1

PRESENT: All the Justices 

GREGORY LEON YOUNG 

v. Record No. 060473 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 April 20, 2007 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 

erred in remanding a robbery conviction for a new sentencing 

proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, rather than ordering a new 

trial on all issues, based on the erroneous admission of 

evidence of other crimes during the guilt phase of a defendant’s 

trial. 

 Gregory Leon Young was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court 

of the City of Danville for robbery, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-58. Young was convicted of the offense and sentenced, in 

accordance with the jury verdict, to a term of life 

imprisonment.1

Young chose to represent himself at his trial. The 

evidence at trial showed that in January 2004, a robbery 

occurred at “Check ‘n Go,” a check-cashing establishment in the 

City of Danville (the Danville robbery). 

 1

 In the same trial, Young also was convicted for use of a 

firearm in the commission of a robbery, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-53.1. However, Young’s conviction for use of a firearm 

is not before us in this appeal. 
2

Shanna D. Jones was the sole cashier in the store when a man 

entered and handed her a note that read, “I Have a Gun Give me 

$2,100 you have 10 seconds.” The man produced a gun from inside 

his coat and stated, “Just do what I say and you don’t get 

hurt.” Jones gave the man $1,776, the entire contents of her 

“money drawer.” 

The Commonwealth offered into evidence several segments of 

a video recording made of Young in the Henry County Sheriff’s 

Office about one week after the Danville robbery. Young had 

been taken into custody in Henry County for a separate bank 

robbery that had occurred in the City of Martinsville (the 

Martinsville robbery). While Young was in custody at the Henry 

County Sheriff’s Office, City of Martinsville police officers 

interviewed him for about three hours regarding the Martinsville 

robbery. When the Martinsville police officers concluded their 

interview, City of Danville police officers questioned Young for 

an additional hour regarding the Danville robbery. Both 

interviews were preserved on a video recording (the Henry County 

interview). During the Henry County interview, Young confessed 

that he committed the Danville robbery. 

The Commonwealth informed the circuit court that the 

Commonwealth did not intend to present to the jury any 

statements in the Henry County interview that would be 

inadmissible in evidence. The circuit court stated that it 
3

would allow the Commonwealth to play the portions of the Henry 

County interview relating to the Danville robbery, but ruled 

that other portions of the video recording that were unrelated 

to the Danville offenses would be inadmissible. 

The Commonwealth showed the jury the portion of the Henry 

County interview in which Young confessed to the Danville 

robbery. The jury also was shown, however, some inadmissible 

portions of the Henry County interview, including Young’s 

statements concerning his purchase and use of illegal drugs, his 

previous robbery charges, and his admission that he had 

committed other robberies in the past.2

Young repeatedly objected to the introduction of any 

statements he made in the Henry County interview concerning his 

prior crimes and drug use. On three occasions, the circuit 

court instructed the jury to disregard any evidence of Young’s 

prior crimes or other acts that were not related to the Danville 

robbery. 

 2

 The jury was shown portions of the Henry County interview 

in which Young mentioned a robbery that occurred in Henry 

County, and in which he referred to the Danville robbery as 

“this particular job.” At other points in the Henry County 

interview, Young admitted that he had been involved in “some 

more armed robberies,” stated that he had a “bad history” and 

had made “several” mistakes, and began discussing a prior 

robbery charge. The jury also was shown a portion of the Henry 

County interview in which Young asked his interviewer, “[D]id 

those guys really get me in Martinsville?” The jury also 

observed Young stating that he used the proceeds of the Danville 
4

After the jury found Young guilty on the robbery charge, 

the circuit court conducted a sentencing proceeding. At the 

sentencing proceeding, the jury heard evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth that Young previously had been convicted of armed 

robbery, common law robbery, statutory burglary, “first degree” 

burglary, breaking and entering, grand larceny, three other 

felony convictions of larceny, and misdemeanor larceny. 

Young appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 

which concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the 

jury to see the portions of the Henry County interview relating 

to Young’s other crimes and drug use. However, the Court of 

Appeals determined that the circuit court’s error was harmless 

with respect to the issue of Young’s guilt because the evidence 

of guilt was overwhelming. Young v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 

616, 633-35, 625 S.E.2d 691, 701-02 (2006). 

The Court of Appeals further determined that the 

presentation of Young’s statements in the Henry County interview 

relating to the “Henry County offense,” for which Young had not 

yet been convicted, and of the statements relating to Young’s 

involvement with illegal drugs, introduced into evidence during 

the guilt phase, did not constitute harmless error with regard 

to the sentencing proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that 

 

robbery to buy illegal drugs, and that his purpose in coming to 

Henry County was “[f]or drugs.” 
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because this evidence would have been inadmissible in the 

sentencing proceeding, its erroneous admission during the guilt 

phase prejudiced Young in the jury’s determination of his 

sentence. Id. at 637-38, 625 S.E.2d at 701-02. 

 The Court of Appeals affirmed Young’s conviction, but 

remanded the case to the circuit court for a new sentencing 

proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1, which provides for such a 

proceeding when a sentence is “set aside or found invalid solely 

due to an error in the [original] sentencing proceeding.” Id. 

The Court of Appeals concluded that because the error in the 

guilt phase of the trial affected the sentencing proceeding but 

was harmless with respect to the issue of Young’s guilt, the 

sentence was invalid “solely due to an error in the sentencing 

proceeding” within the meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1. Young 

appeals from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. 

 Young contends that the Court of Appeals set his sentence 

aside only because of evidentiary error during the guilt phase 

of his trial, not because of an error “in the sentencing 

proceeding.” Therefore, Young argues, the Court of Appeals 

erred in ordering a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-

295.1, which only affords a remedy for errors that occur in the 

sentencing phase of a trial. Young asserts that because the 

evidentiary error occurred during the guilt phase of his trial, 

his case should be remanded for a new trial on all issues. 
6

In response, the Commonwealth argues that the Court of 

Appeals properly concluded that because the evidentiary error 

was harmless with regard to the issue of Young’s guilt, the 

error affected only the sentence imposed by the jury. Thus, the 

Commonwealth contends that the erroneous admission of evidence 

occurred “in the sentencing proceeding,” within the meaning of 

Code § 19.2-295.1, and the Court of Appeals properly remanded 

the case for a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-

295.1, rather than for a new trial on all issues. We disagree 

with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 

 An issue of statutory interpretation presents a pure 

question of law, which we review de novo on appeal. Conyers v. 

Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 

S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007); Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 

455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006); Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 

352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003). We determine the meaning of 

certain statutory language from the express words contained in 

the statute. Washington, 272 Va. at 255, 634 S.E.2d at 313; 

Alger v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 255, 259, 590 S.E.2d 563, 565 

(2004); Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 493, 604 S.E.2d 66, 

68 (2004). 

We consider the disputed language in the context of the 

entire statute, rather than by isolating particular words or 

phrases. Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 335, 345, 641 
7

S.E.2d 486, 492 (2007); Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 

S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001); Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 369, 

514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). When statutory language is 

unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language 

and may not give the words a construction that amounts to 

holding that the General Assembly did not mean what it actually 

stated. Gunn v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 580, 587, 637 S.E.2d 324, 

327 (2006); Tucker, 268 Va. at 493, 604 S.E.2d at 68; Alger, 267 

Va. at 259, 590 S.E.2d at 565. 

The statute we examine in the present case, Code § 19.2-

295.1, provides in relevant part: 

In cases of trial by jury, upon a finding that the 

defendant is guilty of a felony . . . a separate proceeding 

limited to the ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 

soon as practicable before the same jury. At such 

proceeding, the Commonwealth shall present the defendant’s 

prior criminal convictions. . . . After the Commonwealth 

has introduced such evidence of prior convictions, or if no 

such evidence is introduced, the defendant may introduce 

relevant, admissible evidence related to punishment. . . . 

If the sentence imposed pursuant to this section is 

subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due to an 

error in the sentencing proceeding, the court shall impanel 

a different jury to ascertain punishment. . . . 

Id. 

 We conclude that this statutory language is plain and 

unambiguous. The statute refers to the sentencing proceeding as 

a “separate proceeding limited to the ascertainment of 

punishment,” and specifies the evidence that the parties may 

present “[a]t such proceeding.” Id. Thus, as set forth in the 
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statute, “the sentencing proceeding” is a distinct phase of a 

criminal trial that follows a jury’s determination of a 

defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, an error “in the sentencing 

proceeding” can occur only after the jury determines the issue 

of the defendant’s guilt and in the stage of the trial when the 

jury considers the separate issue of the defendant’s punishment. 

 We find no support in the language of Code § 19.2-295.1 for 

the Court of Appeals’ contrary interpretation, that any error 

occurring during the guilt phase of a trial but affecting the 

sentence a defendant receives, is an error “in the sentencing 

proceeding.” That rationale would render any part of a criminal 

trial, even the voir dire of potential jurors, a part of “the 

sentencing proceeding” if jurors were exposed to inadmissible 

evidence that may ultimately have affected the jury’s sentencing 

decision. 

 We also must reject the Court of Appeals’ construction of 

Code § 19.2-295.1 because that construction effectively would 

require us to add language to the statute. The Court of 

Appeals’ construction would require us to discount the 

unambiguous phrase, “due to an error in the sentencing 

proceeding” and effectively replace that language with the 

phrase “due to an error affecting the sentencing proceeding.” 

Such an interpretation of the statute would violate the basic 

principle that courts cannot, by judicial interpretation, add 
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language to a statute that the General Assembly did not include 

in its enactment. Washington, 272 Va. at 459, 634 S.E.2d at 

316; Holsapple v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 

561, 564-65 (2003); Burlile v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 511, 

544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001). 

 In addition, we observe that we have ordered a new 

sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1 only when we have 

reversed a judgment solely due to an error committed in the 

sentencing phase of a trial. See, e.g., Gillespie v. 

Commonwealth, 272 Va. 753, 761, 636 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2006) 

(remand of statutory burglary conviction for new sentencing 

proceeding because sentence imposed for prior offense and fact 

of acquittal on other charge were erroneously admitted into 

evidence in sentencing proceeding); Jaccard v. Commonwealth, 268 

Va. 56, 59, 597 S.E.2d 30, 31 (2004) (remand of malicious 

wounding conviction for new sentencing proceeding because jury 

erroneously was informed in sentencing phase that defendant’s 

prior probation status had been revoked); Hills v. Commonwealth, 

262 Va. 807, 812, 553 S.E.2d 722, 725 (2001) (remand of rape 

conviction for new sentencing proceeding because circuit court 

failed to instruct jury in sentencing phase that parole had been 

abolished in Virginia); Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 

117, 532 S.E.2d 629, 635 (2000) (remand of eight felony 

convictions for new sentencing proceeding because circuit court 
10

failed to instruct jury in sentencing phase that parole had been 

abolished in Virginia). 

 Here, because the improper evidence of other crimes was 

presented during the guilt phase of Young’s criminal trial, not 

in his sentencing proceeding, the remedy of a new sentencing 

proceeding afforded by Code § 19.2-295.1 is inapplicable.3

 

Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering 

that Young’s case be remanded solely for a new sentencing 

proceeding. 

 For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’ 

judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further 

remand to the circuit court for a new trial on the robbery 

indictment, if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LEMONS and JUSTICE AGEE join, 

dissenting. 

The majority decides today that Gregory Leon Young, a 

convicted armed robber, is entitled to a new opportunity to 

adjudicate his guilt notwithstanding the finality of the Court 

of Appeals’ conclusions that “the evidence of [Young’s] guilt 

 3

 The Court of Appeals’ holding determining which items of 

“other crimes” evidence resulted in prejudicial error is not 

before us in this appeal. Therefore, we express no opinion 

regarding which statements in the Henry County interview 

resulted in prejudice to Young. 
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was overwhelming,” Young v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 616, 636, 

625 S.E.2d 691, 701 (2006), and that the error in his trial 

prejudiced only the jury’s sentencing determination, not its 

finding of guilt. Id. at 638, 625 S.E.2d at 702. In my view, 

to disturb the conclusive effect of a jury’s valid determination 

of guilt runs counter to the General Assembly’s manifest purpose 

for creating a bifurcated jury-trial procedure for non-capital 

felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors. Therefore, I respectfully 

dissent. 

 The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals erred 

by ordering only a new sentencing proceeding under Code § 19.2-

295.1 instead of a new trial on the issues of both guilt and 

sentencing. The relevant portion of Code § 19.2-295.1 states: 

 If the sentence imposed pursuant to this section 

is subsequently set aside or found invalid solely due 

to an error in the sentencing proceeding, the court 

shall impanel a different jury to ascertain 

punishment, unless the defendant, the attorney for the 

Commonwealth and the court agree, in the manner 

provided in [Code] § 19.2-257, that the court shall 

fix punishment. 

The majority “conclude[s] that this statutory language is plain 

and unambiguous.” With respect to the phrase “solely due to an 

error in the sentencing proceeding,” I disagree. 

“Language is ambiguous if it admits of being understood in 

more than one way, refers to two or more things simultaneously, 

is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or lacks 
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clearness and definiteness.” Gillespie v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 

753, 758, 636 S.E.2d 430, 432 (2006) (citing Brown v. Lukhard, 

229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985)). Where the language 

of an enactment is ambiguous, resort to the rules of statutory 

construction is appropriate. Buonocore v. Chesapeake & Potomac 

Tel. Co., 254 Va. 469, 472, 492 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1997) (citing 

USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 248 Va. 185, 194, 445 S.E.2d 

145, 150 (1994); City of Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors, 

246 Va. 233, 236, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993); Wertz v. Grubbs, 

245 Va. 67, 70, 425 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1993)); Virginia Dep’t of 

Labor & Indus. v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 101−02, 353 

S.E.2d 758, 762 (1987) (Where statutory language is ambiguous, 

“we . . . must resort to extrinsic evidence and the rules of 

construction to determine legislative intent, ‘the paramount 

object of statutory construction.’ ”) (quoting Vollin v. 

Arlington County Electoral Bd., 216 Va. 674, 678−79, 222 S.E.2d 

793, 797 (1976)). 

On its face, the text of Code § 19.2-295.1 is not clear 

whether “an error in the sentencing proceeding” means, as the 

majority concludes, a discrete act or occurrence that happens 

between the temporal beginning and ending of a sentencing 

proceeding, or the prejudicial impact such an event has on the 

validity of the sentence imposed, irrespective of when it 

temporally occurs. The majority dismisses the latter 
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interpretation, claiming that if we adopted it, we would be 

impermissibly rewriting the pertinent provision of Code § 19.2-

295.1 to read, “due to an error affecting the sentencing 

proceeding.” Yet, the majority engages in the very sort of 

statutory revision that it claims to eschew when it effectively 

replaces the enacted language with the phrase “due to an error 

during the sentencing proceeding.” Thus, despite its claim that 

the relevant text is unambiguous and its recitation of the plain 

meaning rule, the majority engages in its own statutory 

construction to reach the conclusion that Young is entitled to a 

new trial on the robbery indictment. 

Since the General Assembly’s use of the word “in” allows 

the provision at issue to be “understood in more than one way,” 

Gillespie, 272 Va. at 758, 636 S.E.2d at 432, resort to the 

principles of statutory construction is appropriate in order to 

decide the issue before us. See Buonocore, 254 Va. at 472, 492 

S.E.2d at 441. “A statute must be construed with reference to 

its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the 

legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should 

receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that 

purpose rather than one which will defeat it.” Esteban v. 

Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605, 609, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003) 

(citing Stanley v. Tomlin, 143 Va. 187, 195, 129 S.E. 379, 382 

(1925)); see also Bulala v. Boyd, 239 Va. 218, 227, 389 S.E.2d 
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670, 674 (1990) (“ ‘Every statute is to be read so as to promote 

the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it 

is directed.’ ”) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. King Land 

Corp., 238 Va. 97, 103, 380 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1989)). 

Before the General Assembly’s enactment of Code § 19.2-

295.1 in 1994, see 1994 Acts chs. 828, 860, 862, 881, a jury 

made its guilt and sentencing decisions for non-capital offenses 

in an unitary proceeding, based solely on evidence relevant to 

the charged offense and the statutory range of permissible 

punishment. See Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 42, 510 

S.E.2d 232, 235 (1999); Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 

648, 621 S.E.2d 140, 145 (2005). With the enactment of that 

statute and the resulting change to a bifurcated system for jury 

trials of non-capital felonies and Class 1 misdemeanors, the 

General Assembly advanced the laudable goal of “truth in 

sentencing,” Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 113, 532 

S.E.2d 629, 632 (2000), by expanding the scope of information 

that a jury can receive in making its sentencing decision. With 

the advent of two separate proceedings, one for the 

determination of guilt and the other for the determination of an 

appropriate sentence, the General Assembly recognized that an 

error committed during an accused’s trial could conceivably 

prejudice only a jury’s sentencing decision. Thus, one year 
15

after the General Assembly first created the bifurcated system, 

it added the provision now at issue. See 1995 Acts ch. 567.1

The entirety of Code § 19.2-295.1 is directed at postconviction sentencing proceedings. The contested language 

directs that, when a sentence is “set aside or found invalid 

solely due to an error in the sentencing proceeding,” the trial 

court shall impanel a different jury to determine only 

punishment. Code § 19.2-295.1 (emphasis added). The statute 

does not address those instances when the basis for reversal is 

an error in the determination of a defendant’s guilt. Nor 

should it. When an error at trial requires the reversal of a 

jury’s guilt determination and the award of a new trial, the 

sentence imposed by that jury is necessarily also set aside. 

But, as the General Assembly recognized, with separate 

proceedings for determining guilt and sentencing, there is no 

reason to set aside a jury’s guilt determination when an error 

prejudices only its imposition of sentence. The majority’s 

construction of Code § 19.2-295.1, however, renders this 

distinction meaningless and is irreconcilable with that 

 1

 In 1995, the relevant portion of Code § 19.2-295.1 

provided, “If the sentence on appeal is subsequently set aside 

or found invalid solely due to an error in the sentencing 

proceeding, the court shall impanel a different jury to 

ascertain punishment, unless the defendant, the attorney for the 

Commonwealth and the court agree, in the manner provided in 

§ 19.2-257, that the court shall fix punishment.” The General 
16

statute’s express declaration that the penalty phase of a 

bifurcated criminal trial is “a separate proceeding limited to 

the ascertainment of punishment.” 

The basis of the Court of Appeals’ decision to invalidate 

Young’s life sentence was the prejudicial impact of the jurors’ 

knowledge of Young’s unadjudicated criminal conduct on their 

sentencing decision. Young, 47 Va. App. at 638, 625 S.E.2d at 

702. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error either in 

the guilt phase alone, or in the guilt and sentencing 

proceedings collectively. Id. “The only harm done was in 

sentencing.” Id. at 638 n.10, 625 S.E.2d at 702 n.10. Thus, 

the Court of Appeals set aside Young’s sentence “solely due to 

an error in the sentencing proceeding.” The appropriate remedy 

under such circumstances is to remand the case to the trial 

court to “impanel a different jury to ascertain punishment.” 

Code § 19.2-295.1. As the Court of Appeals appropriately noted, 

“[t]o remand for a new trial would be a futile act.” Young, 47 

Va. App. at 638 n.10, 625 S.E.2d at 702 n.10. It also would be 

a waste of judicial resources. 

Nevertheless, the majority opines that the Court of 

Appeals’ “rationale would render any part of a criminal trial, 

even the voir dire of potential jurors, a part of ‘the 

 

Assembly amended the statute to its current version in 2001. 

2001 Acts ch. 389. 
17

sentencing proceeding’ if jurors were exposed to inadmissible 

evidence that may ultimately have affected the jury’s sentencing 

decision.” This concern, however, is misplaced because the 

majority’s observation actually reflects how bifurcated trials 

proceed. Jurors are not told to disregard all the evidence 

heard during the guilt phase of a trial upon commencement of the 

sentencing proceeding. Instead, all the evidence presented 

during the guilt proceeding carries forward and is appropriately 

considered by the jury during the penalty phase. Indeed, that 

is precisely why the inadmissible evidence regarding Young’s 

unadjudicated conduct, which was introduced during the guilt 

phase, rendered the jury’s imposition of sentence invalid. 

Otherwise, there would have been no error in the sentencing 

proceeding.2

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding Young’s case for a 

new sentencing proceeding only. 

 2

 Citing Gillespie, 272 Va. at 761, 636 S.E.2d at 434, 

Jaccard v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 56, 59, 597 S.E.2d 30, 31 

(2004), Hills v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 807, 812, 553 S.E.2d 722, 

725 (2001), and Fishback, 260 Va. at 117, 532 S.E.2d at 635, the 

majority states “that we have ordered a new sentencing 

proceeding under Code § 19.2-295.1 only when we have reversed a 

judgment solely due to an error committed in the sentencing 

phase of a trial.” (Emphasis added.) But, the issue before us 

today is one of first impression.