UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

GRACE LAWRENCE ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 vs. ) 

 ) Civil Action No. 02-CV-4440 

TRANS UNION, LLC ) 

 ) 

 and ) 

 ) 

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 )

 PLAINTIFF GRACE LAWRENCE’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION 

TO DEFENDANT TRANS UNION, LLC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff Grace Lawrence, through her undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this 

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Trans Union, LLC’s (“TU”) Motion for Summary 

Judgment. For the numerous reasons stated below, TU’s Motion should be denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Grace Lawrence instituted the current action against TU to recover for the 

damages she sustained as a result of TU’s unlawful credit reporting practices.1

 Plaintiff’s 

Complaint asserts violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et 

seq., as amended, and various laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

This case centers around TU’s inexcusable conduct in reporting an erroneous and 

damaging $2951 civil judgment on Ms. Lawrence’s credit file from the Philadelphia Municipal 

Court until July of 2002. TU reported this phantom judgment despite never having seen any 

court record documenting the existence of such a judgment, and even after having received 

 

1

 Defendant City of Philadelphia was previously dismissed from this matter. 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 1 of 53
multiple disputes of the judgment from Ms. Lawrence and objective evidence from the

Municipal Court demonstrating that the information it was reporting about her was grossly 

inaccurate. In fact, Ms. Lawrence had won a judgment. Notably, TU does not contend that the

judgment was ever owed by Ms. Lawrence. Moreover, even after discovery, TU has yet to 

identify one single document or record demonstrating the origin or existence of a judgment 

against Ms. Lawrence. As the FCRA was designed to protect consumers against “the trend 

toward . . . the establishment of all sorts of computerized data banks [that places a consumer] in

great danger of having his...character reduced to impersonal ‘blips’ and key punch holes in a 

stolid and unthinking machine which can literally ruin his reputation without cause,” this case

presents the archetypal credit nightmare demonstrating why this remedial statute exists.2

 

Contrary to TU’s contentions, Ms. Lawrence does not advance any time-barred claims. 

Rather, she challenges TU’s conduct in reporting the judgment during the two years prior to the 

filing of her July 3, 2002 Complaint and failing to investigate her dispute of that judgment in 

March of 2001. She seeks to recover cognizable damages she sustained within the two year 

period of time prior to the filing of her Complaint, including, among other things, a credit denial 

in July of 2001, damage to her credit reputation, and emotional distress, embarrassment and 

humiliation she suffered during that period as a result of being stigmatized as a bad credit risk. 

She also seeks punitive damages for TU’s reckless conduct during 2000-2002 in reporting the 

judgment and misrepresenting to her that it had verified the judgment as “accurate” despite never

having contacted the Philadelphia Municipal Court and having no court record demonstrating the 

existence of any such judgment. 

 

2

 See Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries, Inc., 257 F. 3d 409 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 

36570). 

2 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 2 of 53
TU’s ironic admissions made in support of its statute of limitations defense that it was 

actually reporting the judgment about Ms. Lawrence since 1997, and that she had disputed the 

information at that time, do nothing more than strengthen Ms. Lawrence’s timely claims by

demonstrating the abundant notice that TU had of the derogatory information within the statutory 

period. While Ms. Lawrence agrees that her battles with TU unfortunately go back many years, 

she is not seeking recompense under the FCRA for TU’s actions or any damage she suffered 

prior to July 3, 2000. Other than providing evidence of TU’s notice of the inaccurate 

information it was reporting, the 1997-2000 transactions have no impact on her claims based 

upon TU’s conduct and damage she suffered within the statutory time frame. As Chief Judge 

Giles recently noted when following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hyde v. Hibernia, 861 F.2d 446 

(5th Cir. 1988), each transmission of a disputed credit report in an FCRA action creates a separate 

and distinct tort to which a separate statute of limitations applies. Jaramillo v. Experian

Information Solutions, Inc. 155 F. Supp. 2d 356, 359-360 (E.D. Pa. 2001). As Ms. Lawrence has 

placed evidence before the Court that TU reported the judgment until July of 2002, and that she

suffered damage up through that time, Ms. Lawrence’s FCRA claims arising from TU’s postJuly 2000 conduct are clearly not time-barred.3

 

As a matter of course, TU files for summary judgment,4 contending that Plaintiff has not 

adduced sufficient facts during discovery to proceed to trial. TU’s motion must be denied given 

the abundant admissible evidence Ms. Lawrence places before this Court, including deposition 

 

3

 As discussed below, evidence of TU’s pre-July 2000 conduct is relevant to Plaintiff’s burden of proof on

her timely claims, as well as her CPL claim which has a 6 year statute of limitations. Philbin v. Trans Union, 101 

F.3d 957, 968, fn. 7 (3rd Cir. 1996). 4

 It bears mention that in all cases challenging TU’s reporting of inaccurate information, it consistently 

moves for summary judgment on all claims. See Crane v. Trans Union, CA. No. 02-7599 (E.D. Pa.) (TU’s

summary judgment filed and pending); Sutton v. Trans Union, C.A. No. 02-6908 (E.D. Pa.) (TU’s summary 

judgment filed and pending); Evantash v. Trans Union, C.A. No. 02-1188 (E.D. Pa.) (TU’s summary judgment filed

and pending); Williams v. Trans Union, C.A. No. 02-2574 (E.D. Pa.) (TU’s summary judgment filed, case later

settled); Miller v. Trans Union, C.A. No. 00-5107 (consolidated as C.A. No. 00-4778) (E.D. Pa.) (summary

3 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 3 of 53
testimony of TU’s corporate representative Eileen Little, Chase Bank and Ms. Lawrence herself, 

certified records from the City of Philadelphia and documents Plaintiff sent to and received from 

TU. This evidence establishes that: (1) Ms. Lawrence won a judgment in the Philadelphia 

Municipal Court; (2) TU actually reported that this judgment was entered against her from 1997 

until July of 2002, right after this case was filed; (3) Ms. Lawrence repeatedly disputed the 

judgment with TU, including in February 2001; (4) Ms. Lawrence went to the Municipal Court, 

obtained a copy of the docket demonstrating that there was no judgment against her (but rather 

was in her favor) and forwarded this document to TU; (5) TU received a copy of the docket from 

Ms. Lawrence and rejected it; (6) TU has never forwarded the court docket to its vendor, 

Superior Information Services, because it does not forward documents submitted by a consumer 

to the company reporting the disputed information as a matter of policy, despite the clear 

mandate set forth at 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(2)(B); (7) TU repeatedly informed Ms. Lawrence that 

the Philadelphia Records Department and Municipal Court had verified the judgment as 

accurate; (8) TU has never contacted the Municipal Court or Philadelphia Records Department

and does not in fact know whether they were ever contacted by anyone in response to Ms. 

Lawrence’s disputes; (9) TU has never seen any document or record demonstrating that Ms. 

Lawrence ever had a judgment against her by any party in any court; (10) until a few months 

ago, TU had never even requested Superior Information Services to provide it with a document 

or record reflecting a judgment against Ms. Lawrence; (11) Ms. Lawrence was denied credit 

from Chase in July of 2001 as a direct result of the inaccurate judgment TU was reporting; (12)

Ms. Lawrence suffered embarrassment, anxiety, emotional distress damage and damage to her 

credit reputation as a result of TU’s misreporting of the judgment up through July of 2002. From 

 judgment filed, case later settled). 

4 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 4 of 53
this vast factual record, a reasonable factfinder could certainly find in favor of Plaintiff on all of 

her claims and requested relief, including punitive damages. 

Unlike other circuits, the Third Circuit has specifically addressed the summary 

judgment standard to be applied in an FCRA case challenging a credit reporting agency’s (TU in 

fact) reporting of inaccurate information after receiving dispute of the information from the

consumer. See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F. 3d 220, 225 (3d. Cir. 1997); Philbin v.

Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 (3d. Cir. 1996) (discussed infra). These cases strongly 

support the submission of this case to a jury. Accordingly, TU’s Motion for Summary Judgment

must be denied. 

II. COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Ms. Lawrence Wins A Philadelphia Municipal Court Case In 1996 

In 1996, Ms. Lawrence won a small claims lawsuit in the Municipal Court of 

Philadelphia, and had a judgment entered in her favor in the amount of $2,951.5 (Lawrence Dep. 

at 6-7).6 (See also Certified Record of Judgment in Plaintiff’s favor, which is attached hereto as 

Exhibit B). Despite the fact the Ms. Lawrence prevailed in the action, and that the judgment

against Mr. Frommer was withdrawn without prejudice, in 1997 TU, one of the three largest 

national credit reporting agencies, began reporting this court record as a judgment against Ms.

Lawrence. (See Lawrence Dep. at 7). (See also Plaintiff’s redacted TU credit reports of 

7/29/1997, 11/12/97, 1/23/98, 1/25/01, 3/26/01, 6/24/02 showing how the judgment was reported 

 

5

 An individual named Thomas Frommer with whom Ms. Lawrence shared a car initiated the 1996 lawsuit in

the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, docket number 11080, against Ms. Lawrence. Ms. Lawrence counterclaimed.

Ms. Lawrence prevailed in the action against Mr. Frommer and won a $2,951 judgment on her counterclaim. After a

post-judgment settlement with Mr. Frommer, Plaintiff withdrew her judgment against him without prejudice. 

6

 A true and correct copy of the pages from Plaintiff Grace Lawrence’s deposition testimony of May 8, 2003, 

that are cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

 

5 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 5 of 53
between 1997 and 2002, which are attached collectively hereto as Exhibit C). Ms. Lawrence had 

an otherwise excellent credit history; and this $2,951 judgment was the only derogatory account 

or information on her TU credit report. (See Exhibit B). 

B. It Must Be A Mistake: Plaintiff First Learns That TU Is Reporting A 

Philadelphia Municipal Court Judgment As Recorded Against Her 

Ms. Lawrence first learned about this derogatory judgment being reported against her on 

her TU credit report when Sallie Mae and Key Bank denied her application for college loans for 

her daughter’s education in the late Summer of 1997. (See Lawrence Dep. at 7). (The denial 

letters from Sallie Mae and Key Bank are attached hereto as Exhibit D). Ms. Lawrence 

obviously thought that it must be a mistake and thus wrote a letter to TU in August 1997, asking 

it to correct her credit report by removing the judgment. (Lawrence Dep. at 10-11). 

This gross mistake would not be corrected for approximately six years, or until just after 

this lawsuit was filed. Indeed, Ms. Lawrence repeatedly disputed the inaccurate information 

with TU on multiple occasions including but not limited to: August of 1997, November 1997, 

December 1997 and February 2001. (See Lawrence Dep. at 15, 23); (see also TU’s Memo. of 

Law at 5). Several times in the 1997-1998 timeframe, TU deleted the $2,951 judgment from Ms. 

Lawrence’s credit report, only to re-insert the same judgment a few weeks later: 

 14 A. Actually there were so many 

 15 letters back and forth, I can't say if this 

 16 is exactly the one that I do believe I 

 17 received. They told me it was taken off 

 18 and put back on, I do know that. When it 

 19 was, I don't remember because there was 

 20 several of these letters that I sent back 

 21 and forth and they said the same thing, 

 22 take it off, put it back on. 

6 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 6 of 53
(Lawrence Dep. at 15); (See also correspondence from TU to Ms. Lawrence 11/12/97 and 

1/23/98 which are attached collectively hereto as Exhibit E). TU continued to report this false 

judgment on Ms. Lawrence’s credit report until after she initiated this action in July 2002. 

C. TU Refuses to Correct Its Mistake: “No Way Out Of It” 

TU criticizes Ms. Lawrence for not continuing to dispute the judgment even after three

disputes with TU failed to correct the problem. (See TU’s Memo. of Law at 1-2). This is both 

unjustified and unsupported by the facts of record. Consumers have no obligation to continue 

disputing inaccurate credit information that a credit bureau repeatedly fails to correct. 

Moreover, in her deposition Ms. Lawrence did, in fact, explain why she simply stopped disputing 

the judgment with TU for a period of time: “I know these things sat for a long time in a big pile 

because it seemed like there was no way out of it, no way to get it straightened out.” (Lawrence 

Dep. at 53). Like other consumers whose disputes fall through the cracks of the credit reporting 

system, Ms. Lawrence simply gave up after TU again and again rebuffed her efforts to clear her 

credit and good name. 

D. Ms. Lawrence’s 2001 Dispute: TU Again Rejects Plaintiff’s Municipal Court 

Docket And Misleads Plaintiff Into Believing That The Municipal Court Is 

At Fault 

Despite feeling like there was no way out, in February 2001 Ms. Lawrence again wrote a 

letter to TU, asking it to remove the judgment that was being misreported against her.

(Lawrence Dep. at 47).7

 As with her previous disputes, Ms. Lawrence sent to TU, along with her 

letter, copies of the Municipal Court docket in her case (which Ms. Lawrence referred to as the

“disposition”), showing that the judgment was actually in her favor. (Lawrence at 47-48). (A

 

7

 TU inaccurately states that the February 2001 dispute was “prompted” by counsel and thus treats it with 

distain. (See TU Memo. of Law at 5). TU is wrong in stating that the dispute was prompted by Francis & Mailman, 

P.C., Plaintiff’s counsel. Although it is irrelevant as to why Plaintiff initiated another dispute, Plaintiff did not retain 

her counsel until 2002. 

7 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 7 of 53
copy of Plaintiff’s February 2001 dispute along with the Municipal Court docket is attached

hereto as Exhibit F). Again, TU verified the judgment as accurate despite having no knowledge 

whatsoever that Ms. Lawrence ever had a judgment against her. (A copy of TU’s March 2001 

Investigation Results and Credit Report is attached hereto as Exhibit G). 

During discovery in this matter, Plaintiff learned that TU apparently dismissed the 

Municipal Court docket because it was not a “stamped” document. (Little Dep. at 26-27).8

 TU

never told Plaintiff at any time during her multiple disputes, however, that it was rejecting her

supporting documentation or that she need a “stamped” document. (Little Dep. at 71-72) (“Q . . 

Did anyone from Trans Union ever call Ms. Lawrence and ask her to supply the stamped court

record concerning this judgment? A. No.”). Rather, on each occasion it simply sent Ms. 

Lawrence form letters stating that it had investigated her dispute with the original source (i.e, the 

Municipal Court or Philadelphia County Records) and they had certified and verified the 

judgment “verified” as “complete” and “accurate.” (See TU Investigation Results 

correspondence of 11/12/97, 1/23/98, 3/26/01, attached hereto as Exhibit I). When Plaintiff’s 

counsel asked TU’s corporate representative Eileen Little why TU never informed Ms. Lawrence 

that she needed a stamped court document, Ms. Little simply stated that it was not TU’s policy to 

do so. (Little Dep. at 89). Ms. Little conceded, however, that consumers have no way of finding 

out that TU does not accept certain documents in support of disputes and that it could be useful 

to consumers if they knew what documentation TU requires. (See Little Dep. at 93-95). 

 

8

 A true and correct copy of the pages from Eileen Little’s deposition testimony of May 13, 2003, that are 

cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit H. Ms. Little is Manager of Consumer Relations for TU and has overseen

investigations of consumer disputes for approximately 10 years. 

8 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 8 of 53
E. TU Never Disclosed To Ms. Lawrence Who Was Actually “Verifying” The 

Accuracy Of The Municipal Court Judgment Against Her 

To make a bad matter worse, TU falsely continued to inform Ms. Lawrence that it had 

contacted the Philadelphia Municipal Court Records Department and that it had verified that the 

judgment was entered against Ms. Lawrence. In fact, deposition testimony revealed that TU 

never contacted the Municipal Court and that, as of just a few weeks ago, it was not aware

whether the vendor from whom it purchased its judgment information, Superior Information 

Sercives (“Superior”), ever contacted the Municipal Court. 

 

 Page 118 

 

 18 Q. I guess that's what I'm asking. 

 19 Isn't it true that you don't know whether 

 20 or not anybody actually contacted the 

 21 Philadelphia County Courthouse or 

 22 Philadelphia County Records located at 34 

 23 South 11th Street in connection with Ms. 

 24 Lawrence's disputes?

 

 Page 119 

 

 1 MR. LUCKMAN: Object to the form. 

 

 2 THE WITNESS: Correct. 

 

 3 BY MR. FRANCIS: 

 4 Q. And do you have any information 

 5 or knowledge as you sit here today that 

 6 Trans Union was ever contacted by 

 7 Philadelphia County Records or the 

 8 municipal court concerning any of Ms. 

 9 Lawrence's disputes?

 

 10 MR. LUCKMAN: Object to the form. 

 

 11 THE WITNESS: That the City of 

 12 Philadelphia contacted Trans Union?

 

 13 MR. FRANCIS: The Philadelphia 

9 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 9 of 53
 14 County Records. 

 

 15 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of 

 16 that, no. 

 

 17 BY MR. FRANCIS: 

 18 Q. And in connection with any of Ms. 

 19 Lawrence's disputes to Trans Union, did 

 20 Trans Union ever inform her of the identity 

 21 and/or address of Superior Information 

 22 Services?

 

 23 A. No, we did not.

 

(Little Dep. at 118-19). 

Because TU never told her, Ms. Lawrence never knew about Superior, but rather 

assumed – as TU stated in its letters – that the Municipal Court had entered the judgment against 

her. This left Ms. Lawrence running from one Philadelphia City office to the next trying to 

correct an error that was created and perpetuated by TU. Ms. Lawrence even tried to meet with 

the Municipal Court judge who decided her case in order to solve this problem, but to no avail: 

 Page 24 

 20 A. For one thing I went to the 

 21 judge's office, I saw an aide, I wasn't

 22 allowed to see the judge to see if he 

 23 couldn't pull up records giving me

 24 something to prove how he ruled in the 

 

 Page 25 

 

 1 case. I went to numerous different offices 

 2 downtown where they shuttled me from one 

 3 place to another trying to get more 

 4 information about how to clear this up or 

 5 get the document that I needed to prove how 

 6 the case was ruled on in my favor. I went 

 7 to the prothonotary's office, I've never 

 8 seen so many rude people in all my life and 

 9 got no satisfaction. 

 

10 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 10 of 53
 10 Q. Was this in January?

 

 11 A. Honestly I have no idea when it 

 12 was. I think it was over a period of 

 13 time. I don't think I did all these things 

14 at once. 

 . . . . 

 22 THE WITNESS: You know what, it's 

 23 hard to recall because I went to more than 

24 a few places downtown. The one day, like I 

 

 Page 51 

 1 said, I was shuttled from one office to 

 2 another because nobody knew where I should 

 3 go. . . . 

(Lawrence at 24-25, 50-51). Thus, without ever being told that TU was rejecting her Municipal 

Court docket, and without knowing who TU was actually “verifying” the judgment with, Ms. 

Lawrence was left knocking on the wrong doors for years. 

F. TU’s “Investigation” Procedures 

The precise details of what, if anything, Superior did in investigating Ms. Lawrence’s 

disputes are not known because Superior has thus far refused to abide by the subpoena served

upon it.9

 What is known is that TU received all of Ms. Lawrence’s disputes, and through its 

automated and perfunctory dispute investigation process forwarded them on the Superior for 

“verification.” For its investigation services, Superior charges TU approximately $5 per 

investigation. (Stockdale Dep. at 46-47).10 

 

9

 Because Superior and TU are business associates, TU has attempted amicably to have Superior produce 

documents and provide a deposition in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff has thus far restrained form filing a 

contempt motion against Superior for failing to comply with Plaintiff’s subpoena. 

 

10 A true and correct copy of the pages from William Stockdale’s deposition testimony of June 10, 2003, that 

are cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit J. 

 

11 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 11 of 53
Even though the FCRA places the duty to investigate consumer disputes of allegedly 

inaccurate information squarely upon credit reporting agencies, TU passes most of its 

investigation duties of public records data to Superior (at a cost of $5).11 Aware of its nondelegable duties, TU initially processes the dispute, and ultimately responds to the consumer 

(thus appearing to the consumer as if it is the only entity involved in an investigation), but 

conducts no independent review and exercises almost no oversight functions over Superior for 

any particular consumer dispute. Rather, TU simply parrots on the consumer’s credit report 

whatever result Superior reports. (See Little Dep. at 57-59, 69). In this case, it did so without 

having any knowledge of whether Superior ever actually contacted the Court or obtained proof

of the “judgment” that was being reported against Ms. Lawrence: 

 11 Q. As you sit here today, do you 

 12 know whether or not at any time since 1997 

 13 Superior Information Services ever 

 14 contacted either the Philadelphia Municipal 

 15 Court, the Philadelphia County Records, or 

 16 the City of Philadelphia concerning Ms. 

 17 Lawrence's disputes?

 

 18 A. I don't know that. 

(Little Dep. at 121). Thus, although TU acknowledges that it, and not Superior, is the party that 

the law charges with investigating disputes, and that it is the party that publishes credit 

information to third parties, it apparently has no idea as whether the judgment that it was 

reporting against Ms. Lawrence was accurate: 

 5 Q. Somewhere along the line Trans 

 

 6 Union got information that Ms. Lawrence 

 7 owed a judgment to a Mr. Frommer and it 

 8 reported that information about her. Would 

 9 you agree with me on that? 

 

11 Superior also sells public record information to TU in the first instance for a price of approximately $0.40

per record. (Stockdale Dep. at 29).

12 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 12 of 53
 

 10 A. Yes. 

 

 11 Q. Have you seen any record at all 

 12 up until today which shows or represents 

 13 that Ms. Lawrence actually owed a judgment 

 14 to Mr. Frommer?

 

 15 MR. LUCKMAN: Object to the form. 

 

 16 THE WITNESS: No. 

 

 17 BY MR. FRANCIS: 

 18 Q. Do you have any idea what the 

 19 vendor that Trans Union used in connection 

 20 with this dispute or in connection with 

 21 this judgment, what records the vendor had 

 22 concerning this court record?

 

 23 A. No. 

 

 24 Q. As you sit here today, do you 

 

 Page 70 

 

 1 know whether or not Ms. Lawrence ever owed 

 2 a judgment to a Thomas Frommer?

 

 3 MR. LUCKMAN: Objection. 

 

 4 THE WITNESS: I don't know if she 

 5 ever owed him one. I know she claims she 

 6 won. 

 

 7 BY MR. FRANCIS: 

 

 8 Q. And as you sit here today, do you 

 9 know one way or the other whether or not 

 10 she won that judgment?

 

 11 A. No. 

 

 12 Q. Have you ever seen the actual 

 13 court record relating to this judgment?

 

 14 A. No. 

13 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 13 of 53
 

 15 Q. Even up until today?

 

 16 A. Right. 

(Little Dep. at 69-70). 

Although TU conducts bulk statistical assessments of the data sold to it by Superior, 

neither of TU’s corporate representatives testified that TU ever spot-checks Superior’s 

investigations or that TU ever reviewed or even spoke with anyone at Superior about its

“investigation” of the judgment repeatedly disputed by Ms. Lawrence with TU. 

TU’s Group Manager of Consumer Relations, Eileen Little, has also provided deposition

testimony explaining TU’s general investigation procedures, which are implicated here.12 (See

Little Dep. in Evantash at 10-14) (describing Ms. Little’s position and responsibilities). Ms. 

Little has testified that, despite its legal requirement to do so, TU never shows a consumer’s 

dispute, or documentation supporting the dispute, to the furnisher of the credit information, in 

this case Superior:13

 

12 Eileen Little was deposed on October 9, 2001, in Jaramillo v. Trans Union, et al., (Civ. No. 00-CV-5876 

E.D. Pa.), a FCRA case, where she testified about Trans Union’s investigative procedures during the past few years 

(hereinafter cited as “Little Dep. in Jaramillo”). Additionally, Mr. Little was deposed on February 25, 2003, in

Evantash v. Trans Union et al., (Civ. No. 02-CV-1188 E.D. Pa.), where she testified about Trans Union’s 

investigative procedures during 2000-2001 (hereinafter cited as “Little Dep. in Evantash”). Ms. Little also gave

deposition testimony about TU’s general investigation procedures in this case (cited herein as “Little Dep.”). All of

Ms. Little’s deposition transcripts are attached in chronological order as Exhibit H. Ms. Little’s testimony in

Jaramillo and Evantash about TU’s investigative procedures and policies over the past two years is also cited herein

because it is clearly relevant to this action. Since the present TU attorneys defended the Jaramillo and Evantash

depositions, and thus had a full and fair opportunity to develop Ms. Little’s testimony, and since the deposition 

testimony concerns substantially similar issues as those in the present case, the testimony is appropriate for purposes 

of this motion as it would be at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a); Copeland v. Potroleum Transit Co., 32 F.R.D. 445, 

447 (E.D.S.C. 1963) (deposition taken for use in another case could be used in instant case where substantially same

issues were involved and defendant had adequate opportunity to cross-examine deponent with same motive and

interest); see also Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, 181 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1999) (relying on deposition testimony

taken in another case to vacate summary judgment); Donahey v. Wellman, 687 F. Supp. 195, 196-97 (W.D. Pa. 

1988) (relying on deposition taken in parallel case to grant summary judgment); see generally Aileen Mills Co. v. 

Ojay Mills, Inc., 192 F. Supp 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (deposition taken in prior action by other plaintiffs against same

defendants was part of record where submitted to district court upon motion to quash); Tobacco & Allied Stocks v.

Transamerica Corp., 18 F.R.D. 355 (D. Del. 1955) (all depositions, exhibits and pleadings from analogous litigation 

offered by party, over objection of opponent, were accepted and considered admissible). 

13 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2)(A) (providing that the CRA must forward “all relevant information” to the 

14 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 14 of 53
13 Q. Does the furnisher ever see the 

14 Consumer’s written dispute?

15 A. No. 

(Little Dep. in Jaramillo at 115). 

 17 Q. If the consumer sends some type of 

 18 documentation along with their dispute, is that 

 19 documentation forwarded to the furnisher?

 20 A. No. 

 21 Q. Ever?

 22 A. No. 

(Little Dep. in Evantash at 58); (see also Little Dep. at 116) (TU does not send documentation 

provided by consumer to the furnisher). Additionally, Ms. Little has testified that TU never even

bothers to call a consumer during the course of an investigation: 

 21 Q. Are there any instances in which the 

 22 dispute investigator would call the consumer 

 23 to find out more about the dispute?

 24 A. No. 

(Little Dep. in Jaramillo at 120). In the case at bar, Ms. Little explained that TU unbelievably

never even forwarded to Superior the Municipal Court docket provided by Ms. Lawrence to TU

and never telephoned Ms. Lawrence to find out more information about her dispute or to tell her 

that she need a “stamped” court document. (Little Dep. at 63-65, 71-72). 

Moreover, Ms. Little has testified that even though it requires consumers in many 

instances to provide corroborative documentation with their disputes, TU does not require 

creditor-furnishers, such as Superior, to do the same: 

18 Q. If the furnisher disagrees with the 

 19 consumer’s dispute, does Trans Union require the 

 20 furnisher provide documentation?

21 A. No. They have to just be able to 

 22 verify the information back . . . . 

 credit furnisher). 

15 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 15 of 53
(Little Dep. in Evantash at 64). Thus, in this case, even though Ms. Lawrence’s documentation 

was rejected because she did not present TU with a stamped court record, TU placed no such 

burden on Superior. That is, Superior simply had to send an electronic message to TU that the 

reporting of the judgment against Ms. Lawrence was accurate. Thus, TU continued to report the 

judgment against Ms. Lawrence even though no one at TU ever saw any court record concerning 

a judgment owed by Ms. Lawrence and no one at TU knows whether anyone at Superior ever 

saw such records. (Little Dep. at 69-70, 120-21). 

Finally, Ms. Little has given testimony about the enormous demands that TU places on 

the clerks who process investigations of consumer disputes. Ms. Little has explained that TU’s 

clerks who handle disputes are high school educated, hourly employees who are paid between 

$10 and $17 per hour. (Little Dep. in Evantash at 51-54). These clerks are required to meet

certain quotas including the demand to review, respond to and resolve 10 to 14 consumer

disputes per hour. (Little Dep. at 115-16); (Little Dep. in Evantash at 40-42, 51-54). A dispute 

constitutes a consumer complaint about as many items of credit information as the consumer 

claims are being inaccurately reported on his credit report, and generally involves three (3) items 

of information on average. (Id.). Thus, in the routine course of business, and assuming a perfect

world with no breaks in the workday, TU’s investigation clerks must process approximately 30 – 

42 consumer disputes per hour, or must complete an investigation in 1 1⁄2 to 2 minutes. 

Surprisingly, the employees (called “CDV/ACDV operators) who are charged by TU with 

inputting the data received from credit furnishers, such as Superior, are not the same clerks who 

initially receive the consumer’s dispute. Moreover, the data entry personnel who receive the 

responses from the credit furnisher are required to process 85 dispute responses per hour. (Little 

Dep. in Evantash at 60-61). Mr. Little testified: 

16 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 16 of 53
 Page 60 

4 Q. What does the CDV operator do with 

5 that information?

 6 A. They input the data returned by the 

 7 subscriber. 

 8 Q. Do they do anything else?

 9 A. No. 

 10 Q. Do the CDV operators have access to 

 11 documents that the consumer might have provided 

 12 along with his or her dispute?

 13 A. No. 

 14 Q. The 10 to 14 disputes an hour 

 15 standard that you talked about, is that just for 

 16 the dispute investigators, or does that also 

 17 apply to the CDV operators?

 18 A. No. The CDV operators have their 

 19 own standard. 

 20 Q. What is their standard?

 21 A. 85 an hour. 

(Little Dep. in Evantash at 60). 

Thus, in processing consumer disputes such as Ms. Lawrence’s, TU has procedures in 

place that would require high school educated, hourly employees to spend no more than 2 – 3 

minutes to interpret and characterize the consumer dispute, place it in the appropriate automated

format for the credit furnisher, send it out for verification (in this case, to Superior), receive a

response and update the consumer’s credit report. The labor cost to TU is approximately $0.30 - 

0.50 per consumer complaint. The cost paid to Superior for its part is $5. (Stockdale Dep. at 46-

47). 

 Moreover, the “investigation” involves no telephone calls, letters or e-mails, no review 

of records, or discussion with third parties – and no questions of any type either to the consumer 

or to the credit furnisher. Importantly, the Municipal Court docket that Ms. Lawrence repeatedly

sent to TU (showing that she actually won her case) was never forwarded by TU to Superior, and 

was rejected by TU for purposes of investigating Ms. Lawrence’s disputes. 

17 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 17 of 53
G. Ms. Lawrence Suffered Harm Within The FCRA Two-Year Statute Of 

Limitations Due To TU’s Misreporting Of The Judgment On Her Credit 

Report 

Contrary to Defendant’s bald contentions, Ms. Lawrence suffered cognizable and 

compensable damages (within the statute of limitations period) as a result of TU’s misreporting 

of the civil judgment.14

For example, Plaintiff was rejected for a Chase credit card on August 2, 2001. (The

Chase denial letter of 8/2/01 is attached hereto as Exhibit K). The unequivocal deposition 

testimony of Chase’s corporate representative, Donna Stout, leaves no doubt that the civil 

judgment being reported by TU on Plaintiff’s credit report was the only reason for this credit 

denial: 

 Page 13 

 9 Q. Okay. Do you know based upon 

 10 your review of the documents in this case 

 11 whether Grace Lawrence applied for a Chase 

 12 Platinum Master Card in July or August of 

 13 2001?

 

 14 A. Yes. We have it that she applied 

 15 for a Chase Platinum Master Card and the 

 16 date that we received it was July 1, 2001. 

 17 And it was an application that came over 

 18 the phone. It was an applied by phone 

 19 application. 

 

 20 Q. Did Chase approve that 

 21 application?

 

 22 A. No. 

 

 Page 15 

 

 

14 TU stresses to this Court that what it deems to be the most significant damages suffered by Ms. Lawrence

lay outside of the two-year statute of limitation under the FCRA. (See TU’s Memo. of Law at 1-3, 10-13). 

Although Plaintiff agrees that she has suffered harm at the hands of TU for a long time, the damages that she seeks 

to recover in this action under the FCRA clearly lay within the limitations period. 

18 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 18 of 53
 21 Q. Do you see any lawsuits or 

 22 judgments or liens against her?

 23 A. I see a judgment. That's the 

 24 only thing we have. 

 

 Page 16 

 

 

 1 Q. Would you please show me where 

 2 you see the judgment on Chase-3, if in fact 

 3 it's listed there? 

 

 4 A. On page six of that document. 

 

 5 Q. Okay. 

 

 6 A. The second block down it says, 

 7 public records. 

 

 8 Q. And is that the judgment where 

 9 the creditor is Thomas Froneer, it looks 

 10 like?

 

 11 A. Yes. 

 

 12 Q. And it's a civil judgment. Could 

 13 you tell the amount of the judgment against 

 14 her?

 

 15 MR. CREECH: Objection to form. 

 

 16 THE WITNESS: The current balance 

 17 we have here is $2951. 

 

 18 BY MR. SOUMILAS: 

 

 19 Q. Was that the reason why Chase 

 20 turned Ms. Lawrence down for this credit 

 21 card?

 

 22 A. Yes.

 

19 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 19 of 53
(Stout Dep. at 13-16) (emphasis added).15

TU makes a great deal out of the fact that the application was marked “withdrawn” after 

Chase’s decision to deny but before the denial letter was actually sent. Ms. Stout’s testimony, 

however, explains what happened: 

 9 BY MR. SOUMILAS: 

 10 Q. Do you know whether the decision 

 11 to decline Ms. Lawrence's application 

 12 because of the judgment on Trans Union's 

 13 credit report was made before the 

 14 application was withdrawn?

 

 15 MR. CREECH: Objection. 

 

 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, it was made 

 17 before. 

. . . . 

 Page 41 

 

 16 Q. Do you know whether my client was 

 17 told over the phone by a Chase 

 18 representative that her application had 

 19 been declined and as a result of that she 

 20 chose to withdraw it?

 21 A. I don't have any type of comment

 22 stating that they told her it was declined; 

 23 however, I would assume that she knew 

24 that's why she wanted it withdrawn. 

 

(Stout Dep. at 40-41). Finally, Ms. Stout explained that had Chase never actually denied Ms. 

Lawrence’s credit card application, as TU suggests, it would have never set her the denial letter 

of August 2, 2001. (Stout Dep. at 50). Thus, Chase denied Ms. Lawrence credit because of 

TU’s misreporting of a civil judgment against her, as the August 2, 2001 letter plainly states. 

 

15 A true and correct copy of the pages from Donna Stout’s deposition testimony of May 29, 2003, that are 

cited herein are attached hereto as Exhibit L.

20 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 20 of 53
In addition to the Chase credit card denial, Ms. Lawrence testified that (although she did 

not receive or keep adverse action letters) other creditors offered her higher interest rates than 

what a consumer with excellent credit should have gotten. (See Lawrence Dep. at 71-72) 

(testifying about credit card interest rates between 17% and 21%). Finally, Ms. Lawrence lost 

credit opportunities since she was embarrassed to apply for credit, knowing the civil judgment 

would show up on the TU credit report obtained by any potential creditor. (See Lawrence Dep.

at 42). 

In addition to the above credit damages, Ms. Lawrence has suffered embarrassment, 

humiliation, emotional distress, anxiety, frustration and damage to her reputation as a result of

TU’s publication of the derogatory judgment to third parties such as Chase, Plaintiff’s existing

creditors and other third parties. According to TU’s own consumer disclosure records, many of 

Plaintiff’s creditors – including, but not limited to, Sears (3/01), Chase (2/01), Cenlar Mortgage 

(12/00), Universal Bank (11/00 and 10/00), and Strawbridges (9/00) – conducted “account 

reviews” of Ms. Lawrene’s TU credit report during the time that TU was misreporting the 

judgment. (See TU’s consumer disclosures of 3/26/01, attached hereto as Exhibit M) (showing 

account reviews on next to last page). Thus, TU’s own records show that it disclosed this false 

and derogatory judgment information to third parties during the statutory time period. 

As Ms. Lawrence had no other negative credit history, the judgment constituted a 

humiliating embarrassment and a solitary stigma on her financial history that caused unwarranted 

anxiety and frustration. Ms. Lawrence explained in her deposition how she walked around with

the Municipal Court docket (which she calls “the disposition”) in her possession for a period of

years: 

 1 Q. When you say you had it with you, 

 2 is it something you kept in your car? 

21 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 21 of 53
 3 A. No, any time I went to apply for 

 4 any kind of credit of any kind, car, house, 

 5 anything that required signatures, I took a 

 6 copy of it with me. It was an 

 7 embarrassment, you know. 

 

 8 Q. Do you remember having to go -- 

 9 when you say it was an embarrassment, what 

 10 do you mean?

 

 11 A. What do I mean? I mean I've had 

 12 excellent credit all my life and rather 

 13 than have them say, listen, you can't have 

 14 this loan, I showed them the document so 

 15 that they could make up their own mind, 

16 meaning the disposition of the trial. 

(Lawrence Dep. at 42). Thus, Ms. Lawrence suffered great humiliation and embarrassment from 

falsely being identified for a period of approximately six years as an individual with an unpaid 

judgment on her record and having to carry around her Municipal Court docket like an albatross 

around her neck.16 

 16 These non-economic damages suffered by Ms. Lawrence are well recognized specifically as

compensable under the FCRA. See Boris v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc.,WL 1255891 (W.D. Ky. March 14, 2003) 

($100,000 in emotional distress damages verdict upheld as appropriate under FCRA upon defendant credit reporting 

agency’s post-trial motion); Thomas v. Trans Union, (D. Or. 2002) ($300,000 in compensatory damages for

emotional distress and $5 million for punitive damages, remitted to $1 million); Johnson v. MBNA (D. Virginia 

2002) (jury award of $90,300 for emotional distress and damage to reputation sustained against credit furnisher

MBNA for negligent investigation of consumer’s dispute in violation of FCRA section 1681s-2(b); Jorgenson v. 

TRW, Inc., C.A. No. 96-286 (D. Or. 1998) (jury awarding plaintiff $600,000 for compensatory damages for credit 

rating damage and emotional distress); Anderson v. Conwood Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 650 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) ($50,000

in actual damages awarded in absence of testimony other than worry, stress and anxiety); Milgram v. Advanced

Cellular Systems, Inc., 1990 WL 116322 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (jury award of $20,000 for credit damage, $20,224 in 

attorney’s fees); Stevenson v. TRW, 987 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1993) ($30,000 in mental anguish and embarrassment 

damages, plus $20,700 in attorney’s fees); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976)

($21,750 for loss of reputation, embarrassment, in recognition of the “many subtle and indirect adverse effects upon

a personal, social and economic life”; $50,000 in punitive damages and $21,000 in attorney’s fees); Bryant v. TRW

Inc., 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982) ($8,000 for embarrassment and humiliation, attorney’s fees $13,705); Jones v. 

Credit Bureau of Huntington, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 1990) (jury award of $4,000 compensatory, $42,500

punitive upheld); Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982) ($10,000 actual

damages for humiliation and mental distress even when no out-of-pocket expenses); Pinner v. Schmidt, 617 F. Supp.

342 (E.D. La. 1985) ($25,000 in actual damages for negligent credit violations); Trans Union Corp. v. Crisp, 896 

S.W.2d 446 (Ark. App. 1995) ($15,000 in actual damages, $25,000 in punitive damages in a case involving reports 

which did not show that debts had been satisfied); Thompson ($10,000 for three credit denials); Thorton v. Equifax

Inc., 467 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Ark. 1979) ($5,000 compensatory and $250,000 in punitive damages); Phillips v. 

22 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 22 of 53
Finally, Ms. Lawrence has incurred out-of-pocket expenses including, but not limited to, 

lost time and energy, local or long distance telephone calls, parking, postage, and other related 

costs. (See Lawrence Dep. at 21-25, 50-51 (various trips to Philadelphia and being shuttled from 

office to office); 15, 20, 60 (letters and phone calls)). 

III. ARGUMENT

A. Applicable Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a motion for summary judgment will 

only be granted: 

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In other words, summary judgment may only be granted if the movant 

shows, by admissible evidence, that there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would 

permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383 

n.2 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 843 F.2d 139, 143 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 

870 (1988). 

The party opposing the motion for summary judgment is entitled to have his/her 

allegations taken as true, to receive the benefit of the doubt when his/her assertions conflict with 

those of the movant and to have inferences from the underlying facts drawn in his/her favor. Big 

Apple, BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1362-63 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 

 David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 1992 WL 67374 (Conn. Super. 1992) ($5,000 for credit rating damage); see also

Dalton v. Capital Assoc. Indus., 257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (damages for loss of reputation are available under 

FCRA); Guimond v. Trans Union, 45 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1995) (humiliation and mental distress damages available 

under FCRA); Morris v. Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, 563 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (nervousness, irritation

and loss of sleep compensable under FCRA.). In FCRA cases, such damages do not require expert medical 

testimony. See Boris, 2003 WL 1255891 *5-7; see also Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333.

23 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 23 of 53
denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). In analyzing the moving party’s burden under Rule 56(c), the 

Third Circuit has stated that “[i]f there is any evidence in the record, from any source, from 

which a reasonable inference in the respondent’s favor may be drawn, the moving party simply 

cannot obtain a summary judgment, no matter how many affidavits are filed (citations omitted) . 

. . . The ‘burden’ then is insurmountable.” In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 

F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir. 1983), reversed on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see also Boyle v.

County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). 

A court may not, at the summary judgment stage, weigh evidence or make credibility 

decisions. These tasks are left to the factfinder. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. DarlingDelaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994 (1993). To raise a 

genuine issue of material fact, the respondent need not match, item for item each piece of

evidence proffered by the movant. Big Apple, BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1362-63. As the Third 

Circuit has explained: 

In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere 

scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of

material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant’s

version of events against the opponent, even if the quality 

of the movant’s evidence far outweighs that of its 

opponent. It thus remains the province of the factfinder to 

ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence. 

In re Unisys Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 433 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Big Apple, 

BMW). If there are gaps in the pertinent materials submitted by the movant, without explanation, 

that justifies denial of the motion. O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 

1989). In the case at bar, there exist genuine issues of material fact, and therefore summary 

judgment is inappropriate. 

24 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 24 of 53
B. Background Of The FCRA

A brief discussion of the FCRA and its relevant sections provides helpful background to 

the nature of Plaintiff’s FCRA claims and why TU’s Motion should be denied. 

As Congress explained in the FCRA itself: 

It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 

reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting 

the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, 

insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair 

and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the

confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization

of such information in accordance with the requirements of 

this subchapter. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). See, e.g., Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957, 962 (3d. Cir. 1996). 

The FCRA was prompted by “congressional concern over abuses in the credit reporting 

industry.” Philbin, 101 F.3d at 962; see also Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 

1329 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, it is fashioned so as to protect the credit worthiness and reputation 

of every consumer. Ackerly v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 658 (D. Wyo. 

1974). The FCRA was crafted to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate 

information about them. Kates v. Croker National Bank, 776 F.2d 1396, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Like the other portions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, the FCRA is to be

liberally construed in favor of the consumer. See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 

F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). 

Congress enacted the FCRA to protect consumers against “the trend toward . . . the

establishment of all sorts of computerized data banks [that places a consumer] in great danger of

having his life and character reduced to impersonal ‘blips’ and key punch holes in a stolid and 

unthinking machine which can literally ruin his reputation without cause, and make him 

unemployable.” Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries, Inc., 257 F. 3d 409 (4th Cir. 2000), 

25 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 25 of 53
(citing 116 Cong. Rec. 36570). As a result, the FCRA imposes “grave responsibilities” on credit 

reporting agencies to ensure the accuracy of the information that they report. Cushman v. Trans

Union Corp., 115 F. 3d 220, 225 (3d. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). 

The FCRA framework includes statutory provisions governing what information can be 

contained in the reports (sections 1681a(d), 1681c, 1681s-1), to whom the reports can be 

disseminated and for what purposes (sections 1681b, 1681e), the duty to reinvestigate (section 

1681i), the duties of the report user (sections 1681m, 1681q), the duties of the furnishers of 

information to the credit reporting agencies (section 1681s-2), and the rights of the consumer, 

including a statutory cause of action by the consumer for violations of the Act (sections 1681n, 

1681o). 

The FCRA sections that provide private causes of action for violation of these sections

are sections 1681n and 1681o, which state: 

Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement 

imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is 

liable to that consumer . . . . 

15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (emphasis added). 

Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any

requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any 

consumer is liable to that consumer. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) (emphasis added).17

These are the provisions of the FCRA that give consumers the right to bring private 

 

17 Amendments to the FCRA, which took effect on September 30, 1996, imposed new duties and causes of

action against furnishers of credit information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2. Creditors-subscribers have statutorily

imposed duties to perform proper investigations once a consumer has disputed the accuracy of any information 

reported about him/her by the furnisher with a credit reporting agency. Subsection (b) of 1681s-2 provides that if a 

furnisher has been notified that specific information has been disputed as incomplete or inaccurate, the furnisher 

must conduct an investigation, and if the information, in fact, turns out to be inaccurate, that information must be 

deleted and suppressed and cannot continue to be furnished. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). If the furnisher determines 

that information it has reported is inaccurate or incomplete, the furnisher has a duty to report that information and 

correct its prior reportings to all agencies to whom it subscribes and also to correct its own internal records. 15

26 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 26 of 53
causes of action against persons who violate the FCRA. The language in sections 1681n and 

1681o provides that any person who violates the FCRA “is liable to that consumer.” For both 

willful and negligent violations, a consumer is entitled to “any actual damages sustained” and an 

award of reasonable attorney’s fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and o. For willful violations, a 

consumer is also entitled to statutory damages of between $100 and $1000 and “such punitive 

damages as the court will allow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 

C. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Timely

Before getting to the heart of Plaintiff’s case, it is important to address TU’s argument 

concerning the statue to limitations, which is nothing more than a diversion. TU vamps on about

the FCRA’s 2 year statute of limitations as if this is a contested issue. Indeed, TU spends the 

greater part of its brief making the obvious point that the FCRA has a two-year statute of 

limitations. (See Tu’s Memo. of Law at 1-3, 5-8, 10-13). 

Plaintiff agrees – the FCRA does have a two-year statute of limitations. Nevertheless, 

Plaintiff has come forward with facts that TU reported the judgment through July of 2002, that 

she disputed the judgment with TU in February of 2001 and that she has suffered damage in 

2000-2002 (e.g. July 2001 Chase credit denial). This evidence supports her timely FCRA claim. 

It is of no moment that TU may have also caused Ms. Lawrence damage six years ago. 

Likewise, it may be correct that the damage it caused Plaintiff outside of the limitations period is

greater than that which she Ms. Lawrence suffered within the two years preceding the filing of

the Complaint. The fact of the matter, however, is that Ms. Lawrence disputed the judgment

within the limitations period and also continued to suffer damages at the hands of TU within the

two years of the filing of this lawsuit period. 

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has already held that the two year FCRA statute of 

 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1).

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Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 27 of 53
limitations begins to run anew from the date of each violation. See Jaramillo v. Experian 

Information Solutions, Inc., 155 F. Supp.2d 356, 359-61 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“each transmission of 

the same credit report is a separate and distinct tort to which a new statue of limitation applied”) 

(citing Hyde v. Hibernia, 861 F.2d 446, 450 (5th Cir. 1988)). Thus, since Plaintiff has established 

FCRA violations in 2000, 2001 and 2002, her claims are cognizable and timely. 

 Furthermore, the facts that lay outside of the FCRA’s two-year statute of limitations are

not irrelevant to this lawsuit. Although they may not constitute damages under the FCRA, these 

facts are relevant to show the origins of the civil judgment; when and how Ms. Lawrence learned 

of the inaccurate reporting of the judgment; the history of disputes and notices that she sent

directly to TU; TU’s faulty procedures in dealing with a repeated dispute case, such as this one; 

TU’s lack of procedures in retaining records and forwarding relevant records to the furnishers of

information; as well as other relevant matters. The Third Circuit has already held that facts 

outside of the limitations period may be admitted in an FCRA case, even though damages 

outside of the limitations period may not be recovered. Philbin, 101 F.3d at 968 n.7 (in FCRA 

case, consumer could use evidence of incidents that occurred outside of limitations period to

satisfy burden of proof on timely claims); see also Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 

95, 111 (3d Cir. 1999) (evidence of events that occurred well outside of limitations period are 

admissible in sexual harassment case to satisfy burden for timely claims). Recognizing this, this 

case, TU has not moved to preclude such evidence (the motion in limine deadline set in the 

Court’s most recent scheduling order was May 21, 2003. (See Court’s Order Extending 

Deadlines of March 21, 1003 is attached hereto as Exhibit N). 

Finally, the evidence dating back to 1997 is relevant and admissible with respect to 

Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law (CPL) claim, which has a six-year statute of

28 

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limitations. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5527(6); Gabriel v. O’Hera, 534 A.2d 488 (Pa. Super. 1987). TU 

argues that the CPL has only a two-year statute of limitations – but cites only to cases where the 

CPL was applied in the fraud context. Here, Plaintiff is not claiming fraud. Rather, Plaintiff 

alleges that by reporting false credit information, whether negligently or willfully, TU was

engaging in an unfair and deceptive trade practice. Since this is not a fraud claim, the six-year 

statute of limitations applies. Accordingly, evidence and damages stemming from six years 

prior to the filing of the July 3, 2003 Complaint should be considered by the factfinder for this 

claim. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5527(6) 

D. There Is A Genuine Issue of Material Fact That TU Violated The FCRA By 

Failing To Investigate Ms. Lawrence’s Disputes Of Inaccurate Information

And By Failing To Use Reasonable Procedures To Assure Maximum Possible

Accuracy Of Credit Information It Disseminated About Her 

Through documents and deposition testimony, Ms. Lawrence clearly has demonstrated 

that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to her claims that TU failed to appropriately

investigate her repeated credit disputes and failed to use reasonable procedures to assure the

maximum possible accuracy of the information that it reported about her concerning the $2,951 

civil judgment. Thus, Plaintiff survives summary judgment on her claims against TU for 

violation of FCRA sections 1681i and 1681e(b). 

1. A Reasonable Jury Could Find That TU Violated Section 1681i Of 

The FCRA 

 

Section 1681i of the FCRA requires credit reporting agencies such as TU to perform an

investigation if a consumer disputes any item of information contained in their credit report. 15 

U.S.C. 1681i(a)(1)(A).18 The FCRA provides that consumer reporting agency must review all 

 

18 The term “investigation” is not defined by the FCRA. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word

“investigation” as “to follow up step by step by patient inquiry and observation. To trace and track; to search into; 

to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of

evidence . . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary at 740 (5th Ed). Nothing that TU did in this case even remotely resembles 

29 

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relevant information concerning a dispute sent to it by the consumer, and forward all such

information to the credit furnisher. See 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(2)(A)(emphasis added). If after the 

investigation “an item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be

verified [as accurate], the consumer reporting agency shall promptly delete that item of 

information from the consumer’s file or modify that item of information, as appropriate, based 

on the results of the reinvestigation.” 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(5)(A). The standard is no different if 

the credit item being disputed is a civil judgment. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 

280, 286 (7th Cir. 1994) (failure to inquire as to plaintiff’s disputes about state court judgment 

docket a violation of 1681i); Betts v. Equifax, 245 F. Supp.2d 1130, 1135 (W.D. Wash. 2003) 

(FCRA imposes duty to investigate accuracy of public records and to go beyond face of public 

record when consumer disputes same). 

As stated above, sections 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA impose liability against a credit 

reporting agency that violates this section. 15 U.S.C. 1681n and 1681o. Section 1681i claims in 

the overwhelming number of cases present jury questions and are not appropriate for summary 

judgment. See Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F. 3d 220, 225 (3d. Cir. 1997); Henson v. 

CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Following the holdings of several other circuit courts from around the country, the Third 

Circuit in Cushman clarified a credit reporting reporting agency’s duties under section 1681i. In 

Cushman, TU argued that section 1681i as a matter of law does not require credit reporting 

agencies to do more than “confirm the accuracy of the information [that it is reporting] with the 

original source of the information.” Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 224. The Third Circuit rejected this 

interpretation, noting that the duty to investigate “falls squarely” on the credit reporting agencies 

 such an understanding of “investigation.” 

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and the “grave responsibilities” that credit reporting agencies bear to ensure the accuracy of the

information that they report. Id. at 225. Further, the Third Circuit found that credit reporting 

agencies cannot simply mimic or “parrot” information from the sources of information in 

performing section 1681i investigations: 

The FCRA evinces Congress’s intent that consumer reporting 

agencies, having the opportunity to reap profits through the 

collection and dissemination of credit information, bear “grave 

responsibilities,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4), to ensure the accuracy of 

that information. The “grave responsibility” imposed by section 

1681i(a) must consist of something more than merely parroting 

information received from other sources. Therefore, a 

“reinvestigation” that merely shifts the burden back to the 

consumer and the credit grantor cannot fulfill the obligations 

contemplated by the statute. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

In so opining, the Third Circuit simply turned to and followed the rulings of other Circuit

Courts from around the country which have also found that a credit reporting agency’s mere 

parroting or mimicking process criticized in Cushman falls far short of the type of 

“investigation” required by section 1681i of the FCRA, and creates a factual issue precluding 

summary judgment. See Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1994) (failure 

to inquire as to plaintiff’s disputes about state court judgment docket a violation of 1681i); 

Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993) (only sending CDV forms to plaintiff’s

creditors and not calling them constituted a violation of the FCRA); Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 

1258, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1986) (where plaintiff had personal dispute with manager of credit 

grantor, contacting manager only was unreasonable); Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 79 (6th 

Cir. 1982) (merely making two calls to plaintiff’s creditors insufficient investigation); see also

Curtis v. Trans Union, Nos. 02-C-207, 02-C-208, 2002 WL 31748838 * 5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 

2002) (again rejecting TU’s argument that merely reporting what credit furnisher provides is 

31 

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insufficient in context of investigation); Richardson v. Fleet Bank of Mass., 190 F. Supp.2d 81, 

88 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting that mere parroting is insufficient and that reasonableness of 1681i 

investigation usually is question for jury). 

In Cushman, the Third Circuit reversed summary judgment for TU, finding that a 

reasonable jury could have found for Cushman based on this evidence. The Court held that 

whether a credit reporting agency will be liable under section 1681i of the FCRA for failing to 

properly investigate a consumer’s dispute will depend on a number of factual issues, including 

the efforts taken by the agency, and presents a jury question not appropriate for summary 

judgment: 

We hold that in order to fulfill its obligation under section 1681i(a) 

“a credit reporting agency may be required, in certain 

circumstances, to verify the accuracy of its initial source of 

information.” (citations omitted) We further hold that “whether the 

credit reporting agency has a duty to go beyond the original source 

will depend” on a number of factors. (citation omitted). One of 

these is “whether the consumer has alerted the reporting agency to

the possibility that the source may be unreliable or the reporting 

agency itself knows or should know that the source is unreliable.” 

(citation omitted) A second factor is “the cost of verifying the 

accuracy of the source versus the possible harm inaccurately

reported information may cause the consumer.” (citation omitted). 

Whatever considerations exist, it is for “the trier of fact [to] weigh 

these factors in deciding whether [the defendant] violated the 

provisions of section 1681i.” 

Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 227 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

Thus, more often than not, claims brought pursuant to 1681i will not be appropriate for

summary judgment as they present factual issues relating to the conduct of the defendant credit

reporting agency. This is such a case, and presents more compelling facts than Cushman. 

Plaintiff has produced a plethora of facts that demonstrate that TU violated section 1681i. She 

has produced evidence that she send multiple disputes to TU challenging the reporting of the 

32 

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$2,951 judgment. She has also produced evidence that she actually sent a copy of the docket and

TU rejected it. Any cursory review by a TU employee of the actual court record would have

revealed that the judgment was not against her, but actually in her favor. Further, Plaintiff has

produced evidence that TU never even forwarded the docket to the very company that it 

contracted to assist it with disputes, a clear violation of the FCRA. 

Even though the FCRA places the duty to investigate consumer dispute on the credit

reporting agency, and even though TU received Ms. Lawrence’s numerous disputes since 1997,

TU still does no know, to this day, whether Ms. Lawrence has a judgment against her or in her 

favor. Ms. Little, the head of TU’s investigations department in Pennsylvania, testified that TU 

simply reported what Superior told it to report. (Little Dep. at 69-70). Indeed, no one at TU ever 

went to the Municipal Court or ever saw a copy of the judgment. (Little Dep. at 120-21). TU 

does not even know whether Superior ever went to the Municipal Court or has ever seen a copy 

of the judgment. (Id.). TU simply knows that it paid Superior $0.40 for the judgment 

information and $5 for the investigation. This head-in-the-sand pass-the-buck attitude could 

certainly lead a jury to find that TU negligently failed to investigate her dispute. 

Moreover, TU’s lack of knowledge defense means that it did not fulfill its statutory duty 

to conduct a proper investigation and discover the true status of the credit information in dispute 

from the “original source.” See 16 C.F.R. Part 600, § 611(2) (credit bureau must investigate 

with original source). TU’s blind adherence to information that Superior (a secondary source)

allegedly was supplying to it is precisely what the Third Circuit held constitutes an inadequate 

investigation. As explained by Cushman, a consumer reporting agency’s mere parroting of 

information supplied by a credit furnisher does not fulfill the obligations imposed by 1681i. See

Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 225; see also Curtis v. Trans Union, Nos. 02-C-207, 02-C-208, 2002 WL

33 

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31748838 * 4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2002) (finding that even factually correct information may be 

“inaccurate” for FCRA purposes where such information may be misleading to a party reviewing

the consumer’s credit report). 

Moreover, TU in this case had a very good reason to doubt the reliability of Superior’s 

report that the $2,951 judgment was against Ms. Lawrence. Namely, Ms. Lawrence sent to TU 

on multiple occasions the Municipal Court docket that showed that she actually won that

judgment. Rather than treating the docket sheet as a cause to dig deeper into the issue and 

investigate, TU simply rejected the document because it was not “stamped,” and never even told

Ms. Lawrence that it was rejecting it. A reasonable jury could find that TU had reason to doubt 

the reliability of the information it was reporting and should have conducted and independent 

and thorough investigation. 

Nor is there any cost that TU incurred here that outweighs the harm suffered by Ms. 

Lawrence. To the contrary, the evidence of record demonstrates that TU’s representatives,

charged with processing 10 to 14 disputes per hour, spent only a few minutes in dealing with Ms. 

Lawrence’s repeated disputes and never so much as picked up a telephone to call Ms. Lawrence, 

Superior, the Philadelphia Municipal Court or any other party that could have shed more light on 

the nature of Plaintiff’s dispute. The labor cost to TU was probably not even $2. Additionally,

TU passed off its duty to go to the courthouse and investigate the dispute with the original source 

of the judgment to its vendor, Superior, for a cost of $5 per investigation. The cost to Ms.

Lawrence, one the other hand, is significant, including the inability to use and obtain credit,

increased cost of credit, in addition to compensable humiliation, embarrassment and frustration.19

 

19 See footnote 16 (emotional distress, damage to reputation, credit denial damages

compensable under FCRA). 

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Accordingly, Plaintiff may proceed to trial with her Section 1681i claims. 

2. A Reasonable Jury Could Find That TU Violated Section 1681e(b) Of 

The FCRA 

As for Plaintiff’s claims for negligent violation of section 1681e(b), Plaintiff has also 

presented that a genuine issue of material fact exists for many of the same reasons outlined 

above. 

Section 1681e(b) provides: 

Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer

report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum

possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual 

about whom the report relates. 

15 U.S.C. §1681e(b) (emphasis added). To proceed with a claim for violation of section 

1681e(b), a plaintiff need only show that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the 

defendant issued credit reports about the plaintiff that were inaccurate. Philbin v. Trans Union 

Corporation, 101 F. 3d 957 (3d. Cir. 1996). In Philbin, the Third Circuit clarified a plaintiff’s 

burden of proof in 1681e(b) case, and which cases must be submitted to a factfinder. 

The Third Circuit held that once a plaintiff has “demonstrated inaccuracies in his credit 

report, a defendant can only prevail on summary judgment if it can produce evidence that

demonstrates as a matter of law that the procedures it followed were reasonable.” Philbin, 101 

F. 3d at 965. The Third Circuit looked to the cases of Guimond, supra, and Cahlin v. General 

Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1991) and arrived at the conclusion that the 

mere fact the defendant TRW had issued two credit reports with inaccurate information was 

“sufficient to permit a jury to infer that TRW did not follow reasonable procedures” in violation 

of section 1681e(b). Philbin, 101 F. 3d at 966; see also Boris v. Choicepoint Servs., Inc., No. 

A3:01 cv 342, 2003 WL 1255891 *2 (W.D. Ky. March 14, 2003) (noting that section 1681(e)(b) 

35 

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claims under FCRA typically are also questions for jury). As a result of this finding, the Third 

Circuit reversed the district court’s granting of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s section 

1681e(b) claim. 

Here, TU repeatedly issued credit reports about the Plaintiff that contained inaccurate

information. As discussed in detail above, TU failed to remove the false judgment from Ms.

Lawrence’s credit report for almost six years. Within the two years prior to the filing of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, TU’s credit report was published to numerous third parties, including 

Chase bank and Plaintiff’s existing creditors. These publications of inaccurate credit reports are 

sufficient to establish Ms. Lawrence’s section 1681e(b) claim.

Moreover, a reasonable jury could find that TU has not put reasonable procedures in 

place to assure maximum possible accuracy in reporting Plaintiff’s credit information for several

other reasons. For example, a reasonable jury could find that TU’s policy of not accepting an 

unstamped court document is unreasonable. In that vain, a reasonable jury could find that TU

was, at a minimum, negligent for failing to inform Ms. Lawrence that it was rejecting her

unstamped document. Had a TU investigator simply called Ms. Lawrence and told her what 

kind of document TU specifically required, perhaps years of defamation, anxiety and harm to

Plaintiff’s credit could have been avoided. As TU’s Eileen Little testified, however, as a matter 

of practice TU simply never calls consumers in connection with their disputes. (See Little Dep. 

in Jaramillo at 120). 

Additionally, a reasonable jury could find that TU has no proper procedures in place to 

deal with a disputes that goes on for years, such as the one in this case. TU admittedly has no

records of the history of disputes by Ms. Lawrence over the same false credit information dating 

back for more than six years. A reasonable jury could find that in cases of repeated disputes, 

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such as this one, Defendant should maintain some history of the credit file. TU states that it does 

not keep documents for significantly longer than the two year FCRA statute of limitations. To 

Plaintiff’s knowledge, there exists no prohibition against keeping documents for a longer period.

Even if it does not keep documents, TU certainly could have procedures to simply keep a history 

of particular consumer disputes on its computer database, so that it can be alerted of a repeated 

problem when it receives the consumer’s next dispute. 

Thus, the facts of this case present an issue of fact for the jury as to whether TU’s 

procedures assured maximum possible accuracy in the reporting of Ms. Lawrence’s credit 

information. 

3. A Reasonable Jury Could Find That Plaintiff Suffered Damages 

Under the FCRA, a plaintiff may recover actual damages and attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681o(a). For proving a willful violation, a plaintiff may also recover statutory damages of up

to $1,000 as well as punitive damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). Under the FCRA, denial of credit, 

emotional and mental distress and anguish, damage to credit reputation, humiliation,

embarrassment and frustration are specifically compensable. See Boris v. Choicepoint Servs., 

Inc., No. A 3:01 cv 342, 2003 WL 1255891 (W.D. Ky. March 14, 2003) ($100,000 in emotional 

distress damages appropriate under FCRA); Thomas v. Trans Union, (D. Or. 2002) ($300,000 in 

compensatory damages for emotional distress and $5 million for punitive damages, remitted to

$1 million); see also Dalton v. capital Assoc. Indus., 257 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2001) (damages for

loss of reputation are available under FCRA); Guimond v. Trans Union, 45 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 

1995) (humiliation and mental distress damages available under FCRA); Thompson v. San 

Antonio Retail Merchants Ass’n, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982) ($10,000 actual damages for 

humiliation and mental distress even when no out-of-pocket expenses); Jones v. Credit Bureau of

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Huntington, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 1990) (jury award of $4,000 compensatory $42,500 

punitive upheld); Morris v. Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, 563 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Ohio 1983) 

(nervousness, irritation and loss of sleep compensable under FCRA). Courts generally recognize 

such damages without the need for expert medical testimony. See Boris, 2003 WL 1255891 *5-

7; see also Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. 

Here, TU contends, with a proverbial straight face, that Ms. Lawrence has suffered no 

damage. This contention is false. As demonstrated by documents produced in litigation and in 

deposition testimony, Ms. Lawrence has cognizable damages in this case. Specifically, Ms. 

Lawrence was denied a credit card by Chase in July of 2001 solely because of the inaccurate 

judgment reporting on her TU credit report. This alone would allow Ms. Lawrence to proceed to 

trial on damages. However, Ms. Lawrence also lost potential credit opportunities, as she was 

embarrassed to apply for credit because of the judgment. Additionally, Ms. Lawrence suffered 

non-economic harm in the form of emotional distress and damages to her reputation and dignity. 

Indeed, Ms. Lawrence had to deal with the humiliation of walking around for years with the 

“disposition” (i.e., the court docket) of her Philadelphia Municipal Court case, hanging like an 

albatross around her neck. (See Counter-Statement of Facts, Sections II.B & G, supra,) 

Accordingly, there is more than enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether Ms. Lawrence suffered damages. Accordingly, Plaintiff should be permitted 

to proceed to trial. 

E. TU Willfully Violated the FCRA, And Ms. Lawrence Is Therefore Permitted 

To Proceed To Trial On Her Punitive Damages And Common Law Claims

As far as FCRA cases go, this is one that justifies the submission of punitive damages to 

the jury. The evidence of record demonstrates that TU recklessly violated the FCRA. As a 

result, Ms. Lawrence may also proceed with her common law claims for defamation, negligence 

38 

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and invasion of privacy/false light.20 

To show “willfulness” under the FCRA (which would justify both punitive damages and 

allow Plaintiff to proceed with her common law claims), a plaintiff need not show malice, but 

only that the credit reporting agency “knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious 

disregard for the rights of others.” Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 227.21 Such conscious disregard may 

be found when a credit reporting agency adopts a policy either knowing it to be in “contravention 

of the rights possessed by consumers under the FCRA or in reckless disregard for whether the 

policy contravenes those rights.” Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 227. 

Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated a “reckless disregard” for Ms. Lawrence’s rights in at 

least three ways. First, TU flatly ignores the FCRA’s requirement of providing the entity 

furnishing the information “all relevant information” regarding the consumer’s dispute, as 

provided by 15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(2)(A). Specifically, the FCRA provides: 

Before the expiration of the 5-business-day period beginning on 

the date on which a consumer reporting agency receives notice of a 

dispute from any consumer . . . the agency shall provide 

notification of the dispute to any person who provided any item of 

information in dispute, at the address and in the manner established 

with the person. The notice shall include all relevant information

regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the 

consumer. 

15 U.S.C. 1681i(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 

 

20 TU does not challenge the merits of Plaintiff’s common law claims; it only argues that Ms. Lawrence 

cannot show willfulness. Moreover, and contrary to TU’s contention, Plaintiff has not “abandoned” these common

law claims through its “pretrial.” (See TU’s Memo. of Law at 9). Rather, in its Pre-Trial Memorandum, Ms. 

Lawrence continued to argue that she is bringing this case under the FCRA and “and various other state laws.” 

Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum at 1. The fact that Plaintiff did not submit jury instructions on all of her state law 

claims is only a consequence of the limitations placed by this Court on the number of jury instructions that each 

party may submit, and not an abandonment of her state law claims. 

21 Although the term “willful” is not defined in the FCRA, case law has held that neither malice nor evil

motive need be established for a finding of “willfulness” to be made. See Stevenson v. TRW, Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 294 

(5th Cir.1993) (citing Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir.1983)). Many courts 

have noted that “willful” under the Act is demonstrated by a showing of “knowingly and intentionally committed an

act in conscious disregard for the rights of others.” See id. at 293 (citing Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th

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Here, TU did not forward the documentation (the Municipal Court docket) that Ms. 

Lawrence sent it supporting her dispute to Superior (not even her letters characterizing the 

inaccuracy). TU’s Group Manager of Consumer Relations, Eileen Little (who oversees TU’s 

consumer investigations department), testified that TU never sends the customers dispute or 

supporting documentation to the credit furnisher: 

 17 Q. If the consumer sends some type of 

 18 documentation along with their dispute, is that 

 19 documentation forwarded to the furnisher?

 20 A. No. 

 21 Q. Ever?

 22 A. No. 

(Little Dep. in Evantash at 58); (Little Dep. at 116) (same in this case). This conduct constitutes

an intentional violation of the law, and, at a minimum, a reckless disregard for the right of 

consumers. A reasonable jury could certainly find that TU’s conscious procedure in not 

forwarding documentation to credit finishers fails to assure maximum possible accuracy. Had

Superior only seen the Municipal Court docket submitted by Ms. Lawrence to TU, the entire 

misreporting problem could have been solved. At a minimum, Superior could have taken a 

second look at its initial reporting of the judgment. In failing to forward documentation to 

Superior, TU intentionally violated the FCRA, and paid no regard to Ms. Lawrence’s rights. 

Second, TU knowingly misled Plaintiff into believing that it was verifying the accuracy 

of the $2,951 judgment with the Philadelphia Municipal Court, when in fact TU never contacted 

the Municipal Court and does not know whether anyone ever contacted the Municipal Court on 

its behalf.

22 TU’s head of consumer investigations, Eileen Little, testified as follows: 

 Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022 (1987)); Cushman, 115 F. 3d at 227. 22 TU argues that Plaintiff’s argument that TU “misidentified the identity of the source of the public record” 

should be barred because it constitutes a “new claim,” not previously asserted by Plaintiff. (See TU’s Memo. of 

Law at 12). This argument is absurd. First, Plaintiff’s argument is not that TU misidentified the source of the 

public records. Rather, Plaintiff’s argument is that TU misled her into believing that it was actually verifying the 

40 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 40 of 53
 11 Q. As you sit here today, do you 

 12 know whether or not at any time since 1997 

 13 Superior Information Services ever 

 14 contacted either the Philadelphia Municipal 

 15 Court, the Philadelphia County Records, or 

 16 the City of Philadelphia concerning Ms. 

 17 Lawrence's disputes?

 

 18 A. I don't know that. 

(Little Dep. at 121). Dispute not knowing what, if anything, Philadelphia Municipal Court 

judgment records showed about Ms. Lawrence, TU kept on responding to Ms. Lawrence’s 

disputes by telling her that the Municipal Court in Philadelphia at “34 South 11th Street” was 

reporting the judgment against her. TU never disclosed to Plaintiff that its information about the 

judgment was coming second-hand through Superior. As a result, Ms. Lawrence did the only 

thing that she could do – which was to go the Municipal Court to try to resolve this matter. As 

discussed in detail under Section II.E supra, Ms. Lawrence got the run-around from the 

Municipal Court and City because, naturally, they did no know what she was talking about: 

 Page 24 

 20 A. For one thing I went to the 

 21 judge's office, I saw an aide, I wasn't

 22 allowed to see the judge to see if he 

 23 couldn't pull up records giving me

 24 something to prove how he ruled in the 

 

 Page 25 

 

 1 case. I went to numerous different offices 

 2 downtown where they shuttled me from one 

 3 place to another trying to get more 

 4 information about how to clear this up or 

 judgment with the Municipal Court. Moreover, this is not a “new claim,” or a claim at all. Plaintiff’s claims are the 

same as the ones that she asserted in her Complaint on July 3, 2002. (A true and accurate copy of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit O). In paragraphs 26-31 of that Complaint, Plaintiff pled that TU violated 

FCRA sections 1681i and 1681(e)(b) in a willful manner. The argument raised by Plaintiff in support of her 

willfulness claim is not a new claim, but rather an argument in support of willfulness based on the evidence of

record. Accordingly, TU’s waiver claim must be rejected. 

41 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 41 of 53
 5 get the document that I needed to prove how 

 6 the case was ruled on in my favor. I went 

 7 to the prothonotary's office, I've never 

 8 seen so many rude people in all my life and 

 9 got no satisfaction. 

 

 10 Q. Was this in January?

 

 11 A. Honestly I have no idea when it 

 12 was. I think it was over a period of 

 13 time. I don't think I did all these things 

15 at once. 

 . . . . 

 22 THE WITNESS: You know what, it's 

 23 hard to recall because I went to more than 

25 a few places downtown. The one day, like I 

 

 Page 51 

 1 said, I was shuttled from one office to 

 2 another because nobody knew where I should 

 3 go. . . . 

(Lawrence at 24-25, 50-51). Thus, without ever being told the truth about who TU was actually 

“verifying” the judgment with, Ms. Lawrence was mislead into one dead end after another. This 

type of false disclosure by TU clearly was knowing and willful and shows an utter disregard for 

Plaintiff’s rights to have a proper investigation into her dispute and to get an honest answer as to 

the results of the investigation under FCRA section 1681i. 

Finally, TU has acted recklessly in purchasing (for $0.40) and publishing (for a period of 

years) a civil judgment that it admittedly knows nothing about. Although such an entry on a 

consumer’s credit report can be devastating, TU’s head of consumer investigations cavalierly 

admits that as of May 2003, TU still does not know one way or the other whether this judgment 

was for or against Ms. Lawrence. (See Little Dep. at 69-70, 119-121). Thus, despite the long 

history of disputes as well as the present litigation in this case, TU still does not know that Ms. 

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Lawrence won her small claims case in 1996 and that the Municipal Court properly entered the 

judgment in her favor, and not against her. Nevertheless, TU maintains that Ms. Lawrence 

cannot set forth an FCRA section 1681(e)(b) claim because it employs procedures that assure 

“maximum possible accuracy” in the reporting of consumer credit information. 

These facts establish that TU knowingly and regularly disregard the FCRA’s 

requirements. Thus, Plaintiff may be permitted to proceed with her punitive damages and 

common law claims at trial. 

E. Plaintiff’s CPL Claim Is Not Preempted By The FCRA 

TU’s challenge to Ms. Lawrence’s CPL claims is its unfounded and unsupportable legal 

argument that the FCRA somehow preempts this Pennsylvania statutory cause of action. As TU 

has not challenged the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s evidence or factual support for her CPL claims, 

Plaintiff confines her response to demonstrating that the FCRA does not provide any such 

preemption of CPL claims. Plaintiff has stated a cause of action against TU for violation of the 

CPL. 

TU misguidedly attacks Ms. Lawrence’s CPL claims using two dissimilar, yet equally

flawed arguments. TU first argues that the FCRA does not provide Plaintiff with a private cause

of action for violation of the CPL, focusing exclusively section 1681s of the FCRA. (TU’s 

Memo. of Law at 22). The availability of Plaintiff’s private cause of action, however, is 

grounded in the CPL and Pennsylvania caselaw, not the FCRA. The FCRA merely provides that 

a violation of it constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice; as discussed below, the CPL 

and relevant caselaw provide that such a violation provides a remedy. 

TU’s second argument is that the FCRA preempts Plaintiff’s CPL claims. While more 

pertinent than its first argument, it is equally untenable. The plain reading of the FCRA does not 

43 

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in any way preempt Ms. Lawrence’s CPL claims, and all of the relevant authority and analysis 

holds otherwise. 

1. Violation of The FCRA Constitutes Violation of The CPL 

The relevant issue is not whether the FCRA provides for a private cause of action under 

the CPL, but whether it forbids it on preemption grounds or otherwise. As Plaintiff demonstrates 

below, the CPL and supporting Pennsylvania caselaw provide consumers with a cause of action 

under the CPL for violation of the FCRA. 

Contrary to TU’s assertions, the fact that there is no Pennsylvania case directly holding 

that a plaintiff may state a CPL claim in an FCRA case does not justify its contention that this 

case raises an issue of first impression. In Pennsylvania, courts have found that a violation of

any consumer protection statute presents a claim under the CPL. The CPL and Unfair and 

Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) statutes of the fifty states were modeled after the 

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. and the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., and prohibit unfair practices in any trade or commerce. 73 P.S. §§ 201 et

seq.; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 

329 A.2d 812 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974). Moreover, credit and banking activities are within the

purview of “trade or commerce.” See Pennsylvania Bankers Ass’n. v. Commonwealth, 58 Pa. 

Commw. 170, 427 A.2d 730 (1981). Further, it is well established in Pennsylvania jurisprudence 

that the violation of any consumer protection statute most often constitutes a per se CPL

violation. See, e.g. Gabriel v. O’Hara, 368 Pa. Super. 383, 534 A.2d 488 (1987) (violation of 

Unfair Insurance Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act and Pennsylvania’s usury 

laws constitute violations of the CPL); King v. Rubin, 35 Phila. 571 (Phila. C.P. 1998) (violation 

of Real Estate Licensing Act is a violation of the CPL); Deetz v. Nationwide Insurance 

44 

Case 2:02-cv-04440-AB Document 26 Filed 07/10/2003 Page 44 of 53
Company, 20 D. & C. 3d 499 (Mercer C.P. 1989) (violation of Unfair Insurance Practices Act a 

violation of CPL); see also In re Koresko, 91 B.R. 689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (violation of 

Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act found to be a violation of CPL); In re Russell, 72 B.R. 855 

(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (same). 

This principle is especially true in a situation like the case at bar where the underlying 

consumer protection statute (i.e. FCRA) explicitly states that a violation is deemed to be an

unfair trade practice. See, e.g. McClelland v. Hyundai Motor Company America, 851 F. Supp. 

680 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (violation of Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law explicitly states that a violation of

it is a CPL violation). Violation of federal consumer credit protection statutes such as the FCRA 

equally present violations of the CPL, not just violations of state laws. See Commonwealth ex rel 

Zimmerman v. Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C. 3d 115 (Mercer C.P. 1983) (violation of the Truth in 

Lending Act, a component of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, along with 

the FCRA, presents a violation of the CPL). The statutes providing the basis for the CPL causes 

of action in these cases are not anomalies. The FCRA should be treated no differently. 

While it has not yet been discussed in Pennsylvania caselaw, the issue of the FCRA’s 

cognoscibility as a consumer protection law that creates a cause of action under a state’s CLP has 

been addressed elsewhere. The Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, has 

specifically addressed this issue, finding that violation of the FCRA and California’s state credit 

reporting statute presented a violation of its version of the CPL (i.e. its version of the FTC 

UDAP statute). Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, 39 Cal. App. 4th 548, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 (1995), 

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1074 (1996) (violation of state and federal fair credit reporting statutes is a 

per se violation of California unfair trade practices statute). Not surprisingly, the Cisneros court 

followed the same logic employed by Pennsylvania courts in the above-referenced cases to find 

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that the defendant’s violation of the FCRA and state credit reporting laws amounted to an 

unlawful business practice. Although every state UDAP statute varies somewhat, the California 

statute at issue in Cisneros presented no significant difference from the Pennsylvania’s CPL as 

far as its finding that the defendant’s violation of the FCRA amounted to a violation of that law. 

Here, Ms. Lawrence alleges that TU violated the CPL by negligently and willfully

violating sections 1681e(b) and 1681i of the FCRA. In the FCRA, Congress explicitly provided 

that a violation of these sections constitutes an unfair practice. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a)(1). With

this mandate, and pursuant to Pennsylvania law, there is no question that Plaintiff has stated a

cause of action for the CPL. TU has not raised any challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 

evidence or even whether the conduct complained of rises to a CPL violation. Instead, it argues 

that section 1681s(a)(1) provides for administrative enforcement only, and that it does not 

provide a private cause of action. This is correct, but like the other consumer protection laws

forming the basis for Plaintiff’s CPL claim in Gabriel, King, McClellan, and Nickel, supra, the

FCRA would not provide for a remedy for another state’s law. The remedy for Plaintiff’s CPL

claim does not originate in the FCRA, only the declaration that TU’s practice is unlawful. 

Plaintiff’s remedy at law comes from the CPL. There is no plausible explanation for why a 

violation of the FCRA does not also state a claim for violation of the CPL, as do the other 

consumer protection statutes listed above. 

 2. The FCRA Does Not Preempt Plaintiff’s CPL Claim 

Without significant elaboration or analysis, TU argues that section 1681t(b) of the FCRA 

somehow completely preempts Plainitiff’s CPL claim. This is incorrect. A plain reading of this

section, and a look at the relevant FCRA authority, belie TU’s bald contention. 

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 TU cites Jaramillo v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 356 (E.D. Pa. 

2001) for the proposition that Plaintiff’s CPL claims also are preempted by the FCRA. By its 

own argument, Jaramillo provides no support for TU’s claim as it involved the actions of a

person who furnishes information to a consumer reporting agency, and the specific provision of 

section 1681t(b)(1)(F), which only applies to furnishers. The liability-conferring section for 

furnishers is found in section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. Further, there is no provision in the 

FCRA providing that all state causes of action, whether for violation of a UDAP statute such as

the CPL or otherwise, are fully preempted. TU then seems to recognize this plain fact, and 

nevertheless argues that subsections 1681t(b)(1)(B) and (F) provide for preemption of Plaintiff’s 

CPL claims against credit reporting agencies. They do not, and this position is absolutely

unfounded. 

A plain reading of the FCRA reveals no blanket preemption of UDAP or CPL laws. In 

fact, section 1681t first provides that it does not preempt any state laws imposing obligations on 

any person unless those laws are inconsistent with it, and then only to the extent of the 

inconsistency. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a). When the FCRA was amended in 1996, Congress 

retained this section, but added as an exception to this general rule a specific list of prohibitions 

that may not be imposed by a state. In pertinent part, the following language became codified as

sections 1681t(b)(1)(B) and (F): 

 (b) General exceptions 

No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of 

any State - 

(1) with respect to any subject matter regulated under - 

 . . . . 

(B) section 1681i of this title, relating to the time by which a 

consumer reporting agency must take any action, including the 

notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related 

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to the disputed accuracy of information in a consumer’s file, 

except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any State law in

effect on September 30, 1996; 

(F) section 1681c of this title, relating to information contained in 

consumer reports, except that this subparagraph shall not apply to 

any State law in effect on September 30, 1996; 

 

15 U.S.C. §1681t(b)(1)(B) and (F). 

By its plain language, section 1681t(b)(1)(B) applies only to a state law that imposes a

“requirement or prohibition” on the timeframe by which credit reporting agencies must complete 

investigations of consumer disputes of inaccurate information under section 1681i. Section 

1681t(b)(1)(F) applies only to a state law that imposes a “requirement or prohibition” on the 

types of information that may not be included within a credit report pursuant to section 1681c of

the FCRA. Neither of these apply to Plaintiff’s CPL claims. 

From the outset, the CPL does not impose any obligations or requirements on credit 

reporting agencies; in fact it does not reference them at all. Without a doubt, it certainly does not 

impose any requirements relating to the timing of a credit reporting agency’s investigations of a 

consumer’s dispute and the information that may not appear in a consumer report. Moreover, the 

CPL is not a statute regulating credit reporting; it merely makes actionable certain unfair and/or 

deceptive business practices outlined by the FCRA. It is a general statute proscribing unfair and 

deceptive practices, a legislative product flowing from the Federal Trade Commission’s model 

law, and precedents established under the FTC Act should be relied upon for interpreting the 

CPL. Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974). 

Moreover, the premise of Plaintiff’s FCRA claim does not even concern these specific

matters. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege that TU failed to respond within the thirty (30) day 

timeframe set forth by section 1681i or that it violated section 1681c. Thus, even if TU could 

plausibly argue that Plaintiff’s CPL claim is implicitly premised upon specific violations of the 

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FCRA, it would certainly not involve the subject matters set forth by subsections (B) and (F). 

By its own language, section 1681t(b) preempts only certain subject matter regulated under 

specifically enumerated sections of the FCRA. 

Thus, as the CPL does not address this subject matter, TU seems to be suggesting that 

section 1681t(b) somehow preempts all state law claims against consumer reporting agencies 

other than the torts of defamation, negligence and invasion of privacy specifically permitted by 

section 1681h(e) of the FCRA. This defies contrary authority and the longstanding FCRA 

fundamental principle that it does not preempt state laws as long as the state law is not 

inconsistent with the FCRA. Credit Data of Arizona, Inc. v. State of Arizona, 602 F.2d 195 

(C.A. Ariz. 1979); see also Hughes v. Fidelity Bank, 709 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Pa. 1989). The 

FCRA is designed only to preempt state statutes on those specific credit reporting matters. Other

state statutes would not be preempted. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (a 

general negligent manufacturing claim is outside the category of “requirements” with respect to 

devises such as pacemakers which gives rise to presumption of more specific state laws); 

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (where Congress preempted state law

“requirements or prohibitions” based on smoking and health advertising, even some common 

law remedies were preempted, but claims with respect to express warranties, fraud, 

misrepresentation and conspiracy were not preempted because they were predicated on a general 

standard not to deceive, which is not a duty based on “smoking or health”). 

More specifically, and though it curiously did not reference it, Defendant TU at least is 

aware of recent authority specifically rejecting the total preemption theory of section 1681t(b).

See Watkins v. Trans Union, LLC, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (N.D. Ala. 2000). In Watkins, the 

Northern District of Alabama was confronted with a case originally filed in state court which 

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contained allegations that TU disseminate inaccurate credit information about the plaintiff. The 

complaint failed to identify any specific causes of action or laws. TU removed the case to 

federal court. Its same counsel as in the instant case argued that section 1681t(b) provided for 

complete preemption of plaintiff’s cause of action of action. The Watkins court specifically 

rejected this argument, finding that section 1681t(b) provided only “sharply drawn” exceptions 

to the general rule of section 1681t(a) that only inconsistent state laws are preempted, and 

holding that the leglislative history of the FCRA specifically provides for concurrent state and 

federal jurisdiction. Watkins, 118 F. Supp. at 1222-23. In so ruling, the Watkins noted other 

cases rejecting TU’s argument. See Saia v. Universal Card Services, 2000 Dist. LEXIS 9494, 

2000 WL 863979 (E.D. La. 2000); Rule v. Ford Receivables, 36 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D. W. Va. 

1999); Swecker v. Trans Union, 31 F. Supp. 2d 536 (E.D. Va. 1998). 

Accordingly, there is no question that Plaintiff’s CPL claim does not specifically regulate

a matter left for sole enforcement by the FCRA and that the FCRA does not provide for complete 

preemption. TU has not provided any authority whatsoever to rebut this or any persuasive 

analysis in the absence of such authority. As noted above, Jaramillo provides no authority 

because that case only involved the applicability of section 1681t(b)(1)(F), a specific preemption 

exception broadly removing from state regulation the responsibilities of credit furnishers, not 

credit reporting agencies like TU. Following the rationale of Cisneros, supra, there is no reason 

why Plaintiff may not proceed with his CPL claim. 

Thus, TU’s arguments fails, as Ms. Lawrence has stated claims for violation of the CPL. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should deny Trans Union, LLC’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. 

 Respectfully submitted,

FRANCIS & MAILMAN, P.C. 

BY: ___________________________ 

JAMES A. FRANCIS, ESQUIRE 

MARK D. MAILMAN, ESQUIRE 

JOHN SOUMILAS, ESQUIRE 

Land Title Building, 19th Floor 

100 South Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19110 

(215) 735-8600 

Dated: July 10, 2003 

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