Filed 7/8/15 Wiesjahn v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JUDD WIESJAHN, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 

COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 H040138

 (Monterey County

 Super. Ct. No. M95923)

Plaintiffs Judd Wiesjahn and Analisa Sand brought this action against multiple 

defendants including Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear), alleging that 

Goodyear’s defectively designed spare tire was responsible for the death of their daughter 

in a car accident. Goodyear obtained summary judgment on the ground that there was no 

competent evidence that the tire was defective or that it was the cause of their daughter’s 

death.

On appeal, plaintiffs contend that their expert’s declaration and their discovery 

responses were sufficient to create triable issues of fact regarding the defective design of 

the tire and its contribution to the accident. We cannot find a material triable issue here 

and therefore must affirm the judgment.

Background

Because this appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment, our summary of the 

history of the case is drawn from the parties’ separate statements of undisputed facts and 
2

the accompanying evidence.

1

At 1:30 a.m. on August 28, 2008, plaintiffs’ daughter, 

Rachel Wiesjahn, was a passenger in a 2006 Chevrolet HHR driven by Christopher 

Tindall. About a week earlier, Tindall had replaced the driver’s-side front tire with a 

convenience spare tire that had come with the HHR.

Tindall had been drinking alcohol at a local pub that night, before giving a ride to 

Rachel and another passenger, Sean Willig. According to Tindall, as he drove 

southbound on Highway 1 in the Big Sur area, a northbound vehicle entered the 

southbound lane in front of him, and he swerved to the right to avoid a head-on collision.

2

 

Although he did not experience any handling problems or loss of control, the HHR ran up 

the embankment next to the roadway and rolled over, landing on the driver’s side.

At Tindall’s inquiry both passengers said that they were okay, and the three began 

to get out of the vehicle. Rachel was able to exit fully and she stood just south of the 

HHR. Just then a truck driven by Mark Hudson struck the HHR, causing the HHR to 

spin. Tindall got out on the right side instead; but as he did, he saw Rachel lying on her 

back between the HHR and the embankment. Willig was trying to crawl out of the HHR 

when it was struck; he was thrown clear of the vehicle but was not seriously injured. He 

found Rachel partially underneath (but not touching) the HHR on the embankment side. 

 

1

 In this undertaking we find no assistance from plaintiffs’ opening brief, which 

provides two sentences describing what happened, with no citation to evidence in the 

record where the asserted facts may be found. We will on this occasion disregard 

plaintiffs’ complete failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rules 

8.204(a)(2)(C) and 8.204(a)(1)(C). Goodyear’s brief itself is not exempt from this 

failing, as some of the asserted facts are deficient by not citing the location of those facts 

in the record.

2

 Willig, testifying at a preliminary hearing in the criminal prosecution of Hudson and 

Tillman, did not recall seeing an oncoming vehicle from his position in the front 

passenger seat. Theodore Rocha, a California Highway Patrol officer who responded to 

the scene, testified by deposition that he believed the cause of the rollover to be Tindall’s 

state of intoxication, not the approach of an oncoming vehicle.
3

Paramedics arrived at the scene, but Rachel was already dead. Both the examination by 

the coroner at the scene and the autopsy by the forensic pathologist indicated that Rachel 

had died as a result of the second accident.

Tindall and Hudson both fled the scene of the accident. Each was subsequently 

charged with vehicular manslaughter with injury, driving under the influence of alcohol 

with injury, and hit and run resulting in injury. Tindall eventually pleaded no contest to 

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5) and leaving the scene of 

an accident resulting in injury or death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)).

Plaintiffs initiated this action in December 2008, naming Tindall, Hudson, and 

other individuals associated with the events. Their second amended complaint, filed 

August 27, 2009, added General Motors, Chevrolet, and Goodyear as defendants. 

Plaintiffs asserted wrongful death along with a survival action claiming expenses and loss 

of earnings incurred by Rachel as a result of defendants’ negligence.

Goodyear answered the complaint and then moved for summary judgment, on the 

grounds that there was no evidence of a defect in its tire and no evidence that the tire 

caused or contributed to either of the successive accidents. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, 

relying on the declaration of Clifford Stover, their proffered expert in mechanical 

engineering, as “substantial evidence of negligence and product defect (both design and 

manufacturing),” which caused the HHR to become unstable and “more prone to roll over 

[sic] accidents.” Also based on Stover’s analysis, plaintiffs asserted inadequate testing of 

the tire by Goodyear and its failure to warn consumers not to place the tire on the front of 

the vehicle.

In reply, Goodyear disputed the qualifications of Stover to express an expert 

opinion on the issues in the case. The superior court agreed and sustained Goodyear’s 

objection to every paragraph of Stover’s declaration other than those pertaining to his 

professional history. On July 19, 2013, having found no prima facie evidence of defect, 

negligence, or causation, the court granted Goodyear’s motion. This appeal followed.
4

Discussion

1. Appealability

Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on August 23, 2013, representing that they 

were appealing from a “judgment after an order granting a summary judgment motion.” 

In fact, judgment had not been entered at that time. An order granting summary 

judgment is not appealable. (Allabach v. Santa Clara County Fair Ass’n (1996) 46 

Cal.App.4th 1007, 1010.) Nevertheless, because a judgment was subsequently filed on 

September 4, 2013, we will exercise our discretion to construe the premature notice of 

appeal as pertaining to the actual judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).)

2. Standard and Scope of Review

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c permits a court “to cut through the parties’ 

pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary 

to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 

(Aguilar).) The motion will be properly granted if there are no triable issues of material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subd. (c); Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 

1250.) When the moving party is the defendant, the motion will be granted if one or 

more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established or the 

defendant establishes a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 437c, subds. (o), (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, at p. 850; Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 

Cal.App.4th 102, 109.) When reviewing a trial court summary judgment ruling, we 

“ ‘independently determine the construction and effect of the facts presented to the trial 

court as a matter of law.’ ” (Washington Mutual Bank v. Jacoby (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 

639, 643, quoting Kolodge v. Boyd (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 349, 356.)

The sequence of plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal indicates a lack of understanding 

of summary judgment procedure. Their attack on the judgment begins with a lengthy

discussion of the evidence supplied by their expert, Clifford Stover, arguing that the court 
5

should have liberally construed his declaration and thus found triable issues of fact 

regarding the asserted tire defects. Plaintiffs further challenge the court’s determination 

that Stover’s expertise had not been established.

Their approach on appeal, however, is backwards. In order for the superior court 

to have considered the qualifications and opinion of plaintiffs’ expert, it first had to 

determine that the moving party, Goodyear, had presented “evidence that would preclude 

a reasonable trier of fact from finding that it was more likely than not that the material 

fact was true [citation], or the defendant must establish that an element of the claim 

cannot be established, by presenting evidence that the plaintiff ‘does not possess and 

cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence’ ” to support a necessary element of the cause 

of action. (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003, 

quoting Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854; Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 

Cal.4th 317, 334.) Only if the moving defendant makes that showing does the opposition 

come into play. (See Intrieri v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72, 82 [If moving 

defendant fails in its initial showing, “it is unnecessary to examine the plaintiff’s 

opposing evidence and the motion must be denied”]; Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2011) 

199 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009 [same].) Then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a 

prima facie showing that there exists a triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar, supra, at 

p. 850.)

On appeal, we conduct a de novo review of the record to “determine with respect 

to each cause of action whether the defendant seeking summary judgment has 

conclusively negated a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case, or has demonstrated that 

under no hypothesis is there a material issue of fact that requires the process of trial, such 

that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, 

Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 334; Daly v. Yessne (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 52, 58.) We

apply the same procedure used by the trial court: We examine the pleadings to ascertain 

the elements of the plaintiff’s claim; the moving papers to determine whether the 
6

defendant has established facts justifying judgment in its favor; and, if the defendant did 

meet this burden, plaintiff’s opposition to decide whether he or she has demonstrated the 

existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 

76, 84-85; Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 880, 887.)

With these long-settled principles in mind, we turn first to the allegations against 

Goodyear in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. In the first cause of action for 

wrongful death plaintiffs alleged that Goodyear, Chevrolet, and Chevrolet’s parent 

company, General Motors, were responsible for Rachel’s death because they were

negligent in “the design, manufacture, testing, sale, distribution, warnings, and failure to 

recall the subject vehicle and tire.” Because “[t]he subject vehicle and/or tire were 

defective,” these defendants “wrongfully killed” Rachel and proximately caused 

plaintiffs’ “wrongful death damages.” In the second, “survival” cause of action plaintiffs 

alleged that Rachel had incurred “expenses [and] a loss of earnings prior to her death.”

3

3. Goodyear’s Showing

In moving for summary judgment Goodyear argued that discovery had produced 

no evidence that the convenience spare tire was defective or that plaintiffs’ injuries were 

the result of the functioning of the tire. Instead, plaintiffs had supplied only conclusory 

responses reiterating its dangerousness as the cause of Rachel’s death. On the contrary, 

Goodyear maintained, the initial accident occurred as a result of Tindall’s swerving to the 

right. The second, of course, occurred when the overturned HHR was lying on its side, 

“pretty much taking up the whole right-hand side of the road.”

Goodyear supported its position with abundant evidence relating to both the tire 

and the accident. Joseph G. Dancy testified by deposition that the tire had been tested 

 

3

 Neither party finds it necessary to discuss this second cause of action. Nor do we, 

since Rachel, having been killed immediately, could not have incurred either expenses or 

loss of earnings after the accident.
7

pursuant to the applicable federal safety standards, and it had passed. According to those 

standards, it was the vehicle manufacturer, in this case General Motors, that determined 

which tires, wheels, inflation pressures, and loads a tire must carry on a specific vehicle.

Goodyear only supplied the tires, in accordance with the specifications provided by 

General Motors.

Evidence relating to causation was also discussed in Goodyear’s motion. The 

shoulder between the fog line of the roadway and the embankment was only one foot 

wide. California Highway Patrol officers Theodore Rocha and Christopher Browning, 

who responded to the scene, each testified that he saw no defect in the spare tire nor any 

indication that the tire played any role in causing the accident. Tindall, interviewed in 

jail, never mentioned any difficulty controlling the HHR that night. Tindall himself 

provided a declaration in which he stated that “[t]he spare tire on the HHR did not create 

any handling problems leading up to or at the time of the accident, nor did I lose control 

of the HHR as the result of any issues with the convenience spare tire. I simply had to 

purposefully turn the HHR to the right in order to avoid the on-coming vehicle and I 

would have done so regardless of whether . . . there was a convenience spare tire on the 

HHR at the time.” Both officers believed that Mark Hudson’s state of intoxication 

played a role in the second accident.

Goodyear also pointed to plaintiffs’ responses to interrogatories. When asked in 

form interrogatories if they had information that any malfunction or defect in a vehicle 

caused the “INCIDENT” or contributed to the injuries sustained, each only asserted that 

the HHR, when used in conjunction with the spare tire, was “susceptible to a loss of 

vehicle control,” the vehicle and tire were “unreasonably dangerous and defective,” and 

the vehicle as equipped “lacked proper warnings regarding the danger.” When asked by 

special interrogatory in what way the tire was defectively designed and manufactured,

how these defects contributed to their injuries, and how Goodyear was liable on a “failure 
8

to warn” theory, the same conclusory assertions were made, essentially replicating the 

allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint.

Goodyear thus met its initial burden to establish entitlement to judgment as a 

matter of law. Plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses were prima facie evidence 

that plaintiffs “[do] not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence” to 

support their claim. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854; Andrews v. Foster Wheeler 

LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) Goodyear also produced affirmative evidence

through Dancy, the investigating CHP officers, and Tillman that the spare tire was sound 

and that it had nothing to do with either the initial rollover or the ensuing collision with 

Hudson’s truck. The superior court properly determined that the burden shifted to 

plaintiffs to establish a triable issue of fact requiring trial. 

Plaintiffs’ Showing

As noted earlier, plaintiffs relied on the declaration of Clifford Stover in their 

opposition in an effort to present evidence that the spare tire on the HHR was “defective 

and negligently designed, manufactured and sold” and that its “defects/negligence 

substantially caused and/or contributed to the accident.” Stover was a registered 

professional engineer with over 20 years of experience in “analysis, testing, and 

inspection of mechanical systems.” Stover’s investigation of the accident consisted of a 

review of Goodyear’s moving papers, the traffic collision reports, a supplemental report 

by an accident investigation team of the CHP, and Dancy’s deposition. Those materials 

convinced Stover that there was “substantial evidence of a design defect, and/or a

manufacturing defect, and negligence on the part of the tire manufacturer with regards 

[sic] to the convenience spare identified as the ‘Goodyear Convenience Spare T115/70D 

15 90M’ that was in use as the front left tire on the vehicle that was involved in the 

accident in this case.” He explained that Goodyear’s negligence caused the accident 
9

because the HHR was made unstable by the smaller tire, which made it more susceptible 

to rollover accidents.

4

 Goodyear was also negligent because it had failed to warn 

consumers that the tire was defective, failed “to adequately test and investigate stability 

and roadway driving conditions [before] placing the tire into the stream of commerce,”

failed to cure the defect, and failed to warn consumers not to place the spare tire on the 

front axle of a vehicle.

Stover thus concluded that the tire placed on Tillman’s HHR was “negligently 

designed and manufactured and sold,” and that its “numerous failures” caused “and/or 

contributed to” Tillman’s loss of control, which in turn “caused and/or contributed to” the 

rollover.

The superior court sustained Goodyear’s objection to key paragraphs of Stover’s 

declaration. First, it determined that Stover had “failed to demonstrate that he is qualified 

to testify as to tire manufacturing, tire design, tire failure analysis, vehicle design or 

 

4

 Stover listed four specific defects: “a. Instability of the vehicle caused by the 

smaller convenience spare caused the vehicle to be more prone to roll over [sic] 

accidents, which is exactly what happened in this case; [¶] b. Failure to warn that the 

convenience spare should not be placed on the front axel [sic] due to the increased 

likelihood of roll over [sic] due to the lack of stability present when the convenience 

spare was in use more so on the front axel [sic] than the back, which resulted in the tire 

being placed on that front axel [sic] and which resulted in the accident. [¶] c. It is also 

clear there was a tire bead failure, which, based on the description of the accident and the 

materials reviewed in this matter is evidence of a catastrophic loss of the tire prior to the 

rollover, which caused and/or was a substantial contributing factor to the rollover. A 

bead failure is substantial evidence of either a manufacturing defect and/or substandard 

design related to the tire in use on a vehicle. [¶] d. The convenience spare tire also had 

inadequate testing to determine whether they [sic] could withstand the forces such as 

those that were present on the front left tire on the night of the incident. There was a lack 

of road testing for actual driving conditions all this demonstrates that the tire was 

negligently placed on the road without sufficient testing on the part of the manufacturer. 

Had these tires been appropriately tested, the manufacturer would have been aware of the 

design defects and would have had the opportunity to correct them, such that his [sic] 

accident would not have taken place.”
10

vehicle dynamics.” The court further pointed out that Stover had not established a 

foundation for his opinion, “as he had not examined the tire, examined the vehicle, 

inspected the accident scene[,] or reconstructed the accident. As a result, Mr. Stover’s 

statements are mere conclusions based on assumptions, conjecture[,] and speculation and 

lack evidentiary value.”

On appeal, citing Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 

173, 187 (Garrett) and Jennifer C. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 1320, 1332 (Jennifer C.), plaintiffs contend that the court erred by not 

liberally construing Stover’s declaration. Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that even in 

the context of a summary judgment motion we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of 

discretion. (Garrett, supra, at p. 181.) We find no such abuse here.

The statutory basis for the admission and exclusion of expert testimony is found in 

Evidence Code sections 801-805. Most relevant here is Evidence Code section 801, 

which states, “If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an 

opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently 

beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; 

and [¶] (b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, 

and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at 

or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be 

relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony 

relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his 

opinion.” 

As noted in Garrett, in reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must 

liberally construe the evidence submitted in opposition with respect to both the 

admissibility and its sufficiency to create a triable issue of fact. (Garrett, supra, 214 

Cal.App.4th at p. 189, citing Jennifer C., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332; see also 

Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 125-126 [in considering opposition to 
11

summary judgment, court liberally construes declarations of plaintiff’s experts].) In light 

of that rule, an opposing expert’s declaration that includes a reasoned explanation “need 

not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of 

a summary judgment motion or at trial. [Citations.]” (Garrett, supra, at p. 189.) On the 

other hand, the court does not relinquish its duty to act as gatekeeper in evaluating 

proposed expert testimony, so as to exclude opinion based on speculation, conjecture, 

irrelevant material, or unsupported assumptions. (See Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v.

University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770-772.) The expert’s opinion 

“may not be based on assumptions of fact that are without evidentiary support or based 

on factors that are speculative or conjectural, for then the opinion has no evidentiary 

value and does not assist the trier of fact. [Citation.] Moreover, an expert’s opinion 

rendered without a reasoned explanation of why the underlying facts lead to the ultimate 

conclusion has no evidentiary value because an expert opinion is worth no more than the 

reasons and facts on which it is based.” (Bushling v. Fremont Medical Center (2004) 117 

Cal.App.4th 493, 510; accord, Powell v. Kleinman, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 123; 

Casey v. Perini Corp. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1233.)

In this case, Stover’s declaration was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on 

either the existence of a defect or proximate cause. While asserting Goodyear’s 

negligence for failing to test the tire under similar road conditions, he himself did not 

conduct any such testing or even examination of a tire of the same or similar model. 

These facts alone distinguish the present case from Garrett, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 173,

where the plaintiff’s expert did perform a detailed examination and testing of the 

prosthetic device at issue and its composite materials. Further, Stover’s statement that 

the HHR was unstable was not supported by any evidence, through testing or otherwise, 

that would have contradicted the evidence supplied by Goodyear, particularly Tillman’s 

statement that he did not lose control of the HHR before it struck the embankment. 

Likewise, if, as Stover suggested, the smaller size of the spare tire made the HHR 
12

unstable and thus more prone to rollover accidents, it was incumbent on plaintiffs to 

produce evidence that such cause and effect occurred here. The same can be said 

regarding the asserted failure to warn consumers not to place the tire on the front axle. 

No evidence was supplied of (a) the difference in size between the spare and the other 

three tires; (b) the condition of the other three tires; or (c) a causal link between the 

position of the tire on the HHR and instability of the vehicle. 

In short, even if Stover was qualified to testify in the area of tire design, tire 

performance, and vehicle dynamics, without some form of accident reconstruction or at 

least analysis of the performance of a similar tire on a comparable HHR, Stover’s opinion 

regarding the cause of the accident can only be deemed speculative and conjectural. The 

superior court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the opinion inadmissible.

Plaintiffs next argue that their discovery responses were sufficient in themselves to 

defeat the motion. They point to two of those responses. The first addressed the question 

asking them to explain how the tire was defective. The second asked them to identify 

documents relating to causation. Plaintiffs answered both questions using the language 

of Stover’s declaration.

5

 These responses, standing alone, were merely conclusionary 

and were therefore insufficient. (See Wiz Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 

106 Cal.App.4th 1, 11; accord, Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 

 

5

 In both responses plaintiffs stated: “The subject vehicle when being used in 

conjunction with the spare tire was susceptible to a loss of vehicle control, and as such 

was not suitable for use under normal and foreseeable driving conditions and lacked 

proper warnings regarding the danger. The vehicle and tire were defective by design, 

manufacture, and lack of warnings. The Chevrolet HHR was defective and unreasonable 

[sic] dangerous in that it was sold with a defective spare tire; it was unreasonably 

dangerous in that the vehicle was uncontrollable under certain driving conditions and in 

particular when being used with the spare tire; the vehicle was unstable, and had a high 

propensity to lose control. The subject vehicle and/or tire was unreasonably dangerous in 

their [sic] design, and manufacture of component parts including the spare tire. The 

subject vehicle and/or tire was unreasonably dangerous and defective and there were 

safer reasonable alterative designs available that would have minimized the hazards.”
13

Cal.App.4th 1398, 1404.) Plaintiffs also answered Special Interrogatory No. 1, which 

asked them to explain the incident in detail. Plaintiffs related the facts of the two 

collisions, but none of them was a disputed material fact, nor did any of them point to 

Goodyear as responsible for Rachel’s death. At best plaintiffs could only offer their 

belief that the HHR was “unstable, had a propensity to lose control [sic], and when used 

in conjunction with the spare tire was susceptible to a loss of vehicle control, in turn 

contributing to Defendant Tindall’s loss of control of the Chevrolet on August 8, 2008.” 

This answer did not help plaintiffs avoid summary judgment, as it merely set forth the 

undisputed facts of the accident along with an unsupported assertion that duplicated an 

allegation of their complaint. Without more, plaintiffs’ belief that the vehicle was 

unstable when driven with Goodyear’s tire on it constituted speculation and was thus an 

insufficient basis for denying summary judgment. (See Estate of Nelson (1964) 227 

Cal.App.2d 42, 47 [“the rule of liberal construction does not go so far as to permit of a 

counteraffidavit which merely repeats the allegations of the pleadings or which contains 

no evidentiary facts at all”].)

In summary, we conclude that Goodyear produced evidence that plaintiffs “[do]

not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence” to show that the accident 

leading to Rachel’s death was caused by a defective spare tire designed and manufactured 

by Goodyear. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.) Because plaintiffs were unable to 

produce competent, admissible evidence raising a triable issue of material fact bearing on 

this key element of their claims, the superior court properly entered summary judgment 

for Goodyear. It is therefore unnecessary to address the parties’ dispute over the 

applicability of the component parts doctrine.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________________

ELIA, J.

WE CONCUR:

_______________________________

RUSHING, P. J.

_______________________________

WALSH, J.*

Wiesjahn et al. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

H0401386

 

*

Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.