Report to the Subcommittee on 

Readiness, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

April 2003 DOD CIVILIAN 

PERSONNEL 

Improved Strategic 

Planning Needed to 

Help Ensure Viability 

of DOD’s Civilian 

Industrial Workforce 

GAO-03-472 
DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop 

and implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads 

to be accomplished in each of the services’ depots. The DOD depot system 

has been a key part of the department’s plan to support military systems in 

the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work has 

decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U.S. code requires 

DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at least 50 percent of 

depot maintenance funds be spent for public-sector performance, questions 

remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic 

plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic 

depot planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also 

remain about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed 

workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 

2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal 

year 2002. 

The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans 

to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet future 

requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the industrial 

activities, generally it is short-term rather than strategic. Further, workforce 

planning is lacking in other areas that OPM guidance and high-performing 

organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning. Service 

workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the competencies; 

(2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not 

develop performance measures and evaluate workforce plans. 

Several challenges adversely affect DOD’s workforce planning for the 

viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot 

workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the workforce 

over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty maintaining the 

depots’ viability. Second, the services are having difficulty implementing 

multiskilling—an industry and government best practice for improving the 

flexibility and productivity of the workforce—even though this technique 

could help depot planners do more with fewer employees. Finally, increased 

training funding and innovation in the training program will be essential for 

revitalizing the aging depot workforce. 

Staffing Levels, Age, and Retirement Eligibility of Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities 

Service 

FY 2002 civilian 

staffing levels Average age

Percent eligible 

to retire by 2007

Percent eligible 

to retire by 2009 

Navy 35,563 46 28 39 

Army 14,234 49 41 52 

Marine Corps 1,323 48 45 60 

Air Force 21,152 47 35 44 

Total 72,272 47 33 43 

Source: DOD (data), GAO (presentation). 

Between 1987 and 2002, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

downsized the civilian workforce in

27 key industrial facilities by about 

56 percent. Many of the remaining 

72,000 workers are nearing 

retirement. In recent years GAO 

has identified shortcomings in 

DOD’s strategic planning and was 

asked to determine (1) whether 

DOD has implemented our prior 

recommendation to develop and 

implement a depot maintenance 

strategic plan, (2) the extent to 

which the services have developed 

and implemented comprehensive 

strategic workforce plans, and 

(3) what challenges adversely 

affect DOD’s workforce planning. 

GAO recommends that the DOD 

complete revisions to core policy, 

promulgate a schedule for 

completing core computations, and 

complete depot strategic planning; 

develop a plan for arsenals and 

ammunition plants; develop 

strategic workforce plans; and 

coordinate the implementation 

of initiatives to address various 

workforce challenges. DOD 

concurred with 7 of our 9 

recommendations; nonconcurring 

with two because it believes the 

proposed National Security 

Personnel System, which was 

submitted to Congress as a part of 

the DOD transformation legislation, 

will take care of these problems. 

We believe it is premature to 

assume this system will (1) be 

approved by Congress as proposed 

and (2) resolve these issues. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-472.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek Stewart 

at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-472, a report to 

the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

April 2003

DOD CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 

Improved Strategic Planning Needed to 

Help Ensure Viability of DOD’s Civilian 

Industrial Workforce 
Page i GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

DOD Lacks Strategic Planning to Guide Future Planning for 

Industrial Activities 11

Services’ Efforts to Develop Industrial Workforce Plans 

Vary and Generally Lack Some Key Planning Elements 21

A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic 

Workforce Planning 31

Conclusions 42

Recommendations for Executive Action 44

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 49 

Appendix II Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ Depots 52 

Appendix III Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 55 

Appendix IV GAO Staff Acknowledgments 64 

Related GAO Products 65 

Tables 

Table 1: Status of Service Depots’ Short-Term Workforce 

Planning Efforts 26

Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to Retire 32

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Figures 

Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities 6

Figure 2: Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing 

Activities Performed in Selected Industrial Activities 8

Figure 3: Office of Personnel Management’s Workforce 

Planning Model 11

Abbreviations 

ALC Air Logistics Center 

DOD Department of Defense 

OPM Office of Personnel Managment 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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permission from GAO. It may contain copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. 

Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

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Page 1 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

April 30, 2003 

The Honorable Joel Hefley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The manufacture and support of military weapons involves a vast array 

of industrial capability some of which is in the private sector and some 

of which is in the public sector. The part in the public sector centers 

around 27 key Department of Defense (DOD) industrial facilities, including 

22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 government-owned and-operated 

ammunition manufacturing plants.1

 The civilian workforce in these 

activities was reduced by about 56 percent between 1987 and 2002—from 

about 163,000 to about 72,000 employees. The workforce reduction 

occurred as a result of downsizing initiatives, the increased use of the 

private sector for logistics support activities, and other factors. Because 

seniority was a major factor in determining which workers would be 

retained and little new hiring has occurred in most of these activities, the 

result of downsizing is that more than 7,000 civilian employees, or about 

12 percent of the remaining workforce, are currently eligible to retire and 

about 43 percent will be eligible to retire by 2009. This has created a 

human capital management challenge for DOD. In addition, DOD’s 

challenge is exacerbated by the war on terrorism and other critical 

military operations while it also is undertaking significant transformation 

initiatives and addressing initiatives to further streamline its operations, 

including responding to further downsizing mandates. 

 1

 DOD has nine other active ammunition manufacturing plants that are government-owned 

and contractor-operated. These nine plants have a total of 145 government civilians, 

6 military personnel, and 5,314 contractor personnel. They are not included in this 

report’s discussion. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

In recent years, we have emphasized the importance of strategic 

planning in DOD for establishing and achieving key mission objectives.2

We have also identified specific deficiencies in DOD’s planning for depot 

maintenance operations. For example, in October 2001, we reported that 

DOD had no overall plan that tied investments in depot maintenance 

facilities and equipment with future workloads3

 and, in turn, with human 

capital needs. At that time we recommended that DOD, among other 

actions, develop a strategic—or long-term—plan for depot maintenance 

that addressed human capital needs and the specific actions necessary to 

meet them. 

This report looks specifically at the strategic workforce planning for the 

27 previously mentioned DOD industrial facilities. Concerned about DOD’s 

apparent lack of a plan for its depot workforce and the potential 

implications of these deficiencies, you asked that we determine 

• whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and 

implement strategic plans for depot maintenance; 

• the extent to which the services have developed and implemented 

strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot workforce to meet 

future requirements; and 

• what challenges adversely affect DOD’s workforce planning for the 

long-term viability of its civilian depot workforce. 

As part of our work, we reviewed DOD’s and the services’ existing 

strategic and other workforce plans for these activities. We visited 

18 maintenance depots, three arsenals, and two ammunition 

manufacturing plants and obtained data from 4 additional maintenance 

depots we did not visit. 

 2

 Since 1997, we have issued several reports dealing with DOD’s implementation of 

strategic planning initiatives generated as a result of the Government Performance and 

Results Act of 1993, P. L. No. 03-62. Aug. 3, 1993. 

3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome 

Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 12, 2001). 
Page 3 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

DOD has not implemented our prior recommendation to develop and 

implement a departmentwide depot strategic plan that would delineate 

future workloads to be accomplished in each of the services’ maintenance 

depots, and the services efforts to develop comprehensive depot strategic 

plans vary. Although recognition and maintenance of depots’ core 

capabilities and their workforces are key to the continued viability of the 

depot system, DOD’s increased use of the private sector in recent years 

has decreased the role of DOD’s maintenance depots and raised questions 

about their long-term future role that have not been addressed by a 

comprehensive strategic plan. Uncertainties also exist about the future 

role of DOD arsenals and ammunition plants. Depot officials said that it is 

difficult to develop a depot strategic plan with so many uncertainties 

about how the military depots will be used in the future. However, title 10 

of the U.S. Code provides direction regarding the role of the depots and 

the allocation of depot maintenance work between the public and private 

sectors, and it dictates a continuing role for a level of DOD depot 

maintenance capability. The lack of a strategic plan may have serious 

implications because without forethought to shape the future of the 

depots and their workforces, the future capability of the two for 

performing work is questionable. Absent a departmentwide plan, the 

services’ efforts to develop comprehensive depot strategic plans vary. For 

example, the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps have developed depot 

plans, but the Army plan has been suspended, the Air Force plan does 

not address one depot nor identify specific new work, and the Marine 

Corps plan has not been approved and has no approval schedule. While 

the Navy has not developed a strategic depot plan, two of the Navy 

components—the shipyard and aviation communities—have begun 

strategic planning efforts. 

The services have also not developed and implemented strategic 

workforce plans that will position the civilian industrial workforce to 

meet future requirements. Except for the Air Force, the services industrial 

activities’ workforce plans are mostly short-term rather than strategic. The 

plans are also lacking in other areas that Office of Personnel Management 

(OPM) guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to 

successful workforce planning. Specifically, they (1) usually do not assess 

the competencies needed for current and future workforces; (2) do not 

develop comprehensive retention plans that identify employees critical 

to accomplishment of organizational goals, develop an infrastructure 

to assist workers in becoming long-term assets of the organization, 

or provide meaningful incentives to retain valued employees; and 

(3) sometimes do not develop performance measures for evaluating 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

workforce plans to identify corrective actions needed to improve 

planning efforts. 

Several challenges adversely affect DOD’s workforce planning for the 

long-term viability of the workforce industrial workforce. First, given the 

aging of the workforce and the eligibility for retirement of about 

43 percent of the workforce over the next 7 years, the services could 

have difficulty maintaining the viability of these activities. Yet, the 

implementation of short-term workforce planning rather than strategic 

planning does not address this challenge. Second, the services are having 

difficulty implementing multiskilling—an industry and government best 

practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce—

even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer 

workers. Multiskilling is the process of training maintenance employees 

in specific skills that cross the traditional trade or craft lines and then 

ensuring that the work is performed. A major advantage of multiskilling is 

that particular jobs that require more than one craftnot necessarily more 

than one individualcan be performed by fewer personnel. Being able to 

provide additional compensation to workers for obtaining the desired new 

complementary skills could enhance the depots’ ability to implement this 

program successfully. Finally, the need for both increased funds and 

innovation in the training program will challenge efforts to revitalize the 

depot workforce. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to 

strengthen strategic workforce planning for DOD industrial activities. 

DOD provided oral comments after reviewing a draft of this report, 

concurring with seven of our nine recommendations. DOD’s response 

highlighted the importance the department places in human capital 

management. In non-concurring with two of our recommendations, DOD 

officials said that DOD’s new National Security Personnel System will 

provide all the flexibilities and authorities needed to maintain and 

enhance human resources competencies, capabilities, and performance 

across the department. Since the proposed new system has not yet been 

considered by the Congress, we believe it is premature to assume that all 

its provisions will be approved and that the new system will address 

our concerns. 
Page 5 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

DOD owns and operates industrial activities that support the military 

mission by repairing; rebuilding; overhauling; and upgrading components, 

ammunitions, or end items to return them to a like-new condition or 

by manufacturing new systems components or ammunitions. As of 

January 2003, and as shown in figure 1, DOD industrial activities included 

• twenty-two maintenance depots11 in the Navy (three aviation depots, 

four shipyards, and four warfare centers—two associated with ship 

systems and two associated with engineering analyses and command and 

control), 5 in the Army, 4 in the Air Force, and 2 in the Marine Corps; 

• three Army arsenals4 that have a manufacturing mission; and 

• two Army ammunition manufacturing plants that are government-owned 

and -operated. 

 4

 The Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. 4532) provides that the Army is to have its supplies made in 

U.S. factories or arsenals provided they can do so economically. The act further provides 

that the Secretary of the Army may abolish any arsenal considered unnecessary. 

Background 

DOD Industrial Activities 
Page 6 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Figure 1: Location of 27 Key DOD Industrial Activities 

These activities, which are a part of the combined public and private 

sector industrial base and are largely staffed by DOD civilians, are 

described in appendix II. This appendix also describes the type of work 

performed at the activities and the number of DOD civilians employed in 

each. The activities generally require extensive shop facilities and 

specialized equipment and employ a range of personnel from highly 

skilled technicians and engineers to laborers. Figure 2 shows a collection 

of maintenance or manufacturing activities performed in some of the 

27 industrial activities. In fiscal year 2002, these activities employed about 

72,000 civilian employees—about 10 percent of DOD’s civilian workforce. 

About 1,200 military personnel are also employed in these activities, with 
Page 7 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

over half the military assigned to the Pearl Harbor Shipyard and 

Intermediate Maintenance Activity, which in 1998 consolidated its depot 

and intermediate maintenance work into one activity, bringing together 

the largely military workforce employed in the intermediate activity with 

the largely civilian population employed in the shipyard. In the other DOD 

industrial activities, military personnel are largely in managerial or 

supervisory positions. Of the approximately 72,000 civilian employees, the 

Army employs about 14,200; the Navy, about 35,500; the Marine Corps, 

about 1,300; and the Air Force, about 21,100. Various factors (such as the 

downsizing of the U.S. military force structure; increased use of the private 

sector for performing support activities; and changes in repair processes, 

increasing equipment’s time in the field) have resulted in significant 

reductions in the number of personnel working in these facilities. For 

example, the number of personnel assigned to DOD maintenance depots 

was reduced by about 60 percent between 1987 and 2001—from about 

156,000 to about 64,500 workers, while the total amount of maintenance 

work was cut in half during that period. 
Page 8 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Figure 2: Collection of Various Maintenance and Manufacturing Activities Performed in Selected Industrial Activities 
Page 9 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Improved strategic planning has been a key goal of the federal government 

in recent years, with the Government Performance and Results Act of 

1993 providing guidance on strategic planning for government activities.5

Strategic plans are intended to be the starting point for each agency’s 

performance measurement efforts. Each plan is to cover a period of 

5 years and must include a comprehensive mission statement, which 

discusses, among other things, the agency’s major functions and 

operations, a set of outcome-related goals and objectives, and a 

description of how the agency intends to achieve these goals and 

objectives. We previously reported that high-performing organizations 

begin their strategic planning by defining what they want to accomplish 

and what kind of organization they want to be.6

 Similarly, agencies 

establish their missions, visions for the future, core values, goals and 

objectives, and strategies. 

High-performing public organizations have found that strategic planning 

and management can address human capital, or workforce, shortfalls. 

Strategic workforce planning—planning that focuses on developing 

long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining an 

organization’s people and for aligning human capital approaches that 

are clearly linked to achieving programmatic goals—is a key part of 

human capital management. In short, according to a National Academy of 

Public Administration guide on building successful organizations, strategic 

workforce planning is a systematic process for identifying the human 

capital required to meet organizational goals and developing the 

strategies to meet these requirements. To help meet organizational goals, 

organizations use workforce planninggetting the right people with the 

right skills in the right jobs at the right time—that is explicitly linked to the 

agency’s overall mission and goals. 

 5

 P.L. No. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993. 

6

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency 

Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.: September 2000). 

The Government 

Performance and 

Results Act of 1993 

Strategic Workforce 

Planning 
Page 10 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

While many organizations have developed models for workforce planning,7

putting aside variations in terminology, the models generally include the 

following steps. 

• Set strategic direction, including the identification of organizational vision 

and objectives at that point in the future on which planning will be based. 

This direction should also include human capital goals. 

• Identify workforce skills and competencies needed to achieve the 

objectives. Analyze the present workforce to determine what skills and 

competencies are present. Compare the present workforce skills and 

competencies to those needed in the future. This step is sometimes 

referred to as “gap analysis.” 

• Develop an action plan to transition from the present workforce to the 

future workforce. The action plan should address recruiting, hiring, 

training, succession, and retention. 

• Implement the action plan by developing well-defined objectives, specific 

measurable workforce goals, and timetables and milestones; conducting 

recruiting and training; and putting retention strategies into practice. 

• Establish performance measures; periodically evaluate the workforce 

action plans, review the mission and objectives to ensure they remain 

valid; and make adjustments as required by changes in mission, objectives, 

and workforce skills and competencies. 

Strategic workforce planning is an iterative process, as demonstrated by 

the OPM’s workforce planning model in figure 3. 

 7

 For example, OPM’s Workforce Planning Model (http://www.opm.gov/workforce 

planning/wfpmodel.htm) and U.S. General Accounting Office, Exposure Draft: A Model of 

Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
Page 11 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Figure 3: Office of Personnel Management’s Workforce Planning Model 

As a guide to help agencies in their human capital management efforts, 

the OPM issued the Human Capital Assessment and Accountability 

Framework in November 2002. This document provides standards for 

success that include, among other things: (1) strategic alignment, 

(2) workforce planning and deployment, and (3) suggested performance 

indicators. Criteria provided in other workforce planning models we 

reviewed are compatible with the more recent OPM framework. 

Although we have previously recommended the development and 

implementation of a strategic plan for depot maintenance, DOD does 

not yet have a strategic plan to guide the future development of depot 

maintenance activities, and questions continue about core capabilities 

and future work. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the 

department’s plan to support military systems, the increased use of the 

private sector to perform work previously performed by DOD employees 

has decreased the role of the services’ depots and raised questions 

regarding their future. Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides direction 

regarding the role that DOD depots should play in supporting the fighting 

DOD Lacks Strategic 

Planning to Guide 

Future Planning for 

Industrial Activities 
Page 12 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

forces and in how depot work should be allocated between the public 

and private sectors. However, while some action has been taken to begin 

formulating a depot strategic plan, DOD does not yet have a strategic plan 

for its depot maintenance activities, and it is uncertain when it will be 

completed. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan, the services have in 

varying degrees initiated a strategic depot planning effort. Generally, 

however, the service versions do not identify what work will be performed 

in the service depots in the future, and it is uncertain whether these 

activities will continue to be viable as the systems they support age and 

are phased out of the inventory. 

Although legislation requires the continued performance of some key 

industrial activities—core capabilities—in government-owned facilities 

and by government personnel and specifies that not more than 50 percent 

of funds spent for depot maintenance may be spent for work performed 

by the private sector, DOD has in recent years increasingly relied on the 

private sector for the performance of various logistics activities, including 

depot maintenance. In the past, the department requested repeal of 

legislative provisions that influenced the continued use of DOD facilities 

and personnel performing depot maintenance activities and recently again 

considered proposing the repeal in order to gain flexibility for its business 

decisions. However, the identification and acquisition of future core 

capabilities are key to strategic depot planning. 

Section 2464 of title 10 requires the Secretary of Defense to identify and 

maintain a core logistics capability. Under that provision, the core logistics 

capability is to be owned and operated by the government to ensure the 

existence of a ready and controlled source of technical competence and 

resources so that the military can effectively and timely respond to 

mobilization, national defense emergencies, and contingencies. The core 

capabilities are to include those necessary to maintain and repair the 

weapon systems and military equipment that the Secretary, in consultation 

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies as necessary to 

meet the nation’s military needs. Furthermore, the Secretary is to identify 

the workloads required to maintain those core capabilities and to require 

their performance in government facilities. Finally, the Secretary is to 

assign these facilities sufficient workloads to ensure peacetime cost 

efficiency, technical competencies, surge capacity, and reconstitution 

capabilities to support military strategic and contingency plans. 

Nonetheless, the concept of core capabilities is not precise and has been 

controversial. We have previously reported that the department’s 

implementation of the core statute is not comprehensive and that the 

Legislation Provides 

Direction Regarding the 

Continued Performance of 

Depot Maintenance in 

DOD Activities 
Page 13 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

policy and implementing procedures and practices provide little assurance 

that core maintenance capabilities are being developed as needed to 

support future national defense emergencies and contingencies.8

 In 

response to our report, DOD has revised its core policy to improve the 

department’s guidance to the military services regarding how core 

capability requirements should be developed. Although this guidance has 

been issued, questions remain about the guidance and the services are not 

accomplishing key analyses to identify essential core capabilities. 

In addition, 10 U.S.C. 2466 specifies that no more than 50 percent of the 

funds made available for depot maintenance may be spent for private 

sector performance, unless the requirement is waived for a particular 

fiscal year. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public-sector 

performance of these workloads. In recent years, our mandated reviews 

of the allocation of depot maintenance work between the public and 

private sector with regard to the 50 percent funding rule have found 

that increasing amounts of the service’s depot work was going to the 

private sector. For example, during fiscal 2001 and 2002, the Air Force 

exceeded the 50 percent limit and waived the requirement; we could not 

determine with precision whether the Army was in compliance with the 

50 percent provision.9

Because DOD implemented an acquisition policy that called on the private 

sector for life-cycle logistics support of its weapons systems, during the 

1990s most new weapon system programs called for using private-sector 

maintenance providers, with depot repair of few new programs going to 

military depots.10 With some increased visibility and awareness of the 50-50 

and core provisions, DOD has recognized the need to revitalize the depots. 

DOD guidance supports the use of public-private partnerships. In some of 

these partnerships, private-sector logistics providers subcontract with 

military depots for some depot maintenance work. We recently reported 

that public-private partnerships comprise only about 2 percent of DOD’s 

 8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome 

Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 12, 2001).

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and 

Requirements Could Enhance Congressional Oversight, GAO-03-16 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 18, 2002). 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting 

More Workload for New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector, GAO/NSIAD-98-8

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 1998).
Page 14 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

depot maintenance work, and while the department plans to significantly 

increase the use of such partnerships, there are some challenges that 

must be overcome if the department’s planned expansion of partnerships 

is to be realized.11 It is uncertain the extent to which public-private depot 

maintenance partnerships will result in contractor personnel replacing 

DOD civilian personnel in depots. However, because the 50-50 guidance 

provides that the funds for some depot partnerships are not counted when 

applying the 50 percent limitation, partnership work could be a vehicle for 

transferring significant amounts of maintenance to the private sector 

without exceeding the 50 percent limitation. 

DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot 

maintenance provisions. A legislative proposal that was associated 

with the department’s transformation agenda suggested repealing six 

sections that impose limitations on the management of depot-level 

maintenance and repair by requiring certain amounts of work to be 

performed in public depots.12 According to the proposed repeal, these 

limitations reduce the flexibility necessary for the department to make 

proper and efficient business decisions in determining the source for 

depot-level maintenance and repair. Although DOD decided not to submit 

this proposed repeal at this time, similar language could be proposed in 

the future. 

We previously recognized the importance of the depot maintenance 

mission, noted that it is unclear what future role is planned for the military 

depots in supporting DOD’s military mission, and recommended that the 

department develop a strategic plan for the military depots.13 However, 

while DOD has initiated some action toward developing a depot strategic 

plan, the department still has no depot strategic plan and the future of 

these activities is uncertain. 

 11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Depot Maintenance: Public-Private Partnerships 

Have Increased, but Long-Term Growth and Results Are Uncertain, GAO-03-423

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003). 

12 The sections that DOD considered proposing for repeal were 2460, 2464, 2466, 2469, 

2470, and 2472. 

13 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome 

Capability Gaps in the Public Depot System, GAO-02-105 (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 12, 2001). 

DOD Still Has No Strategic 

Depot Maintenance Plan 

and the Future of the 

Depots Is Uncertain 
Page 15 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Thus, DOD continues to manage its depots on an ad hoc basis 

without clearly defining their role for the future and the capabilities 

that are required to assure the continued performance of that role. The 

implications for the future are uncertain. In short, as we have reported, 

the future capability for performing work in the military depot 

maintenance facilities is questionable because no overall plan exists that 

ties investments in depot maintenance facilities and plant equipment with 

future workloads and, in turn, with human capital needs. Furthermore, 

no other department plan provides required direction to shape the future 

of these facilities and their workforce. Without strategic planning that 

identifies which capabilities these activities will need to provide in the 

future, there is no assurance they will be able to support future readiness 

requirements as they have in the past. For example, DOD’s latest logistics 

strategic plan, which was developed in August 1999, neither mentioned 

maintenance nor the large infrastructure and cadre of personnel required 

to operate and support the DOD maintenance depots.14 This occurred even 

though maintenance is an important logistics activity that is essential for 

keeping complex weapon systems ready to perform even though about 

half the department’s depot maintenance work is currently performed in 

military depots. 

Under the Government Performance and Results Act, federal agencies 

are required to develop strategic plans that include mission statements, 

strategic goals and objectives, and describe how the agencies intend to 

achieve their goals and objectives through their activities, human capital, 

information, and other resources. Depot officials said it is difficult to 

develop a depot strategic plan with so many uncertainties about how the 

military depots will be used in the future. This is particularly true in 

light of the support initiatives implemented in recent years to contract 

out to the private sector most logistics support activities, including depot 

maintenance, for new and upgraded systems and also in light of the base 

realignment and closure process that is planned for 2005. These initiatives 

indicate that the role of military depots could be further reduced in the 

future. But how much it will be reduced is not clear. However, as long as 

title 10 requirements remain, DOD will be limited in the extent to which it 

can reduce the amount of work performed in DOD depot repair activities. 

 14 DOD has not updated its logistics strategic plan since the 1999 plan. The document 

highlighting current logistics initiatives is the Future Logistics Enterprise, which consists 

of six elements, one of which is depot maintenance partnerships. 
Page 16 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Without benefit of a departmentwide strategic depot plan that clarifies the 

future role of military depots, the military services to varying degrees have 

provided a prospective for future depot management, with that of the Air 

Force and the Navy shipyards being the most mature. However, by and 

large, the vision provided is based on short-term workload projections—

1 to 2 years beyond the current year—and does not provide the strategic 

long-term look that is needed to guide future workforce decision making. 

The Army does not have a current strategic depot plan, and its outdated 

plan was not comprehensive. According to Army planners, although the 

Army had a Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan, the plan was 

suspended pending reassessment of depot capabilities and requirements 

as part of an ongoing study of depot proliferation. Further, while the 

suspended plan was intended to provide mission and vision statements, it 

was generally oriented toward improving depot business operations and 

it was not a comprehensive plan that provided a basis for guiding future 

depot planning. 

Although not specifically addressed in the plan, in recent years, work 

assigned to the Army depots has greatly declined as have the workforces 

assigned to the depots. We reported in November of 1998, however, that 

the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of 

positions to be eliminated from its depots.15 This was particularly the 

case in determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to 

support depot workload requirements. To address this problem, the 

Army implemented the Army Workload and Performance System to 

correlate workload and funding requirements with the depot workforce. 

Nonetheless, this system does not provide the visibility of new systems, 

modernization programs, and upgrades that will have depot work that 

could be assigned to the depots. 

Depot planners said they have little assurance that new systems will be 

brought in, as the older systems they currently work on are phased out 

of the inventory. Recently, ownership of Army depots has shifted to 

subordinate commands of the Army Materiel Command that are 

responsible for the sustainment of Army systems. It was hoped that this 

change would increase the commands’ use of the depots and better 

 15 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements 

and Related Issues Affecting Depots and Arsenals, GAO/NSIAD-99-31 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 30, 1998).

Absent DOD Direction, 

the Military Services’ 

Efforts to Develop 

Strategic Plans Vary, but 

Generally Are Weak in 

Defining Future Work 

Army
Page 17 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

integrate depot work into the overall command mission performance, 

but it is too soon to know if this will be successful. The subordinate 

commands such as the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command 

and Aviation and Missile Command, which are responsible for making 

decisions about how support work will be allocated between the public 

and private sectors, were also responsible for decisions that moved 

responsibility for much of the work that used to be performed by the 

depots to the private sector. These actions were based on new acquisition 

guidance encouraging the use of contractor support. 

The Army’s suspended depot strategic plan identified five issues, one of 

which relates to depot workforce planning by keying in on the capability 

of the depot workforce to meet future requirements. The plan’s goal for 

this strategic issue was “to ensure a sustainable, multi-skilled workforce 

that is capable of meeting future depot maintenance requirements;” and 

the plan identified implementation objectives and measurable criteria. 

Nonetheless, as previously noted, it is unclear what the depots’ future 

work will be. Therefore, as older systems are phased out of the inventory, 

it is unclear what, if any, new work will be phased in. This was not 

addressed in the suspended plan. 

The arsenals and manufacturing ammunition plants have strategic plans 

or draft plans providing a mission, vision statements, and goals for the 

organizations. However, it is unclear whether the extent that the vision 

these activities have for themselves is the same as the one that Army 

headquarters and the parent commands have for these organizations. 

Neither the Army nor most of the parent commands have officially 

published strategic plans that identify the vision and objectives for these 

activities. Most arsenals’ workload and corresponding workforce have 

been declining for years. The arsenals generally project workload and 

corresponding workforce requirements primarily by consulting customers 

and prospective customers regarding their future workload for the 

arsenals. Arsenal officials said that this methodology provides a 

reasonable workload projection for only 2 years. Further, some of the 

work that is done in the arsenals is not the type of manufacturing work the 

arsenals used to perform. For example, instead of manufacturing large 

artillery systems, more than 40 percent of workload performed in the 

Rock Island arsenal is manufacturing and assembling tool kits—ranging 

from carrying-case sized sets to fully equipped maintenance shelters. 

A recent Rand study proposed privatizing the arsenals, but it is unclear to 

what extent the Army will pursue this strategy in the future. 
Page 18 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

The ammunition plants have a fluctuating workload, sometimes increasing 

and sometimes declining. The work at two government-owned and 

government-operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years, 

but it is now increasing. The McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant, for 

example, will hire more than 200 new employees in fiscal year 2003, 

primarily because the bomb production workload has increased. 

According to ammunition plant managers, they are generally aware of 

their workload from less than 1 year to 2 years in advance. 

The Navy does not have an overall strategic plan that covers all 

Navy depot maintenance activities, but the naval shipyard and aviation 

communities each have strategic planning efforts. 

The Navy’s plan for shipyards, called the Naval Shipyard Business Plan for 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005, has the essential elements of a strategic plan. It 

is aligned to the Naval Sea Systems Command’s corporate strategy. The 

plan communicates the purpose and direction for naval shipyards and 

focuses on ship maintenance, workload performance, and associated 

improvement initiatives, including making investments in training, skills, 

and facilities necessary through 2005. It includes workload information 

from fiscal year 2001 to 2010. The plan has a strategic workforce goal for 

the naval shipyard workforce to have the skills and flexibility required to 

meet the demands of the future workload and business environment. 

The naval shipyard plan describes the relationship of the naval shipyards, 

which comprise the public sector’s share of the ship industrial base, to 

the overall industrial basethe total force. According to the plan, the 

shipyards must have a workforce that is capable of doing all the work. 

However, Navy officials said that, in reality, with regard to the ship 

repair business, the public sector and private sector personnel are 

complementary and personnel from both sectors are now used to support 

work that is primarily the responsibility of a shipyard from the other 

sector. This strategic planning approach would appear to drive workforce 

planning that is also complementary, but the shipyard business plan does 

not discuss private sector shipyard personnel. 

The naval aviation community published its Depot Maintenance Strategic 

Plan in December 2002. This document is not a complete plan, but it 

provides the framework for general doctrinal policies and principles that 

will provide the future direction of naval aviation maintenance. It defines 

four strategic goals for the depot system: (1) maximize the ability to 

favorably impact war fighter readiness and safety, (2) reduce the war 

fighters’ total cost of ownership, (3) fully integrate depot maintenance into 

Navy
Page 19 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

total life-cycle logistics management, and (4) become the knowledge base 

for naval aviation depot maintenance. The plan does not identify the 

workload and a workforce capability expected to be required at individual 

depots but does reveal that airframe work and modification work will 

be reduced and component rework and in-service engineering and 

logistics support work increased. The plan indicates that public-private 

partnerships will be pursued and are expected to be a significant share 

of the Navy depot maintenance business. According to Naval Aviation 

Systems Command officials, the strategic plan is the first of several 

documents that will be produced, with a depot business plan and 

comprehensive depot human resources plan to follow. The plan also noted 

that changes in title 10 legislation could be needed to implement the plan. 

Strategic planning for the naval warfare centers is done for an entire 

center and includes the depot maintenance function. Depot maintenance 

is not the primary function of the centers but is integrated within several 

departments’ operations and is not centrally managed. For example, depot 

maintenance at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division supports 

engineering efforts within three departments and is not centrally managed; 

rather each department manages the depot operations. Strategic planning 

does not specifically address depot operations but includes workforce 

goals for the center, which includes depot workers. 

The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has depot operations 

located at two centers but depot maintenance is not the primary function 

of the centers. Each center has a strategic plan that includes depot 

operations. Depot operations are managed at the division levels in the 

centers, which provide engineering support for various systems. The 

divisions have strategic plans that include workforce goals, which include 

depot workers. The two centers’ depot operations are not structured like 

other Navy depots and shipyards, where certain types of repairs are 

directed. Instead, they compete with other depots and repair activities 

for work. 

The Marine Corps does not yet have an approved strategic plan to guide 

actions to hire, develop, and retain the depot workforce of the future. 

However, efforts are under way to improve strategic planning at the 

Headquarters and at the Materiel Command, which is responsible for 

identifying depot maintenance requirements and the amounts and types of 

workload for the depots. 

Headquarters Marine Corps has a draft plan, Depot Level Maintenance 

Strategic Plan, that contains mission and vision statements and 

Marine Corps 
Page 20 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

three related goals for improving the support of weapon systems and 

equipment at the depot level. This draft plan does not identify the Marine 

Corps organizations or offices responsible for implementing or monitoring 

the plan. According to a Headquarters Marine Corps official, no schedule 

has been established for the plan to be reviewed, approved, and issued. 

The Materiel Command’s draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2003 through 

2008 contains mission and vision statements and six goals to improve 

materiel life cycle management of weapon systems and equipment at the 

depot level, but it is not depot specific. Command officials said that the 

plan, when finalized, would have metrics to evaluate implementation but 

is on hold pending decisions regarding the reorganization of the Materiel 

Command. As of February 2003, the command had no schedule for 

finalizing the plan. Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of Materiel 

Command, which owns the depots, published its first strategic plan 

about 2 years ago. Its current plan is not depot specific and is mostly 

business-process oriented, with only one of its six broad goals focused on 

workforce issues. Although the plan has mission and vision statements, 

Logistics Bases officials acknowledged that planning efforts do not yet 

address all the elements of workforce planning suggested by OPM and 

GAO because the command did not yet have the data it needed (such 

as attrition rates, retirement trends, and skill gaps) for these analyses. 

Officials of Logistics Bases also said the command has recently contracted 

for data collection and analysis on depot workforce and equipment 

activities that would provide a baseline for future strategic planning. 

Further, officials said they plan to use metrics to implement the plan and 

evaluate the results. 

The Air Force is the most progressive in its depot maintenance strategic 

planning. In August 2002, the Air Force issued a Depot Maintenance 

Strategy and a Depot Maintenance Master Plan covering fiscal years 

2004-2020. These plans provide a roadmap designed to ensure the 

continuing viability of Air Force’s three military depots to meet the warfighter mission needs. However, the plans did not include the Aerospace 

Maintenance and Regeneration Center. The plans are intended to posture 

the Air Force’s three other depots to support both new weapons systems 

and new technologies entering the inventory, as well as its aging systems. 

They have a workforce component, which calls for new and younger 

workers to be acquired and trained prior to the loss of the highly skilled 

workers who are nearing retirement to leverage their knowledge and 

skills. In addition, the Air Force plans call for an increased capital 

investment of approximately $150 million per year over the next 6 fiscal 

years, starting in fiscal year 2004, to modernize the Air Force depots. 

Air Force 
Page 21 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

However, key financial elements of the strategy and plan have changed 

somewhat since the issuance of the strategic and master plans. Most 

significantly, future capital investment plans, operational improvements, 

and workforce enhancements are still evolving and uncertain. For 

example, according to our analysis, funds for replacing and modernizing 

equipment used to accomplish current workloads are less than projected; 

funding amounts and sources for acquiring new capabilities to be provided 

by weapon system acquisition programs and the private sector are 

lagging and uncertain; and funding is not sufficient to implement 

initiatives to improve depot operations and financial systems and for 

workforce enhancements. 

Strategic workforce planning is intended to focus on developing, by its 

definition, long-term human capital strategies that are linked to achieving 

key programmatic goals. Strategic workforce planning requires a strategic 

plan, and as previously discussed, DOD still has not developed a depot 

strategic plan. Thus, the services generally do not perform strategic 

workforce planning that is tied to meaningful long-term visions, objectives, 

and strategic goals for their services’ military roles and missions. However, 

in varying degrees, each of the services performs short-term depot 

workforce planning that is tied to the budget preparation process. The 

services’ existing short-term workforce plans usually do not assess the 

workforce competencies needed to address future skill gaps, do not 

have comprehensive retention plans, and sometimes lack performance 

measures to evaluate the plansall areas identified as key to successful 

workforce planning. 

Each of the services performs short-term workforce planning that is tied 

to the budget process. While largely not strategic in nature, the services 

perform most aspects of workforce planning, which in varying degrees 

address some elements of workforce planning identified by the OPM and 

high-performance organizations. Appendix III provides a synopsis of the 

services’ short-term depot workforce planning efforts. 

The Army Materiel Command and its subordinate commands are 

responsible for determining the work for the Army’s five maintenance 

depots. Semiannually, they hold workload conferences to review, analyze, 

document, and assign work to the depots. Once workload is assigned, 

the depots determine the number of employees needed to support the 

workload, including (1) direct labor workers who charge time to finite 

job taskings; (2) indirect workers, such as shop supervisors and parts 

Services’ Efforts to 

Develop Industrial 

Workforce Plans 

Vary and Generally 

Lack Some Key 

Planning Elements 

Service Depot 

Workforce Planning Is 

Largely Short-Term 

Army
Page 22 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

expediters, whose time supports the overall depot maintenance process 

rather than finite jobs; and (3) general and administrative overhead 

personnel such as production managers, technical specialists, financial 

managers, personnel officers, logisticians, contracting officers, computer 

programmers, and computer operators. Determining personnel 

requirements is an iterative process that begins with the depots and 

subordinate commands. The commands use the Army Workload and 

Performance System to identify projected workload and the future 

staffing requirements based on year-to-year workload changes, known 

organizational adjustments, efficiencies such as the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, and most efficient organization studies. After agreement is 

reached, the proposed staffing levels, which are included in the 

consolidated depot budgets, are forwarded for review up the chain of 

command. These commands can revise the levels initially requested 

based on past performance and other evolving workload and staffing 

information. Once the staffing levels are approved, the depots establish 

plans and take actions to size and reshape the workforce to support 

workload. These actions, in keeping with workforce planning, include 

identifying what skills may be lacking to support the workload and 

developing hiring plans to recruit new workers; training plans for new and 

existing workers to develop and enhance critically needed skills; or, if 

staffing levels are low, measures to accomplish the assigned workload 

such as increased use of overtime. These plans could also include 

reducing the number of depot workers, if the projected work does not 

support the number of workers. 

Although each of the three arsenals determine their future workload and 

estimate future workforce requirements somewhat differently, the 

arsenals generally accomplish the task by (1) examining the currently 

funded work, (2) requesting customers and prospective customers to 

predict their workload for the arsenals for the next 2 to 3 years and 

estimating the labor hours and skills to provide the predicted 

products, (3) examining historical trends such as unexpected orders 

received, (4) discussing workload with their parent organizations, and 

(5) developing their workload and workforce requirements. The projected 

workload and workforce requirements are reviewed and approved at the 

parent organizations using a predictive staffing model to validate the 

arsenals’ computations. Most arsenals estimate the workload and 

workforce requirements for 2 to 3 years in advance, and officials said their 

estimates for this time period are generally fairly accurate. The Watervliet 

Arsenal in New York estimates its workload for 6 years in advance, but 

officials acknowledged that estimates beyond 3 years are subject to 

change. However, they believe estimates are generally reliable. 
Page 23 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

The Army’s two ammunition manufacturing plants’ workload generally 

comes from their parent organization—the Joint Munitions Command 

(formerly Operations Support Command)based on customer orders. 

The orders may come from other services or from commercial 

organizations, but the orders are placed through the parent organization. 

A predictive staffing model is used to determine the workforce 

requirements. Firm orders are usually placed no more than 1 year in 

advance, and the plants’ workloads are generally known from less than 

1 year to 2 years in advance. 

The Naval Air Systems Command distributes the annual and future 

(2 years) industrial-based workload to the three naval aviation depots. 

Once the depots receive the workload, they use historical workload data 

and staffing models to determine the civilian manpower requirements 

needed to accomplish the assigned workload. The staffing models break 

the total workload into the number of workers needed in each shop and 

the related trade skills required. These models include historical factors 

such as direct labor personnel, leave, and overtime percentages. The 

depots then develop the workforce requirements for the aircraft, engines, 

and component programs. Once the requirements are developed, the 

depots also prepare plans that include the specific skills, numbers, and 

types of workers needed in each production shop. These plans are used to 

establish hiring, training, and recruitment efforts at the depots. After the 

depots establish the workforce requirements, they are forwarded for 

review and approval to the Naval Air Systems Command. 

The Naval Sea Systems Command distributes the workload to the four 

shipyards that determine the workforce requirements to accomplish the 

planned work. The Naval Sea Systems Command provides the shipyards 

with depot maintenance workload for at least 6 years. The shipyards’ 

workload is predetermined from legislation, the availability of ships, 

depot-level maintenance requirements, and the budget. The primary tool 

the Naval Sea Systems Command and shipyards use to forecast workloads 

and workforces for budgeting and planning purposes is the Workload 

and Resource Report, which includes data on the current year and 

2 subsequent years. Each shipyard is provided its assigned workload 

schedules so they can develop their workload and resource reports for the 

workforces of each production shop. As part of the shipyards’ processes 

for determining the workforce and skills to efficiently execute the 

workload, each shipyard uses a resource allocation process. The resource 

allocation process determines the right number of workers with the right 

skills to efficiently execute the workload. Also, the shipyards’ production 

shops implement hiring and training plans and skills assessments to 

Naval Aviation Depots 

Naval Shipyards 
Page 24 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

support critical skills that are determined to be necessary for 

successful execution of ship maintenance. After the shipyards’ workforce 

requirements are determined, they are forwarded for approval to the Naval 

Sea Systems Command and included in the command’s budget. 

The Naval Sea Systems Command also has two warfare centers. Depot 

operations at both centers receive annual projected workload allocations 

from their prospective customers. The centers use the annual budget 

workload forecasts and knowledge of program’s future plans to determine 

the civilian workforce requirements. Also, civilian workforce requirements 

are based on workforce demographics such as attrition and retirements. 

The workload allocations combined with changes in the civilian workforce 

demographics provide hiring and training requirements for the centers. 

The civilian workforce requirements for the depot operations are 

forwarded through the centers for approval and review up the chain 

of command. 

The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command has two depot 

maintenance activities that are not structured like the other naval depots 

and shipyards, where certain types of repairs are directed. Rather, these 

centers compete with other depots and repair activities for their workload. 

The depot operations’ workforce allocations are directly dependent on the 

annual workloads they solicit and maintain from customers such as the 

Naval Inventory Control Point, other services, and naval commands. Depot 

operations at the centers receive annual workload information from their 

perspective customers, which are used to develop civilian workforce 

requirements. Hiring and training plans are developed according to the 

annual civilian depot workforce requirements. The centers’ depot 

workforce requirements are forwarded through the centers for approval 

and review up the chain of command. 

The Logistics Bases, a subordinate command of the Marine Corps Materiel 

Command, is responsible for identifying depot maintenance requirements 

and workloading at the Marine Corps’ two maintenance depots. Annually, 

once depot maintenance requirements and related funding are identified, 

the two centers begin the process for determining the total number of 

workers to support the workload—including direct labor and indirect 

labor workers. The centers send their staffing requests back up the chain 

of command for review and approval. Revisions to staffing requests can 

occur as a result of the centers past performance, other evolving workload 

information, and staffing information. Once the centers have an approved 

staffing level, they establish plans and take actions to size and reshape the 

workforce to support workload. Such actions include, among others, 

Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Centers 

Marine Corps 
Page 25 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

identifying skills needed to support the workload; developing hiring plans 

to recruit new workers and training plans for new and existing workers 

to develop and enhance critically needed skills; or if staffing levels are 

reduced, identifying measures to accomplish the assigned workload such 

as increased use of overtime; or, if necessary, reducing the number of 

depot workers. 

In early 2000, the Air Force Materiel Command, which has management 

and oversight responsibility for the four Air Force maintenance depots, 

developed and institutionalized workforce shaping processes to assist 

depot managers in planning and achieving their overall workforce 

objective. That objective is to obtain by fiscal year 2005 a trained, 

flexible workforce of sufficient size with the appropriate mix of skills 

and expertise to accomplish the depot mission. A key aspect of the 

command’s workforce planning process is the development of accession 

or hiring/appointment data. The command requires the depots to provide 

annual accession data in order to determine the number of potential 

vacancies by job series that each center is likely to experience in the 

current and the next 5 fiscal years. The command, in turn, applies a 

probability loss model to produce out-year accession numbers using 

attrition and retirement rates and other loss data, such as separations 

and deaths, for each depot by occupational job series. The final accession 

numbers basically become the depots “hiring plan.” 

According to depot officials at each center we visited, change in the 

mission workloads is just one of many factors used in computing future 

accession requirements. They further stated that as a general rule, 

projected accessions are based primarily on current workloads and 

attrition rates rather than on future workload estimates. According to 

these officials, because the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan 

does not identify new work to be performed in the depots, they cannot 

predict with a high level of confidence what their expected workload 

volumes will be more than 2 or 3 years out. Depot officials told us that 

their projected accession numbers beyond 2 or 3 years are their best 

guess. In addition, the depots annually conduct a bottoms-up workforce 

review to ensure that their civilian workforce is the right size and aligned 

to meet identified workload requirements. If properly done, the workforce 

planning process provides management with the needed data to make 

sound workforce decisions from implementing effective recruitment and 

retention programs, to developing valuable training programs, and to 

arranging for successful accession management. 

Air Force 
Page 26 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Depot workforce planning, as done by the services’ depots, generally 

does not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and 

high-performing organizations as key to effective workforce planning: 

(1) the assessment of competencies needed to address skill gaps; 

(2) the development of comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the 

implementation of performance measures to evaluate the success of the 

workforce plans. Table 1 provides an assessment of the status of service 

depots’ short-term workforce planning efforts in nine key areas of the 

five steps in strategic workforce planning. (See also appendix III.) 

Table 1: Status of Service Depots’ Short-Term Workforce Planning Efforts 

Service/ 

depot type 

Human 

capital 

goals 

Vision & 

objectives 

Assessed 

Competenciesa

Gap 

analysis 

Recruiting 

and/or 

hiring plans 

Training 

plans 

Succession 

plans 

Comprehensive 

retention 

plans 

Evaluate 

plans 

and 

adjust 

Army 

 

Depots √ √ √ √ √ √ √

Arsenals √ √ √ √ √ √ 

Ammo 

Plants 

√ √ √ √ √ √ 

Navy 

Aviation 

Depots 

√ √ √ √ √ √ √

Shipyards √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 

Naval 

Surface and 

Undersea 

Warfare 

Centers 

√ √ √b√ √ √ √ √

Space and 

Naval 

Warfare 

Systems 

Centers 

√ √ √ √ √ √ √c

Marine Corps √ √ d √ √ √ √ √

Air Force √ √ √b √ √ √ √ √

Source: DOD (data), GAO (analysis). 

Note: √ Checkmark indicates efforts under way to address elements in these steps. 

a

All the services and depots assessed their skills to address gaps relative to the future workforce 

requirements. 

b

The Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Air Forces’ Directorates of Maintenance at Ogden Air 

Logistics Center, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, and Warner Robins Air Logistics Center did not 

assess competencies. 

c

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San Diego did not have performance measures. 

Some Depot Workforce 

Planning Efforts Lack 

Competency Assessments, 

Comprehensive Retention 

Plans, and Evaluative 

Performance Measures 
Page 27 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

d

The Marine Corps reported that it has an initiative underway to study establishing competencies and 

career paths for its logistics and facilities communities. However, the results of that initiative have not 

been published. 

Although one Naval Undersea Warfare Center and the Air Force’s 

Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center assessed competencies, 

most depots have not assessed the competencies—a set of behaviors that 

encompass skill, knowledge, abilities, and personal attributes that are 

critical to successful work accomplishment;16 competencies can identify 

where gaps exist in the skills of the current depot workforce relative to 

those needed in the future. 

As shown in table 1, most depot officials did not usually separately assess 

competencies for depot workers, relying instead on job skills, series, or 

classifications. Workforce planning models, however, suggest that the 

assessment of competencies provides more than is discussed in position 

descriptions. A survey of several top-performing organizations suggests 

that a better approach is to conduct an actual assessment of employees’ 

competency levels. An actual assessment will provide much more useful 

information for determining the number of those available and capable of 

fulfilling future functional requirements. It can also give good information 

as to what recruitment, training, and other strategies will be needed to 

address workforce gaps and surpluses. 

Workforce planning models point out the need for identifying 

competencies. For example, the required competencies identified for 

GAO analysts include, among others, thinking critically, improving 

professional competence, achieving results, collaborating with others, 

and facilitating and implementing change. According to the state of 

Washington’s Workforce Planning Guide, competencies provide 

management and staff with a common understanding of the skills and 

behaviors that are important to the organization and the accomplishment 

of its mission. 

Although most depots did not assess competencies separately for their 

depot workers, a couple of depots did competency assessments, with one 

depot doing competency assessments for its entire workforce and one 

 16 As defined by several state and federal agencies such as the Washington State 

Department of Personnel, New York State Department of Civil Service, and the 

U.S. Departments of Interior and Health and Human Services. 

Most Depots Did Not 

Separately Assess 

Competencies Needed for 

the Depot Workforce 
Page 28 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

doing an assessment for only a segment of its workforce. The Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center identified the following competencies in its 

assessment: innovative thinking, situational leadership, managing a diverse 

workforce, conflict management, interpersonal/team skills, technical 

competence, problem solving, and oral and written communications. 

According to warfare center personnel, these attributes are critical to the 

successful achievement of its mission and goals. 

Additionally, the Air Force’s Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration 

Center developed a supervisor’s needs assessment that identified 

supervisor competencies. They included integrity, communication, 

listening, empowering others, accepting responsibility, planning, being 

a team player, dependability, consistency, fairness, and effective 

prioritization. These competencies resulted in the development of a 

core-training curriculum for supervisors. 

Although all of the services had some retention strategies to ensure 

continuity of leadership and for keeping high performing and highly skilled 

personnel, none have comprehensive retention plans to further enhance 

these strategies. 

According to OPM, an important principle behind maintaining a quality 

workforce is employee retention. A critical analysis of workforce trends 

is essential to determine what factors most affect retention. Current 

workforce research has identified the following factors as being critical 

to enhancing the retention necessary for the construction of a high 

performance organization: diversity, career development and 

advancement, work life balance, recognition, employee benefits, 

and performance. Furthermore, OPM’s 5-Step Workforce Planning 

Model states that a comprehensive retention plan should 

• determine those employees who are critical to accomplishment of 

organizational goals, 

• develop a means to provide constant feedback between these critical 

employees, and supervisors/managers to determine what they want and 

need to become long-term assets of the organization, and 

• develop a means of providing incentives and/or working conditions 

designed to retain valued employees. 

Most activities we evaluated had developed a means of providing 

incentives designed to retain valued employees. However, only the Air 

Force identified a separate list of occupations critical to accomplishment 

of organizational goals, with most depots reporting that every employee 

Services Lack Comprehensive 

Retention Plans 
Page 29 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

was critical. Overall, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center and Navy 

shipyards were further along in developing their retention plans. 

The Naval Undersea Warfare Center at Keyport, Washington, developed 

a personnel retention program that includes its depot workforce, 

concentrating on (1) work and job design, (2) career progression, 

(3) awards and compensation, and (4) quality of life. The center 

developed the retention program to make the center a great place to 

work. For example, the center has reinstituted new hire briefings, 

developed an employee handbook, and initiated an improvement award 

program to provide incentives to employees to submit new ideas for 

process improvement. 

The Navy’s shipyard retention strategies focus on bonuses, helper-toworker programs, recognition programs, employment development and 

career opportunities, and leadership training. For example, the shipyards’ 

helper-to-worker programs include, among other things, academics and 

trade theory training. Also, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has used retention 

incentives to pay up to 25 percent of salary to retain approximately 

30 employees who possessed engineering and technical knowledge that 

was critical to the shipyard’s success. Meanwhile, an Air Force depot lost 

8 of 12 workers in a shop because the highly skilled software engineers 

were disgruntled over not being able to get higher pay, even though their 

skills were critical, required years to acquire, and were and are not 

widely available. 

Although workforce planning models emphasize the need for establishing 

performance measures to provide a basis for evaluating workforce 

planning effectiveness, the workforce plans of some service depots did not 

have this element. 

The Government Performance and Results Act stresses the need for 

establishing and using performance measures. Additionally, OPM’s 5-Step 

Workforce Planning Model as well as some state and federal agencies 

stress the importance of measuring the effectiveness of workforce 

action plans as an element of effective workforce planning. Measuring 

performance allows organizations to track the progress they are making 

toward their goals and gives managers crucial information on which 

to base their organizational and management decisions. Leading 

organizations recognize that performance measures can create powerful 

incentives to influence organizational and individual behavior. According 

to the workforce planning guide of one high performance organization, 

leaders should regularly review performance measurement information, 

Some Service Depots Lacked 

Performance Measures for 

Evaluating Workforce Plans 
Page 30 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

assess what is working and not working, and make needed adjustments to 

the plan and strategies. 

The Air Force depots and the naval shipyard communities did establish 

measures for evaluating the effectiveness of their workforce planning 

efforts. In April 2001, the Air Force Materiel Command issued a command 

wide Human Resources Strategic Plan that addressed critical workforce 

issues for depot maintenance workers as well as all other materiel 

command personnel. The plan contained, among other things, 

performance measures and milestones for each human-resource enabling 

task. For example, it identified various performance measures for the 

task “Develop and Implement Methods to Attract and Recruit High-quality 

Employees.” They included, among others, determining whether 

milestones had been completed on time and whether appropriate 

actions had been taken after analysis of data from new employees’ 

entrance surveys. 

The Naval Sea Systems Command also developed performance measures 

for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce plans for Navy shipyard 

personnel. Performance measures for the Navy’s shipyards include, among 

others, measuring the success of the hiring process by comparing actual to 

planned hires. Also, shipyards track the average age to determine whether 

the effect of workforce plans is lowering the average age of the overall 

shipyards’ workforce. Furthermore, evaluations of shipyards’ training 

plans include post training evaluations and review of the budgeted training 

funds expended. 

Some Army depots and arsenals and one naval depot have not established 

performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of workforce 

plans. Army and Navy officials said they did not develop such performance 

measures because their focus was on various business metrics that 

assessed the cost, schedule, and performance of their depot operations. 

However, while those metrics provide details about depot operations and 

worker productivity, they provide little insight into the progress being 

made toward achieving workforce goals and objectives. 

Performance measures are an important element of workforce planning. 

Without establishing and using performance measures, managers will 

likely not be able either to evaluate the progress made toward the 

attainment of workforce planning goals relative to recruiting, hiring, 

training, retention, and succession or to measure the workforce’s 

contribution toward achieving programmatic goals. 
Page 31 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

The services’ depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect 

DOD’s strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian 

workforce. First, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots’ 

long-term viability by replacing up to 31,000 skilled depot workers, if these 

workers retire when they are eligible by 2009. Second, the services are 

having difficulty implementing multiskilling—having one worker capable 

of performing more than one skill, or trade, in the depot—which has been 

shown to improve worker efficiency and productivity and could help the 

depots do more with less. The Navy and the Air Force have attempted 

to implement multiskilling but are having difficulty because additional 

compensation or other financial incentives have not been approved or 

are not available. Lastly, the need for increased training funding and 

innovation for workers who replace the large number of potential retirees 

will also pose a challenge. The Air Force is already facing unfunded 

training costs for its depot workers. 

As a result of depot downsizing, the DOD civilian depot workforce has 

about 31,000 personnel eligible to retire over the next 5 to 7 years.17 This 

creates a challenge for the depots in retaining their viability, assisting 

service readiness, and revitalizing their workforces. 

Table 2 provides age and retirement eligibility information for the 

27 DOD industrial facilities. The average age ranges from 44 in the 

McAlester, Oklahoma, ammunition plant and 45 in three naval shipyards 

(where officials have actively worked to lower the average age), to 52 in 

the San Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center and the Air 

Force’s Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center. In Army 

maintenance depots, where the average age is 49, depot officials said it is 

difficult to bring down the average age because there are not many new 

hires and some of those hired tend to be older employees. 

 17 Retirement projections were based on date the employee becomes eligible for 

optional retirement under the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees 

Retirement System. 

A Number of 

Challenges Inhibit 

Effective Strategic 

Workforce Planning 

Difficulty Maintaining 

Depot Viability if Large 

Numbers of Eligible 

Skilled Workers Retire 
Page 32 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Table 2: Civilian Personnel in Industrial Facilities Eligible to Retire 

Defense industrial facilities 

FY 2002 

civilian 

staffing 

levels

Average 

age 

Number of 

civilians 

eligible to retire 

in FY 2002 

Percent 

eligible to retire 

by FY 2007 

 Percent eligible 

to retire by 

FY 2009 

Navy depots 

Cherry Point Aviation Depot 3,839 46 99 24 34 

Jacksonville Aviation Depot 3,928 48 133 27 37 

North Island Aviation Depot 3,138 49 109 31 43 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard 7,525 45 527 27 38 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 3,500 46 251 30 41 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard 8,608 45 676 28 38 

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 3,987 45 122 27 38 

Crane Naval Surface Warfare Centera 311 45 10 32 40 

Keyport Naval Undersea Warfare Center 608 48 26 41 55 

Charleston Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 49 51 5 47 59 

San Diego Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center 70 52 1 43 47 

Total Navy 35,563 1,959 

Army facilitiesb 

Anniston Army Depot 2,429 48 408 48 60 

Corpus Christi Army Depot 2,869 49 223 22 27 

Letterkenny Army Depot 1,082 49 147 46 59 

Red River Army Depot 1,478 48 203 42 55 

Tobyhanna Army Depot 2,237 49 502 58 72 

Rock Island Arsenal 1,156 50 82 36 41 

Watervliet Arsenal 484 50 28 42 61 

Pine Bluff Arsenal 804 49 89 43 63 

Crane Army Ammunition Activity 620 49 181 49 60 

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant 1,075 44 226 30 48 

Total Army 14,234 2,089 

Marine Corps depots 

Maintenance Center Albany 659 48 128 47 64 

Maintenance Center Barstow 664 47 118 43 56 

Total Marine Corps 1,323 246 

Air Force depotsc 

Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center 439 52 139 65 77 

Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden ALC 5,852 47 1,015 39 49 

Directorate of Maintenance, Oklahoma City ALC 8,533 45 1,167 33 41 

Directorate of Maintenance, Warner Robins ALC 6,328 45 988 33 41 

Total Air Force 21,152 3,309 

Total Defense industrial facilities 72,272 48d 7,603 33 43 

 Source: DOD (data), GAO (presentation). 
Page 33 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

a

Staffing level as of November 2001. 

b

Army industrial facilities include depots, arsenals and government-owned and–operated ammunition 

plants. 

c

Air Force data as of September 30, 2001. 

d

Total weighted average age based on the number of civilian staff at each industrial facility. 

As table 2 shows, about 7,600 employees in these activities—about 

12 percent of the total workforce—were eligible to retire in fiscal year 

2002. However, depot officials told us they cannot hire replacement 

workers until the vacancies occur. Given that years of experience are 

required to get the average worker to a journeyman level, these officials 

are concerned about the impact on depot operations of trying to replace 

large numbers of workers during a short time period. This situation will be 

aggravated during the next few years as the number of workers eligible to 

retire increases significantly. For example, the percent eligible to retire by 

fiscal year 2007 ranges from a low of 22 in one Army depot and 24 in one 

naval aviation depot to a high of 65 percent at one Air Force depot and 

58 at one Army depot. In 2009, 77 percent of the workers will be eligible 

to retire at one Air Force depot, 72 percent at one Army depot, and 

64 percent in one Marine Corps depot. 

Air Force officials said they expect to hire 13,000 depot workers by 

September 2009 to replace retiring workers. They expect to encounter 

difficulties during that process, similar to those they experienced when 

they hired approximately 4,500 workers during the last 2 years (primarily 

as a result of Base Realignment and Closures and transfers). Those 

difficulties included the following: 

• engineering positions were particularly difficult to fill, and the use of 

pay incentives to increase salary levels of engineers and other hard-to-fill 

positions was essential; 

• some qualified and desirable potential employees went elsewhere because 

the hiring process took too long; 

• new hires were not “shop ready” when they come in the door and needed 

additional training; and 

• more supervisors are needed to manage the new workers. 

According to officials at the Air Force’s Directorate of Maintenance, 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, workers in one software engineering shop 

became discouraged at not getting additional pay and 8 out of 12 quit and 

went to work for a local contractor. Unable to fill these highly skilled 

positions or otherwise get the work accomplished in the depot, the depot 

hired the contractor to do the work formerly done in the depot at a 
Page 34 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

considerably higher cost than was incurred when the work was done in 

the depot. 

Army officials noted that a higher average age does not necessarily equate 

to high retirement eligibility. For example, workers at the Corpus Christi 

depot have an average age of 49, but the number of workers eligible to 

retire by 2009 is 27 percent—the lowest of any depot. According to 

Corpus Christi depot officials, during the mid-1980s they hired about 

1,700 workers in their mid-30s, many of which were ex-military. 

Additionally, Army officials noted that many depot workers continue to 

work after they are eligible to retire. Nonetheless, Army depot officials 

recognize that with about 52 percent of the depot workforce eligible to 

retire by 2009, it will be difficult to maintain a viable, trained workforce 

if the retirement eligible employees choose to retire over a short period 

of time. 

We analyzed Army retirement eligibility data for the Army depot 

workforce and observed that some work centers could lose a majority 

of their staff within the next 5 years. Depot officials acknowledged that 

some work centers are at risk if all or most of the workers leave during a 

short period of time and that realignments, or job transfers, are needed to 

make sure a large number of retirement eligible employees are not 

assigned to any one area. However, the depots have limited plans to deal 

with this situation. They said they cannot hire replacement workers until 

after an employee retires. Additionally, transfers to balance retirement 

eligible employees could be unwelcomed by personnel and could have an 

adverse impact on shop productivity, as workers require time to gain skills 

in new areas. It will be a major challenge to balance such concerns about 

current operational impacts and increased training now against longer 

term concerns about retirement eligibility over the next 5 to 7 years. 

However, the depots are generally not making such analyses 

and trade-offs. 

According to Marine Corps depot officials, attrition rates are low and the 

centers have hired few new permanent employees. However, the percent 

of employees eligible to retire will increase from 43 and 47 percent in 2007 

to 56 and 64 percent in 2009. Officials said it would be difficult to bring 

on such large numbers of new workers if these retirement-eligible 

personnel do retire about the same time. However, the centers’ workload 

has declined significantly in the past. Systems that used to comprise the 

bulk of the centers’ work are phasing out of the inventory, and questions 

remain about whether replacement systems will be maintained in the 

Marine Corps depots or the private sector. Officials acknowledged that it 
Page 35 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

is difficult to plan for the revitalization of the center workforce without 

knowing what work will be available for them to do. 

An aging workforce has some advantagesparticularly when the 

workload is relatively stable over time. Officials pointed out that as 

DOD was downsizing its depot workforce and doing no new hiring, there 

were fewer demands for training programs. About half of the depots 

have apprenticeship programs, which are the most comprehensive and 

expensive type of training for industrial workers. Some of these programs 

have been re-established in the past few years. Nonetheless, according to 

depot officials, it would be unaffordable to hire enough apprentices to 

replace the large numbers of workers who will be eligible to retire over the 

next 5 to 7 years. 

The services are having difficulty implementing or are not trying to 

implement multiskillinga private-sector initiative designed to improve 

the flexibility, efficiency, and productivity of workers. Multiskilling is the 

process of training maintenance employees in specific skills that cross the 

traditional trade or craft lines and then ensuring the work is performed. It 

involves reviewing work processes to identify situations where efficiency 

and productivity can be enhanced by training workers in one skill area or 

occupational series to perform some tasks in another occupational series. 

A major advantage of multiskilling is that particular jobs that require more 

than one craftnot necessarily more than one individualcan be 

performed by fewer personnel. It can reduce the time it takes to perform 

jobs involving multiple skill requirements by eliminating the time a depot 

worker must wait for another worker to arrive and perform a task that the 

first worker is not trained to do. For example, an aviation mechanic 

trained in certain electrical tasks can reduce the times an electrician must 

be called when doing aircraft repair. 

In a 1998 review of Army industrial facilities we pointed out inefficiencies 

in the depots and arsenals and stated that improved systems and 

procedures for shifting maintenance workers between different 

organizational units and skill areas would offer better opportunities to 

effectively use limited numbers of maintenance personnel.18 Depot 

 18 U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements 

and Related Issues Affecting Depots and Arsenals, GAO/NSIAD-99-31 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 30, 1998). 

Difficulty Implementing 

Multiskilling Even 

Though It Could Improve 

Worker Efficiency 

and Productivity 
Page 36 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

officials had noted that prior practices made it difficult to transfer workers 

between organizational units and skill areas to adjust for unanticipated 

work stoppages caused by changes in work priorities, parts shortages, 

technical problems, or temporary labor imbalances. We pointed out that 

multiskilled workers offered added flexibility and could allow depot 

managers to use a limited number of workers more cost effectively. We 

recommended that the Secretary of the Army encourage depot managers 

to pursue worker agreements to facilitate multiskilling in industrial 

facilities. Although the Army has not been successful in implementing 

multiskilling, this initiative remains a goal Army depot planners would like 

to pursue. 

In recent years, the naval aviation community has done the most to begin 

using multiskilling as a depot improvement initiative, but full project 

implementation has been delayed because they have not been given 

permission to allow an additional pay grade for workers having more than 

one skill. Although the Air Force first tried multiskilling in 1993 and its 

current depot improvement initiative calls for determining cost effective 

ways to implement multiskilling, the Air Force’s multiskilling initiative is 

also floundering. In addition, although service, depot, and other officials 

attribute improved workforce flexibility and cost-effectiveness to 

multiskilling, Army depots and Marine Corps centers and Navy shipyards 

are not implementing it. 

The naval aviation community has attempted to implement multiskilling 

since 1999. Although its current request to pilot a multiskilling 

demonstration project to use a certain compensation system had not been 

approved as of March 2003, the community is implementing the pilot with 

an alternative compensation approach. 

As a result of an extensive business process reengineering project 

completed in 2002, the Naval Air Systems Command identified 

multiskilling as a solution to achieve a more flexible workforce. The 

program is intended to provide a more flexible, multitraded, trained 

workforce that could react more quickly to fluctuating workloads because 

managers can reassign employees based on workload demands. According 

to naval aviation managers, a multiskilled worker could be particularly 

cost-effective when depot workers go to the weapon system in the field 

rather than bringing the weapon to the depot. For example, a worker 

trained as both a pneudraulic systems mechanic and an aircraft engine 

mechanic could be sent to an operational location to accomplish the work 

that previously required workers trained in each of these skills. As a result, 

Naval Aviation Multiskill 

Efforts Are Delayed 
Page 37 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

cost reductions should occur in field team assignments, which comprise 

an increasing share of Navy aviation depots’ work. 

The naval aviation community’s current multiskilling initiative used a 

business case analysis to justify a demonstration project that would 

provide training for workers who are at the journeyman level in one skill, 

such as a sheet metal mechanic, to attain journeyman status in a second 

trade, such as an aircraft mechanic. The project called for compensating 

the workers involved by increasing their pay by an additional wage grade.19

According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, the economic analysis 

indicated savings could be achieved even though the workers would 

receive increased compensation. Increased throughput is expected to 

result in efficiencies of up to 20 percent due to redirected travel savings 

and increases in volume efficiencies. This same business case analysis 

indicated that during a single year one depot could potentially accomplish 

519 additional maintenance tasks for the same amount of budget. 

According to depot planners, private sector workers receive increased 

compensation under similar circumstances, and union officials believe 

government workers should also. 

However, OPM’s Job Grading Standards do not contemplate providing 

compensation for an additional grade for two equal trades. OPM’s job 

grading standards state that pay is based on the highest level of work 

performed, regardless of how many different trades an employee is 

required to perform. According to Naval Air Systems Command officials, 

OPM’s standard inhibits their ability to pursue multiskilling initiatives and 

achieve reengineering efficiencies. 

The Naval Air Systems Command sought permission to go to OPM 

to request a demonstration project with additional compensation in 

September 2000; but Headquarters, Department of the Navy disapproved 

the request. Based on the results of the 2002 business case analysis, 

which showed that the multiskill concept would increase readiness by 

providing a more flexible and well-trained workforce, in September 2002 

the naval aviation community again sought approval for the proposed 

demonstration project, including increased compensation. 

 19 The additional grade would allow increased compensation (e.g., at wage grade 10) for 

work in two equal skills (e.g., both wage grade 09) when the worker performs the functions 

of the two skills for a minimum of 25 percent of the time at work. 
Page 38 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Navy headquarters has not yet approved the request, but aviation 

depot officials are going forward with the project using an alternative 

compensation approach. They have established a compensation award 

at each site, not to exceed a $2,500 annual award. Five different skill 

combinations have been proposed for the Cherry Point Depot and two for 

the Jacksonville depot. One combination has begun at the North Island 

depot. According to naval aviation officials, workers are reluctant to 

participate because while in training they would not have the opportunity 

for overtime pay. Officials believe that getting an additional grade would 

be sufficient to increase the willingness of depot workers to participate—a 

goal that is likely critical to getting the program to sufficient numbers to 

make it cost-effective. 

Although the Air Force’s current depot maintenance improvement effort 

calls for determining cost effective ways to implement multiskilling, 

officials are generally supportive of it as a workload tool; however, the 

Air Force’s multiskilling program is declining in size. In 1993, the Air Force 

Materiel Command prototyped a multiskilling concept using aircraft 

mechanics at the Oklahoma City depot. The program involved training 

and certifying mechanics in multiple skills (aircraft, sheet metal, and 

electrical) that were capable of performing a series of tasks involving 

general airframe, structural, and electrical maintenance. By 1997, the 

program had over 100 participants. However, since then, depot officials 

told us the program has lost its popularity and currently consists of only 

49 participants. Officials said that due to production requirements, many 

of the skilled workers participating in the original project are now working 

in their primary skill and new hires show little interest because there are 

no financial incentives. 

At the Warner Robins depot, officials designated a specific occupation job 

series, 8801, as multiskilling to provide workers with greater job flexibility 

and a better career path. As of September 2001, 148 workers were 

functioning in this job series. Multiskilled workers primarily performed 

tasks in two occupations, such as aircraft mechanic and electrical 

mechanic or aircraft mechanic and sheet metal mechanic. According to 

depot officials, they used this occupational job series as a hiring tool to 

attract younger, multiskilled workers at the entry level. However, workers 

did not receive any additional salary. 

As a part of its depot maintenance improvement efforts, the Air Force has 

refocused on multiskilling. Officials conducted a business case analysis to 

determine the feasibility of various opportunities for using multiskilling at 

the depots. After several months of data gathering and analysis, officials 

Air Force Multiskilling Program 

Is Older but Declining 
Page 39 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

said they were not able to provide a strong business case for developing a 

standardized approach or expanding the use of multiskilling at the depots. 

We found that, except in very limited cases, the depots are not doing true 

multiskilling today. Rather, the depots are doing something similar called 

multicrafting that does not involve the combination of two or more skills 

at the journeyman skill level. Despite the results of the business case 

analysis, officials from Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, and 

the depots were generally supportive of multiskilling as a tool to deal with 

fluctuating homogenous workloads and to facilitate movement of 

employees as workload demands fluctuate. 

Service, depot, and other organization officials cite the multiskilling 

concept as a way to provide a more flexible, productive workforce that 

can react more quickly to fluctuating workloads, a key issue in trying to 

improve the cost-effectiveness of maintenance operations as well as meet 

readiness needs. 

According to officials of the Naval Air Systems Command, the extensive 

business case analysis they conducted indicated that multiskilling will 

provide a trained workforce, more flexible for increased readiness, and 

more capable of being able to be reassigned on demand to better support 

fluctuating workloads. The officials also indicated that a multiskilling 

program could also better support readiness by serving as an incentive to 

skilled, near-retirement workers to stay and provide on-the-job training for 

younger workers. In addition, depot officials reported, on the basis of the 

economic analysis that savings would be achieved even though workers 

would receive increased compensation. 

Various organizations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority are 

exempt from OPM’s job grading standards and are allowed to establish 

a classification system that is more flexible and better fits their 

environment. Among the flexibilities the Tennessee Valley Authority 

has implemented is a multiskilled work force that receives additional 

compensation for additional skills and work. The Tennessee Valley 

Authority’s program will involve about 1,400 current employees as well 

as new hires. According to Authority officials, multiskilling is improving 

the flexibility and efficiency of the workforce. As North America’s 

largest public power company, the Tennessee Valley Authority developed 

its union agreements on multiskilling in fiscal year 2000 and fully 

implemented its pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2001, with the 

program expected to be fully implemented by 2005. The plan is to review 

all preventive maintenance activities and reassign them to utilize multiskill 

employees. Authority officials said that the multiskilling training program 

Multiskilling Is Cited as 

Improving Flexibility and 

Cost-Effectiveness of Depot 

and Other Workforces 
Page 40 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

is resulting in a more efficient way to accomplish their work and to obtain 

and maintain a versatile group of employees. They reported that increases 

in productivity and efficiency were expected to reduce restaffing after 

attrition by about 15 percent. 

Private sector industrial activities have also implemented multiskilling. 

According to Naval Air Systems Command and Air Force officials, they 

did benchmarking in the private sector before they began trying to put 

together their own multiskilling programs. Navy depot officials also noted 

that they see increased usage of this concept when they do private sector 

wage grade comparability studies. 

Based on the potential retirement of about 31,000 depot workers out of the 

approximately 72,000 workers in the workforce eligible to retire by 2009, 

training requirements will increase significantly for new hires, and 

innovation will be required to develop more cost-effective training 

alternatives. For over 10 years, most depots had training costs much 

smaller than would normally be required for industrial activities since 

depot downsizing resulted in hiring few new employees. However, 

because the Air Force currently has a significant deficit in funding training 

for new hires and refresher training, depot officials raised concerns over 

their ability to fund future training requirements needed for workforce 

revitalization. Furthermore, as the depots face the challenge of developing 

and implementing plans to address skill imbalances occurring due to 

attrition and retirement over the next 5 to 7 years, the need for increased 

funding will likely drive the need to find new funding sources and to 

develop innovative training programs that cost less. 

The Air Force is already challenged by unfunded training costs. Air Force 

workers who had received little training for years were required to take 

“back-to-basics training.” This came about after accidents occurred at two 

depots and additional training requirements evolved from the personnel 

changes resulting from closing two Air Force depots and transferring 

their work to other locations. However, although training requirements 

increased, training budgets have not kept pace. For example, when Air 

Force Materiel Command depot managers requested $10 million in 2001 to 

train first-line supervisors, the Command did not approve any of that 

funding. And when managers requested $11.5 million for budget years 2002 

to 2007 to provide added training for new workers, the Command only 

funded a portion of that request. Lacking sufficient training dollars to fund 

their requirements, Air Force depot managers have been seeking ways to 

partner with state government programs. Partnering with the states to 

Need for Increased 

Funding and Innovation 

Driven by Increased 

Training Requirements 
Page 41 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

develop training programs and curriculum for co-op students at high 

schools, vocational technical colleges, and universities was a cost-effective 

strategy that enabled depots to hire certified and credentialed workers to 

replace retirees. For example, the Warner Robins and Oklahoma City 

depots are working primarily with the states of Georgia and Oklahoma to 

establish training programs with local community colleges and high 

schools so that new hires will be trained and certified as Federal Aviation 

Association Aircraft and Power Plant license holders. Each of the Air 

Force depots is developing courses to groom the next generation of 

leaders and managers. But according to depot planners, much more needs 

to be done and where the funding is to come from is unclear. This is 

particularly true as the Air Force plans for the potential retirement of 43 to 

52 percent of its depot workforce over the next 5 to 7 years. 

The other service depots are also experiencing challenges in funding 

training as they begin to hire new employees after years of downsizing. 

About half of the depots provide new industrial workers with training 

through apprentice programs. The Air Force and one Marine Corps 

center are using cooperative education programs, because they believe 

apprenticeship programs, which take 3 to 4 years to qualify workers for 

becoming journeymen-level workers, are too expensive. The Army 

Materiel Command estimated that $7.9 million was needed to sustain 

79 apprentices already in the program and to add 50 additional apprentices 

for fiscal year 2002, or about $55,000 for each apprentice. However, the 

Command did not receive this level of funding, which caused the 

Command to transfer the costs to the depots as a cost of their operations. 

Army Materiel Command reported that it has requested additional funding 

for the apprentice program to support an average of 184 apprentices each 

year for the 7-year period, fiscal years 2003 through 2009. Army depot 

officials said that the program was too small in number to significantly 

impact future worker needs. In addition, without the Army directly 

funding the program costs; customers pay for depot services will increase, 

which could lead to a loss of customer support. Two of the five Army 

maintenance depots decided that no additional apprentices will be 

accepted into the apprenticeship program unless the program can be 

directly funded. 

In confronting the human capital challenge of revitalizing the depot 

workforce, the services have the opportunity to develop innovative 

training programs that cost less and to identify new funding sources for 

training. According to Navy and Air Force officials, centralized training 

programs and centralized funding could be considered cost-effective 

ways to support depot revitalization. Officials also noted that centralized 
Page 42 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

training programs would help ensure consistency in the quality of training 

provided to depot workers. Also, centralized funding would be another 

source of funding and would provide centralized oversight and 

accountability over how the funds are disbursed. 

Continued shortfalls in DOD’s strategic planning process, including the 

lack of a DOD depot strategic plan and a strategic plan for arsenals and 

ammunition facilities have created questions regarding the future of the 

72,000 civilians in the depot maintenance, arsenal, and ammunition 

manufacturing plant workforce and their ability to support future military 

operations. Without a strategic perspective that complements the 

department’s overall mission and objectives, the services do not have 

the long-term visibility they need to ensure the continued performance 

of these important support missions. When this is coupled with DOD’s 

adoption of increased contracting of work to the private sector, the future 

role of these industrial facilities and their workforce is clearly in doubt. 

The situation is compounded by questions regarding DOD’s 

implementation of the core maintenance statute, which is an essential 

feature in defining the depot workforce of the future. While in some 

cases the services have made a start at defining future objectives for the 

industrial facilities that are centered around the development of 

public-private partnerships, it is unclear how these partnerships should 

be folded into future industrial facilities planning. Further, without a 

departmental approach that has been approved by the Congress, 

future depot planning will continue to be fragmented, inconclusive, and 

inefficient. Since we have previously recommended that DOD develop a 

depot strategic plan, we are not repeating that recommendation in this 

report. However, we continue to believe a depot strategic plan is needed 

and we will continue to follow DOD’s progress toward implementing one. 

The absence of strategic guidance regarding the future of the DOD 

industrial facilities has generally prevented the development of 

comprehensive strategic workforce plans that are required for effectively 

managing DOD’s 72,000 civilian industrial facilities workers to meet the 

challenges of the future. For example, without having long-term strategies 

for acquiring, developing, and retaining their workforce that are clearly 

linked to achieving programmatic goals, the services continued to 

downsize these activities without a vision for what capabilities would be 

required in the future. The result of downsizing is that the remaining depot 

maintenance workforce averages 47 years of age and has skill imbalances. 

With workload in some activities continuing to decline and with 

uncertainties about new work for the future, officials in depots, arsenals, 

Conclusions 
Page 43 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

and ammunition plants are uncertain whether they should plan to replace 

retiring workers and about what skills will be needed in the future. 

Furthermore, the industrial planners, in their short-term planning, 

have followed some but not all of the steps identified by OPM and high 

performing organizations, with the naval shipyard community and 

Air Force more comprehensive in their workforce planning approaches. 

However, the planners, have not, in general, identified competencies, 

developed comprehensive retention plans, or evaluated the performance 

of workforce planning efforts and taken corrective actionsall best 

practices that could help depots more effectively meet current and 

future challenges. 

A number of challenges confront DOD’s workforce planning for the 

revitalization of this industrial workforce, about 12 percent of which are 

eligible to retire in fiscal year 2002 and about 43 percent of which will be 

eligible to retire by 2009. First, workforce planning efforts, which are 

generally focused on the short-term, do not address the potential loss of 

a third to over 40 percent of the depot workforce over a short period of 

time, a challenge that could threaten the depots’ viability. Only the Air 

Force has taken action to ensure the continued viability of its depots in 

2007 and beyond. Secondly, the current occupational series may not be 

the best to most efficiently perform required maintenance operations. 

Multiskilling, which has been successfully implemented in the private 

sector and in some government activities, has flexibilities unavailable to 

most government activities. However, depot activities trying to implement 

the flexibilities have been confronted by rules that do not allow providing 

an additional grade for performing work in additional skill areas. While 

the naval aviation community is trying an approach that would use a 

bonus rather than additional pay, naval aviation officials believe the 

additional flexibilities are still needed. We also believe that if it proves to 

be cost-effective, the full option of providing an additional grade would 

help ensure the greatest potential for success. Finally, with the large 

number of workers eligible to retire by 2009, training requirements and 

funding for training will increase significantly for new hires. Further, the 

need for increased funding for training will likely drive the need to find 

new funding sources and to develop cost-effective training programs. A 

centralized DOD depot training program could be a very practicable way 

to introduce more innovative and cost-effective approaches to producing 

and funding the required training to support depot revitalization, if the 

department intends to continue using the depots as an important part of its 

industrial base. 
Page 44 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

To improve the management and direction of DOD’s strategic planning for 

maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel 

Readiness to 

• complete the revisions to DOD’s core policy and develop a schedule 

for the services to complete the computation of core requirements; 

• require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for defining 

workloads that should be performed in government facilities by 

government personnel; and 

• require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps 

to develop, or complete the development of, and implement strategic plans 

that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is developed and that 

delineate industrial workloads to be accomplished in each service’s 

depots, other service’s depots, by contractors at their own sites and at 

government sites and using partnerships and identify the workforce 

requirements to support the performance of this work. 

To improve the management and strategic direction of DOD’s strategic 

planning for arsenals and ammunition plants, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense require the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to develop a strategic plan that 

provides guidance and a schedule for identifying long-term capabilities to 

be provided by the private sector, those to be provided in governmentowned and -operated plants; and those to be provided in governmentowned and contractor-operated plants. 

To improve the quality and comprehensiveness of the services’ workforce 

planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretaries of the services and 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps develop strategic workforce plans 

that include improvements in areas identified in this report as being 

deficient, such as assessing workforce competencies required for the 

current and future workforce; implementing action plans that include 

comprehensive retention plans; and establishing performance metrics to 

use in evaluating workforce planning efforts and a mechanism for 

performing assessments of prior workforce planning efforts. The strategic 

workforce plans should be linked to DOD’s strategic plan for depot 

maintenance and the strategic plan for arsenals and ammunition plants 

when they are developed. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 45 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

To improve DOD’s strategic workforce planning to ensure the viability of 

its depot maintenance workforce, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness, in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, to coordinate the implementation of 

an initiative to 

• provide guidance for developing workforce revitalization strategies and 

strategic plans to address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7 

years; 

• provide options for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce 

planning initiatives; and 

• implement a working group to explore options for innovative and costeffective training and to explore appropriate funding alternatives, to 

include centralized funding, to revitalize the depot workforce. 

Given the difficulties the Department of Defense is having implementing 

multiskilling and its potential for improving the flexibility and productivity 

of the department’s maintenance workforce, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness to implement a demonstration project that would give the 

military depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for 

multiskilled depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a 

cost-benefit analysis the benefits of such a program. 

The Department of Defense reviewed a draft of this report and provided 

oral comments from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness. The department concurred with seven of our 

nine recommendations dealing with the need for completion of the 

identification of core depot maintenance requirements and capabilities 

and for improved strategic planning and workforce planning for depots, 

arsenals, and ammunition plants. The department did not concur with our 

recommendation to implement a working group to explore (1) options 

for innovative and cost-effective training and (2) appropriate funding 

alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. Also, the department 

did not concur with our recommendation to implement a demonstration 

project for multiskilling. 

The department’s comments noted that the importance of human capital 

strategic planning was clearly recognized in the Quadrennial Defense 

Review, is the first item on the President’s Management Agenda, and is a 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 46 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

top priority for the department. Further, in early 2003, the department 

published its FY 2003 Year of Execution Plan as an Annex to the integrated 

DOD Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan, and focuses on seven goals 

to direct and improve all aspects of human capital strategic planning. We 

recognize that the high-level strategic planning efforts undertaken by the 

department are a necessary first step, but we also believe that much more 

needs to be done to assure that successively lower levels of organizations 

and activities accomplish complementary human capital planning that 

addresses specific issues that may be of concern for a given subset of the 

department’s population, such as for the workers in the department’s 

industrial activities. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the department complete 

revisions to DOD’s core policy and our recommendation to develop 

revised core capabilities that provide a baseline for defining workloads 

that should be performed in government facilities by government 

personnel. Officials noted that the department is finalizing required 

changes to its revised methodology and, upon completion, will task 

the military services with computing their depot maintenance core 

requirements. Regarding our recommendation, to develop depot strategic 

plans that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and to the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is 

completed, DOD officials concurred, noting that in some cases it may be 

more practical to include these plans as part of a logistics or systems 

command strategic plan. DOD agreed with our recommendation to 

develop a strategic plan that provides guidance and a schedule for 

identifying long-term capabilities for arsenals and ammunition plants. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to improve the quality and 

comprehensiveness of the services’ workforce planning efforts. DOD 

partially concurred with our recommendation to provide guidance for 

developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans to 

address expected depot attrition over the next 5 to 7 years. Officials 

said that the department developed the DOD Civilian Human Resources 

Strategic Plan2002-2008 to ensure a DOD-wide civilian workforce 

capable of responding rapidly, efficiently, and effectively to mission 

requirements. However, they agreed that a near-term strategic plan is 

needed at the depot level. We do not believe that the human resources 

strategic plan cited in DOD’s response provides the required guidance for 

developing workforce revitalization strategies and strategic plans and 

supporting the other issues we noted in our recommendation because it is 

at a higher level and does not address issues that need to be dealt with for 

this work force group, such as how to provide affordable technical 

training for large numbers of blue-collar workers. Additionally, to be 
Page 47 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

useful in supporting revitalization of the depot workforce, a depot 

strategic plan should address long-term as well as near-term requirements. 

Regarding our recommendation that the department develop options 

for incorporating multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives, 

the department concurred, stating that its proposed National Security 

Personnel System will provide personnel flexibilities designed to address 

multiskilling requirements. However, the National Security Personnel 

System is a proposed change to the current personnel system that DOD 

has requested the Congress to consider as a part of a large and diverse 

DOD transformation legislative proposal. Because the Congress has not 

yet acted on the department’s transformation proposal, we believe that it 

is premature to assume that Congress will approve this new personnel 

system. We continue to believe that whether or not the new personnel 

system is approved, the depots need options for incorporating 

multiskilling into depot workforce planning initiatives. 

DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to implement a working 

group to explore (1) options for innovative and cost-effective training and 

(2) appropriate funding alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. 

The department stated that a working group is not necessary to explore 

options already offered by new authorities and flexibilities in the proposed 

National Security Personnel System. Because the proposed new personnel 

system has not yet been considered by the Congress, we believe that is 

premature to assume that it will be implemented, and we continue to 

believe that a working group’s exploration of options would benefit depot 

workforce revitalization. 

DOD also nonconcurred with our recommendation regarding the 

implementation of a demonstration project that would give the military 

depots the flexibility to provide additional compensation for multiskilled 

depot workers when the services have demonstrated by a cost-benefit 

analysis the benefits of such a program. Again, the department’s 

response assumes the flexibilities and authorities expected from the 

proposed National Security Personnel System will cover the problems 

multiskilling is intended to address. As with our comments on the prior 

recommendations, we believe that this response is premature and that 

independent action should be taken to implement the recommendation. 

The department provided technical comments that have been 

incorporated when appropriate. 
Page 48 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions regarding this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov or Julia Denman at (202) 512-4290 

or denmanj@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix V. 

Derek B. Stewart 

Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 49 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

To determine the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement 

a strategic plan for depot maintenance, we interviewed officials and 

reviewed the Government Performance and Results Act to identify 

guidance on developing strategic plans and various laws providing 

guidance on the role of DOD depots. 

To determine the extent to which the services have developed and 

implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot 

workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and 

obtained and reviewed 

• DOD’s Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008 and the 

services’ strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to 

identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and 

• services’ and depots’ workforce plans (including recruiting/hiring plans, 

training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to determine 

whether they had a strategic/long-term perspective or a short-term focus 

that was oriented toward the budget process. 

In analyzing the extent to which these workforce plans positioned the 

civilian depot workforce to meet future mission requirements, we 

compared the elements of the depots’ workforce plans to applicable 

workforce planning documents and guidance issued by the OPM, the 

GAO, the National Academy of Public Administration, and other federal 

and state government agencies. Based on our analyses, we identified 

efforts underway that addressed aspects of these elements. 

Additionally, we analyzed the services’ 

• civilian depot workforce skills and competency assessments to determine 

whether they had identified the skills and competencies needed to address 

current and future workforce requirements, 

• civilian depot workforce retention plans to determine whether they had 

the factors identified by current research as being critical to enhancing the 

retention necessary for the construction of a high-performance 

organization, and 

• assessments of workforce plans to determine whether they included 

performance measures that evaluated the effectiveness of their workforce 

plans. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 50 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Moreover, because OPM had identified the elements that should be 

included in a comprehensive retention plan, we compared those elements 

to those found in the services’ retention plans. We did not do this type of 

comparison for the services’ recruiting/hiring, training, and succession 

plans because OPM did not identify comprehensive plans for these 

elements of workforce plans. 

To determine what challenges adversely affect DOD’s strategic planning 

for the viability of its civilian depot workforce, we interviewed officials 

and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documentation to identify the types 

of challenges that might impact planning for the viability of the civilian 

depot workforce. In doing so, we also determined 

• civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the services 

will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large numbers of 

eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years, 

• the total weighted average age based on the civilian staffing at each 

industrial facility, 

• whether the services are having difficulties implementing the multiskilling 

concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity, and 

• whether increased funding will be needed to address increased training 

requirements. 

During this review, we visited and obtained information from the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense and the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

headquarters, all in the Washington, D.C., area; Headquarters, Army 

Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia; and 5 subordinate Army 

commands—the Army Aviation and Missile Command, Huntsville, 

Alabama; Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey; the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, 

Michigan; Operations Support Command (now the Joint Munitions 

Command), Rock Island, Illinois; and the Soldier and Biological Chemical 

Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Additionally, we visited 

the following depots and activities: 

• Army: Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama; Corpus Christi Army 

Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas; Letterkenny Army Depot, Chambersburg, 

Pennsylvania; Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas; Tobyhanna Army 

Depot, Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania; Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island, 

Illinois; Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York; Pine Bluff Arsenal, 

Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Crane Army Ammunition Activity, Crane, Indiana; 

and McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, McAlester, Oklahoma. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 51 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

• Air Force: Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, Ohio; Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center, Tucson, 

Arizona; Directorate of Maintenance, Ogden, Utah; Directorate of 

Maintenance, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Directorate of Maintenance, 

Warner Robins, Georgia; and the Joint Depot Maintenance and Activities 

Group, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. 

• Navy: Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland; Naval 

Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Aviation Depot, 

Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Aviation Depot North Island, San Diego, 

California; 

• Navy: Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C.; Norfolk Naval 

Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire; and Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, 

Washington. 

• Navy: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, South 

Carolina. 

• Marine Corps: Marine Corps Materiel Command, Albany, Georgia; Marine 

Corps Logistics Bases Albany, Georgia; Marine Corps Logistics Bases 

Barstow, California; Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Albany, Georgia; 

and the Marine Corps Maintenance Center, Barstow, California. 

Additionally, we received written responses to audit questions from the 

following activities: Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate 

Maintenance Facility, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Center San Diego, California; Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane 

Division, Crane, Indiana; and Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport 

Division, Keyport, Washington. 

We conducted our review from October 2001 to March 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ 

Depots 

Page 52 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Depots Principal work 

Number of

 civilian depot

 employees per

 location

Army 

Army depots 

Anniston Army Depot 

Anniston, Alabama 

The depot performs maintenance on heavy and light-tracked combat vehicles 

and components and is the designated center of technical excellence for the 

M1 Abrams tank. 

2,429

Corpus Christi 

Army Depot 

Corpus Christi, Texas 

As the Army’s only aviation facility, the depot overhauls and repairs DOD 

rotary wing aircraft and components, such as the AH-64 Apache, CH-47 

Chinook, and the UH-60 Blackhawk. 

2,869

Letterkenny 

Army Depot 

Chambersburg, 

Pennsylvania 

This depot provides repair and overhaul support for air defense and tactical 

missiles such as the Patriot, Hawk, Avenger, Multiple Launch Rocket System, 

and Sidewinder. 

1,082

Red River 

Army Depot 

Texarkana, Texas 

For combat and tactical systems, the depot supports systems such as the 

Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Multiple Launch Rocket System, and vehicles for the 

Patriot and Hawk missiles. 

1,478

Tobyhanna 

Army Depot 

Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania 

From handheld radios to satellite communication, the depot provides repair 

and overhaul support for hundreds of communications and electronic systems. 

2,237

Army arsenals 

Rock Island Arsenal 

Rock Island, Illinois 

The arsenal is primarily a metal manufacturing facility with foundry, forging, 

machining, finishing, and fabricating capabilities. It produces tank and artillery 

components such as gun mounts and recoil mechanisms, spare parts, and 

other equipment. It also fabricates and/or assembles tool sets ranging from 

carrying case-sized sets to fully equipped shelters. 

1,156

Watervliet Arsenal 

Watervliet, New York 

This arsenal is a metal manufacturing facility whose capabilities include 

forging, casting, machining, heat-treating, plating, and fabrication. Its primary 

products are cannons—such as the large gun tubes for tanks and howitzers—

and mortars. 

484

Pine Bluff Arsenal 

Pine Bluff, Arkansas 

The facility produces, renovates, and stores smoke, riot control, and 

incendiary ammunitions such as red and white phosphorus. Also, it 

manufactures and refurbishes chemical and biological defense equipment. 

804

Army ammunition plants 

Crane Army Ammunition 

Activity 

Crane, Indiana 

The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional 

ammunition. Its products include the Navy’s 5-inch projectile, bombs, missile 

warheads, pyrotechnic munitions, and plastic explosives. 

620

McAlester 

Army Ammunition Plant 

McAlester, Oklahoma 

The plant produces, renovates, stores, and demilitarizes conventional and 

missile ammunition. Its products include bombs—ranging from 500 to 5,000 

pounds, missile warheads, rockets, and plastic explosives. 

1,075

Total Army 14,234

Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ 

Depots 
Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ 

Depots 

Page 53 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Depots Principal work 

Number of

 civilian depot

 employees per

 location

Navy 

Naval Aviation Depots 

Naval Aviation Depot, 

Cherry Point 

North Carolina 

The depot performs standard depot-level maintenance and periodic 

maintenance, modifications, and in-service repairs for crash and battle 

damages for helicopters and engines. The depot performs maintenance on 

aircraft such as the AV-8, H-53, and H-46. It also repairs such components as 

jet fuel starters and auxiliary power units. 

3,839

Naval Aviation Depot 

Jacksonville, Florida 

The depot serves as a production center concentrating on repair and 

modification of patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft, attack aircraft, electronic 

countermeasures, engines, and associated components. The depot performs 

maintenance on aircraft such as the P-3, F-14 and SH-60. Also, the depot 

repairs components such as electro-optics, electronic warfare, and 

antisubmarine warfare systems. 

3,928

Naval Aviation Depot 

North Island 

San Diego, California 

The depot serves as the production center concentrating on repair and 

modification of miscellaneous aircraft and associated components. The depot 

performs maintenance on the following aircraft systems: E-2 Hawkeye, C-2 

Greyhound, and F/A 18 Hornet. It also provides engineering, logistics, and 

calibration services. 

3,138

Naval shipyards 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard 

Portsmouth, Virginia 

This shipyard is the East Coast’s largest facility for surface ship, aircraft 

carrier, and submarine overhauls, maintenance and modernization. It also 

repairs, overhauls, dry docks, converts, modernizes, and inactivates ships. 

Also, the shipyard can perform any technical, fabrication, manufacturing, and 

engineering work required by its customers on site or through rapiddeployment of special teams to ships and facilities anywhere in the world. 

7,525

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 

and Intermediate 

Maintenance Facility 

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 

This shipyard is the largest ship repair facility between the West Coast and 

Far East, and it is responsible for ship maintenance, modernization, and 

nuclear ship recycling. Also, the shipyard provides such services as reactor 

plant servicing, nuclear propulsion plant work, and ship maintenance training. 

3,987

Portsmouth Naval 

Shipyard 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire 

The shipyard performs nuclear submarine overhauls, refuelings, 

modernizations, and repairs. Also, it provides nuclear maintenance 

engineering and planning for the Los Angeles class submarines. 

3,500

Puget Sound Naval 

Shipyard 

Bremerton, Washington 

The shipyard overhauls and repairs all types and sizes of Navy ships. Also, 

the shipyard provides other services such as nuclear propulsion work, reactor 

compartment disposal, nuclear-powered ship recycling, and emergent fleet 

support. 

8,608

Naval Warfare Centers 

Naval Surface 

Warfare Center 

Crane Division 

Crane, Indiana 

The overall center provides acquisition, engineering, logistics, and 

maintenance for the fleet’s weapons and electronic systems, ordnance, and 

associated equipment components. The majority of its depot maintenance is 

in electronic warfare systems, engineering and industrial base support, 

electronic module test and repair, microwave components, and radar systems. 

311

Naval Undersea Warfare 

Center Keyport Division 

Keyport, Washington 

The overall center provides test and evaluation, in-service engineering, 

maintenance and repair, fleet support, and industrial base support for 

designated systems. The largest depot workload is the torpedo program. Also, 

the depot operates and maintains shops that accomplish mechanical, 

electrical and electronic production, and assembly of complex undersea 

warfare equipment. 

608
Appendix II: Fiscal Year 2002 Services’ 

Depots 

Page 54 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Depots Principal work 

Number of

 civilian depot

 employees per

 location

Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Centers 

Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Center Charleston 

Charleston, South Carolina 

Depot operations, managed at the division level, provide engineering analysis 

and design, hardware/software development, and integration. Also the depot 

operations include repair, fabrication, installation, and logistics products and 

services to DOD and federal government sponsors. 

49

Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Center San Diego 

San Diego, California 

The depot operation at the center provides engineering, management, life 

cycle support, test, restoration, assessments, and prototype modeling. The 

depot operations also include facilities that enable it to serve as a designated 

overall point and repair facility for reparables (i.e., assemblies, modules, and 

printed circuit boards drawn from various types of equipment). 

70

Total Navy 35,563

 

Marine Corps 

 Maintenance Center 

Albany, Georgia 

The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and 

upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, 

M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and 

communications-electronics equipment. 

659

 Maintenance Center 

Barstow, California 

The depot has multicommodity capability to support overhauls, repairs, and 

upgrades for weapons systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle, 

M1A1 Tank, M198 Howitzer, AN TPS 63 Radar, small arms, and 

communications-electronics equipment. 

664

Total Marine Corps 1,323

 

Air Force 

Aerospace Maintenance 

and Regeneration Center 

Tucson, Arizona 

The center provides for the storage, regeneration, reclamation, and disposal 

of aircraft and related aerospace items such as tooling, pylons, and engines. 

439

Directorate of Maintenance, 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, 

Utah 

It provides worldwide engineering and logistics management for the F-16 and 

maintains the C-130 aircraft. The center produces more than 250 aircraft and 

16,800 avionics and structural components annually. In addition, the center is 

responsible for logistical support of the nation’s fleet of strategic 

intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the Minuteman and Peacekeeper 

missiles. It also overhauls and repairs landing gear, wheels and brakes, rocket 

motors, photonic equipment, avionics, hydraulics, and software. 

5,852

Directorate of Maintenance, 

Oklahoma City Air Logistics 

Center, Oklahoma 

The center is the worldwide manager for a wide range of aircraft, engines, 

missile, and commodity items, aided by some of the most sophisticated 

technical repair and manufacturing processes in the world. The center 

manages an inventory of 2,267 aircraft, which include the B-1, B-2, B-52, 

KC-10, C/KC-135, E-3, and about 25 other contractor logistics support aircraft. 

8,533

Directorate of Maintenance, 

Warner Robins, 

Air Logistics Center, 

Georgia 

This activity is the cargo/transport technology repair center for the Air Force. It 

has worldwide management and engineering responsibilities for the repair, 

modification, and overhaul of the C-130, C-141, C-5, as well as F-15, U-2, 

all Air Force helicopters, and all special operations aircraft and their avionics 

systems. 

6,328

Total Air Force 21,152

Total 72,272

Source: DOD (data) and GAO (presentation). 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 55 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 56 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 57 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 58 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 59 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 60 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 61 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 62 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix III: Synopsis of Service Depots’ 

Short-Term Workforce Plans 

Page 63 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 
Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 64 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Carleen Bennett, Johnetta Gatlin-Brown, Thomas W. Gilliam, 

M. Jane Hunt, Steve Hunter, Jeanett Reid, Jose Watkins, and 

Bobby Worrell made significant contributions to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products 

Page 65 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Depot Maintenance: Public-Private Partnerships Have Increased 

but Long-Term Growth and Results Are Uncertain. GAO-03-423. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003. 

Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address 

High-Risk Issues. GAO-03-637T. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003. 

DOD Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human 

Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and 

Sourcing Decisions. GAO-03-475. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2003. 

High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120. 

Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: 

January 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Defense. GAO-03-98. Washington, D.C.: January 2003. 

Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies 

in Managing Their Workforces. GAO-03-2. Washington, D.C.: 

December 6, 2002. 

Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help Maintain 

Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning. GAO-03-237. 

Washington, D.C.: December 5, 2002. 

Depot Maintenance: Change in Reporting Practices and Requirements 

Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-03-16. Washington, D.C.: 

October 18, 2002. 

HUD Human Capital Management: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce 

Planning Needed. GAO-02-839. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002. 

Managing for Results: Using Strategic Human Capital Management 

to Drive Transformational Change. GAO-02-940T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2002. 

Exposure Draft: A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management. 

GAO-02-373SP. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 66 GAO-03-472 DOD Depot Workforce Planning 

Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct 

Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2002. 

Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Overcome Capability Gaps in the 

Public Depot System. GAO-02-105. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. 

Human Capital: Implementing an Effective Workforce Strategy Would 

Help EPA to Achieve Its Strategic Goals. GAO-01-812. Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2001. 

Defense Logistics: Strategic Planning Weaknesses Leave Economy, 

Efficiency, and Effectiveness of Future Support Systems at Risk.

GAO-02-106. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 2000. 

Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders. 

GAO/OCG-00-14G. Washington, D.C.: September 2000 Version 1. 

Human Capital: Managing Human Capital in the 21st Century. 

GAO/T-GGD-00-77. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2000. 

Human Capital: Strategic Approach Should Guide DOD Civilian 

Workforce Management. GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120. Washington, D.C.: 

March 9, 2000.

Army Industrial Facilities: Workforce Requirements and Related Issues 

Affecting Depots and Arsenals. GAO/NSIAD-99-31. Washington, D.C.: 

November 30, 1998. 

Defense Depot Maintenance: DOD Shifting More Workload for 

New Weapon Systems to the Private Sector. GAO/NSIAD-98-8. 

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1998. 

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