[Cite as State v. Crossen, 2011-Ohio-2509.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsJAMES E. CROSSEN 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2010-COA-027 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Ashland Municipal 

Court, Case No. 10-CRB-566 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and 

 Remanded 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 24, 2011 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

DAVID M. HUNTER THOMAS L. MASON 

Assistant Law Director P.O. Box 345 

1213 East Main Street Ashland, OH 44805 

Ashland, OH 44805 
[Cite as State v. Crossen, 2011-Ohio-2509.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant James E. Crossen appeals his conviction and 

sentence in the Ashland County Municipal Court for one count of Possessing Drug 

Abuse Instruments, a misdemeanor of the second degree in violation of Ohio Revised 

Code 2925.12 (A). The plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On June 2, 2010, Officer Brian Evans of the City of Ashland Police 

Department responded to a call involving a woman who reportedly could not convince a 

man to exit her vehicle. Officer Evans arrived in an unmarked cruiser, saw what he 

believed to be the complainant's vehicle in a parking lot and saw a male walking away 

from the vehicle. Officer Evans recognized the male and followed him. When a marked 

cruiser passed, Officer Evans testified he saw the male place his hand inside a tractor 

wheel well and continued walking. The Officer parked, called the individual's name, and 

jogged after him. Appellant kept walking until about the third time Officer Evans called 

his name, when he stopped and turned. Officer Evans motioned for appellant to come to 

him, appellant complied with the Officer’s request. Officer Evans told him to turn around 

and put his hands behind his back, which he did. Appellant asked what was going on, to 

which Officer Evans responded, "Well, I just saw you put something back there on that 

tractor." Appellant denied that he had. 

{¶3} Two uniformed officers arrived on the scene and appellant was placed in 

handcuffs. Appellant was also read his Miranda rights by Officer Evans at this time. 

Officer Evans then went back to the tractor wheel well and found a syringe. Officer 

Evans returned to appellant. He asked appellant about the syringe. Appellant initially 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 3 

denied putting it on the tractor, but ultimately admitted that he had. He also stated that 

he was the person in the vehicle that would not get out. Appellant was driven to the 

police station where Officer Evans continued his questioning of him approximately 20-

30 minutes later. He did not re-Mirandize appellant. Appellant made other incriminating 

statements, including that the syringe was used to inject heroin. 

{¶4} Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was heard on August 

13, 2010. On August 25, 2010 the trial court issued a Judgment Entry overruling the 

motion. 

{¶5} On September 13, 2010 appellant entered a plea of No Contest to the 

charge, was found Guilty, and was sentenced to serve sixty (60) days in the Ashland 

County Jail. 

{¶6} Appellant has timely appealed raising as his sole assignment of error, 

{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY RULING 

THAT POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE APPELLANT.” 

I. 

{¶8} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 797 N.E.2d 71, 74, 20030-

Ohio-5372 at ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role 

of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate 

witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 

988; State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583. Accordingly, a 

reviewing court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible 

evidence exists to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 4 

Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1; State v. Medcalf (1996), 111 

Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268. However, once this Court has accepted those facts 

as true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met 

the applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara (1997), 

124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539; See, generally, United States v. Arvizu (2002), 

534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744; Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 

1657. That is, the application of the law to the trial court's findings of fact is subject to a 

de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due weight should be given “to 

inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 

officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663. 

{¶9} Appellant’s sole assignment of error relates to the propriety of the trial 

court’s overruling of his motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant contends that the 

state failed to produce sufficient evidence that Officer Evans had probable cause to 

arrest him on June 2, 2010. 

{¶10} Contact between police officers and the public can be characterized in 

three different ways. State v. Richardson, 5th Dist. No.2004CA00205, 2005-Ohio-554 at 

¶ 23-27. The first is contact initiated by a police officer for purposes of investigation. 

“[M]erely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place [,]” seeking 

to ask questions for voluntary, uncoerced responses, does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Flowers (6th Cir. 1990), 909 F.2d 145, 147. The United 

State Supreme Court “[has] held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not 

constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 

L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 5 

L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular 

individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the 

individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.” Bostick, 

supra, at 434-435, 111 S.Ct. 2382 (citations omitted). The person approached, 

however, need not answer any question put to him, and may continue on his way. 

Florida v. Royer (1983), 460 U .S. 491, 497-98. Moreover, he may not be detained even 

momentarily for his refusal to listen or answer. Id. 

{¶11} The second type of contact is generally referred to as “a Terry stop” and is 

predicated upon reasonable suspicion. Richardson, supra; Flowers, 909 F.2d at 147; 

See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1. This temporary detention, although a seizure, 

does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under the Terry doctrine, “certain seizures are 

justifiable ... if there is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to 

commit a crime” Florida, 460 U.S. at 498. In holding that the police officer's actions were 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Justice Rehnquist provided the following 

discussion of the holding in Terry: “In Terry this Court recognized that a police officer 

may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for 

purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable 

cause to make an arrest. The Fourth Amendment does not require a police officer who 

lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply 

shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, 

Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an 

intermediate response. A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his 

identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 6 

be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Adams v. 

Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 145-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923-24, 32 L.Ed.2d 612. 

{¶12} The third type of contact arises when an officer has “probable cause to 

believe a crime has been committed and the person stopped committed it.” Richardson, 

supra; Flowers, 909 F. 2d at 147. A warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid if: “[a]t the 

moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it-whether at 

that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had 

reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 

that the * * * [individual] had committed or was committing an offense.” State v. Heston

(1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 152, 155-156, 280 N.E.2d 376, quoting Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 

U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142. “The principal components of a 

determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which 

occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these 

historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 

amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.” Ornelas v. United States (1996), 

517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-1162. A police officer may draw inferences 

based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists. See, e.g.,

United States v. Ortiz (1975), 422 U.S. 891, 897, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 2589. 

{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a police officer's statement “Hey, 

come here a minute,” while nominally couched in the form of a demand, is actually a 

request that a citizen is free to regard or to disregard. State v. Smith (1989), 45 Ohio 

St.3d 255, 258-259, 544 N.E.2d 239, 242, reversed sub nom. Smith v. Ohio (1990), 494 

U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464. 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 7 

{¶14} In the case at bar, Officer Evans’ initial calling out to appellant and 

motioning him to come over to him would be characterized as a consensual encounter. 

Nothing in the record establishes that appellant could not have continued to walk away 

from Officer Evans as he had done the first two times the Officer hailed him. However, 

once appellant was ordered to place his hands behind his back, confronted with two 

uniformed officers in addition to Officer Evans, placed in handcuffs and read his 

Miranda rights the situation quickly changed. 

{¶15} It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause is 

unconstitutional. State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 122, 311 N.E.2d 16, paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Probable cause arises when “the facts and circumstances within [a 

police officer's] knowledge and of which [he has] reasonably trustworthy information 

were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that 

criminal conduct was afoot. Carroll v. United States (1924), 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 

280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 555; see, also, State v. Heston (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 152, 156, 280 

N.E.2d 376. If, after being arrested, a defendant asserts that probable cause was 

lacking at the time of arrest, the State bears the burden of proof on the issue of whether 

probable cause existed at the time of arrest. Xenia v. Wallace (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 

216, 524 N.E.2d 889, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶16} In United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, the 

United States Supreme Court made the following observation: “[w]e conclude that a 

person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of 

all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 

believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 8 

seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening 

presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 

touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating 

that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 

392 U.S., at 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n. 16; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 

207, and n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2253, 60 L.Ed.2d 824; 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 

53-55 (1978)”. Id. at 544, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. On the facts of this case, clearly a 

“seizure" of the appellant occurred. 

{¶17} Upon review, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the 

events in the case sub judice constituted an arrest such that the officers were required 

to have probable cause to believe a crime had been committed and that appellant 

committed it. However, that does not end our inquiry. Rather, the question is whether 

Officer Evans’ discovery of the syringe was the result of the unlawful arrest. See United 

States v. Bentley (6th Cir. 1994), 29 F. 3d 1073, 1075-76 (concluding that, even though 

the defendant was arrested prematurely, the police had reasonable suspicion to detain 

him, and evidence observed in plain view constituted an independent basis to justify the 

subsequent search of the defendant's vehicle). 

{¶18} In United States v. Bentley supra, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 

refused to suppress evidence obtained immediately after an illegal arrest. In Bentley,

agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (“ATF”) stopped the defendants' 

vehicle and immediately handcuffed them and put them in the back of a police cruiser. 

The ATF agents then approached their vehicle and observed a variety of firearms and 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 9 

firearm boxes, which the agents collected as evidence. State v. Blake, Columbiana App. 

No. 01 CO 44, 2002-Ohio-5221 at ¶ 46-47. 

{¶19} The defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the 

vehicle. The Bentley court held that the arrest was not supported by probable cause. Id.

at 1075. Nevertheless, the court held that there were independent reasons to justify the 

search of the vehicle and the seizure of evidence apart from the illegal arrest. Id. The 

court found that the original stop of the vehicle was constitutionally permissible under 

Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and that the guns 

were discovered pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Id. at 1075-1076. Because these 

independent reasons justified the manner in which the government acquired the 

evidence, the court held that, “the premature arrest played no role in the seizing of the 

evidence * * *.” Id. at 1076. Accord United States v. Eylicio-Montoya (C.A. 10, 1995), 70 

F.3d 1158, 1167; cf. People v. Tariq (1991), 170 A.D.2d 716, 565 N.Y.S.2d 614 

(statements made at police station were not the fruit of illegal arrest where detention in 

police station was otherwise legal); see also People v. Monson (1967), 255 Cal.App.2d 

689, 63 Cal.Rptr. 409 (trial court is free to infer that legal Terry stop, rather than illegal 

arrest, was the basis for police acquiring evidence). State v. Blake, supra. 

{¶20} In the case at bar, the manner in which appellant was detained did rise to 

the level of an arrest, but the officers' display of authority and use of force to detain him 

did not create the circumstances that led to the discovery of the syringe. Rather, it was 

Officer Evans’ observation that appellant had placed something inside the tire well of 

the tractor that led to the discovery of the syringe. See, United States v. Howard (6th Cir 

2010), 621 F.3d 433, 451. Police may freely seize and search abandoned items, such 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 10 

as items thrown from vehicles during a police chase, items placed in trash containers, or 

items dropped by a pedestrian while fleeing from the police. See, e.g., Abel v. United 

States (1960), 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668; State v. Freeman

(1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 296, 18 O.O.3d 472, 414 N.E.2d 1044; United States v. 

Flynn (C.A.10, 2002), 309 F.3d 736; United States v. Mustone (C.A.1, 1972), 469 F.2d 

970; State v. Hill (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 265, 269, 712 N.E.2d 791. Since the Fourth 

Amendment protects only those places and items that a person expects to remain 

private, and since abandoned items are available for anyone to find and peruse, courts 

have consistently denied Fourth Amendment protection over abandoned items. Bond v. 

United States (C.A.7, 1996), 77 F.3d 1009, 1013. See, State v. Dubose (2005), 164 

Ohio App.3d 698, 843 N.E.2d 1222, 2005-Ohio-6602 at ¶42. 

{¶21} Accordingly, we find that the premature arrest played no role in the seizing 

of the evidence from the tractor. It follows that the fact that the arrest was premature is 

not grounds for the suppression of that evidence. 

{¶22} Appellant also argues that the trial court should have suppressed the 

statements he made to Officer Evans after the discovery of the drugs. 

{¶23} In Barry v. New Jersey1

, the United States Supreme Court observed, 

{¶24} “In order for a statement given to police after an illegal arrest to be 

admissible at trial, the statement must not only be voluntary by Fifth Amendment 

standards, but it must also not be the result of exploiting the illegal arrest; rather, it must 

be ‘an act of free will [sufficient] to purge the primary taint.’ Wong Sun v. United States, 

371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 

 1

 See, Barry v. New Jersey, 171 N.J.Super. 543, 410 A.2d 259 (1979), cert. granted, 84 N.J. 388, 

420 A.2d 316 (1980), rev'd, 86 N.J. 80, 429 A.2d 581 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 553, 

70 L.Ed.2d 415 (1981) (the Supreme Court denied certiorari, with three justices dissenting). 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 11 

590, 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Brown held that Miranda 

warnings, by themselves, cannot always make a confession ‘sufficiently a product of 

free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the 

illegality and the confession.’ 422 U.S., at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. By focusing on the 

causal connection between an illegal arrest and a subsequent confession, Brown

sought to implement the policies behind the use of the exclusionary rule to effectuate 

the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218-219, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 

2259-2260, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). It identified three factors for determining whether it 

is necessary to exclude a confession obtained following an illegal arrest: ‘The temporal 

proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, ... 

and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.’ 

Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603-604, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-2262 (footnotes 

omitted).” Barry v. New Jersey, 454 U.S. at 1019, 102 S.Ct. at 554. In articulating this 

multi-factored test, the Court rejected a ‘but for’ approach to admissibility of a 

confession following an illegal arrest, and recognized that ‘persons arrested illegally 

frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality.’ 

Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. See, State v. Cranford, Montgomery App. No. 20633, 2005-

Ohio-1904 at ¶26. 

{¶25} In Brown, the Court stated that the giving of Miranda warnings, though 

relevant to a determination of whether a confession was obtained by exploitation of the 

illegal arrest, was not dispositive. 

{¶26} In the case at bar, the State argues that appellant was read his Miranda

rights, and further was lawfully arrested after the syringe was discovered, therefore his 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 12 

arrest was with probable cause. The record reveals appellant was never advised that he 

was under arrest. (T. at 21). 

{¶27} Officer Evans did not read appellant his Miranda rights after discovery of 

the syringe, during transportation or while appellant was detained and questioned at the 

police station. In terms of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, allowing a confrontation 

such as occurred in this case to qualify as an intervening circumstance would permit the 

police to seize and detain any person without probable cause, secure in the knowledge 

that a confession later obtained by confronting the accused with evidence against him 

would be admissible. Barry v. New Jersey, supra 454 U.S. at 1021, 102 S.Ct. at 555. 

Nothing in the facts suggests that there was any intervening circumstance that may 

have served to separate the statements at the scene from the illegal arrest. 

{¶28} The third Brown factor to be considered is the purpose and flagrancy of 

the police conduct. “Although the police conduct here was not designed to cause fright 

and confusion as it was in Brown, 422 U.S., at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, the police 

admittedly lacked probable cause to arrest petitioner, and the purpose of the arrest was 

to detain ‘in the hope that something might turn up.’ Ibid. This purpose is itself sufficient 

to exclude a confession, absent a sufficient intervening event. Dunaway v. New York, 

supra, 442 U.S., at 218, 99 S.Ct. at 2259.” Barry v. New Jersey, supra 454 U.S. at 

1021, 102 S.Ct. at 555. In the case at bar, appellant was confronted with two uniformed 

police officers and one undercover officer. Appellant was ordered to place his hands 

behind his back. He was placed in handcuffs. At that point the officers did not have 

probable cause to arrest appellant. The Fourth Amendment forbids the police from 

arresting someone because they feel that person is involved in a crime. Probable cause 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 13 

is required, not suspicion. Accordingly, the statements obtained from appellant at the 

scene must be suppressed. 

{¶29} Appellant also made incriminating statements while in custody at the 

police station. That interrogation occurred twenty to thirty minutes after the initial 

encounter. (T. at 13). Appellant was not advised of his Miranda rights while in custody at 

the police station before being questioned by Officer Evans. 

{¶30} The question of an effective waiver of a Federal Constitutional right in a 

State criminal proceeding is governed by Federal standards. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 

395, U.S. 238. (Citing Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415). For a waiver to be 

valid under the Due Process clause of the United States Constitution, it must be: “[a]n 

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Boykin, supra, 

395 U.S. at 243 n. 5 (Quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458). 

{¶31} In State v. Dailey (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 559 N.E.2d 459, the Ohio 

Supreme Court outlined the manner in which a suspect must be informed of his or her 

Miranda rights: “[i]n Miranda, supra, the court indicated that ‘the prosecution may not 

use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’ Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. 

{¶32} We note that there is no written or recorded waiver of rights by appellant in 

the record of this case. Accordingly, nothing in the record suggests that appellant 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights prior to questioning at the police 

station. Here as we have previously noted, there is nothing in the record to establish 

that the statements made at the police station were not obtained by exploitation of the 
Ashland County, Case No. 2010-COA-027 14 

initial illegal arrest. As we have noted, appellant was not informed that he was under 

arrest after the syringe was discovered; nor was he advised of, or asked to waive, his 

constitutional rights subsequent to the discovery. 

{¶33} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is sustained in part and 

overruled in part. 

{¶34} For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Ashland Municipal Court, 

Ashland County, Ohio is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is 

remanded for proceedings in accordance with our opinion and the law. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Delaney, J., concur 

 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

 

WSG:clw 0428 
[Cite as State v. Crossen, 2011-Ohio-2509.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

JAMES E. CROSSEN : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2010-COA-027 

 

 For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Ashland Municipal Court, Ashland County, Ohio is affirmed in part and 

reversed in part, and this case is remanded for proceedings in accordance with our 

opinion and the law. Costs to be divided equally between the parties. 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. W. SCOTT GWIN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN 

 _________________________________ 

 HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY