### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE January 22, 2003 Se ssion STATE OF TENNE SSEE v. ALBER T D. WIL SON, II Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County No. C-10843 D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge

No. E2002-00890-CCA-R3-CD September 9, 2003
The appellant, Albert

D. Wilson, II, pled g

uilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of a Schedule II

controlled substance and was sentenced to eig ht yearsincarc eration

in the Tennessee Department

of Correction. The appella nt reserved two certified questions of law rela ting to the proprie ty of the search of his motel room. Upon review of the record and the par ties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appe al as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cir

cuit Cour

t is Affirmed.
N ORMA M C G EE O GLE , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON and J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R ., JJ., joined. Robert W. White (on appeal) and Charles Deas (at trial), Mary ville, Tennessee, for the a pp ellant, Alb ert D. W il son , II. Paul G. Summers , Attorne y General and Repor

ter; Pete r M. Coug

hlan, Ass istant Atto

rney Genera l; Mike Flynn, District Attorney General; and

John Bobo, A ssistant D istrict At torney Genera l, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. OPINION
I. Fact ual Backgro

und
On June 14, 1999, and July 8-9, 1999, a hearing was held in the Blount County Circuit Court on the appe

llant’s mo tion to supp

ress evidence discovered as the result of a searc h of his mote

l room. The first witness at the suppression hearing was Ron Talbott, a Blount County Sheriff’s De partment officer who was a ssigned

to the Fif th Judicial District Drug Task Force. Ag ent Talbott testified that on July 18, 1997, he received a telephone call from Major Ron Dunn of the Blount County Sheriff’s Departm ent. Major Dunn informed Agent Talbott that an anonymous ca

ller had informed him that “there was a sub

ject by the name of ‘Don’ at the Ramada Inn on Alcoa Highway , staying in Room1 Agen t Ta lbott ex plaine d that a “knoc k-and -talk is simply n othing mor e than to investiga te a co mpla int. . . .

W e kno cked and o nce w e got a n answ er, we sta rted talk ing. An d that’s ju st what it’s refer red to .” -2- 606, that was selling

and using

crack c ocaine a

nd coca ine.” The anony

mous calle

r also stated that there was a tan minivan parked outside the room. Agent Talbott, Agent Scott Johnson, and Agent Derrick Swenson went tothe Ramada Inn on Alcoa Highwa y to “foll ow up o n that compl aint” by perform ing a “knock-and-talk.” 1 When the agentsapproached room 606, Agent Talbott noticed a tan minivan parked outside the room. Agent Talbott knocked on the door of room 606 and “[a] g entleman came to the door as we knocked on the door.” The man, later

identified as David Simerly, did not offe r his name a

t that time a

nd the ag ents didnotsee anyone

else in the room. Ag ent Talbott identif ied himself and the

other ag ents and t

old Simerly “that we had

received complaints of sales of illegal narcotics and the use of dr ugs coming from this room, 6 06. I

told him we ’d like to

come in a

nd speak with him ab out it

and follow up on the complaint.” Simerly responde d, “Yeah, come on in.” Agent Talbott testified that Simer

ly d id no t o bj ec t t o t he ag en ts ’ e nt ry; in fa ct , S im er ly w as ve ry c oo pe ra ti ve an d f ri en dl y. Ac co rd in gl y, the thre e age nts enter ed room 60 6. Agen

t Talbott n oticed th at there was “quite a bit of clot

hing in the room. ” Almost imm

ediately after the agents’ entry , a man later identified as the appellant emerged

from the bathroom with a

towel wr apped a round hims elf. Ag ent Talbott agai n identified himself a

nd the othe

r agen ts and expla

ined why they were in the ro om. The appellant askedif he could q

uickly finish his shower and Agent Talbott agr eed to this request. The appellant did not ask the officers to leave the room. While the appellant was showering, the agentshad a brief conversation with Simerly . During the conversation, Agent Talbott noticed “drug para phernalia in two different areas of the room.” Agent Talbott testified that

he observed “[i]tems used to commonly smoke coca ine with. Light bulbs that had the tips busted out of them. By lig ht bulbs, I mean like a car lig ht bulb and with straws tapedand attached to the back parts of the bulbs. And butane torches and that type of thing.”

Agent Talbott stated:
I

didn’t move anything. O ne was just right at the – right behind me. Like I say , I was standing at

the foot of the bed where the – between the b e d and where the TV sets on the desk – or the dresser or whatever you might want to ca

ll it – and it was laying r

ight beside of it. The other was lay

ing on the table underneath the light that drops from the ceiling next to the door. Shortly thereafter, the appellant

em er ge d f

ro m t he sh ow er an d t he ag en ts le ar ne d h is id en ti ty. The agentsagain explained why they were

there. Agent Talbott also informed the appellant that he had noticed drug paraphernalia in the roomwhile the appellant finished his shower. The appellant stated that he was aware that the drug pa rap he rnalia was in the room. Agent Talbott requested consent to search the room, but the appellant refused to g ive consent.-3-

Following the appellant’s refusal, Offic er Joe Thornhill and Officer David Carswell of the Alcoa Police De

partmen t were c alled to

room 606. They “secur[ed] the room and protect[ed] it as a crime scene” while Agent Ta lbot t left to ob ta in a sear ch warr ant for th e room. A gent Ta

lbott estimate d that app

roximately

two hours elapsed from

the time of

the anony

mous telep

hone ca ll to the signing of the search wa rrant. U pon Agent Talbott’s return to room 606, he encountere d the appellant’s atto rn ey, Jeff Whitt , and one of Whitt’s associates. Agent T albott lea rned tha t the appe llant had called Wh

itt while Agent Talbott was obtaining

the sear ch warr ant. Whitt a sked the a

gents to leave . Agent

Talbott g ave Whitt a copy of the se arch warrant and told Whitt that “I ha d a search warrant

and a crime scene to search and that I would leave whe n my investigation was c omplete.” During the sear

ch of the room, the age

nts discov ered va

rious item s used to sm

oke narc otics, a book about cocaine, approximately $3000, approximately seven or eight grams of methamphetamine, 128 grams of cocaine, some marijuana, a nd a loaded nine-millimeter handgun. A large amount of

th e cocaine was individually packaged for resa

le. The contraband was found underne aththe mattress on one of the two beds in the room and in a black leather bag located in the bathroom. Agent Talbott acknowledged that prior to the officer s’ entry into room 606, he did not determine who had rented the room. Agent Talbott also maintained that af ter knocking on the door of room 606, h

e did not in str

uct Sim erly

to sit on the

bed. Ag ent Talbott stated t hat “as f ar as I knew, it was his p l ace of r esidenc y.”

Further more, Ag ent Talbott relate d that “I don’t know

if [S im er ly] was staying

there or he hadn’t been stay ing there as long as Don Wilson [the appellant] had been or if he was just visiting or – s ee ms li ke he ha d s om e c lo th es th er e b ut , l ik e I s ay, I don’t really re member.” Agent Sc ott Johnso n testified that on July 18, 1997, he accompanied Ag ent Talbott and Agent Swenson to room 606 of the Ramada Inn on Alcoa High way

to investig ate a co mplaint. Agent Talbo tt knocked o n the door of room 606 and the door was opened almost immediately by Si me rl y. Ag ent Johnson stated that Agent Talbott did most of the talking during the encounter. After identifying himself a

nd the o ther agents , Agent Talbott e

xplained th at they

were the re to inve stigate

a compl aint regarding the sale a nd use of narcotics in room 606. Agent Talbott then asked Simerly for pe

rmission to enter the room. Simerly responde d, “Yeah, come on in.” Shortly after th e age nts enter ed the ro om, the ap

pellant c ame

out of th e bathroom. The officers again identified themselves and explained their reason for being in the room. The appe llant askedfor permission to finish his shower, which permission was granted. The appe llant did not ask the agen ts to leave. While the appellant showered, the age nts talked with Simerly and Ag ent Johnson noticed a “crack pipe” located “in plain view on a table right there next to the doorway.” Agent Johnson testified that when the appellant came out of the bathroom, “there wa s a little more discussion . . . ab out why we we re ther e. We told him that we had seen the crack pipe.” The-4-

appellant acknowledged that he knew the de vice was there. The officers then requested permission to search the room, but the appellant refused to consent. Agent Johnson stay

ed in room

606 with two Alcoa

office rs while Agent Talbott and Agent Swenson left to obt

a i n a search warrant for the r oom. During the wait, the appellant asked Ag ent Johnson if he could make a telephone call. Agent Johnson gave the a ppellant permission to do so and the ap pella nt cal led hi s atto rney, Whi tt. A fter s peaki ng with Whitt, the appellant asked the officers to leave the room. However, the officers refused to leave and soon thereafter, Whitt and an associate arrived at the room. Agent Johnson note d that dur

ing the w ait for th

e searc h warra nt, Simerly, who appear

ed to be intoxic ated, fell asleep on one of the beds in the room. When Simerly roused, he asked Agent Johnson if he could get a beer out of the coole r in the room. Agent Johnson responded that Simer

ly had alread

y ha d enough to drink. Simerly then became uncooperative and eve ntually Age

nt Johnson raised his voice and told Simerly to sit down and coope rate. Simerly complied. John David Simerly testified that he and the appellant were friends and that on July

18, 1997, he was visiting the appellant at the Ramada I

nn on Alco a Highw ay

in order to use the motel p ool. Simerly estimated that

he had been in the appellant’s room for a fe w hours when he heard

a knock on the door. Simerly told the appellant, who was in the shower, that someone was at the door. The appellant instructed Simerly to determine who was at the door but not to allow any one in the room. Simerly asserted that the a ppellant never gave permission for any one to enter the room. Simerly stated that upon

hearing another knock, he “cracked the door” in order to see who was there. Simerly

asserte d th at “[t]here was a badge put in my face, ‘Blount County

Metro Narcoti cs, take a se at on the b ed.’” T he offic ers aske d if

“Don Wilson” wa s in the room, and Simerly told them that the appellant was in the shower. The offi cers the n entere d the bath

room to speak with the appellant. The agents asked the appellant for per mission to search the room, but the appellant refused the request. Simerly asser ted that he did not

see the pipe found by

the officers. Simerly sta

ted that he was upset and “didn’t know what was going on.” The appellant testified that he was the only g uest registered to room 606 of the Ramada Inn on Al co a H ig hw ay o n J ul y 1 8, 199 7, and that on the date of the search, he had been living at the m otel fo r a pp ro xi ma te ly f ou r t o s ix we ek s. Th e a pp el la nt st at ed th at Si me rl y wa s m er el y visitin g room606 that day; he wa s not an overnig ht guest and had no clothes in the room. Moreover, the appellant asserted that Simerly did not have the authority to allow any one to enter the room. The appellant stated that while he was in the shower, he heard a knock on the door of the motel room. The appellant instructed Simerly to determine who was at the door, buthe instructed Simerly not to allow any

one to enter the room. The appellant stated:-5- I remembered that

I had a bag sitting in the middle of the floor in the mainpart of the room. I hollered at [Simerly], Isaid, wait a minute. I got out, grabbed a towel, wra pped it around me, wal ke d in there – run in the re, go t it and run

back in th

e bathro om. The appellant closed the bathroom door and continued his shower. The appellant testified tha tshortly thereaf

ter, he opened the shower curtain and saw Agent Johnson standing in the bathroom

. The appellant asked Agent Johnson to identify himself. In response, Ag ent Johnson askedthe appellant, “Are

you Don?” When the appellant replied in the affirmative, Agent Johnson identified himself

and explained that he was an officer with Metro Narcotics. The appellant wrapped a towel ar ound himself and we

nt into the b edroom. T

he appellant ave

rred tha t he neve r got ba ck into the shower. Agent Talbott in

formed th e appell ant that th

e age nts wante d to sear

ch the ro om becau se of an anonymous tip. The appellant re fused to consent to the search of his room. According to the appella nt, Agent Talbott “turned to the other officer which was stand

ing in the doorw ay

and told him to . . . ‘Get on the horn and find us a judge.’” The appellant admitted that a pipe used to smoke methamphetamine w as in the r oom, but he claimedthat the pipe was “underneath the table, lay ing on top of the air conditioner.” The appellant stated that the p ipe was n ot in plain view, explaining “[y]ou’d have to be on the – wa lk around the table and be on the back side of the table in order to see it, and then y ou’d have to squat to see it.” Furthermore, the appellant asserted that any butan e torche s in the room were stored in a box and were not in plain view. The appellant stated that while the search warra nt was being obtained, he asked Age nt Johnson if he could use the telephone. Agent Joh nson told the appellant that he could use the telephone and the a

ppellant called Wh

itt. Whitt inst

ructed t he appellant to tell the officers to leave the room. The appellant did so, but the officers refused to leave . Whitt asked to speak with Agent Johnson on the telephone. The appellant stated that Agent Talbott stay ed in the corner of the room the entire time. When Whitt arrive d, he ask ed the of ficers t o leave. The offi cers ag ain ref used to leave and subsequently

produce d the pipe , stating that t he y were securing the room while wa iting for a search warrant.
Fi na ll y, Jeff Whitt testified that the appellant called him on July 18, 1997, and informed him that the officers were in the appellant’s motel room. Whitt told the appellant to order the off icers to leave the room. After the of ficers refused to comply, Whitt spoke with Agent Johnson on the telephone. Whitt and Willi am Brow n, anothe r attorne y f rom Whitt’s o ffice, went toroom606 at the Ramada Inn on Al co a H ig hw ay. Whitt could not recall if Agent Talbott was at the room when he arrived. Whitt, acti ng as the appella nt’s attor ney , asked th

e offic ers to lea

ve. The o fficer s again refused and explained that t

h ey wer e waiting on a search warr ant. Whitt maintained that either Agent Johnson or A gent Ta

lbott showed him the pip e that wa s found in the room, stating “wecould just arrest him for this.”-6-

At the co nclus ion o f the h earing, the trial cou rt overr uled the a ppellant ’s motion to

suppress the evidence obtained during a search of the appe llant’s motel room. Thereafter, the appellant pled guilty to the possession of a schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver, a class B felony. The a

ppellant was sentenc ed to eig ht y ears, “ split

confinement of 11/29 day for day, 1 y

ear intensive prob[ation], 2 years supervised prob[ation], balance on unsupe rvised prob[ation].” The appellant properly

reserved the following certified que stions of law:
I. Whether o fficer s of the B lount County Sheriff ’s Offic e Fifth Judicial District Drug Task Force had valid consent to enter the hotel roomo f the

[a ppe ll ant ] o n J ul y 18, 199 7 pu rsu ant to th e IV Amendment

to the U. S . Constitution & Article I, Sect. 7 of the TN Constitution , where a quantity of Schedule I I narcotics wer

e subsequently discovered[; and]
II. Whether there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant secure d by

Ron Talbot

tof the Blount

County Sheriff’s Off

ice Fifth Judicial District Drug Task Force on July 18, 1997 for a search of the [appellant’s] hotel room pursuant to the Fou

rth Amend

ment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee

Constitution. II. Analysis
In reviewing a trial court’s determinations re garding a suppression hear ing, “[q]uestions of credibi lity

of the witnesses, the weight and value of

the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State v. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, “a trial court’s findings of fa ct in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id. Neverth eless, a ppellate courts wi ll review

the tr ia l court’s applica

tio n of law to the facts purely de novo. State v. Walton , 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 20 01 ). Fu rt he rm or e, th e S ta te , a s t he pr ev ai li ng pa rt y, is “entitl ed to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be dra

wn from the evidence.” Odom , 928 S.W.2d at 23.
A. Consent Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution p rovide protection f or citizens against “unreasonable searc hes and seizures.” Ge ne ra ll y, a warra

ntless sea

rch is co nsidere d presump tively unreaso nable, th

us vio lati ve of constitutional protections. See State v. Walker , 12 S.W.3d 460 , 467 (Te nn. 2000) . The same protection enjoyed by

a citizen in his home is extended to a citizen in a “hotel room[] and other temporary living

spaces.” State v. Ro ss , 49 S.W.3d 833, 840 (Tenn. 2001).
Our supreme court has noted that, “[i]t is, of course, well settled that one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a searc h conducted pursuant to consent.” State v. Bartram , 925 S.W.2d-7-

227, 230 (T enn. 1 996) ( citi ng Schneck loth v. Bu stamonte

, 412 U.S. 21 8, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043- 2044 (1973), and State v. Jackson , 889 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)). “The sufficiency of consent depends largely

upon the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Jackso n , 88 9 S.W.2d at 221. The prosecution bears the burde n of proving that t

he appellant freely

and volun

tarily gaveconsent. See State v. McMahan, 650 S.W.2d 38 3, 386 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1983). We further observe that “‘[t]he existence of consent and whether it was voluntarily given a re questions of fact.’” Statev. Ashwor

th , 3 S .W.3d 25, 29 (Tenn . Cri m. App . 1999 ) (quo ting McMahan, 650 S.W.2d at 386).
Ge ne ra ll y, consent may be g iven “either

by t he individ ual whose propert y is searched or by a third party who possesses c ommon authority over the pre mises.” State v. El lis , 89 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court ha s defined common authority as the

mutual use of the property by persons g enerally ha

ving joint acce s s or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inha

bitants ha s the rig

ht to permi

t the inspe ction in his own right a

nd that the

others ha ve assume d the risk

that one o f their number might permit the common area to be searc hed. United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 94 S. Ct. 988, 9 9 3 n.7 (197 4); see also Bartram , 925 S.W.2d a

t 231. How ever, th

is court h as previ ously

explained

that [ t]he State may satisfy

its burden of proof in this regard eithe r b y demonstrating that

the third party in fact possessed common authority as defined above or, alterna tively , by demonstr

ating th at the fa

cts availab le to the searching police officers would have warra nted “‘ “a man of reasonable caution in the belief”’ that the consentingparty had authority over the pr

emises.” Ellis , 89 S.W. 3d at 5 93 (qu otin g Illin ois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2801 (1990)). Notably, the

United States Supreme Court has opined that the Constitution is no more violated when off

icers e nter with out a warrant because they

reasonably

(though e rroneous ly) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident

of the pr emises, than it is vi olated when they enter without a warrant because they reasona bly (though erroneously) believe they are in pur suit of a violent felon who is about to escape. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 186, 110 S. Ct. at 2800.-8-

In the instant

case, the three drug task for ce agents went to room

606 to perform a “knockand-talk.” See St ate v. B oyd L. Jones , No. W2002-00827-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 1618069, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Mar. 26, 2003). Agent Talbott knocked on the door of room 606 and a man later identified as Simerly opened the door. The agents could see into the motel room behind Si me rl y, but they

did not noti ce any

one else in the roo m. Agen

t Talbott id

entified himself and the other agents and advised

Simerly that they

worked for the drug task force

. Agent Talbott explained that the agents were at

the room to investigate a complaint regarding the use and sa

le of drugs from room60 6; ac co rd in gl y, Agent Talbott asked for permission to enter the room. Simerly allowed the agents to enter the room. There was no pr

oof addu ced at the suppre ssion hea ring to s ugge st

that Simerly had “common authority,” as defined in Matlock , over the motel room. However, the evidence did show that the agentsreasona

bly believe d that Simer

ly w as a resident of

the prem ises with th

e requis ite autho

rity to grant the agents entry . Significantly, at the c onclusion of the suppression hearing the trial court found: Here, I’ve judge d the credibility by the testimony and the appea rance and the demeanor of the witnesses that I ’ve seente st if y. And I do not find the testimony given

by Mr. Simerly

about how the of

ficers c ame into the room to be credible. Based on his actions on the stand, based on his action s at the sc ene, ba se d on him – I think Mr. Simerly

was under the influen ce and w ent to the door and saw these men at the door and he opene d the door and they sa id can we come in and he said, sur e, come on in. And there’s no reason that the office rs shouldn’t enter a t this point. The next issue is, since they were in the r oom by permission, they could have been ejected by

direction of Mr. Simerly or Mr . Wilson at any time , unl ess th ey had som ethin g –something had happened in the meantime that ga ve them the rig ht to stay there over somebody’s objection. And I think the proof has shown that that did happen. And that is, that the

y sa w some thing th at was obviously used to smoke some sort of controlled substance and a lighter or torch of some sort laying in plain vie

w when they ca

m e into the room. And that was evidence of a crime. And from that point on, they didn’ t ha ve to leave when they

were told to leave. They could hav e made a

n arres tbased on

probable cause a t that point , and done a wa

lk-throu gh. Tha

t would have revealed the bag that had the gun in it and

maybe some more

paraphernalia. I

t wouldn’t have giventhem the right to search to the extent tha t t hey did with the search warrant – that is, between the mattresses and things lik

e that. There would have been no justification, obviously, f or loo king for-9- somebody hid ing under a mattress or any thing like that. But they didn’tdo that. They just stay ed there and got the warrant and then searched.
We conclude that

the evidence does not preponderate ag ainst the trial court’s findings. The office rs, acting under a r easonab le belief

that Simer

ly w as a resident of the pr emises, a sked Simer

ly for permissio n to enter the motel room and Simerly g ave the agents permission to enter. Therefore , the officers could have reasonably determinedthat

Simerly had the authority to give consent to the officers to enter the room. B. Search Warrant The appe llant also raised th e issue of whether there wa s probabl e cause for the issuance of the sear ch warr ant for th e appell ant’s mote

l room. Our

supreme court ha s explaine d that [t]he Fou rth Am endment to the United States Constitution requires that search warran ts issu e only “upon proba ble cause, supported by Oa th or affirmation.” Article I , Section 7 of the Tennessee Consti tution precludes the issuance of warrants e xcept upon “evidenceof the fact committed.” Therefore, under both the federal and state constitutions, no warra nt is to be issued except upon probable cause.
Statev. Henning , 975 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tenn. 1998) (footnote and citations omitted). “A showing of probable cause requires, ge nerally, re asonable grounds for suspicion, supported by circumstances indicative of an illegal act.” State v. Stevens , 989 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 1999).

Moreover, “a finding of probable cause s uppor ting i ssuance of a search warr ant must be basedupon evidence incl uded in a writ ten and sworn affidavit.” Henning , 975 S.W.2d at 294. Sp ec if ic al ly, this court has observed that “[p]robable cause to support the issuance of a warra nt must appear in the af fidavit, a nd judicia

l review of the exis tence of probable cause will not include looking to o ther evidence provided to or known by the issuing magistrate or possessed by the affiant.” State v. Barbara Copeland , No. 03C01-9402-CR-00079, 1996 WL 368209, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville , June 28, 19 96); see also State v. Moon , 841 S.W.2d 336, 337-38 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992 ). Additio nally , “[i]n orde r to estab lishprobable

cause, a n affida vit must set

forth facts from which a r

easonab le concl

usion may

be draw n that the

contrab and will be

found in th e place to be searched pursuant to the warrant.” State v. N orris , 47 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 2000). Furthermore, “‘affidavits must be looked at a nd read in a commonsense and practical manner ’, a nd . . . the finding of probable cause by the issuing magistrate is entitled to great deferenc e.” State v. Brya n , 769 S .W.2 d 208, 211 (T enn. 1 989) ( quot ing State v. Melson , 638 S.W.2d 342, 357 (Tenn. 1982)). Accordingly , we must review the affidavit to determine whether there wa s suffici ent evide nce con tained therein to

support th

e issuanc e of the s earch w arrant

.-10-

In the affidavit supporting the search war rant, Agent Talbott explained that the agents went to room606 to investigate the anony mous complaint of drug use and sales. After knocking on the door and receiving consent, the ag ents entered the room. Once legitima tely in the room, the age

nts observed two “crack pipe[s]” in plain view. In the af fidavit, Agent Talbott stated that he is “familiar withwhat drug parap hernali a looks lik e and how

it is used.”

Thus, bas ed solely

upon the a

gents’ observation of drug

paraphe rnalia u sed to smoke narcotics, a magistrate could rea sonably determine that narcotics were in the room. According ly, we conc lude tha t the s earch warrant permitting the search of the appellant’s motel room was valid. III. Conclusion Based upon the foregoing , we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE