STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

State of West Virginia,
 FILED 

Plaintiff Below, Respondent August 29, 2014
­

RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

vs) No. 13-0984 (Nicholas County 13-F-7) OF WEST VIRGINIA 

Courtney J. Hamon, 

Defendant Below, Petitioner 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner Courtney J. Hamon, by counsel Harley E. Stollings, Esq., appeals the order 

entered August 15, 2013, in the Circuit Court of Nicholas County, that suspended her sentence of 

one to ten years in prison for the felony offense of grand larceny and designated her as a youthful 

offender pursuant to the West Virginia Youthful Offender Act, West Virginia Code §§ 25-4-1 to 

25-4-12. The circuit court placed petitioner in the Anthony Correctional Center for a period of not 

less than six months nor more than two years. The State, by counsel Derek A. Knopp, has filed its 

response. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. 

Petitioner was arrested on June 15, 2012, and charged with three felony counts—breaking 

and entering, grand larceny, and conspiracy—related to an incident occurring on June 5, 2012. 

Petitioner was twenty-two years old at the time of the offense. The record indicates that petitioner 

was incarcerated upon arrest and did not post bail until December 21, 2012. 

On December 26, 2012, less than a week after being released from incarceration, 

petitioner tested positive for a controlled substance. On January 8, 2013, the Nicholas County 

Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment against petitioner charging her with three felony 

counts—breaking and entering, grand larceny, and conspiracy—for the June 5, 2012 incident. The 

next day, petitioner again tested positive for a controlled substance. Subsequently, the State of 

West Virginia filed a motion to revoke petitioner’s bail due to her positive drugs screens, which 

violated the terms and conditions of her bail. The circuit court revoked petitioner’s bail on 

January 23, 2013. On March 22, 2013, the circuit court reinstated petitioner’s bail, and petitioner 

was released on the condition that she report to and comply with the terms and conditions of the 

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Nicholas County Day Report Center. However, on April 17, 2013, the circuit court again revoked 

petitioner’s bail for her violation of the terms and conditions of the Nicholas County Day Report 

Center. 

On June 5, 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of grand larceny in violation of 

West Virginia Code § 61-3-13. By order entered August 15, 2013, the circuit court sentenced 

petitioner to one to ten years in prison. However, the circuit court, over petitioner’s objection, 

suspended that prison term and designated petitioner as a youthful offender pursuant to the West 

Virginia Youthful Offender Act.1 The circuit court then ordered petitioner to the Anthony 

Correctional Center for a period of six months to two years. The circuit court also granted 

petitioner 312 days credit for time served. This appeal followed. 

Petitioner first argues that the circuit court erred in sentencing her as a youthful offender. 

Petitioner avers that the circuit court’s sentence violated her constitutional right to equal 

protection of law under the West Virginia and United States Constitution. W.Va. Const. art. III, § 

10; U.S. Const. amend. IV. In support of this argument, petitioner explains that the statutory 

prison term imposed for the crime of grand larceny is one to ten years in prison. Petitioner argues 

that under her original sentence (prior to the circuit court designating her as a youthful offender) 

and given her credit for time served of 312 days, she could have been released in just fifty-three 

more days of incarceration. However, once the circuit court designated her as a youthful offender, 

she now must serve no less than six months or as much as a year and 238 days at the Anthony 

Correctional Center. Therefore, petitioner concludes that the circuit court effectively sentenced 

her to a longer period of incarceration than someone similarly situated but of a different age, and 

thereby violated her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. 

Our review of sentencing orders is governed by the following standard: “‘[t]he Supreme 

Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders . . . under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, 

unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.’ Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 

201 W.Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. James, 227 W.Va. 407, 710 S.E.2d 98 

(2011). However, ‘[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not 

based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.’ Syllabus Point 4, State 

1 W. Va. Code §§ 25-4-1 to 25-4-12. W.Va. Code § 25-4-6 provides, in pertinent part: 

The circuit court may suspend the imposition of sentence of any young 

adult, as defined in this section, convicted of or pleading guilty to a felony 

offense, other than an offense punishable by life imprisonment, including, but not 

limited to, felony violations of the provisions of chapter seventeen-c of this code, 

who had attained his or her eighteenth birthday but had not reached his or her 

twenty-fourth birthday at the time the offense was committed for which the 

offender is being sentenced and commit the young adult to the custody of the 

West Virginia Commissioner of Corrections to be assigned to a center: Provided, 

That no person over the age of twenty-five may be committed pursuant to this 

section. 

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v. Goodnight, 169 W.Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982).” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Slater, 222 W.Va. 499, 

665 S.E.2d 674 (2008). 

Here, it is uncontested that petitioner was eligible to be sentenced as a youthful offender 

given that she was between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four at the time of the commission of 

the offense; the offense was not punishable by life imprisonment; and at no time up to and 

including sentencing had petitioner attained the age of twenty-five. We have stated as follows: 

Just as a trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation is subject to the 

discretion of the sentencing tribunal, so too is the decision whether to sentence an 

individual pursuant to the Youthful Offenders Act. The determinative language of 

West Virginia Code § 25–4–6 is stated indisputably in discretionary terms: “[T]he 

judge of any court . . . may suspend the imposition of sentence . . . and commit the 

young adult to the custody of the West Virginia commissioner of corrections to be 

assigned to a center.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Since the dispositive statutory term 

is “may,” there can be no question that the decision whether to invoke the 

provisions of the Youthful Offenders Act is within the sole discretion of the 

sentencing judge. See State v. Allen, 208 W.Va. 144, [157], 539 S.E.2d 87, [100] 

(1999) (recognizing that “[c]lassification of an individual as a youthful offender 

rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court”); accord State v. Richards, 

206 W.Va. 573, 575, 526 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1999) (stating that Youthful Offenders 

Act “grants discretionary authority to the circuit courts to suspend imposition of 

sentence, and place a qualifying defendant in a program of rehabilitation at a 

youthful-offender center”) (citation omitted). 

State v. Shaw, 208 W.Va. 426, 430, 541 S.E.2d 21, 25 (2000) (Emphasis added). 

Furthermore, to the extent petitioner argues that the circuit court based its decision upon 

any impermissible factor or that the sentence here is unconstitutional under the Youthful 

Offenders Act, we disagree. Petitioner’s equal protection argument hinges on the presumption 

that she is entitled to release upon her parole eligibility date. This presumption is incorrect. We 

have explained on many occasions that: 

“[p]arole is not a right, and eligibility for parole does not guarantee the 

defendant's release from prison. State v. Scott, 214 W.Va. 1, 7, 585 S.E.2d 1, 7 

(2003).” See also State v. Lindsey, 160 W.Va. 284, 291 233 S.E.2d 734 738–39 

(1977) (“One convicted of a crime and sentenced to the penitentiary is never 

entitled to parole.”); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 536, 276 S.E.2d 

205, 213 (1981)(“[T]here is no automatic right to parole once the prisoner crosses 

the threshold of eligibility.”) 

State v. Eilola, 226 W.Va. 698, 703, 704 S.E.2d 698, 703 (2010) (Emphasis in original). 

Petitioner was not entitled to be released upon her parole eligibility date, and therefore, whether 

she would have spent less time incarcerated if she had not been sentenced as a youthful offender 

is entirely speculative. Therefore, we find no merit to petitioner’s first assignment of error. 

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Petitioner’s second and third assignments of error are cursory arguments that the circuit 

court erred by sentencing her as a youthful offender only after she had been incarcerated for more 

than six months unable to afford bail.2 Petitioner cites no authority or portion of the record to 

support her argument. As we stated in State of West Virginia, Department of Health and Human 

Resources, Child Advocate Office, on Behalf of Robert Michael B., Minor Child of Trudy Mae B. 

v. Robert Morris N., 195 W.Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995), “ ‘[a] skeletal “argument,” 

really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.... Judges are not like pigs, 

hunting for truffles buried in briefs.’ “(quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th 

Cir.1991)). See State v. Lilly, 194 W.Va. 595, 605, 461 S.E.2d 101 a 16, 194 W.Va. 595, 461 

S.E.2d 101, 111 n. 16 (1995) (noting that “appellate courts frequently refuse to address issues that 

appellants ... fail to develop in their brief.”); Ohio Cellular RSA Ltd.P'ship v. Bd. of Pub. Works of 

W.Va., 198 W.Va. 416, 424, 481 S.E.2d 722 all, 198 W.Va. 416, 481 S.E.2d 722, 730 n. 11 

(1996) (refusing to address issue on appeal that had not been adequately briefed). 

Assuming, arguendo, this issue had been fully briefed, no error is apparent from the 

record. As we have explained, “‘[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits 

and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.’ Syllabus 

Point 4, State v. Goodnight, 169 W.Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982).” Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Slater, 

222 W.Va. 499, 665 S.E.2d 674 (2008). Petitioner’s sentence was within statutory limits and not 

based upon any impermissible factor. Therefore, we find no error with regard to petitioner’s 

second and third assignments of error. 

Lastly, petitioner lists a fourth assignment of error,3 but on that issue, her brief is devoid of 

any discussion, provides no citations to authority, and is without any references to the record on 

appeal. This Court has previously stated that “issues . . . mentioned only in passing but are not 

supported with pertinent authority are not considered on appeal.” State v. LaRock, 196 W. Va. 

294, 302, 470 S.E.2d 613, 621 (1996) (citations omitted). This Court declines to address this issue 

because it has not been sufficiently developed by petitioner. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

Affirmed. 

2 Petitioner’s second and third assignments of error are identical except the second alleges 

a constitutional equal protection violation while the third alleges an abuse of discretion by the 

circuit court in ordering this sentence. 

3 Petitioner’s heading for her fourth assignment of error states that “[t]he circuit court 

erred in failing to grant petitioner bond during the time necessary to prosecute this appeal from 

the unconstitutional sentences complained of herein.” 

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ISSUED: August 29, 2014 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Robin J. Davis 

Justice Brent D. Benjamin 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

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