IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MARLETTE E. THOMAS and KATHRYN A. : CIVIL ACTION 

THOMAS, as Co-Executors of the Estate of : 

JAMES A. THOMAS, Deceased, and on Behalf : 

of All Surviving Next of Kin and MARLETTE E. : 

THOMAS and KATHRYN A. THOMAS, : 

Individually and in Their Own Right : 

15021 Bonnair Road : 

Glen Rock PA 17327 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

FRANCIS N. KUHN a/k/a FRANCIS W. KUHN : 

and MARY ANN KUHN, as Co-Executors of the : 

Estate of JODY A. LAUGHMAN, Deceased, and : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

on Behalf of All Surviving Next of Kin and : 

FRANCIS N. KUHN a/k/a FRANCIS W. KUHN : 

and MARY ANN KUHN, Individually and in : 

Their Own Right : 

226 Princess Street : 

Hanover PA 17331 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

RORY L. LAUGHMAN, as Administrator of the : 

Estate of NICOLE L. LAUGHMAN, Deceased, : 

and on Behalf of All Surviving Next of Kin and : 

RORY L. LAUGHMAN, Individually and in His : 

Own Right : 

319 Eagle Avenue : 

Hanover, PA 17331 : 

 : 

 Plaintiffs, : 

 : 

v. : 

: 

K&S HELICOPTERS, INC.; : 

K&S HELICOPTERS, INC. d/b/a TROPICAL : 

HELICOPTERS; CALVIN G. DORN : 

73-4345 Paani Place : 

Kailua-Kona, HI 96740 : 

 : 

 and : NO. 

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JOSEPH EDWARD ZAREMBA; and JOSEPH : 

EDWARD ZAREMBA d/b/a PACIFIC TURBINE; : 

PACIFIC TURBINE, INC. : 

73-4344 Pahee Place : 

Kailua-Kona, HI 96740 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

TINA HOLLIDAY, Special Administrator of the : 

Estate of RUSSELL TIMOTHY HOLLIDAY, : 

Deceased : 

2608 ñ 41st Street SE : 

Puyallup, WA 98374 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

ACTIVITY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.; and : 

ACTIVITY INFORMATION CENTER, INC. : 

d/b/a HAWAII ACTIVITY WORLD : 

c/o National Registered Agents of HI, Inc. : 

1136 Union Mall, Suite 301 : 

Honolulu, HI 96813 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

EXTEX, EXTEX LTD.; and EXTEX LTD, LLC : 

1383 N. Tech Blvd. : 

Gilbert, AZ 85012 : 

 and/or : 

c/o CT Corporation : 

3225 N. Central Avenue : 

Phoenix, AZ 85012 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

EXTEX INVESTORS, INC. : 

c/o ACFB Incorporated : 

200 Public Square, #2300 : 

Cleveland, OH 44114 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

LARRY SHIEMBOB : 

1383 N. Tech Blvd. : 

Gilbert, AZ 85012 : 

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 and : 

 : 

SUPERIOR AIR PARTS, INC. : 

621 S. Royal Lane, Suite 100 : 

Coppell, TX 75019 : 

 and/or : 

c/o CT Corporation System : 

1515 Market Street, Suite 1210 : 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION; : 

ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE COMPANY; : 

ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE SERVICES; : 

ALLISON ENGINE COMPANY, INC. d/b/a : 

ROLLS ROYCE-ALLISON; and ALLISON : 

ENGINE COMPANY : 

c/o Corporation Service Co. : 

251 E. Ohio Streeet, Suite 500 : 

Indianapolis, IN 46204 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, : 

ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION : 

c/o Corporation Service Co. : 

251 E. Ohio Streeet #500 : 

Indianapolis, IN 46204 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

GENERAL MOTORS : 

CORPORATION, DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON : 

DIVISION; and GENERAL MOTORS : 

CORPORATION : 

c/o The Corporation Company : 

30600 Telegraph Road : 

Bingham Farms, MI 48025 : 

 : 

 and : 

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MD HELICOPTERS, INC. : 

c/o David W. Kash, Esquire : 

Jennings Strouss & Salmon : 

201 E. Washington Street, 11th Floor : 

Phoenix, AZ 85004-2385 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

MD HELICOPTERS B.V.; RDM HOLDING(S) : 

INC.; and MD HELICOPTER HOLDINGS, INC., : 

a subsidiary of RDM HOLDINGS, INC. : 

c/o Ronald D. Moore : 

7828 E. Oak Shore Drive : 

Scottsdale, AZ 85258 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

MD HELICOPTERS USA, INC. : 

c/o The Corporation Trust Co. : 

Corporate Trust Center : 

1209 Orange Street : 

Wilmington, DE 19801 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

HUGHES HELICOPTER COMPANY : 

c/o McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company : 

c/o Corporation Service Company : 

2338 W. Royal Palm Road, Suite J : 

Phoenix, AZ 85012 : 

 : 

 and : 

 : 

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION; : 

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTER : 

COMPANY; MCDONNELL DOUGLAS : 

HELICOPTER COMPANY d/b/a MCDONNELL : 

DOUGLAS HELICOPTER SYSTEMS; and : 

THE BOEING COMPANY : 

c/o Corporation Service Company : 

2338 W. Royal Palm Road, Suite J : 

Phoenix, AZ 85012 : 

 : 

 and : 

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UNIVERSAL POWER, INC. : 

c/o Russell L. Strohn, Jr. : 

P.O. Box 842459 : 

Hildale, UT 84784 : 

 : 

and : 

 : 

DOES ONE through ONE HUNDRED, inclusive, : 

and each of them, : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

CIVIL ACTION COMPLAINT

 Marlette E. Thomas and Kathryn A. Thomas, Francis N. Kuhn and Mary Ann Kuhn, 

and Rory Laughman, by and through their attorney, Richard E. Genter, respectfully allege as 

follows: 

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

The Parties

1. These actions on behalf of plaintiffs, Marlette E. Thomas and Kathryn A. 

Thomas, Individually and as Co-Executors of the Estate of James A. Thomas; Francis N. 

Kuhn and Mary Ann Kuhn, Individually and as Co-Executors of the Estate of Jody A. 

Laughman, and Rory Laughman, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Nicole L. 

Laughman, all deceased, on behalf of the Estates of James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman 

and Nicole L. Laughman, and all surviving next of kin of James A. Thomas, Jody A. 

Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman, seek damages recoverable under applicable wrongful 

death and survival action common law and/or statutes for the wrongful death of James A. 

Thomas, Jody A. Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman who died as a result of injuries suffered 

in a helicopter crash that occurred on June 15, 2003. 

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2. Plaintiffs, Marlette E. Thomas and Kathryn A. Thomas, are individuals, 

husband and wife, citizens and residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, residing at 

15021 Bonnair Road, Glen Rock, PA 17327, and at all times material hereto, are the 

surviving parents of their deceased adult son, James A. Thomas, and the duly appointed CoExecutors of the Estate of James A. Thomas, deceased, having been so appointed on June 27, 

2003 by the Register of Wills of the County of Adams, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs 

bring this action in their capacity as Co-Executors, individually and in their own right, and on 

behalf of all interested beneficiaries and/or next of kin of the decedent. 

3. Plaintiffs, Francis N. Kuhn a/k/a Francis W. Kuhn and Mary Ann Kuhn, are 

individuals, husband and wife, citizens and residents of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 

residing at 226 Princess Street, Hanover, PA 17331, and at all times material hereto, are the 

surviving parents of their deceased adult daughter, Jody A. Laughman, and the duly appointed 

Co-Executors of the Estate of Jody A. Laughman, deceased, having been so appointed on 

June 27, 2003 by the Register of Wills of the County of Adams, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 

Plaintiffs bring this action in their capacity as Co-Executors, individually and in their own 

right, and on behalf of all interested beneficiaries and/or next of kin of the decedent. 

4. Plaintiff, Rory L. Laughman, is an individual, citizen and resident of the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, currently residing at 319 Eagle Avenue, Hanover, PA 

17331, and at all times material hereto, is the surviving father of his deceased minor daughter, 

Nicole L. Laughman, deceased, and the duly appointed Administrator of the Estate of Nicole 

L. Laughman, deceased, having been so appointed on August 14, 2003 by the Register of 

Wills of the County of Adams, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Nicole L. Laughman, deceased, 

was the daughter born of the marriage of Rory L. Laughman and Jody A. Laughman, 

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deceased. Plaintiff brings this action in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Nicole 

L. Laughman, individually and in his own right, and on behalf of all interested beneficiaries 

and/or next of kin of the decedent. 

5. Defendant, K&S Helicopters, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing 

under the laws of the State of Hawaii, with its principal place of business located in KailuaKona, HI, but, upon information and belief, conducts and/or transacts business within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over this 

defendant. At all times material hereto, this defendant is in the business of owning and 

operating helicopters which are used, among other things, to provide commercial sightseeing 

tour rides in and around the Hawaiian Islands. 

6. Defendant, K&S Helicopters, Inc. d/b/a Tropical Helicopters is a corporation 

and/or business entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of Hawaii, with its 

principal place of business in Kailua-Kona, HI, but, upon information and belief, conducts 

and/or transacts business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the 

exercise of jurisdiction over this defendant. At all times material hereto the name Tropical 

Helicopters is a trade name registered by and/or a separate entity created by defendant K&S 

Helicopters, Inc. for the purpose of providing commercial helicopter sightseeing tour rides in 

and around the Hawaiian Islands. 

7. Defendant, Calvin G. Dorn, is an individual, citizen and resident of the State of 

Hawaii, residing and/or conducting business at 73-4345 Paani Place, Kailua-Kona, HI, and at 

all times material hereto acted individually and/or in his capacity as president, shareholder, 

director, officer, agent and/or employee of defendant K&S Helicopters, Inc. and defendant 

K&S Helicopters, Inc. d/b/a Tropical Helicopters. Defendants K&S Helicopters, Inc., K&S 

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Helicopters, Inc. d/b/a Tropical Helicopters and Calvin G. Dorn are hereinafter collectively 

referred to as ìthe K&S defendantsî. 

8. Defendant, Joseph Edward Zaremba, is an individual, citizen and resident of 

the State of Hawaii, residing and/or conducting business at 73-4344 Pahee Place, KailuaKona, HI, and at all times material hereto acted either individually and/or in his capacity as 

agent, servant, workman and/or employee of the K&S defendants, including but not limited to 

acting and serving as the Director of Maintenance for the commercial helicopter operations of 

the K&S defendants and/or acting and serving as the sole proprietor of a helicopter 

maintenance facility doing business as Pacific Turbine. 

9. Defendant, Pacific Turbine, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing 

under the laws of the State of Hawaii, with its principal place of business at 73-4344 Pahee 

Place, Kailua-Kona, HI, and at all times material hereto is and/or was in the business of 

providing aircraft and helicopter inspection, maintenance and repair, including providing 

personnel to act, serve and perform the maintenance operations and requirements of the K&S 

defendants. Defendants Pacific Turbine, Inc., Joseph Edward Zaremba, and Joseph Edward 

Zaremba d/b/a Pacific Turbine are hereinafter collectively referred to as ìthe Zaremba 

defendantsî. 

10. Defendant, Tina Holliday, Special Administrator of the Estate of Russell 

Timothy Holliday, deceased, is an individual, citizen and resident of the State of Washington, 

and at all times material hereto is the surviving spouse and duly appointed Administrator of 

the Estate of Russell Timothy Holliday, deceased, having been so appointed on February 15, 

2005 by Order of the Circuit Court of the Third District, State of Hawaii. At all times 

material hereto, defendantís decedent, Russell Holliday, served as pilot-in-command of the 

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accident helicopter which crashed causing the death of plaintiffsí decedents, and in 

connection thereto, pilot Holliday acted either individually and/or in his capacity as agent, 

servant, workman and/or employee of the K&S defendants. Defendant Tina Holliday, Special 

Administrator of the Estate of Russell Timothy Holliday is hereinafter referred to as defendant 

Holliday. 

11. Defendant, Activity Information Center, Inc., is a corporation duly organized 

and existing under the laws of the State of Hawaii, with its principal place of business in 

Honolulu, HI, but, upon information and belief, conducts and/or transacts business within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over this 

defendant. At all times material hereto this defendant is in the business of selling and 

marketing activities and tour packages available in and around the Hawaiian Islands, 

including helicopter sightseeing rides. 

12. Defendant, Activity Information Center, Inc. d/b/a Hawaii Activity World, is a 

corporation and/or business entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of 

Hawaii with its principal place of business in Honolulu, HI, but, upon information and belief, 

does regularly conduct and/or transact business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 

sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over this defendant. At all times material 

hereto the name Hawaii Activity World is a trade name registered by and/or a separate entity 

created by defendant Activity Information Center, Inc. for the purpose of providing activity 

sales and tour packages, including helicopter sightseeing rides, in and around the Hawaiian 

Islands. Defendants Activity Information Center, Inc. d/b/a Hawaii Activity World and 

Activity Information Center, Inc., are hereinafter collectively referred to as ìthe Hawaii 

Activity World defendantsî. 

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13. Defendants Extex, Extex, Ltd. and Extex Ltd. LLC are one or more 

corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio, with their 

principal place of business located at 1383 N. Tech Blvd., Gilbert, AZ, but, upon information 

and belief, regularly conducts and/or transacts business within the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over these defendants. At all 

times material hereto, said defendants hold FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) for an 

engine component part called the compressor adapter coupling, which component part failed 

on the accident helicopter engine resulting in an immediate and total loss of engine power and 

subsequent crash of the helicopter piloted by defendant Holliday. 

14. Defendant, Extex Investors, Ltd., is a corporation duly organized and existing 

under the laws of the State of Ohio, with its principal place of business located in Akron, 

Ohio. At all times material hereto, this defendant is either the parent, holding company and/or 

legal beneficiary of the business operated and conducted by the defendants Extex, Extex Ltd. 

and Extex Ltd. LLC. 

15. Defendant, Larry Shiembob, is an individual, citizen and resident of the State 

of Arizona, residing and/or conducting business at 1383 N. Tech Blvd., Gilbert, AZ, and at all 

times material hereto acted individually and/or in his capacity as president, shareholder, 

director, officer, agent and/or employee of defendants Extex, Extex Ltd. and Extex Ltd. LLC 

and Extex Investors Ltd. Defendants Extex Investors Ltd., Larry Shiembob and Extex, Extex 

Ltd., and Extex LLC are hereinafter collectively referred to as ìthe Extex defendantsî. 

16. Defendant, Superior Air Parts, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as defendant 

Superior) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Texas, 

with its principal place of business located at 621 South Royal Lane, Suite 100, Coppell, TX, 

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but, upon information and belief, regularly conducts and/or transacts business within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over this 

defendant and further, this defendant has a registered agent for service of process in this 

District. At all times material hereto, defendant Superior is the original PMA designer, 

developer and manufacturer of the make and model compressor adapter coupling which failed 

on the engine of the accident helicopter, having sold their PMA assets, rights and 

responsibilities to manufacture PMA parts for the Allison 250 series engines to the Extex 

defendants in and around 1996. 

17. Defendants, Rolls-Royce Corporation, Rolls-Royce Engine Company and 

Rolls-Royce Engine Services, are one or more corporations duly organized and existing under 

the laws of the State of Indiana, with their principal place of business located at 2001 S. Tibbs 

Avenue, Mail Drop u27, Indianapolis, IN, but, upon information and belief, regularly 

conducts and/or transacts business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to 

satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over these defendants. At all times material hereto these 

defendants are the corporate successor(s) and/or successor(s) in interest to the Allison Engine 

Company, Inc. d/b/a Rolls Royce-Allison; Allison Engine Company; General Motors 

Corporation, Allison Gas Turbine Division; General Motors Corporation, Detroit Diesel 

Allison Division, and/or General Motors Corporation, the original and/or predecessor 

manufacturer(s) of the Allison 250 series engines, including the accident engine and the 

accident engine components. Further, at all times material hereto, defendant Rolls-Royce 

Corporation holds the FAA Type Certificate and/or Production Certificate for the make and 

model of the Allison 250 series engine and engine components used in the accident engine 

and/or has otherwise acquired the design, development, servicing, customer support, repair, 

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publication and other manufacturing responsibilities for the Allison 250 series engine and 

engine components thereof, previously belonging to the original and/or predecessor 

manufacturers. 

18. Defendants, Allison Engine Company, Inc. d/b/a Rolls Royce-Allison; Allison 

Engine Company; General Motors Corporation, Allison Gas Turbine Division; General 

Motors Corporation, Detroit Diesel Allison Division, and General Motors Corporation, are 

corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with their 

principal places of business in the State of Michigan, but, upon information and belief, 

regularly conducts and/or transacts business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over these defendants. At all times material 

hereto, these defendants were the original designer(s), developer(s) and manufacturer(s) of the 

Allison 250 series engine, including the accident engine and the engine components thereof. 

Upon information and belief, and as a result of various corporate mergers and acquisitions, 

the design, development, servicing, customer support, repair, publication and other 

manufacturing responsibilities of these defendants with regard to the Allison 250 series 

engine and engine components have been sold, assigned and/or otherwise transferred to or 

acquired by the defendant Rolls-Royce Corporation. Accordingly, these defendants, together 

with the defendant Rolls-Royce Corporation, are hereinafter collectively referred to as ìthe 

Rolls-Royce/Allison defendantsî. 

19. Defendant, MD Helicopters, Inc., (hereinafter, ìMDHIî), is a corporation duly 

organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona, with its principal place of 

business located at 4555 East McDowell Road, Mesa, AZ, but, upon information and belief, 

regularly conducts and/or transacts business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

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sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over this defendant. At all times material 

hereto, defendant MDHI is the corporate successor and/or successor in interest to MD 

Helicopters USA, Inc., Hughes Helicopter Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 

McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (MDHC), McDonnell Douglas Helicopter 

Company d/b/a McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems (MDHS), The Boeing Company, and 

MD Helicopter Holdings, Inc., a subsidiary of RDM Holdings, Inc., the original and/or 

predecessor manufacturer(s) of the accident model helicopter, including the accident 

helicopter and its components. Further, at all times material hereto, defendant MDHI holds 

the FAA Type Certificate and/or Production Certificate for the make and model of the 

MD500 series helicopter, including the accident helicopter and/or has otherwise acquired the 

design, development, servicing, customer support, repair, publication and other manufacturing 

responsibilities for the MD500 series helicopter, including the accident helicopter and its 

components previously belonging to the original and/or predecessor manufacturer(s). 

20. Defendant(s) MD Helicopters B.V. and RDM Holding(s) Inc. are foreign 

public companies organized and existing under laws of the Netherlands, having their principal 

place(s) of business in the Netherlands, and at all times material hereto are either the parent, 

holding company, majority shareholder and/or legal beneficiary of the business operated and 

conducted by defendant MDHI. 

21. Defendants, MD Helicopters USA, Inc., Hughes Helicopter Company, 

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company (MDHC), 

McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Company d/b/a McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Systems 

(MDHS), The Boeing Company, and MD Helicopter Holdings, Inc., a subsidiary of RDM 

Holdings, Inc., are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of states other 

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than Pennsylvania, having their principal places of business in a state other than Pennsylvania, 

but, upon information and belief, regularly conducts and/or transacts business within the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise of jurisdiction over these 

defendants. At all times material hereto, these defendants are either the original and/or 

predecessor designers, developers, and manufacturers of the accident model helicopter, 

including the accident helicopter and the components thereof. Upon information and belief, 

and a result of various corporate mergers and acquisitions, the design, development, servicing, 

customer support, repair, publication and other manufacturing responsibilities of these 

defendants, with regard to the accident model helicopter, including the accident helicopter and 

the components thereof, have been sold, assigned and/or otherwise transferred to and/or 

acquired by the defendants MDHI and/or MD Helicopters BV. Accordingly, these 

defendants, together with the defendants MDHI and MD Helicopters BV, are hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ìthe MDHI defendantsî. 

22. Defendant, Universal Power, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing 

under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business located at 3945 West 

7875 South, West Jordan, UT, but, upon information and belief, regularly conducts and/or 

transacts business within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sufficient to satisfy the exercise 

of jurisdiction over this defendant. At all times material hereto, this defendant is and/or was a 

maintenance facility which performed, at the request of the K&S defendants and/or the 

Zaremba defendants, inspection, maintenance, and repair on the accident helicopter engine, 

including but not limited to the compressor assembly, the turbine assembly and/or the 

components thereof. 

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23. Defendants, Doe, One through One Hundred, inclusive, are individuals, 

corporations, government entities and/or other entities or associations, the true name, 

identities, involvement and capacities of which are unknown to plaintiffs at this time, who are 

therefore sued as Doe defendants by their fictitious names, and plaintiffs will ask leave of 

Court to amend this Complaint to show their true names, identifies, involvement and 

capacities when the same has been ascertained. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and 

thereupon allege, that each of the defendants designated as a Doe defendant is or may be 

negligent and/or otherwise legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings 

hereinafter described and which proximately caused the damages suffered by plaintiffs herein. 

Jurisdiction and Venue

24. Jurisdiction of the within Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ß 1332 due to 

the diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy being certified 

in excess of $100,000.000, exclusive of interest and costs. Jurisdiction of the within Court is 

also invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ß 1331, Federal Question Jurisdiction, in that the accident 

occurred in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park and the cause of action arises under 16 U.S.C. ß 

457 of the National Parks Act. 

25. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania is an appropriate venue in which to 

pursue this action under 28 U.S.C. ß 1391(b) in that it is a judicial district in which one or 

more of the defendants may be found. 

Background Facts Regarding The Accident Flight

26. On June 15, 2003, plaintiffsí decedents, James A. Thomas, age 38, Jody A. 

Laughman, age 36, and Nicole L. Laughman, age 13 were passengers on board a certain 

McDonnell Douglas 369D helicopter, FAA Registration Number N4493M (the ìaccident 

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helicopterî) equipped with an Allison 250-C20B engine, which helicopter departed from Hilo 

International Airport at approximately 9:15 a.m. Hawaii standard time, on a for-hire 

sightseeing tour over portions of Hawaii, including Volcanoes National Park. The accident 

helicopter is also known as an MD500D. 

27. The sightseeing tour ride contracted for was known as the Hilo Volcano 

Helicopter Deluxe and was purchased by plaintiffsí decedents from the Hawaii Activity 

World defendants, with the tour ride to be given by the K&S defendants. 

28. The accident helicopter was owned and operated by the K&S defendants, and 

flown by their designated pilot, defendant Holliday. 

29. The accident helicopter departed on June 15, 2003 in visual meteorological 

conditions and under visual flight rules, and within 30 minutes after departure, defendant 

Holliday radioed a ìMaydayî call to other aircraft as a result of an in-flight engine failure he 

was experiencing. 

30. Other aircraft in the area not only heard the ìMaydayî call over common area 

traffic frequency, but could also hear the engine out audible alarm in the background coming 

from the accident helicopter. 

31. The K&S defendants are a for-hire commercial operation whose business 

activities are controlled and governed by, among other things, 14 C.F.R. Part 135 (hereinafter 

FAR Part 135) and Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 71. 

32. In connection with their Part 135 Commercial operations, the K&S defendants 

are required by law to have a duly appointed Director of Maintenance and, upon information 

and belief, the Zaremba defendants acted and served as the designated Director of 

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Maintenance for the K&S defendants and, in fact, at all times material hereto carried out the 

duties of such. 

33. As a result of the in-flight engine failure, defendant Holliday was required to 

attempt to safely land the accident helicopter and/or attempt to locate a suitable landing site 

for a safe emergency landing, which efforts were unsuccessful as a consequence of the fact 

that defendant Holliday was operating the accident helicopter at the time the engine failed in, 

near and/or over the lava fields on the Pulama Pali in the Volcanoes National Park, 

Volcanoes, Hawaii, and in an area and at an altitude which was in violation of the FAA 

approved procedures manual for the K&S defendants, and/or was otherwise operating in 

violation of a temporary flight restriction zone established by the FAA at the request of the 

National Park Service on June 13, 2003, which restriction remained in effect on June 15, 

2003. 

34. As a result of the in-flight engine failure and/or the failure and inadequate 

efforts of defendant Holliday to safely land the accident helicopter in an emergency, the 

accident helicopter crashed in and collided with the hardened lava field terrain, followed by 

an intense post-crash fire. 

Background Facts Regarding The Accident Engine And Its Components

35. The accident helicopter was equipped with a single Allison 250-C20B 

turboshaft engine, serial number CAE-835428 (hereinafter referred to as the ìaccident 

engineî). The accident engine is one of many models of the Allison Model 250-C20 Series of 

engines, which are currently designed, developed and manufactured by the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants. 

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36. The Allison Model 250-C20 series engine (hereinafter, ìthe accident 

model/series engineî), consists of four major engine components or assemblies; a compressor, 

a combustion section, a turbine, and a power and accessories gearbox. These four 

components combined make up the engine assembly. (A schematic of the accident 

model/series engine appears below). 

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37. The compressor assembly consists of various components, including a 

compressor rotor assembly. The compressor rotor assembly consists of six stages of wheel 

assemblies, an impeller assembly, a tie bolt and the compressor adapter coupling. Air enters 

the engine through a compressor inlet and after being compressed, the compressed air is then 

discharged into ducts, which convey the compressed air back to the combustion section of the 

engine. (A schematic of the compressor rotor assembly appears below). 

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38. The combustion section consists of several components. Air which enters the 

combustion section is mixed with fuel sprayed from fuel nozzles and combustion takes place. 

Combustion gases then move forward out of the combustion section to the turbine section of 

the engine. 

39. The turbine section consists of two main components; a gas producer (N1) 

turbine rotor, which drives the compressor and accessory gear train, and a power (N2) turbine 

rotor, which furnishes output power to the engine, and drives the main transmission. 

40. The main power and accessories drive gear trains are enclosed in a single gear 

case, which acts as the structural support of the engine, and to which the other engine 

components are attached. The compressor is mounted on the front of the power and 

accessories gearbox; the turbine is mounted between the combustion section and the power 

and accessories gearbox, and the combustion section is mounted on the turbine at the aft end 

of the engine. 

41. The engine assembly itself is considered to be modular. In other words, from 

the standpoint of repair and maintenance, the engine components described above can be 

separately removed from the engine assembly so that while maintenance is being performed 

on a particular engine component or assembly (or module), a loaner or replacement module 

can be installed. This interchangeability allows the helicopter to remain in service and 

operational while repair or maintenance is performed on a particular engine module. 

42. The accident engine as a complete assembly was installed on the accident 

helicopter in or about July 1988, was overhauled in 1991 and, after being reinstalled post 

overhaul, the accident engine as an assembly remained on the accident helicopter from 1991 

until the time of the crash in June, 2003. 

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43. Although the accident engine assembly remained on the accident helicopter 

from 1991 until the time of the crash, there were assorted engine component or module 

removals (i.e., compressor, turbine, etc.) for repair or maintenance (routine or otherwise), all 

of which was foreseeable and as intended by the designer(s), developer(s) and/or 

manufacturer(s) of the accident helicopter, the accident model/series engine, the accident 

engine and its components, and also by those who own, operate, inspect, maintain and repair 

these engines. 

44. The K&S defendants purchased the accident helicopter in or around August 

1999. 

45. The compressor assembly installed on the accident engine at the time of the 

June 15, 2003 crash (hereinafter, ìthe accident compressor assemblyî), was a module that was 

installed on the accident engine in September 2002. However, the accident compressor 

assembly had been previously installed in December 2000 on another helicopter, an Agusta 

A109A, registration no. N293G, registered to and owned by Niihau Helicopters, Makaweli, 

Hawaii (hereinafter ìthe Niihau helicopterî). 

46. Prior to its installation in the Niihau helicopter, the accident compressor 

assembly had repair and maintenance performed to it in June 2000, including the installation 

of a new compressor adapter coupling. The new compressor adapter coupling installed in the 

accident compressor assembly in June 2000 was a PMA part manufactured, sold, supplied and 

furnished by the Extex defendants. 

47. On March 22, 2001, the Niihau Helicopter was damaged in a hard-landing 

accident. 

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48. Upon information and belief, no repair or maintenance was performed on the 

accident compressor assembly after this hard landing accident until July 1, 2002, at which 

time the accident compressor assembly was removed for inspection from the Niihau 

helicopter by the K&S defendants and/or Zaremba defendants. 

49. On or about July 22, 2002, after inspection of the accident compressor 

assembly, the K&S defendants and/or Zaremba defendants determined that part to be 

airworthy and suitable for return to service, and certified it as such. 

50. Thereafter, on or about September 7, 2002, the K&S defendants and/or the 

Zaremba defendants, as Director of Maintenance for the K&S defendants, and with the 

express knowledge, consent and permission of the K&S defendants, installed the accident 

compressor assembly on the accident engine of the accident helicopter. 

51. Upon information and belief, the accident compressor assembly had not been 

used at all (i.e., saw no service, cycle or operational time) from July 1, 2002 (the date of its 

removal from the Niihau helicopter) until after its installation on September 7, 2002 on the 

accident helicopter owned and operated by the K&S defendants. 

52. The accident compressor assembly remained in the accident helicopter from 

September 7, 2002 until June 15, 2003. 

Background Facts As To The MDHI Defendants And The Rolls-Royce/Allison 

Defendants _______________________________________________________________

53. Prior to and on June 15, 2003, the MDHI defendants designed, developed, 

manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed, sold, serviced, supported, maintained 

and repaired the accident helicopter, and wrote and/or approved instructions and warnings for 

the accident helicopter and its components parts, including its flight manual, maintenance 

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manual, maintenance instructions, service bulletins, inspection schedules, and service life 

schedules. 

54. Prior to and on June 15, 2003, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants designed, 

developed manufactured, assembled, inspected, tested, distributed, sold, serviced, supported, 

maintained and repaired the accident model/series engine and its component parts, including 

the accident engine and its component parts that were incorporated and installed into the 

accident helicopter, and wrote and/or approved instructions and warnings for the accident 

engine, including its operation manual, maintenance manual, maintenance instructions, 

service bulletins, inspection schedules and service life schedules. 

55. The accident helicopter was manufactured and first sold by the MDHI 

defendants prior to October 1983. The accident engine assembly was manufactured and first 

sold by the Rolls Royce/Allison defendants in February 1984. Based upon these date(s) of 

first sale, it is anticipated that these defendants may assert the eighteen (18) year Statue of 

Repose contained in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA) as a bar to 

some of plaintiffsí claims, hence these additional allegations which follow. 

56. Long prior to June 15, 2003, the MDHI defendants and the Rolls 

Royce/Allison defendants manufactured the accident helicopter and the accident engine and 

the component parts thereof. The accident helicopter and the accident engine and its 

component parts were all certified to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) by the 

defendants, through their agents, servants, workmen, employees, vendors and/or suppliers, as 

airworthy at the time of manufacture, and following the date of manufacture until the date of 

the accident, certified as airworthy to the FAA by virtue of the defendantsí failing to notify 

either the FAA, other agencies of government, repair and maintenance facilities, owners of 

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affected helicopters and/or engines, plaintiffs, plaintiffsí decedents and those in their position, 

that there were defects in the design and/or manufacture of the accident helicopter and/or the 

accident engine and its components, which were known to the defendants but with respect to 

which they declined to provide required information, and which information was vital in 

connection with the certification, airworthiness and/or continued airworthiness of the accident 

helicopter and/or accident engine. 

57. Upon information and belief, the accident helicopter, and in particular, the 

accident engine and component parts thereof, were defectively designed and/or manufactured, 

such defects consisting of defects which are or might not be detectable during normal and/or 

special inspection and maintenance procedures conducted by maintenance facilities and/or 

mechanics in the field. 

58. With respect to the type certificate and/or production certificate for, and/or 

obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of, the accident helicopter and/or the 

accident engine or a component, system, subassembly or other part thereof, the defendants 

knowingly misrepresented to the FAA, or concealed or withheld from the FAA, required 

information that is and was material and relevant to the certification, performance, 

maintenance, operation, airworthiness and/or continued airworthiness of the accident 

helicopter and/or accident engine or a component, system, subassembly or other part thereof, 

and is directly and causally related to the harm which plaintiffs and plaintiffsí decedents 

suffered and is directly related to the cause of the accident on June 15, 2003. Such failures, 

conduct, acts or omissions, constitute an exception to the eighteen (18) year Statute of Repose 

referred to in GARA. 

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59. Defendantsí knowing misrepresentation and/or concealing and withholding of 

information, consisted of failing to notify the FAA and other regulatory authorities of the 

extent and seriousness of the accident helicopter and/or accident engineís defects which 

caused, in whole or in part, the crash of the accident helicopter, and also consisted of 

improper certification and continued certification of the accident helicopter and accident 

engine assembly and their component, system, subassemblies or other parts thereof. 

60. Notwithstanding defendantsí knowledge of the defects associated with the 

accident helicopter and/or the accident engine, defendants failed to notify and adequately 

warn owners, operators, repair shops and the regulatory authorities concerning these 

problems, all of which affected the airworthiness and continued airworthiness of the accident 

helicopter and the accident engine. 

61. Specifically, with respect to the defects alleged by plaintiffs, the defendants 

have issued numerous service bulletins, service letters, maintenance instructions, repair 

instructions and other written materials, allegedly issued to cure specific problems with the 

Allison 250 series/model engine or the components or systems they addressed, but instead 

simply hid or masked, intentionally or otherwise, the serious design and/or manufacturing 

flaws and defects in the accident helicopter and accident engine model and similar models, 

and/or such written materials or publications improperly attempted to blame maintenance 

facilities or mechanics in the field for the problems with the product, when in actuality the 

problem was one of defective design and/or manufacture. 

62. In the case at bar, post-crash inspection of the accident engine revealed that the 

compressor adapter coupling failed in flight, leading to the crash of the accident helicopter. 

The compressor adapter coupling is part of the shafting system between the gas producer 

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turbine and the compressor. Long prior to June 15, 2003, these defendants knew that a failure 

of this part results in an immediate and total loss of engine power. 

63. Long prior to June 15, 2003, these defendants knew or should have known, 

based upon a service history which includes numerous failed and/or prematurely worn parts, 

including numerous problems relating to the compressor adapter coupling itself, as well as to 

the interference fit between the compressor adapter coupling and the impeller, that the 

original design and/or manufacture of the accident helicopter and/or accident engine and the 

components thereof was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 

64. Upon information and belief, the defendants were aware long prior to June 15, 

2003 of numerous other reports of accidents, incidents, failures and/or service difficulties 

involving the accident model/series engine, compressor adapter couplings, the impeller and 

the component parts to which the compressor adapter coupling and impeller are mated and/or 

interfaced, yet failed to disclose, concealed and/or withheld this information and/or the 

significance of such information from the FAA despite its obligation to do so under 14 C.F.R. 

ß 21.3, which requires type certificate and/or production certificate holders and 

manufacturers, such as the defendants, to report all defects that they have determined, through 

service experience or otherwise, resulted in and/or can result in helicopter and/or engine 

failure. 

65. Upon information and belief, there have been numerous other reported 

accidents or incidents involving the alleged defectively designed and/or manufactured 

accident helicopter, accident model/series engine and/or its components, and there have been 

numerous unreported failures, perhaps unbeknownst to the FAA and other regulatory 

agencies. 

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66. Based upon the foregoing, it is believed that the defendants have further 

concealed or withheld from the FAA required information that is material and relevant to the 

performance, maintenance, airworthiness, and continued airworthiness of the accident 

helicopter and/or the accident engine and its component parts. 

67. In the alternative, plaintiffs allege that the accident helicopter and the accident 

engine may and did contain new, used, rebuilt or overhauled components, systems, 

subassemblies or other parts, replacement parts or added parts, which render the GARA 

Statute of Repose not applicable, including but not limited to, new parts installed pursuant to 

compliance with Rolls-Royce/Allison Commercial Engine Bulletin (CEB) 1325. 

68. Specifically, in December 1993, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants issued 

Commercial Engine Bulletin (CEB) 1325, which bulletin introduced the release of a new 

compressor adapter coupling designed to provide improved spline wear characteristics. CEB 

1325 also allowed a modification to repair compressor assemblies with worn or damaged 

splines or snap ring grooves, and provided for a modification to the compressor impeller. 

69. Compliance with CEB 1325 resulted in various components in the compressor 

assembly being replaced with totally new parts or otherwise being reworked and being 

assigned new part numbers, thus rendering the entire compressor assembly a new part. 

70. A review of maintenance records on the accident helicopter engine revealed 

that the accident compressor assembly underwent a CEB 1325 modification on or about June 

8, 2000, at which time a new compressor adapter coupling, a reworked impeller, as well as 

other new parts were installed in accordance with CEB 1325, all of which constitute new parts 

which render the GARA Statute of Repose not applicable. 

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71. In the alternative, plaintiffs further allege that the manuals and/or other written 

materials, including service manuals, service bulletins, service kits, service letters and service 

instructions issued by the defendants and applicable to the accident helicopter and/or the 

accident engine, are defective and negligent such that if followed they fail to discover, reveal, 

or disclose the alleged defects giving rise to plaintiffsí claims.

Background Facts As To The PMA Process

72. PMA stands for Parts Manufacturer Approval. PMA is an FAA regulation set 

forth in the Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 (14 CFR), part 21, subpart K, ß 21.303 

(hereinafter F.A.R. ß 21.303), which permits an entity other than the original equipment 

manufacturer (OEM) of an aircraft or engine part to manufacture and sell replacement parts. 

73. PMA was originally conceived, in part, as a way of keeping out of production 

aircraft in service which were no longer being supported by the OEM. In an effort to insure a 

steady supply of parts for these aircrafts, the FAA recognized a need to permit non-OEMs to 

manufacture replacement parts. 

74. F.A.R. ß 21.303 requires, among other things, that the replacement parts either 

duplicate the design of the original part, a process known as ìidenticalityî; or that the parts be 

shown to meet or exceed the airworthiness requirements of the original product design, a 

process known as the ìtest and computationî method of approval. 

75. Generally, replacements parts made by way of ìidenticalityî occurs when a 

PMA manufacturer obtains proprietary design drawings from the OEM through a licensing 

arrangement between the OEM and the PMA manufacturer. 

76. However, most PMA parts, including the failed Extex compressor adapter 

coupling in this case, are made through the ìtest and computationî method, whereby the PMA 

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manufacturer duplicates the design of the part through reverse engineering. In this process, 

the PMA manufacturer analyses the OEMís original part and after determining the 

dimensions, material, construction and fabrication processes, the PMA manufacturer asks the 

FAA to agree that the PMA manufactured replacement part so precisely duplicates the 

original OEM part that the FAA certify the PMA part as an approved replacement part. 

77. For the PMA manufacturer, a key feature of the ìtest and computationî method 

of approval is that since the part duplicates the OEMís part, the FAA does not require that the 

PMA manufacturer write its own maintenance procedures, but rather allows the PMA 

manufacturer to use the OEMs maintenance practices and procedures. In other words, the 

PMA manufacturer is relieved of the responsibility (and the cost) of developing its own 

program to insure the continued airworthiness of its part, and customers using PMA parts are, 

for the most part, instructed to follow the OEMs maintenance manuals, procedures and 

practices. 

78. Historically, PMA parts makers occupied a small niche in the regulatory 

framework (and in turn provided little competitive threat to OEMs), however, this changed 

around 1990 after the FAA adopted a more standardized PMA approval process. 

79. Once the PMA regulatory framework became better defined, the number of 

PMA parts available in the marketplace increased significantly. In addition, growth of the 

PMA parts industry was enhanced by the fact that OEMs were more anxious to sell and make 

money on their newly designed products, so much so that some OEMs were actually relieved 

that their aftermarket responsibilities for their older models and products were being assumed 

by PMA manufacturers. The PMA industry experienced further growth because OEM prices 

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for replacement parts was exorbitant compared to those charged by the PMA manufacturer for 

the very same part. 

80. However, when the aviation industry became depressed and new sales fell 

sharply, certain OEMs came to regret the loss of revenue generated by the sale of replacement 

parts. As a result, OEMs realized that they needed to generate money from the sale of 

aftermarket parts, a market share which they had previously not focused on. 

81. As a result of the explosive growth of the PMA industry and the OEMsí loss of 

market share for replacement parts, certain OEMs, including the Rolls-Royce/Allison 

defendants, have become aggressively protective of their replacement parts market share, and 

have embarked on a plan to eliminate the PMA market entirely. 

82. The Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, along with other OEMs, have attempted 

to accomplish this plan by: (1) lowering their prices to match PMA prices, but only on parts 

that are also produced by PMA manufacturers; (2) signing up operators for long term 

maintenance and parts contracts which preclude the use of PMA parts; (3) asking the FAA to 

restrict the ability of non-OEMs to make aftermarket products; (4) making it difficult for 

alternative supply sources to enter the marketplace; (5) voiding warranties for their engines if 

any PMA part is used at all within the engine; and (6) withholding or delaying product 

improvements. 

83. The acts or omissions of the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, along with other 

OEMs, are designed to protect their market share and monopoly on replacement parts, and are 

not related to product safety. 

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84. The battleground between OEMs and PMAs as it relates to engine replacement 

parts is extremely intense, and two of the most aggressive combatants in the OEM/PMA 

market share war are the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants and the Extex defendants. 

85. Upon information and belief, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants consider the 

Extex defendants to be their biggest competitor and a major threat to their aftermarket 

livelihood with regard to the approximately 16,000 Rolls-Royce/Allison Model 250 engines 

that are in service today. 

86. Upon information and belief, the Extex defendants have targeted the design of 

the Rolls-Royce/Allison Model 250 series engine and have obtained or are in the process of 

obtaining a PMA for virtually every replaceable part in that engine. 

87. Upon information and belief, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants and the 

Extex defendants have long known of the defects in the compressor adapter coupling for the 

accident model engine and the defects in the accident model compressor assembly yet, prior 

to the accident which took the life of plaintiffsí decedents, failed to correct or repair known 

defects in the accident engine as a consequence of their ongoing battle with each other 

regarding replacement parts for the Rolls-Royce/Allison Model 250 series engines. 

Background Facts As To The Extex Defendants

88. In or around 1993, defendant Superior, using their own design, manufacturing 

and testing protocols, obtained PMA approval via the ìtest and computationî method (or its 

then equivalent) to manufacture and sell compressor adapter couplings for installation and use 

in the Allison 250 series engines. 

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89. In or around 1996, the Extex defendants acquired some of the defendant 

Superiorís assets, including the PMA rights to manufacture and sell compressor adapter 

couplings for the Allison 250 series engines. 

90. Upon information and belief, the Extex defendants sold approximately 660 

compressor adapter couplings between 1996 and 2002. 

91. By March 2001, and perhaps earlier, the Extex defendants knew or should 

have known that their compressor adapter couplings were defective and unreasonably 

dangerous in design and/or manufacture, including the knowledge that one of their failed 

compressor adapter couplings was determined to have been the cause of a helicopter accident 

in Rockport, Texas in December 2000. 

92. Subsequent to March 2001, the Extex defendants knew or should have known 

that there was a serious design and/or manufacturing defect in their compressor adapter 

couplings, including the knowledge that there was no correlation between the compressor 

adapter couplingsí service life and failure rate. In other words, some couplings showed signs 

of failure after only 200 hours of service while some parts showed no signs of failure even 

after 2000 hours of service. 

93. The Extex defendantsí knowledge of the defects in the design and manufacture 

of their compressor adapter couplings became so widespread and pervasive that by July 2002, 

nearly one year before the crash of the accident helicopter on June 15, 2003, the Extex 

defendants stopped selling their compressor adapter couplings altogether. 

94. The compressor adapter couplings manufactured and sold by the Extex 

defendants are not ordinary or household goods or a common business appliance, which by 

their nature are mass-marketed or mass-produced products that could get swept away in the 

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currents of commerce or could otherwise become impossible to track or difficult to locate. 

Rather, the compressor adapter couplings manufactured by the Extex defendants are sold in a 

small and distinct market, are a unique and costly product for which there are business 

establishments that service helicopter engines that are convenient and logical points of contact 

for the Extex defendants, and in fact, the Extex defendants routinely maintain contact with 

these facilities and owners/operators of their products or products for which they hold PMA 

approval for the very purpose of keeping them current on all pertinent information regarding 

their products. Moreover, the defects alleged herein are not open and obvious but instead are 

latent, internal defects known only to the Extex defendants. 

95. Despite the Extex defendantsí actual knowledge that the compressor adapter 

couplings that they designed, manufactured and/or sold were defective and unreasonably 

dangerous, and despite the fact that the Extex defendants stopped manufacturing and selling 

new compressor adapter couplings as of July 2002, and despite the fact that the Extex 

defendants were, by virtue of the type of product involved, able without difficulty to track 

and/or locate the remaining compressor adapter couplings located in service in the field, the 

Extex defendants failed to recall, retrofit or even warn their customers and the public at large 

that those compressor adapter couplings remaining in service were defective and 

unreasonably dangerous, and could and would likely fail in flight without any correlation to 

time in service. 

96. Despite the Extex defendants knowledge as aforesaid, the Extex defendants 

willfully, wantonly, callously and with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the 

public, instead of recalling, retrofitting and/or warning of the dangers associated with their 

product, engaged in a parts mortality analysis, concluding that it would be cheaper for them to 

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allow the remaining population of couplings to remain in service rather than to recall, retrofit 

or remove those parts from service, or otherwise warn those using these couplings that they 

were defective and unreasonably dangerous.

The Post-Crash Investigation

97. Post-accident investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board and 

others has confirmed that the compressor adapter coupling on the accident helicopter failed 

in-flight. 

98. Shortly after the accident which took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

Extex defendants issued Customer Information Letter T-080 acknowledging that there had 

been numerous prior reports of compressor adapter couplings failing in service, some of 

which were manufactured by the Extex defendants. 

99. In Extex Customer Information Letter T-080, the Extex defendants also 

claimed that there had been no indications of discrepancies in dimensions, material or 

workmanship of the Extex parts, but rather, the compressor adapter couplings experienced 

fatigue failures caused by fretting of the part in service. The Extex defendants further claimed 

that they did not understand the cause of the fretting but acknowledged that failure of this 

critical part will result in an immediate and total loss of engine power. 

100. Upon information and belief, the information set forth by the Extex defendants 

in Customer Information Letter T-080 contained false and fraudulent misrepresentation, all 

deliberately designed by the Extex defendants further to their plan and scheme to avoid 

retrofitting or recalling their defective product and further, as part of their plan and scheme to 

blame others for their own defective and unreasonably dangerous product. 

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101. On or about March 24, 2004, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins (SAIBs) NE-0456 and NE-0458 advising 

owners, operators and repair stations of the reported numerous failures of compressor adapter 

couplings manufactured by both the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants and the Extex 

defendants. 

102. Subsequent to the issuance of the aforesaid SAIBs, the FAA ultimately issued 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) No. 2004-26-09. Under the FAAís regulatory scheme, 

compliance with an AD is mandatory. AD 2004-26-09 required owners or operators to 

remove from service at specific times or intervals compressor adapter couplings manufactured 

by the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, the Extex defendants and defendant Superior, and 

replace those defective and unreasonably dangerous couplings with a new and improved part 

now made only by the Rolls Royce/Allison defendants. 

103. The actions taken by the FAA were as a result of information, including prior 

failures and failure rates, which were long known to the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, the 

Extex defendants, the MDHI defendants and defendant Superior, including information 

known to these defendants long prior to the crash of June 15, 2003 which took the lives of 

plaintiffsí decedents. 

104. It was as a result of these defendantsí failure to comply with 14 CFR ß 21.3 

and/or their other reporting obligations regarding continuing airworthiness and/or failures in 

service of their parts, that the FAA was not first made aware of the problem with compressor 

adapter couplings until July of 2003 and, more specifically, not until and as a result of the 

crash which took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents. 

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General Damage Allegations

105. Upon information and belief, passengers James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman 

and Nicole L. Laughman, did not suffer physical injuries in the crash sufficient to cause their 

death and perished in the post-crash fire. 

106. As a result of the foregoing crash and subsequent post-crash fire, plaintiffsí 

decedents, James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman, were caused to 

endure severe mental anguish and distress, fear of impending death, extreme and excruciating 

post-crash pain and suffering of a measurable duration, and suffer severe physical injuries and 

thermal burns, which ultimately led to their death, together with pre-impact pain and 

suffering, mental and emotional injuries and post-impact physical, mental and emotional 

injuries and pain and suffering that preceded their death. 

107. Each of the decedents, by and through their legal representatives, has, and 

therefore makes, claim against the defendants for their severe physical, mental and emotional 

injuries, pain and suffering, property damage, and other related claims, which occurred before 

the impact and crash which caused their death, as well as claims for those injuries which 

occurred after the impact and crash, which ultimately caused and led to their death. 

108. As a result of the foregoing crash and subsequent post-crash fire which took 

the lives of their decedents, the plaintiffs and all those beneficially interested in the claims for 

the wrongful death of the decedents, have suffered the loss of the decedents, their care, 

companionship, society, comfort, counsel, love, services, and support, as well as severe and 

devastating emotional distress as a result of their decedentsí catastrophic and fatal injuries. 

109. As a result of the foregoing crash and subsequent post-crash fire, plaintiffsí 

decedents and their estates, the plaintiffs individually and all those beneficially interested in 

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the claims for the wrongful death of decedents, James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman and 

Nicole A. Laughman, have sustained damages and are entitled to recover all fair and just 

compensatory damages allowed under applicable wrongful death and survival action law, 

including damages for the value of the plaintiffsí decedentsí life, loss of past and future 

earnings and earning capacity of the decedent, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of probable 

support, future contributions and pecuniary benefits, loss of services, loss of inheritance or 

prospective accumulations, mental anguish, emotional pain, distress and suffering, grief and 

sorrow, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, parental care, attention, advice, 

maintenance, counsel, physical, intellectual and moral training, guidance and education, as 

well as decedentsí pain, suffering and disfigurement, and plaintiffsí decedents were caused to 

endure great physical and mental pain and suffering before their death; and decedentsí 

survivors were caused to incur funeral and burial expenses and other damages and are thus 

entitled to recover fair and reasonable monetary compensation for those damages; the exact 

amount of said damages are unknown at this time and plaintiffsí will seek leave of court, if 

necessary, to amend this Complaint when the amount has been determined. 

COUNT I

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants and Defendant Holliday 

110. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 109 as though set 

forth at length. 

111. On June 15, 2003, plaintiffsí decedents, James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman 

and Nicole L. Laughman were passengers on board the accident helicopter, which was owned, 

operated, maintained and controlled by the K&S defendants and was being piloted by 

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defendant Holliday. The accident helicopter departed from Hilo International Airport at 

approximately 9:15 a.m. Hawaii standard time on a for-hire sightseeing tour over portions of 

Hawaii, including Volcanoes National Park. 

112. On or prior to June 15, 2003, the K&S defendants, by themselves and/or 

through their officers, agents, employees, servants and/or representatives, undertook to select, 

hire, train, instruct, educate and/or teach defendant Holliday regarding, among other practices 

and procedures, pre-flight planning, in-flight planning, including adherence to SFAR 71 and 

the K&S procedures and operations manual, emergency procedures, helicopter performance, 

engine out procedures, and helicopter safety operations in connection with the K&S 

defendantsí commercial helicopter operation. 

113. On or prior to June 15, 2003, defendant Holliday, acted either individually or 

was an employee, servant and/or agent of the K&S defendants, and at all times material 

hereto, was acting within the scope of his authority, employment and/or agency for the K&S 

defendants. 

114. On June 15, 2003, at approximately 9:43 a.m. Hawaii standard time, the 

accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure and defendant Holliday could be heard 

by other aircraft in the area declaring a ìMaydayî. Shortly thereafter the accident helicopter 

crashed into a hardened lava field in the Volcanoes National Park, Hawaii. 

115. As a result of the foregoing crash and subsequent post-crash fire, plaintiffsí 

decedents were caused to endure severe mental anguish and distress, fear of impending death, 

post-crash pain and suffering and ultimately suffered severe physical injuries which caused 

their death. 

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116. The K&S defendants, by themselves and/or through their officers, agents, 

employees, servants or representatives, as a common carrier of passengers for hire, owed 

plaintiffsí decedentsí the highest duty of care to ensure that the accident helicopter and its 

pilot were safe and not unreasonably dangerous, and to ensure that the accident helicopter was 

operated so as not to cause injury or death, and otherwise owed plaintiffsí decedentsí a duty to 

use reasonable care in the ownership, use, operation, inspection, maintenance and repair of the 

accident helicopter. 

117. At all times material hereto, the duties of the K&S defendants with respect to 

providing safe carriage to plaintiffsí decedents and with resepct to performing adequate 

inspection, maintenance and repair on the accident helicopter were non-delegable duties under 

the FARs and/or other applicable law. 

118. The defendants were negligent, by act or omission, and breached their duty of 

care to plaintiffsí decedents in that they: 

a. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly operated the accident helicopter 

and the accident engine; 

b. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly inspected the accident helicopter 

and the accident engine; 

c. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly maintained the accident 

helicopter and the accident engine; 

d. Careless, negligently and recklessly operated the accident helicopter by 

allowing the accident helicopter to crash, by failing to avoid the crash and/or otherwise failing 

to safely land the accident helicopter in an emergency; 

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e. Careless, negligently and recklessly created an unreasonably dangerous 

condition at the time of the crash with regard to the accident helicopter and the accident flight; 

f. Failed to operate the accident helicopter considerate of the conditions 

that then and there existed; 

g. Failed to operate the accident helicopter considerate of the mechanical 

deficiencies and conditions which then and there existed; 

h. Failed to warn the plaintiffsí decedents prior to flight that there were 

serious mechanical deficiencies in and/or inadequate maintenance performed on the accident 

helicopter and the accident engine that could result in a crash or unsafe condition; 

i. Failed to properly inspect and/or correct deficiencies in the accident 

helicopter and the accident engine; 

j. Failed to properly instruct and warn the passengers before the accident 

flight; 

k. Failed to comply with their duties and responsibilities under and in 

accordance with the Federal Aviation Regulations with respect to the ownership, use, 

operation, control, maintenance, inspection, repair, airworthiness and continuing 

airworthiness of the accident helicopter and the accident engine; 

l. Failed to select competent and adequate maintenance facilities and/or 

maitnenace personnel to inspect maintain and repair the accident helicopter and the accident 

engine; 

m. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to investigate the 

experience, qualifications and safety record of the pilot assigned to the accident flight; 

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n. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected an inadequately trained, 

inexperienced, ill-prepared and unsafe pilot to act as pilot-in-command of the accident 

helicopter and knowingly compromised the safe operation of the accident flight; 

o. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to train defendant Holliday 

regarding proper pre-flight and in-flight planning and procedures, including responses to 

emergencies, emergency procedures, and engine out procedures and adherence to and 

compliance with applicable regulations; 

p. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to impose safe operational 

limits for the accident helicopter and the accident flight; 

q. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to provide the services 

necessary to promote safety and avoid a crash; 

r. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to disclose that the K&S 

defendants had a prior accident history, including a prior crash related to poor maintenance 

practices and pilot error; 

s. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to follow all applicable 

Federal Aviation Regulations and the parameters of its own procedures and operations 

manuals, including flying the accident helicopter into a temporary flight restriction zone on 

the day of the accident; 

t. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to maintain directional 

control, and failed to see and avoid terrain obstacles in order to ensure a safe landing in an 

emergency; 

u. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly flew the accident helicopter into 

a hardened lava field; 

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v. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to properly and safely 

operate the accident helicopter with due care and caution; 

w. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly deviated from good, sound, 

reasonable and safe helicopter operating practices and was otherwise negligent and careless in 

the operation and control of the accident helicopter on the accident flight; 

x. Otherwise failed to pay proper attention to the operation of the accident 

helicopter during the accident flight so as to avoid a crash landing; 

y. Failed to properly and adequately make a safe emergency landing; 

z. Such other acts of negligence as will appear during the course of 

discovery to be liability-producing conduct on the part of these defendants. 

119. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter was in the exclusive 

possession and control of the K&S defendants and defendant Holliday; these defendants had 

the exclusive knowledge of the control and management of the accident helicopter, and the 

crash of the accident helicopter is one that would not ordinarily have happened in the absence 

of negligence. Accordingly, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts of this case, 

warranting an inference of negligence on the part of these defendants. 

120. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duties and responsibilities, 

negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the K&S defendants and defendant Holliday, 

jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of 

control and crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí 

decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of 

kin seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as 

permitted by applicable law. 

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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT II

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL 

DAMAGES BASED UPON MISREPRESENTATION

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants and Defendant Holliday

121. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 120 as though set 

forth at length. 

122. On or prior to June 15, 2003, the K&S defendants represented to plaintiffsí 

decedents that they would provide a safe, experienced, qualified and well-trained pilot, 

including a pilot that would adhere to and comply with all regulations governing the accident 

flight as well as the K&S defendantsí procedures and operations manual, and also that they 

would provide a safe helicopter to fly the plaintiffsí decedents on their sightseeing tour. 

123. On June 15, 2003, defendant Holliday represented to plaintiffsí decedents that 

he was a safe, experienced, qualified and well-trained pilot, that the accident helicopter was 

safe and properly maintained for the sightseeing tour, and that the flight would be conducted 

safely and in accordance with company policy and procedure and would be in compliance 

with all applicable regulations. 

124. At all times material hereto, defendant Holliday was not a safe pilot, nor was 

he sufficiently experienced, qualified or trained to safely fly the accident helicopter, none of 

which information was communicated to plaintiffsí decedents. 

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125. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter was inadequately and 

improperly maintained and was otherwise unsafe to perform the accident flight and, in 

particular, the accident helicopter had critical engine components installed within the engine 

which were taken from a previously crashed helicopter, some of which were either improperly 

repaired and/or not repaired at all, none of which information was communicated to plaintiffsí 

decedents. 

126. At all times material hereto, the defendants knew or should of known that the 

accident helicopter was not capable of completing the mission safely and compromised the 

safe operation of the flight. 

127. At all times material hereto, the defendants represented to plaintiffsí decedents 

that the accident helicopter would fly in, over, above and around safe and permissible air 

space, all within the parameters of the Federal Aviation Regulations and in compliance with 

the defendantsí procedures and operations manual. 

128. At all times material hereto, the defendants represented that they were a safe 

tour operator with an unblemished safety record, when in fact they were not, and in fact had a 

prior accident history, including a prior crash related to poor maintenance and pilot error, 

none of which was disclosed to and/or was deliberately concealed from plaintiffsí decedents. 

129. At all times material hereto, the defendants deliberately, intentionally and 

willfully operated the accident flight in and over air space which was part of a temporary 

flight restriction zone and otherwise operated the aircraft at unsafe altitudes in violation of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations, SFAR 71 and the K&S defendantsí own procedures and 

operations manual, none of which information was communicated to plaintiffsí decedents, 

either before or during the accident flight. 

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130. Plaintiffsí decedents were unaware that the representations made by the 

defendants regarding the safety of the accident helicopter, the safety and training of the 

accident pilot, and the safety of the route of the flight in question were false, and had 

plaintiffsí decedents been provided accurate information regarding the capabilities of the 

accident helicopter, the accident engine, the accident pilot, and information regarding the 

route of flight of the accident helicopter, plaintiffsí decedents would not have taken the 

accident flight. 

131. The crash, injuries, death and resultant damages were caused by the defendants 

as a result of their intentional, reckless and/or negligent misrepresentations. 

132. As a direct and proximate result of the misrepresentations, gross negligence, 

carelessness and recklessness of the K&S defendants and defendant Holliday, jointly and/or 

severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and 

crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, 

all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of kin seek 

damages, compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by 

applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT III

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants and The Zaremba Defendants

133. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 132 as though set 

forth at length. 

134. On or prior to June 15, 2003, the K&S defendants and the Zaremba defendants, 

by themselves, and/or through their officers, agents, employees, servants and/or 

representatives, were responsible for and otherwise undertook to perform inspection, 

maintenance, and repair on the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts. 

135. On or prior to June 15, 2003, the K&S defendants and the Zaremba defendants, 

owed a duty of care to plaintiffsí decedents to use reasonable care in the use, ownership, 

operation, inspection, maintenance and repair of the accident helicopter, the accident engine 

and/or their components parts. 

136. On or prior to June 15, 2003, the Zaremba defendants, with respect to the 

inspection, maintenance, and repair that they performed on the accident helicopter, the 

accident engine and/or their component parts, acted, in whole or in part, either in their 

capacity as Director of Maintenance for the K&S defendantsí Part 135 commercial 

operations, individually and/or as an employee, servant, and/or agent, and/or joint enterpriser 

with, the K&S defendants and at all times material hereto, were acting within the scope of 

their authority, consent and permission, express or implied, and/or within the scope of their 

employment, agency and/or joint enterprise with the K&S defendants. 

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137. At all times material hereto, the K&S defendants and the Zaremba defendants, 

acting through their agents, servants, workman, and/or employees, negligently and improperly 

performed inspection, maintenance, and/or repair on the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and their component parts. 

138. The defendants were negligent, by act or omission, and breached their duty of 

care in that they: 

a. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly maintained the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

b. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly inspected the accident helicopter, 

the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

c. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly repaired the accident helicopter, 

the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

d. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly installed, reinstalled and/or 

reassembled the accident engine and/or its component parts; 

e. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected unqualified and 

inadequate outside vendors to perform inspection, maintenance and repair on the accident 

helicopter, accident engine and/or their components parts; 

f. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly installed engine components 

from a previously crashed engine without first ascertaining the full extent of damage to that 

engine and/or its component parts, and/or without first performing proper and adequate 

inspection, maintenance and repair on the crashed engine parts; 

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g. Careless, negligently and recklessly engaging in a practice of swapping 

out engine components or modules in a dangerous and haphazard fashion for the purposes of 

keeping their helicopters in flight, without regard to safety; 

h. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly altering engine component data 

plates for the purposes of keeping their helicopters in flight without regard to safety; 

i. Knowingly operating the accident engine with an altered engine 

component data plate, a reckless and dangerous practice, for the purposes of keeping their 

helicopters in flight, without regard to safety; 

j. Carelessly, negligently, recklessly and knowingly employing 

unqualified and inadequate outside vendors to perform inspection, maintenance and repair 

without regard to safety, simply because these defendants had an ownership and/or financial 

interest in those outside vendors; 

k. Carelessly, negligently, and recklessly failing to ascertain whether or 

not the outside vendors employed to perform inspection, maintenance and repair had the 

necessary qualifications, experience, skills, tools, facilities and equipment to perform the 

inspection, maintenance and repair requested; 

l. Carelessly, negligently, and recklessly keeping poor and inadequate 

records and paperwork with respect to the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts in furtherance of their desire to keep their helicopters in flight, without 

regard to safety; 

m. Failed to properly and adequately perform and comply with applicable 

FAA airworthiness directives; 

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n. Failed to properly and adequately perform and comply with 

manufacturer service bulletins, service letters, approved instructions, warnings, maintenance 

manuals, inspection schedules and service life schedules; 

o. Failed to properly and adequately perform inspection and testing on the 

accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

p. Failed to properly and adequately perform inspection and testing on the 

accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

q. Failed to properly and adequately use and comply with the accepted 

practices, procedures, techniques and materials when inspecting, maintaining, repairing, 

reassembling and reinstalling the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

r. Failed to warn users of the accident helicopter of the improper 

inspection, repair and maintenance performed on the accident engine; 

s. Unreasonably, improperly and contrary to regulations certifying the 

accident engine as airworthy; 

t. Failed to discover, or if discovered, failed to disclose and/or correct 

defective and dangerous conditions in the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts; 

u. Failed to adhere to the Federal Aviation Regulations pertaining to 

inspection, maintenance, and repair; 

v. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly, either on their own, or in 

conjunction with other maintenance facilities, failed to properly and adequately maintain, 

inspect, repair, service or test the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts; 

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w. Provided defective and unsafe component parts or improperly installed 

and/or designed component parts into the accident engine; 

x. Otherwise being negligent under the circumstances; 

y. Such other acts of negligence as will appear during the course of 

discovery to be liability producing conduct on the part of these defendants. 

139. As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of duties and responsibilities, 

negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the K&S defendants and the Zaremba 

defendants, jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine 

failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in the injuries to and the 

death of the plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their 

survivors and next of kin seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as previously 

alleged and as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT IV 

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL 

DAMAGES BASED ON BREACH OF WARRANTY

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants and The Zaremba Defendants

140. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 139 as though set 

forth at length. 

141. The defendants are liable to plaintiffs and plaintiffsí decedents on the basis of 

breach of warranty in that, at all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, the accident 

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engine and/or their component parts were inspected, maintained and repaired with express 

warranties and/or implied warranties that the accident helicopter and accident engine were of 

fair and average qualities in the trade, were safe and merchantable, and were fit for their 

ordinary and particular purpose. 

142. The defendants also warranted that the accident helicopter and accident engine 

were free of defects in materials and/or workmanship when in fact they were dangerous and 

defective in breach of the aforesaid warranties. 

143. When the defendants inspected, maintained and repaired the accident 

helicopter, accident engine and their component parts they expressly warranted that the 

accident helicopter and accident engine were in a condition suitable for safe flight when in 

fact they were not in a condition suitable for safe flight, thus said express warranty was 

breached and, as a proximate result of said breach, plaintiffs suffered injuries resulting in their 

death. 

144. As a result of the inspection, maintenance and repair of the accident helicopter, 

accident engine and/or their component parts by the defendants, there also arose certain 

warranties implied by law. Those warranties include merchantability and fitness for a 

particular purpose, to wit, safe flight. 

145. Plaintiffsí decedents relied upon such warranties in occupying the accident 

helicopter on June 15, 2003. 

146. The defendants did breach their implied warranties of merchantability in that: 

a. Defendants, merchants in the goods of the type used by plaintiffsí 

decedents, did not have the same adequately inspected, maintained and repaired; 

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b. Said goods were not of fair and average quality in the trade in which 

the defendants engage; 

c. Said goods were not fit for the ordinary purpose for which said goods 

were used; 

d. Said goods were not in conformity with, in so far as safety was 

concerned, those generally used in the trade or business in which the defendants are engaged; 

e. The defendants knew or should have known that the goods were not fit 

for their ordinary purposes; 

f. Defendants knew or should have known that said goods were 

defectively, negligently and improperly inspected, maintained and/or repaired and as such 

were dangerous to the plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position; 

g. The defendants knew or should have known that said goods were 

inadequate for the purposes intended and were dangerous to the safety of plaintiffsí decedents 

and others in their position; 

h. Said goods did not conform to the normal commercial standards of the 

trade in which the defendants engage. 

147. The defendants did breach their implied warranties of fitness for a particular 

purpose in that: 

a. The defendants knew or should have known that said goods would be 

used by plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position; 

b. The defendants knew or should have know that plaintiffsí decedents 

and others in their position did and would rely upon the defendants to furnish goods which 

were not defective; 

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c. The defendants knew or should have known that the goods were not 

adequately and properly inspected, maintained and repaired and therefore would not be fit for 

the purposes for which plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position would be using them; 

d. The defendants failed to provide a safe and non-defective accident 

helicopter, accident engine and components thereof, which would not cause injury, harm and 

damage to plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position. 

148. As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of warranty by the K&S 

defendants and the Zaremba defendants, jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter 

suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field, 

resulting in injuries to and the death of the plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, 

their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of kin seek damages, compensation and 

financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT V 

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants, The Zaremba Defendants And Defendant Holliday

149. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 148 as though set 

forth at length. 

150. The defendantsí acts and omissions, in knowingly using an unsafe and 

improperly maintained helicopter, in knowingly using engine parts in the accident engine 

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which were from a previously crashed engine without properly and thoroughly inspecting the 

crashed engine and its component parts prior to reusing them, by intentionally flying and 

operating the accident helicopter into an area which was subject to a temporary flight 

restriction, and by intentionally operating the accident helicopter at an unsafe location and 

altitude thereby allowing it to crash into a hardened lava field in violation of Federal Aviation 

Regulations, SFAR 71 and the requirements of the defendants own procedures and operations 

manual, notwithstanding the known dangers and hazards in doing so, all constitute willful, 

wanton, reckless and malicious misconduct and gross negligence, evidencing a conscious 

indifference and reckless disregard for the safety of plaintiffsí decedents. 

151. As a result of defendantsí willful, wanton, malicious misconduct, and 

conscious indifference and reckless disregard for the safety of plaintiffsí decedents, plaintiffs, 

their decedents, their decedentsí estates and surviving next of kin are entitled to punitive 

damages as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, and for such other and 

further relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT VI

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL 

DAMAGES BASED ON BREACH OF CONTRACT

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants and The Hawaii Activity World Defendants

152. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 151 as though set 

forth at length. 

153. On or prior to June 15, 2003, plaintiffsí decedents contracted with the 

defendants for a commercial sightseeing tour ride over portions of the Big Island of Hawaii, 

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including Volcanoes National Park, for which plaintiffsí decedents paid the defendants the 

required consideration. 

154. Defendants, in arranging and providing the aforementioned tour ride, acted in 

the capacity of a common carrier and assumed the duties of a common carrier towards the 

plaintiffsí decedents, including the duty of providing a safe tour ride. 

155. Defendants breached their duties to plaintiffs by placing them in the accident 

helicopter, which was unsafe and dangerous, and by otherwise exposing them to a hazardous 

and dangerous flight as previously described, which breach caused plaintiffsí decedentsí 

injuries and led to their death. 

156. It was foreseeable that the acts or omissions of the defendants would create an 

unreasonable risk of harm or injury to plaintiffsí decedents. 

157. The acts or omissions of the defendants, jointly and severally, and as agents for 

and/or joint enterprisers with each other, constituted a breach of contract with plaintiffsí 

decedents, and such breach was the proximate and legal cause of the injuries and damages set 

forth herein. 

158. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of contract by the K&S 

defendants and the Hawaii Activity World defendants, jointly and/or severally, the accident 

helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava 

field, resulting in injuries to and the death of the plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the 

plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of kin seek damages, 

compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by applicable 

law. 

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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT VII

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs v. The Hawaii Activity World Defendants

159. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 158 as though set 

forth at length. 

160. Prior to June 15, 2003, plaintiffsí decedents contacted the defendants for the 

purposes of arranging and selecting a helicopter sightseeing tour ride over portions of the Big 

Island of Hawaii. 

161. As a result of their discussions with plaintiffsí decedents regarding the nature 

of the flight desired, the defendants, by and through their agents, servants, workmen and/or 

employees, selected the K&S defendants to provide plaintiffs with their sightseeing tour ride. 

162. Upon information and belief, the defendants selected the K&S defendants over 

numerous other tour operators who were ready, willing, able and available to provide the 

same sightseeing tour ride in a safe manner. 

163. Defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiffsí decedents to select a safe 

sightseeing tour ride operator, including but not limited to an operator with an unblemished 

accident or incident record which would be detrimental to safe flight. 

164. The K&S defendants were not such a safe operator. On the contrary, on 

September 29, 2001, a Bell 206 single-engine helicopter, powered by an Allison 250-C20B 

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engine, owned and operated by the K&S defendants and providing a sightseeing tour ride, 

crashed within minutes of departure and was destroyed in the collision sequence and postcrash fire. 

165. The cause of the September 29, 2001 accident was engine failure resulting 

from negligently and inadequately performed maintenance by the K&S defendants and 

mechanics on their behalf, including the Zaremba defendants, combined with pilot error on 

behalf of the K&S defendants once the engine failure occurred. 

166. The Hawaii Activity World defendants knew or should have known of the 

above-referenced accident involving the K&S defendants by virtue of the publicity and 

notoriety surrounding that accident. 

167. The defendants were negligent, by act or omission, and breached their duty of 

care to plaintiffsí decedents in that they: 

a. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected a sightseeing tour ride 

owner and operator, which was unsafe; 

b. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected a sightseeing tour 

operator who was inadequate for the flight intended; 

c. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected a sightseeing tour 

operator with an accident history; 

d. Failed to warn or otherwise inform plaintiffsí decedents prior to the 

flight that the K&S defendants were unsafe and had a history of an accident caused by poor 

maintenance and poor piloting; 

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e. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly failed to investigate the 

experience, qualifications and safety record of the tour operator chosen to provide the 

sightseeing flight to plaintiffsí decedents; 

f. Failed to select another tour operator to provide the flight in question; 

g. Such other acts of negligence as will appear during the course of 

discovery to be liability producing conduct on the part of these defendants. 

168. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duties and responsibilities, 

negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the Hawaii Activity World defendants, the 

accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a 

hardened lava field, resulting in injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which 

the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of kin seek damages, 

compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by applicable 

law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT VIII 

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL 

DAMAGES BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants, The Rolls Royce/Allison 

Defendants, The MDHI Defendants and Defendant Superior Air Parts

169. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 168 as though set 

forth at length. 

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170. At all times material hereto, the defendants were in the business of designing, 

developing, manufacturing, testing, servicing, distributing, assembling, supplying and selling 

helicopters, helicopter engines and/or helicopter engine components, and providing 

accompanying product support, product support materials, and continuing airworthiness 

materials with respect thereto, including service bulletins, service letters, service instructions 

and service manuals, and did in fact design, develop, manufacture and/or sell the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts. 

171. Prior to and on June 15, 2003, the accident helicopter and its component parts 

were being operated and used for the purpose and in the manner for which they were 

designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed and sold and 

intended to be used, all in a manner foreseeable to the defendants. 

172. Prior to and on June 15, 2003, the accident engine and its component parts 

were being operated and used for the purpose and in the manner for which they were 

designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced, distributed and sold and 

intended to be used, all in a manner foreseeable to the defendants. 

173. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or 

their component parts were defective in design and/or manufacture, were defective for lack of 

warnings and instructions, and were in an unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition, 

which was a substantial factor in the happening of this accident. 

174. The defects in the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts consisted of, but are not limited to, the following: 

a. Defective design and development of the accident helicopter, the 

accident engine and/or their component parts; 

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b. Defective manufacture of the accident helicopter, the accident engine 

and/or their component parts; 

c. Defective and inadequate written instructions, warnings, procedures 

and other product support information concerning the design, manufacture, inspection, 

maintenance and/or repair of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts; 

d. Failing to warn of the defects in the design, development and/or 

manufacture of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

e. Failing to warn of the lack of airworthiness and continued 

airworthiness of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

f. Designing, manufacturing and selling the accident helicopter, the 

accident engine and/or their component parts without performing proper testing during 

certification and/or manufacture or any time thereafter; 

g. Defective design, manufacture, assembly and selection of materials for 

the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

h. Certifying the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts without proper testing, both pre- and post manufacture; 

i. Defective and inadequate warnings concerning prior failures and/or 

prior service history of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component 

parts; 

j. Designing and manufacturing the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts with defective and inadequate parts and materials; 

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k. Designing and manufacturing the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts with defective parts and components, including the 

manner in which certain engine component parts interface and/or fit with other component 

parts; 

l. Designing and manufacturing the accident helicopter, the engine and/or 

their component parts with the materials that were defective and inadequate in strength, 

quality and/or performance; 

m. Designing, manufacturing, selling and/or supplying a defective 

helicopter engine and/or component parts thereof; 

n. Failing to correct known defects in, and/or failing to recall, replace 

and/or retrofit the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

o. Designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing a helicopter and 

components thereof which was not crashworthy; 

p. Designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing a heliopter which, in 

an otherwise survival crash scenario, burst into flames during the post-crash landing, killing 

the occupants thereof; 

q. Such other defects as will appear during the course of discovery to be 

liability-producing conduct on the part of these defendants. 

175. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, accident engine and the 

components thereof were in essentially the same condition before the crash as when they left 

the defendantsí control, and were used in the foreseeable manner and for the particular 

purpose which the defendantsí knew or should have known that their products would be used. 

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176. At all times material hereto, and at all times prior to the subject accident, the 

defendants had the responsibility under the Federal Aviation Regulations as the owner(s) 

and/or holder(s) of the type and/or production certificate, and/or as the PMA holder for certain 

component parts to make certain that any defects in the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts as designed, developed and/or manufactured or which 

defects were discovered through field and service experience, were corrected prior to causing 

serious injury or death, so long as the type or production certificate or PMA approval was not 

surrendered. 

177. At all times material hereto, and at all times prior to the subject accident, the 

defendants were aware of numerous prior events of engine failure and/or component part or 

engine module failure due to the defective design, development, manufacture, assembly and 

selection of materials, and the defects in product support materials, including instructions or 

warnings related to inspection, maintenance and repair with regard to the accident helicopter, 

the accident model/series engine, as well as the accident engine and/or their component parts, 

and had or should have had the means to correct the same, especially since the defendants 

knew that the failures as alleged herein continued to occur. 

178. The accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts are 

not ordinary or household goods or a common business appliance, which by their nature are 

mass marketed or mass produced products that could get swept away in the currents of 

commerce or otherwise become impossible to track or difficult to locate. Rather, the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their components parts are sold in a small and distinct 

market, are a unique and costly product for which there are business establishments that 

service said helicopter engines and/or component parts that are convenient and logical points 

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of contact for the defendants, and in fact the defendants routinely maintain contact with these 

facilities and owners/operators of their products or products for which they hold the type or 

production certificate or PMA approval, for the very purpose of keeping them current and 

informed as to all pertinent information regarding their products. Moreover, the defects 

alleged herein are not open and obvious, but instead are latent internal defects known only to 

the defendants. 

179. As a direct and proximate result of the defects and unreasonably dangerous 

conditions alleged herein, and the failure to warn of and/or correct these defects, and/or to 

otherwise retrofit or recall the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component 

parts by the Extex defendants, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, the MDHI defendants and 

defendant Superior, jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight 

engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in serious injuries 

to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates 

and their survivors and next of kin seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as 

previously alleged and as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT IX

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants, The Rolls-Royce/Allison Defendants, 

The MDHI Defendants and Defendant Superior Air Parts

180. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 179 as though set 

forth at length. 

181. The defendants owed a duty of care to plaintiffsí decedents to use reasonable 

care in connection with the design, development, testing, inspecting, manufacture, selection of 

materials for, assembly, distribution, sale, servicing, maintenance, airworthiness and 

continuing airworthiness of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts. 

182. Long prior to June 15, 2003, it became apparent through the high number of 

service difficulty reports, failures in the field and otherwise, that the accident helicopter, the 

accident engine and/or their component parts were unsuitable for its application and were 

defectively and/or negligently designed and/or manufactured, and were otherwise unsafe. 

183. Notwithstanding this actual knowledge, the defendants negligently, carelessly 

and recklessly failed to timely apprise owners and operators, the Federal Aviation 

Administration and others of the defects in and the unsuitability of the accident helicopter, the 

accident engine and/or their component parts. 

184. The defendants were negligent, by act or omission, and breached their duty of 

care owed to plaintiffsí decedents by: 

a. Failing to reasonably and properly design and develop the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts in a manner suitable for its 

intended application; 

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b. Failing to reasonably and properly manufacture, test, inspect, assemble 

and sell the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts in a manner 

suitable for its intended application; 

c. Failing to reasonably and properly select materials which were 

adequate in strength, quality and/or performance for the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts; 

d. Failing to reasonably and timely notify and warn the FAA and other 

regulatory authorities that defects in the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts existed and/or had not been cured; 

e. Failing to warn and notify the public at large, including owners and 

operators and service facilities, that the defects and dangerous conditions in the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their components parts existed and/or had not been 

cured; 

f. Failing to correct known defects in materials utilized in the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

g. Failing to comply with their responsibilities as type and/or production 

certificate holder and/or PMA holder pertaining to design, manufacture, testing, identifying, 

correcting and warning of defects in the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts; 

h. Failing to comply with their responsibilities as type and/or production 

certificate holder and/or PMA holder pertaining to airworthiness and continued airworthiness 

of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

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i. Failing to reasonably and properly instruct, warn and otherwise provide 

information regarding the unsuitability of the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or 

their component parts for its intended application; 

j. Failing to reasonably and properly test and analyze the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts for its intended application prior 

to or even after certification to ascertain the true nature of the defects and dangerous 

conditions in the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

k. Failing to warn that the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or 

their component parts were inadequate for its intended use; 

l. Unreasonably, improperly and contrary to regulation, certifying to the 

FAA and/or other appropriate regulatory authorities that the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts were airworthy and suitable for its intended application 

when in fact they were not; 

m. Designing and manufacturing the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts with inadequate materials in strength, quality and 

performance; 

n. Failing to recall and/or retrofit the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts; 

o. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly manufacturing, designing, 

developing, assembling, inspecting, testing, distributing, selling, and providing product 

support, product support materials, written instructions and written procedures related to 

inspecting, servicing, maintaining and repairing the accident helicopter, the accident engine 

and/or their component parts; 

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p. Issuing written service instructions for maintenance and repair which 

were confusing and misleading and not capable of effectuating suitable repair to the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts; 

q. Designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing a helicopter which 

contained defectively designed and/or manufactured engine parts; 

r. Designing, manufacturing, selling and distributing a helicopter which 

was not crashworthy; 

s. Failing to reasonably and properly design, develop, and manufacture a 

helicopter which would not burst into flames upon crash landings and/or impacts such as the 

crash in this case; 

t. Supplying and providing written maintenance instructions which were 

either too difficult, too confusing or otherwise were incapable of being complied with by 

mechanics in the field; 

u. Otherwise being negligent under the circumstances; and 

v. Such other acts of negligence as will appear during the course of 

discovery to be liability-producing conduct on the part of these defendants. 

185. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duties and responsibilities, 

negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the Extex defendants, the Rolls-Royce/Allison 

defendants, the MDHI defendants and defendant Superior, jointly and/or severally, the 

accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a 

hardened lava field resulting in serious injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for 

which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors and next of kin seek damages, 

compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by law. 

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WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT X

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL 

DAMAGES BASED ON BREACH OF WARRANTY

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants, The Rolls-Royce/Allison 

Defendants, The MDHI Defendants and Defendant Superior Air Parts

186. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 185 as though set 

forth at length. 

187. The defendants are liable to plaintiffs on the basis of breach of warranty in 

that, at all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their 

component parts were designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, sold, inspected, 

maintained, repaired and supported with express warranties and/or implied warranties that the 

accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their components parts were of fair and 

average qualities in the trade, were safe and merchantable, and were fit for its ordinary and 

particular purpose. 

188. The defendants also warranted that the accident helicopter, the accident engine 

and/or their component parts were free of defects in materials and/or workmanship when in 

fact they were dangerous and defective in breach of the aforesaid warranties. 

189. When the defendants designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, 

sold, inspected, maintained, repaired and supported the accident helicopter, the accident 

engine and/or their component parts, they expressly warranted that the accident helicopter, the 

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accident engine and/or their component parts were in a condition suitable for safe flight when 

in fact they were not, thus said express warranty was breached and, as a proximate result of 

said breach, plaintiffsí decedents suffered injuries resulting in their death. 

190. As a result of the design, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, sale, 

inspection, maintenance, repair and support of the accident helicopter, the accident engine 

and/or their component parts by the defendants, there also arose certain warranties implied by 

law. Those warranties include merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, to wit, 

safe flight. 

191. Plaintiffsí decedents relied upon such warranties in occupying the accident 

helicopter on June 15, 2003. 

192. The defendants did breach their implied warranties of merchantability in that: 

a. Defendants, merchants in the goods of the type used by plaintiffsí 

decedents, did not have the same adequately designed, developed, tested, assembled and 

manufactured; 

b. Said goods were not of fair and average quality in the trade in which 

the defendants engage; 

c. Said goods were not fit for the ordinary purpose for which said goods 

were used; 

d. Said goods were not in conformity with, in so far as safety was 

concerned, those generally used in the trade or business in which the defendants are engaged; 

e. The defendants knew or should have known that the goods were not fit 

for their ordinary purposes; 

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f. Defendants knew or should have known that said goods were 

defectively designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, sold, inspected, maintained 

and/or repaired and as such were dangerous to the plaintiffsí decedents and others in their 

position; 

g. The defendants knew or should have known that said goods were 

inadequate for the purposes intended and were dangerous to the safety of plaintiffsí decedents 

and others in their position; 

h. Said goods did not conform to the normal commercial standards of the 

trade in which the defendants engage. 

193. The defendants did breach their implied warranties of fitness for a particular 

purpose in that: 

a. The defendants knew or should have known that said goods would be 

used by plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position; 

b. The defendants knew or should have know that plaintiffsí decedents 

and others in their position did and would rely upon the defendants to furnish goods which 

were not defective; 

c. The defendants knew or should have known that the goods were not 

adequately and properly designed, developed, manufactured, assembled, tested, sold, 

inspected, maintained, repaired and supported, and therefore would not be fit for the purposes 

for which plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position would be using them; 

d. The defendants failed to provide a safe and non-defective accident 

helicopter, accident engine and/or components thereof, which would not cause injury, harm 

and damage to plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position. 

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194. As a direct and proximate result of the breaches of warranty by the Extex 

defendants, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, the MDHI defendants and defendant 

Superior, jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, 

loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in serious injuries to and the 

death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their 

survivors and next of kin seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as previously 

alleged and as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XI

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants, The Rolls-Royce/Allison 

Defendants, The MDHI Defendants And Defendant Superior Air Parts

195. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 194 as though set 

forth at length. 

196. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

defendants were actually aware of the defects alleged herein and of the very high accident 

and/or incident rate and/or service difficulty rate, and/or failure rate regarding the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts, and other similar models. 

197. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

defendants knew that the continued use of the accident helicopter, the accident engine, and/or 

the components thereof, would inevitably result in catastrophic failure of the engine with the 

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substantial likelihood of serious personal injury and/or death to those occupying the 

helicopter. 

198. Long prior to the accident which took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

defendants were aware of a fix and/or fixes which would have corrected the known defects 

and dangerous conditions in the accident helicopter, accident engine and/or component parts 

thereof, but willfully, wantonly, knowingly, unjustifiably, outrageously and in conscious 

disregard of the rights and safety of the plaintiffs, their decedents and the public at large, 

failed to implement such changes or fixes. 

199. In spite of the defendantsí actual knowledge that others had been and/or would 

likely continue to be injured and/or killed, and actual knowledge that the accident helicopter, 

the accident engine and/or their component parts were defective, unairworthy, unsafe and 

unreasonably dangerous, the defendants nonetheless failed to take any adequate and/or 

reasonable steps to prevent, warn, eliminate or correct the defects alleged herein or otherwise 

modify, recall, or retrofit the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component 

parts, all of which was in their capabilities and reasonable to accomplish, as a consequence of 

which the accident helicopter crashed unnecessarily taking the lives of plaintiffsí decedents. 

200. At all times material hereto, the defendants made decisions relating to the 

accident helicopter, the accident engine and its components based not on safety but rather 

based on retaining and/or capturing market share and/or otherwise for economic, not safety, 

reasons. 

201. The defendants willfully, wantonly, knowingly, unjustifiably, outrageously and 

in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffsí decedents and 

the public at large, failed to take any reasonable steps to avoid injury to plaintiffsí decedents 

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and others in their position, even though they knew that their failure to do so would result in 

and/or create an extreme likelihood of serious bodily injury or death, entitling plaintiffs to 

punitive damages. 

202. As a direct and proximate result of the defendantsí outrageous, willful and 

wanton misconduct, and conscious and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 

plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position, plaintiffsí decedents suffered injury and 

harm, resulting in and leading to their death, and therefore plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates 

and their survivors and next of kin pray for punitive damages as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial and for such other and 

further relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XII

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL DAMAGES BASED ON NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiffs v. Defendant Universal Power

203. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 202 as though set 

forth at length. 

204. Prior to June 15, 2003, defendant Universal Power, by and/or through its 

agents, servants, workmen and/or employees, undertook to perform certain inspection, 

maintenance and repair on the accident engine and/or its component parts. 

205. Prior to June 15, 2003, defendant Universal Power owed a duty of care to 

plaintiffsí decedents to use reasonable care in connection with inspection, maintenance and 

repair performed on the accident engine and/or its component parts. 

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206. Prior to June 15, 2003, defendant Universal Power, with respect to the 

inspection, maintenance and repair that it performed on the accident engine and/or its 

component parts, acted, in whole or in part, either individually, and or in its capacity as 

vendor and/or joint enterpriser with the K&S defendants and/or the Zaremba defendants, and 

at all times material hereto, acted within the scope of its authority, consent and permission, 

expressed or implied, and/or within the scope of its employment, agency and/or joint 

enterprise with the K&S defendants and/or the Zaremba defendants. 

207. At all times material hereto, defendant Universal Power, through its agents, 

servants, workmen and/or employees, negligently and improperly performed inspection, 

maintenance and/or repair on the accident engine and/or its component parts, including but 

not limited to, the performance of Commercial Engine Bulletin (CEB) 1325 issued by the 

Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants. 

208. The defendant was negligent, by act or omission, and breached its duty of care 

in that it: 

a. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly maintained the accident engine 

and/or its component parts; 

b. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly inspected the accident engine 

and/or its component parts; 

c. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly repaired the accident engine 

and/or its component parts; 

d. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly installed, reinstalled, reworked 

and/or reassembled the accident engine and/or its component parts; 

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e. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected unqualified and 

inadequate outside vendors to supply parts and materials for the inspection, maintenance and 

repair being performed on the accident engine and/or its component parts; 

f. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly performed the inspection, 

maintenance, repair, rework, reinstallation and reassembly as required by CEB 1325; 

g. Knowingly performed the maintenance, inspection, repair, 

reinstallation, rework and reassembly required by CEB 1325 without having the proper tools, 

facility and equipment to accomplish the same; 

h. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly selected unqualified and 

inadequate vendors to perform portions of CEB 1325; 

i. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly maintained poor and inadequate 

records and paperwork with respect to inspection, maintenance and repair performed on the 

accident engine and/or its component parts; 

j. Failed to properly and adequately perform and comply with applicable 

FAA airworthiness directives and/or manufacturer service bulletins, service letters, approved 

instructions, warnings, maintenance manuals, inspection schedules and service life schedules; 

k. Failed to properly and adequately use and comply with the accepted 

practices, procedures, techniques and materials when inspecting, maintaining, repairing and 

reassembling, reworking and reinstalling the accident engine and its component parts; 

l. Unreasonably, improperly and contrary to regulations certifying the 

accident engine and/or component parts thereof as airworthy; 

m. Failed to adhere to the Federal Aviation Regulations pertaining to 

inspection, maintenance and repair; 

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n. Carelessly, negligently and recklessly, either on its own, or in 

conjunction with other maintenance facilities, failed to properly and adequately maintain, 

inspect, repair, service or test the accident engine and/or its component parts; 

o. Provided defective and unsafe component parts and/or improperly 

installed and/or designed component parts into the accident engine; 

p. Otherwise being negligent under the circumstances; 

q. Such other acts of negligence as will appear during the course of 

discovery to be liability-producing conduct on the part of this defendant. 

209. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duties and responsibilities, 

negligence, carelessness and recklessness of the defendant Universal Power, the accident 

helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava 

field resulting in the injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the 

plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their surviving next of kin, seek damages, 

compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by applicable 

law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT XIII

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTION 

DAMAGES BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY

Plaintiffs v. The K&S Defendants, The Zaremba 

Defendants and Defendant Universal Power

210. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 209 as though set 

forth at length. 

211. At all times material hereto, the defendants were in the business of supplying 

helicopters, helicopter engines and/or helicopter engine components for use in connection 

with the K&S defendantsí FAR Part 135 for hire commercial sightseeing operations and/or in 

connection with inspection, maintenance and repair related thereto. 

212. On June 15, 2003, the accident helicopter, accident engine and/or their 

component parts were supplied to plaintiffsí decedents and were being used for the purpose 

and in the manner for which they were supplied. 

213. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or 

their component parts supplied by the defendants were defective in design and/or 

manufacture, were defective for lack of warnings and instructions, and were in an 

unreasonably dangerous and unsafe condition, which was a substantial factor in the happening 

of this accident. 

214. The defects in and the unreasonably dangerous condition of the accident 

helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component parts supplied by the defendants 

consisted of, but are not limited to, the following: 

a. Supplying a defectively designed and developed accident helicopter, 

accident engine and/or their component parts; 

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b. Supplying a defectively manufactured accident helicopter, accident 

engine and/or their component parts; 

c. Failing to warn that they were supplying an accident helicopter, 

accident engine and/or component parts thereof, which contained defects in design, 

development and/or manufacture; 

d. Supplying an accident helicopter, accident engine and component parts 

thereof which was not airworthy; 

e. Supplying the accident helicopter, accident engine and/or component 

parts thereof, which contained defective and dangerous parts and materials; 

f. Supplying a defectively designed, developed and manufactured 

accident helicopter and components thereof which was not crashworthy; 

g. Supplying a defectively designed and manufactured helicopter which, 

in an otherwise survivable crash scenario, burst into flames during the post-crash landing, 

killing the occupants thereof; 

h. Failing to discover defects in the accident helicopter, accident engine 

and/or their components parts prior to supplying them for use by plaintiffsí decedents; 

i. Such other defects as will appear during the course of discovery to be 

liability-producing conduct on the part of these defendants; 

215. At all times material hereto, the accident helicopter, accident engine and the 

components thereof were in essentially the same condition before the crash as when they left 

the defendantsí control and were supplied to the plaintiffsí decedents, and were used in the 

foreseeable manner and for the particular purpose which the defendants knew or should have 

known that the products supplied by them would be used. 

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216. As a direct and proximate result of the defects and unreasonably dangerous 

conditions alleged herein, and the failure to warn of and/or correct these defects, and/or to 

otherwise retrofit or recall the accident helicopter, the accident engine and/or their component 

parts by the K&S defendants, the Zaremba defendants, and defendant Universal Power, 

jointly and/or severally, the accident helicopter suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of 

control and crashed in a hardened lava field, resulting in serious injuries to and the death of 

plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their survivors 

and next of kin seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and 

as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XIV

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTION 

DAMAGES BASED UPON FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants

217. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 216 as though set 

forth at length. 

218. Long prior to June 15, 2003, the Extex defendants represented to the FAA and 

others that with respect to the PMA engine parts that they designed, developed, manufactured 

and sold, that such PMA replacement parts were safe, carefully designed, equal to or better 

than the component parts originally designed and manufactured by the Rolls-Royce/Allison 

defendants, and that said PMA replacement parts were in all respects better than OEM parts. 

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219. At all times material hereto, the representations made by the Extex defendants 

were false, fraudulent and a material misrepresentation of fact in that said replacement parts 

were inferior in design, development and manufacture, including omitting critical design and 

quality assurance processes used and/or incorporated into the product by the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants. 

220. At all times material hereto, the defendants knew or should have known that 

the PMA replacement parts they were touting as being equal to or better than those provided 

by the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants were in fact defectively and dangerously designed and 

manufactured, especially since the failure rate of those parts by the Extex defendantsí own 

analysis confirmed that there was no relationship to rates of failure and time in service. 

221. At all times material hereto, the Extex defendants represented to the FAA and 

users and consumers of its PMA replacement parts, including some or all of the defendants 

herein, that said parts were in full compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations with 

respect to design and manufacture, and that said replacement parts could be safely maintained 

and inspected in compliance with the OEMsí maintenance manuals and instructions for 

continued airworthiness when in fact these representations were false, fraudulent and a 

misrepresentation of material fact. 

222. At all times material hereto, the false and fraudulent misrepresentations by the 

Extex defendants were made deliberately, intentionally and willfully, without due regard for 

safety and without due regard for the rights and safety of plaintiffsí decedents and those in the 

position of plaintiffsí decedents. 

223. Plaintiffsí decedents, and the users and consumers of PMA replacement parts 

designed, developed, manufactured and sold by the Extex defendants were unaware that the 

Case 2:05-cv-02768-LDD Document 1 Filed 06/10/05 Page 80 of 92
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representations made by the defendants regarding the safety, quality and integrity of the PMA 

replacement parts sold by the Extex defendants were false and fraudulent, and had they been 

provided accurate information regarding the quality and integrity of the Extex defendantsí 

PMA replacement parts, plaintiffsí decedents would not have taken the accident flight and 

some or all of the defendants in this case would not have used and/or supplied the PMA 

replacement parts manufactured and sold by the Extex defendants. 

224. The crash, injuries, death and resultant damages of plaintiffsí decedents were 

caused by the Extex defendants as a result of their intentional, reckless and/or negligent 

misrepresentations. 

225. As a direct and proximate result of the misrepresentations, gross negligence, 

carelessness and recklessness of the Extex defendants, the accident helicopter suffered an inflight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field resulting in serious 

injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the plaintiffs, their decedentsí 

estates and their surviving next of kin, seek damages, compensation and financial recovery as 

previously alleged and as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT XV

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiffs v. The Extex Defendants

226. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 225 as though set 

forth at length. 

227. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

defendants were actually aware of the false, fraudulent and material misrepresentations that 

they were making with respect to the PMA replacement parts which they designed, 

developed, manufactured and sold, including the failed compressor adapter coupling in this 

case. 

228. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the 

defendants knew that the continued use of PMA replacement parts which they supplied, 

including the failed compressor adapter coupling in this case, would inevitably result in 

catastrophic failure of the engine with the substantial likelihood of serious personal injury 

and/or death to those occupying the helicopter. 

229. In spite of the defendantsí actual knowledge that others had been and/or would 

likely continue to be injured and/or killed on account of their false, fraudulent and material 

misrepresentations and with actual knowledge that there was no correlation between time in 

service and rate of failure, the defendants nonetheless failed to take any adequate and/or 

reasonable steps to prevent, warn, eliminate or correct the defects alleged herein or otherwise 

modify, recall or retrofit the accident engine and/or its component parts, all of which was in 

their capabilities and was reasonable to accomplish prior to the accident, as a consequence of 

which the accident helicopter crashed unnecessarily taking the lives of plaintiffsí decedents. 

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230. At all times material hereto, the defendants made decisions with respect to 

their PMA parts, including the failed compressor adapter coupling in this case, for reasons 

based not on safety, but rather based on retaining and/or capturing market share, and/or 

otherwise for economic reasons and/or in conjunction with their ongoing battle with the 

OEMs and, in particular, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants. 

231. The defendants willfully, wantonly, knowingly, unjustifiably, outrageously, 

and in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffsí decedents 

and the public at large, failed to take any reasonable steps to avoid injury to plaintiffsí 

decedents and others in their position, even thought they knew that their failure to do so 

would result in and/or create an extreme likelihood of serious bodily injury or death, entitling 

plaintiffs to punitive damages. 

232. As a direct and proximate result of the Extex defendantsí outrageous, willful 

and wanton misconduct and conscious and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of 

plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position, plaintiffsí decedents suffered injury and 

harm resulting in and leading to their death and therefore plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates 

and their surviving next of kin, pray for punitive damages as permitted by applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial and for such other and 

further relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT XVI

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL ACTION DAMAGES 

BASED UPON FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION

Plaintiffs v. The Rolls-Royce/Allison Defendants

233. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 232 as though set 

forth at length. 

234. Long prior to June 15, 2003, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants represented 

to the FAA and others that the accident model/series engine that they designed, developed, 

manufactured and sold was safe, carefully designed and manufactured, and free of any defects 

in design and/or manufacture. 

235. Long prior to June 15, 2003, the representations made by the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants were false, fraudulent and a material misrepresentation of fact in 

that the accident model/series engine was defective in design, development and manufacture, 

and was unreasonably dangerous, including but not limited to, having critical defects in 

design and manufacture related to the compressor assembly, the compressor adapter coupling, 

the impeller assembly and the shafting system of the engine. 

236. At all times material hereto, the defendants knew or should have known that 

the accident engine was defectively and dangerously designed and manufactured, especially 

since the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants had actual knowledge of numerous compressor 

adapter coupling failures and/or service difficulties alerting them that there was a problem 

with premature wear and/or fretting of the compressor adaptor coupling, as well as actual 

knowledge of failures and/or service difficulties related to the impeller assembly and the 

shafting system of the engine. 

Case 2:05-cv-02768-LDD Document 1 Filed 06/10/05 Page 84 of 92
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237. At all times material hereto, and long prior to June 15, 2003, the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants were aware that design and/or manufacturing changes and/or fixes 

to the compressor adapter coupling were necessary so as to avoid premature part and/or 

engine failure, yet failed to share this knowledge and information with the FAA and/or the 

aviation community. 

238. At all times material hereto, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants represented to 

the FAA and users and consumers that the accident model/series engine and the component 

parts thereof was in full compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations with respect to 

design and manufacture, and that the engine and component parts thereof could be safely 

maintained and inspected in compliance with the Rolls-Royce/Allison maintenance manuals 

and instructions for continued airworthiness when in fact these representations were false, 

fraudulent and a misrepresentation of material fact. On the contrary, the Rolls-Royce/Allison 

defendants were aware, prior to June 15, 2003, of numerous premature failures and/or 

removals of compressor adapter couplings due to fretting that had been experienced with that 

part in service which in turn could lead to fracture and/or failure of the coupling followed by 

an immediate and total loss of engine power. 

239. At all times material hereto, the false and fraudulent misrepresentations by the 

Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants were made deliberately, intentionally and willfully, without 

due regard for safety and without due regard for the rights and safety of plaintiffsí decedents 

and those in the position of plaintiffsí decedents. 

240. Plaintiffsí decedents, and the users and consumers of the accident model/series 

engine designed, developed and sold by the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, were unaware 

that the representations made by the defendants regarding the safety, quality and integrity of 

Case 2:05-cv-02768-LDD Document 1 Filed 06/10/05 Page 85 of 92
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the engine and its component parts sold by the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants were false and 

fraudulent, and had they been provided accurate information regarding the safety, quality, and 

integrity of the engine and its component parts, plaintiffsí decedents would not have taken the 

accident flight. 

241. The crash injuries, death and resultant damages of plaintiffsí decedents were 

caused by the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants as a result of their intentional, reckless and 

negligent misrepresentations. 

242. As a direct and proximate result of the misrepresentations, gross negligence, 

carelessness and recklessness of the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants, the accident helicopter 

suffered an in-flight engine failure, loss of control and crashed in a hardened lava field 

resulting in serious injuries to and the death of plaintiffsí decedents, all for which the 

plaintiffs, their decedentsí estates and their surviving next of kin, seek damages, 

compensation and financial recovery as previously alleged and as permitted by applicable 

law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XVII

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiffs v. The Rolls-Royce/Allison Defendants

243. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 242 as though set 

forth at length. 

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244. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants were actually aware of the false, fraudulent and material 

misrepresentations that they were making with respect to the accident model/series engine, 

which they designed, developed, manufactured and sold. 

245. Long prior to the accident that took the lives of plaintiffsí decedents, the RollsRoyce/Allison defendants knew that the continued use of the accident model/series engine, 

including but not limited to, the continued use of compressor adapter couplings of the type 

and/or design incorporated into the accident engine, would inevitably result in catastrophic 

failure of the engine with the substantial likelihood of serious personal injury and/or death to 

those occupying the helicopter, regardless whether said type and/or design was an OEM 

design or a PMA replacement part. 

246. In spite of the defendantsí actual knowledge that others had been and/or would 

likely continue to be injured and/or killed on account of their false, fraudulent and material 

misrepresentations and in spite of the defendantsí actual knowledge that there had been 

numerous prior failures of the compressor adapter coupling and numerous premature 

removals of that component part, the defendants nonetheless failed to take any adequate 

and/or reasonable steps to prevent, warn, eliminate or correct the defects alleged herein or 

otherwise modify, recall or retrofit the accident engine and/or its component parts, all of 

which was in their capabilities and was reasonable to accomplish prior to the accident, as a 

consequence of which the accident helicopter crashed unnecessarily taking the lives of 

plaintiffsí decedents. 

247. At all times material hereto, the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendants made 

decisions with respect to the accident model/series engine and the component parts thereof, 

Case 2:05-cv-02768-LDD Document 1 Filed 06/10/05 Page 87 of 92
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including the compressor adapter coupling, for reasons based not on safety, but rather based 

on retaining and/or capturing market share, and/or otherwise for economic reasons and/or in 

conjunction with their ongoing battle with the PMA industry and, in particular, the Extex 

defendants. 

248. The defendants willfully, wantonly, knowingly, unjustifiably, outrageously, 

and in conscious disregard of the rights and safety of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffsí decedents 

and the public at large, failed to take any reasonable steps to avoid injury to plaintiffsí 

decedents and others in their position, even thought they knew that their failure to do so 

would result in and/or create an extreme likelihood of serious bodily injury or death, entitling 

plaintiffs to punitive damages. 

249. As a direct and proximate result of the Rolls-Royce/Allison defendantsí 

outrageous, willful and wanton misconduct and conscious and reckless disregard for the rights 

and safety of plaintiffsí decedents and others in their position, plaintiffsí decedents suffered 

injury and harm resulting in and leading to their death and therefore plaintiffs, their 

decedentsí estates and their surviving next of kin, pray for punitive damages as permitted by 

applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, and for such other and 

further relief as the court deems just. 

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COUNT XVIII

SURVIVAL CLAIMS

Plaintiffs v. All Defendants

250. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 249 as though set 

forth at length. 

251. Both prior and subsequent to the impact in and from this crash, the plaintiffsí 

decedents all experienced severe emotional distress, physical and mental injury, and fear of 

impending death that caused them tremendous conscious pain and suffering before and up to 

the time of their death. 

252. Accordingly, plaintiffs and plaintiffsí decedentsí estates seek compensation for 

pre-impact pain and suffering, as well as post-impact pain and suffering prior to death 

pursuant to their decedentsí survivorship rights as set forth pursuant to Pennsylvania law 

and/or any other applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XIX

WRONGFUL DEATH

Plaintiffs v. All Defendants

253. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 252 as though set 

forth at length. 

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254. As a result of the severe emotional distress and physical and mental injuries as 

more particularly set forth above, plaintiffsí decedents were killed as a result of the crash of 

the accident helicopter. 

255. Plaintiffs are all proper heirs, surviving next of kin and/or dependents of 

decedents James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman at the time of this 

accident, and therefore seek compensation for their decedentsí wrongful death pursuant to 

Pennsylvania law and/or any other applicable law. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XX

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Plaintiffs v. All Defendants

256. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 255 as though set 

forth at length. 

257. Plaintiffs suffered severe and devastating emotional distress as a result of 

James A. Thomasí, Jody A. Laughmanís and Nicole L. Laughmanís catastrophic and fatal 

injuries, all of which were proximately caused by the breaches, tortious conduct and/or 

negligent acts and/or omissions of the defendants, all of which entitles plaintiffs to 

compensation for their emotional distress in amounts to be shown and/or determined at trial. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

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($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

COUNT XXI

LOSS OF CARE AND COMPANIONSHIP 

Plaintiffs v. All Defendants

258. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 257 as though set 

forth at length. 

259. As a result of the defendantsí breaches, tortious conduct and/or negligent acts 

and/or omissions, proximately causing the death of their decedents, James A. Thomas, Jody 

A. Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman, plaintiffs individually, and/or the decedentsí 

beneficiaries and/or next of kin at law, have all suffered the loss of love, support, care and 

companionship of James A. Thomas, Jody A. Laughman and Nicole L. Laughman, all for 

which they seek compensation in amounts to be shown and/or determined at trial. 

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment against the defendant(s), jointly and 

severally, for compensatory damages in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars 

($150,000.00) exclusive of interest, costs, and attorneysí fees and for such other and further 

relief as the court deems just. 

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JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands for a trial by jury. 

Dated: ____________________________ 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 REG4398

 Richard E. Genter, Esquire 

 LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD E. GENTER 

 610 Old York Road, Suite 200 

 Jenkintown, PA 19046 

 (215) 884-8190 

 Attorney for Plaintiffs 

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