[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13225

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDWIN SYLVAIN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60313-DPG-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13225

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Edwin Sylvain appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2). 

The government has moved for summary affirmance because

there is no substantial question as to the outcome of Sylvain’s appeal. We agree, grant the summary affirmance motion, and affirm 

the district court’s order.

I.

Sylvain pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act 

robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of violence, kidnapping, and carjacking. In 2015, the district court sentenced Sylvain to 408 months’ imprisonment. 

Between May 2021 and September 2022, Sylvain moved 

more than a dozen times to reduce his sentence. Relevant here:

• In May 2021, he moved for compassionate release under 

section 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the Covid-19 pandemic. 

• In June 2022, he moved for reduction of his sentence under section 3582(c)(2), arguing plain error under Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and misapplication of 

guideline section 2K2.4 and guideline amendments 599 

and 600. 

• In July 2022, he moved for compassionate release under 

section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he saved the life of a 

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22-13225 Opinion of the Court 3

corrections officer in medical distress by providing immediate assistance and calling other officers for help. 

On August 16, 2022, the district court denied Sylvain’s section 3582(c)(2) motion for reduced sentence because he failed to 

show “how the guidelines were misapplied to him,” noting that he 

and the government jointly recommended a sentence of thirtyfour years’ imprisonment. That same day, the district court denied 

Sylvain’s May 2021 and July 2022 section 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate release motions because the section 3553(a) factors didn’t support his release, he failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and 

compelling reason for his early release, and he remained a danger 

to the safety of the community. 

On September 13, 2022, Sylvain moved to reduce his sentence under section 3582(c)(2), reiterating his arguments from his 

June 2022 and July 2022 motions. The next day, the district court 

described the motion as “another collateral attack on his convictions and sentence” and denied it “for the reasons already stated 

. . . in its previous [o]rders.” 

Sylvain timely appealed, and the government has moved for 

summary affirmance and a stay of the briefing schedule. 

II.

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of 

one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can 

be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). We 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13225

review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope 

of its authority under section 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lawson, 

686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). If section 3582(c)(2) applies, 

we review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence 

reduction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “While we read briefs 

filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro 

se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 

870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

III.

Section 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based 

on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the 

Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A district court

considering a motion under this section must determine (1) what 

sentence it would’ve imposed based on the subsequently lowered

sentencing range, and (2) whether, in its discretion, it should reduce the defendant’s sentence accordingly considering the section 

3553(a) factors and whether the defendant poses a threat to the 

safety of the community. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 

1256 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81 

(11th Cir. 2000); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(ii)–(iii).

In his notice of appeal, Sylvain specified that “[t]his notice is 

for my 3582(c)(2) that was denied 9/14/2022.” No other orders or 

motions were mentioned.

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22-13225 Opinion of the Court 5

But, in his brief, Sylvain doesn’t mention section 3582(c)(2). 

He doesn’t address whether the district court abused its discretion 

when it denied his section 3582(c)(2) motion. And he identifies no 

amendment to the guidelines that was made after he was sentenced 

and that would have subsequently lowered his guideline range. 

Sylvain has therefore abandoned these arguments. 

What Sylvain does mention is his July 2022 motion for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), which he calls the 

“instant motion on appeal.” But where an appellant makes an express statement limiting the scope of the appeal, we have jurisdiction to review only the judgments or orders that are specified in 

the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The general 

rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to review only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are 

specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.”), aff’d sub nom. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). We liberally construe

this requirement. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“When 

papers are technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3], a court 

may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if 

the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires.” (quotation omitted)). But even under the most liberal construction possible, Sylvain’s notice shows no overriding intent to 

appeal anything other than the September 14 ruling. See Nichols v. 

Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3, however, and an appeal is not lost 

if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13225

where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider his arguments related to his earlier motions. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck, 825 F.3d at 1528.1

The government argues that Sylvain has abandoned his 

challenge to the denial of his section 3582(c)(2) motion by not briefing it on appeal. Because the government is clearly correct as a 

matter of law, it is entitled to summary affirmance. See Groendyke

Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. 

But even if it weren’t, the outcome would be the same. Sylvain’s section 3582(c)(2) motion didn’t rely on any amendment to 

the guidelines that retroactively reduced his guideline range. Rather, he relied on amendments 599 and 600, which went into effect 

November 1, 2000, well before the district court sentenced him. 

The other grounds he cited in support of his motion—saving the 

life of the corrections officer, the district court’s alleged “misapplication” of section 924(c), and the “ambiguity” of that statute—

1

Even if we could review the district court’s order denying compassionate 

release, we would still grant the government’s summary affirmance motion. 

“[T]he only circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those extraordinary 

and compelling reasons as described by [s]ection 1B1.13.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021). But the reasons Sylvain gave for compassionate release were not described in section 1B1.13. So there was no basis 

for the district court to grant relief. 

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aren’t reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2). 

The district court therefore could not have abused its discretion.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE GRANTED;

AFFIRMED.2

 

2 The government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule is DENIED AS 

MOOT.

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