Filed 11/14/13 In re X.Z. CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re X.Z., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
JASMIN S.,
Defendant and Appellant. B247449 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK86090)

APPEAL from an order of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite Downing, Judge. Diane Reye s, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, Office of the Count y Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and William D. Thetford , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Appellant Jasmin S. (Mot her) filed this appeal af ter the juvenile court’s December 4, 2012 order terminated her pa rental rights over her infant daughter
X.Z. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. 1 Mother seeks to revive issues arising out of the court’s decision to terminate her reuni fication services at the September 12, 2011 six-month review hearing based on its understanding that
Mother would be incarcerated for a period that exceeded the maximum reunification time permitted by statute. She contends reasonable reunification services were not provided prior to Septem ber 2011, that the caseworker misled the court about when she was likely to be re leased from prison, and that the court failed to make statutorily -mandated findings. Mother does not dispute that orders terminating reunification services are ordinarily reviewable solely by way of writ , or that the court provided notice at the September 2011 hearing of the writ review requirement. She contends she is
entitled to raise issues related to the reuni fication period in this proceeding because the notice the court provided did not inform her of the deadline to file a notice of
intent to seek a writ. We conclude th at Mother received su fficient notice of the writ requirement to preclude her from rais ing issues pertaining to the September 2011 order at this late date, and that, in any event, she raises no issues with respect to the September 2011 order requiring re versal. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2011, the family home was raided by police and a large quantity of methamphetamine and chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine

1 Undesignated statutory references ar e to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 were found. 2 X.Z., then two months old, wa s detained by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), along with her two half-siblings. 3 After a brief period in foster care, X.Z. was placed with Mothe r’s sister, Conseulo M. A few days after the detention hearing, Mother was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine and child endangerment. On February 16, 2011, the caseworker reported that Mother’s case was about to be submitted to the district attorney’s office for felony filing consideration. The court ordered a supplemental report to addre ss the status of both parents’ criminal cases before the jurisdictional/dispositiona l hearing, but the caseworker was unable
to obtain further information. At the March 14, 2011, jurisdictiona l/dispositional hearing, the court found
that Mother and Father “created a detr imental and endangering home environment for the children” by (1) “possess[ing] toxic, flammable, hazardous chemicals, used
in the manufacture of meth amphetamine in the children’ s home, within access of the children” and exposing the children to such chemicals; (2) keeping eight and one-half pounds of methamphetamine in th e children’s home, within access of the children; and (3) exposing the children to illicit drug trafficking in the home and in their presence. At the same hearing, the court addressed disposition for Mother
and ordered reunification servic es. Mother’s plan require d her to participate in a parenting class and indivi dual counseling to address case issues and drug

awareness.

2 Hector A., the girl’s father, was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine for sale, transportation of a controlled substance, manufacture of methamphetamine, and manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of a child. He is not a party to this appeal.

3 X.Z.’s half-siblings, a 13-year old boy and a nine-year old girl, were ultimately placed with their father and are no t the subjects of this appeal.4 On April 20, 2011, a new caseworker me t with Mother, then incarcerated at
Twin Towers. Mother advised her that th e facility did not offer any programs for parents, and that she would be unable to make progress on the reunification plan until she was transferred to a state pris on. Mother further reported that she anticipated receiving a four-year sentence and serving half or less. On June 8, the caseworker talked to Mother’s probation officer, who reported he was working on the probation report and that Mother was lik ely to face a sentence of three to six

years. 4 A few days later, on J une 17, Consuelo told the caseworker she had spoken
with Mother and that Mother had said she was going to serve 14 months in state prison and would enroll in classe s once she arrived at the prison. 5 In mid-July,
Mother was transferred to the California Institute for Women. In August, the caseworker left a message with Mothe r’s correctional counselor asking for Mother’s release date, but received no return call. The September 2011 report, filed in advance of the six-month review hearing, stated that in June, Mother had been convicted of possession of a
controlled substance for sale and child endangerment and that the court had imposed sentences of three years for the form er crime and four years for the latter. The report did not indicate whether the se ntences were to run consecutively or concurrently and gave no estimate of Mo ther’s release date. It described the
caseworker’s unsuccessful effort to obtain Mother’s precise release date from the correctional counselor. The report stated that maternal relatives were bringing X.Z. for prison visits, but that due to her incarceration, Mother had been unable to

4 At the time of her arrest, Mother was on probation for taking drugs into a prison facility.

5 Reports of these three conversations were in the delivered service log, which was not before the court at the six-month review hearing. The log was not filed until October 19, 2011.5 participate in court-ordered programs. The report said it was “highly unlikely” Mother would be able to reunify with he r children, even if additional reunification services were ordered. Therefore, it was recommended that reunification services
be terminated. At the September 12, 2011 six-month revi ew hearing, the court stated it was
inclined to terminate reunification services with respect to X.Z. due to her age (less than a year old). 6 Counsel for Mother stated: “I understand Mother will be incarcerated longer than the statutory peri od of reunification; however, I’m going to enter an objection today to terminating her services.” The court expressed its understanding that both parents objected, but found that “since both parents will be incarcerated longer than the reunificati on period . . . [¶] . . . there is not a substantial probability that [X.Z.] may be returned to her parents by the 12-month permanency hearing.” The court furthe r found that the parents were unable to “complete any of the disposition case pl an” due to their incarceration or to “demonstrate[] the capacity or ability to complete the objectives of the treatment plan and to provide for the child’s sa fety, protection, physical and emotional
health.” The court terminat ed services and set a secti on 366.26 hearing for January 9, 2012. The minute order stated that the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that return of the minors to th e physical custody of the parents would
create a substantial risk of detriment to th eir physical or emotional well-being, that DCFS had complied with the case plan, th at Mother was not in compliance with the case plan, and that reasonable services had been provided to meet the needs of
the minors. After terminating reunification se rvices and setting the section 366.26 hearing, the court provided the following advisement: “[T]he court advises all

6 The parties stipulated to Diane Reyes acti ng as a temporary judge at this hearing.6 parties present and directs the clerk of th e court to forward written advisement to parties not present that to preserve any right to review on appeal of the court’s order setting a hearing to select and im plement a permanent plan under 366.26, the party must seek an extraordinary writ by f iling a notice of intent to file writ petition and request for record, or other notice of in tent to file writ petition and request for record, and a writ petition-juvenile form, or other petition for extraordinary writ. [¶] I would advise you to speak to your attorney.”
Mother did not seek writ review of the September 2011 order. After multiple continuances, the s ection 366.26 hearing was he ld on December 4, 2012. Mother presented no evidence , but objected to termination of her parental rights. 7 The evidence presented esta blished that Consuelo, Mother’s sister and X.Z.’s guardian since shortly after the detention, had repeatedly expressed her desire to adopt X.Z., and that X.Z. was thriving in Consuelo’s care. The adoption home study was completed in August 2012. On December 4, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that X.Z. wa s adoptable, and that no exception to adoption applied. The court issued an orde r terminating parental rights over X.Z. Mother filed a notice of appeal from the or der. Mother was released from prison in January 2013.

7 In the interim between the September 12 , 2011 hearing and the December 4, 2012 hearing, Mother provided evidence of having participated in various programs in prison, including Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonym ous, a behavioral transformation program and a parenting program. From the evidence presented, it appears her participation in such programs began in October 2011. In addition, the evidence indicated Mother had monthly visits with X.Z., un til October 2012, when prison officials objected to contact visitation and Mother stated she did not wi sh to visit her daughter behind glass.7 DISCUSSION An order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing is “not appealable” unless “(1) A petition for extraordinary writ review was filed in a timely manner.[ 8 ] [¶] (B) The petition s ubstantively addressed the specific issues to be challenged and s upported that challenge by an adequate record. [¶] (C) The petition for extraord inary writ review was summarily denied or otherwise not decided on the merits.” (§ 366.26, subd. ( l )(1); see § 366.26, subd. ( l )(2); In re Cathina W . (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 719.) Section 366.26, subdivision ( l ) and the court rules implementing it are intended to ensure that resolution of challenges to setting orders are resolved before the section 366.26 hearing. ( Karl S. v. Superior Court (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1402-1403.) The provision supports “‘the state’s interest in expedition and finality’” and the child’s interest in “‘securing a stable, “ normal,” home,’” which goals would be compromised if the validity of issues addressed in the order terminating reunification services and setting the sect ion 366.26 hearing remained undecided until after the court’s adoption of a permanent plan. ( In re Anthony B . (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1022-1023; see In re Rashad B . (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 447 [“In adopting section 366.26, subdivision ( l ), ‘ . . . the Legislature has unequivocally expressed its intent that [set ting] orders be challenged by writ before the section 366.26 hearing.’”].)

8 Rule 8.450(e)(4) of the California Rules of Court sets out the various time limits for those seeking writ review. The shortest ti me limit applies to a party “present at the hearing when the court ordered [the] section 366.26 [hearing]”: such party must filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition and a request for the reco rd within seven days of the order. (Rule 8.450(e)(4)(A).) It is undisputed that Mother was present at the September 2011 hearing when the court set the sec tion 366.26 hearing fo r January 9, 2012.8 Section 366.26, subdivision ( l ) requires the court, after terminating reunification and issuing an order setting a section 366.26 hearing, to “advise all parties of the requirement of filing a pe tition for extraordinary writ review as set forth in this subdivision in order to preserve any right to appeal in these issues.” (§ 366.26, subd. ( l )(3)(A).) The notice must be “mad e orally to a party if the party is present at the time of the making of th e order or by first-class mail by the clerk
of the court to the last known address of the party not present at the time of the making of the order.” ( Ibid .) Rule 5.590(b) of the California Rules of Court similarly provides: “When the court orde rs a hearing under . . . section 366.26, the court must advise all partie s and if present, the child’s parent, guardian, or adult relative, that if the party wishes to pres erve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing under . . . section 366.26, the party is required to seek an extraordinary writ by filing a Notice of Inte nt to File Writ Pet ition and Request for Record . . . (form JV-820) or other noti ce of intent to file a writ petition and request for record and a Petition for Extrao rdinary Writ . . . (form JV-835) or other petition for extraordinary writ. [¶] (1) the a dvisement must be given orally to those present when the court orders the heari ng under . . . section 366.26. [¶] (2) Within one day after the court orders the heari ng under . . . section 366.26, the advisement must be sent by first-class mail by the cler k of the court to the last known address of a party who is not present when the co urt orders the hearing under . . . section 366.26.” (Italics omitted.) Rule 5.590(b) of the California Rules of Court goes on to state that “[t]he advisement must include the time for filing a notice of intent to file a writ petition” and that “[c]opies of Petition for Extraordinary Writ . . . (form JV-825) and Notice of Intent to File Writ petition and Request for Record . . . (form JV-820) must be
available in the courtroom and must ac company all mailed notices informing the9 parties of their rights.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(3) & (4), italics omitted.) Mother contends the oral notice pr ovided was defective because the court failed to indicate the time for filing a notice of intent. 9 Citing cases in which the juvenile court failed to advise the parent of his or her right to writ review of the order setting the section 366.26 hearing, she contends she must be permitted to raise issues related to a hearing that t ook place two years ago. For the reasons discussed, we conc lude otherwise.

9 Although the minute order stated that th e court directed the clerk to send written information about writ procedures to the pare nts by first class mail to their last known address and that the clerk mailed the informa tion, there is no proof of service in the record indicating that the in formation was actually mailed, and respondent does not suggest it was. In a separate motion to dism iss the appeal, respondent contended that we must presume the forms required by California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(4) -- “Petition for Extraordinary Writ” and “Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition and Request for Record” -- were available in the courtr oom. (See Evid. Code, § 664.) We do presume they were available and take judicial notice that the Notice of Intent, form JV820, states on its face “[i]n mo st cases, you have only 7 days from the court’s decision to file a Notice of Intent” and adds on the revers e side: “If you were present when the court set the hearing to make a permanent plan, you mu st file the Notice of Intent within 7 days from the date the court set the hearing.” Ho wever, there is no indication in the record that the presence of such form s was made clear to Mother or that Mother was actually provided a form.

While this appeal was pending, Mothe r’s counsel brought to our attention the recent decision in Maggie S. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662. There, the record indicated that the mother, who was pr esent in the courtroo m when the juvenile court denied reunification services, was prov ided a Notice of Intent to File Writ Petition form. The clerk also mailed her a written advi sement of rights. The Court of Appeal concluded the failure to give an oral advise ment at the hearing as required by section 366.26 and the Rules of Court excused Mother’s failure to file a timely petition for extraordinary writ and construe d her appeal of the order terminating parental rights as such petition. (220 Cal.App.4th at p. 671.) Here, unlike in Maggie S ., Mother was orally advised of the need to file a writ petition.10 Courts have held that where the juve nile court fails entirely to advise a parent of his or her right to seek writ re view of an order terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing, claims of error relating to provision of reunification services are cognizable on appeal from the order terminating parental rights. ( In re Frank R . (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539; In re Lauren Z

. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110; In re Harmony B . (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831; In re Maria S . (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038; In re Rashad B
., supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 450; In re Cathina W
., supra , 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 722-724.) We find those cases inapposite. Here, th e court did advise Mother that “to preserve any right to review on appeal ” of the September 2011 order, she “must seek an extraordinary writ by filing a not ice of intent to file writ petition and request for record, or other notice of in tent to file writ petition and request for record, and a writ petition-juvenile form, or other petition for extraordinary writ.” In the presence of counsel, the court expressly advised Mother to “speak to your attorney.” The court’s onl y fault was in failing to mention the deadline for filing the notice of intent and request for reco rd. But Mother did not merely miss the deadline for filing a notice of intent and reque st for record. She failed to file a writ petition, notice of intent or request for record at any time, ignoring the court’s
advisement that this was the sole met hod to preserve her right to review its September 2011 order.
No case of which we are aware has held that failure to inform a party of the deadline, standing alone, justifies disr egarding section 366.26, subdivision ( l ) and permitting a parent to re-open reunificati on issues by an appeal filed after the permanent plan has been implemented. Nor do we believe such a rule would be wise. It is not at all unusual for depe ndency proceedings to move slowly after termination of reunification services, as th e focus shifts to determining a child’s adoptability and considering po tential permanent homes. A year or more may pass11 before the necessary investigations and pa perwork are completed and the final plan approved by the court, during which ti me the child becomes increasingly
accustomed to a new environment and new ca regivers. Any rule allowing a parent to belatedly raise issues relating to th e reunification phase should be drawn as narrowly as possible. Where no information about the writ review requirement was provided by the court, such a rule is a necessary evil required to protect fundamental due process despite its detrim ental impact on the goals of expedition, finality and stability. (See In re Frank R
., supra , 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) But where the parent has been advised of the necessity of seeking review by way of a writ proceeding with no information about th e deadline, he or she has the option of filing a writ petition or notice of intent within any reasonable time and asking the Court of Appeal to grant relief from default for a late filing. (See Jonathan M. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1831 [petitioner who files notice of intent late may obtain relief from default on showing of good cause]; Karl S. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 1404 [same].) Mother could have obtained review of the court’s Septem ber 2011 order by filing a late writ petition or notice of intent, and presenting evidence that she had been misled or confused by the court’s advisement. Instead, having been advised of the need to seek writ review, she sought none at any time dur ing the nearly 15 months between the September 2011 hearing terminating reuni fication services and the December 2012 section 366.26 hearing. On this record, we see no basis to apply the rule applicable to parents who were not advised of their right to seek writ review of an order terminating reunification services. Accordi ngly, we conclude the issues raised in Mother’s appeal pertaining to the Septem ber 2011 order are not reviewable at this
time. Moreover, even were we to reach the merits, we would not reverse the September 2011 order. Pointing out that the statutory provision governing six-12 month review hearings for children unde r the age of three (§ 366.21, subd. (e)) requires the court to continue the case to the 12-month permanency hearing if it
finds that “reasonable services have not been provided [to a parent],” Mother contends that she was provided no services prior to the six-month review hearing and that no reunification plan was ever developed. Preliminarily, we note that
Mother did not raise these issues at the Se ptember 11 hearing. “A parent’s failure to raise an issue in the juvenile court pr events him or her fro m presenting the issue to the appellate court.” ( In re Elijah V . (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582.) Moreover, the record reflects that reasonabl e services were provided to the extent possible under the circumstances. (See Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 [“The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [DCFS’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.”]; In re Misako R . (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 [“The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be prov ided in an ideal world, but whether the services were r easonable under the circumstances.”].) At the dispositional hearing, the court orde red a straightforward plan for Mother, a parenting course and indi vidual counseling to address case issues and drug
awareness. The caseworker met with Mother in April 2011, shortly after the dispositional hearing, when Mother was still incarcerated at Twin Towers, to discuss the plan. Mother informed the cas eworker that no services were available there, but would be available when she wa s transferred to a state prison. She was
transferred to the California Institute fo r Women in mid-July 2011. She informed her sister Consuelo that she going to enro ll in the programs available there, and
Consuelo so advised the caseworker. 10 However, the record indicates Mother did

10 At no point, did Mother indicate she was meeting any resistance from prison officials or ask the casew orker for assistance.13 not begin to participate in prison pr ograms until late 2011, after the hearing terminating reunification servic es and setting the section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s failure to make progress in the progra ms assigned her within the six months following the dispositional hearing was not the fault of the caseworker, but was a consequence of Mother’s criminal conduc t -- resulting in her incarceration for the first four months in a facility with no serv ices -- and of her failure even to begin the programs available following her transfer in July. (See In re Lauren Z

. , supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1111 [mother placed herself out of reach of any meaningful rehabilitative services Depa rtment could have provide d when she engaged in
conduct that resulted in her im prisonment out of state].) Mother also contends that the caseworker misled the court by indicating in the September 2011 report that she would be imprisoned longer than was expected.
The record indicates that when Mother and the cas eworker met in April 2011, Mother anticipated being incarcerated fo r a total of two years. The probation officer had estimated three to six years. The caseworker attempted to determine the precise date Mother was scheduled to be released, but was unable to reach the appropriate prison official. In the mean time, the caseworker heard from Consuelo
that Mother believed she would serve 14 months, but did not include this information in the September 2011 report. The caseworker was not required to report secondhand speculation wh ich, in any event, prove d to be incorrect. The caseworker included in the September 2011 report the only concrete information she had: the length of the two sentences imposed for the two offenses Mother committed. Based on the information prov ided, the court presumed -- correctly -- that Mother would be incarcerated longer than the one-year period of reunification generally applicable to children under the ag e of three. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1).) Mother was present in court, with he r counsel, and could have corrected any misapprehension on the court’s part. Inst ead, Mother’s counsel agreed she would14 be “incarcerated longer than the statutory period of reunification.” In fact, Mother was not released until January 2013 and w ould not have been in a position to reunify with X.Z., even if the court had waited to terminate services and set a section 366.26 hearing until the 12-month or 18-month review dates. Under these circumstances, any misinformation in th e September 2011 report about Mother’s period of incarceration did not prejudice her.
Mother contends the court failed to make statutorily-mandated findings at the September 2011 hearing, specifically, a finding that reasonable services were provided to Mother or a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother “‘failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.’” The last paragraph of section 366.21, subdivision (e) provides
that if the child is not returned to his or her parent or legal guardian, “the court
shall determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offere d to the parent or legal guardian.” 11 (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.708(e)(1).) Although not articulated at the hearing, the minute order reflects that the court made this finding. (See In re Merrick V . (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 23 5, 249 [conflicts between reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript may be resolved in favor of clerk’s transcript where particular circumstances dictate]; In re Byron B . (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018 [reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript are to be

11 The first paragraph of sec tion 366.21, subdivision (e) prov ides that the court shall, at the six-month review hearing, “order the re turn of the child to th e physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of th e child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, pr otection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd . (e).) There is no dispute that the court made this finding.15 harmonized if possible and clerk’s transcri pt may be viewed as clarifying point reporter’s transcript left ambiguous]; People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [“‘[T]hat part of the record will prevail, which because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to great er credence [citation].’”]; People v. Malabag (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1423 [“Absent a conflict between the transcripts, the clerk’s transcript can establish a valid waiver wh ere the reporter’s transcript is silent on the matter.”].) For the reasons alrea dy discussed, we ha ve concluded that substantial evidence supports that the se rvices provided were reasonable under the
circumstances. 12 The court must also find “by clear a nd convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan” if it terminates reunifi cation services and sets a section 366.26 hearing, as it did here. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Although the court found that Mother was not in compliance with the case pl an, it erroneously ma de the finding under the preponderance of the evidence standa rd. We do not, however, believe this constitutes ground for reversal. The evid ence was undisputed that Mother had made no progress and Mother offered no excu se for her lack of progress or failure to enroll in the programs available. Accordingly, assuming Mother had not

12 Mother contends that DCFS’s alleged fa ilure to provide reasonable services during the six-month post-disposition period and the court’s alle ged failure to find that reasonable services were provided at the Se ptember 2011 hearing precluded the court from terminating parental rights over X.Z. at the December 4, 2012 section 366.26 hearing. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A); In re T.M . (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1173.) The court’s minute order included the findings th at “reasonable servi ces [were] provided to meet the needs of the minor s” and that “DCFS . . . comp lied with the case plan.” These findings were sufficient to establish th at the court believed reasonable services had been provided to Mother. For the reasons discussed, substantial evidence supported that finding. Accordingly, we reject this contention.16 forfeited her right to appella te examination of these issues by failing to seek writ review, we would find no ba sis for reversing the Sept ember 2011 order terminating services and setting the section 366.26 hearing.17 DISPOSITION The order terminating pare ntal rights is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.