NO. 81-224 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

STATE OF XONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

VS. 

WESTLEY F. DEITCHLER, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial 

In and for the County of Rosebud 

Honorable Alfred B. Coate, Judse presidinq. 

Counsel of Record: 

For A.ppellant: 

lilestley F. Deitchler, Pro Se, Forsyth, Jqontana 

For Respondent : 

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

John Maynard arqued, Assistant Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

John S. Forsythe, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana 

S. Charles Sprinkle arqued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Forsyth, Montana 

Submitted.: SepSe~ber 8 I 1982 

Decided: October 7, 1982 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

On August 4, 1980, the defendant was stopped by a 

highway patrolman and issued citations for wasting natural 

resources and for failing to display a Montana driver's 

license on demand. He was convicted of the two misdemeanors 

following a jury trial in the Justice Court of Rosebud 

County. He appealed to the District Court and, following a 

trial witnout a jury, was again convicted of the two offenses. This appeal follows. 

Two issues are presented on appeal: 

1. Whether section 61-5-116, MCA, requiring that a 

driver's license be carried by the operator of a motor 

vehicle and that it be exhibited on demand, is constitutional; and, 

2. Whether section 61-8-304, MCA, declaring that 

speed limits should be set by the attorney general in 

conformance with limits imposed by federal law, is constitutional. 

Appellant challenges both statutes on a due process 

basis. He premises his argument upon the theory that the 

use of public highways by individuals in their vehicles and 

with their gasoline is a right. He contends that the police 

power of the state may not be exercised to regulate an 

individual's use and control of his property in an attempt 

to provide for the general welfare and safety of the people 

of the state. Rather, he argues that only when an individual has in fact harmed another through irresponsible use of 

his property may the state exercise its police power. Appellant's argument is without merit. 

The United States Supreme Court in 1837 recognized 
that state and local governments possess an inherent power 

to enact reasonable legislation for the health, safety, 

welfare, or morals of the public. Charles River Bridge v. 

Warren Bridge Co. (1837), 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420. This Court 

has also recognized that such a police power exists even 

though the regulation may frequently be an infringement of 

individual rights. State v. Rathbone (1940), 110 Mont. 225, 

241, 100 P.2d 86, 92. See also, State v. Penny (1910), 42 

Mont. 118, 111 P. 727. Regulations that are formulated 

within the state's police power will be presumed reasonable 

absent a clear showing to the contrary. Bettey v. City of 

Sidney (1927), 79 Mont. 314, 319, 257 P. 1007, 1009. Appellant has not met his burden of making such a showing. 

Whether use of public highways has been held to be a 

right or a privilege, courts have consistently impliedly or 

expressly acknowledged the power of the state to require 

licensing procedures to be followed prior to use of the 

highways and have acknowledged the state's power to properly 

regulate traffic on the highways. Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 

443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321; Dixon v. Love 

(1977), 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172; Bell v. 

Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90; 

Popp v. Motor Vehicle Department (1973), 211 Kan. 763, 508 

P.2d 991; Robertson v. State ex rel. Lester (Okla. 1972), 

501 P.2d 1099; Campbell v. State Dept. of Rev., Div. of 

Motor Vehicles (1971), 176 Colo. 202, 491 P.2d 1385, 60 

kLK3d 419; State v. Shak (1970), 51 Haw. 612, 680, 466 P.2d 

422, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 191, 27 L.Ed.2d 

190; Adams v. City of Pocatello (1966), 91 Idaho 99, 416 

P.2d 46. See also, Annot., 6 ALR3d 506; Annot., 86 ALR3d 
We nave previously recognized the power of the state 

to regulate licensing of drivers in the interests of public 

safety. Sedlacek v. Ahrens (1974), 165 Mont. 479, 483, 530 

P.2d 424, 426. We have also recognized that the state's 

exercise of police power in setting speed limits is in the 

best interests of the state's economy and is in keeping with 

the national goals of conservation of gasoline and oil and 

of improved safety, Lee v. State (1981), Mont . I 

635 P.2d 1282, 1287, 39 St.Rep. 1729, cert. denied, U.S. 

Appellant's contentions fail. 

Affirmed. 

R44-4, @&&a 

Chief Justice 

We concur: