NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0190n.06

Case No. 18-1826

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DAWN GREEN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CITY OF SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

Before: GRIFFIN and DONALD, Circuit Judges; and BERTELSMAN, District Judge.

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BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Defendant City of Southfield, Michigan, 

filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Dawn Green’s § 1983 claim for race and/or gender 

discrimination. The district court granted Defendant’s motion and this Court affirmed. Defendants 

then requested attorney’s fees with the district court in the amount of $12,550.00, pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court denied the motion. Defendants now appeal.

This Court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees under the 

abuse of discretion standard. Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 469 (6th Cir. 1989). “A district 

court abuses its discretion when it relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, applies the law 

improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” The Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 

831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

 

* The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of 

Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Case No. 18-1826, Green v. City of Southfield, Mich., et. al

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An award of attorney’s fees may be granted at the district court’s discretion to the 

prevailing party, other than the United States, in a § 1983 case. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “Under 

§ 1988, a civil-rights defendant may recover attorneys’ fees only if the defendant is a ‘prevailing 

party’ and proves that the plaintiff’s action was ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.’” 

Hescott v. City of Saginaw, 757 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 

5, 14 (1980)) (emphasis in original). Attorney’s fees should be assessed to the defendant only 

when the court finds that the plaintiff’s “claim was groundless at the outset or that the plaintiff 

continued to litigate after it clearly became so.” Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 183 

(6th Cir. 1985) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)).

“An award of attorney’s fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, 

and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct.” Jones v. Cont’l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 

1232 (6th Cir. 1986).

Defendants’ argument rests largely on the fact that the district court dismissed the case on 

its pleadings, which, Defendants contend, shows that Green should have known that her claims 

were frivolous. This amounts to impermissible “‘post hoc reasoning’ and . . . ‘hindsight logic’ of 

concluding a suit is without foundation because the plaintiff ultimately does not prevail.” Smith, 

754 F.2d at 183 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 422). This Court recognizes 

that “a plaintiff may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit even when the law or 

facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset.” Id. (citing Christiansburg Garment Co.,

434 U.S. at 422). Though Green’s claims ultimately failed, Defendants’ arguments do not show 

that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the claims were not frivolous and 

declining to award attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.