are not easily satisfied. In

Lipowski, the new evidence strongly suggested that the

conviction was based on fabricated evidence. In Taglia, the

new evidence showed that a key witness routinely committed

perjury when testifying as an informant, and because the

witness had testified in that capacity at the defendants’ trials,

there was great reason to doubt the validity of the convictions.

And in Davis, the new evidence showed that the primary

witness was a “crooked cop” who had been caught tampering

with (in fact, stealing) evidence.

The facts in these three cases can be contrasted with

those in Saada. In Saada, a witness named Rishty agreed to

testify for the government pursuant to a cooperation

agreement. Rishty later was caught on tape advising a friend

to give false testimony in exchange for a reduced sentence.

Obviously, this new information cast doubt on Rishty’s

testimony. If he had been willing to advise a friend to give

false testimony in exchange for leniency, would he not take

his own advice? Nonetheless, we found that the new

evidence offered in Saada was “only” impeaching, because

there was “no exculpatory connection” between the new

evidence and defendants’ criminal acts. 212 F.3d at 216.

Even though the new evidence greatly undermined Rishty’s

credibility, we felt that the exculpatory connection between

Rishty’s testimony and his advice to a friend in an unrelated

case was too tenuous to require granting a new trial.
Indeed, there may be some tension between Saada and the 16

other cases. A reasonable person could say that the newly

discovered evidence in Saada was more damaging to the

government’s case than the newly discovered evidence in Davis

and Taglia. Of course, under our practice Saada sets forth the

controlling law in this Court. Third Circuit Internal Operating

Procedure 9.1.

22

We do not cite the preceding examples in an attempt to

define the exact “exculpatory connection” required. We 16

simply are emphasizing the question to be asked: is there a

strong exculpatory connection between the newly discovered

evidence and the evidence presented at trial or does the newly

discovered evidence, though not in itself exculpatory, throw

severe doubt on the truthfulness of the critical inculpatory

evidence that had been introduced at the trial. If the answer is

affirmative, then a defendant may be entitled to a new trial

even though he relies on evidence that could be classified as

“impeachment evidence.” If the answer is negative, then the

defendant is relying on mere impeachment evidence and will

not be entitled to a new trial on its basis. Determining the

strength and importance of the exculpatory connection or the

significance of the newly discovered evidence with respect to

the credibility of critical evidence given at the trial is a

difficult task that is left in the first instance to the discretion of

the district court. 

In considering Saada we observe that we could not

have intended to hold that evidence germane only for

impeachment purposes never could be the basis for granting a
We note that the government in effect acknowledges that our 17

view of Saada is correct because in its brief it recites that

“[w]hile this Court has not addressed this express issue, other

circuit courts have recognized that newly discovered

impeachment evidence may warrant a new trial in exceptional

circumstances.” Appellee’s br. at 43 n.22.

In point of fact the jury never would hear that the evidence that 18

the ersatz witness had been in prison at the time of the crime

because once the government learned that he had been there it

would not call on him to testify at a retrial. For that very reason

it is fair to say that, depending on what the other evidence was

of the defendant’s guilt, that the evidence of the witness’s

incarceration, though not introduced at a retrial, probably would

produce an acquittal at that trial as it would eliminate the eye

witness testimony of the defendant’s guilt.

23

new trial. In this regard, we posit the hypothetical of a 17

defendant discovering after a trial that the sole eye witness at

the trial who testified that the defendant committed the crime

was beyond any doubt in prison miles from the place of the

crime at the time of its commission. We think that 18

depending on what other evidence had been introduced at

trial, it would be reasonable to hold that Rule 33 would

authorize a trial court to grant a new trial in that situation even

though the newly discovered evidence in no way supported

the defendant’s claim of being innocent and thus there was no
In this opinion, we have distinguished mere impeachment 19

evidence from evidence supporting the grant of a new trial using

a two-part question: is there an exculpatory connection between

the new evidence and the charge against the defendant or does

the new evidence destroy critical trial evidence? We include

this hypothetical to explain the second half of that question. The

newly discovered evidence in the hypothetical, devastating as it

would be, would not have an “exculpatory connection” to the

charge against the defendant and would not support an inference

that the defendant was not guilty of the charge against him. See

Saada, 212 F.3d at 216. Yet, clearly, the interest of justice

suggests that a new trial should be granted. Of course, we are

not implying that in our hypothetical the court would be

compelled to grant a new trial and would abuse its discretion if

it did not do so. In this regard, we point out that there might

have been evidence other than eye witness evidence of the

defendant’s guilt justifying the conviction.

24

exculpatory connection between the evidence and the facts at

trial.19

3. The New Evidence Offered in This Case Is Merely

Impeaching

In the District Court, appellants argued that the jury

never would have believed Ayala if it had known he was a

convicted child rapist. See Mills v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 119, 120

(5th Cir. 1977) (convictions show that the witness is unlikely

to have the normal witness’s respect for the necessity of
Appellants acknowledged at oral argument that the focus of 20

their argument has changed somewhat as more facts have

developed. Now they focus less on Ayala’s bad character (as

shown by his heinous acts) and more on his direct history of

lying to the government. However, appellants did cite Lipowski

before the District Court, so they raised their argument

sufficiently to preserve it so that we can address it.

25

giving truthful testimony because of his obvious disrespect of

the law). Appellants’ argument made it clear that their newly

discovered evidence was mere impeachment evidence and

thus, by definition, it is not a sufficient basis for a new trial. 

In their appellate briefs and at oral argument,

appellants wisely attempt to focus on the negative effect that

the new evidence has on Ayala’s credibility and, therefore, on

his critical testimony. Appellants now argue that Ayala 20

repeatedly lied to the government while acting as a

confidential informant because he repeatedly but falsely

pledged not to commit any crimes. In appellants’ view, this

case is similar to Taglia, where a witness was shown to be a

serial liar when testifying in a certain capacity.

Notwithstanding appellants’ arguments, we find that

critical evidence has not been so severely weakened as to

justify granting a new trial. Ayala has testified as a

confidential informant in three other cases. If it was shown

that he committed blatant perjury in these other cases then

there might be reason to doubt his testimony in this case.

Instead, appellants simply have shown that Ayala committed

crimes while working for the government, something he
26

promised not to do. This is too narrow a basis for granting a

new trial because a person signing a government agreement

and then violating its terms has engaged in a course of

conduct wholly different from that of a person fabricating

testimony. A showing that Ayala violated the terms of his

employment is not a sufficient basis to suggest that his entire

work as a confidential informant was a sham. Ayala’s

treatment of a young girl in violation of his terms of

employment, upsetting as it may be, has nothing to do with

the conversations that occurred inside Aruba Check Cashing.

See Quiles, 2009 WL 466283, at *5 (“[T]he crimes with

which Ayala is charged have absolutely no relation to his role

in the investigation or trial of defendants.”). This case

involves evidence different from the type of evidence we

discussed above regarding the imprisoned witness for the

evidence at issue here simply does not establish that Ayala

necessarily was untruthful at the trial in this case.

4. Conclusion on the Rule 33 Issue

Appellants are not entitled to a new trial merely

because the principal witness adverse to them has turned out

to be a vile person. A practice supporting the granting of a

new trial when such a post-trial showing is made would not

be workable. How bad would the witness’s unrelated conduct

have to be before a new trial should be granted? What if

Ayala had been stealing cars instead of raping children? For

this reason, appellants here and defendants generally are not

entitled to a new trial solely on the basis of newly discovered

impeachment evidence. However, if there is a strong
27

exculpatory connection between the newly discovered

impeachment evidence and the charge against the defendant,

or if the new evidence totally undermines critical evidence of

the defendant’s guilt, then the newly discovered impeachment

evidence can serve as the basis for a new trial. But

impeachment evidence which lacks this connection —

evidence that is merely impeaching without an exculpatory

connection with respect to the charge against the defendant or

without undermining critical inculpatory evidence — will not

suffice. Whether our standard of review is de novo or abuse

of discretion, the evidence in this case is merely impeaching.

Therefore, the District Court correctly denied appellants’

motion for a new trial.

B. There Was Sufficient Evidence to Convict Gloria

Quiles

When evaluating a challenge to a jury’s verdict, we

apply a particularly deferential standard of review. United

States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). We do not

re-weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.

Id. (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir.

1996)). Instead, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government before deciding whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the presence of the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d

Cir. 1997)). In this case, our standard of review requires that

we view Ayala as a credible witness.
28

Inasmuch as the jury acquitted Gloria Quiles on the

conspiracy charge (Count One) we examine evidence of her

personal involvement in every transaction of which she was

convicted. The evidence shows that Ayala spoke with Gloria

Quiles on October 19, 2006, and on December 6, 2006. On

both occasions, Ayala told Gloria Quiles that he was there to

launder drug money. For reasons that we do not know the

jury did not convict Gloria Quiles with respect to the charges

arising from the October conversation, but it nevertheless

convicted her of the six acts of money laundering occurring

on or after December 6, 2006 (Counts Twelve through

Seventeen). After December 6, Gloria knew Ayala’s purpose

and therefore the assistance she provided was sufficient to

convict her of aiding and abetting money laundering. See

United States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming

conviction of friend who arranged drug deal, even though

friend was neither buyer nor seller).

The audio tapes confirm that Gloria Quiles was present

for transactions with Ayala on December 6 (Count Twelve),

December 7 (Count Thirteen), December 8 (Count Fourteen),

January 11 (Count Sixteen), and January 12 (Count

Seventeen). Although her interaction with Ayala may have

been minimal on some of these days, she knew Ayala was

laundering drug money and, by processing his transactions,

she was helping the venture to succeed and was participating

in it. See United States v. Moses, 220 F.2d 166, 169 (3d Cir.

1955) (“In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it

is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself

with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that

he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it

succeed.”) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S.
Judge Smith believes that the evidence is insufficient to 21

support the conviction of Gloria Quiles on Count 15, and he

therefore dissents from this portion of the opinion only.

29

613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769-70 (1949)) (internal quote

omitted). 

The government acknowledges that on two of these

occasions Gloria Quiles told Ayala that he had to return later

if he wanted to complete his transaction. When Ayala did

return, someone else completed the money laundering

transaction. However, because Gloria Quiles knew that Ayala

was there to launder money, her admonition to Ayala to return

later was sufficient to support her conviction for aiding and

abetting. In short, she knew what Ayala was doing and

sought by her actions to help him succeed. On those days

when Gloria Quiles performed the transactions herself, she

structured them to avoid money laundering requirements. 

With respect to the transaction on January 10 (Count

Fifteen) the evidence suggested that Gloria Quiles was at

Aruba Check Cashing, but did not interact with Ayala that

day. However, Ayala was unable to complete the transaction

that day and had to return the next day. When Ayala returned,

Gloria Quiles spoke to him about the money he had left the

previous day. This conduct was sufficient to show that she

had involved herself in the January 10 transaction after Ayala

departed.21

We see no basis to conclude that a reasonable juror

could not have voted to convict Gloria Quiles on the facts
30

presented at trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, we cannot overturn the jury’s

verdict. Thus, we will affirm Gloria Quiles’s conviction in

full.

C. German Quiles’s Sentence Was Reasonable

German Quiles challenges the procedure used to arrive

at his sentence. He argues that the Court failed to consider

evidence suggesting that a lower sentence would have been

appropriate and failed to justify the sentence that it imposed.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (court should state the reasons for its

imposition of a particular sentence). But the record

demonstrates that the Court was involved closely at every

stage of the trial and sentencing. The Court heard sentencing

arguments from German Quiles and from the government.

The Court then explained at some length why German Quiles

was being sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. A

sentencing court need not analyze explicitly every argument

that a defendant puts forward. See Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (sentencing

court’s terse statement of reasons was sufficient explanation

of sentence). The Court clearly performed its duties in this

case, and did not make a procedural error in doing so.

Next, German Quiles argues that the District Court

failed to explain why he was sentenced to prison while his
German Quiles does not challenge the amount of the fine. Of 22

course, he does not argue that the District Court should have

imposed longer sentences on his wife and daughter.

31

wife and daughter were not. He argues that the Court was 22

required to address this issue explicitly under 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)(6). But that statute does not contain such an

“explicit” explanation requirement, and we already have

stated that the Court sufficiently explained the sentence that

was imposed. Additionally, a defendant does not have a right

to be sentenced equally with his co-defendants. See United

States v. Parker, 462 F.3d 273, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2006).

Sentencing is an individual matter. Finally, the record makes

clear that the Court saw German Quiles as the ringleader of

the criminal activity. He was the president of Aruba, Inc. and

was in charge of its compliance with the applicable

regulations with respect to money laundering. The Court

increased his offense level by two because the Court found

that he was the leader, manager, or supervisor of the criminal

activity at issue. Supp. App. 1582. During sentencing, the

Court asked German Quiles “why did you involve your wife

and daughter?” Supp. App. 1618. We see no error here.

German Quiles also challenges his sentence as

substantively excessive. When a district court imposes a

sentence after a procedurally sound review, a court of appeals

will consider the sentence imposed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,

128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We cannot say that German

Quiles’s below-guideline sentence was beyond the discretion

of the District Court here.
32

V. CONCLUSION

We have considered whether newly discovered

impeachment evidence, standing alone, can be the basis for a

new criminal trial, assuming all the other requirements of

Rule 33 are met. We have concluded that it can be in

situations in which the evidence is more than merely

impeaching or in which it severely undermines the credibility

of a crucial government witness whose testimony was

essential to the government’s case. Thus, there must be an

exculpatory connection between the new impeachment

evidence and the witness’s testimony at trial or the

impeachment evidence must undermine critical trial

testimony. When those connections are missing, as they are

here, or the impeachment evidence is less significant, as it is

here, the newly discovered evidence is merely impeaching

and a new trial should not be granted on its basis. For this

reason, we will affirm the District Court’s order entered on

February 25, 2009, denying a new trial. We also will affirm

the order entered on August 14, 2008, denying appellant

Gloria Quiles’s motion for a new trial. Viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the government, there was

sufficient evidence to convict her. Moreover, we will affirm

the sentence of German Quiles. The Court conducted a full

sentencing hearing and then sufficiently explained why it was

imposing a below-guideline sentence of 60 months

imprisonment. Thus, we will affirm the judgments of

conviction and sentence entered in the District Court on

February 27, 2009, in No. 09-1667, and on March 3, 2009, in

No. 09-1686.