Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-14-00397-CV

In the Interest of D.S.A., S.D.A., and S.A.A., Children

From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013EM506191

Honorable Eric Rodriguez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 10, 2015

REVERSED AND REMANDED

The Office of the Texas Attorney General filed an original petition in a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship alleging that Sam M. Alvarez was the father of the children the subject 

of this suit and seeking orders for conservatorship, visitation, and support. Alvarez, who is 

incarcerated in a federal prison, filed a pro se answer and, on at least two separate occasions, filed 

documents asking the trial court to permit him to participate in the trial either in person or by 

telephone. The trial was reset multiple times. When the case was finally called for trial, the trial 

court reviewed the documents filed by Alvarez and expressly denied his request to participate in 

the trial by telephone. The trial court then proceeded to trial, considering only the evidence 

presented by the Attorney General’s Office.1 Thereafter, the trial court rendered a default judgment 

 1

Alvarez’s request for a bench warrant to appear at trial was implicitly denied.
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against Alvarez. The judgment appoints Alvarez as possessory conservator of the children, grants 

him no visitation, orders him to pay cash medical support of $25.00 per month, grants a retroactive 

child support judgment against him in the amount of $30,240.00, and orders him to pay this 

judgment by paying $200.00 per month. Alvarez appealed.

Alvarez’s threshold complaint on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his requests 

to participate in the trial. Alvarez claims that his due process rights were violated. 

Although an inmate does not have an automatic right to appear personally in court, he does 

not automatically lose the right to access the courts by virtue of being incarcerated. In the Interest 

of R.C.R., 230 S.W.3d 423, 426 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (citing In the Interest of 

Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003)). An inmate’s right to have access to the courts entails 

not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence 

of the opposing party. Id. When the trial court finds that a pro se inmate in a civil action is not 

entitled to leave prison to appear personally in court, then the prisoner should be allowed to 

proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means. Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 

714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds, Z.L.T., 

124 S.W.3d at 166.

For these reasons, Texas appellate courts, including this court, have sustained complaints 

similar to Alvarez’s complaint. See Larson v. Giesenschlag, 368 S.W.3d 792, 797-98 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2012, no pet.); In the Interest of D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 313-14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2004, no pet.). For example, in Lann v. LaSalle Cnty., 04-02-00005-CV, 2003 WL 141040, at *1 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio January 22, 2003, no pet.), we held that the trial court erred when it 

denied a request by a pro se inmate to participate by telephone in the trial of a civil matter. As we 

stated in Lann, the trial court “should have permitted [the incarcerated civil litigant] to proceed by 

some other viable means, such as the telephone conference [he] had expressly requested.” Id. We 
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explained that the trial court, by failing to provide the inmate an alternative means to participate, 

effectively denied the inmate his fundamental right under the federal constitution to be heard at a 

meaningful time in a meaningful manner. Id. 

Here, the trial court did not err in denying Alvarez’s request for a bench warrant. See Z.L.T., 

124 S.W.3d at 166 (holding the trial court did not err in denying a request for a bench warrant 

when the inmate failed to make the required showing). However, the trial court did err in denying 

Alvarez’s alternative request to participate in the trial by some other viable means, such as by 

telephone. See Larson, 368 S.W.3d at 797-98 (holding the trial court erred in denying incarcerated 

civil litigant’s request to participate at trial by alternative means); D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 

(same); Lann, 2003 WL 141040, at *1 (same). We therefore reverse the judgment and remand this 

case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Karen Angelini, Justice