FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT OCTOB ER 1, 2004 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1432 6

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 00 02 7- CR-T-2 4- TGW UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,

ve rs us JAM ES MAXW ELL, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ( O CT O BE R 1 , 200 4) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, T JO FL A T and C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJOFLAT, Cir cu itJu dg e. Aj ur y f ound Jam es Ma xw el l gu ilty

of tw o c ount s of

kno w ing ly

pos se ssi ngTh at se c tio n o f t he statut e pr ov ide s, 1 Any pe rs on wh o . . . kn ow ing ly

po sse sse s a

ny bo ok , ma g a zine , p e ri od ic a l, f ilm , vid e ota pe , c omp ute r d isk , o r a

ny oth e r m ate ri a l th at c onta ins an im a g e of c hil d pornog raphy

that has bee n mailed, or shipped or transporte d in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer, or

that was produc ed using materials that have been ma iled, or shipped or tra nsported in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer . . . sha ll be punished as provided in subsec tion (b). Def initions of § 2252A’s te rms are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256. We repr int § 2256, as it read at the time of Maxwell’s indictment, below. The section wa s amende d just day s befor e Maxwell’s trial, see Pub. L . No. 108-21, tit. V, § 502(a) to (c), 117 Stat. 678, 679 (2003) , but the amendments a

re of no moment in this case . § 2256. Def

initions for c hapter For the purposes of

this chapter, the term— (1 ) “ min or ” me ans any

pe rs on un de r t he a g e of e ig hte e n ye ars ; (2) “ sexually

expli cit conduct” means a ctual or simulated— (A) se x ual interc ourse, includingg enital-g enital, ora l-g enital, ana l-g enital, or o r a l- an a l, w h e th e r

b e tw e e np e r s o n s o f

th e s ame o r

o p p o s it e s e x; ( B ) b e s t i a l i ty; (C) masturbation; (D) sa distic or masochistic abuse ; or (E) la scivious exhi bition of the g enitals or pubic a rea of any person; (3 ) “ p ro d u ci n g” m ean s p ro d

u ci n g, d i re ct i n g, m an u fa cturi n g, i s s u i n g, p u b l i s h i n g, o r a dv ert i s i n g; (4 ) “ or g anizatio n” me ans a pe rs on oth e r t ha n a n in div idu a l; (5) “ visual depiction” include s undevelope d film and videotape , and data stored on computer disk or by

elec tronic mea

ns which is capa

ble of c onversion into a visual imag e; (6) “ computer” has the mea ning g iven that term in sec tion 1030 of this ti tle; (7) “ custody

or control” includes tempora ry supervision over or

responsibility

for a minor whe ther leg ally

or illeg ally

obtained; (8) “ child pornog raphy” mea ns any visual depiction, includingany photogr aph, film, video, picture, or

computer or

computer- g ener ated imag e or pic ture, whe ther ma de or pr od uc e d b y e le c tr on ic , me c ha

nic a l, o r o the r m e ans , o f s e xua lly e xplic it conduct, whe re— (A) the production of suc h visual depiction involves the use of a minor eng ag ing 2 child po rnography

in viol ation of 18 U.S .C. § 2252 A( a)(5) (B). A s a 1in s e xua lly e xplic it c on du c t; (B ) s uc h v isu a l de pic tio n is , o r a pp e ars to b e , o f a

min or e ng a g ingin s e xua lly e xplic it c on du c t; (C) such visual de piction has bee n cre ated, a dapted, or modified to appea

r that an identifiable minor is eng ag ing in se x ually expli cit conduct; or (D) suc h visual depiction is adver tised, promoted, pre sented, de scribed, or distributed in such a manne r that conve y s the impression that the mater ial is or contains a visual de piction of a minor eng ag ing in se x ually expli cit conduct; and (9) “ identifiable minor”— (A) me ans a pe rson— (i)(I ) who wa s a minor at the time the visual de piction was cr eate d, adapte d, or modified; or (I I ) whose imag e as a

minor was used in c reating, a dapting , or modifying the visual depiction; and (ii) who is rec og nizable as an a ctual per son by the per son’s fac e, likeness, or other dis tin guis hin gc ha

ra c te ri sti c , s uc h a s a

un iqu e bir

thm ark or oth e r r e c ogniza

ble feature; and (B ) s ha ll n ot b e c on str

ue d to re qu ir e pr oo f o f t

he a c tua l id e nti ty

of the ide nti fi a

ble minor. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1996) (ame nded 2003). 3 j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t of

the of fe nse , the statut e re qui re d th e G ove rn m en t t o pr ove that the c hil d po rn ogr ap hy , or a t l ea st the m at er ia l tha t pr oduc ed it , tr av el ed

in int er state c om

m er ce . A t M ax w el l’ s tr ia l, the G ove rn m en t di d no t e sta bli sh tha t the ch ild por nogr ap hy m ove d a cr oss state li ne s. C onse que ntl y , it s c as e re lie d on es tabl is hi ng th atth e im ag es were p ro du cedby m at eri al s t ha t d id . Ma xw el l a

ppe al s hi s c onvi ct ion s onf our gr ound s. T he f

ir st thr ee gr ound s ar e ins uf fi ci en t t o w ar

rant r ev er sa l. T he f

our th g ro und is tha t the appl ic at ionof § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ) to the f ac ts o f his c as e am ount s to an un co nst itutio na l e xe rc ise of the Co m m er ce Cl au se . T ha t gr ound ha s m er it an d r equir es that w e re ve rs eSpecial Ag ent Keith Ar ndt of the F BI , a spec ialist in ex amining e vidence on computers 2 and other digital media , descr ibed zip dis ks at Maxwell’s trial. Acc ordingto Arndt, zip di sks are remova ble device s that are used to store c omputer files, much like standa rd floppy disks. The te c hn olo g y

that f a c ili tate s st or a g e is s lightl y dif fe re nt f or zip d isk s th an it

is f lop py dis ks , a nd zip disks therefor e ca

n only be used in c omputers that ar e equippe d with a zip drive. Z ip disks are c a pa ble of sto ri ngsu

bs tanti a lly

mor e inf or matio n th an f

lop py dis ks . 4 Max well ’s con vi ct io ns . I. Ma xw el l r en te d ar oom

in A lbe rt a W al la ce ’ s a

partm en t i n S t. P et er sbur g, Florida from

May until Augus t of 2002. During that tim e, Maxwe ll used W al la ce ’ s c om

put er to ac ce ss the I nte rn et , and s he ha d a cc es s to Ma xw el l’ s m ai l and com puter accounts. W allace e ventuallygrewsuspi cious that Maxwell wa s int er es te d inhom ose xua l I nte rn et a ct ivi ty , som e inv olv ing c hil dr en , and s he co nta ct ed the pol ic e ab out

he r co nc er

ns. W allace a llowed the Feder al Burea u of Investigatio n to search her ap ar tm en t. F BI a ge nts c opi ed the c ont en ts o f W al la ce ’ s c om put er hard dr ive and se iz ed a lm ost 140 it em s. Mo st o f the se it em s c onsi ste d of c om put er dis ks and f

ilm taken from

Maxwe ll’ s room . One item wa s a zip disk containing several hundred 2 im ag es of c hi ldpo rn og rap hy. Su bse que nt t o th e se ar ch , W al la ce f ound a ddi tio na l di sks in a dr aw er in Ma xw el l’ s r oom , and s he tur ne d th em ove r to the F BI . O ne w as af lop py dis k co nt ai ni ng ab ou t fi fte en im ag es of c hi ldpo rn og rap hy.5

InJanuary

200 3, agr an d j ur

y ind ic te d M ax w el l ontw o c ount s of pos se ssi ng ch ild por nogr ap hy in vio la tio n of

18 U . S . C. § 22 52A . C ount I w as pr ed ic at ed

on th e z i p d i s kd es cr i b edab o v e. Co u n tII wa s p re d i ca t edo nth e f l o p p y d i s k . (We refe r to these two disks collectively as “ the charged disks.”) Max well was a rrai gn edin Feb ru ary, pl eadno t g ui lt y , andst oo d t ria l i n M ay . T he G ove rn m ent pr es en te d th e te sti m ony of W al la ce and s ev er al lawe nf or ce m en t of fic ia ls fro m

va rio us ag en ci es . W al la ce te sti fi ed

that sh e kne wMa xw el l f ro m c hur chand d at ed

him br ie fl y after her husband pass ed aw ay . They stopp ed dating after a short tim e, in part because W allace w as offended w hen she learned that Maxwe ll was living with an unm ar ri ed c oupl e that e nga ge d inse xua l r el at ion s ( w ithone anothe r, not Maxwe ll). By

the tim e Maxw ell m oved in to W allace’ s apartm ent, he and W allace we re m erely

platonic friends and slept in differ ent room s. N o one else had a key to the apartm en t or

sto re d po sse ssi ons the re . A t f ir st, Ma xw el l a cc es se d th e Internet w ith his own com puter, but he began using W allace’ s com puter, w ith her pe rm iss ion , a ft er

his I nte rn et

se rv ic e w as dis co nne ct ed . I n Augus t 20 02, Ma xw el lMaxwe ll l e ft Wal la c e ’s a

pa rtme nt t o s e rv e a

pr iso n s e nte nc e fo r a

n unr e late d s tate 3 offe nse, but Wallace w as not asked to e x plain this reason for Maxwell’s absence in front of the jury . Maxwell int ended to r eturn to the a partment followinghis relea se. B eca use of Wallace ’s conce rns and the e vents that followed, howe ver, he never did return. 6 m ove d ou t of

the apartm en t. H e gave W al la ce pow er of a tto rn ey to m an ag e his 3 pe rs ona l a ff

ai rs f or the ti m e he w oul d be gon e. S he ha d a cc es s to his bank a cc ount an d pa id b ill s f

or Ma xw el l’ s vari ous expe nse s, inc lud ing m ovi ng and c el l ph one expe nse s. Maxw el l a lso gave W al la ce a cc es s to his pe rs ona l po st o ff ic e box an d e-m ail accounts. Around th e beginnin g of Septem ber, in the course of her ste w ar dshi p, W al la ce say s sh e dis co ve re d e -m ai l m es sa ge s in vol vin g hom osexualityand teenagers in Maxw ell’ s accounts. When W allace questioned him about tho se m es sa ge s, he be cam e an gr y , and the tw o ne ve r spok e to o ne an oth er pr ior to Ma xw el l’ s tr ia l. I n O ct obe r, W al la ce c ont ac te d th e pol ic e ab out he r su sp ic io ns th atMax well acce ss ed(an d p os si bl y po ss es se d) ch il d p orno gr ap hy. Sh e al low ed

the F BI to se ar chMa xw el l’ s f orm er r oom and o bse rv ed

a ge nts se iz ing it em s th at

Ma xw el l ha d m ove d in to tha t r oom . W al la ce te sti fi ed that sh e had two filing cabinets of her own in Maxw ell’ s room , but they only contained m at er ia ls s he use d f

or te ac hin g. S he sto re d no c om put er dis ks o f he r ow n in M ax we l l ’s ro o m

(i nth e f i l i n g cab i n et o r o th erwi s e) an d n ev eru s edMa x we l l ’s dis ks. F urthe rm or e, W al la ce ne ve r gave any one e lse ( oth er than th e FB I) a cc es s to7

Maxwe ll’ s room

or com puter disks . In addition to the room , W allace per m itted the FBI to exam ine som e of her belong ings, includi ng the lapto p com puter Ma xw el l us ed

to ac ce ss the I nte rn et . W al la ce te sti fi ed that sh e ne ve r vie w ed

c hil d po rn og rap hy on th atco m pu te r an d n ev er l etan y on e o th er t ha n M ax well us e it . A fewday s after

the FBI searc h, W allace f oundsom e additional com puter disks that she identified as belon ging to Maxwell and forwar ded them to the FBI. She never us edth os e d is ks or a ll owe d o th ers to us e th em . T he G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed int o e vid en ce aw ide arr ay of phy sic al e xhi bit s, includi ng the charged disks . The z ip disk , c orrespondin g to Coun t I, wa s adm itted as Governm ent Exhibit 5A. Its label, which w as publis hed to the jury , c ontained th e fo ll owi ng ha nd writ te n wo rd s: “ adul t an d you ng ,” “pr e te en s,” “ pi ss ,”

“ shaved,” and “pierced. ” T he word “ anim als” also appeared but had been crossed out . T he f

lop py dis k, c or re spon din g to Co unt

I I, w as a dm itt ed

a s G ove rn m en t E xhi bit 7. A lth oughthe se tw o di sks —a lon g w ithse ve ra l othe rs that w er e not charged in Maxwe ll’ s indictm ent—wer e adm itted as phy sical exhibits , the c ourt pr ec lud ed the j ur y f ro m vie w ing the ir

c ont ents w iththi s e xc ep tio n: the Governm ent was per

m itted to offer into evidence as separate exhibits hard copies m ad e of portio ns o f the dis ks. S om e of the hard c opi es w er e im ag es of

c hil d pornog raphy . The c ourt perm itted the Governm ent to adm it a total of ten suchAlthough the prosec ution did not s how the jury imag es conta ined on the uncha rg ed 4 disks, it di d elicit testimony that those disks contained imag es of c hild pornog raphy .

8 hard c opy im ag es f ro m a ll of the dis ks i n e vid en ce , and the G ove rn m en t c hose to introdu ce im ages from

the two char ged disk s only(even though other adm itted disks in evidence also contained po rnographic im ages). 4 Agent Philippe Dubord of the Hillsborough County Sherif f’ s Of fice w as assigned to the “ Innocent Im ages Ta sk Force” w ith the FBI and investigated Ma xw el l’ s c as e. D ubor d id en tif ie d and d es cr ibe d th e ch ar ge d di sks , a lon g w ith co rr es pond ing e xhi bit s sh ow ing inf orm at ionabout

the f ile s c ont ai ne d ontho se dis ks ( suc h a s th e nam es of the f ile s, w he n th ey

w er e save d onthe r es pe ct ive disks , when they

we re last ac cessed, and the nam es of the directories in which they we re stored). T he nam es of the folders in w hich som e of the im ages we re saved included “ adult,” “ y oung ,” and “pre teen. ” O n cross-exam ination , D ubord c o n c e d e dth a tn e i th e r

o f th e c h ar g e dd i s k s c o n t a i n e df i l e s b e ar i n g M a x w e l l ’s n a me or pic tur e (a lth oughsuc h c ont en ts d id a ppe ar on o the r dis ks tha t w er e fo und am ong Maxwell’ s poss essions ). O the r pr ose cu tio n w itn es se s id en tif ie d tw o of

the pe rs ons de pic te d onthe ch arg eddi sk s as m in orch il dr en , on e fro m Flo rid a an d t he ot he r fro m Texa s. Sp ec ia l A ge nt S usan K ote enof the F lor ida

D ep ar tm en t of L awE nf or ce m en tThis evidence was a dmitted through the testimony of Katherine Cochr an of the 5 Hi l l s b o ro u ghC o un ty

S h er i ff ’s Of fi ce , wh o m o n i t o re d

th e t el ep h o n e s y s t em atth e H i l l s b o ro u gh County J ail used by

inmates there . Cochran e x plained that all inmate phone calls we re r ecor ded and that wa

rning s to that effe ct wer e visibly posted nea

r the prison phone s. 9 testified that she recognized the phy sical surroundin gs sho wn in the im ages inv olv ing the F lor ida

c hil d. S he ide nti fi ed

the m a s th e ch ild ’ s ho m e, loc at ed in H ow ie -i n- the -H ill s, asm al l t ow n inL ak e Co unty , F lor ida . D et ec tiv e- Se rg eant K athe ri ne D av is o f A ngl et on, T ex as ide nti fi ed the T ex as c hil d bu t c oul d no t de te rm ine w he re the pho tog ra phs w er e take n. As additional circum stantial evidence that Maxwell knowingly possess ed por nogr ap hic im ag es , the G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed ar ec or din g of

apho ne co nve rs at ionbe tw ee n M ax w el l and h is p as tor , L ind a Se ssl er . T he G ove rn m en t 5 pl ay edth e rec or di ng at t ria l an d d is tri bu te d atra ns cri ptof i ts co nt en ts to th e jury. Maxwe ll initiated th e phone call on Novem ber 10, 2002 (three day s before the F BI searched W allace’ s apartm ent) fr om the Hillsborough County j ail, where he w as being heldon unrelated charges. During the call, Sessler indicated that law en fo rcem en t o ffi ci al s p la nn edto sea rch hi s b el on gi ng s at W al la ce’s ap art m en t. Ma xw el l r es pond ed , W el l do m e a favor

. . . um m , ge t m y f lop py dis k and a ll of

m y z ip dis ks f ro m [ W al la ce ] . ‘ Ca

use som e of

it I have r ec ipe s and s tuf

f on an d , an ds o me o f

th e m I h a ds t art e dj o u rn a l s an ds tu f f . A n ds o me stu ff I have that w as lon g be fo re ge ne sis and s tuf f. B ut j ust

ge t a ll of10

th a ts tu f f . B u tI c an , s o me o f

I c an ’tr e me mb e r

w h a ti ti s . A n ds o me of it I have be enw ipi ng o ut s om e of the dis ks. A nd uhh, j ust ge t a ll of th atstuf f an d p utitso m ewh ere. (E llipses in original). S essler asked if the m aterials to w hich Maxwell w as re fe rr ing w er e la

be le d. H e re pli ed , It w as j ust a big bo x. I t had a bunch of floppydisks . And then there w as the z ip d isk s th at

are about the siz e of

af lop py the y ’ re j ust

ali ttl e bit big ger. It doesn’ t have anything to do with uhh , anything that they w e r e t a l k i n ’ ab o u t . B u ta s yo uh a ds a i dth e r e ’s n o mo r e p r o b l e ms ne ed ed and s o th at

w oul d a lle viate that. B ut I w as , I w oke up i n th e m idd le of the nig ht and l as t ni ght

I w as sic k, I ha d af

ev er and e v e ryt h i n g . I d o n ’tkn o ww h a tw a s g o i n g o n . . . . A n dI s a i dl e tme as k y ou a bout that a ga in. A nd j ust

a sk y ou t o do that. B ut j ust a ll of m y floppy disks and m

y zip disks . Just take them and j ust pu t ‘ em som ew here. Sessler indicated doubt abo ut this instruction and surm ised to Maxwell that law enforcem ent authorities were “ j ust try in’ to see if they

can find anything .” Ma xw el l a gr ee d. H e sa id, Ri ght , w el l tha t’ s why , that’ s why . . . that w oul d j ust

sol ve any problem s that m ight wouldcom e up. L ike y ou said, like if they totally had to have a [unintellig ible] com e in and lookbut in case they don’ t or in ca se the y

do, y ou know. . . it

ke ep the pr obl em s do w n. (Bo th ell ip se s an d a lt erat io n i n o rig in al ). O ve r Ma xw el l’ s ob

j ec tio n, the G ove rn m en t a lso intro duc ed aple tho ra

of te sti m ony and e xhi bit s in to e vid en ce c onc er nin g M ax w el l’ s c ondu ct

be y ond his poss ession o f the char ged disk s. T his evidence concerned several other c om puterUser pr ofiles conne cted to an I nterne t acc ount are like online identities created by the 6 acc ount user. Other

Interne t “surfe rs” c an lea rn about the a ccount use r by rea ding his prof

ile, and they can of ten contac t him through it or shar e files with him if they so desire. Acc ordingto Ag ent Dubord, Interne t “g roups” a re w ebsites “whe re pe ople have a 7 common interest whe re the y . . . meet and c hat, post messag es, . . . shar e picture s, . . . [and] interac t basically .” Dubor d testified that the title of an Interne t gr oup will often identify the g roup’s intere sts. 11 d i s k s co n t ai n i n g d ep i ct i o n s o f c h i l dp o rn o g rap h y th at we re s ei ze dfr o m Wal l ac e’s hom e but w er e ne ve r ch ar ge d a ga ins t M ax w el l i n hi s in dic tm en t ( co lle ct ive ly , the

“ unc harg ed

e vid en ce ”) . T he se m at er ia ls c onsi ste d of aCD -R om , tw o z ip d isk s, an d th irte enf

lop py dis ks. T he unc harg ed

e vid en ce a lso inc lud ed

te sti m ony

and ex hib its c onc er

nin g M ax w el l’ s e -m ai l a cc ount s w ithonl ine se rv ic es inc lud ing Y ah oo and M SNH otm ai l. T he G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed r ec or ds s uppl ie d by Y ah o o i n d i c a t i n g th a tM a x w e l l e s t ab l i s h e dau s e r p r o f i l e u n d e r th e n a me

“ boy _lov er69_69.” D ubord testi fied about evidence indicating that Maxwe ll had 6 ac ce sse d aY ah oo I nte rn et gr oup w he re f

ile s c oul d be share d am ong use rs . 7 A lth oughD ubor d c oul d no t a cc es s th e fi le s st or ed on tha t gr oup’ s w eb sit e an d co uld not say f or c er ta in whe the r Ma xw el l di d, D ubor d ob se rv ed that the w eb sit e contained three folders that we re a ssociated with Maxwe ll’ s account and entitled

“ boy s, ” “ boy s 2, ” an d “boy s 3. ” T he G ove rn m en t a lso intro duc ed te sti m ony

and ev id en ce ab ou t ce rta in m es sa ge s M ax well rece iv edon hi s M SN Hot m ai l ac co un t. These m essages contained subje ct lines sugg esting th at Maxw ell had becom e aSoftware prog rams that fa cilitate Interne t use often store information ac cesse d on the 8 Interne t on the user’ s computer in tempora ry folders. The prog rams ty pically cre ate these folders automatically

and without the user’ s direction. Maxwe ll d id, ho we ve r, mov e fo r a jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l pu rs ua nt t o F e d. R. C ri m. P . 9 29. The c ourt denied the motion. 12 m em be r of I nte rn et gr oups nam ed

“ Re x’ s pl ac e fo r gay

/bi boy s :) ”; “ gay

and b i b o ys ( t e e n s ) ” ; an d“ D a i l y Di g e s tf o r g ay& b i t e e ng u ys . ” Dub o r dc o u l dn o ts ay ho wev er, wh et he r Max well ev er ac ces se d t he se gro up s af te r be co m in g am em

be r. Fi na lly , D ubor d te sti fi ed

about nin e unc harg ed

im ag es of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy discovered in tem

porary Internet f

olders on W allace’ s com

puter. 8 Be fo re it r es te d it s c as e- in- ch ie f, the G ove rn m en t a ske d th e co urt t o r ea d a s t i p u l at i o nt o th e ju ry co n ce rn i n g th e p u rp o rt edre l at i o n s h i p b et we en Ma x we l l ’s charges and interstate com m erce . The c ourt com

plied and in form ed the j ury as fo llo w s: It is sti pul at ed

and a gr ee d be tw ee n th e part ie s th at the c om put er z ip disk th at is the basis for Count 1 of the Indictm ent, and the com puter fl oppy dis k th at is the ba sis f

or Co unt 2 of the I ndi ctm en t, w er e both m anuf ac tur ed out sid e the S ta te of

F lor ida and h av e be enm ai le d, sh ip pe d o r tr an sp or te d i n i nt ers ta te co m m erce . T he G ove rn m ent the n r es te d. Maxw el l put onno d ef en se and a lso r es te d. 9 On May 7, 2003, af

ter approxim ately

two hours of deliberation, the j ury re tur ne d ave rd ic t f

ind ing Ma xw el l gu ilty

of Co unt s I and I I. O n Augus t 12 , theHe r ece ived six ty -month term for Count I and an a dditional six -month term for Count 10 II . T h e c o urts p e c i f

i e d th atth e t e r

m s w o u l d r unc o n s e c u t i v e l y. 13 co urt se nte nc ed

him to a tot al of

six ty -s ix m onths i n pr iso n. 10 II. Maxwe ll appeals his conv ictions o n four distin ct grounds . W e address eac h i ntu rn i nSub p ar t s A. t h ro u g h C. b el o w. We b eg i nwi th Ma x we l l ’s noncon stitut ional argum ents. Se e, e. g., Ly ng v. Northw est Indian Cem etery Pr ote ct ive A ss’ n, 485 U . S. 439 , 445 , 108 S . Ct . 131 9, 132 3, 99 L . E d. 2d 5 34 (1988) (“ A f

undam ental and long standin g principle of judicial re straint requires that c ourts avoi d r ea ch ing c onst itutio na l qu es tio ns i n a dvanc e of the ne ce ssi ty

of de ci din g th em . ”) . B ec au se non e of the se arg um en ts p er

m it us t o di spos e of Max well ’s app eal , we pro ceedto hi s co ns ti tu ti on al arg um en t. A. Fi rs t, Ma xw el l c ont en ds tha t the unc harg ed im ag es and e vid en ce c onc er nin g hi s In te rn etact iv it y

sh ou ldno t h av e b een ad m it te d i nt o e vi de nc e. W e rev ie w a dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e vid en tiary r uli ngs fo r ab use of

dis cr et ion . U nit ed

S ta te s v. D odds , 347 F. 3d 8 93, 897 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . “ Adis tr ic t c ourt a buse s it s di sc re tio n if

it m isa ppl ie s th e lawor

m ak es f ind ing s of

f ac t tha t are c le ar ly

e rr one ous. ” A m

br osi a Co al & Co nstr. Co . v. P ag es Mo ra le s, 368 F . 3d 1 320, 133 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 4)14

(ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . The district court f

oundthat the uncharged evidence wa s adm issib le under Ru le 404 (b ) of

the F ed er al Ru le s of

E vid en ce . T ha t r

ule pr ovi de s, E vid en ce of

oth er c ri m es , w ro ngs, or

a ct s is not

a dm iss ibl e to p ro ve the c hara ct er

of ape rs on i n or de r to s howa ct ionin co nf orm ity therew ith. It m ay , how ever, be adm issib le for other purposes, such as proof of m otive, opportun ity , intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ide nti ty , or

abse nc e of

m ist ak e or

a cc ide nt, pr ovi de d th at

upo n re que st b y

the a cc use d, the pr ose cu tio n inac ri m ina l c as e sha ll pr ovi de r ea sona

ble not ic e in a dvanc e of

tr ia l, or dur ing tr ia l i f the court excuses pretrial notice on goodcause shown, of the general na tur e of any suc h e vid en ce it

int en ds t o in tr oduc e at

tr ia l. W ith out que sti on, the unc harg ed

e vid en ce w as pr obativ e of Ma xw el l’ s kn ow le dge an d in te nt. T he re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n in

a dm itt ing it . B. Ma xw el l ne xt arg ue s th e ev ide nc e ag ai nst him w as ins uf

fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh th athe kn ew th atth e ch arg eddi sk s co nt ai ne d i m ag es of c hi ldpo rn og rap hy. Knowle dge is an elem ent of the charged off enses. S ee 18 U. S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ) (e sta

bli shi ng c ri m ina l l ia

bil ity f or any pe rs on who “ know ing ly po ss es se s” m at eri al “ th atco nt ai ns an im ag e o f ch il d p orno gr ap hy”). W e re view challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. U nited St at es v. A la

boud , 347 F . 3d 1 293, 129 6 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . I n so doi ng, w e vie wthe ev ide nc e in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the G ove rn m en t, takin g a ll re as ona ble15

in fere nc es an d c red ib il it y de te rm in at io ns reac he d i n t he Gov ern m en t’s fa vo r. Id. Beca use Maxwell c hose not to testify , e vidence of his kno wledge w as necessarily

circum stantial. T he Governm ent presented considerable circum stantial evidence of Maxw ell’ s knowledge. Fir st, W allace and Agent Dubord indicated th atth e d is ks were fo un d i n M ax well ’s roo m am on g M ax well ’s po ss es si on s. So m e o f th e d is ks co nt ai ne d l ab el s s uc h a s “ adul t an d you ng ” an d “ pr e te en s,” su gg es ti ng th atth e d is ks ’ own er kne w th ey co nt ai ne d fi le s co nc ern in g c hi ld ren . W al la ce te sti fi ed

that sh e did

not plant the dis ks i n th at

r oom , did

not use the dis ks, and d id n ot a llo woth er s a cc es s to the r oom . F ina lly , w he n sh e br oa ch ed the subj ec t of he r sus pic ionto Ma xw el l, he r es pond ed w ithange r, not

sur pr ise . T his te sti m ony , c oupl ed

w ithe vid en ce about

the loc at ion , appe ar an ce , and c ont en ts o f th e d is ks , m ig htha ve be en su ffi ci en t t o e st ab li sh Max well ’s kn owi ng po ss es si on . Bu t t he Gov ern m en t d idno t s to p t he re. A s de sc ri be d inP ar

t I . B s upr a, the G ove rn m en t a lso pr es en te d am ple ev id en ce o f Max well ’s in te res t i n p orno gr ap hy, inc lu di ng “pr e te en ” p orno gr ap hy. T he G ove rn m ent sh ow ed that M ax w el l j oin ed

por nogr ap hic I nte rn et

gr oups w ith nam es and file directorie s sugg esting an int erest in “boy s.” Maxwe ll identified him se lf in at le as t on e of

the se gr oups a s “boy

_lo ve r6 9_69 . ” T he G ove rn m en t al s o s h o we dth atch i l dp o rn o g rap h y h adb ee nac ce s s edo n l i n e f ro m Wal l ac e’s16

co m put er , w hic h M ax w el l ha d us ed , and tha t num er ous dis ks c ont ai nin g c hil d po rn og rap hy, oth er t ha n t he ch arg eddi sk s, were fou ndam on g h is po ss es si on s. T he j ur y c oul d have inf

er re d f ro m thi s e vid en ce that M ax w el l ha d an in te re st i n ch ild por nogr ap hy and tha t hi s po sse ssi on o f the tw o c harg ed dis ks w as not acci de nt al or u nk no win g. Fi na lly , the G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed c om pe lli ng e vid en ce of

apho ne co nve rs at ionbe tw ee n M ax w el l and h is p as tor . Jus t day s be fo re the se ar chof W al la ce ’ s a

partm en t, Ma xw el l i nstru ct ed his pa sto r to r em ove e vid en ce , inc lud ing floppydisks and zip disks in particular, from the scene. Area sonable factfinder could have inferred fr om this conv ersation, espec ially in ligh t of the other ev id en ce, t ha t M ax well kn ew th atth e ch arg eddi sk s co nt ai ne d c hi ldpo rn og rap hy. T he j ur y m igh t have dis re gard ed

som e of thi s e vid en ce a s unre lia

ble ; i t m igh t have a cc ep te d so m e of the e vid en ce but

de ci de d th at

it did not sup port a finding that Maxwe ll knew about the illicit im ages. Ultim ately , how ever, the j ury w as pe rs ua de d th at

Ma xw el l kn ow ing ly

pos se sse d c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . I t do es not ma t t e r w h e th e r w e w o u l dh a v e r e a c h e dth e s a me f i n d i n g b a s e do nth e s a me ev ide nc e. I t on ly

m atte rs that the j ur

y ’ s f ind ing w as r ea sona

ble . B ec au se it obvi ousl y w as , Ma xw el l i s no t e nti tle d to r el ie f on this gr ound . C.17

Ma xw el l’ s th ir d arg um en t i s th at his c onvi ct ion s r es t up on a m isconst ruction of the term “produced” within the m eaning of the statute on which his conv ictions were base d. T o prosecute Maxwell succe ssfully under that statute, the G ove rn m en t ha d to pr ove be y ond a re as ona ble doubt tha t M ax w el l knowingl y

possess [ed a] book , m agazine, periodical, f ilm , videotape, co m put er dis k, or any oth er m at er ia l tha t c ont ai n[ ed ] an im ag e of ch ild por nogr ap hy [ 1] that [ w as ] m ai le d, or

shi ppe d or

tr an spor te d in interstate or fore ign comm erce by any m eans, including bycom puter, or [ 2] that w as pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t [ w er e] m ai le d, or shi ppe d or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, including bycom puter. 18 U . S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ) (e m pha sis a dde d) . B ec au se the G ove rn m en t di d no t establish th at the pornographic im ages m oved across state lines, its case r elied en tir el y on e sta bli shi ng tha t the m at er ia ls tha t “pr oduc ed ” the dis ks c ont ai nin g th e im ag es m ov edacro ss st at e li ne s. A s e xpl ai ne d a

bove , the G ove rn m en t pr ove d th at Ma xw el l kn ow ing ly poss es se d on e zi p di sk and o ne f lop py dis k c ont ai nin g im ag es of c hil d por nogr ap hy . T he G ove rn m en t di d no t e sta bli sh tha t M ax w el l kn ow ing ly poss essed cam eras or sim ilar devices that w ere used to capture the original de pi ct io ns st or edon th es e d is ks . A lth oughMa xw el l st ipu la te d th at the c harg ed

dis ks trave le d in

int er state com m erce before they

contained the illegal im ages, see Part I. B supra, he argues18

that those dis ks d id n ot “pr oduc e[ ] ” por nogr ap hic im ag es . D isk s, Ma xw el l co nte nds, are nothin g m or e than st or ag e m ed ia , and the ir tr an spor ta tio n in in te rs ta te co m

m erce is irr el ev an t t o § 22 52 A(a)(5 )(B) ’s juri sd ic ti on al ele m en t. Ma xw el l su gge sts that the m at er ia ls tha t “pr oduc e[ ] ” por nogr ap hy in sa tis fa ct ion of the statute’ s jur isdictio nal elem ent onlyinclude cam eras, film , and sim ilar de vi ces th atare u se d t o g iv e “ be in g, fo rm , or s hape ” to th e o rig in al im ag es . Ma xw el l i nsi sts that, be ca use the G ove rn m en t sh ow ed onl y that he sto re d im ag es , as op po se d t o p ro du ci ng th em , hi s co nv ic ti on s m us t b e rev ers ed . W e cannot

a gr ee . Maxw el l’ s di sin ge nuou s r ea din g of the statut e ign or es the statut e’ s pl ai n langua ge . T ha t l an gua ge dir ec ts the w or d “pr oduc ed ” to m ed ia containin g illegal im ages, r ather than som e abstract c onception of im ages divorced fr om that m ed ia . A s th e statut e m ak es c le ar , pos se ssi ng a c om put er dis k containin g child po rnography is no different than possess ing a m agazine that co nta ins c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . 18 U . S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ). I n ac as e ch ar gin g poss es sio n of

apor nogr ap hic m ag az ine , c er

ta inl y the G ove rn m en t c oul d e sta bli sh that the m ag az ine w as pr oduc ed w ithm at er ia ls tha t trave le d inint er state com m erce by dem onstrating that the pornog raphic im ages contained therein wer e phot ogr ap he d by

ac am er a im

porte d f ro m out of the state or

c ountry . B ut the cam er a w oul d no t be the G ove rn m en t’ s on ly r ec our se . T he G ove rn m en t w oul d19

s h o wth a to th e r

ma t e r i a l s w e r e a l s o u s e dt o c r e a t e th e ma g a z i n e , i n c l u d i n g f i l m, pa pe r, apr int ing pr es s, glu e or sta ple s, and quit e poss ibl y

ac om put er . I f the Governm ent established th at any of those m aterials “ ha[d] been m ailed, or shipp ed or tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, ” the n th e Gov ern m en t wo ul d h av e m etth e b ur de n re qu ire d b y th e te xtof § 22 52 A(a)(B )(5 ). T his und er standi ng o f the statut e y ie lds alog ic al c onse que nc e: th e productio n of any

pornographi c m aterial that is prohibited bythe statute such that it could n ot legally

travel in interstate com

m erce constitu tes productio n that satisfies statute’ s jur isdictio nal requirem ent. W hether that m aterial is the original de pic tio n or

ac opy is ir re le vant. T hus, w hil e de sc ri bin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy in w ri tte n pr ose or

sto ri ng i t i n apa

pe r en ve lop e w oul d no t am ount to pr oduc tio n, dupl ic at ing that po rn ogr ap hy —i n pr int ed

or e le ctro nic f

orm at —w oul d. B y

the t erm s o f t h e s t at u t e ( m o m en t ar i l y s et t i n g as i d e t h e d i s t i n ct qu es t i o no f t h e s t at u t e’s validity ), possess ors of child porno graphy cannot legally

use m aterials that tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce to co py

il lic it im ag es and the re by c re at e ind ep en de nt c ontra

band, e ve n if

the im ag es w er e or igi na lly pho tog ra phe d in -s ta te with cam eras and film

m anufactured w ithin the state’ s borders. N or can they cl eanse the ta int

of an im ag e take n w ithac am er a that trave le d inint er state co m m er ce sim

ply by de str oy ing the or igi na l f ilm and i m ag e, and r et ai nin g on lyThis decision and many others we discuss have a ddresse d statutes simil ar to the one at 11 iss ue , mo st p ro min e ntl y

inc lud ing18 U. S.C. § 2 25 2( a )( 4) (B ). Th at st atut e pr ov ide s,

20 co pie s th at

w er e m ad e w ithe qui pm en t m anuf ac tur ed in- state . U lti m at el y , the contraband item

on which the charge is based—be it a photograph or com puter dis k, an or igi na l or

dup lic at e— co uld

not have be en“pr oduc ed ” w ith out the cam er a, f ilm , and the tangi ble m ed ium on whic h it

w as pr int ed , w ri tte n, dis play ed , or c opi ed . If the re is a dif

fi cu lt ca se a s to w ha t m at er ia ls “pr oduc ed ” co ntr ab an d m ed ia containin g im ages of child pornog raphy , it is not Maxwe ll’ s case. H e w as indicted fo r poss es sin g tw o di sks c ont ai nin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . T his pr osc ri be d m ed ia w as “pr oduc ed ” w ithnum er ous m at er ia ls, inc lud ing ac am er a, c om put er s di sks , an d, pr es um ab ly , ac om

put er . H er e, the G ove rn m en t pr ove d by sti pul at ionthat the co m put er dis ks u se d to pr oduc e the ba se s f or Ma xw el l’ s in dic tm en t trave le d in int er state c om

m er ce . A s f

ar a s th e te xt o f the statut e is c onc er ne d, the n, the G ove rn m en t m et

it s burd en . S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. A ngl e, 234 F . 3d 3 26, 341 (7 th Cir . 20 00 ) (“ W e b el ie ve . . . th atco m pu te riz edvi su al de pi ct io ns (i.e ., co m put er gr ap hic f ile s) are ‘ pr oduc ed ’ w he n c om put er e qui pm en t, inc lud ing co m put er dis ke tte s, are use d to c opy the de pic tio ns o nto the dis ke tte s th at have traveled in interstate com m erce .” ). 11Any pe rs on wh o . . . kn ow ing ly

po sse sse s 1 or

mor e bo ok s, ma g a zine s, periodica ls, films, vi deo tape s, or other matter which c ontain any visual depiction th ath as b ee nm ai l ed , o r h as b ee ns h i p p edo r t ra n s p o rt edi ni n t er s t at e o r f o re i gn c omm e rc e , o r whic h w a s p ro du c e d u sin gmate ri a ls whic h h ave be e n ma ile d o r s o shipped or tra

nsported, by

any means includingby

computer, if— (i ) t he pr od uc ingof su c h v isu a l de pic tio n invo lve s th e us e of a min or e ng a g ingin sexually expli cit conduct; and (i i) su c h v isu a l de pic tio n is of su c h c on du c t; shall be punished as pr ovided in subsection (b) of this section. Although this statute conta ins differe nt languag e in par t, the terms of its jurisdictional require ment are identical to those of § 2252A, the statute under which Maxwell was convicte d. W e d o n o tre ac hth e qu es t i o no f w h et h er § 2 2 5 2 A i s fa ci al l y

i n v al i d . Al th o u gh 12 Maxwell attacked the statute on its face in the district court, his argument on appea l is confined to an as-a pplied challeng e. The Gove rnment conte nds that Maxwell failed to prese rve this issue for a ppeal a nd 13 that we a re, the ref ore, limited to review

it for plain er

ror. The Gover

nment is wrong . At the close of the evidenc e, Maxwell made a n oral motion under F ed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) for a judg ment of ac quittal. W e agree it is debatable whe ther he challeng ed § 2252A’ s constitutionalit y at that time. Wi thin seven business day s of his convictions, howeve r, Maxwell filed a wr itten rene wed mot ion fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. S e e F e d. R. C ri m. P . 2 9( c ). In th at mo tio n, Maxwe ll e xplic itl y argued that “18 U .S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (B ) is unconstitutional on it s fac e and a s applied to his case , sin c e Con g re ss e xce e de d it s a uth or ity un de r t he Comme rc e Cla

us e by makin gthe int

ra state possession of child pornography a fe dera l crime.” Thus, there can be no question that the constitutional iss ue bef

ore us—now limited to an as a pplied challeng e—wa s proper ly prese rved 21 D. Ma xw el l’ s f

ina l and m ost

f or ce fu l arg um en t i s th at

Co ngr es s c oul d no t have en ac te d § 2 252Asuc h th at it w oul d a ppl y he re w ith out

e xc ee din g th e sc ope of

it s le gis la tiv e au tho ri ty . F or that r ea son, Ma xw el l arg ue s, § 22 52Ais uncons titutio nal as it has been applied in hi s particular ca se. 12 W e re view district court conclusions as to the constitu tionalit y of a ch al le nge d st at

ute de nov o. S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. P an fi l, 338 F . 3d 1 299, 13in t

he dis tr ic t c ourt . The Gove rnment, pointing to our de cision in United States v. Viscome, 144 F .3d 1365, 13 70 (1 1th

Cir . 1 99 8) , invit e s u s to ho ld t hat Maxwe ll w a ive d th is a rgume nt b e c a

us e he ra ise d it for the f irst time after the jury

returne d its verdict. Even if w e found that the argument was not prese nted in the pre conviction motion for judg ment of ac quittal, we could re ach no suc h holding. In Viscome, a

ppellant Gentile a ssailed the constitutionality of the statute unde r which he was c ha rg e d f or the ve ry fi rs t ti me a ft e r h e wa s f

ound guil ty . G e nti le ’s mot ion c onta ini ngthi s argument was untimely . I d. at 1370. Maxwell’s written, re newe d motion was not. Rule 29(c) permits defe ndants to file such motions “within 7 day s after a guilty verdic t.” Fe d. R. Crim. P . 49(d) spe cifies that pa

pers f iled in criminal ca ses must be “filed in a manner provided for

in a civil action.” In turn, Fe d. R. Civ. P . 6(a) provides that we ekends a nd leg al holiday s are excluded from the c omputation of filing de adlines of less than 11da y s. Thus, Maxwell had seven business day s to file his renew ed motion. The jury returne d guilty

verdic ts ag ainst him on May 7, 2003. Maxwell filed his mot ion on May 16, exactly

seven business da

y s later. The Gover nment’s re sponse to Maxwell’s renew ed motion made no intimation that the argument was wa ive d. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lso c or re c tly a ssume d th at th e c on sti tut ion a l argume nt w a s p ro pe rl y be fo re it. F or

that r e a so n, the c ourt

a dd re sse d th e iss ue sq

ua re ly on the me ri ts a

nd e xplic itl y found that “18 U .S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (B ) is constitutional on it s fac e and a s applied to Def endant Maxwell.” Since Maxwell raised his ar gument on time, Viscome is inapposite. His constitutional challeng e wa s prese rved f or this appea l, and we must re view it de novo.

22 1300 (11th Cir. 2003). O ur dis cu ssi on o f thi s is sue pr oc ee ds i n th re e part s. F ir st, w e dis cu ss the lim ite d po w er

of Co ngr es s a s age ne ra l m atte r. S ec ond, w e w ei gh the f our co nsi de ratio ns the S upr em e Co urt e num er at ed in U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. 598 , 120 S . Ct . 174 0, 146 L . E d. 2d 6 58 ( 2000 ), f or de te rm ini ng the e xte nt o f Co ngr es s’ s po w er

to re gul at e “ tho se a ct ivi tie s havin g asub stanti al r el at ionto in te rs ta te co m

m erce .” Id . at 6 10 -1 2, 1 20 S. Ct. at 17 49 -5 1. In th e th irdpa rt, we conclude our analy sis of Maxwell’ s as-applied challenge. 1.23

“ Th[e ] [fe deral] governm ent is acknowledged by all to be one of enum erate d pow er s. T he pr inc ipl e, that i t c ane xe rc ise onl y the pow er s gr an te d to it

. . . is now uni ve rs al ly

a dm itt ed . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ope z, 514 U . S. 549 , 566 , 115 S . Ct . 16 24 , 16 33 (qu ot in g M cCu ll oc h v . Marylan d, 1 7 U.S. (4 Whe at .) 31 6, 4 05 , 4 L. E d. 579 ( 1819 )) . A cc or din gly , Co ngr es s c anle gis la te onl y w ith in t he a m bit of the spe ci fi c pow er s th e Co nst itutio n c onf er s onit . T he r eg ulatio n of c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty in particular has long been regarded as a r ole reser ved prim arily

to the states. S ee, e. g., Morrison, 529 U. S. at 618, 120 S. C t. at 1754 (“ [W ] e can think of no better ex am ple of the pol ic e pow er , w hic h th e Fo unde rs de nie d th e N at ion al G ove rn m en t an d r ep ose d inthe S ta te s, than th e supp re ssi on o f vio le nt c ri m e an d vi ndi catio n of its vic tim s. ”) ; i d. a t 61 9 n. 8, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 54 n . 8 ( “ [T ] he pr inc ipl e that the Co nst itutio n c re at ed

aF ed er al G ove rn m en t of li m ite d po w er s, w hil e re se rv ing a generalized police power to the States, is deeply

ingrained in ou r constituti onal h i s t o ry.” ( o r i g i n a l a l t e r a t i o n s an dqu o t a t i o nmark s o mi t t e d ) ) . Ac c o r d i n g l y,

“ [u ] nde r our

f ed er al sy ste m

the a dm ini str at ionof

c ri m ina l j ust ic e re sts w iththe states except as Congress, a cting within th e scope of [its] delegated powers, has cr eate d of

fe nse s a ga ins t the U nit ed S ta te s. ” S cr ew s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 325 U . S. 91, 109, 65 S. C t. 1031, 1039, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opini on). T hr oughthe Ch ild

P or nogr ap hy P re ve nti on A ct

of 199 6, P ub. L . N o. 104 -24

208, § 12 1, 110 S ta t. 300 9- 26 ( 1996 ) (c odi fi ed a s am en de d insc atte re d se ct ion s of 18 U . S. C. c h. 110 ), and s ubse que nt am en dm en ts, Co ngr es s ha s c ra ft ed an of fe nse against the United States for the possession o f child pornog raphy , including su ch por nogr ap hy that or igi na te d w ith in a

giv en state and r em ai ne d th er e. Maxw el l was co nv ic te d o f th is off en se as i t i s co di fie d i n 1 8 U.S.C. § 22 52 A(a)(5 )(B) . In this case, the Governm ent established th at Maxw ell knowinglypossess ed child po rnography

in Florida. That pornography wa s saved on com

puter disks that ha d tr av el ed

f ro m out -o f- state be fo re the y

c ont ai ne d il le ga l i m ag es . T he Governm ent proved no thing m ore. Apart fr om the origin of the disk s (before they ha d be enc om

m itt ed to ne fari ous pur

pose s) , Ma xw el l’ s c as e inv olv ed no a ppare nt co nne ct ionto ac tiv ity

be y ond Fl or ida . Y et , the G ove rn m en t c ont en ds tha t the pow er to en fo rc e § 22 52Aa ga ins t M ax w el l st em s f ro m the auth or ity

pr ovi de d to Congress by

the Constitu tion’s Com

m erce Clause. Pursuant to that clause, Congress has autho rity

“ [t] o regulate Com

m erce . . . am ong th e severa l States. ” U.S. Con st . art . I, § 8 , cl. 3 . T im e ha s bo rn e out

that the te xt o f the Co m

m er ce Cl au se is no m ode l of cl ari ty. Co ns eque nt ly, th e Supr em e Co ur t h as st ru gg le d t o d efi ne it s b ou nd ari es . Si nc e the e ar ly

180 0s, the Co urt ha s e m pha siz ed that the pow er

to re gul at e co m m er ce is not

ablank c he ck :25

Co m pr eh en siv e as the w or d ‘ am ong’ is, it m ay ve ry pr ope rl y be res tri ct edto th atco m

m erce whi ch co nc ern s m or e St at es th an on e. T he phr as e is n ot o ne w hic h w oul d pr oba bly have be ense le ct ed

to indicate the com

pletely interior traf

fic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enum eration of the particular cl as se s of c om m er ce , to w hic h th e pow er w as to be e xte nde d, w oul d not have be enm ad e, ha d th e int en tio n be ento ex te nd the pow er to ev er y de sc ri pti on. T he e num er at ionpr es uppo se s so m ethin g no t enum er at ed ; and tha t so m ethin g, if w e re gard

the langua ge or

the subj ec t of the se nte nc e, m

ust be the e xc lus ive ly

int er na l c om m er ce of a State . G ibb ons v. O gde n, 22 U . S. ( 9 Whe at . ) 1, 194 -9 5, 6 L . E d. 23 ( 1824 ). I n r ec en t y ears , the S upr em e Co urt ha s sy nth es iz ed it s vo lum ino us C om

m er ce Cl au se precedent and determ ined that the Clause authorizes Congress to regulate “ three broad categories of ac tivity ”: (1) “ the use of the channels of interstate com m erce ”; (2 ) “ the ins tr

um en ta lit ie s of

int er state c om

m er ce , or pe rs ons or

thi ngs in i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce ”; and (3 ) “ tho se a ct ivi tie s havin g asub stanti al r el at ionto int er state co m m er ce , i. e. , tho se a ct ivi tie s th at sub stanti al ly

a ff ec t i nte rs ta te co m m erce .” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 8- 59, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 29- 30 ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). A s th e Su pr em e Co urt m ad e cl ear in L ope z, Co ngr es s m ay r eg ulate any

c hanne ls o r ins tr um en ta lit ie s of

int er state c om

m er ce . I t m ay

a lso r eg ulate any

pe rs on o r thi ng in in te rs ta te co m

m erce .We cite B allinge r on the stre ng th of its reasoningonly . Be cause the dec ision has been 14 va c ate d a nd wi ll b e re he ard

by our f ull c ourt , it

is n ot t he law o f t

his c ir c uit . 26 It s auth or ity

und er the c om m er ce c lause is m or e lim ite d, how ev er , w ith re spe ct to oth er sub j ec ts and a ct ivi tie s, suc h a s a ct ivi tie s c ondu ct ed e nti re ly w ith in a state ’ s bo rd er s. A lth oughCo ngr es s c an und oubt ed ly

r eg ulate c er

ta in i ntr as ta te ac tiv ity , it s po w er

e xte nds ove r intra state a ct ivi ty onl y if that a ct ivi ty

be ar s a

“ subs tanti al r el at ionto int er state c om m er ce , ” or

a s th e Co urt c lari fi ed , if

it

“ subs tanti al ly

a ff ec t[ s] int er state c om

m er ce . ” S ee id. a t 55 9, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 30 (“ W ithin this final category , a dm ittedly , our c ase lawhas not been clear whether ana ct ivi ty

m ust ‘ af fe ct ’ or ‘ subs tanti al ly

a ff ec t’ int er state c om

m er ce in or de r to b e wi th i nCo n g re s s ’ po we r t o re g u l at e i tu n d erth e C o m m er ce Cl au s e. . . . We conclude . . . that the proper test requires an analy sis of whether the r egulated activity ‘ subs tantially

aff ects’ interstate com

m erce .” ); U nited States v. Ba lling er, 312 F. 3d 1 264, 127 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) , va cate d by 369 F . 3d 1 238 (1 1thCi r. 200 4) (aw ai tin g r eh eari ng e n banc ) (“ Whe re as Co ngr es s m ay r eg ulate any ins tr um en ta lity

or c hanne l of

int er state c om

m er ce , the Co nst itutio n pe rm its Congress to regulate onlythose intrastate activities which have a substantial effect on int erstate c omm erce , and such regulatio n of purely intrastate activity

rea ches the out er li m its of Co ngr es s’ c om

m er ce pow er . ”) . S ta te d bl unt ly , w hol ly 1427

intra state a ct ivi tie s th at

have aonl y

m ini m al or

ins ubst an tia l e ff

ec t onint er state co m m er ce are not

pr ope r subj ec ts f

or f ed er al r eg ulatio n, a t l ea st n ot thr oughthe po wer b es to wedby the Co m m erce Cla us e.

2. Inthi s c as e, the c ha lle nge d st at ute doe s no t go ve rnthe “ ch anne ls o f interstate com

m erce ,” and the Governm ent did no t establish th at the proscribed im ag es w er e “ thi ngs in i nte rs ta te c om m er ce . ” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 8, 115 S . Ct . at 162 9. R athe r the G ove rn m en t ha s pr ose cu te d M ax w el l f or intra state pos se ssi on of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

and r el ie s e nti re ly

f or it s c onvi ct ion s onthe f

ac t tha t the disks on which the pornog raphy wa s copied traveled in interstate com m erce before th ey co n t ai n edth e i m ag es . Th er ef o re , i f C o n g re s s h as p ro s cr i b edMa x we l l ’s co nduc t purs uant t o a“pow er [] gr an te d to it , ” id. a t 56 6, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 33 (quot ing Mc Cu llo ch , 17 U . S. ( 4 Whe at . ) at 405 ), it m ust be be ca use the intra state poss ession chil d pornog raphy falls w ithin Lopez’ s third category of activities that

“ subs tanti al ly

a ff ec t i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . ” Cf

. U nit ed S ta te s v. A dam s, 343 F . 3d 1024 , 102 8 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) ( “ O f co ur se , the pos se ssi on o f ch ild por nogr ap hy [unde r § 22 52] c onc er

ns n ei the r the c hanne ls n or the ins tr um en ta lit ie s of

int er state co m m er ce . I t f

oll ow s th at

the pos se ssi on o f ch ild

por nogr ap hy m ust ‘ subs tanti al ly af fe ct int er state c om

m er ce ’ in or de r fo r Co ngr es s to r eg ulate it und er the28

Co m m er ce Cl au se . ”) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. H ols ton , 343 F . 3d 8 3, 88 ( 2d C ir . 200 3) (holdin g that assessin g the constitution ality of a r elated statute, 18 U .S .C. § 22 51( a) , “ re qui re s us to de te rm ine w he the r, in lig ht o f the Mo rr iso n f ac tor s, the statute regulates an activity that subs tantially

aff ects’ interstate com

m erce ”); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 , 326 (6th Cir. 2001 ) (sustaining an as-applied ch al le nge to § 22 52 a ft er appl y ing onl y

the te st f or L ope z’ s th ir d c at eg or

y of Co m m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. Ro dia , 194 F . 3d 4 65, 474 n. 3 ( 3d Cir. 1999 ) (“ [W ] e w ill consid er the [ 18 U. S. C. § 225 2(a)( 4)(B) ] only under [L opez’ s] category

(iii), ref erring to the relevant inquiry in this case whether it was re as ona ble f or Co ngr es s to be lie ve that the be havio r re gul at ed sub stanti al ly

a ff ec ts interstate com

m erce .” ). T he S upr em e Co urt ha s art ic ulate d f our c onsi de ratio ns f

or de te rm ini ng w he the r ana ct ivi ty

“ subs tanti al ly

a ff ec ts” int er state c om

m er ce suc h th at

it c anbe va lid ly r eg ulate d th ro ugh Co m

m er ce Cl au se le gis la tio n: 1) w he the r the statut e in que sti on r eg ulate s c om m er ce “ or any sor t of ec onom ic e nte rp ri se ”; 2) w he the r the statut e co nta ins any “ expr es s j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t whic h m igh t l im it its r ea chto a dis cr et e se t” of ca se s; 3 ) w he the r the statut e or it s le gis la tiv e his tor

y c ont ai ns “ expr es s c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s” that the r eg ulate d a ct ivi ty a ff ec ts interstate com

m erce ; and 4) whether the link b etwe en the regulated ac tiv ity and a sub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce is “ attenuated.”W e m ak e n o j u d gm en tt o d ay as t o wh et h er

th e d i s t i n ctac t s o f p ro d

u ci n g, b uyi n g, 15 se lli ng , tr a din g , w are ho us ing , d istri butin g , o r m a rk e tin gc hil d p or

no g ra phy c on sti tut e e c on omi c o r c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i ty. 29 U nit ed S ta te s v. Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d 1 114, 111 9 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) ( quot ing Mo rr iso n, 52 9 U.S. at61 0- 61 2, 1 20 S. Ct. at 17 50 -5 1) . W e an al y ze § 22 52A ’ s va lid ity a s a ppl ie d to Ma xw el l’ s sp ec if ic c as e in lig ht o f the se f

our c onsi de ratio ns, w hic h w e have r eo rd er ed f or c onve nie nc e of discuss ion. T he statute is consti tutio nal in its appl ication to Maxwell if “ a rational ba sis e xis te d f

or c onc lud ing that” the intra state pos se ssi on o f ch ild por nogr ap hy pr oduc ed w ithm at er ia ls tha t trave le d inint er state c om m er ce “ suf

fi ci en tly a ff ec t[ s] in te rs ta te co m

m erce .” Lop ez, 5 14 U.S. at 5 57 , 11 5 S . Ct. at16 29 . a. T ur nin g to Mo rr iso n’ s f

ir st c onsi de ratio n, w e dis ce rnnothin g c om m er ci al or ec onom ic about

the pos se ssi on o f ch ild

por nogr ap hy , e ve n if

that po rn ogr ap hy

is save d onc om

put er dis ks tha t w er e im

porte d f ro m out -o f- state . T he a ct

of poss es sio n a lon e—

the onl y a ct f or w hic h M ax w el l w as c harg ed —e nta ils no tr an sa ct ion s, no c onsum

pti on o f good s or

se rv ic es , and n o ne ce ssary r es ort t o th e m arketplace. 15 Ma xw el l’ s c ondu ct

c anbe sharp ly

dis tin gui she d f

ro m the a ct ivi ty

the Su pr em e Co urt f

ound sub j ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n inW ic kard v.30

Fi lburn , 317 U . S. 111 , 63 S . Ct . 82, 87 L . E d. 122 ( 1942 ). I n W ic kard , an O hio farm er c ha lle nge d C ongr es s’ s po w er to en ac t a

194 1 am en dm en t t o th e A gr ic ult ur al A dj ustm en t A ct

of 193 8. I d. a t 11 3, 63 S . Ct . a t 83 . A s am en de d, the act assessed a “ m arketing penalty ” against the farm er bec ause he grewm ore wheat than th e am ount

pe rm itt ed

by the a ct ’ s m ar

ke tin g qu ota . I d. T his quo ta“ not onl y em br ac e[ d] a ll that m ay

be sol d w ith out

pe na lty but a lso w ha t m ay

c onsum ed

on the pr em ise s” of

agiv enf ar m . I d. a t 11 9, 63 S . Ct . a t 86 . T he f ar m er sou ght a de cl arat io n t ha t t he act ’s qu ot a p ro vi si on s wer e u nc on st itut io na l as ap pl ie d t o h im . Id . a t 11 3- 14, 63 S . Ct . a t 83 . H e ar gue d th at the pr oduc tio n and c onsum pti on o f wheat are “bey ond th e re ach of Congressional power under the Com m erce Clause, since they

are local in charac ter and their ef fects upon interstate com m erce are at m ost ‘ indirect.’ ” Id. at 119, 63 S. Ct. at 86. T he Suprem e Court disagreed. In re ac hin g it s de ci sio n, the Co urt e xpl ai ne d, The gener al schem e of the A gricultural Adj ustm ent Act of 1938 as re la te d to w he at

is to c ontro l the vol um e m ovi ng i n in te rs ta te and fo re ignc om

m er ce in or de r to avoi d surp lus es and s hor ta ge s and the co nse que nt a

bnor m al ly lowor hig h whe at

pr ic es and o bstru ct ion s to com m erce . I d . a t1 1 5 , 6 3 S . C t . a t8 4 . T h u s , th e c h a l l e n g e d a c tc o n s t i tu t e dac i v i l s c h e me dir ec te d at c ontro lli ng the c ost and f lowof r iva l go ods in the m ar

ke tpl ac e. T he Co u rt ’s h o l d i n g re l i edh ea v i l y o nth e s t at u t e’s ec o n o m i c p u rp o s e a n dCo n g re s s ’s31

long -rec ogni zed authority to enact price regulations th at aff ect the national m ar ke t: It is w el l e sta

bli she d by

de ci sio ns o f thi s C ourt tha t the pow er to regulate com

m erce includes the po we r to regulate the price s at which co m m odi tie s inthat c om

m er ce are de al t i n and p ra ct ic es a ff ec tin g such prices. O ne of the prim ary purposes o f the A ct in questio n was to i nc re as e the m ar

ke t pr ic e of

w he at and t o th at

e nd t o li m it the vo lu m e th ereo f th atco ul d a ffec t t he m ark et . Id. at 128, 63 S. C t. at 90-91 (footn ote om itted). T he Court concluded that even the growth and consum

ption of w heat locally , if

left unregulated, “would have a subs tanti al e ff

ec t i n de fe at ing and o bstru ct ing it s purp ose to sti m ulate tr ad e the re in at inc re as ed

pr ic es . ” I d. a t 12 9, 63 S . Ct . a t 91 . The r egulation at issue in Maxwell’ s case, by contrast, has no clear ec onom ic pur

pose . I t m ak es no e ff

ort t o c ontro l natio na l tra de by r eg ulatin g intrastate activity . Instead, it attem pts to regulate prim ary

conduct directly , e ven w ith in s ta te bor de rs . U nli ke w he at , por nogr ap hy is a nonr iva l go od. Maxw el l i s ch ar ge d w ithpos se ssi ng i t, and p oss es sin g po rn ogr ap hy doe s no t r es ult

in its co ns um pt io n s uc h t ha t t he ov eral l s up pl y of p orno gr ap hy in t he m ark etis reduc ed . Inany e ve nt, Co ngr es s is c le ar ly not c onc er ne d w iththe sup ply

of c hil d por nogr ap hy f or the pur pose of a voi din g surp lus es and s horta ge s or f or the pu rp os e o f st im

ul at in g i ts tra de at i nc reas edpri ces .We discuss these finding s and re lated finding s in gr eate r deta il in P art I I .D.4, infra . 16 32 N or doe s it se em that § 2252 Ar ep re se nts af ed er al e ff ort t o r ed uc e the tr af fi ck ing of c am er as , c om

put er s, sta

ple s, blank p ap er , f

ilm , or dis ks i n in te rs ta te co m m er ce . W e ar e aw ar e of

no r el at ed

r eg ulatio n th at

pr ohi bit s th e m ove m en t of the se it em s whe n th ey

are not c om m itt ed to the pur

pose of pr oduc ing c hil d por nogr ap hy . C ongr es s’ s e xpr es s f ind ing s inthe Ch ild

P or nogr ap hy P re ve nti on Ac t of 1996 revea l no hin t that Congress was concer ned about th e m aterials used 16 to pro du ce p orno gr ap hy or h ow t ho se m at eri al s wo ul d i m pa ctin te rs ta te co m

m erce . The statute provides no variation in punis hm ent (or any other distin ction for that m atte r) f or por nogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ithve ry

f ewm at er ia ls transpo rt ed

in int er state co m m er ce and p or

nogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ithm any

suc h m at er ia ls. Mo re ove r, w hil e the statut e is c onstru ct ed

suc h th at e ac h it em

of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

ade fe ndant poss es se s c anse rv e as the ba sis f or ase parate c onvi ct ion , it

doe s no t pe rm it m ult ipl e co nvi ct ion s ba se d onpos se ssi on o f a sin gle it em c ont ai nin g c hil d pornog raphy

sim ply because that item

wa s produced with num erous m aterials that tra ve le d i n i nt ers ta te co m m erce . T he se c ir cum stanc es pe rs ua de us tha t C ongr es s’ s r ef er en ce in thi s st at

ute to pr oduc tio n m at er ia ls s m ac ks o f pr et ex t; the statut e’ s tr ue and c or e pur

pose is to crim inalize the possessi on of child po rnography . Thus, w e conclude that regulated33

intra state a ct ivi ty

in thi s c as e is m or e sim ilar by f ar to the br an d of

intra state cr im ina l c ondu ct

that i s apr ope r subj ec t f

or state r eg ulatio n a lon e than it is to the sort of e co nom ic a ct ivi ty

a ddr es se d inW ic kard . C f. Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 8, 120 S. Ct . a t 17 54 ( “ T he r eg ulatio n and p uni shm en t of intra state vio le nc e that i s not dir ec te d a t the ins tr

um en ta lit ie s, c hanne ls, or goo ds i nvol ve d inint er state co m m erce ha s al way s b een th e p ro vi nc e o f th e St at es .”).

“ [A ] f ai r re ad ing of

L ope z show s th at

the non ec onom ic , c ri m ina l natur e of the c ondu ct

a t i ssu e w as c en tr al to [the Co urt’ s] de ci sio n inthat c as e. ” I d. a t 61 0, 120 S. Ct. at 1750. H ere, the nonecono m ic, crim inal nature of Maxw ell’ s conduct is c en tr al to our

de ci sio n. b. M o rr i s o nan dLo p ez , a l s o co n s i d er edwh et h erth e r eg u l at edac t i v i ty’ s subs tantial effe ct on interstate com m erce wa s attenuated. T he Court expressed re luc tanc e to c onsi de r the lon g r ea ch ing , ind ir ec t e ff ec ts o f cr im ina l a ct s on int er state c om

m er ce w he n a sse ssi ng the sc ope of Co ngr es s’ s po w er

und er the Co m m er ce Cl au se . A ft er

a ll, if w e w er e to w ei gh the “but -f or c au sa l c ha in” f

ro m the oc curr en ce of

c ri m e, tr ac ed

to “ ev er y a tte nuate d e ff

ec t onint er state co m m er ce , ” the n “ Co ngr es s m igh t us e the Co m m er ce Cl au se to co m

ple te ly oblit erate the Constitu tion’s distinction betwee n nation al and local authority .” See34

Mor ri son, 529 U . S. a t 61 5, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 52. T he Co urt c hara ct er iz ed thi s ex te nde d- ca

usatio n a ppr oa cha s “unw orkable if w e ar e to m ai nta in the Co nst itutio n’ s e num er at ionof pow er s. ” I d. If Maxwell’ s conduct h as had any eff ect on interstate com

m erce , that e ffec t is atte nuate d to say

the le as t. I n th e fi rs t pl ac e, w e re ite rate that the re is nothin g inh er en tly

c om m er ci al or

e co nom ic about

the m er e poss es sio n of

por nogr ap hic im ages. W e also ree m

phasize the evident fact that the statute’ s jur isdictio nal elem ent is directed at overcom ing th e legal hurdle of obtaining feder al j ur isd ic tio n, r athe r than an a spe ct of the pr im ar

y sub j ec t m atte r Co ngr es s w ish es to control. T his is n ot regulation o f conduct to achieve price r egulation or other ec onom ic e nds; it

is re gul at ionof

pr im ar y c ondu ct , a im ed

a t pr ev en tin g A m er ic an s from engaging in certain activity under any

circum stances. T his circum stance al one ne ce ssari ly

a tte nuate s th e re la tio nshi p be tw ee n r eg ulate d c ondu ct and interstate com

m erce to som e degree. A fter a ll, § 2252A’ s own term s sugg est that the very idea of interstate c omm erce is at least once re m oved from the regulated ac tiv ity w ithw hic h st at

ute is tr uly c onc er ne d, i. e. , the pos se ssi on o f ch ild po rn og rap hy. The f ull extent to which the re lationsh ip is attenuated, however, becom es apparent only

after looki ng, as w e m

ust, to Maxwe ll’ s specific conduct. A s far35

int er state c om

m er ce is co nc er

ne d, Ma xw el l ha s do ne nothin g m or e than po sse ss tw o di sks that trave le d f

ro m out -o f- state . W

hil e poss es sin g m at er ia ls o f pr oduc tio n m igh t c onc ei vably have adir ec t i m

pa ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce in certa in circum stances, Maxwell’ s convictio ns present no su ch case. T he causal ch ai n ne ce ssary

to lin k hi s a ct ivi ty

w ithany sub stanti al im

pa ct on i nte rs ta te co m m erce m ig htbe lo ng en ou gh to reac h t he ou te r li m it s o f th e so la r syste m . T he f ind ing s C ongr es s announc ed w ithit s in iti al e na ctm en t of § 22 52A sugg est in relevant part, first, that the existence of and traf

fic in child pornog raphic im ages . . . inflam es the desires of child m olesters, pedophiles, and child porno graphers w ho p re y on c hil dr en , the re by

inc re as ing the c re at ionand d istri but ion of child porno graphy

and the sexual abuse and expl oitation of actual ch ildre n who are vic tim iz ed a s ar es ult

of the e xis te nc e an d us e of the se m at er ia ls . . . [ an d, se co nd, that] pr ohi bit ing the pos se ssi on and viewing of child porno graphy will encourage the poss essors of such m at er ia l t o r id the m se lve s of or de str oy the m at er ia l, the re by

he lpi ng to p ro te ct the vic tim s of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

and t o e lim inate the m ark etforth e se xu al ex pl oi ta ti ve us e o f ch il dr en . Ch ild P or nogr ap hy P re ve nti on A ct

of 199 6, P ub. L . N o. 104 -2 08, § 12 1, 110 S ta t. 3009 -2 7 ( 1996 ). Whe the r thi s e xpl an at ionof howpos se ssi ng c hil d po rn ogr ap hy can substanti ally

aff ect interstate c omm erce is too attenuated as a general m atter, w e ne ed not say . I t i s su ff

ic ie nt t o r em ar

k th at , on the f

ac ts o f thi s c as e, the re is sim ply no record evidence to suggest th at Maxw ell wa s a potential child m olesterSe e , e .g ., Ho lst on , 3 43 F .3 d at 90 (“ Sin c e no on e wo uld do ub t Co ngre ss’ s a

bil ity to 17 re gulate a natio na l ma

rk e t in c hil d p or no g ra phy , th e qu e sti on

be c ome s whe the r C on g re ss c ou ld ratio na lly have de te rm ine d th at it

mus t r e a c h lo c a l, i ntr a state c on du c t in or de r t o e ff

e c tiv e ly re gulate a natio na l inte rs tate mark e t. . . . [W]e c on c lud e that Co ngre ss, in a n atte mpt to h a lt interstate tra fficking , can pr ohibit local production that fee ds the national marke t and stimulates demand, a s this production substantially aff ects interstate commer ce. ( citations and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ka llestad, 236 F.3d 225, 230 ( 5th Cir. 2000) (“No one questions Congre ss’s authority to regulate [the interstate mar ket in child pornog raphy] di rec tly . . . . Applying the commerc e powe r, re ad through the Nec essar y and Proper

Clause, Cong ress c an re a c h p ur e ly

loc a l po sse ssi on

if it r atio na lly

de te rm ine s th at do ingso is n e c e ssa ry to e ff e c tiv e ly re gulate the natio na l ma

rk e t.” ); An g le , 2 34 F .3 d at 33 8 ( “ [B ]ec a us e § 2 25 2( a )( 4) (B ) p ro hib its int ra state a c tiv ity

that is su bs tanti a lly

re late d to the c los e ly

re gulate d inte rs tate mark e t of c hil d po rn ogra phy , w e c on c lud e that th e statut e is a va lid e xer c ise of

Con g re ss’ s Co mme rc e Cla us e power .”). 36 or that hi s c ondu ct

w oul d li ke ly

inc re as e the c re at ionand d istri but ionof c hil d por nogr ap hy e lse w he re , m

uc h le ss t o th e ex te nt tha t su chc re at ionand d istri but ion w oul d have asub stanti al e ff ec t onint er state c om

m er ce . T he r ec or d is a lso de voi d of e vid en ce that M ax w el l’ s po sse ssi on o f por nogr ap hy w oul d e nc our ag e oth er s to po ss es s s uc h m at eri al in an y di rector s ub st an ti al m an ne r. O the r ci rc uit s have c onc lud ed that the intra state pos se ssi on o f ch ild por nogr ap hy ha s adir ec t i m

pa ct on the na tio na l m ar

ke t f or c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

by loo kin g be y ond the iso la te d c ondu ct of the de fe ndant and c onsi de ri ng the a g g r e g at e e f

f e c to f s u c h p o s s e s s i o nb y o th e r s th r o u g h o u tth e c o u n try. 17 W e believe this aggregate approach cannotbe applied to int rastate c rim inal ac tiv ity of anon ec onom ic na tur e. C ongr es s w ie lds the pow er to re gul at e int er state ch ild por nogr ap hy , not

be ca use suc h po rn ogr ap hy

ha s asub stanti al e ff

ec t on37

interstate com

m erce in the aggregate, but because such po rnography is a “ thing [] in interstate com

m erce .” L opez, 514 U. S. at 558, 115 S. C t. at 1629 . A substantial ef fe ct ne ed not be e sta bli she d f or thi s so rt of r eg ulatio n, so the iss ue of ag gr eg at io n i s i rrel ev an t. The op po si te is tru e in th e in tra st at e co nt ex t. A ggr eg at ionw as appr opr ia te in W ic kard , anothe r ca se inv olv ing intra state act iv it y , bec au se of t he eco no m ic an d c omm erci al na tu re o f th e act iv it y reg ul at ed . See M orris on , 52 9 U.S. at61 1 n .4, 1 20 S. Ct. at 17 50 n.4 (“ In ev ery cas e whe re we have sus ta ine d f

ed er al r eg ulatio n un de r the a ggr eg at ionpr inc ipl e in W ic kard v. Fi lburn. . . the r eg ulate d a ct ivi ty w as of an a ppare nt c om

m er ci al c hara ct er . ”) . B ut the Suprem e Court has since re m arked that “ W ickard . . . is per haps the m ost far reac hing exam

ple of Com

m erce Clause authority

over intrastate ac tivity .” L opez, 514 U . S. a t 56 0, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 30. I n L ope z, the Co urt c ontra ste d th e none co nom ic na tur e of

the G un- Fr ee S ch ool Z one s A ct of 199 0 to the e co nom ic na tur e of the le gis la tio n a t i ssu e in W ic kard : [T he G un- Fr ee S ch ool Z one s A ct ] is a cr im ina l st at ute that by

it s te rm s ha s no thi ng t o do w ith“ co m m er ce ” or any sor t of e co nom ic en te rp ri se , how ev er

br oa dly one m igh t de fi ne tho se te rm s. [ It ] is not an essential part of a larger r egulation of econom ic activity , in which the r eg ulator

y sc he m e co uld

be und er cu t un le ss the intra state a ct ivi ty we re r egulated. I t cannot, theref ore, be sustained un der our cases upho lding regulations of activities th at arise out of or are c onnected with a c omm ercia l transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, subs tantially

aff ects interstate com

m erce .38

Id. at 561, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 . Although the Suprem e Court has not gon e so far as to ad opt

“ a cate gor ic al r

ule a ga ins t a ggr eg at ing the e ff ec ts o f any

non ec onom ic ac tiv ity in or de r to d ec ide the se c as es , ” it ha s e m pha siz ed that “ thu s f

ar in our N at ion ’ s hi sto ry

our c as es have uph el d C om

m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n of intra state activity only wher e that activity

is econom ic in nature.” Morrison, 529 U. S. at 613, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 51; c f. Ba lli nge r, 312 F . 3d at 12 70 ( “ T he Co nst itutio n pe rm its

. . . a ggr eg at ionof

e ff ec ts t o j ust if

y c ongr es sio na l r eg ulatio n of pur el y intra state econom ic activity

when the absence of such regulation wouldundercut a larger regulatory

schem e af

fecting interstate com

m erce . No such aggregation of local ef fe ct s is c onst itutio na lly

pe rm iss ibl e in r ev ie w ing c ongr es sio na l r eg ulatio n of intra state , non -e co nom ic a ct ivi ty . ” (c itatio n om itt ed )) ; M cC oy , 323 F . 3d at 11 22 & n.1 7 (a do pt in g t he reas on in g i n B al li ng er). W e have no intentio n of breaking new ground here. As the S uprem e Court ha s w ar ne d, appl y ing an a ggr eg at ionappr oa chto none co nom ic , c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty w he n a sse ssi ng i ts i m

pa ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce w oul d e ff

ec t an in te rp re ta tio n of the Com m erce Clause that essentially vests general police powers w ith the federal gove rn m en t. T he a ggr eg at ionpr inc ipl e, the Co urt r ea sone d,Al tho ugh th e Mo rr iso n ma jor ity re pe ate dly

vo ic e d d ou

bts a bo ut t he a bil ity of Con g re ss 18 to regulated nonec onomic, “violent” c rimes, we pe rce ive no re ason why its rationale would not extend with full force to e qually noneconomic c rimes of a nonviolent nature. 39 wil l n otli m itCo ng res s t o re gu la ti ng vi ol en ce bu t m ay , as we 18 sugg es te d inL ope z, be appl ie d e qua lly a s w el l t o f

am ily lawand oth er are as of tr ad iti ona l st at e re gul at ionsin ce the a ggr eg at e ef fe ct of m ar ri ag e, div or ce , and c hil dr eari ng o n th e na tio na l e co nom y is un do ub te dl y

si gn ifi can t. Mo rri so n, 5 29 U.S. at 6 15 -1 6, 1 20 S. Ct. at 17 53 . A s apr ac tic al m atte r, w e not e furthe r that i f the c om m er ci al im

port of ge ne ra l c at eg or ie s of

non ec onom ic , c ri m ina l a ct ivi tie s c oul d be m ea sur ed in the ag gr eg at e, j ur isd ic tio na l ho oks w oul d be r en de re d ir re le vant. B ec au se the cate gor ic al a ct ivi ty

of intra state por

nogr ap hy w oul d be inv ar ia

bly de em ed to have a subs tanti al e co nom ic e ff ec t onint er state c om

m er ce , Co ngr es s w oul d no t be co nstra ine d to pr osc ri be it s po sse ssi on t o c as es in w hic h th e m at er ia ls u se d to produce it wer e transported in interstate com m erce . Thus, the m isgui ded ag g re g at i o nap p ro ac h s u g g es t s th at ju ri s d i ct i o n al el emen t s i nal l o f C o n g re s s ’s Co m m er ce Cl au se e na ctm en ts am ount to nothin g m or e than su

pe rf luo us hur dle s to fe de ra l l awe nf

or ce m en t. Fi na lly , w e re ite rate the r isk Jus tic e T hom as not ed

in his c onc ur

ri ng o pin ion in Lopez that the aggregation approach could com e packaged w ith an unwanted legislative by

product. Per

m itting the validityof congressional action to be testedWe a c kn ow le dg e that th is p art ic ula r c on g re ssi on a l r e sp on se might b e me t w ithF ir st 19 Amendment hurdle s, but we set that issue aside for the moment. Othe r ac tiviti es that could be spiraled into expanding r ings of regulation might not enjoy protec tion from the B ill of Rights. 40 by the a ggr eg at e im

pa ct of the r eg ulate d a ct ivi ty

e nc our ag es Co ngr es s no t t o us e restraint in exerc ising its trem endous power, but ins tead to paint with a fatter regulatory

brush. “ [O ] ne alway s can drawthe circle broadly enough to cover an ac tiv ity that, w he n take n iniso la tio n, w oul d no t have sub stanti al e ff ec ts o n co m m erce .” Lop ez, 5 14 U.S. at 6 00 , 11 5 S . Ct. at16 50 (Tho m as , J., co nc urrin g) . T hus, if w e ad opt ed

an a ggr eg at e m ethodo log y f or a sse ssi ng the e ff

ec t of nonecono m ic, crim inal activity on interstate com

m erce , and we then determ ined that the e ff

ec t of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

w as sti ll ins uf

fi ci en t, Co ngr es s c oul d a c c o mp l i s h i t s a i ms b y o u t l aw i n g a l l p o rn o g r ap h y. 19 By fin di ng th atCo ng res s’s p owe r to reg ul at e in tra st at e p os se ss io n fo ll ows na tur al ly f ro m it s po w er to re gul at e int er state pos se ssi on, our sis te r ci rc uit s have take n tw o le ap s. T he y

f ir st a ssum e that i ntr as ta te pos se ssi on a ff ec ts the int er state m ar ke t f or c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . T he y the n a ssum e that this e ff ec t onthe int er state m ar ke t y ie lds asub stanti al im pa ct on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . Whe the r or

not a subs tanti al e ff

ec t onthe int er state m ar

ke t f or c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

ne ce ssari ly tr an slate s in to a

sub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce , w e de te ct

af lawin the ir ap pli catio n of

le ap one . T he e ff

ec t onthe int er state m ar

ke t— an d ul tim at el y41

interstate com

m erce —m

ust be m easured in relation to the isolated cond uct at iss ue , r athe r than a s ana tio nw ide a ggr eg at e, be ca use the intra state pos se ssi on o f c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y i s ac r i mi n a l , n o n e c o n o mi c a c t i v i ty. O ne c ourt ha s a dvanc ed

an “ ad dic tio n th eo ry ” as to w hy the intra state po ss es si on of c hi ldpo rn og rap hy has a su bs ta nt ia l i m pa cton in te rs ta te co m

m erce . Sp ec if ic al ly , the T hir d C ir cu it, on r ev ie w ing the le gis la tiv e his tor y of § 22 52, post ulate d th at

ape rs on p oss es sin g in tr as ta te c hil d po rn ogr ap hy c oul d de ve lop an inc re as ing appe tit e fo r m or e suc h m at er ia ls tha t e ve ntu al ly a ff ec ts the int er state m arket substantially . See Rodia, 194 F. 3d at 478 -79. T his theory , which was de vis ed be fo re Mo rr iso n c am e down, pr ovi de s to o a tte nuate d ali nk t o in te rs ta te com m erce and would require us “ to pile inference upon inference in a m anner that w oul d bi d f

ai r to c onve rt

c ongr es sio na l auth or ity

und er the Co m m er ce Cl au se to a ge ne ra l po lic e pow er

of the sor t r et ai ne d by

the S ta te s. ” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 7, 11 5 S . Ct. at16 34 . Insum , w e re vie wMa xw el l’ s c ondu ct ind ep en de ntl y

and d et er m ine that i ts lin k to asub stanti al e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce , if any , is ex ce ed ing ly at te nu at ed . c. In Morrison and Lopez, the Suprem e Court also considered the absence of a42

“ j urisdictio nal elem ent that would ensure, through case-by -case inqu iry , that the” ch ar ge d c ondu ct

“ ha s th e re qui sit e ne xus w ithint er state c om m er ce . ” L ope z, 514 U. S. at 549, 115 S. C t. at 1625 . The C ourt noted th at “ [s] uch a j urisdictio nal el em en t m ay

e sta bli sh tha t the e na ctm en t i s inpur suanc e of Co ngr es s’ r eg ulatio n of in te rs ta te co m

m erce .” Mo rri so n, 5 29 U.S. at 6 12 , 12 0 S . Ct. at17 51 . O f co ur se not

j ust any a ddi tio na l e le m en t of

ac ri m e can “ en sur e, thr ough ca se -b y -c as e” ana ly sis that a giv ena ct ivi ty

is co nst itutio na lly

sub j ec t t o r eg ulatio n through the Com

m erce Clause, even if the ele m ent is cast in jurisdictional langua ge . W e de cl ine the inv itatio n to pe rm it Co ngr es s to a ch ie ve pow er be y ond its c onst itutio na l r ea chsim ply by utt er ing pr et ex tua l i nc an ta tio ns e voki ng the phanta sm of c om m er ce . O bvi ousl y , Co ngr es s c oul d no t f ed er al iz e the c ri m e of m urder by inserting statu tory

elem ents that are irr elevant to interstate com m erce , such as obli ging the prosecution to show that the defendant has blue ey es. It fo llo w s th at

Co ngr es s c annot

guarante e the pr ope r the use of it s auth or ity

by cr eatin g j ur isd ic tio na l ho oks that r el at e to i nte rs ta te c om m er ce in som e w ay

but fai l i n a ll cas es to co nf

in e th e sc op e o f it s re gu la ti on to Co ns ti tu ti on al bo un da rie s. T his f ac t i s ob vio us t o th e poi nt o f tauto log y : i f a statut e’ s j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t is n ot s uf fi ci en tly r es tr ic tiv e to c ab in the statut e’ s r ea chto pe rm iss ibl e applications , then the elem ent is no gu arantee of constitut ional appli cation. S eeW e d o n o tp as s o nth e s u ff i ci en cy o f t h e s t atut e’ s al t ern at i v e j uri s d i ct i o n al s h o wi n g, 20 namely that the cha

rg ed pornographic materia l itself “has be en mailed, or shipped or tra

nsported in i nte rs tate or

fo re ig n c omm e rc e by

any me ans , in c lud ingby

c omp ute r. ” 18 U. S.C. § 2252A(a )(5) (B ). 43 K al le sta d, 236 F . 3d at 22 9 ( “ Whe re the r el at ion shi p be tw ee n th e int er state and loc al a ct ivi ty

is atte nuate d, aj ur isd ic tio na l ho ok a lon e cannot j ust if y a ggr eg at ing ef fe ct s up on i nte rs ta te c om m er ce to fi nd C ongr es sio na l po w er und er the Co m m er ce Cl au se . ”) ; R odi a, 194 F . 3d at 47 3 ( “ Aj ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t i s on ly suf fi ci en t t o e nsur e a statut e’ s c onst itutio na lity w he n th e el em en t e ith er

li m its the regulation to in terstate ac tivityor ensures that the intrastate ac tivityto be regulated falls w ithin one of the three c ategories of congressional po we r. ”). W ere the law otherwise, Congress could federalize the c rim e of m urder by inserting a statuto ry elem ent that requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant ate a ch ees eb ur ge r th attra ve le d i n i nt ers ta te co m m erce . T his c as e re qui re s us to co nsi de r onl y the se co nd o f tw o j ur isd ic tio na l ho oks co nta ine d in§ 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ). T his hoo k e nable s th e G ove rn m en t t o ob ta in a 20 fe de ra l c onvi ct ionf

or the pos se ssi on o f ch ild

por nogr ap hy upo n asho w ing that the ch ar ge d po rn ogr ap hy

w as “pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d, or shi ppe d or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by com puter.” 18 U. S. C. § 225 2A(a )(5)( B). T he statute was a pplied to convict44

Maxwe ll for purely

intrastate activity

that could on ly

fall w ithin the third category o f a ct i v i t i es s ub

je ctt o Co m

m er ce Cl au s e l eg i s l at i o n . C o n s eq u en t l y, th e s t at u t e’s j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok o nly

guarante es that C ongr es s a ct ed w ith in the c onf

ine s of it s pow er in al l a ppl ic at ion s of

the statut e if

the hoo k r equir es the pr ose cu tio n to pr ove , in subs tanc e, that M ax w el l’ s c ri m ina l po sse ssi on “ subs tanti al ly a ff ec t[ s] int er state c om

m er ce . ” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 9, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 30 ( em pha sis ad de d) . W e hol d th at

the te rm s of

the j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok at i ssu e fa ll shor t of de m an di ng th atsh owi ng . As the N inth Circuit reasoned with regar d to an identi cal j urisdictio nal el em en t i n 18 U . S. C. § 22 52( a) (4 )( B) , “ [i ] t no t on ly f ai ls t o li m it the r ea chof

the statut e to any

c at eg or y or c at eg or ie s of

c as es that have apart ic ular ef fe ct on int er state c om

m er ce , but , to the c ontrary , it e nc om pa sse s vi rt

ua lly e ve ry c as e im aginable, so long as any m odern-day

photo graphic equipm ent or m aterial has be enuse d. ” Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d at 11 24; se e al so R odi a, 194 F . 3d at 47 3 ( “ A s a pr ac tic al m atte r, [ § 22 52( a) (4 )( B) ’ s] li m iti ng j ur isd ic tio na l f ac tor is al m ost use le ss h e r e , s i n c e a l l b u tth e mo s ts e l f - s u f f i c i e n tc h i l dp o rn o g r ap h e r s w i l l r e l y o nf i l m, cam er as , or

c he m ic al s th at

tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce and w ill the re fo re f al l w ith in the sw ee p of

the statut e. ”) . W e have str uggl ed to co nc ei ve of

apos se sso r of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

w ho w oul d no t be sub

j ec t t o f ed er al pr ose cu tio n if

Ma xw el lOn the re asoningof some of our sister circ uits, the possession of pornog raphy , even 21 when wholly

intrastate, inher ently

aff ects interstate commer ce. O n this view (which we do not sh are ), it s e e ms that th e orig in o f p ro du c tio n mate ri a ls i s c on sti tut ion a lly ir re le va nt, and Con g re ss thu s h a s a uth or ity to r e gulate the int

ra state po sse ssi on

of po rn ogra phy mor e c los e ly

tha n it a lr e a dy ha s b y the te rm s o f § 22 52 A. Ev e n th e po rn ogra ph e r o n th e c omm

un e wo uld

be wi thi n fede ral re ach if

Congr ess should desire to re ach so f ar. 45 is. W e co uld

onl y im ag ine apos se sso r inh ab iti ng an auto nom ous co m m une lo cat edin a si ng le st at e. Thi s h y po th et ic al co m

m un e h as de ve lo pe d i ts own te ch nol ogy , and h as giv enf orm to that t ec hnol ogy

e nti re ly f ro m m at er ia ls pr oduc edwit hi n i ts bo rd ers . Thatco m m un e m ak es it s o wn p ap er fro m it s o wn pu lp an d h as in ge ni ou sl y co ns tru ct edcam eras fro m in di ge no us in gr ed ie nt s al on e. Those sam e ingredients are used to m ake and develop bricolage film into pi ctures w ith out a ssi stanc e fr om

the out sid e w or ld. U nf

ortun at el y , e ve n he re in thi s in du st rio us an d s el f-s uf

fic ie ntso ci et y

we en co un te r th e can cer o f ex pl oi ta ti on . A m em ber of the com

m une takes pornog raphic pictures of a c hild-resident. T hat por nogr ap he r, w e co nc lud e, w oul d arg uably be the onl y

de fe ndant b ey ond the reac h of the federa l governm ent by the term s of the statute. 21 Inour c oll ec tiv e expe ri en ce , w e knowof no s uc h c om

m une s. W e str ongl y sus pe ct that i t w oul d be im

poss ibl e in t oday ’ s w or ld t o de ve lop apic tur e w ith out utilizin g a m aterial, som ew here down the line, that originated bey ond th e borders o f th e s t a t e i nw h i c h th e p i c tu r e w a s t a k e n . We , th u s , t a k e h e e do f th e S up r e me Co urt’ s w ar

nin g46

that the scope of the interstate com m erce power “ m

ust be consi dered in the li ght

of our dua l sy ste m

of gov er nm en t and m ay

not be ex te nde d so a s to e m

br ac e ef fe ct s up on i nte rs ta te c om m er ce so indirect and rem ote that to em brace them , in viewof our com plex soc ie ty , w oul d e ff

ec tua lly obl ite rate the dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n wha t i s national and what is local and create a com pletely centralize d go ve rn m en t.” L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 7, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 28- 29 ( quot ing N L RB v. Jon es & L au ghl in St eel Co rp ., 30 1 U.S. 1 , 37 , 57 S. Ct. 6 15 , 62 4, 8 1 L. Ed. 8 93 (19 37 )). W e ne ed not —and d o no t—

hol d to day

that the re is ab sol ute ly

no s et of f ac ts on which the intrastate possessi on childpornographycould have a subst antial im pact on interstate com

m erce . Ne vertheless, w e fa il to com prehend, for

instance, howthe pos se ssi on o f anil le ga l m ag az ine m igh t su bst an tia lly

a ff ec t i nte rs ta te com m erce because it contains a foreign staple. Beca use we have no dou bt that the re are som e ins tanc es in w hic h ade fe ndant c anpos se ss c hil d po rn ogr ap hy cr eate d w ithm at er ia ls tha t trave le d f ro m out -o f- state w ith out

sub stanti al ly af fe ct ing int er state c om

m er ce , w e co nc lud e that § 2252 A ’ s j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok i s patently insufficient to ensure the statute’s c onsti tutio nal application in a ca se such as Ma xw el l’ s. d. Fi na lly , Mo rr iso n di re ct s us to co nsi de r w he the r § 22 52A ’ s le gis la tiv e his tor y c ont ai ns e xpr es s c ongr es sio na l f ind ing s r eg ar din g th e ef

fe ct s onint er state47

com m erce of possessin g child po rnography . The C ourt specified, howe ver, that

“ the e xis te nc e of

c ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s is not

suf fi ci en t, by

it se lf , to sus ta in the co nst itutio na lity

of Co m m er ce Cl au se le gis la tio n. ” Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 4, 120 S. Ct . a t 17 52. W e ar e not obl ige d to c onc lud e that a r eg ulate d a ct ivi ty subs tanti al ly

a ff ec ts i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce sim

ply be ca use Co ngr es s c ra ft ed

f ind ing s statin g th at

it doe s. S ee id. [W ] hether particular oper ations affect interstate com m erce suf fi ci en tly to co m e unde r the c onst itutio na l po w er of Co ngr es s to re gul at e the m

is ult im at el y

aj udi ci al r athe r than ale gis la tiv e que sti on, and c anbe se ttl ed f ina lly onl y by thi s C ourt. L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 55 7 n. 2, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 29 n . 2 ( quot ing H eart of A tlanta Mot el , I nc . v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 379 U . S. 241 , 273 , 85 S . Ct . 348 , 366 , 13 L . E d. 2d 258 (196 4) (Blac k, J. , c oncurring)). In Morrison, in fac t, the S uprem e Court w as unpe rs ua de d by

Co ngr es s’ s f

ind ing s and n ote d th at

tho se f ind ing s r el ie d “ he av ily on a m ethod of

r ea soni ng w e have a lr ea dy r ej ec te d a s unw orkable if w e ar e to m ai nta in the Co nst itutio n’ s e num er at ionof pow er s. ” Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 5, 12 0 S . Ct. at17 52 . Co ngr es s e na ct ed

the or igi na l ve rs ionof

§ 22 52Aund er

the Ch ild Po rn ogr ap hy

P re ve nti on A ct

of 199 6. E ve n th is e ar ly

ve rs ionc ont ai ne d th e j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok at i ssu e in this c as e. W iththe ini tia l e na ctm en t, Co ngr es sCon g re ss f ind s th at— 22 (1 ) t he us e of c hil dr e n in

the pr od uc tio n o f s e xua lly

e xplic it m ate ri a l, i nc lud ingph oto g ra ph s, films, videos, computer imag es, and othe r visual depictions, is a for m of sexual abuse which c an result in phy sical or psycholog ical har m, or both, to the children involved; (2) whe re c hildren ar e used in its production, child pornography perma nently rec ords the victim’s abuse, a nd its continued exi stence cause s the child victims of sexual abuse continuingharm by ha untin gtho se c hil dr e n in

futur e y e ars ; (3) c hild pornog raphy

is often used a s part of a

method of seduc ing othe r childre n into sex ual a c tiv ity ; a c hil d who is r e luc tant t o e ng a g e in s e xua l a c tiv ity wi th a n a du lt, or

to p os e fo r s e xua lly expli cit photogr aphs, ca

n sometimes be convince d by viewingdepictions of other children “ h av i n gf un ” p art i c i p at i n gi ns u c ha c t i v i ty; (4) c hild pornog raphy

is often used by

pedophiles and c hild sex ual abuse rs to stimul ate a nd whet the ir own s e xua l a

pp e tit e s, and

a s a mod e l f or se xua l a c tin gout w ithc hil dr e n; s uc h u se of c hil d pornog raphy

can de sensitiz e the view er to the pathology of sexual abuse or e x ploitation of children, so that it ca

n become acc eptable to a nd even pr efe rre d by

the viewe r; (5) ne w photog raphic and computer imag ing te chnolog ies make it possible to produce by elec tronic, mec hanica l, or other mea ns, visual depictions of what a ppear to be childre n eng ag ing in sex ually

expli cit conduct that a

re virtua lly

indisti nguishable to the unsuspec ting view er f rom unre tou c he d p ho togra

ph ic ima g e s o f a c tua l c hil dr e n e ng a g ingin s e xua lly e xplic it c on du c t; (6) c omputers and c omputer imag ing te chnolog y can be used to-- (A ) a lte r s e xua lly

e xplic it p ho togra

ph s, fi lms , a

nd vid e os in s uc h a

wa y a s to make it v ir

tua lly impossibl e for

unsuspectingviewer s to identify individuals, or to determine if the of fending materia l was produc ed usingchildren; (B ) produc e visual depic tions of child sex ual ac tivity desig ned to satisfy

the pre fer ence s of individual child molesters, pedophiles, and por nog raphy collector s; and (C ) a lte r i nn oc e nt p ic tur e s o f c hil dr e n to c re ate vis ua l de pic tio ns of tho se c hil dr e n e ng a g ingin se xua l c on du c t; (7 ) t he c re atio n o r d istri butio n o f c hil d p or no g ra phy wh ic h in c lud e s a

n im a g e of

a re c ogniza

ble minor invades the c hild’s privacy and re putational interests, since imag es that ar e cr eate d sh ow inga

c hil d’ s f a c e or oth e r i de nti fi a

ble fe atur e on

a bo dy e ng a g ingin s e xua lly

e xplic it conduct c an haunt the minor f or year s to come; (8) the e ffe ct of visual depic tions of child sex ual ac tivity on a child molester or

pedophile using that mate ri a l to sti mul ate or wh e t hi s o wn

se xua l a pp e tit e s, or

on a c hil d whe re the mate ri a l is beingused as a

means of se ducingor bre akingdown the child’s inhibitions to sex ual abuse or exploi tation, is the same whethe r the c hild pornog raphy consists of photogr aphic de pictions of actua l children or visua l depictions produce d wholly or in part by

elec tronic, mec hanica l, or other means, includingby

computer, which ar e virtually indisti nguishable to the unsuspec ting view er from photog raphic imag es of a ctual childre n; (9 ) t he da ng e r t o c hil dr e n who are se du c e d a nd mol e ste d w iththe a id o f c hil d s e x pic tur e s is jus t as g reat when the c hild pornog raphe r or c hild molester uses visual depictions of c hild sex ual 48 m ad e num er ous fi ndi ngs, w hic h w e re pr oduc e in the m ar gin . A s e xpl ai ne d 22activity

produce d wholly

or in part by

elec tronic, mec hanica l, or other mea ns, including by computer, a s when the material c onsists of unretouche d photogr aphic imag es of a ctual childre n e ng a g ingin s e xua lly

e xplic it c on du c t; (10)( A) the e x istence of

and tra ffic in c hild pornog raphic imag es cr eate s the potential for ma ny ty pes of ha rm in the community

and pre sents a cle ar a

nd prese nt dang er to a ll children; and (B ) it inflames the de sires of c hild molesters, pedophiles, and c hild pornog raphe rs who pre y on children, the reby

incre asingthe cr eation and distribution of child pornography and the se x ual a bu se and e xploi tatio n o f a c tua l c hil dr e n who are vic tim ize d a s a re su lt o f t

he e xiste nc e and

us e of the se mate ri a ls; (1 1) (A ) t he se xua lizatio n a

nd e ro tic izatio n o f m ino rs thr ou g h a ny fo rm of c hil d p or no g ra ph ic imag es has a

deleter ious effe ct on all childre n by encour ag ing a

societal pe rce ption of children a s sexual objects and leadingto further sexual abuse and e x ploitation of them; and (B ) this sex ualization of minors creates an unwhole some environment whic h aff ects the psy cholog ical, mental a

nd emotional development of children a

nd undermines the e ffor

ts of pare nts and families to enc ourag e the sound menta l, moral and e motional development of children; (12) pr ohibiting the possession and view ing of child pornog raphy

will encoura g e the possessor s of such mate rial to rid themselves of or destroy

the mater ial, there by

helpingto protect the victims of child pornog raphy and to eliminate the mar

ket for the sexual ex ploitative use of children; a

nd (13) the e limination of child pornogr aphy and the pr otection of c hildren fr om sex ual exploit ation provide a compellingg overnme ntal interest for prohibiting the pr oduction, distribution, po sse ssi on , s a le , o r v ie wi ngof vis ua l de pic tio ns of

c hil dr e n e ng a g ingin s e xua lly e xplic it conduct, includingboth photogr aphic imag es of a ctual childre n eng ag ing in suc h conduct a nd depictions produce d by

computer or

other mea

ns which ar e virtually

indisti nguishable to the un su sp e c tin gvie we r f

ro m ph oto g ra

ph ic ima g e s o f a c tua l c hil dr e n e ng a g ingin s uc h c on du c t. Child P ornog raphy

Prevention Ac t of 1996, Pub. L . No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26-27 (1996). 49 in P ar t I I. D . 2. b su

pr a, li ttl e can be gle an ed

f ro m the se f ind ing s a bout the im pa ct of ch ild por nogr ap hy on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce , and p ar

tic ularl y the im pa ct of poss es sin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy intra state . I nst ea d, the va st m aj or ity of the f ind ing s supp ort the br oa de r pr opos iti on tha t c hil d po rn ogr ap hy ( ev enthat whic h is g en er at edb y co m

p u t erwi th o u tac tu al p eo p l e) i s b adan dh arm fu l t o ch i l dre n . We ar e pr ep ar ed

to take j udi ci al not ic e of the se poi nts , but

the y a id u s li ttl e inInstead, the ne w finding s were direc ted almost exclusively at conc erns r elated to the 23 Sup re me Court ’s re c e nt d e c isi on in A sh c ro ft

v. F re e Spe e c h Co a lit ion , 5 35 U. S. 2 34 , 1 22 S. Ct . 13 89 , 1 52 L . E d. 2d

40 3 ( 20 02 ). Th at c a se he ld C on g re ss v iol ate d th e F ir st Ame ndme nt i n it s eff orts to proscribe all virtual child pornography (as c ontrasted to ac tual child pornog raphy inv olv ingre a l c hil dr e n) , in c lud ingthat whic h c ou ld n ot b e de fi ne d a s o bs c e ne a c c or din gto Sup re me Court

pr e c e de nt. I d. at 25 6, 12 2 S. Ct. at 14 05 (“ In s um, § 2 25 6( 8) (B ) c ov e rs mate ri a ls be yon d th e c ate g or ie s r e c ognize d in F e rb e r a nd Mil le r, and

the re a so ns the Go ve rnme nt o ff e rs in support of limiti ngthe fre edom of spee ch have no justification in our prec edents or in the la w of 50 unde rs tandi ng h owaf

ed er al pr ohi bit ionon the intra state pos se ssi on o f ch ild por nogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ithint er state m at er ia ls i s apr ope r ex er ci se of the Co m m erce Cla us e p owe r. Si nc e its e na ctm en t, the statut e ha s be ena m en de d se ve ra l t im es . F ind ing s re la te d to the a m en dm en ts s houl d be vie w ed w ithc au tio n be ca

use the y do n ot necessarily

ref lect Congress’ s intentio ns at the tim e the original statute was en act ed . See, e.g ., Uni te d S ta te s v . Pric e, 36 1 U.S. 3 04 , 31 3, 8 0 S . Ct. 3 26 , 33 2, 4 L . E d. 2d 3 34 ( 1960 ) (“ [T ] he vie w s of asub se que nt C ongr es s f orm aha zard ous basis for inferr ing th e intent of an ear lier one.” ). A t any rate, those findin gs shed little li ght on the pr es en t i nqui ry . T he statut e w as a m en de d, f or e xam ple , pur suant to the Prosecutorial Rem edies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Tod ay Act (P ro te ctAct) of 2 00 3, Pu b. L. No. 1 08 -2 1, 1 17 Sta t. 6 50 (20 03 ). Co ngr es s su

ppl ie d a ddi tio na l f

ind ing s w iththo se a m en dm en ts, but the y did not ad dr es s C ongr es s’ s auth or ity or , m or e im

portantl y , the e ff

ec t onint er state com m erce of possessin g child po rnography intrastate. 23the Fir st Amendment. The pr ovision abridg es the fr eedom to eng ag e in a substantial amount of

lawful spee ch. F or this rea son, it is overbroad a nd unconstitutional.”). 51 O the r ci rc uit s up hol din g § 2 252 (whic h c ont ai ns a j ur isd ic tio na l ho ok sim ilar to the one in § 22 52A, see supra note 11) against as-applied challenges have se iz ed

on l eg isl at ive f

ind ing s r el at ed

to that st at

ute . S ee , e . g. , K al le sta d, 236 F. 3d at 229 . These f

indin gs are particularly

unreliable for our purposes since they w er e re ac he d no t on ly

a t a dif fe re nt t im e than whe n § 2 252Aw as e na ct ed , but a lso refle ct Congress’ s view of a differ ent, a lbeit related, statutory provisio n. Cf

. L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 56 3, 115 S . Ct . a t 16 32 ( “ [I ] m porta tio n of

pr ev iou s f

ind ing s to j ustify § 922(q) is especially

inappropriate here beca

use the prior federa l en ac tm en ts o r Co ngr es sio na l f ind ing s [ do n ot] spe ak

to the sub

j ec t m atte r of se ct ion922 (q ) or

it s r el at ion shi p to int er state c om m er ce . I nde ed , se ct ion922 (q ) plo w s th or ough ly

ne wgr ound

and r ep re se nts asharp br eak w iththe lon g- standi ng pa tte rnof f ed er al f ir earm s le gis la tio n. ” (a lte ratio n inor igi na l) ( quot at ionm ar ks and citation om itted)). T he following findin g in particular has been cited by other ci rc uit s: [C ] hil d po rn ogr ap hy

and c hil d pr ost itutio n have be co m e hig hly or ganiz ed m ult im ill iondol lar ind

ustri es that op er at e on a

na tio nw ide scale[, and] such prostit ution and the sale and distribu tion o f such por nogr ap hic m at er ia ls are c ar ri ed on t o asub stanti al e xte nt thr ough the m ai ls and o the r ins tr

um en ta lit ie s of

int er state and f

or ei gn co m m erce . . . .Com pa ra ble fi nd ing s are re fe re nc e d in the Hi sto ri c a l and

Statut or y No te s to 18 U. S.C. 24 § 2251 (“Congressional F indings” ) (quotingPub. L . No. 99-500, § 702(1) , 100 Stat. 1783-74 (1 98 6) ; Pu

b. L . N o. 99 -5 91 , § 70 2( 1) , 1 00 Stat. 3 34 1- 74 (1 98 6) ; Pu b. L . N o. 98 -2 92 § 2 , 9 8 St at. 204 (1984)) . 52 S. Re p. N o. 95- 438, a t 5 (1 977) , r ep ri nte d in197 8 U . S. C. C. A . N . 40, 42- 43. 24 Notably , this finding rem arks only on interstate child po rnography and teaches nothin g a bout the e ff ec ts o f intra state c hil d po rn ogr ap hy or non co m m er ci al c hil d por nogr ap hy f or that m atte r. S ee Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d at 11 27. F or that r ea son, the T hir d C ir cu it, e ve n inuph old ing the statut e, ind ic at ed that i t w as “ tr oubl ed

by the la ck of e xpr es s C ongr es sio na l f

ind ing s a bout the e ff ec t of intra state pos se ssi on o f ch ild por nogr ap hy on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . ” Ro dia , 194 F . 3d at 48 2. T he N inth Ci rc uit c onc lud ed

that “ [a ] t m ost , the le gis la tiv e his tor y he re te lls us tha t C ongr es s int en de d to e lim inate the int er state c om m er ci al c hil d po rn ogr ap hy m ar ke t, and nothin g m or e. ” Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d at 11 27. O the r as pe ct s of

§ 22 52’ s le gis la tiv e his tor y r ev ea l so m e unc er

ta inty about Co ng res s’s p owe r to reg ul at e in tra st at e act iv it y at t he ti m e iten act edth e st atut e. T he S en at e Judi ci ar

y Co m m itt ee , f or e xam ple , r em ar

ke d th at it w as “ w el l aw ar e of the delicate balance that m ust be m aintained between fe deral and state and local law enforcem ent efforts to curb crim inal behavior. It is quite true that the general responsib ility

for dealing with cr im inal activity is norm ally

not a m atter of f

ederal53

co nc er n. ” S . Re p. N o. 95- 438, a t 10 . N ev er the le ss, the c om

m itt ee pr oc ee de d to expr es s th e vie wthat st at e au tho ri tie s c oul d no t a de quate ly c ontro l c hil d por nogr ap hy on the ir own. Whil e thi s c om

m en t r ev ea ls a

c ongr es sio na l m oti ve f

or re gul at ion , it

answ er s no ne of

the c onc er

ns the c om

m itt ee voi ce d a

bout the de li cat e b al an ce b et ween fed eral an d s ta te po wer. Furthe rm or e, a s th e N inth C ir cu it obse rv ed , an a ppe ndi x to the sam e Se na te re port a lso c ont ai ne d th e U nit ed S ta te s D ep ar

tm en t of Jus tic e’ s vi ew s a

bout the le gi sl at io n a ndsu gg es te d t ha t t he st atut e’s en act m en t ex ceed edCo ng res s’s p owe r. Mc Co y , 323 F . 3d at 11 28 ( ci tin g S . Re p. N o. 95- 438, a t 25 -2 6) . I nde ed , A ssi stant Att orne y Gene ral Pat ric iaW al d b lu nt ly caut io ne d, Inthe f ir st p la ce , the bil l i s, in our opi nio n, j ur isd ic tio na lly

de fi ci en t.

. . . .

. . . [T ] he bill couldcover a purely local act of child abuse in which the re is, in fa ct , no f

ilm ing or pho tog ra phi ng and n o po ssi ble e ff ec t on int er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce . T he bil l, the re fo re , w oul d r ea chsit ua tio ns not prop erly

cognizable under the Com m erce Clause. S. Rep. No. 95-438, at 25-26. T he De partm ent thus recom m ended that the inv es tig at ionor

pr ose cu tio n of

pur el y loc al a ct s of

c hil d a buse shou ld be left to local authorities with federa l invo lvem ent confined to those ins tanc es in w hic h th e m ai ls o r fa ci lit ie s of int er state co m m er ce are a ct

ua lly use d or int en de d to be use d f

or dis tr ibu tio n of the f ilm or pho tog ra phs in que sti on. Id . at 2 6.54

It be ar s r ep et iti on tha t the se se ri ous doub ts r eg ar de d th e ini tia l ve rs ionof § 225 2. T hat version didnot even contain th e expansive jurisdictional hoo k at iss ue in thi s c as e (i . e. , the hoo k r el at ing to por nogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ithm at er ia ls that have been transported in int erstate c omm erce ). Furtherm ore, that statute was fi rs ten ac t edi n1 9 7 8 , r o u g h l y s ev en t ee ny ea rs b ef o re th e S up re m e C o u rt ’s la nd m arkde ci si on in Lop ez. Re co gni zi ng tha t l eg isl at ive his tor y is ane cl ec tic ste wf

ro m w hic h j ust about any vegetable can be e xtracted, we find noth ing to persuade us that poss es sin g c hil d po rn ogr ap hy pr oduc ed

w ithm at er ia ls transpo rt ed in int er state co m m erce is an act iv it y

th atha s a s ub st an ti al effe cton in te rs ta te co m m erce . 3. In sum , our analy sis of Morrison’s f our consid erations reveals no rational basis for concludin g that the condu ct for which Maxwell w as convicted subs tantially

aff ects or af fecte d interstate com

m erce . Maxwe ll’ s activity wa s nonecono m ic and noncomm ercia l in nature; its conn ection to int erstate c omm erce w as te nuou s at be st. S ec tio n 22 52A ’ s j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t r equir ing the governm ent to establish that the illegal im ages we re produced by m aterials that w er e tr an spor

te d in int er state c om

m er ce by no m eans e nsur es that the statut e w ill be e nf or ce d on ly

w ithr eg ar d to a ct ivi ty

that ha s asub stanti al im

pa ct on i nte rs ta te55

co m m er ce . L as tly , the statut e’ s le gis la tiv e his tor y pr ovi de s no m eanin gf

ul evidence that the intrastate possessi on of child po rnography at issue in this case, althoug h produced with two disks that traveled in interstate com m erce , subs tanti al ly

a ff ec ts i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce . C onse que ntl y , § 22 52A ’ s a ppl ic at ionto Ma xw el l’ s c ondu ct

c annot be sus ta ine d a s ava lid

e xe rc ise of

Co m m er ce Cl au se au th or it y . W e b el ie ve Mo rri so n’s fr am ewo rkpro du ces th e co rrec t re su ltin th is cas e. It is dif fi cu lt to i m ag ine an a ct ivi ty m or e loc al in ch ar ac te r than M ax w el l’ s pr ivate poss ession o f im ages within the confines of a single state (and perhaps, m oreover, w ith in a sin gle hom e) . T he r ec or d sh ow s th at the G ove rn m en t di d no t a lle ge or pr ove that M ax w el l pr oduc ed the por nogr ap hy . I t di d no t a lle ge or pr ove that he purchased the pornog raphy . It did not allege or prove that he traded or distribu ted the por nogr ap hy or that he e ve r harb or ed

any int en tio n of

doi ng s o. I t di d no t al le ge or pr ove that he c onsum ed

the por nogr ap hy so a s to a ff

ec t i ts s uppl y

in the m ar ke t. I t di d no t a lle ge or

pr ove that hi s po sse ssi on e nc our ag ed him or oth er s to seek m ore pornography

so as to affec t its dem and in the m arket. It did not even al le ge or pr ove that he a ct

ua lly vie w ed the por nogr ap hy . A s su ch , it

str ai ns r ea son to c onc ei ve of

howMa xw el l’ s a ct ivi ty

of pos se ssi on w as in any

se nse

“ co m m er ce .” Mo re o v er , t h e G o v ern m en td i dn o tal l eg e o r p ro v e t h at Ma x we l l ’sWe n ote in p a ssi ngthat so me of our s ist e r c ir c uit s h ave re a c he d a c ontr ary re su lt i n 25 c omp ara ble c a se s. Many

of the se c a se s w e re de c ide d b e fo re the Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on in Morrison. See, e .g ., Rodia, 194 F.3d at 479 (holding “ that Congr ess rationally could have believed that child pornog raphy that did not its elf travel in interstate c ommerce has a substantial eff ect on inter state commer ce, a nd is thus a valid subject of re gulation under the Commerc e Clause”) . Some entailed fa ctual distinctions that might have ha d a ser ious impact on our analy sis. See, e.g ., Ang le, 234 F.3d at 330-31 (Gove rnment supported c harg es of attempted re c e ipt and po sse ssi on

of c hil d p or no g ra phy , 1 8 U .S. C. § § 2 25 2( a )( 2) , 2 25 2( a )( 4) (B ), wi th e vid e nc e that de fe nd ant o rd e re d p or no g ra phy fr om a fo rm e r c omm e rc ia l di str ibutor via e -m a il; Gover nment supported cha

rg e of solicitinga minor to eng ag e in sexually prohibited ac tivity , 18 56 pornog raphy

traveled fr om

out-of-state. It did not allege or prove that the pictures w er e or igi na lly

pho tog ra phe d ou t- of

-s ta te . I n f

ac t, the onl y

te sti m ony

c onc er nin g the or igi n of

any c harg ed pho tog ra ph s ugge sts that i t w as take n inF lor ida . T he G ove rn m en t di d no t a lle ge or pr ove that M ax w el l ob ta ine d th e por nogr ap hy thr oughthe use of

the I nte rn et , pho ne li ne s, or any oth er c hanne l of

int er state co m m er ce or c om m uni catio n. I t di d no t a lle ge or pr ove that M ax w el l t ook or in te nd edto tak e th e p orno gr ap hy ou t o f th e st at e, fo r co m m erci al or p ers on al us e. As such, it strains reason to conceive of how Maxw ell’ s activity of possessio n was in any sense “ interstate.” A t the end of the day , the G overnm ent rested its entire ca se on o ne f

ac t r el at ing to the j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en t: the dis ks o n whic h th e por nogr ap hy w as ult im at el y

c opi ed tr av el ed , w he n bl an k, to Fl or ida f ro m som ep la ce out sid e of

F lor ida . W e re

j ec t the G ove rn m en t’ s c ont en tio n th at thi s fa ct c onve rt s M ax w el l’ s c ondu ct int o an a ct ivi ty

sub j ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se re gul at ion . 25U. S.C. § 2 42 2( b) , w ithe vid e nc e that de fe nd ant h a d u se d th e te le ph on e and Inte rn e t in further ance of his eff

orts). Ye t others attributed a misplaced re liance to the pr esenc e of a jurisdictional hook like the one conta ined in § 2252A. See, e .g ., United States v. Hog g ard, 254 F .3 d 7 44 , 7 46 (8 th C ir . 2 00 1) (h old ingthat a “ jur isd ic tio na l ne xus” sim ila r t o th at in

§ 2 25 2A“ is sufficie nt to place [18 U.S.C. § 2251(b)] bey ond constitutional attack”) . Ultimately , we f ind that these de cisions are inapplicable or , otherwise, unc onvincing . We a re mos t pe rs ua de d b y

the Ni nth Cir c uit ’s op ini on

in M c Coy . In th at c a se , th e Ni nth Circuit determined that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) (B ), a statute ve ry simil ar to § 2252A( a)( 5)(B ), was unc onstitut ional as applied to a defe ndant who wa s convicted f or possessingone imag e of child pornog raphy

displaying he r and he r daughter, side by side, with their g enital ar eas e x posed. McCoy , 323 F.3d at 1115, 1133. Fede ral jurisdiction for the defe ndant’s prose cution “wa s premised upon the pla ce of manufa cture of the c amer a and f ilm used to take the picture s.” I d. at 1116. The c ourt conc luded that § 2252(a) (4)( B) ’s application to the simple intrastate posse ssion of a visual depiction (or de pictions) that has not bee n mailed, shipped, or tra nsported interstate a

nd is not int ended f

or interstate distribution or for ec onomic or commerc ial use, includingthe exchang e of the prohibited materia l for other prohibited materia l, cannot be justified unde r the Commerc e Clause. I d. at 1133; see a lso Corp, 236 F.3d at 326, 333 (holdingthat fede ral jurisdiction to prosec ute a defe ndant for pr oducingchild pornog raphy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) could not be based e ntirely

on the fa ct that the photog raphic paper on which the por

nog raphy was printed w as manu fa c tur e d o ut- of

-s tate ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt in t his c a se c on c lud e d th at Mc Coy is i na pp os ite beca use of its fac tual distinctions. W e disagree . McCoy differ ed fr om this case in at lea st two respe cts. First, the de fenda nt in McCoy

was c harg ed with possessingonly one illeg al imag e. McCoy , 323 F.3d at 1115. Max well was c harg ed with possessingmany . Second, the de fenda nt in M c Coy c le arl y pr od uc e d th e ima g e , whic h d e pic te d h e r o wn da ughte r. Th e Ni nth

Cir c uit found no “r eason to be lieve that she ha d any interest in ac quiringpornog raphic depictions of other c hildren. Ther e is thus no fung ibilit y element pr esent in ca ses such a s hers.” I d. at 1122. By contra st, there is no evide nce that Max well’s prur ient interests we re c onfined to par ticular c h il dr e n ; h e ma

y w e ll h av e r e g ar d e d

th e im a g e s h e p o s s e s s e d

a s f un g ib le w it

ho th e r im a g e s . We believe that McCoy

is instructive despite these distinctions. I ts assessment of the tenuous “ c onne c tio n b e tw e e n th e sim ple int ra state po sse ssi on

of c hil d p or no g ra phy and int e rs tate commerc e” se ems applica ble eve n wher e a de fenda nt possesses numerous, fung ible imag es. I d. at 1123-24 (r easoningthat Congr ess’s re gulation of local c rime on a the ory of its ag g reg ate e ffe ct on the natio na l e c on omy

wo uld inv a de the po lic e po we rs re se rv e d to the state s) . Its s ke pti c ism of the statute’ s jurisdictional hook and leg islative history is likewise applicable , at least by analogy . I d. at 1124-29. 57 It could be argued that the consid erations articulated above, by and large,58

have nothin g to do w iththe e le m en ts o f the statut e. A ft er a ll, § 22 52Apr ohi bit s poss es sio n, not

pr oduc tio n, not

tr av el , not

tr ad e or sa le . T his c ri tic ism

c annot be ove rl ooke d. B ut n ei the r can th e fa ct that the te rm s of

the Co m m er ce Cl au se it se lf an d th e co nst itutio na l l im itatio ns o n f ed er al pow er

are art ic ulate d ou tsi de the statut e. O bvi ousl y , the va lid ity of the statut e’ s a

ppl ic at ionin thi s c as e re sts not on the satis fa ct ionof

it s own r equir em en ts; r athe r, it r es ts o n c onf

orm ity w iththe re str ic tio ns b uil t i nto the Co nst itutio n and the f ed er al ist gov er nm en t the Co nst itutio n e sta

bli she s. T he f

ac t tha t the Co nst itutio n m igh t r equir e show ing s that a statut e doe s no t i s no anom al y , but is ins te ad

an in dis pe nsa

ble ing re die nt i n the recipe f

or any statute that is facially

valid butinvalid as appli ed in particular cases. If the elem ents of the crim e set forth in § 2252 A r equired showings that w er e al w ay s su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh C ongr es s’ s auth or ity f or it s e na ctm en t and application, then every

conviction under the statute would be valid (assum ing th at the statute never invaded ov erriding rights, such as that of free speech). O ur N at ion ’ s F ound er s w er e not na ive about

the r isk of an a ll- en co m

pa ssi ng central powe r, nor, it see m s, did they ignore the poss ibilitythat the legislature m igh t be te m

pte d to ove rs te p it s bo unds to le gis la te ide al s f av or ed by it s co nst itu en ci es . F ed er al ism is no a ca de m ic shi bbol eth. I t i s ne ith er an in an e le ga lis m , nor

an ana ch ro nous ve sti ge of aby gone c olo nia l e ra . T he f ed er al ist59

sy ste m pla ce s avit al c he ck

on the pow er

of the c en tr al gov er

nm ent t o tr es pa ss o n our f re ed om . S ee Mo rr iso n, 529 U . S. a t 61 6 n. 6, 120 S . Ct . a t 17 53 n . 6 ( “ [T ] he Fr am er s c ra ft ed

the f ed er al sy ste m

of G ove rn m en t so that the pe opl e’ s r igh ts w oul d be se cure d by

the div isi on o f pow er . ”) ; L ope z, 514 U . S. a t 57 6, 115 S . Ct . a t1 6 3 8 ( K e n n e dy, J . , c o n c u rr i n g ) ( “T h o u g h o nth e s u r f a c e th e i d e a[ o f

f e d e r a l i s m] m ay seem counterintuit ive, it w as the insigh t of the Fram ers that fr eedom wa s enhanc ed by the c re at ionof

tw o go ve rn m en ts, not

one . ”) ; A ta sc ad er o S ta te H osp. v. S canlo n, 472 U . S. 234 , 242 , 105 S . Ct . 314 2, 314 7, 87 L . E d. 2d 1 71 ( 1985 ) (“ T he ‘ co nst itutio na lly

m an da te d ba lanc e of

pow er ’ be tw ee n th e St at es and the Fe de ra l G ove rn m en t w as a dopt ed by the F ram er s to e nsur e the pr ote ct ionof ‘ our fundam en ta l l ibe rt ie s. ’ ” (quot ing G ar ci a v. S anA nto nio Me tr o T ransi t Auth . , 469 U.S. 52 8, 5 72 , 10 5 S . Ct. 1 00 5, 1 02 8, 8 3 L. Ed. 2 d 1 01 6 (1 98 5) (Po well , J., dis se nti ng) )) . F ed er al ism e nsur es ar ole f

or the gov er

nm en ts o f the state s and af fo rd s th e vot ing pub lic am or e re sonant v oic e in the de ba te ove r m any le gis la tiv e iss ue s of pr inc ipa lly

loc al c onc er

n. W e de cl ine tod ay , w ithno s m al l r eg re t a bout the out co m e in this c as e, to ign or e that de sig n, e ve n inf av or of str en gth en ing the hand o f fe de ra l l awe nf

or ce m en t i n th e sa lut ar

y a im of e ra dic at ing c hil d po rn og rap hy. III .60

For the fore goin g reasons, Maxw ell’ s convictio ns are REVERSED.