No. 87-513, 

87-542 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

No. 87-513 

DONALD W. LAKE and BERNADINE A. LAKE, 

husband & wife, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants. 

-vsLAKE COUNTY, MONTANA, and INDIVIDUAL 

MEMBERS OF THE LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF 

COMMISSIONERS, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

THE CITY OF RONAN, a Montana Municipal 

corporation, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsDONALD WILLIAM LAKE, a/k/a DONALD W. LAKE, 

and BERNADINE A. LAKE, 

Defendants and Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lake, 

The Honorable C.B. McNeil, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Edward K. Duckworth, Ronan, Montana 

For Respondent : 

William H. Coldiron; Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & 

Waterman, Helena, Montana 

Larry J. H~stler, County Attorney, Polson, llontana 

For Amicus Curiae: (David Tilton, Deputy County Atty.) 

Philip J. Grainey; French Mercer & Grainey, Polson, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: June 9, 1988 

Decided: ALlg~st 2, 1988 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This action was commenced as an eminent domain 

proceeding brought by the City of Ronan (Ronan) to condemn 

land owned by the Lakes in furtherance of an airport 

expansion project. Donald and Bernadine Lake responded by 

seeking a preliminary injunction halting the action by Ronan, 

summary judgment and a delay in the proceedings. The Lakes 

also sought a preliminary injunction against Lake County 

prohibiting funding of Ronan's actions. Following a hearing, 

the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake 

County, issued orders denying the Lake's motions and quashing 

the motion for preliminary injunction as to Lake County. We 

affirm. 

The issues before the Court are: 

1. Does formation of a joint airport board pursuant to 

5 67-10-204, -206, MCA, preclude independent exercise of the 

power of eminent domain by a member municipality for airport 

purposes? 

2. Does Ronan's independent eminent domain proceeding 

constitute a violation of the Lakes' right to due process? 

3. Did the District Court err in denying the Lakes' 

application for a preliminary injunction against Ronan? 

4. Did the District Court err in granting Lake County's 

motion to quash the Lakes' application for a preliminary 

injunction? 

On October 16, 1947, Lake County, the City of Polson, 

the Town of St. Ignatius, and Ronan entered an agreement 

providing for the establishment of a joint airport board. As 

the original agreement neared its expiration date, the 

parties again joined together in an attempt to further the 
public good. On March 18, 1966, the parties entered an 

agreement for a term of 25 years which, as amended, provides, 

in pertinent part: 

I 

CREATION OF JOINT BOARD 

There is hereby created, pursuant to the provisions 

of Chapter 288, Laws of 1947, a Joint Airport 

Board, to have, and which shall have, the 

jurisdiction over the planning, acquiring, 

establishment, development, construction, 

enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, 

operation, regulation, protection and policing of 

said joint airports or landing fields or other air 

navigation facilities established, owned or 

controlled, or to be established, owned or 

controlled by the county and cities and town 

aforementioned, located upon the sites above 

mentioned and which shall have, as well, 

jurisdiction over the airport hazards as authorized 

by Chapter 288, Laws of 1947. 

POWERS AND DUTIES 

The Joint Airport Board created and 

established hereby shall have the following powers 

and duties: 

(1) To provide for the planning, acquisition, 

establishment, development, construction, 

enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, 

operation, regulation, protection and policing of 

the joint airports or landing fields on the sites 

above described, and other air navigation 

facilities established thereon or to be established 

thereon and all airport hazards, but the said Joint 

Airport Board shall make no contract nor incur any 

obligation for such purposes, nor for any one of 

them, which singly or in the aggregate shall 

involve an expenditure of any more money than is 

available under the Joint Airport Board Budget for 

such purpose. 
The agreement does not vest the joint airport board with 

the power to tax or the power of eminent domain. In 

addition, although the agreement provides for joint ownership 

of the various airports, Ronan has held record fee simple 

title to the Ronan airport property since its construction in 

the early 1950's. The controversy at hand arises as a result 

of Ronan's efforts to condemn the Lake's land in order to 

expand the airport without benefit of the consent and 

approval of the joint airport board. 

On August 29, 1986, Ronan and Lake County jointly 

applied to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an 

airport expansion grant in order to fund acquisition of the 

land. Following approval of a $256,500 grant by the FAA, and 

written acceptance of the same by Ronan and Lake County, the 

money was deposited in the "Airport Fund for the City of 

Ronan. I' Shortly thereafter, Ronan began eminent domain 

proceedings against the Lakes. Ronan's efforts were funded 

by the "Airport Fund for the City of Ronan." 

EMINENT DOMAIN 

The crucial question is the effect of the 1966 agreement 

entered into by Ronan and the other signators. The Lakes 

argue that as a result of the adoption of the joint airport 

board agreement, S 67-10-205 (2) (c) , MCA, mandates that Ronan 

may bring an eminent domain proceeding for airport purposes 

only as a joint action with the other signators. We 

conclude, however, that the Lakes take an overly narrow view 

of Ronan's power of eminent domain. 

Generally, the power of eminent domain is viewed as an 

inherent attribute of sovereignty existing without reliance 

on constitutional acknowledgement. State v. Aitchison 

(1934), 96 Mont. 335, 341, 30 P.2d 805, 808. At its heart, 

the sovereign's right of eminent domain is little more than 

an embodiment of the principle that the rights of the 
individual sometimes pale in comparison with the needs of the 

common welfare. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. v. Montana 

Union Ry. Co. (1895), 16 Mont. 504, 536, 41 P. 232, 243. It 

is a right necessarily incident to the government's duty to 

serve the common need and advance the general welfare. 

From the days of early statehood, the legislature has 

recognized the need to endow municipalities with the power of 

eminent domain for the good of the whole. Consequently, with 

the advent of the broad availability of commercial aviation, 

the 1947 Montana Legislature acted to ensure that Montanans 

would reap the benefits inherent in increased air service. 

See, Ch. 288, Laws of Montana (1947). Then, as now, 

"Expansion, not restriction, [was] the legislative 

watchword. " See Montana Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mine Co. (1987) , 

748 P.2d at 444, 448, 44 St.Rep. 2161, 2166. 

Chapter 288 of the Laws of Montana (1947), declared 

itself to be an act "providing for acquisition, construction, 

maintenance, operation, and regulation" of airports by 

municipalities and counties. In addition, the Act authorizes 

counties and municipalities to accomplish this task either 

jointly or separately, through the use of eminent domain. 

See, Ch. 288, S;S; 3, 14, Laws of Montana (1947) . However, 

consistent with the broad grant of authority embodied by the 

Act, and the earlier enactments of the 1929 legislature 

granting similar rights, the 1947 legislation did not 

specifically provide that the creation of a joint airport 

board constituted a waiver of the right to independent 

action. Both the 1929 and 1947 Acts, as codified in Title 

67, Ch. 10, remain substantially unchanged. 

At issue in the instant case is the interaction of the 

various sections of Title 67, Ch. 10. The statutes at issue 

provide in pertinent part: 
67-10-102. Acquisition and establishment of 

airports and landing fields. (1) counties, 

cities, ax towns in this state may, either 

individually or the joint action of a county and 

one or more of thecities and towns within its 

border, acquire by gift, deed, purchase, or 

condemnation land for airport or landing field 

purposes and thereon establish, construct, own, 

control, lease, equip, improve, - operate - and 

regulate airports . . .. 

(2) In addition a county, city, or town may do the 

acts authorized by this section by acting jointly 

with one or more counties, with one or more cities, 

with one or more towns, or any combination of such 

counties, cities, or towns . . . 

67-10-103. Public purpose. (1) Any lands 

acquired, owned, controlled, or occupied by any 

county, city, or town, individually or- to 

on action as herein provided for-the purposes 

enumerated in 67-10-102, are acquired, owned, 

controlled, and occupied for a public use and as a 

matter of public necessity, and such counties, 

cities, and-towns, whether-acting individually or 

jointly, -- have the right to acquire property for 

such purposes under the power of eminent domain as 

and for a public use or 'ecessity. 

(2) The acquisition of any land or interest 

therein pursuant to this chapter; the planning, 

acquisition, establishment, development, 

construction, improvement, maintenance, equipment, 

operation, regulation, protection, and policing of 

airports and air navigation facilities, including 

the acquisition or elimination of airport hazards; 

and the exercise of any other powers herein granted 

to municipalities and other public asencies, -- to be 

severally- or jointly exercised, are public and 

governmentaT functions, exercised for a public 

purpose and matters of public necessity . . .- 

67-10-201. General municipal powers (1) Every 

municipality may, out of any appropriations 

or other money made available for such purposes, 

plan, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, 

improve, maintain, equip, operate, regulate, 

protect, and police airports and air navigation 

facilities, either within or without the 
territorial limits of such municipality and within 

or without the territorial boundaries of this 

state, including the construction, installation, 

equipment, maintenance, and operation at such 

airports of buildings and other facilities for the 

servicing of aircraft or for the comfort and 

accomodation of air travelers and the purchase and 

sale of supplies, goods, and commodities as an 

incident to the operation of its airport 

properties. For such purposes the municipality may 

use any available property that it may now or 

hereafter own or control and may, by purchase, 

gift, devise, lease, eminent domain proceedings, or 

otherwise, acquire property, real or personal, or 

any interest therein,. . . 

67-10-202. Creation of board--fundin%--rules. (1) 

The county, city, ortown, acting individually or 

acting jointly as authorized by 67-10-102, having 

established an airport or landing field and 

acquired property for such purpose, may construct, 

improve, equip, maintain, and operate the same and 

for that purpose may create a board or body from 

the inhabitants of such county, city, or town, or 

such joint subdivisions of the state for the 

purpose of conferring upon them, and may confer 

upon them, the jurisdiction for the improvement, 

equipment, maintenance, and operation- of such 

airport or landing field.. . . 

67-10-204. Joint exercise of powers. (2) All 

powers, privileges, and authority granted to any 

municipality by this chapter may - be exercised and 

enjoyed jointly with any public agency of this 

state and jointly with any public agency of any 

other state or of the United States to the extent 

that the laws of such other state or of the United 

States permit such joint exercise or 

enjoyment.. . . 

67-10-205. Joint airport board. (1) Public 

agencies acting jointly pursuant to 67-10-204 

through 67-10-206 shall create a joint board which 

shall consist of members appointed by the governing 

body of each participating public agency.. . . The 

joint board shall have power to plan, acquire, 

establish, develop, construct, enlarge, improve, 

maintain, equip, operate, regulate, protect, and 

police any airport or air navigation facility or 
airport hazard to be jointly acquired, controlled, 

and operated; and such board may exercise on behalf 

of its constituent public agencies all the powers 

of each with respect to such airport, air 

navigation facility, or airport hazard, subject to 

the limitations of subsection (2) of this 

section.. . . 

(2) (c) Eminent domain proceedings under 67-10-204 

through 67-10-206 may be instituted only by 

authority of the governing bodies of the 

constituent public agencies of the joint board. If 

so authorized, such proceedings shall be instituted 

in the names of the constituent public agencies 

jointly, and the property so acquired shall be held 

by said public agencies as tenants in common until 

conveyed by them to the joint board. (Emphasis 

added. ) 

By its terms, § 67-10-205(2) (c), MCA, requires joint 

action when an eminent domain proceeding is brought pursuant 

to the authority of a joint airport board. However, it does 

not, on its face, preclude action separate and apart from the 

joint airport board. Statutes cannot be examined in a 

vacuum. Rather, statutes affecting the same topic should be 

read together and, if possible, harmonized so as to give 

effect to each of them. See, Schuman v. Bestrom (Mont. 

1985), 693 P.2d 536, 42 St.Rep. 54. 

In the instant case, §§ 67-10-102, -103, -201, and -202, 

MCA, evidence a legislative intent to empower municipalities 

to act either jointly or independently. In addition, our 

state constitution demonstrates an intent to endow cities 

with a broad grant of power. "The powers of incorporated 

cities and towns and counties shall be liberally construed." 

Art. XI, 4(2), 1972 Mont. Const. Further, when the 

authority of a city is in question, "every reasonable doubt 

as to the existence of a local government power or authority 

[is to] be resolved in favor of the existence of the exercise 

of that power or authority." Section 7-1-106, MCA. 
To limit the statutory scheme to the narrow 

interpretation suggested by the Lakes would fly in the face 

of both constitutional and legislative directive. We are not 

prepared to do so. Neither the joint airport board agreement 

nor any of the provisions of Title 67, Ch. 10, specifically 

prohibit the independent exercise of a municipality's power 

of eminent domain. Rather the power in this case is 

expressly granted. We must conclude that Ronan acted within 

its statutory powers to exercise eminent domain. 

DUE PROCESS 

The crux of the Lakes' due process argument is that it 

is unfair to allow Ronan to bring an independent eminent 

domain proceeding and thereby manipulate the geographical 

area subject to a public necessity determination. However, 

although ably argued, the Lakes are unable to cite authority 

in support of their contention. We conclude that such a 

failure is not the result of a lack of diligence, but rather 

reflects the lack of merit of the claim. 

The right to due process guarantees that no person shall 

be deprived of property pursuant to eminent domain 

proceedings without adequate notice, a hearing and just 

compensation. See Housing Authority v. Bjork (1940), 109 

Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 324. Ronan's compliance with the eminent 

domain procedures contained within Title 70, Ch. 30, MCA, 

clearly satisfies those requirements. 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

As the Lakes' claim to entitlement to a preliminary 

injunction was founded on the alleged statutory and 

constitutional violations committed by Ronan, the claim is 

clearly without merit. We therefore limit our discussion to 

the issue of the quashing of the application for preliminary 

injunction against Lake County. 
The first allegation of error concerns the adequacy of 

the District Court's order denying the Lakes' application for 

preliminary injunction and granting Lake County's motion to 

quash. Specifically, that the District Court failed to make 

adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Pursuant to Rule 52 (a), M.R.Civ.P., orders granting or 

refusing interlocutory injunctions shall be accompanied by 

findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Ensley v. 

Murphy (1983), 202 Mont. 406, 658 P.2d 418. However, the 

extent of such findings and conclusions is necessarily 

dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. 

Consequently, the litmus test in such cases is whether the 

District Court's order sets forth its reasoning in a manner 

sufficient to allow informed appellate review. Accord, 

Clemans v. Martin (Mont. 1986), 719 P.2d 787, 43 St.Rep. 994. 

In the instant case, the District Court found that the 

Lakes' prayer for relief failed because they retained a 

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law--the Lakes 

complaint for damages. Although the court failed to state 

its findings and conclusions in the recommended form, the 

court's reasoning is nevertheless clear. Under such 

circumstances, we conclude the Lakes' specification of error 

is meritless. 

In the second and third specifications of error, the 

Lakes contend that the District Court's order is erroneous 

because the possible award of damages is not sufficient to 

remedy Lake County's illegal funding of Ronan's illegal 

eminent domain proceedings, and that the County's action 

results in the indirect seizure of the Lakes' land because 

the land will be held by the joint airport board. FJe 

disagree. 

As noted above, Ronan is free to pursue independent 

eminent domain proceedings. Upon the successful completion 
of the eminent domain proceedings, and payment of just 

compensation, title to the property will be vested in Ronan 

alone. Neither Lake County nor the joint airport board will 

hold an interest in the property. The Lakes' contention that 

Lake County is indirectly seizing their land must therefore 

fail. 

In addition, the Lakes have made no showing that the 

funding of the project is unlawful. Lake County merely acts 

as custodian of the separate airport funds. When not bound 

by the procedural constraints of joint action under 5 

67-10-201, et seq., MCA, Lake County remains free to release 

funds to Ronan upon lawful request A 

The judgment is affirmed. 

Justice 

We Concur: 

I 

Justices 

%IvuJb Hon. Frank & I. flaswell, Lit'-4 

sitting for Chief ~ustice 

J. A. Turnage