SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5038-17T2

FATMATA KAMARA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND

PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION 

OF STATE POLICE,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted September 16, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-0100-18.

Fatmata Kamara, appellant pro se.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Marvin L. Freeman, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 30, 2019
2

A-5038-17T2

Plaintiff Fatmata Kamara appeals the trial court's May 25, 2018 order 

granting defendant State of New Jersey's motion to set aside entry of default and 

granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time-barred. 

Having reviewed the record in light of the governing legal principles, we affirm.

We discern the following facts from the record. Plaintiff formerly worked 

as a clerk typist for the New Jersey State Police (NJSP). She was terminated on 

August 13, 2014 after a hearing regarding her behavior at work. 1 Plaintiff 

participated in an arbitration with the State, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of 

the State, issuing a report on October 11, 2017. 2

On January 9, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint against the State, alleging 

that the State subjected her to "retaliation, harassment, transfer and then sent 

[her] for fitness for duty, that resulted [in] remo[val] without a just cause," after 

she reported an overtime record that she believed was inappropriate. Plaintiff 

served defendant at the NJSP headquarters on February 2, 2018. On April 4, 

 

1 The facts leading to plaintiff's termination have not been verified. At the May 

25, 2018 motion hearing, defendant's counsel stated, "The State takes no 

position on the merits of [plaintiff's] termination." 

2 Plaintiff states that she participated in arbitration to "seek[] restoration with 

the State." Defendant has not verified the purpose of the proceeding, and there 

is nothing else in the record that discusses it.
3

A-5038-17T2

2018, she requested entry of default after receiving no answer from defendant. 

Default was entered on the same day.

On May 25, 2018, the trial judge entered an order vacating default because 

plaintiff failed to effect service on the Attorney General's office as required by 

Rule 4:4-4(a)(7). Regarding the motion to dismiss, the judge determined that 

plaintiff's complaint asserted claims arising under the Conscientious Employee 

Protection Act ("CEPA"), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, and the Law Against 

Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, based on the allegations of 

harassment and retaliation. Applying the applicable statutes of limitations, the 

judge concluded that plaintiff's claims were not timely filed, and dismissed 

plaintiff's complaint. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial judge's dismissal of her 

complaint should be reversed because her union contract provided her with 

access to arbitration procedures to seek reinstatement, and until the arbitration 

was concluded, her claims for retaliation and harassment did not accrue. 

This court reviews a grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure 

to state a claim de novo and applies the same standard under Rule 4:6-2(e) that 

governed the trial court. Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. 

Div. 2010). The court must "search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality 
4

A-5038-17T2

to ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned even 

from an obscure statement of claim . . . ." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp 

Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove 

Mem'l Park, 43 N.J. Super. 244, 252 (App. Div. 1957)). This review "is limited 

to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the 

complaint." Ibid.

A claim alleging a CEPA violation must be brought within one year of the 

alleged violation. N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. A claim alleging a LAD violation must be 

brought within two years of the cause of action accruing. Rodriguez v. 

Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343, 356 (2016) (citing Montells v. Haynes, 

133 N.J. 282 (1993)). The time of accrual depends on the type of conduct that 

the plaintiff alleges violated the LAD. Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204 N.J. 

219, 228 (2010). "A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act occurs on the day 

that it happens." Ibid. (quoting Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 567 (2010)). Such 

acts include "[d]iscriminatory termination and other similar abrupt, singular 

adverse employment actions" resulting from discrimination in violation of the 

LAD. Ibid. (citing Roa, 200 N.J. at 569). 

Plaintiff contends that her claims are timely because her union contract 

permitted her to seek a remedy for her alleged wrongful termination through 
5

A-5038-17T2

arbitration. Plaintiff argues that because she participated in arbitration with the 

State on October 11, 2017, her claims accrued on that date. There is no legal 

support for plaintiff's contention that her obligation to file a timely complaint 

against the State had to await the outcome of the arbitration. Although based on 

similar facts, her complaint in this case is independent of the arbitration 

proceeding. We conclude that the trial judge correctly determined that plaintiff's 

claims arose under CEPA and LAD, as there are no other supporting causes of 

action, and properly applied those statutes of limitations to her complaint. 

Plaintiff's retaliation and harassment claims arise out of conduct that 

would have occurred through the end of her employment, which terminated on 

August 13, 2014. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege any adverse employment 

action that occurred after her termination. Consequently, under either CEPA or 

LAD, plaintiff's claims accrued, at the latest, on August 13, 2014. Accordingly, 

the trial court correctly concluded that when plaintiff filed her complaint on 

January 9, 2018, both the one-year statute of limitations that applies to CEPA 

claims and the two-year statute of limitations that applies to LAD claims had 

expired. 
6

A-5038-17T2

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments 

raised by plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.