2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-10-2004

Reinert v. Larkins

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-3184

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PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________________

NO. 02-3184

_________________

SCOT A. REINERT,

 Appellant

 v.

DAVID H. LARKINS,

SUPERINTENDENT;

DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF LEHIGH

COUNTY,

JAMES MARTIN; *THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF

PENNSYLVANIA, GERALD

PAPPERT 

*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c) F.R.A.P)

_________________

On Appeal from the United States

District Court For

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 98-cv-05257)

District Judge: Honorable Anita Brody

______________________

Argued May 3, 2004

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and

BECKER, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 10, 2004)

THEODORE SIMON, ESQ. (ARGUED)

Fifth Floor

1600 Market Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Appellant

JAMES B. MARTIN, ESQ. 

District Attorney of Lehigh County

JOAN L. REINSMITH, ESQ.

(ARGUED)

Deputy District Attorney

KELLY B. WALDRON, ESQ.

Office of District Attorney

455 West Hamilton Street

Lehigh County Courthouse

Allentown, PA 18101

Attorneys for Appellees

_________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_________________

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal by Scot A. Reinert

(“Reinert”), a state prisoner serving a

sentence of life imprisonment for first

degree murder, from an order of the

District Court denying his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus, presents two

congeries of issues, one dealing with

Miranda rights, and the other with

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Considering the Miranda issues first, we

must evaluate the admissibility of three

statements made by Reinert when he was

being transported to the hospital by
2

emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”),

accompanied by police officers. The

admissibility of the first two statements—

one to an EMT and the other to an officer,

both of which were given prior to the

administration of an y Miranda

warnings—turns on whether Reinert was

in custody at the time he made the

statements. The admissibility of the third

statement, made to a police officer after a

Miranda warning had been given, depends

on Reinert’s competence at the time to

waive his Miranda rights. Then we must

determine whether Reinert was competent

to waive his Miranda rights when he made

a statement to two detectives at the

hospital following surgery. We do not, of

course, either write or decide on a blank

slate. The record contains fact findings by

the state trial judge following a

suppression hearing, and our decision

making is constrained by the rigorous

standard of review under the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), codified in relevant part at 28

U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255.

We are satisfied that, at the time of

Reinert’s first statement, made to an EMT

when he was being transported to the

hospital for treatment (at which time he

was not a crime suspect and indeed was

considered a possible victim), he was not

in custody, even though a police officer

was present in the ambulance. However,

with respect to the second statement made

in the ambulance to a police officer to

whom Reinert was “turned over” by the

EMT after his first seemingly

incriminating statement, we conclude that

Reinert was in custody and that his preMiranda statement should not have been

admitted. Deference is not due to the state

trial judge’s finding and conclusion to the

contrary because she mistakenly stated that

the second statement was post-Miranda

warning. However, due to the fact that the

statement was duplicative of others

properly received after appropriate

Miranda warnings were administered, we

conclude that the error was harmless. 

Additionally, we are satisfied that when

the post-Miranda statement in the

ambulance and the subsequent (postsurgery) statement was made at the

hospital, Reinert was alert and oriented

and that his waiver of Miranda rights was

voluntary. The state trial court decision, in

accord with these conclusions, was not

based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the state court proceedings, nor was it

contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme

Court. 

The second set of issues before us

stems from Reinert’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel allegedly in violation

of his Sixth Amendment rights. First, he

complains of his state trial counsel’s

failure to call a medical expert to testify at

the suppression hearing as to his alleged

mental and physical inability to voluntarily

and knowingly waive his Miranda rights.

However, our analysis of the record will

show that the expert testimony that Reinert

believed would have helped him would

have made no difference to the merits of
3

his Miranda claim. He also scores his

counsel’s failure to inform him of his right

to testify at the suppression hearing, but

we conclude that this claim too lacks

merit. Reinert has thus failed to

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s actions; moreover the state

court’s conclusions on the issue were not

contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme

Court. 

We will therefore affirm the order of

the District Court denying the petition.

I. Background Facts

On March 10, 1991, responding to a

telephone call during which Reinert made

some rather bizarre statements, his mother

Janet Ketner and her husband rushed to his

home and found him sitting on the first

floor covered in blood, with large, visible

slashes on both wrists. Mr. Ketner called

911, describing Reinert as delirious.

Police and ambulance services soon

arrived. Reinert looked strange, and it was

determined that he had recently attempted

suicide by drinking alcohol, taking

sleeping pills, and slashing his wrists. At

12:11 p.m., Officer Jeffrey Mertz

(“Mertz”) arrived, checked on Reinert and

his parents in the first floor living room,

and then went upstairs to check the

parents’ report of a body on the third floor.

When Mertz reached the third floor, he

found the body of Sean Brady, Reinert’s

long time companion, and determined that

he was dead.

Shortly after Mertz’s arrival, three

more Allentown police officers, Bruce

Zimmerman (“Zimmerman”), Robert

Lembach (“Lembach”), and Brian Brader

(“Brader”), arrived at Reinert’s home,

followed by the EMTs. Law enforcement

officers secured the home. The EMTs

examined Reinert; his blood pressure was

down and his pulse rate was up. The

EMTs helped Reinert to his feet and he

then walked to the ambulance. At this

juncture, Zimmerman was ordered by his

superiors to remain with Reinert and told

“not to let him leave your custody.” 

Reinert was laid on a stretcher inside

the ambulance, had an oxygen mask placed

over his face, was given IVs in his arms,

a n d was hooked up to a n

electrocardiograph. Reinert had been

observed to have lacerations to his wrists

and he complained of an injured ankle.

When he was in the ambulance, the EMTs

noticed multiple lacerations to his

abdomen. Upon discovery of the

abdominal wound, EMT Timothy Snyder

(“Sn yder”) asked Reinert “what

happened?” Reinert responded “I stabbed

him with a butcher knife, then I did

myself.” Snyder at once turned to Officer

Zimmerman and stated, “I think you ought

to step in.” 

Zimmerman then, without advising

Reinert of his Miranda rights, asked him

“what happened?” Reinert responded to

the question by stating, “I think I killed

him. I think I stabbed him.” At that point,

Zimmerman read Reinert his Miranda

rights. See infra note 3. After reading

Reinert his rights, Zimmerman asked him:
4

“And with these rights in mind, do you

wish to talk to us now?” Reinert replied:

“I think I killed him.” When asked whom

he had killed, Reinert responded: “Sean,

Sean Brady,” “with a butcher knife.”

Once at the Lehigh Valley Medical

Center (“LVMC”), Reinert underwent

preparatory treatment for surgery by

Nurses Thomas Gavigan and Patricia

Lombardo. Police officers were ordered

by their superiors to stand guard outside

his room.1 Reinert entered surgery at

approximately 1:15 p.m. Prior to surgery,

Reinert was, of course, anesthetized.

Surgery lasted approximately two and onehalf hours. Reinert lost about half a pint of

blood during the operation; he had also

lost a quart of blood prior to being treated

by the EMTs. Reinert experienced postoperative pain, and was given Robinal, a

sedative and muscle relaxant, at 3:30 p.m,

and Cefoxitan, an antibiotic, at 6:00 p.m.

At 7:47 p.m., Detectives Joseph

Stauffer (“Stauffer”) and Glenn Granitz

(“Granitz”) arrived at the hospital. The

detectives first spoke to the attending

physician, Dr. Homayoun Hashemi (“Dr.

Hashemi”), who testified that he

performed a post-operative check at 7:30

p.m. on Reinert, and found him awake,

coherent, and with stable vital signs. After

conferring with Dr. Hashemi, the

detectives went to see Reinert. They

testified that they found him conscious,

oriented, alert, and responsive. They

proceeded to interview him while he was

laying in the recovery room, wrists and

abdomen bandaged, attached to IVs and

other post-operative equipment. They first

read him his Miranda rights. The two

detectives present differing accounts as to

how Reinert responded to the question:

“Do you waive these [Miranda] rights?”

Stauffer stated that Reinert answered the

question verbally with a “yes,” whereas

Granitz said that Reinert merely nodded

his head. Both detectives, however,

agreed that Reinert clearly communicated

to them his decision to waive his Miranda

rights.

The detectives then questioned him for

forty-five minutes, during which Reinert

stated that he had obtained a knife, had

gone to see Sean Brady, who was in bed,

and stabbed him. Reinert’s chart

indicated no abnormality with regard to his

ability to answer questions appropriately.

Dr. Hashemi also testified that the first

administration of medication for pain,

spec ifically morphine, was no t

administered to the defendant until 10:00

 

1Zimmerman asked Gavigan prior to

Reinert’s treatment, at the doors of the

trauma room, “to note down anything

that Reinert said which may be of use to

him.” During this surgical preparation,

Gavigan asked Reinert some questions,

to which Reinert responded that he had

been fighting with his friend with a

knife, they had fallen off the bed and that

he, the friend, might have done this. 

Reinert also acknowledged he might

have wounded himself, and that he had

fallen down the stairs. However,

Reinert’s response to the nurse is not at

issue on appeal.
5

p.m. We will amplify this factual

background in our discussion of the

procedural history and the merits issues,

infra.

II. Procedural History

On or about March 10, 1991, Reinert

was arrested and charged with the criminal

homicide of Sean Brady. Pre-trial

motions, including motions to suppress

physical evidence and statements, were

heard before Judge Carol K. McGinley of

the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh

County. After a hearing, the suppression

motions were denied.

 The suppression court made a number

of relevant findings. First, it rejected

Reinert’s claim that his pre-Miranda

statement should be dismissed, finding that

the statement was “volunteered by the

defendant to Paramedic Snyder . . . in

response to a routine question by

paramedic Snyder.” The court further

concluded that:

. . . although the police were

present, there is nothing in the

situation which would lead a

reasonable man to believe that he

was under arrest or in the custody

of the police. The arrival of the

police at the scene was due to a

request made on his behalf by his

mother and her husband, and the

defendant’s transport to the

Hospital Center was voluntary on

his part. The mere fact that police

were present was not in any way

indicative that the defendant was in

their custody. Their presence

would be explained by many

things, including a desire to

interview an important witness or a

desire to protect a potential victim.

We conclude therefore that the

statement made to paramedic

Snyder was not made while the

defendant was in custody and,

furthermore, that it was not made

pursuant to interrogation by police

officers.

Second, the suppression court concluded

that:

The defendant remained

conscious, alert and oriented

throughout his transport to the

hospital. No medication was

administered to him in the care of

the Emergency Medical Service

Unit.

Then, after describing his treatment in the

emergency room, the Court found that

Reinert

. . . remained alert and coherent.

He responded to questions

concerning allergies to medication

and to the approximate time of his

most recent tetanus inoculation. He

indicated he was allergic to

penicillin. Ms. Lombardo observed

that his blood pressure was stable,

that his pulse was providing him

with adequate oxygenation to the

brain, and she performed the

Glasgow coma score to determine
6

his level of consciousness. In all

categories the defendant received

the highest possible score.

Turning to the next phase of the

treatment, the surgery, from which Reinert

returned at approximately 4:05 p.m., the

suppression court found:

At 7:47 p.m. Detective Stauffer

arrived at the hospital with

Detective Granitz. After speaking

to the attending physician, Dr.

Homayoun Hashemi, the detectives

proceeded to interview the patient.

The questioning began at least five

hours after the defendant’s surgery

had been completed.

Detective Stauffer determined

that the patient was conscious and

oriented. He asked him his date of

birth and his social security

number, both of which were later

verified as accurate. He asked him

other questions to determine

whether or not the defendant was

aware of his surroundings and

received satisfactory answers.

After determining that the

defendant was able to be

responsive, Detective Stauffer

advised him of his rights, following

which the defendant said he

understood his rights and he agreed

to speak with the police. Detective

Granitz also asked questions to

determine the capacity of the

defendant, both at the beginning

and the end of the statement.

T h e defen dant, upo n

questioning by Detective Stauffer,

made incriminating statements. In

the course of making these

statements the defendant was

volu ble , and vol unteere d

information not specifically sought

by Detective Stauffer. The

questioning ended at 8:30 p.m.

Dr. Hashemi testified that he

had performed a post-operative

check at 7:30 p.m. on the

defendant, that he had seen that the

defendant was awake, coherent,

and had stable vital signs. His

chart indicated no abnormality with

regard to the defendant’s ability to

answer questions appropriately.

Dr. Hashemi also testified that the

first administration of medication

for pain, specifically morphine, was

not administered to the defendant

until 10:00 p.m.

Immediately following his

statements to the police, the

defendant was seen by his family,

his close friend Cindy Mellinger,

and his mother’s minister. All

testified that he was extremely softspoken at this time.

A jury trial commenced on January 15,

1992, resulting in a verdict of guilty of

murder in the first degree. Reinert was

sentenced to life imprisonment. Timely

post-trial motions were denied as to all

issues on November 15, 1994.

Through new (and present) counsel,

Reinert appealed to the Pennsylvania
7

Superior Court. During that appeal

Reinert raised the issue of the

effectiveness of his trial counsel,

submitting a number of affidavits/letters in

support of his ineffectiveness claim. On

January 23, 1996, the Superior Court

denied relief on all grounds in a

Memorandum Opinion, denying the

ineffectiveness claims without ordering an

evidentiary hearing. Inter alia, the

Superior Court stated:

After reviewing the record, we find

that trial counsel thoroughly crosse xamine d all of th e

C omm onw ealth’s witnesse s

regarding Reinert’s mental and

physical state at the time he was

given Miranda warnings and when

he made statements to both the

police and the medical staff.

Moreover, we note that the

Comm o n w e alth produce d

overwhelming evidence that

Reinert had knowingly and

voluntarily waived his Miranda

rights. Thus, we conclude that trial

counsel was not ineffective for

failing to call medical experts at the

suppression hea ring . See

[Commonwealth v. Williams, 640

A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994)] (counsel was

not ineffective for failing to call

expert witnesses where he

extensively cross-examined police

officer and doctor regarding their

testimony); see als o

Commonwealth v. Logan, 549 A.2d

531 (Pa. 1988) (counsel was not

ineffective for failing to employ

psychiatric te sti m o n y a t

suppression hearing to demonstrate

that defendant’s mental illness

prevented proper waiver of

Miranda rights where evidence

indicated defendant was aware of

nature of right and consequence of

waiver).

The Superior Court also rejected Reinert’s

contention that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel because his attorneys

failed to advise him that he could testify at

the suppression hearing. The Court found

that he established neither what his

testimony would have been, nor how it

would have altered the outcome of the

hearing. There was never an evidentiary

hearing on the ineffectiveness issue, which

was raised for the first time in the

Pennsylvania Superior Court; the Superior

Court rejected that claim on the basis of

the record before it.

A motion for reconsideration and/or

reargument was denied by the Court. A

petition for allowance of appeal and a

petition for reconsideration of denial of

petition for allowance of appeal were filed

and denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court on September 26, 1996, and

December 11, 1996, respectively. A

petition for a writ of certiorari was denied

by the United States Supreme Court on

October 6, 1997. This petition for a writ

of habeas corpus now before us was filed

on October 2, 1998, and was denied by the

District Court on July 8, 2002. A motions

panel of this Court granted a certificate of

appealability (“COA”). Reinert continues

to serve a sentence of life imprisonment
8

for murder. Because Reinert’s claims

were fully adjudicated in state court, we

apply the by now familiar AEDPA

standard of review, which we set forth in

the margin.2

III. Admissibility of Reinert’s

Statements

A. Pre-Miranda Statements to EMT

Snyder and Officer Zimmerman

As we have set forth above, at the time

 

2Although our review of the District

Court’s decision is plenary, Marshall v.

Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 50 (3d Cir.

2002), under AEDPA and the Supreme

Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000), we must deny

federal habeas corpus relief to any claim

which was adjudicated on the merits in a

state court proceeding unless such

adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2). A state

court decision is “contrary to our clearly

established precedent if the state court

applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in our cases . . . .

[or] if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S.

at 405-06. A state court decision

involves “an unreasonable application

of” clearly established federal law if it

“unreasonably applies the law of this

Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” 

Id. at 409. This is an objective test: “[A]

federal habeas court making the

‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should

ask whether the state court’s application

of clearly established federal law was

objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

Moreover, “unreasonable” does not mean

“erroneous.” Thus, “a federal habeas

court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411.

This standard does not apply,

however, to claims that the state courts

did not address on the merits. In such

instances we exercise the pre-AEDPA

standard and “conduct a de novo review

over pure legal questions and mixed

questions of law and fact. . . . However,

the state court’s factual determinations

are still presumed to be correct,

rebuttable upon a showing of clear and

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1).” Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d

203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
9

of his initial statement Reinert was in the

ambulance being tended by the EMTs.

After asking questions about his past

medical history and allergies to

medications, EMT Snyder, in an effort to

find out how the injury to the abdomen

was sustained, asked Reinert what

happened, receiving the response “I

stabbed him with a butcher knife, then I

did myself.” At this point, Snyder notified

Officer Zimmerman and went on with his

treatment. When asked whether he was

paying attention to the conversation taking

place between Officer Zimmerman and

Reinert, Snyder responded: “No, my job is

to administer emergency care, and my

patient is my priority.”

After Snyder asked Zimmerman to step

in, Zimmerman, without advising Reinert

of his Miranda rights, asked him “what

happened?” and Reinert responded to the

question by stating: “I think I killed him.

I think I stabbed him.” At that point,

Zimmerman read Reinert his Miranda

rights. More specifically, Zimmerman

read to Reinert the standard Miranda Card,

the text of which we set forth in the

margin.3 At trial, Zimmerman testified

that the following colloquy ensued.

Q. Did Mr. Reinert respond to this

first question, “did he understand

his right?”

A. As best as he could, yeah, he –

they were working on him and he,

you know, he kind of nodded and

then he said yes, or yeah.

Q. Did he actually vocalize words?

A. Right, yeah.

Q. He said, “yeah”, correct?

A. Correct

Q. And you then asked him a

second question, and what did he

respond then?

A. He basically just said, “I think I

killed him” He didn’t say yes, and

then go on – he just started talking.

Q. And what else did he say, or did

you ask any further questions?

A. Yeah, I said, again, going back

to that first thing, “I think I killed

him, I stabbed him.” I said “Who

did you kill?” And he said, “Sean.”

And I asked, “Sean Brady?”

 

3

“My name is Officer Bruce

Zimmerman of the Allentown Police

Department. I wish to advise you that

you have an absolute right to remain

silent. That anything you say can and

will be used against you in a Court of

law. That you have the right to talk to an

attorney before and have an attorney

present with you during questioning. 

That if you cannot afford to hire an

attorney one will be appointed to

represent you, without charge, before any

questioning, if you so desire. And if you

decide to answer any questions you may

stop at any time you wish. Do you

understand these rights I’ve explained to

you? And with these rights in mind, do

you wish to talk to us now?”
10

and—or he said, “Sean Brady,” I

said, “Is that the gentlemen upstairs

on the third floor?” He said,

“Yes.” I said, “How did you do

it?” He said, “With a butcher

knife.” 

Reinert argues at great length that he

was in custody at the time of the

ambulance statements. His principal

contentions are the following: (1) The

police had entered his home and controlled

it (though they had entered at his mother

and stepfather’s request); (2) the

investigating officers were directed to

accompany Reinert in the ambulance and

keep him in their custody; and (3) the

officers were in close proximity to Reinert

in the ambulance. Reinert contends that

these factors combined in such a way that

a reasonable man in his situation would

not think himself “free to leave.” 

It is not entirely clear from Reinert’s

brief whether he objects to the statement

made to the EMT or only to the one made

to Zimmerman, but we will assume that

objection is made to both. 

1. The pre-Miranda statement to EMT

Snyder

The state trial judge found as follows:

The first statement is that

statement volunteered by the

defendant to paramedic Snyder. At

the time the statement was made, it

was volunteered by the defendant

in response to a routine question by

paramedic Snyder. It was not

solicited by the police.

Furthermore, although the

police were present, there is

nothing in the situation which

would lead a reasonable man to

believe that he was under arrest or

in the custody of the police. The

arrival of the police at the scene

was due to a request made on his

behalf by his mother and her

husband, and the defendant’s

transport to the Hospital Center was

voluntary on his part. The mere

fact that police were present was

not in any way indicative that the

defendant was in their custody.

Their presence could be explained

by many things, including a desire

to interview an important witness

or a desire to protect a potential

victim.

We conclude, therefore, that the

statement made to paramedic

Snyder was not made while the

defendant was in custody, and,

furthermore, that it was not made

pursuant to interrogation by police

officers.

The question, of course, is whether the

state court’s determination that Reinert

was not in custody is contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States, or resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. We do not believe that this

standard is met by Reinert with respect to
11

the statement made to the EMTs. Reinert

was not in custody, nor was he a suspect in

a crime when he entered the ambulance for

the purpose of medical treatment and

transport to the hospital. Although police

officers accompanied Reinert in the

ambulance, at that time officers had the

limited knowledge that a body was found

inside the house and that Reinert appeared

to be wounded. Officers could have

reasonably assumed that Reinert was a

victim who could possibly identify a third

person that may have been in the house.

Snyder stated that police officers regularly

ride with him in the ambulance and that he

requested police officers to accompany

him on this occasion.

Ordinarily, in determining whether an

individual is in custody, the ultimate

inquiry is “whether there is a ‘formal arrest

or restraint on freedom of movement’ of

the degree associated with a formal arrest.”

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125

(1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429

U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). When

the individual has not been openly arrested

when the sta tements are made,

“‘something must be said or done by the

authorities, either in their manner of

approach or in the tone or extent of their

questioning, which indicates they would

not have heeded a request to depart or to

allow the suspect to do so.’” Steigler v.

Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.

1974) (quoting United States v. Hall, 421

F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969)).

Reinert argues that the interrogation in

the ambulance was custodial because he

was never told that he was free to leave or

free not to answer questions. He contrasts

his situation with the one at issue in United

States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740 (3d Cir.

1999), where a postal employee suspected

of having stolen postal funds was found

not to be in custody during the course of

an interrogation where she was told she

was not under arrest, that she would not be

made to go with her questioners when they

left, and during the course of which she

was allowed to take breaks in order to

consult with her union representative.

Reinert argues that unlike in Leese where

the suspect was given ample opportunity to

end questioning and where she was

explicitly told that she was not under

arrest, Reinert was never afforded similar

information or opportunities.

While the difference is real, it is not

dispositive. Had Zimmerman made an

explicit statement to Reinert that he was

not under arrest or that he need not answer

questions, such a statement would surely

have bolstered the governmen t’s

contention that Snyder’s questioning was

non-custodial in nature. However, the

absence of such a statement does not ipso

facto turn questioning into a custodial

interrogation, especially when the

questioning is being done by a medical

professional in the course of providing

routine medical care. See Mathiason, 429

U.S. at 495 (“[P]olice officers are not

required to administer Miranda warnings

to everyone whom they question. Nor is

the requirement of warnings to be imposed

simply because . . . the questioned person

is one whom the police suspect.”) Given

that Reinert was in the ambulance
12

receiving care for an open wound and had

an oxygen mask covering his face, it seems

unlikely that he could or would have left

the EMTs’ care, even if Zimmerman had

told him that he was at liberty to do so.

Under those circumstances, an explanation

that he was not required to answer

questions would have no doubt been more

meaningful and more appropriate.

However, as we explained above, such a

statement, while helpful to determine the

custodial nature of the interrogation, is not

required to render an interrogation noncustodial.

More to the point, although Officer

Zimmerman was present under the

described circumstances, the case of

ambulance transportation is oblique to the

core of “in custody” jurisprudence where

the focus is on the relationship between the

officers and the suspect in terms of

putative coercion and freedom to leave. In

our view, the presence of Zimmerman in

the ambulance was a background factor in

terms of Reinert’s statement to Snyder.

Reinert had entered the ambulance

voluntarily and was in the charge of the

EMTs who elicited the challenged

statement innocently (they did not know

Reinert to be a criminal suspect) in the

course of obtaining routine medical

information. Under these circumstances,

and others recited above, we do not think

that the state trial judge’s determination

was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the

evidence. Nor was the legal conclusion

based thereon contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court.

Accordingly we will affirm the order of

the District Court on that issue.

2. The pre-Miranda statement to Officer

Zimmerman

The statement made to Officer

Zimmerman in response to his “what

happened” question (“I think I killed him,

I stabbed him.”) is another matter. At that

point Reinert had made an incriminating

statement, and when the EMT turned him

over to Officer Zimmerman, he had to

know that he was a suspect being

questioned by a police officer. Prior to

starting his question, Zimmerman should

have, but failed to, read Reinert his

Miranda rights. The state trial judge’s

treatment of this matter was premised on a

misapprehension or misstatement of the

facts—that Reinert had been Mirandized

already when, in fact, he had not: “The

next statement made by the defendant was

a statement given to Officer Zimmerman

in the ambulance. Prior to this statement,

Officer Zimmerman advised the defendant

of his Miranda rights, following which the

defendant indicated that he wished to

answer questions.” The Commonwealth

now concedes that the judge was mistaken

in stating that Reinert was given Miranda

warnings before the statement to

Zimmerman. We must therefore reject the

state court’s finding with respect to the

first ambulance statement to Zimmerman.

However, “[w]here a subsequent

confession is obtained constitutionally, the

admission of prior inadmissib le

confessions [is] harmless error.” United

States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180 (3d
13

Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.

Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 923 (3d Cir.

1987)) (first alteration in original).

Because we conclude that Reinert made

subsequent, constitutionally obtained,

admissible statements that mirrored his

earlier un-Mirandized statement, see infra

Parts III.B and III.C, we hold that

admission of the initial statement was

harmless error, even under the stringent

constitutional error standard where we

may affirm only if the error is harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See United

States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698,

703 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).

B. The Post-Miranda Statement to

Officer Zimmerman

At this point, Zimmerman read Reinert

his Miranda rights. The issues presented

by Reinert are twofold. He contends (1)

that he was not physically and mentally

capable of knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights and

(2) that even if he were, the post-Miranda

statement was not validly obtained in light

of his pre-Miranda confession. 

1. Competence and waiver

The Supreme Court has frequently

articulated the applicable waiver standard.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966), the Court held as to waiver and

burden:

The defendant may waive

effectuation of these rights,

provided the waiver is made

voluntarily, knowingly and

intelligently.

* * *

If the interrogation continues

without the presence of an attorney

and a statement is taken, a heavy

burden rests on the government to

demonstrate that the defendant

knowingly and intelligently waived

his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to

retained or appointed counsel.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,

490, n.14 [(1964)]. This Court has

always set high standards of proof

for the waiver of constitutional

rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

458 (1938), and we reassert these

standards as applied to in-custody

interrogation. 

Id. at 444, 475 (emphasis added).

The Court made clear in Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, (1986), the twopronged test for waiver:

First, the relinquishment of the

right must have been voluntary in

the sense that it was the product of

a free and deliberate choice rather

than intimidation, coercion, or

deception. Second, the waiver

must have been made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the

right being abandoned and the

consequences of the decision to

abandon it. Only if the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation reveal both an

uncoerced choice and the requisite
14

level of comprehension may a court

properly conclude that the Miranda

rights have been waived. 

Id. at 421 (internal quotations marks and

citations omitted).

We have also explained that:

This inquiry requires us to consider

the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the interrogation,

which includes examining the

events that occurred and the

background, expe rience, and

conduct of the defendant. Miranda

rights will be deemed waived only

whe re the totality of the

circumstances “reveal[s] both an

uncoerced choice and the requisite

level of comprehension.”

United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 749

(3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at

421) (citations omitted). 

The state trial judge concluded, after

the suppression hearing, that Reinert’s

mental and physical states were such that

he was “conscious, alert and oriented on

three spheres.” She added that: 

[T]he interview by Officer

Zimmerman was brief, the

interrogation routine, and the

detention basically the result of

circumstances created by the

defendant. Clearly there was no

physical threat to the defendant

from the police inasmuch as the

interview took place in the

ambulance in the presence of

paramedics. We firmly conclude

that there was no physical or

psychological coercion in the

situation, nor in the questioning

technique used by Officer

Zimmerman.

This finding is clearly supported in the

record. EMT Snyder testified at the

suppression hearing that Reinert remained

“conscious, alert, and oriented throughout

our transport” and that he was “very much

aware and awake, and knew what was

going on. I explained every part of the

treatment that I was doing for him, and he

understood that fully.” When asked, “And

this was during the entire time when

Officer Zimmerman was talking to Mr.

Reinert as well?”, Snyder responded,

“That’s correct.” In sum, Snyder stated

that Reinert answered all questions posed

to him “ intelligently.” Officer

Zimmerman testified that Reinert was

“lucid and coherent.” And Officer

Lembach, who was also in the ambulance,

testified that Reinert was alert and

coherent, and that his answers to questions

asked in the ambulance were responsive

and pertinent and did not go off on

tangents. 

As noted above, Reinert had walked to

the ambulance. The record of treatment

administered to him in the ambulance was

unexceptional. Reinert was wearing an

oxygen mask but that did not impair

communication. He was receiving IV

fluids and was connected to an

electrocardiograph. His vital signs were

monitored. But none of this impaired his

coherence. Supporting this conclusion is

the testimony of Nurse Patricia Lombardo
15

of LVMC who, shortly after Reinert’s

admission, observed him and administered

the Glasgow coma test, about which she

discoursed at some length. The short of it

is that Reinert received the highest

(Glasgow) score for verbal and motor

response, and for being alert and oriented.

His respiratory rate, vital signs, etc., were

all good. Independently, Nurse Lombardo

concluded that Reinert was alert.

In opposition to this welter of

testimony the state trial judge had only the

testimony of Reinert’s mother and

stepfather, which it had the clear right not

to credit, and did not credit. In this appeal,

Reinert relies largely on the affidavits of

two psychiatrists whose affidavits were

offered at the Pennsylvania Superior Court

level as appendices to his direct appeal

brief. The Superior Court declined to

consider these affidavits and none of them

were before the trial court. They were also

attached to his federal habeas petition.

These psychiatrists, Dr. Lynn Bornfriend

(“Dr. Bornfriend”) and Dr. Robert Sadoff

(“Dr. Sadoff”), did not examine or witness

Reinert during the time period in which he

was in the hospital or in the ambulance,

and relied solely upon the narratives of

Reinert’s family and friends and excerpts

from the (subsequent) medical records of

LVMC.

The Commonwealth submits that we

cannot consider these affidavits which

were not a matter of record and which are

presented to the Court merely as

attachments to a pleading, citing United

States v. Madkins, 994 F.2d 540, 542-43

(8th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v.

Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1983)

(holding efforts to supplement record by

affidavits or attachments to brief

improper)). Reinert counters with the

argument that consideration of these

affidavits is necessary to demonstrate the

ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in not

presenting expert evidence at the

suppression hearing. This “counter”

seems inadequate because the affidavits

are being presented in support of two

different contentions: a merits issue

involving Miranda rights and a collateral

issue involving the ineffective assistance

of counsel. Given that these affidavits

were not part of the record before the trial

court, Reinert most likely procedurally

defaulted this line of argument on his

Miranda claims, and should be allowed

only to use the affidavits insofar as his

claim for ineffectiveness is concerned.

However, since the affidavits relate both to

the Miranda and ineffectiveness issues,

and since we will need to examine the

affidavits when we rea ch th e

ineffectiveness claims, we will, out of an

abundance of caution, consider the

substance of the Sadoff and Bornfriend

affidavits—both of which conclude that

Reinert was not competent physically or

mentally to waive Miranda rights or to

make statements either in the ambulance or

post-operatively at the hospital—in terms

of the Miranda claims as well. 

Dr. Bornfriend relies on a number of

factors: (1) several nursing entries

describing Reinert as confused after his

admission to LVMC; (2) lab evidence of

dehydration, blood loss, liver damage and
16

an extruding wound (the occasion for the

subsequent surgery); and (3) an increased

white blood cell count. Dr. Bornfriend

opines that Reinert was in emotional

shock, largely as the result of having been

in the house with a corpse for two days.

She also makes reference to his recent

suicide attempt. Dr. Sadoff relies on: (1)

Reinert’s mother’s description of his

confusion; (2) the emotional shock of the

altercation with Sean Brady; and (3)

Reinert’s low blood pressure and fast heart

rate. We find this counter underwhelming,

surely not enough to render the state trial

judge’s supported findings unreasonable or

to undermine her conclusions of law under

the AEDPA standard as to the validity of

the waiver and the post-Miranda statement

in the ambulance. 

2. Validity of post-Miranda statement

Reinert argues that, even had he been

competent to waive his Miranda rights in

the ambulanc e, the post-Miranda

statement would nevertheless be invalid

because it followed too quickly on the

heels of a non-Mirandized confession. To

support his contention, Reinert attempts,

unsuccessfully, to distinguish his case

from Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298

(1985). In Elstad, a man suspected of

burglary made an incriminating statement

in his own home without having been

Mirandized. He was taken to the police

station, and after he was advised of and

waived his Miranda rights, the suspect

produced a written confession. In his

subsequent prosecution for burglary, the

state trial court excluded from evidence his

first statement because he had not been

given Miranda warnings, but admitted the

written confession. Elstad was convicted,

but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed,

holding that the confession should also

have been excluded because of the brief

period separating his initial,

unconstitutionally obtained statement and

his subsequent confession. In reversing

the Oregon Court of Appeals, the United

States Supreme Court explained that the

failure of police to administer Miranda

warnings does not mean that the

statements received have actually been

coerced, but only that courts will presume

the privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination has not been

intelligently exercised. See Elstad, 470

U.S. at 304-11. 

The Court held that it was “an

unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold

that a simple failure to administer the

warnings, unaccompanied by any actual

coercion or other circumstances calculated

to undermine the suspect’s ability to

exercise his free will, so taints the

investigatory process that a subsequent

voluntary and informed waiver is

ineffective forsome indeterminate period.”

Id. at 309. The Court further held that

although Miranda “requires that the

unwarned admission must be suppressed,

the admissibility of any subsequent

statement should turn in these

circumstances solely on whether it is

knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id.

Absent deliberate coercion or improper

tactics in obtaining an unwarned

statement, a careful and thorough

administration of Miranda warnings cures
17

the condition that rendered the unwarned

statement inadmissible. See id. at 311-12.

Reinert argues that no cure could be

made in his case because the police created

coercive circumstances and that other

independent circumstances, such as the

injury and resulting pain, tainted the

investigatory process beyond repair. We

disagree. The Supreme Court’s most

recent pronouncement on this issue

supports our conclusion. In Missouri v.

Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004), a suspect

was questioned for 30 to 40 minutes and

confessed to her role in the crime of

second-degree murder. She was given a

20-minute break and was only then

Mirandized. After receiving her Miranda

warnings, she signed a waiver and the

questioning resumed. During the postMiranda questioning, she was confronted

with her prewarning statements, and was

made to repeat the information she had

given before she was Mirandized. In

holding unconstitutional the interrogation

technique of intentionally withholding

Miranda rights to obtain a confession and

ofsubsequently reading the Miranda rights

and continuing on with the interrogation,

the Supreme Court distinguished Seibert

from Elstad in the following way:

Elstad rejected the “cat out of the

bag” theory that any short, earlier

admission, obtained in arguably

innocent neglect of Miranda,

determined the character of the

later, warned confession, Elstad,

470 U.S. at 311-14; on the facts of

that case, the Court thought any

causal connection between the first

and second responses to the police

was “speculative and attenuated,”

id. at 313. Although the Elstad

Court expressed no explicit

conclusion about either officer’s

state of mind, it is fair to read

Elstad as treating the living room

conversation as a good-faith

Miranda mistake, not only open to

correction by careful warnings

before systematic questioning in

that particular case, but posing no

threat to warn-first practice

generally. See Elstad, [470 U.S.] at

309 (characterizing the officers’

omission of Miranda warnings as

“a simple failure to administer the

warnings, unaccompanied by any

actu a l coercion or other

circumstances calculated to

undermine the suspect’s ability to

exercise his free will”).

Id. at 2612.

We are confident that Reinert’s case

more closely resembles Elstad’s than

Siebert’s. Zimmerman’s initial failure to

read Reinert his Miranda rights, though

unfortunate and unexplained, seems much

more likely to have been a simple failure

to administer the warnings rather than an

intentional withholding that was part of a

larger, nefarious plot. While it would have

been preferable for Zimmerman to read

Reinert his rights immediately before

eliciting the initial response, we conclude

that the cure mandated by Elstad was met

in this case and that, because Reinert’s

waiver was knowing and voluntary, the

post-Miranda statement was properly
18

entered into evidence.

C. The Statement at the Hospital

Probably the most incriminating

statement made by Reinert was that made

to Detectives Stauffer and Granitz after

surgery at LVMC. In that statement

Reinert admitted that he had obtained a

knife and then went to see Brady, who was

in bed, and stabbed him. We have already

recounted the essential history of the

events after Reinert’s admission to the

hospital, see supra Part I. We have

amplified that description through

recitation of the state trial judge’s findings,

see supra Part II; we will not rescribe that

material here. However, our review of the

record confirms that all the facts stated by

Judge McGinley are supported by the

record.

As our frame of reference, we reiterate

that surgery (on March 10, 1991) lasted

from 1:15 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., and the

interrogation took place at about 8:00 p.m.

It was discovered during surgery that one

of the knife wounds in Reinert’s abdomen

had also cut his liver. The surgery

consisted of an exploratory laparotomy to

examine stab wounds to the abdomen. The

results were essentially negative, except

for a non-bleeding laceration of the left

lobe of the liver and a large retroperitoneal

hematoma. There was no evidence of

injury to any intraabdominal organ.

Because the retroperitoneal hematoma was

stable, nothing was done, and the abdomen

was closed after copious irrigation.

Reinert’s wrist lacerations were then

repaired, and he was taken to the Shock

Trauma Unit for observation. 

We have scrutinized the entire LVMC

record. That record is consistent with the

facts chronicled above, most importantly

that at times relevant Reinert was alert and

oriented. Initially, the surgeon, Dr. Barry

Slavin, reported that Reinert woke up

promptly and was awake and alert after

recovery from anesthesia. Morphine for

pain was not administered until 10:00

p.m., well after the statement at issue had

been made. Reinert was also given

Robinal, a sedative and muscle relaxant, at

3:30 p.m. and Cefoxitan, an antibiotic, at

6:30 p.m. The most important witness,

however, was Dr. Hashemi, the chief

surgical resident, who had come to LVMC

afer three years of surgical residence at

Presbyterian and the University of

Pennsylvania Medical Center. As noted

above, Dr. Hashemi testified that he had

performed a post-operative check at 7:30

p.m. on the defendant, and that he had seen

that Reinert was awake, coherent, and had

stable vital signs. His chart indicated no

abnormality with regard to Reinert’s

ability to answer questions appropriately.

This testimony accords with that of the

detectives who questioned Reinert after his

surgery and said that they found him

conscious, oriented, alert, and responsive.

Arrayed against this solid phalanx of

evidence is the testimony of Reinert’s

mother, stepfather, a friend Cindy

Mellinger, and Reinert’s mother’s pastor,

Ronald Keller, who saw Reinert after the

police left. They all described him as

extremely quiet and soft spoken, kind of

“mumbly,” heavily sedated. Reinert also

contends that he was affected by the presurgical med icine, especia lly the
19

anesthesia, and by the Robinal given at

3:30 p.m. Additionally, Reinert relies

heavily on appeal on a psychiatric consult

the day after surgery. 

Dr. Joseph Antonowicz, a psychiatrist,

reported that:

The patient tells me that he

remembers essentially nothing of

the events that led to his

hospitalization here. He tells me

that the police have informed him

that they suspect him of having

murdered Shawn. He is quite

surprised by this. The patient is

very tearful at the loss of Shawn

and seems to genuinely miss him.

He states that he currently does

have suicidal ideation, although he

does not have a plan at this time. 

The patient is an alert,

cooperative young man who

appears quite sad. He also appears

very befuddled and shows some

disorganization in his thought

process. He tends to be somewhat

rambling and at times is mildly

loosened in his associations. He

seems quite bewildered by what’s

going on as well as frightened.

There are no hallucinations. There

do not appear to be delusions

present at this time. However, the

patient is somewhat guarded in his

history. Affect is depressed.

Sensorium: He is oriented times

three. Memory: 2 of 3 objects at 5

minutes. Similes: Good. Proverbs:

Quite concrete. Insight: Limited.

Judgment: Good on formal testing.

IMPRESSIONS: The patient is

a 27 year old white male admitted

to the Lehigh Valley Hospital

Center on 03/10/91 followed self

inflicted stab wounds with slashed

wrists. He is currently under arrest

on suspicion of having murdered

his roommate. The patient has

essentially no recollection of events

leading to and including these

alleged occurrences. At the present

time he is confused, overwhelmed,

frightened and seemed somewhat

disorganized in his thought

processes.

Working diagnoses are: 

1. Psychogenic amnesia versus

malingering.

2. Possible reactive psychosis.

I am uncertain about the presence

of psychosis in this case, although

he does seem inordinately

bewildered and disorganized.

These pieces of evidence are used by

Drs. Bornfriend and Sadoff in their

affidavits. Dr. Bornfriend writes:

Reinert was in the Operating Room

for laparotomy and tendon repair

until around 4:00 in the afternoon.

During surgery, he was given many

anesthetics, including Fentanyl, a

synthetic narcotic, and Robinal, a

sedative and muscle relaxant.

Without the above medications, any

patient would be in severe pain

after such extensive surgery. It

was, therefore, clear that the

narcotic and sedative and muscle
20

relaxan t effec ts of th e s e

medications persisted and remained

during the course of Mr. Reinert’s

being interviewed by the police and

that when these medications wore

off, Mr. Reinert was in severe pain

and required 4 mgs. of morphine.

In addition, the fact that a physician

told police officers that Mr.

Reinert’s health would not be

threatened by their questioning him

does not imply that he was

cognitively and mentally clear

enough for them to do so.

Dr. Sadoff recapitulates the traumatic

events preceding the stabbing, the

impressions of Dr. Antonowicz, the reports

of the family members who saw Reinert

after the surgery, and the LVMC records.

He concludes:

One is usually in a fairly

confused state of mind following

surgery with general anesthesia,

and is not thinking as clearly

usually, as one does after several

days. Scot had just been through a

serious altercation with his lover,

had lost his lover by death and had

been in a state of shock himself

following loss of large quantities of

blood due to self-inflicted and other

wounds to his wrists and his

abdomen. He appeared confused to

his mother on the telephone and

also when she visited him at his

residence shortly thereafter. He

also appeared less than clear to his

mother, stepfather, pastor and

female friend while in the hospital

following surgery.

Thus, for all the reasons noted

above, it is my opinion, within

reasonable medical and psychiatric

certainty, that at the time of the

taking of the statement of Scot

Reinert, he was not at his clearest

thinking and was under the

influence of the shock of the loss of

his lover, the shock of his own

wounds and recently emerging

from general anesthesia with

abdominal surgery and that his will

and strength and clarity of mind

were all impaired. It is more likely

than not that at the time he was

interrogated by the police and given

his Miranda rights, his emotional

state was so impaired that he would

not have been able to resist

effectively the demands of the

police at the time or the requests of

the police. It would seem that his

statement would not be totally

voluntary, as he may choose, when

in a clearer state of mind, to resist

giving such a statement, especially

under the advice of his attorney, if

he had been allowed to see his

attorney prior to the interrogation.

The note of Dr. Antonowicz, the

psychiatrist who examined him in

consultation one day after he was

admitted and then three days later,

indicated a clearing of his

sensorium on the second

examination. This implies that his

first examination showed Scot to be

less than clear, and that was one
21

day after his admission or one day

after the interrogation. . . .

Thus, it is for all these reasons

that it is my opinion, within

reasonable medical certainty, that at

the time of the taking of the

statement by the police, Scot

Reinert was in such a weakened

state of emotional condition

following the shock to his system

from the death of his lover, the

wounds that he had to his own

body, the medication that he was

under, the loss of blood, the

surgical procedure under general

anesthesia, that his mental state was

not clear enough for him to be

competent to waive his Miranda

warnings or to give a truly

voluntary statement.

W e fi nd these argum ents

underwhelming, and conclude that they do

not even come close to rendering the state

trial judge’s findings of fact unreasonable

under the totality of the record, or in any

way undermine her conclusions of law

under the AEDPA standard. The

Bornfriend and Sadoff affidavits are

extremely generalized and conclusory and,

at all events, do not counter the

considerable evidence of Reinert’s

competence to waive his Miranda rights

and to make a statement which was

credited by the suppression judge, to

whose findings heavy deference is owed

under AEDPA. Indeed, they also rely on

statements that the judge discredited.

Additionally, we note that the Superior

Court also made findings of fact consonant

with those of Judge McGinley, see supra

Part II, which are entitled to deference.

See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).4

 

4

 Reinert urges us to follow the

example of the Supreme Courts of

Minnesota and Alaska and rule that, in

the absence of an electronic record of the

custodial interrogation in the hospital (by

either audiotape or videotape), we should

suppress the confession as a violation of

the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment,

protections of due process, protection

against self-incrimination, and provisions

for effective assistance of counsel and

confrontation. See State v. Scales, 518

N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (holding that

custodial interrogations must be recorded

where feasible); Stephan v. State, 711

P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) (holding that

non-recorded statements made during the

course of a custodial interrogation should

be suppressed because they were

obtained in violation of the Due Process

Clause of the Alaska Constitution). 

While the advocated policy may be a

desirable one, Reinert can point to no

Pennsylvania law supporting it; indeed

there is none. Even if there were such a

rule announced in Pennsylvania, we, as a

federal court sitting in habeas

jurisdiction, would not have the authority

to review a violation of the state

constitution. It therefore goes without

saying that, given that there is no right to

recorded custodial interrogations under

Pennsylvania law, we are certainly not at

liberty to create one. Insofar as Reinert

invokes the Fifth and Sixth Amendments

of the Federal Constitution, he invokes a
22

IV. The Ineffective Assistance of

Counsel Claims

A. Failure of State Trial Counsel to Call

a Medical Expert to Testify at the

Suppression Hearing as to Reinert’s

Alleged Mental and Physical Inability to

Voluntarily and Knowingly Waive His

Miranda Rights

Reinert claims that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to call an expert

medical or psychiatric witness to testify

about his physical and mental condition at

the time he waived his Miranda rights. In

order successfully to claim ineffective

assistance of counsel, Reinert must

establish both that his attorney’s

performance was objectively unreasonable

and that, but for the deficient performance,

there would have been a reasonable

probability of a different outcome. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). Reinert can make neither showing

here. After reviewing the record, the

Superior Court found that trial counsel

thoroughly cross-examined all the

Commonwealth’s witnesses regarding

Reinert’s mental and physical state at the

time he was given his Miranda warnings

and when he made statements to the police

and medical staff: “We conclude that trial

counsel was not ineffective for failing to

call medical experts at the suppression

hearing.” Indeed, the state court followed

the relevant Pennsylvania authority for the

proposition that trial counsel need not

introduce expert testimony on his client’s

behalf if he is able effectively to crossexamine prosecution witnesses and elicit

helpful testimony. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 640 A.2d 1251, 1265 (Pa. 1994).

Trial counsel was surely able to do so here.

The Superior Court’s rejection, under

Williams, of Reinert’s claim that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to call

an expert witness with respect to his

mental and physical condition was not an

unreasonable application of the standards

set forth in Strickland in light of the

evidence from police officers and medical

personnel that Reinert’s waiver of his

Miranda rights was knowing and

voluntary. Reinert’s claim must therefore

fail. Furthermore, we reject the notion,

advanced at oral argument, that Reinert

should be entitled to an ineffective

assistance of counsel hearing at this

juncture. Given the well developed record

in this case and our analysis of it above,

we do not see what more useful

information could be elicited at this time.

B. Failure to Inform Reinert of His

Right to Testify at the Suppression

Hearing

Reinert contends that his state trial

counsel was ineffective for not informing

him of his right to testify at the

suppression hearing. At the suppression

hearing Reinert’s counsel called his

purported federal right to have a

custodial interrogation recorded. He

does not, however, cite any authority for

this proposition; again there is none. We

will, at this juncture, decline to infer a

federal right to have custodial

interrogations recorded.
23

mother, stepfather, a female friend, and his

mother’s pastor to testify about his

physical condition post-surgery and prior

to his statement to the officers. Reinert’s

mother and stepfather also testified to

Reinert’s condition prior to his transport to

the hospital (and prior to his initial

statement). Additionally the medical

records of LVMC were before the

suppression court. The suppression court

thus had before it a considerable amount of

evidence supporting Reinert’s position that

he was not competent to give a statement

or to waive Miranda rights. We do not see

that Reinert’s testimony would have added

anything to the mix in his favor, and, as

the Pennsylvania Superior Court observed,

Reinert failed to state with any specificity

what his testimony would have been

and/or how his testimony would have

altered the outcome of the hearing. The

Superior Court concluded that Reinert had

failed to establish that his claim had

arguable merit, that his counsel’s actions

were unreasonable, or that he suffered

prejudice. In our view, the District Court

correctly concluded that the state court’s

resolution of this claim was not objectively

unreasonable. The Superior Court also

found that Reinert had failed to show that

he was prejudiced by the failure of counsel

to inform him of his right to testify at the

suppression hearing, i.e., that there was a

reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s alleged error, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.5 

 

5While we need not decide whether

counsel’s performance was deficient, it is

worth noting that Reinert’s testimony

might have been risky to his defense. 

Reinert testified extensively at trial about

the entire incident leading up to and

following the death of Sean Brady. By

taking the stand at the suppression

hearing, Reinert may have been

providing the Commonwealth with the

means to impeach his testimony. In

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,

93-94 (1980), the Supreme Court

reserved the question whether Simmons

v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),

precludes the use of a defendant’s

testimony at a suppression hearing to

impeach his testimony at trial. The Court

noted, however, that a number of courts

considering the question had held that

such testimony is admissible as evidence

of impeachment. Id. at 94 & n.8 (citing

Gray v. State, 403 A.2d 853, 858 (Md.

Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (noting that nothing

in Simmons precludes use of defendant’s

testimony at suppression hearing for

purpose of impeachment at trial); People

v. Sturgis, 317 N.E.2d 545, 547-48 (Ill.

1974) (same); People v. Douglas, 136

Cal. Rptr. 358, 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)

(holding that defendant’s testimony at

suppression hearing was admissible for

impeachment purposes because

defendant took the stand in his trial and

testified in a manner inconsistent with his

pretrial testimony)). Were we to adopt a

similar interpretation of Simmons and

conclude that suppression testimony was

fair game for impeachment purposes, the

action of putting Reinert on the stand

during the suppression hearing could

have itself potentially become subject to
24

Finally, we consider the affidavit

submitted by Reinert’s trial attorney Diane

Dickson. In our view, the Dickson

affidavit, which constitutes a conclusory

concession of ineffectiveness by trial

counsel, does not mitigate the propriety of

the actions taken during the time of trial,

and does not affect the outcome. 

V. Conclusion

In light of our extensive review of the

record before us, we conclude that the

state trial court’s decision to deny

Reinert’s motion to suppress the

statements at issue was not an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state

court proceedings, and that it was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal

law as determined by the United States

Supreme Court. To the extent that the

state trial court’s finding on the one preMiranda statement made to Officer

Zimmerman was in fact unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented before it,

the statement should have been

suppressed. However, the admission of

duplicative statements was proper, and the

error was therefore harmless.

As for Reinert’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, he has failed to

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s performance, and the state

court’s conclusions on the issue were not

contrary to or an unreasonable application

of clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme

Court. 

We will therefore affirm the order of

the District Court denying the petition.

an allegation of ineffectiveness.