I n t he D i s t r i ct Co ur t , H awk i ns - D un n a l s o c l ai med s he was ent i t l ed t o add i t i onal s er vi ce t i me un der G ene r al 1 M o t o rs ’ pe nsi o n plan. T he D i st ri ct C o urt hel d t hat she i s ent i t l ed t o t he ad d i t i o nal pe nsi o n credit and G eneral M o t o rs d o e s n o t co n te st tha t d e c isio n o n a p p e a l.

NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0212n.06 Filed: Mar ch 22, 2007 No. 05-2124 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
DEBRA HAWKIN S-DUNN, P laintif f-App ellant,
v. G EN ER A L M OTOR S CO RP OR AT IONand M ET R OP OL ITAN LIFE INSURAN CE COMP ANY, De fend ant s- App e lle e s, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

BEF ORE: BOG G S, C hie f Judg e ; M ERRI TT, and M OORE, C ir c uitJudg e s.
ME RR I T T , Ci rc u i t J u d ge. I n th is E RI SA

a c ti o n , D e b r a Ha

wkins-Dunn appe als the District Court’s holding that she is not entitled to a n additional 0.8 y ear s of par ticipation under the Extended Di sab ili ty B e ne fi ts p lan o f h e r f

or me r e mpl oy e r, Ge ne ra l Mo tor s. B e c a us e Ge ne ra l Mo tor s’ 1 inte r p r e tati o n o f th e d is a

b il it y p la n is n o t ar

b it r ar y an d c a p r ic io u s , w e a f

f ir m th e D is tr ic t Court’s d e c is io n . We a ls o d e n y H aw k in s - D un n ’ s r e qu e s t f o r a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s b e c a u s e th e issue was not pr op e rl y ra ise d in the Di str ic t Co ur

t.No. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

A rti cle II, secti o n 7 (c) o f t he E xten d ed D i sab i l i t y B en efi t s P l an d esc ribe s t he b en efi t p erio d as f o l l o w s: 2
I n t he cas e of an empl oy e [ s i c]
. . . wh o has t en or more Y ear s of P ar t i ci pat i on as o f t h e d a y o n w h ic h the d isa b ili ty co m m e n c e d , t h e [p e rio d ] c o m m e n c ing w ith the m o n th in whi ch t h e dat e of t h e ex pi r at i on of
. . . we ek l y Si ck n es s an d Acc i den t B en ef i t s occur s and t er mi n at i n g w i t h t h e en d of t h e mon t h i n w h i ch t h e empl oy e at t ai n s a g e 65. [I ]n t he case of

an em p l o y e w ho has l ess t han t en Y ears o f P art i ci p at i o n as o f

t he d ay o n whi ch t he d i sabil i t y co m m enced , t he [am o unt o f t i m e] b y whi ch t he em p l o y e’ s Y ears of Par t i ci pat i on at comme n ce men t of di s abi l i t y ex ce ed[ s ] t h e max i mu m n u mber of w ee k s f or w hich he i s enti t l ed t o rec eive S i ck ne ss and A cc i d en t B en efi t s. -2- I. Hawkins-D unn beg an wor king for Gene ral Motors on August 15, 1977. As a membe r of the Un ite d Auto Wor

ke rs , s he part ic ipate d in Ge ne ra l Mo tor s’ pe ns ion and lon g -t e rm

dis a bil ity ins ur anc e pla

ns . Hawkins-D unn worke d for Gene ral Motors until she beca me disabled on January 27 , 1 98 7. She re tur

ne d to wo rk fo r tw o br ie f pe ri od s in 19 87 , but ne ith e r w a s lo nge no ug h to “ re se t” J anuar y 27 as her disability leave date under t he terms of the GM disability plan. As of January

27, 19 87 , H awk ins -D unn h a d w or ke d f or Ge ne ra l Mo tor s f

or nin e y e ars and

se ve n mo nth s. Pursuant to Gener al M otors’ l eave policies, Hawkins-D unn rec eived Sickness & Acc ident Be nefits for the first 52 wee ks that she was una ble to work, ending March 7, 1988. At this point , she beg an re ce i v ing E x tended Disa bility Be nefits. Under

the Ext ended D isability

Be nefits Plan, the leng th of time an employ ee is e ligible to re ceive disability pay ments depends pr incipally on whether an employ ee ha s acc rued ten y ear s of participation under the plan. M ore spe cifica lly , an employ ee with te n( o r mo r e ) y e ar s o f

p arti c ip a ti o no nth e d a te th e d is a b il it y b e g in s is e n ti tl e d

to r e c e ive disability benef its unti l ag e 65. An employ ee with le ss tha n ten y ear s, on the other ha nd, will rece ive disability benef its for a pe riod of time equa l to her y ear s of par ticipation. 2No. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

J. A. 103 G eneral M o t o rs wai ved recove ry of al l but t he l ast y ear of d i sabil i t y be nef i t s o verpa y m ent s. T he rema i ni ng 3 o verpa y m ent was mo re t han o f f set b y t he f

act t hat t he i nsur er had b een usi ng an i nco rr ect (and l o wer) rat e i n co m p ut i ng h er di s abi l i t y pa y men t s . As a r es u l t of t h i s of f s et , H aw k i n s - D u n n r ec ei v ed a n et pa y men t of $3, 390. 60. -3- Ha wk ins -D unn c on tin

ue d to re c e ive monthl y

dis a bil ity pay me nts fr om M arc h 1 98 8 unti l April 2000, when a

n analy st at Metropolitan L ife Insuranc e Company , the plan administrator, discovere d that her be nefits should have te rminated in Mar ch 1996, base d on her 9
. 6 y ear s of pa rt ic ipatio n at th e tim e he r d isa bil ity c omm e nc e d. Th e insu rer su bs e qu e ntl y c omm un ic a te d th is fi nd ingto H awk ins -D unn a nd c e a se d h e r d isa

bil ity pa y me nts
. 3 In an effort to re instate her be nefits, Haw kins-Dunn contac ted a r epre sentative of the United Auto Wor

ke rs and a sk e d wh e the r Ge ne ra l Mo tor s and Me tr op oli tan L if e we re mis tak en i n t heir conclusion that she ha d not attained ten y ear s of p ar t i ci p ati on in the plan. Ron Graha m, from the UAW’s Be nefit Plans Section, responde d by letter on July

27, 2004: Ihave c oncluded my

inquiry about the issue you broug ht to my attention about y our elig ibilit y for e x tended disability

benef its unti l y ou turn 65. The recor ds show that y our first day of di sability (sick leave) was J anuar y 27, 1987. At that time, y ou had 9.6 y ear s of cr edited ser vice. In order

to ha ve your extended disability benef its continue to ag e 65, on January 27, 1987, y ou would have to have had 10 y ear s of cr edited ser vice. Your plant seniority date wa s Aug ust 15, 1977, and y our last day

worke d was January 27, 1987, by the cale nder you wer e over 6 months sh or t of 10 y e ars . A na u d it o f y o ur c r e d it e d s e r v ic e is e n c lo s e d
. T w o U A W In te r n a ti o n al Re pr e se ntativ e s f

ro m th e UA W G. M. De pa rtme nt B e ne fi ts St a ff

ha d c he c ke d th is iss ue fo r you

be fo re . Th e y bo th c ame up wi th the re su lts on y our i nq uir y that I did and I have inc luded both of those re sponses for your re cords. You should a lrea dy have c opies, but Iam including these a nswers a g ain.No. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

-4- J .A. 67-68. Ha

wkins-Dunn continued to c omplain to Graham about t h e denial of continued disability benef its, so Graham c ontacted E liz abeth L aMar ra, a n insurance specia li s t at Gene ral Motors. L aMar

ra r esponded by

letter o n August 25, 2004, assuring Gra ham that his analy sis was
corr ect. J.A. 69-70. In the District Court, Hawkins-D unn claimed she was entitled to additional cre dited service under the Pension Pl an and the disability plan. The D is t ri ct Court concluded that Hawkins-Dunn had ea rned a n additional 0.8 y ear s of s er v i ce time under the Pension Plan on ac count of a plan provision that awar ds service cre dit for cor porati o n -a p p roved leaves of absenc e. Specif

ically the court found that a 1992 worke r’s c ompensation set t l em ent betwe en Ha wkins-Dunn and G ener al Motors rende red a

portion of her

first y ear

of dis ab i l i t y leave a cor poration-a

pproved le ave of
a bs e nc e . Th e c ourt he ld that this ad dit ion a l cr e dit did no t app ly un de r t he dis a bil ity pla n b e c a us e it
was e arne d afte r the date on which Ha wkins-Dunn commenc ed disability leave
. II. Under ERI SA § 502(a) (1)( B) , a participant in an employ ee be nefit plan may bring an ac tion “to enf orce his rights unde r the ter ms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benef its under the terms of the pla

n.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1)( B)
. Where, as here , the benefit plan in question g ives the plan administrator a

uthority to construe the te rms of the plan, c ourt s wi l l only overturn the administrator’s decision if it is arbitrary and ca pricious. Firestone T

ire and Rubber Co. v. Bruc h , 489 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1989). This court re views the District Court’s a pplication of the a

rbitrar y and capr icious standard de novo.No. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

W here t he l anguage i n a plan s um m ary co nf l i ct s wi t h t he t erm s o f

t he b enef

i t p l an i t sel f

, t he p rovis i o n i n t he 4 p la n su m m a ry c o n tro ls. Uni ve r s i t y H os ps . of Cl ev el and v

. Em ers on El ec . Co. , 20 2 F.3d 83 9 , 85 0

- 5 1 (6t h C i r. 20 0 0 ). -5- An interpre tation of an e mploy ee b e n e f it plan is not ar

bitrary and ca pricious when the rea ding is “rational in lig ht of the plan’s pr ovisions.” D a n ie l v

. Ea to n Corp. , 8 3 9 F. 2 d263, 267 (6th Cir. 1988). This standard rec og nizes that eac h interpre tation of an employ ee benef it plan “ implicates the rig hts of other members of the plan” and by ensuring that an administrator’s de cision is rational “the courts contr ibute to consistency and fa irness in plan administration.” Id
. The resolution to this di spute over H awkins-Dunn’ s service time turns on the interpre tation
and a pp lic a tio n of

the te rm s o f G e ne ra l Mo tor s’ dis a bil ity pla n. As e xce rp te d a

bo ve , th e dis a

bil ity pla n s tate s th a t an e mpl oy e e ’s “ y e ars of pa rt ic ipat io n” for th e purp os e s o f c a lc ulatin g dis a bil ity be nefit s is de te rm ine d “ a s o f t he da y on wh ic h th e dis a

bil ity c omm e nc e d. ” J.A. 51 , 1 03 . It is undisputed that, as of January 27, 1987, when Ha

wkins-Dunn’s disab ility

commence d, she had
acc umulated 9.6 y ear s of servic e time, just short of th e t en y ear s neede d to become e ligible f or disability benef its unti l ag e 65. In light of this fa ct, we a g ree with the District Court’s conclusion that Gene ral Motors’ de termination that Hawkins-D unn has less than ten y ear s of participation under the dis a bil ity pla n w a s n ot a

rb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s. Hawkins-D unn argues that a pr ovision in Gene ral Motors’ insura nce pla n summary

entitled

“ What you

sh ou ld k no w a bo ut y our B e ne fi ts fo r h ourl y e mpl oy e e s” c on fl ic ts w iththe langua g e in the disability plan and compels a finding that she is entitled to more than ten year s of par ticipation. 4 Specifica lly , Hawkins-D unn points to l anguag e in the plan summar y u n d er the heading“Ye ars of Participation under the Insuranc e Plan” that state s, “F or insurance purposes, y our cr edited ser viceNo. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

-6- acc rued on a n d af

t er October 1, 1975 unde r the Pension Plan will be added to your y ear s of participation unde r the Group L ife and Disability Insuranc e Prog ram as of Septemb er 3 0 , 1 9 7 5 .” J .A. 78. Hawkins-Dunn interpre ts this provision to allow her to use he r cr edited ser vice unde r the pe ns ion pla n, wh ic h a ll p art ie s a g re e is i n exce ss of te n ye ars , to qu a lif

y fo r t he a dd iti on a l di sa

bil ity be ne fi ts. We b e g in b y

no tin g tha

t H awki ns -Dunn ’s int e rp re tatio n is no t th e on ly , o r e ve n th e mos t plausib l e, i nterpre tation of the summary plan languag e cited. I

nstead, the pr ovision allows an employ ee to a dd cre dited service under the pension plan acc rued afte r October 1, 1975, to the y ear s of par ticipation ear

ned by the employ ee prior t o September 30, 1975. Since Hawkins-D unn did not beg in w orking at Gene ral Motors until 1977, this provision appea rs to ha ve no rele vance t o her benef it calculations. Fur ther, e ven i f t h i s p rovi sion did somehow allow for a n employ ee hir ed in 1977 to add pension cre dit to her year s of par ticipation under the insura nce pla n, Hawkins-D unn’s elig ibilit y for benef its under the disability plan is de termined “as of the day on which [her] disability commence d.” J .A. 103. Thus, as the District Court observed, she c annot add the c redit she r ece ived for a corpor ation-appr oved leave of a bsence that occur

red a fter January

27, 1987, to the y ear s of participation she had on that date
. Reading the provision of the plan summary cited by Hawkins-D unn in light of the summar y ’s surroundingprovisions further suppor ts the conclusion that Ge n er al M otors’ interpr etation is not
arb itr ary or c a pr ic iou s. Th e se c tio n ti tle d “Y e ars of Part ic ipatio n und e r t he Ins ur anc e Plan” se ts f

or th
a me tho d f or c ha ng ingthe wa

y Ge ne ra l Mo tor s c a lc ulate d y e ars of pa rt ic ipatio n. Th e section i sNo. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

T he rec o rd co ntains o nly o ne refere nc e to att o rne y’ s f ee s; i t a p p e a r s in t he sec o nd

- t o - l ast l i ne o f H aw kins- 5 D un n’ s 13- page r es po ns e t o G ene r al M ot ors ’ mo t i on t o af f i r m t he ad m i nist rato r ’ s deci s i on. I n i t s order , t he D i s t r i ct C o u rt d id no t ad d re ss th is p a ssin g re q u e st. -7- broken into three subsections: 1) P rior to September 1, 1950; 2) For t he P eriod S eptember 1, 1950 to O c tober 1, 19 75 and

3) On and Af te r O c tob e r 1 , 1 97 5. Th e langua g e highli g hte d b y Ha wk ins

Dunn is in the last of these subsec tions. A close inspection of the thre e subsec tions shows that the lang uag e of the second subse ction
more c losely

mirrors the interpretation Hawkins-Dunn is trying to assig n to the third subsection. The
se c on d, or

int e ri m, s ub se c tio n p ro vid e s in pa rt , “ I f your c re dit e d s e rv ic e un de r t he Pe ns ion

Plan is g reater than y

our y ear s of par

ticipation, cre dited service may be used instead o f y ear s of participation.” J .A. 78. I f Genera l Motors intended for employ ees to be able to use the ir cre dited service for the pe nsion plan for insura nce pur poses, this straig htforwa

rd provision would have
a pp e are d in

the thi rd , f

or wa rd -l oo kin g se c tio n. Th e com pan y ’s de c isi on no t to e mpl oy

thi s sa me provision in the final subsection indicates that the third subsec tion has a diffe rent mea ning, suc h as the one de scribed a

bove. Since the interpre tation urg ed by Hawkins-D unn is inconsistent with the lang uag e of the plan summary , we c annot say that Ge nera l Motors’ interpre tation is arbitrary and
c a pr ic iou s. Hawkins- Du n n also reque sts this court to orde r the de fenda nts to pay her attorney ’s fe es
re latin g to h e r D istri c t Co ur t vi c tor y on he r p e ns ion

c la im. Sin c e the re qu est was ne ve r p ro pe rl y br ie fe d o r r

ule d u po n in the Di str ic t Co ur

t, w e de c lin e to r e a c h it
. 5 For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the dec ision of the district court.No. 05-2124

Hawkins-Dunn v . Gene ral Motors Corp.

-8-