U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

1994-1996

Juvenile

Justice

Reform

Initiatives

in the States

Program Report
Research and Program Development Division

develops knowledge on national trends in juvenile

delinquency; supports a program for data collection

and information sharing that incorporates elements

of statistical and systems development; identifies

how delinquency develops and the best methods

for its prevention, intervention, and treatment; and

analyzes practices and trends in the juvenile justice

system.

Training and Technical Assistance Division provides juvenile justice training and technical assistance to Federal, State, and local governments; law

enforcement, judiciary, and corrections personnel;

and private agencies, educational institutions, and

community organizations.

Special Emphasis Division provides discretionary

funds to public and private agencies, organizations,

and individuals to replicate tested approaches to

delinquency prevention, treatment, and control in

such pertinent areas as chronic juvenile offenders,

community-based sanctions, and the disproportionate

representation of minorities in the juvenile justice

system.

State Relations and Assistance Division supports

collaborative efforts by States to carry out the mandates of the JJDP Act by providing formula grant

funds to States; furnishing technical assistance to

States, local governments, and private agencies;

and monitoring State compliance with the JJDP Act.

Information Dissemination Unit informs individuals

and organizations of OJJDP initiatives; disseminates

information on juvenile justice, delinquency prevention, and missing children; and coordinates program

planning efforts within OJJDP. The unit’s activities

include publishing research and statistical reports,

bulletins, and other documents, as well as overseeing

the operations of the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Concentration of Federal Efforts Program promotes interagency cooperation and coordination

among Federal agencies with responsibilities in the

area of juvenile justice. The program primarily carries

out this responsibility through the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, an

independent body within the executive branch that

was established by Congress through the JJDP Act.

Missing and Exploited Children’s Program seeks to

promote effective policies and procedures for addressing the problem of missing and exploited children.

Established by the Missing Children’s Assistance Act

of 1984, the program provides funds for a variety of

activities to support and coordinate a network of resources such as the National Center for Missing and

Exploited Children; training and technical assistance

to a network of 47 State clearinghouses, nonprofit

organizations, law enforcement personnel, and attorneys; and research and demonstration programs.

Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) was established by the President and Congress through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act of 1974, Public Law 93–415, as

amended. Located within the Office of Justice Programs of the U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP’s goal is to

provide national leadership in addressing the issues of juvenile delinquency and improving juvenile justice.

OJJDP sponsors a broad array of research, program, and training initiatives to improve the juvenile justice

system as a whole, as well as to benefit individual youth-serving agencies. These initiatives are carried out by

seven components within OJJDP, described below.

The mission of OJJDP is to provide national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent juvenile victimization

and respond appropriately to juvenile delinquency. This is accomplished through developing and implementing prevention programs and a juvenile justice system that protects the public safety, holds juvenile offenders accountable,

and provides treatment and rehabilitative services based on the needs of each individual juvenile.
i

Shay Bilchik, Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

October 1997

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives

in the States: 1994 –1996

Program Report

National Criminal Justice Association
ii

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention is a component of the Office of

Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

This document was prepared under grant number 96–JN–FX–0001 from the Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily

represent the official position or policies of OJJDP or the U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

John C. Dwyer

Acting Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Shay Bilchik

Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
iii

Foreword

Juvenile crime and violence continue to be serious problems in our Nation. In 1994, more than 150,000 juveniles were arrested for violent crimes—murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. From 1985 to 1994,

the rate of murders committed by teens ages 14 to 17 increased 172 percent. Many of these offenders were

friends and acquaintances of their victims.

As Governors, we are concerned about juvenile violence and must find ways to combat it. States and communities are implementing innovative strategies to stem the tide of juvenile violence, from parental responsibility

laws to prevention and early intervention programs to initiatives that allow the most violent and intractable

youth to be tried in adult court. Some methods seem to be working, considering recent press accounts and

Government reports on the decline in juvenile violence arrests in 1995.

Despite the recent leveling off of juvenile crime rates, we must not lose sight of the fact that the incidence of

youth crime and violence is far too prevalent in our communities. Therefore, we must continue to develop efficient and effective programs to prevent and deter young people from committing crimes, and we must find

swift and effective methods of sanctioning those who do.

Violent crime tears at the very fabric of civilized society. It fills citizens with fear, causes them to rearrange

their lives, and discourages them from venturing from their homes. Our citizens living in public housing developments, for example, suffer when the entire complex is ravaged by gang violence. Children miss school—not

to play hooky, but to play it safe by staying at home. Businesses find it difficult, if not impossible, to operate in

a climate of violence and intimidation, a climate that makes customers too afraid to shop. Many people leave

our inner cities and crime-ridden neighborhoods.

Our citizens have a right to be free from the fear of crime, whether in their homes, on the streets, or in any

other place in their communities. They expect the government to provide for their safety and protection.

We Governors are leading the way in attacking crime, especially juvenile crime. This report demonstrates that

States are finding innovative methods of dealing with juvenile violence. It is a major analysis of the tools being

used to combat violence, with an indepth focus on the comprehensive juvenile justice reform that is taking

place in four States—Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio, and Oregon.

I wish to thank the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention for

providing the funding for the report and the National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) for developing it.

NCJA’s work with the National Governors’ Association through the years has produced many innovative policies to assist Governors in tackling the crime problem.
iv

Whatever juvenile crime initiatives the Federal Government may choose to undertake in the future, the States,

because of our system of government, will retain the primary responsibility and authority for dealing with

youth violence. And we must be willing and able to perform. I hope that tools such as this report will help

Governors and other State officials make appropriate and better informed decisions.

Governor Bob Miller

Chairman

National Governors’ Association
v

Acknowledgments

This report, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 1994–1996, reflects the skill and diligent work of the

National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) staff; the numerous Federal and State officials who contributed generously of their time to help expedite this project; and other organizations that shared their contributions to the field of State juvenile justice policy for compilation in this report.

The project staff is grateful to U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Administrator Shay Bilchik for his review and continued guidance on the report. OJJDP

Deputy Administrator John Wilson and Project Monitor Eileen Garry also provided valuable advice and insight through their review of the report during various stages of its development. Further, Nolan Jones, director of the Human Resources Group of the National Governors’ Association (NGA), also provided insight and

commentary on the report.

The NCJA project staff would also like to extend a special thanks to former NCJA Executive Vice President

Gwen A. Holden, who was instrumental in the development of the project and went beyond the call of duty to

contribute to its substance after she had completed her 21-year tenure with NCJA.

The project staff are also appreciative of the time given generously by State officials in Colorado, Connecticut,

Ohio, and Oregon during the case study interviews. The following individuals were instrumental in the information they provided and the insight they offered concerning the status of comprehensive juvenile code reform

in their States: William R. Woodward, director of criminal justice planning, Colorado Department of Public

Safety; Pat Cervera, juvenile justice specialist, Office of Juvenile Justice, Colorado Department of Public

Safety; Joe Thome, program administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice, Colorado Department of Public Safety;

Thomas A. Siconolfi, director of policy development and planning division, Connecticut Office of Policy and

Management; William H. Carbone, director of the Office of Alternative Sanctions, Connecticut Judicial Department; Michael L. Lee, director of the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services; Julie Reuetner, legislative

affairs and communications, Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services; Linda Modry, administrator, Ohio Department of Youth Services; Carol Rapp Zimmermann, assistant director, Ohio Department of Youth Services;

Linda Lewis-Day, administrator, Ohio Family and Children First; L. Craig Campbell, former special assistant

attorney general of the State of Oregon and coordinator of the Governor’s Juvenile Justice Task Force; and

Greg Peden, director of criminal justice services, Oregon State Police.

The chapter on juvenile justice reform initiatives in the States could not have been completed without the contributions and hard work of other organizations that provided information concerning State-level juvenile justice policies. Those organizations to which NCJA is indebted are the American Prosecutors Research

Institute, the Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy, the Institute for Law and Justice, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, the National Center for Juvenile Justice, and the National Conference of State

Legislatures.
vi

Finally, NCJA would like to acknowledge the work of the following staff members and interns: Paul E.

Lawrence, director of administration and information systems; Lisa Doyle Moran, associate director for legal

affairs; Robert A. Kapler, senior staff associate; Michelle M. Vannemann, staff attorney; Elizabeth A. Pearson,

staff associate; Paula Bresnan Gibson, legal researcher; and Alan Burchardt, intern.

Cabell C. Cropper

Executive Director

National Criminal Justice Association
vii

Foreword .............................................................................................................................................................. iii

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ v

Preface................................................................................................................................................................... xi

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

Methodology, Uses, and Limitations ............................................................................................................. 2

Chapter I: The Scope of Juvenile Violence............................................................................................. 3

Trends and Causes ........................................................................................................................................... 3

Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 3

What Caused the Increase? ............................................................................................................................ 4

Juveniles and Murder ................................................................................................................................ 4

Anatomy of Violence .................................................................................................................................. 4

Juveniles and Firearms: A Closer Look ....................................................................................................... 5

Where Juveniles Get Guns........................................................................................................................ 5

Prognosis for the Future ................................................................................................................................. 6

A Dissenting Voice ..................................................................................................................................... 7

Chapter II: Issues and Trends in State Juvenile Justice Reform..................................................... 9

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 9

Prevention ........................................................................................................................................................ 9

What Works?............................................................................................................................................ 10

Recent State Action .................................................................................................................................. 12

Curfew ............................................................................................................................................................ 13

Pros and Cons........................................................................................................................................... 14

Judicial Interpretation of the Constitutionality of Curfews .................................................................. 15

Recent Initiatives ...................................................................................................................................... 17

Parental Responsibility Laws ...................................................................................................................... 18

Combating Street Gangs ............................................................................................................................... 21

The Spread of Gangs ................................................................................................................................ 22

Table of Contents
viii

Gangs, Drugs, and Violence .................................................................................................................... 23

Approaches to Gang Control and Intervention ...................................................................................... 23

State Initiatives ......................................................................................................................................... 24

Local Initiatives ........................................................................................................................................ 24

Multijurisdictional Initiatives .................................................................................................................. 25

Gang Prosecution ..................................................................................................................................... 27

The Movement Toward Graduated Sanctions ............................................................................................ 27

Recent State Action .................................................................................................................................. 28

Juvenile Boot Camps .................................................................................................................................... 29

Evaluation of Juvenile Boot Camps ........................................................................................................ 30

Recent State Action .................................................................................................................................. 32

Youth and Guns ............................................................................................................................................. 33

Possession, Licensing, and Transfer of Firearms .................................................................................... 33

Gun-Free Schools and Transfer Provisions ............................................................................................ 34

Juvenile Proceedings and Records .............................................................................................................. 36

Juvenile Proceedings ............................................................................................................................... 37

Juvenile Records ...................................................................................................................................... 38

Other Administrative Responses ............................................................................................................. 40

Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court .......................................................................................................... 41

Types of Juvenile Transfers ..................................................................................................................... 43

Transfer Provisions and Trends ............................................................................................................... 44

Offenders Judicially Waived to Criminal Court .................................................................................... 45

Impact of Waiver and Transfer ................................................................................................................ 46

Sentencing Authority .................................................................................................................................... 46

Effectiveness of Expanded Sentencing Authority .................................................................................. 48

Chapter III: Selected Case Studies of Juvenile Reform Initiatives ............................................... 51

Colorado: Review of Children’s Code Brings Significant Change

for Juvenile Justice Administration ........................................................................................................... 51

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 51

Impetus for Reform: A Summer of Violence ........................................................................................... 52

Task Force for the Recodification of the Children’s Code ..................................................................... 52

The Juvenile Justice Subcommittee Findings and Recommendations ................................................. 53

Legislative Oversight Committee Action ................................................................................................ 55

Elements of Reform .................................................................................................................................. 56

House Bill 96–1005 ............................................................................................................................ 56

Implementation and Outlook ................................................................................................................... 57
ix

Connecticut: Balancing Service and Public Safety Objectives

in Juvenile Justice System Reform ............................................................................................................ 58

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 58

Impetus for Reform .................................................................................................................................. 58

Elements of Reform .................................................................................................................................. 59

The Reform Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 60

Expedited Contruction ...................................................................................................................... 61

Transfer of Juveniles ......................................................................................................................... 61

New Funding ..................................................................................................................................... 61

Transfer of Juvenile Justice Centers ................................................................................................ 61

Implementing Reform .............................................................................................................................. 61

A Window of Opportunity....................................................................................................................... 63

Sustaining Momentum ............................................................................................................................. 64

Ohio: Sharing Responsibility for Administration of Juvenile Justice ................................................... 64

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 64

RECLAIM Ohio ...................................................................................................................................... 65

Elements of Reform ........................................................................................................................... 66

Reform Strategy ................................................................................................................................. 66

A Skillful, Strategic Choice for Public Peace ................................................................................... 67

A Context Conducive to Change ...................................................................................................... 68

Moving Toward the Future ............................................................................................................... 68

Amended Substitute House Bill 1 ........................................................................................................... 69

Oregon: Making Juvenile Offenders Accountable .................................................................................... 70

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 70

Impetus for Reform .................................................................................................................................. 71

Elements of Reform .................................................................................................................................. 72

Equalizing Service Needs .................................................................................................................. 73

The Reform Strategy ................................................................................................................................ 74

Implementing Reform .............................................................................................................................. 75

Making Things Happen ........................................................................................................................... 76

The State Ballot Initiative ................................................................................................................. 76

Realizing Reform Objectives ................................................................................................................... 77

Chapter IV: Observations Concerning State Juvenile Justice Reform ....................................... 79

Recommendations .......................................................................................................................................... 80

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 80
xi

I am pleased to present Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 1994–1996, an overview of recent State

juvenile justice reform measures. This report, prepared under a grant from the U.S. Department of Justice,

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, represents the dedicated efforts of the staff of the

National Criminal Justice Association, working in affiliation with the National Governors’ Association.

State juvenile justice systems recently have undergone a paradigm shift in their approach to the problem of

preventing and responding to juvenile crime. The consequences and future implications of heightened rates of

juvenile violence during the past decade have spurred State policymakers to initiate new programs and State

legislators to enact new legislation that places a greater emphasis on public safety, imposes greater penalties for

violent juvenile offenders, and creates innovative sentencing options.

This shift from the rehabilitative focus developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s to a more balanced system has created a need for enhanced communication between Federal agencies, the States, and local jurisdictions to gauge

and monitor the impact of new laws and programs. It has also necessitated the development of a greater understanding of the factors and conditions that foster juvenile crime, especially violent juvenile crime. But, most

urgently, it has created a need to understand where we are now. Without a clear picture of the current state of

juvenile justice, the other two objectives would be all but impossible to meet.

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 1994–1996, which identifies and analyzes issues and trends associated with State juvenile reform initiatives, represents an effort to fill that need. The report explains some of the

more punitive measures, such as new criminal court transfer authority and expanded juvenile court sentencing

options. However, many States have balanced these steps with enhanced resources and new programs designed to interrupt the development of youth violence and victimization. This document includes selected case

studies of four States’ implementation of such balanced initiatives.

It is my belief that this report will help crystallize the key issues facing juvenile justice practitioners and Statelevel policymakers concerned about the future of juvenile justice and help guide them in formulating future

laws and policies in this important field.

Shay Bilchik

 Administrator

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Preface
1

Introduction

People across the country—from every racial, socioeconomic, and political sphere—are concerned

about the increase in the number of crimes committed by juveniles. Policymakers are mobilizing to

respond, in light of statistics that support this fear

and indicate that the incidence of violent crimes

committed by youth is intolerably high. This heightened concern and attention, coupled with an expected increase in the youth population over the

next decade, have policymakers scrambling to find

effective and affordable ways to prevent delinquency and to intervene with and sanction youth

who commit crimes.

Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 1994–

1996 is designed to provide timely information to

policymakers on the mechanisms that States are

using to respond to increased youth violence and

delinquency. The report is broken down into four

chapters that discuss in detail the juvenile crime and

delinquency problem and highlight State responses

to that challenge.

Chapter I, The Scope of Juvenile Violence, provides

an overview of the incidence of youth crime in the

Nation, discusses trends in violent juvenile crimes,

considers how and why youth crimes are being committed, and gives a prognosis for the future. A full

discussion of the statistics collected and reported on

juvenile crime is provided, as is a discussion of the

factors, such as firearms, gangs, and drug use, that

are believed to be major contributors to this

country’s youth crime epidemic.

Chapter II, Issues and Trends in State Juvenile

Justice Reform, highlights major issues and trends

associated with recent State responses to youth

crime in this country. This chapter addresses the

following policy initiatives:

◆ Crime prevention.

◆ Curfews.

◆ Parental responsibility.

◆ Gang activities, including drug trafficking.

◆ Graduated sanctions.

◆ Juvenile boot camps.

◆ Youth and guns.

◆ Juvenile records.

◆ Juvenile waivers.

◆ Expanded sentencing authority.

Chapter III, Selected Case Studies of Juvenile Reform Initiatives, discusses in depth the reform initiatives in four States—Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio,

and Oregon. Each case study describes in detail the

elements of the State’s reform initiatives based on

interviews with officials in the State. Further, this

chapter describes the relevant catalysts for changes

to the administration of juvenile justice in each jurisdiction and the positions of opponents and proponents of the reform initiatives as they moved

through the legislative process.

Finally, chapter IV, Observations Concerning State

Juvenile Justice Reform, summarizes in general

terms the juvenile justice reform trends that have

been taking place around the country and includes

observations and recommendations based on the

experiences of States undertaking both single-issue

and comprehensive juvenile justice reform.
2

Methodology, Uses, and

Limitations

National Criminal Justice Association staff compiled information from a variety of sources for use in

this report. The publications of other organizations;

various journal, newsletter, magazine, and newspaper articles; and Federal Government publications

constitute the major reference documents used in

chapters I and II. This secondary research was

complemented with primary source references, especially in the case of State code citations, when further explanation of a State program or policy was

appropriate or necessary.

The case studies in chapter III represent original,

primary source research. The case studies were

completed by reviewing copies of reform legislation,

obtaining relevant State-generated documentation

about the various reform initiatives, and conducting

telephone interviews with key players in each State’s

reform initiative.

This report targets State-level decisionmakers who

are concerned with the issues surrounding juvenile

justice reform from policy initiation through implementation. It should be viewed as a tool for lawmakers and policymakers who are searching for ways to

help improve the administration of juvenile justice in

their States. This report does not seek to evaluate,

empirically or otherwise, existing programs but reports on what those programs are and, when available, recounts self-reporting on their impact on the

incidence of youth crime.
3

Chapter I

The Scope of Juvenile Violence

Trends and Causes

Overview

The reality, fear, and consequences of juvenile

violence continue to plague this Nation and drive

legislative and political agendas at every level of

government. More and more States are lowering the

age at which juveniles can be waived or transferred

to criminal court and enacting other measures to

“get tough” with violent juvenile offenders. Meanwhile, prognosticators warn of a coming tide of juvenile violence, driven primarily by increased arrests

of juveniles for serious and violent crime over the

past 10 years and shifting demographics of age and

race. These forecasts are based to some extent on

the assumption that current trends are likely to

continue.

Yet the hyperbole and alarm that surround much of

the political posturing and new legislation obscure a

simple fact: Very few juveniles engage in criminal

acts, especially violent criminal acts. According to

the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s (FBI’s) Uniform Crime Report

(UCR) data, about 6 percent of all juveniles were

arrested for some offense in 1994—and of those

arrested, about 7 percent were arrested for a violent

crime. Therefore, less than one-half of 1 percent of

juveniles in the Nation were arrested for a violent

offense in 1994.1

However, as a number of studies have shown, juveniles commit a proportionately higher number of

violent crimes than members of other age groups,

and since the mid-1980’s, juvenile offenders have

become increasingly violent.2 These findings are

supported by comparisons of arrest statistics for

adult and juvenile offenders. The number of individuals of all ages arrested for murder and negligent

manslaughter increased approximately 23 percent

between 1985 and 1994, while the number of juveniles arrested for those crimes in the same period

grew by 150 percent.3

In 1991, the National Crime Victimization Survey

(NCVS), which seeks information on crimes committed against persons age 12 or older, found that

victims attributed about one in four personal crimes

(crimes of violence and theft, including larceny) to

juvenile offenders. Juveniles were reported to be

responsible for about one in five violent crimes, and

juveniles in groups were involved in about one in

seven serious violent crimes.

A juvenile’s chance of becoming a victim of violence

or a violent offender is, to some extent, affected by

race and geography. Data from the NCVS and the

FBI’s UCR indicate that African-American juveniles

are more likely to be homicide victims and offenders

than other racial and age groups. The rate of homicide victimizations for African-Americans was six

times greater than for whites in 1994. According to

the NCVS, African-American males had a rate of

violent crime victimization in 1993 of 76 victimizations per every 1,000 persons, compared with the

rate for white males of 59 victimizations per 1,000

persons.4

1. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:

UPDATE ON VIOLENCE iv (1996) [hereinafter UPDATE].

2. Id. at 14–15.

3. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 1994, AT 221 (1995) [hereinafter

1994 UCR].

4. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 4.
4

While African-Americans constituted 12.5 percent

of the population in 1994, they accounted for nearly

29 percent of the juvenile arrests and more than half

of the arrests for violent crime, including 59 percent

of the juvenile homicide arrests.5

The majority of juvenile offenders and victims are

concentrated in large cities. FBI data show that

more than half of the juvenile homicide arrests in

1994 occurred in six States—California, Florida,

Illinois, Michigan, New York, and Texas—and just

four cities—Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, and

New York. These accounted for nearly one-third of

all juvenile homicide arrests.6 By contrast, approximately 8 out of every 10 counties in the Nation had

no known juvenile homicide offenders in 1994.

What Caused the Increase?

Juveniles and Murder

While only a small minority of juveniles living in

specific geographic areas are responsible for most of

the juvenile violence in the Nation, there is no doubt

that, on the whole, the problem of juvenile violence

increased significantly in the past decade. What

changed during the intervening years is what one

noted researcher calls the “age-specific patterns for

murder.”7 Basically, while the murder rates remained

stable or declined among older people in the decade

following 1985, they climbed for younger people. The

number of juvenile homicide offenders doubled between 1980 and 1994. During this period, the juvenile responsibility for homicide in the country grew,

based on FBI clearance statistics, from 5 percent to

10 percent of all homicides in the United States.8

Anatomy of Violence

The increase in juvenile violence began in 1985 as

the use of cocaine in inner cities began to reach epidemic proportions. According to Alfred Blumstein,

the J. Erik Johnson University Professor of Urban

Systems and Operations Research at Carnegie

Mellon University (Pennsylvania) and director of

the National Consortium on Violence Research, the

increase was the result of the interrelationship—or

“deadly nexus”—of several factors: drugs, guns, and

juveniles.

Under Blumstein’s theory, the expansion of the

crack cocaine market led to drug traffickers recruiting children and teenagers as low-level sellers, carriers, and lookouts. Juveniles were recruited partly

because they worked for less, took greater chances,

and were more likely to escape detection and

punishment.

Juveniles involved in drug trafficking carried guns

because they were unable to rely on police for protection. As more juveniles were recruited by drug

traffickers, firearms proliferated among inner-city

gangs engaged in turf and drug market battles. This

in turn persuaded other juveniles, who may not have

been involved with the drug industry, to carry guns

for self-protection and also as a status symbol.

Thus, as more guns appeared in the community, the

incentive for individuals to arm themselves increased,

creating what Blumstein refers to as a “local arms

race.”9

Data on the number of firearm-related homicides

appear to support Blumstein’s theory. In 1976, less

than two-thirds of juvenile homicide offenders used

a gun; by 1991, more than three-quarters killed with

a gun;10 in 1994, 82 percent used a gun.11 Since 1980,

the murder arrest rate has declined slightly for

adults and increased markedly for juveniles, regardless of race. But between 1985 and 1992, the drug

5. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1995, 409

(1996).

6. NATIONAL CENTER ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS OF JUVENILE HOMICIDES: WHERE THEY OCCUR AND THE EFFECTIVENESS

OF ADULT COURT INTERVENTION 1 (July 1996).

7. Alfred Blumstein, Violence by Young People: Why the Deadly

Nexus?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

JOURNAL, Aug. 1995, at 3.

8. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 18.

9. Blumstein, supra note 7, at 6.

10. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A FOCUS ON VIOLENCE iv (1995).

11. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 24.
5

arrest rate for juveniles climbed only for nonwhites.

12 Blumstein offers a simple explanation for

this disparity:

. . . [T]he apparent absence of significant involvement of white juveniles in the drug markets during this time has not insulated them

from the growth of their involvement in homicide, possibly through the suggested process of

the diffusion of guns from drug sellers into the

larger community. When the arrest trends of

young nonwhites for homicide and drug offenses are compared, it is evident that both

rates climbed together from 1985 to 1989, suggesting the relationship between the two. The

drug arrest rate declined somewhat after 1989.

There was a flattening out, but no corresponding decline, in the murder arrest rate. In other

words, the continued high rate of murder arrests seems to demonstrate that, once guns are

diffused into the community, they are much

more difficult to purge.

Only by stopping the “diffusion” of firearms,

Blumstein says, will the Nation lower the incidence

of violent crime committed by juveniles.

Juveniles and Firearms:

A Closer Look

For many juveniles, firearms have become a fact of

life. For juvenile offenders, guns have become as

common as knives once were. Consider that:

◆ The juvenile arrest rate for weapons laws violations increased by 103 percent between 1983 and

1994; during the same period, the adult arrest rate

increased 26 percent.13

◆ In a recent study of 4,000 arrestees in 11 cities, 40

percent of juvenile males reported possessing a

firearm at some time.14

◆ A Virginia Department of Criminal Justice study

of adult and juvenile inmates found that juveniles

were more likely than adults to have carried a

semiautomatic pistol in the commission of a

crime.15

◆ In 1994, the National School Safety Center estimated that each day about 135,000 students nationwide carried guns into schools.

◆ A 1991 study of a sample of juvenile inmates in

four States found that, in particular, juvenile offenders prefer high-quality, large-caliber, concealable handguns.16

Juveniles increasingly are the victims of firearmsrelated violence. The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) reported that more U.S. teenagers die from

gunshot wounds than from all natural causes of disease combined.17 In a June 1993 fact sheet, the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention reported that

firearms are the second leading cause of death for

young people 10 to 34 years of age.18 In 1991, the

ATF reported that firearms-related mortality accounted for almost half of all deaths among teens; in

1993, 85 percent of 15- to 19-year-old murder victims were killed with a firearm.19

Where Juveniles Get Guns

In November 1993, the ATF initiated a tracing program to identify the source of firearms recovered

from juvenile offenders. When doing followup investigations, the ATF’s tracing program also seeks to

determine in which criminal activities firearms were

12. Blumstein, supra note 7, at 7, 8.

13. UPDATE, supra note 1, at 21.

14. Id.

15. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

GUNS USED IN CRIME 5 (July 1995).

16. Id.

17. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, U.S. DEP’T

OF THE TREASURY, THE ATF JUVENILE FIREARMS INFORMATION 2

(1995) [hereinafter ATF].

18. NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL,

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FACT SHEET: FIREARMS INJURIES

AND FATALITIES (June 1993).

19. ATF, supra note 17, at 2.
6

used and to discover how the juveniles obtained the

firearms. Traces are initiated at the request of law

enforcement agencies.

In 1993 and 1994, the ATF conducted more than

3,800 traces of firearms recovered from juveniles. In

most cases, juveniles were charged with weapons

offenses, such as illegal possession of a firearm.20 Of

the total firearms recovered, 2,700 were involved in

incidents that resulted in charges of weapons violations.21 The ATF also found that 205 of these weapons were used in assaults, 199 in homicides, 156 in

incidents involving narcotics, 98 in robberies, 46 in

burglaries, and 13 in sexual assaults.22

In 712 followup trace investigations conducted from

November 1993 through June 1994 to determine

the source of firearms recovered from juveniles, the

ATF found that 27 percent of the juveniles had been

given firearms by individuals other than parents or

guardians and 22 percent had obtained firearms in

burglaries or other thefts.23 The investigations also

found that 16 percent of the juveniles had purchased

their firearms on the street and 15 percent had taken

firearms from their homes.24 The ATF was unable to

determine how juveniles secured firearms in the

remaining 20 percent of the traces.

Juveniles who commit violent crimes involving firearms frequently use stolen guns. The ATF found

that 32 percent of firearms used by juveniles in committing violent crimes were taken in burglaries and

other thefts, 25 percent were obtained by juveniles

from persons other than parents or guardians, and

21 percent were purchased on the street.25

Prognosis for the Future

Until recently, the prognosis for greater levels of

juvenile violence was bleak. The report Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A Focus on Violence, published in

May 1995, concluded that “[i]f violent juvenile

crime increased in the future as it has for the past 10

years . . . by the year 2010 the number of juvenile

arrests for violent crime will more than double and

the number of juvenile arrests for murder will increase nearly 150 percent.”

However, more recent data provided by the FBI

show that the level of juvenile crime and violence

appears to be leveling off, if not falling. The juvenile

murder arrest rate, which increased 169 percent between 1983 and the end of 1993, has decreased 23

percent since 1993 and dropped 14 percent in 1995

alone.26 The juvenile violent crime arrest rate decreased 4 percent in 1995, with the greatest decline

occurring among juveniles ages 10 to 14.

Observers hailed the new statistics as proof that antiviolence and crime prevention efforts by the administration, law enforcement, schools, and community

groups finally were paying off. Other observers concluded that the most violent group of juveniles from

the 1980’s crack cocaine trade had matured into less

violent adults in their twenties.27 Blumstein said that

efforts to get guns out of the hands of young people

in some of the crime-heavy cities, such as New York

and Boston, were having a noticeable effect.

While policymakers might consider the latest figures

as cause for cautious optimism, criminal justice prognosticators are warning that the downturn could

merely be a lull before the next storm of juvenile violence. Two of the most vocal espousers of this theory

are John J. DiIulio, Jr., a professor of politics and

public affairs at Princeton University (New Jersey),

and James Alan Fox, a professor in the College of

Criminal Justice at Northeastern University (Massachusetts). They argue that while a slight downturn in

juvenile violence is inevitable, the Nation, in Fox’s

words, is “on the verge of another crime wave that

will last well into the next century.”28

20. Id.

21. Id.

22. Id.

23. Id.

24. Id.

25. Id. at 3.

26. Press Release by U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 12, 1996) (on

file with author).

27. Fox Butterfield, After 10 Years, Juvenile Crime Begins to Drop,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A1.

28. James Alan Fox, Presentation at National Criminal Justice

Association Annual Meeting (May 30, 1996); see Fox

Butterfield, Crime Continues to Decline, But Experts Warn of Coming

‘Storm’ of Juvenile Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at A1.
7

Fox states that the level of adult violence has tapered off as baby boomers have aged and “curbed

their violent ways” or engaged in “profit-driven

crime.” Between 1980 and 1985, the homicide rate

dropped nationally by approximately 25 percent. At

the time, he had assumed that “all else would be

equal” and the homicide rate would keep dropping

until the end of the 1980’s. However, increases in

drug trafficking and related handgun violence

pushed up the homicide rate among young people

by 22 percent during the second half of the 1980’s.

“The murder rate is down now only because the

homicide rate among adults is overshadowing that

of teenagers,” Fox said. He also stated that the homicide rate among African-American teenagers is

10 times that of white teenagers. “Too many children

are coming out undersocialized and undersupervised,”

he said. “They have too much free time on their

hands. Literally time to kill.”

Fox warned that a “baby boomerang” is likely to

increase violent crime and drug abuse rates as the

Nation enters the next millennium. The boomerang

cohort in question is the generation of children born

to the baby boomers—loosely defined as the postWorld War II generation that grew up during the

1950’s and 1960’s.

Currently, there are 39 million children under the

age of 10 in the Nation.29 By the year 2005, the number of teens between the ages of 14 and 17 will swell

14 percent, and the number of African-American

teens will grow by 17 percent. Teenagers are part of

the “prime crime age group” and “given the trends,

we may face a bloodbath that makes the 1990’s look

like the good old days,” Fox said.

According to Fox, political leaders must act now

to avert the coming crime wave by reinvesting in

schools, afterschool care, and family support

activities.

A Dissenting Voice

Dire predictions of a coming wave of juvenile violence are of little value because they are based on

faulty assumptions and incomplete data, a California

law professor believes. Franklin E. Zimring, the

William G. Simon Professor of Law and director of

the Earl Warren Legal Institute at the University of

California at Berkeley School of Law, has contended

that “[u]sing demographic statistics to project how

many kids are going to commit homicide [has] extremely limited utility.”30

Generally, “homicides by kids are not well observed

by the data,” he said. “The data focus only on youth

arrests, not on total incidents, victims, or perpetrators. The overall incidence of homicide, which is

variable and cyclical, is still a much better predictor

of future violence than assumptions based on demographic shifts.” Moreover, Zimring said, Fox and

DiIulio are basing their predictions on an assumption that a certain percentage of youth will become

criminal offenders. In an essay published by the Los

Angeles Times, Zimring writes:

When asked the basis for [his prediction],

DiIulio points to studies that have shown about

6 percent of all boys are responsible for about

half of all the police contacts with minors. In

the most important study in Philadelphia, boys

in this 6 percent were classified as chronic delinquents because they had five or more police

contacts for any cause. Some of these Philadelphia kids had committed violent acts; many

had not. In other studies set in smaller cities,

almost no life-threatening violence showed up

in the youth samples that were responsible for

the majority of all police contacts . . . . No

study of any youth population supports

[DiIulio’s] projection of predatory violence.31

Though only time will tell whether DiIulio and

Fox’s predictions will become a reality, juvenile violence has been and continues to be a major concern

for policymakers at every level of government. Even

with the recent leveling in violent juvenile arrests,

the dimensions of the problem are far greater than

they were a decade ago.

29. DiIulio has put the figure at 40 million. Butterfield, supra

note 27.

30. Franklin E. Zimring, Presentation at National Criminal

Justice Association Annual Meeting (May 30, 1996).

31. Franklin E. Zimring, Crying Wolf Over Teen Demons, L.A.

TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at A17.
9

Chapter II

Issues and Trends in State Juvenile Justice

Reform

section when discussing local laws that hold parents

criminally responsible for their children’s misconduct

and delinquent behavior.

Prevention

Delinquency prevention efforts are considered by

many to be crucial to the development of a consistent

and comprehensive approach to the problem of

youth crime and delinquency. Traditionally, evaluations have lacked empirical support of prevention

programs’ impact on juvenile misconduct. Today,

however, a growing body of research supports the

idea of delinquency prevention as both a practical

and cost-effective means of reducing youth misbehavior. Even so, policymakers continue to debate the

efficacy of these “front end” programs that claim to

avert crime, as opposed to “get tough” sanctions that

purportedly deter youth violence and delinquency.

Delinquency prevention efforts are broad based,

and their impact sometimes is difficult to gauge precisely. They touch on almost every aspect of public

policy that addresses children’s issues, including

programs traditionally associated with education,

housing, law enforcement, or health and human services-related agencies. Programs that are preventive

in nature can focus on children of any age. Other

programs may concentrate on the parents of these

children or on the communities in which they live.

Current discussions centered on juvenile crime prevention focus on several key components in an effort

to define what programs are most effective in discouraging youth misbehavior. The first relates to the

notion of providing a continuum of services to youth

at different stages of the child welfare and juvenile

justice systems, providing both assistance and sanctions appropriate to individual children in individual

Introduction

States have responded with increasing urgency to

the problems presented by violent youth behavior.

Nearly every State in the past 2 years has enacted

legislation changing the way juvenile justice is

implemented. From programs that help prevent a

child’s misbehavior from evolving to more delinquent and violent acts to those that allow juveniles

to be tried and sentenced in adult criminal court,

States have responded in a variety of ways to the

challenges inherent in combating youth crime.

Presented here are juvenile justice initiatives that

have been undertaken by many States in the past few

years. They are discussed in an order that lends itself

to the notion of providing a continuum of services to

high-risk delinquent youth or responding to juvenile

delinquency with sanctions that are both immediate

and reflective of the nature of the crime committed.

The topics are juvenile crime prevention, curfews,

combating youth gangs, parental responsibility laws,

juvenile boot camps, youth and guns, opening juvenile records and proceedings, juvenile transfer to

criminal court, and expanded sentencing authority.

It should be noted that although this report focuses

primarily on State-level responses to juvenile crime,

some consideration of local measures to address

youth violence (both as offender and victim) and

delinquency is presented. A discussion of curfew

laws is included, for example, even though curfew

restrictions are overwhelmingly imposed by local

jurisdictions, because of the number of localities that

have enacted curfew ordinances in an effort to preserve public safety. Further, local responses to juvenile crime are presented in the gang section when

describing multijurisdictional collaboration to combat gang violence and in the parental responsibility
10

situations. According to the U.S. Department of

Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention (OJJDP), the need for intervention

may arise long before a child’s initial contact with

the juvenile justice system. For example, families

and schools should respond immediately when a

youth starts to misbehave at school or if his or her

grades begin to suffer. It is hoped that immediate

intervention will help remedy antisocial behaviors

before they become more disruptive, criminal, or

violent in nature.32 According to a recent report on

State-level juvenile justice policies by the National

Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), “Research shows that youths commit the most serious

delinquent acts during their teen years and early

adulthood, and that the earlier a juvenile commits a

violent offense, the more likely he or she will commit

crimes as an adult. But other less serious infractions—such as shoplifting, running away, staying

out late, sexual promiscuity, and vandalism—occur

much earlier and frequently are predictive of future

patterns of delinquent behavior.”33

These immediate intervention efforts involve all of

the core institutions that contribute to a youth’s

environment, according to a recent report by the

President’s Crime Prevention Council (PCPC).

Efforts to curb youth violence should be inclusive of

the various stakeholders living with the problems or

charged with finding solutions to youth crime.

“These stakeholders include families, neighborhood

committees, businesses, landlords, law enforcement

agencies, public and private health and human services providers, educators, and state and local government,” according to the 1995 PCPC report.

“Mobilizing communities—including youth—and

developing stronger ties between community residents, service providers, and law enforcement officials have proven to be critical components of crime

prevention.”34

These ideas of community inclusion and a swift,

appropriate response to juvenile misbehavior

through a strong network of organizations, agencies,

and individuals may sound appealing to those interested in a comprehensive approach to the administration of juvenile justice. However, few States or

localities have the resources to tackle all aspects of

youth violence and crime prevention at once. For

example, a recent article from The Compiler, the

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority’s

publication, describes the challenges of providing

appropriate services to the youth who need them in

that State: “While there are several options available

in Illinois for youthful offenders, ranging from station adjustments to incarceration at the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Juvenile Division, there is

no consistent range of services available to all youth

in the State.” According to the article, “Illinois is not

alone in struggling to find the optimum combination

of punishment, rehabilitation, and prevention programs that will prevent juveniles from reoffending—

or even from committing a crime in the first place.”35

The PCPC recommends that States and localities

searching for the correct balance of services for

troubled youth target their efforts based on the

types of programs that currently exist in a jurisdiction, adding programs that have been shown to have

a positive impact on youth misconduct. However,

what population to target, when, and with what type

of prevention mechanism or alternative sanction are

critical planning questions for policymakers.36

What Works?

More and more research indicates that juvenile

crime and delinquency prevention programs not

only have a positive impact on troubled youth, but

are a good investment when compared with the

costs associated with the behavior of serious, violent,

32. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE

COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC

JUVENILE OFFENDERS 8 (James C. Howell ed., June 1995)

[hereinafter HOWELL GUIDE].

33. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, A

LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE TO COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE,

INTERVENTIONS FOR YOUTH AT RISK (1996) [hereinafter NCSL

LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE].

34. THE PRESIDENT’S CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, PREVENTING

CRIME AND PROMOTING RESPONSIBILITY: 50 PROGRAMS THAT

HELP COMMUNITIES HELP THEIR YOUTH 4 (Sept. 1995).

35. Intervention and Prevention: What’s Available?, THE COMPILER

(Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Chicago, Ill.),

Summer 1996, at 14.

36. Id. at 5.
11

and chronic juvenile offenders. A recent literature

review identified prevention programs that provide

positive influences in the lives of youth who misbehave or act out. Evaluations and assessments of

these programs varied in design, making a ranking

or comparison of their efficacy impossible. However,

OJJDP was able to identify several programs that

were proven effective through empirical evaluations

and several that were potentially promising based on

less rigorous research designs.

Programs that consistently demonstrated positive

effects on youth at risk of developing delinquent

behavior include those that strengthen the institutions

of school and family in the life of the youth, such as

smaller class sizes in early years of education; tutoring

and cooperative learning; classroom behavior management, behavioral monitoring, and reinforcement of

school attendance, progress, and behavior; parent

training and family counseling; and youth employment and vocational training programs.37

Programs considered promising include conflict resolution and violence prevention curriculums in schools;

peer mediation; mentoring relationships; community

service for delinquent youth; restrictions on the sale,

purchase, and possession of guns; and intensified

motorized patrol and community policing.38

Traditionally, policymakers have found it difficult to

support programs that are not guaranteed to produce a definitive result—unlike incarceration, for

example—when public concern about crime and

safety is high. “In State capitols as well, it’s difficult

to support expenditures that might reduce crime and

prison costs in years to come when voters are clamoring for action now,” according to a recent article

on youth crime prevention initiatives in State Legislatures magazine.39 However, research as early as a

1984 study conducted by Vanderbilt University indicates that it is worth making an investment in frontend programs. The university’s analysis of various

Los Angeles County delinquency prevention programs indicated that prevention saved $1.40 for

every $1 invested.40

The RAND Corporation released a study in June

1996 that supported Vanderbilt University’s results.

The study, titled Diverting Children from a Life of Crime:

Measuring the Costs and Benefits, found that programs

aimed at helping juvenile offenders before they become repeat felons may be a more cost-effective

approach to reducing crime than the “three-strikesand-you’re-out” sentencing laws that have become

so popular in recent years.

Working under the assumption that juvenile delinquency and behavioral problems are strongly linked

to criminality later in life, RAND studied programs

intended to prevent or help resolve earlier youth

misconduct while simultaneously avoiding the costs

of adjudicating and imprisoning some offenders

later. For the report, RAND researchers examined

pilot programs in four selected categories and evaluated their success in deterring crime among juveniles

and adults, the short- and long-term impacts of the

pilot programs, and their cost effectiveness. Four

kinds of programs were under consideration, including programs in which (1) child care professionals

visit children under the age of 3 at home, followed

by 4 years of sponsored daycare and guidance to

parents to prevent abuse and neglect; (2) parents of

school children beginning to show signs of aggression and behavioral problems are trained; (3) cash

and other incentives are offered for disadvantaged

high schoolers to complete their diplomas; and (4)

high school students who have already exhibited

delinquent behavior are monitored and supervised.

Relatively small programs and limited data form

much of the basis of the report’s comparisons, the

RAND Corporation notes, but the study’s findings

are significant enough to warrant further, more extensive trials. The authors attempted to compensate

for problems with the data by using conservative

estimates and factoring in expenses for applying

programs on a larger scale than previously attempted.

For purposes of comparison, the report calculated the

average cost of each program per serious crime prevented, then tallied the number of serious crimes

37. HOWELL GUIDE, supra note 32, at 127–128.

38. Id. at 128.

39. Ounce of Prevention, STATE LEGISLATURES (National Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.), May 1995, at 14–16.

40. Id.
12

prevented per $1 million spent. Some 60 crimes were

prevented annually per $1 million spent on threestrikes laws, compared with the estimated 258 crimes

prevented per $1 million spent on graduation incentives and the estimated 157 crimes prevented if the

same amount were invested in parent training. The

report also suggested that 72 crimes could be prevented for each $1 million spent annually on supervision of delinquents. Because of its high cost, the

home visits and daycare program was estimated to

prevent just 11 crimes annually per $1 million spent.

The report predicted that three-strikes laws would

reduce serious crime by 21 percent at a cost of

$5.5 billion annually if fully implemented. Another

22-percent reduction in serious crime could theoretically be reached through graduated incentives and

parent training at an additional annual cost of less

than $1 billion. The programs have not been tested

in combination with each other and with three-strikes

laws, and the cost-efficiency analyses are based on

“crude approximations,” according to the authors.

But the report recommended a test of the three programs—graduated incentives, parent training, and

supervision of delinquents—in combination to see

if its prediction holds up.41

Recent State Action

State initiatives indicate policymakers consider prevention efforts important components of successful juvenile

justice systems. Two themes emerge when considering

recent crime prevention enactments: promoting a community-based, public-/private-sector response to juvenile delinquency, often with unique sources of funding

and support, and utilizing school-based programs and

activities in the development and implementation of

youth violence prevention initiatives.

The Illinois Violence Prevention Act of 1995 created

the Illinois Violence Prevention Authority to coordinate statewide violence prevention efforts, raise

funds for State and community organizations that

address violence prevention in a comprehensive and

collaborative manner, and provide technical assistance and training to help build the capacity of communities, organizations, and systems to develop,

implement, and evaluate violence prevention initiatives.42 The act also created a Violence Prevention

Fund, consisting of appropriations and grants from

Federal, State, or private sources set aside specifically for violence prevention. In addition, the act

established a unique funding source for violence

prevention efforts—revenue from the issuance of

violence prevention license plates. Of the $40 the

State charges for the license plates, $25 will be deposited into the Violence Prevention Fund. For each

renewal, the State charges $27, of which $25 will be

deposited into the fund.43

Comprehensive juvenile justice reform in Missouri

and Oregon created tax incentives for individuals

and organizations to become involved in the youth

crime and delinquency prevention effort. The State

of Missouri enacted the Youth Opportunities and

Violence Prevention Act, which provides a tax credit

for individuals and corporations that make monetary

or physical contributions to public or private initiatives that establish, implement, or expand various

education and employment programs for youth.

Examples of these programs include those that encourage school dropouts to reenroll in school, employment and internship programs targeting youth

living in poverty and high-crime areas, mentoring

and role model programs, drug and alcohol abuse

prevention training, conflict resolution and mediation programs, and youth outreach and counseling.44

The Oregon initiative, the First Break Program,

gives tax incentives to employers that hire juveniles

at risk for delinquent behavior. Youth qualified for

participation are those who are certified by various

community-based organizations to be prone to becoming gang involved or gang affected.45

School-based initiatives to fight delinquency have

also become popular in recent legislative sessions. A

Mississippi measure seeks to facilitate collaboration

among schools, families, and local agencies involved

41. Three Strikes Laws Used Rarely; Effectiveness in Doubt, JUSTICE

BULLETIN (National Criminal Justice Association, Washington,

D.C.), Dec. 1996 (citing Peter Greenwood et al., THE RAND

CORPORATION, DIVERTING CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF CRIME:

MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS (1996)).

42. 20 ILL. REV. STAT. 4027/15 (West Supp. 1996).

43. 625 ILL. REV. STAT. 5/3–629 (West Supp. 1996).

44. MO. REV. STAT. § 135.460 (Supp. 1996).

45. OR. REV. STAT. § 315.259 (Supp. 1996).
13

46. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37–3–85 (Supp. 1996).

47. Misunderstood Youth, ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1996, at 26.

48. Tamara Henry, Curfews Attempt to Curb Teen Crime, USA

TODAY, Apr. 5, 1995.

49. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33.

50. Cities with Curfews Trying to Meet Constitutional Test, WASH.

POST, Dec. 26, 1995.

51. William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynolds, Curfews and

Delinquency in Major American Cities, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY

347, 355–358 (July 1995).

in youth development activities and to provide a

cost-effective response to youth misbehavior before

it escalates and warrants more expensive crisis intervention. The Save Our Students (SOS) program

was created to award grants to community-based

organizations to provide afterschool mentoring and

activities for school-aged youth. The primary goals

of the SOS program are reducing juvenile crime;

improving the attitudes, behavior, and academic

performance of youth; and improving coordination

of existing resources to provide services to youth

effectively and efficiently. The statute defines specifically the requirements that qualified communitybased organizations must adhere to in qualifying for

funds under this State Department of Educationadministered program.46

Other initiatives that focus on providing positive

activities for youth have been undertaken by a number of States and localities and have shown positive

results. The development and implementation of a

late-night basketball program developed recently

throughout the State of Maryland was associated

with a 60-percent drop in drug-related crime. When

funding shortages limited the recreational programs

available to youth in Phoenix, Arizona, the incidence

of juvenile crime decreased on evenings that activities, such as youth basketball, were available and

went up on nonactivity evenings.47

Strengthening and enforcing age-old compulsory

school attendance laws are other ways States are

trying to prevent delinquent behavior that occurs

when children skip school. A Rhode Island initiative

allows parents of truant youth to be fined $50 per

absent day, with a possible $500 fine and a 6-month

prison term if the youth’s truancy exceeds 30 school

days during the academic year.

Curfew

Curfews have reemerged recently as a popular option for policymakers in their efforts to deter juvenile victimization and delinquency. Imposed on and

off since the turn of the century, curfews tend to

receive increased attention when there is a perceived

need for more stringent efforts at social control. For

example, curfew ordinances were originally enacted

in the 1890’s to decrease crime among immigrant

youth. During World War II, curfews were perceived as an effective control for parents who were

busy helping with the war effort. More recent interest in juvenile curfew ordinances came as a response

to growing juvenile crime during the 1970’s.48

Many States have laws enabling localities to enact

curfew ordinances, with Georgia, Minnesota, Ohio,

Tennessee, and Texas recently enacting laws of this

sort, according to NCSL.49 Only Hawaii has enacted

statewide curfew legislation. Both California and

Florida have debated the idea of adopting statewide

curfew legislation, but neither State has enacted any

legislation to that end.

Traditionally under the jurisdiction of local governments, curfews are commonplace in cities and towns

across America, according to the U.S. Conference of

Mayors. In a December 1995 survey of 1,000 cities

with populations of more than 30,000, the conference found that 70 percent, or 270 of the 387 cities

responding, have a curfew ordinance in place. An

additional 6 percent, or 23 cities, were considering

adopting curfew legislation, according to the survey.50 Cities that have enacted new curfew ordinances or have amended existing curfew legislation

since 1994 include Arlington, VA; Austin, TX; Baltimore, MD; Buffalo, NY; Phoenix, AZ; Oklahoma

City, OK; and San Jose, CA.51

Curfew laws vary with respect to the locale affected,

timeframe, and sanctions. Most restrict minors to

their homes or property between the hours of 11

p.m. and 6 a.m., with some jurisdictions allowing

exceptions for weekend nights or summer months.

Many curfew ordinances provide exemptions for

youth who are going to or from a school-, religious-,

or civic-sponsored event. Youth traveling from
14

places of employment or responding to emergencies

often are excluded from curfew provisions as well.

Several ordinances allow unrestricted mobility for

youth who are married, accompanied by an adult, or

traveling with a parent’s permission.

In addition, some curfew laws impose more stringent curfew parameters in specific zones of the city,

usually in targeted high-crime or commercially important areas. A recent example of this type comes

from the city of Austin where, in 1994, the city

council took action to limit youth activity in the

nightclub district of the city. In that area, the curfew

begins at 10 p.m. each night, compared with the

11:30 p.m. curfew for the rest of Austin.52

Enforcement efforts also differ from city to city.

William Ruefle, then of the University of South Alabama, and Kenneth Mike Reynolds, of the University of New Orleans, found in a recent literature

review and survey of existing curfew ordinances

that curfew enforcement initiatives are implemented

through regular law enforcement and special policing units. The 1994 survey, which polled 77 U.S.

police departments in cities with populations of

200,000 or more, indicates that 71 percent of the

cities with curfew ordinances used regular law enforcement personnel and resources to implement the

cities’ curfew initiatives. The remaining police departments frequently used additional personnel to

augment regular enforcement, according to the survey. These added officers contributed to periodic

sweeps or “zero tolerance” crackdown efforts in

which law enforcement personnel were pulled from

other assignments for short periods to strongly enforce a curfew ordinance.53

Sanctions for curfew violations, which are status

offenses for juveniles, also may vary among jurisdictions. Offenders can be fined from $50 to several

hundred dollars or charged with a misdemeanor.

Some ordinances include a parental accountability

provision, under which parents can be held partially

or fully responsible for children’s curfew violations.

Sanctions against parents may include participation

in diversion programs, fines, and, in some jurisdictions, jail time. For example, the 1994 curfew ordinance in Denver, CO, does not mandate a fine be

levied against parents whose children violate the

city’s curfew ordinance. Rather, the law provides for

the assessment of a fine only if the youth and their

parents fail to participate in a court-assigned diversion program.54

Pros and Cons

The stated goal of most curfew laws is twofold: to

prevent juvenile crime and to protect youth from

victimization. According to the Ruefle and Reynolds

analysis, those who support juvenile curfews indicate that neighborhoods afflicted with high rates of

crime may use curfews as a “means to protect nondelinquent youth from crime and to deny delinquent

youth the opportunity to engage in criminal behavior.”55 By keeping youth under the age of 18 off the

street, curfews are expected to reduce the incidence

of crime among the cohort most likely to offend,

according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s

(FBI’s) 1994 Uniform Crime Report (UCR).56 Since

juvenile perpetrators of crime often take as their

victims other youth, it is hoped that rates of youth

victimization will drop as well.

Curfews are credited by some with restoring and

maintaining order in lower crime neighborhoods,

according to the Ruefle and Reynolds analysis. In

addition to equipping law enforcement with tools to

keep youth off the streets, curfews provide parents

with a legitimate, legal basis for restricting the activities of their children. It is easier for parents to

place boundaries on their children’s activities, proponents argue, when other youth in the neighborhood are similarly restricted by a specific time to

return home.57

Critics of curfew ordinances oppose these initiatives

on both practical and legal grounds. According to

the National Council on Crime and Delinquency

52. Id. at 358.

53. Id.

54. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN,

CURFEW: AN ANSWER TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND VICTIMIZATION 4 (April 1996) [hereinafter CURFEW].

55. Id. at 349.

56. 1994 UCR, supra note 3, at 221.

57. Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 51, at 348.
15

(NCCD), curfew enforcement is often ineffective

and unnecessarily funnels large numbers of nondelinquent youth into a criminal justice system that is

already inundated with alleged offenders.58 In addition, some opponents cite a dearth of empirical evidence supporting the efficacy of curfew legislation.

According to the literature review conducted by

Ruefle and Reynolds, little or no recent empirical

evidence indicates that curfew initiatives have an

effect on juvenile crime, nor has research addressed

the impact of curfews and their enforcement on the

criminal justice system as a whole.59

The one outcome evaluation uncovered by Ruefle

and Reynolds described the efficacy of a Detroit,

MI, curfew ordinance evaluated during the summer

of 1976. The before-and-after comparison of youth

gangs indicated that the presence of a curfew seemed

to reduce or suppress crime levels effectively during

curfew hours. However, the authors note that this

diminished incidence of youth misbehavior while

under curfew was accompanied by an observable

increase in criminal activity between 2 and 4 p.m.

Thus, it appears as if youth misconduct was merely

displaced to time periods when the curfew ordinance

was not in effect.60

Additional criticisms come from other groups, like

the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who

argue that curfew measures violate the constitutional rights of children and parents. Legal challenges to the constitutionality of curfew laws are

most often based on the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 14th

amendments to the U.S. Constitution, according to a

recent report by OJJDP. Opponents of curfew

ordinances are concerned with the restrictive nature

of these laws and the limitations on a youth’s first

amendment right to free speech and association.

Others argue that curfews give law enforcement

excessive power to detain children without probable

cause and subject them to police questioning in violation of the fourth amendment’s guarantees against

unreasonable search and seizure. Additional legal

challenges to curfew laws have been based on the

ninth amendment, which has been interpreted as

providing a privacy right applicable to parents rearing children. Yet other critics argue that curfews

violate the equal protection clause of the 14th

amendment by establishing a suspect classification

based solely on the age of a group of individuals.61

Some groups, like NCCD, fear that this classification may result in a disparate enforcement of curfew

initiatives, to the detriment of minority youth.62 Further, some court cases have struck down curfew

laws because they are vague and overreaching, not

because they violate fundamental rights.

Judicial Interpretation of the

Constitutionality of Curfews

U.S. district and appellate court decisions indicate

that the critical issue in cases challenging curfew ordinances may be maintaining the intricate balance between the government’s interest in protecting public

safety and ensuring the mobility rights of youth. A

recent case in Texas illustrates this problem. In May

1994, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an

appeal of a case, Qutb v. Bartlett, in which the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a Dallas, TX, curfew ordinance. The refusal to hear the

case allowed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to stand.

The ordinance, adopted by the city in June 1991,

prohibits persons under the age of 17 from being

present in a public place or establishment between

11 p.m. and 6 a.m. on weeknights and between midnight and 6 a.m. on weekends. The law does not

apply if the juvenile is traveling to or from work,

church, or a civic event; if the juvenile is accompanied by a parent or guardian; if there is an emergency; if the juvenile is running an errand for a

parent or guardian; or if the juvenile is on the sidewalk in front of his or her home. The maximum penalty for violating the ordinance is a $500 fine. The

minor’s parent also may be fined if he or she allows a

minor to remain in any public place during the curfew.

In Qutb v. Bartlett, a mother and daughter challenged

the ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance

unconstitutionally infringed upon a youth’s right to

58. Id. at 347.

59. Id. at 350.

60. Id. at 351.

61. CURFEW, supra note 54, at 7.

62. Ruefle & Reynolds, supra note 51, at 347.
16

mobility and free association and a parent’s fundamental privacy interest in choosing how children are

to be raised.

The Federal district court ruled in favor of the

Qutbs. However, the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling

that an ordinance may be constitutional, even when

it infringes upon a fundamental right, if it promotes

a compelling governmental interest and if no less

restrictive way exists to achieve the State’s objective.

The court held that the Dallas City Council proved

its compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime by

providing statistical findings that showed the incidence of youth misconduct in the city. The data provided demographic information about the prevalence

of juvenile delinquency, the incidence of specific

crimes, and the times of day and locations at which

most violent juvenile crimes were committed. This

effort, combined with the numerous exceptions written in the ordinance, indicated to the court the

council’s intent of limiting youth crime and victimization in the least restrictive manner possible. The

court concluded that “the ordinance presents only a

minimal intrusion into the parents’ rights” because

of the broad exemptions.63

The Court’s refusal to hear an appeal in the Qutb

case does not guarantee protection against future

challenges to curfews on constitutional or nonconstitutional grounds. However, a more recent ruling

out of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California upheld that city’s more stringent

curfew legislation based upon the Qutb precedent. In

March 1995, ACLU filed a suit in San Diego Federal court challenging the city’s juvenile curfew ordinance on the grounds that it unreasonably restricted

the mobility of youth in the city. The ACLU suit

came in response to 6 months of aggressive enforcement of the curfew legislation in late 1994. From

June to November of that year, 2,300 young people

were arrested for curfew violations, an increase from

the 1,000 charged with a violation during that same

period in 1993.64

The Federal district court upheld the 10 p.m. curfew

ordinance in December 1995. According to the court,

the city has a legal right to impose ordinances meant to

“promote the moral, social, and physical welfare of

minors” by keeping them off the streets.65 At the time

of this writing, ACLU was appealing the judgment.

An October 1996 decision handed down by the U.S.

District Court for the District of Columbia illustrates

the significance of obtaining relevant data to support

the position that a curfew ordinance fulfills a public

safety need. In Hutchins v. District of Columbia,

66 a

group of minors, parents, and a commercial establishment sued the District of Columbia to restrain the

city from enforcing its Juvenile Curfew Act of 1995.

Under the law, minors under the age of 17 could not

be in any public place or on the premises of any establishment, with certain exceptions, in the District of

Columbia, on Sunday through Thursday between 11

p.m. and 6 a.m. and between midnight and 6 a.m. on

weekends and during the summer.

None of the plaintiffs who commenced the action

were prosecuted under the curfew law, but the minors argued that the imposition of the law violated

their constitutional rights to freedom of movement

while their parents asserted that the law infringed

upon their fundamental rights to raise and supervise

their children. The plaintiffs contended that because

the law violated protected fundamental rights, the

District of Columbia must show that the law was

necessary to promote a compelling interest and that

it was narrowly tailored to advance that purpose.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

found that both the minors and parents had protected fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution and analyzed the curfew law to determine

whether the District of Columbia law was constitutional. The court found that the District of Columbia

had a compelling interest in enacting the law because the three objectives were to (1) protect children from becoming victims or perpetrators of

crimes, (2) assist parents in exercising their responsibility over minors, and (3) prevent all persons

from the dangers posed by unsupervised minors

who are out late at night and in the early morning.

63. Qutb v. Bartlett, 11 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 1993).

64. ACLU Challenges San Diego’s Curfew Law; Lawsuit Filed in Federal Court on Behalf of Teenagers, Parents, Press Release by American Civil Liberties Union, March 15, 1995.

65. Tony Perry, Teen Curfew in San Diego Upheld, L.A. TIMES, Dec.

19, 1995.

66. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.

1996).
17

The court found, however, that although the District

of Columbia had a compelling interest in enacting

the law, it was drawn broadly without consideration

of less restrictive means to achieve the three aims of

the curfew law. The Federal district court was critical of the data compiled by the District of Columbia

and concerned with the city’s inability to show that

the enactment of a curfew ordinance would preserve

public safety. In drafting the law, the City Council

relied on “extrapolated” crime statistics that did not

distinguish between crimes committed by juveniles

or the time of day that the crimes occurred. In other

words, the statistics did not demonstrate a clear

connection between the stated purpose of the law

and the restriction imposed upon all juveniles. The

court also found that the data that the District of

Columbia relied upon was flawed. The data included

18-year-olds as minors, whereas the curfew law considered those under 17 years of age as minors. Further, the majority of the data was based upon

Federal statistics rather than local statistics. In fact,

the court indicated that the District of Columbia

ignored data showing that more than 90 percent of

all juveniles do not commit crimes and are not arrested at night or at any other time.

As a result, the court found that the District of

Columbia’s evidence was insufficient to support the

imposition of a curfew on all minors as a means to

reduce juvenile crime and victimization and that the

law was not narrowly drawn to achieve the purpose

of the curfew law. Consequently, the court found

that the law impermissibly interfered with a minor’s

right of freedom of movement and a parent’s right to

raise and supervise his or her minor children and

held that the curfew law was unconstitutional.

Recent Initiatives

Although empirical studies addressing the impact of

juvenile curfew ordinances have not yet been undertaken, officials of several localities that recently

adopted curfew legislation have self-reported success

since the introduction of these initiatives into their

communities. For example, 3 months after the enactment of the Dallas curfew ordinance, the Dallas Police Department found that juvenile victimization

during curfew hours declined by 17.7 percent and

juvenile arrests during curfew hours dropped by 14.6

percent, according to the recent OJJDP report.67

New Orleans, which has enacted one of the strictest

curfew ordinances in the country, also reports a significant decrease in juvenile crime since its curfew

ordinance went into effect in May 1994. The dusk-todawn curfew, enacted in response to an escalating

level of violent crime involving juveniles as both perpetrators and victims, was influential in decreasing

the incidence of youth crime arrests by 27 percent the

year after its adoption. In that same time period,

armed robbery arrests decreased by 33 percent and

auto theft arrests decreased by 42 percent.68

A curfew ordinance in Long Beach, CA, amended in

January 1994, has enjoyed similar success. In an

attempt to meet the needs of the city’s growing

population and thwart escalating gang activity, Long

Beach officials established a 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew

law. The ordinance led to a 14-percent decrease in

the average number of crimes committed per hour in

1994, compared with 1993. Gang-related shootings

decreased in that time period as well, down nearly

23 percent. However, Chief William Ellis of the

Long Beach Police Department acknowledged that

Long Beach has experienced displacement of youth

delinquency. “In Long Beach,” Ellis said, “approximately twice as many crimes per hour are committed

during noncurfew hours as during curfew hours.”69

Effective curfew programs share several components. Two of the keys to the success of any curfew

ordinance are sustained enforcement and community involvement, according to the OJJDP report.

Curfew laws are less successful when they are enforced rigorously immediately after adoption, but

become more loosely enforced as limited law enforcement resources and personnel are pushed into

other policing efforts. City officials ensure a program’s success by making a long-term commitment

to enforcement and by enlisting volunteers to fill out

paperwork, wait for parents to pick up their children,

or give on-the-spot counseling to parents and children.

67. CURFEW, supra note 54, at 4–5.

68. Id. at 7.

69. Chief Samuel D. Pratcher, A Response to Juvenile Curfew Violations, 61 POLICE CHIEF 58, 58 (Dec. 1994).
18

Other factors that contribute to the implementation

of successful curfew policies include:

◆ Establishing a curfew center or using recreational, religious, or educational facilities to hold

violators while they await their parents.

◆ Staffing centers with community social service

providers and volunteers; providing intervention

services for juveniles and their families.

◆ Creating specific procedures for repeat offenders;

recreational, educational, and job opportunities

for offenders; and antidrug and antigang programs.

◆ Providing a hotline for community questions or

problems related to curfews and juvenile delinquency in general.

Parental Responsibility Laws

Susan and Anthony Provenzino of St. Clair Shores,

MI, knew their 16-year-old son, Alex, was troubled.

His first arrest occurred in May 1995, and in the

year that followed, he continued his delinquent behavior by committing burglary, drinking alcohol,

and using and selling marijuana. Alex was difficult

at home as well, verbally abusing his parents and

once attacking his father with a golf club. Although

the Provenzinos were disturbed by Alex’s behavior,

they supported his release from juvenile custody

during the fall of 1995, fearing he would be mistreated in the youth facility where he was detained—

a facility where juveniles charged with more violent

crimes were housed.70

It is unlikely that the Provenzinos expected to be

the first parents tried and convicted of violating a

2-year-old St. Clair Shores ordinance that places an

affirmative responsibility on parents to “. . . exercise

reasonable control over their children.”71 On May 5,

1996, however, after a jury deliberated only 15 minutes, the Provenzinos were convicted of violating the

parental accountability ordinance. They were each

fined $100 and ordered to pay an additional $1,000

in court fees.72

The Provenzino case brought national attention to a

growing trend at both State and local levels to combat youth crime: the enactment of parental responsibility laws imposing liability on parents for the delinquent behavior of their children. Caught somewhere between prevention and punishment for both

children and parents, these laws attempt to involve

parents in the lives of their children by holding them

civilly and/or criminally liable for their children’s

actions. Penalties for violation of these laws include

increased participation by parents in juvenile proceedings; financial responsibility for restitution payments and court costs; financial responsibility for

detention, treatment, and supervisory costs; participation in treatment, counseling, or other diversion

programs; and criminal responsibility and possible

jail time for parents found negligent in their supervision. Although the effectiveness of these laws has

not been evaluated in a systematic way, the notion of

parental responsibility has attracted broad support.

Various types of legislation mandating a minimum

level of parental responsibility have been a part of

this Nation’s history since its inception. The objective of these laws is to impose affirmative duties on

parents to provide necessities for the youth in their

custody and to ensure they do not abuse or abandon

their children. According to P. Thomas Mason, in

his article “Child Abuse and Neglect,” States have

established criminal sanctions against parents who

have abused, severely neglected, or abandoned their

children since the early years of American history.73

Other related efforts to establish a minimum standard of parenting include compulsory school attendance laws and criminal nonsupport laws.74

Tort liability for damages caused by delinquent

youth is yet another way States traditionally have

held parents accountable for the misdeeds of their

children. Typically, tort law varies from State to

70. Jill Smolowe, Parenting on Trial, TIME, May 20, 1996, at 50.

71. Id.

72. Robin Meredith, Michigan Parents Convicted for Youth’s Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996.

73. Howard Davidson, No Consequences—Re-examining Parental

Responsibility Laws, 7 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (citing

P. Thomas Mason, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix and Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293–302

(1972)).

74. Id.
19

State regarding the monetary thresholds on damages

collected, the age limit of the child, and the inclusion

of personal injury in the tort claim. Hawaii was the

first State to enact such legislation in 1846, and its

law remains one of the most broadly applied in that

it does not limit the financial bounds of recovery and

imposes liability for both negligent and intentional

torts by underage persons.75 Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and New Jersey also do not place a limit

on the amount of recovery. Today, all States but New

Hampshire and New York have provisions holding

parents civilly responsible for youth crime, with an

average maximum recovery amount of $4,100.76

Legislation holding parents criminally responsible for

the delinquent acts of their children quickly followed

the enactment of civil liability and neglect-type statutes. In 1903, Colorado became the first State to

establish the crime of contributing to the delinquency

of a minor (CDM). Supporters of CDM statutes

believe that the conditions within the family are the

most predictive component of a child’s behavior and

that it is the responsibility of the parent to provide

sufficient positive guidance to children on the importance of adhering to the values of society at large.

This type of legislation quickly gained popular support, and since the enactment of the Colorado initiative, at least 42 States and the District of Columbia

have passed similar legislation.77 One of the oldest of

such laws, an amended CDM statute from California, includes misdemeanor sanctions against parents

who fail “. . . to exercise reasonable care, supervision,

protection and control over their children.”78 The

California law was expanded in 1988 as a component

of a larger, antigang initiative undertaken by the

State. Violation of the provision brings a misdemeanor

charge and may include a fine no greater than $2,500

and a 1-year prison term. In 1995, Arizona, Louisiana, and Wyoming enacted comparable laws creating

a crime of “improper” or “negligent” parental supervision, with misdemeanor sanctions similar to the law

in California.

Some States have taken action to hold parents liable

when children gain access to a firearm, but their provisions vary in language and parental intent requirements. At least nine States hold adults criminally

responsible for storing a loaded firearm in such a

way as to allow a minor to gain access. Some of these

provisions include an enhanced penalty if the minor

causes injury or death to himself or another person

and create exceptions for parental liability when the

minor gains access to a weapon by unlawful entry

into the home or place of storage or if the firearm is

used in self-defense. In addition, 13 States have provisions that create criminal liability when a custodial

adult or parent is aware that his or her child possesses a firearm unlawfully and does not take action

to prevent the possession.79 Typically, penalties levied on parents for violation of safe storage laws are

misdemeanors, but parents found guilty of these

crimes in California, Connecticut, and Florida are

subject to felony charges under some circumstances.80

While some States impose criminal liability on parents of delinquent youth, many more have enacted

less stringent types of parental responsibility laws in

the past 2 years. For example, some accountability

initiatives require increased parental involvement in

juvenile proceedings. Recent initiatives in Kansas,

Michigan, and Texas require parents to attend the

hearings of children adjudicated delinquent or face

contempt charges. New legislation in Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, and West Virginia amends existing

laws to require parents to pay the court costs associated with these proceedings.

Some States impose financial responsibility on parents for the costs incurred by the State when youth

are processed through the juvenile justice system.

New laws from Florida, Idaho, Indiana, North

Carolina, and Virginia require parents to reimburse

75. Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of Their Children: Parental

Responsibility for Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS

& PUB. POL’Y 307 (1991).

76. Elizabeth Pearson, Parental Responsibility Laws: An Overview 62 (Aug. 6, 1996) (unpublished M. Public Affairs thesis,

University of Colorado) (on file with author).

77. Id.

78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988).

79. MODEL JUVENILE HANDGUN CODE 36 (National Criminal

Justice Ass’n, Unpublished Draft 1995) [hereinafter MODEL

HANDGUN CODE].

80. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISBRIEF,

KIDS, GUNS, AND ACCIDENTS: TAKING RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 1993).
20

the State for the costs associated with the care, support, detention, or treatment of their children while

under the supervision of State agencies. Further,

measures from Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, and

Oklahoma require parents to undertake restitution

payments when children are not financially able to

compensate their victims.

Initiatives to encourage parent and child togetherness are yet another approach incorporated into

parental responsibility legislation in some States. In

the past 2 years, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas have enacted legislation that requires parents and children to participate in

community service activities after the youth has

been in trouble with the law. In addition, new laws

in Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,

North Carolina, North Dakota, and Oregon require

parents to attend counseling or other court-ordered

treatment programs. Recent legislation in Arkansas,

Colorado, Texas, and Wisconsin requires adult participation in parent training and responsibility

courses. Often, involvement in these types of programs is a diversion option, with participation deferring any further punitive sanction from the court.

While many States have embraced the idea of holding parents responsible for the actions of their children—at least 36 States have mandated some type of

responsibility provision beyond civil liability for

parents or guardians of delinquent children—others

are critical of the idea, fearing legal challenges and

citing a dearth of empirical evidence supporting the

efficacy of parental responsibility initiatives.

Some legal scholars say legislation that attempts to

define parent behavior is worded vaguely. This

vagueness makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to

understand what type of behavior falls within the

purview of the law. For example, the lack of clarity

of some CDM statutes has led courts in Connecticut, Louisiana, Oregon, and Wyoming to strike

down this type of parental accountability law on

“void for vagueness” grounds. The inability of the

original statute to define practical, realistic, and

comprehensible standards for the court to use consistently in determining parental negligence or incompetence is what led to the laws in these States

being declared unconstitutional.81

Attempts to prescribe parent behavior may violate

the established privacy right in child rearing. This

fundamental right to privacy in family matters was

established by the U.S. Supreme Court with two

cases in the mid-1920’s, Meyer v. Nebraska82 and Pierce

v. Society of Sisters.

83 In each case, the High Court

restricted the State from impinging on parents’ authority to raise a child. In only one case, Williams v.

Garcetti,

84 has the constitutionality of a current parental responsibility law been challenged at the State

level (see sidebar).

To date, no empirical study has been conducted to

support the claim that these laws have an impact on

youth crime. Much of the analysis of parental accountability laws has been limited to readily available data and has lacked the precision of statistical

analysis. For example, Paul Alexander, a judge from

Toledo, OH, tracked more than 1,000 cases of

CDM violations between 1937 and 1946, half of

which involved parents. According to Alexander,

75 percent of the parents pleaded guilty or were

convicted, and of them, 25 percent were sent to

prison as a part of their sentence. Although parents

prosecuted under the statute exhibited some positive change in their parenting skills, the number of

parents arrested steadily increased over the 10-year

period. On the basis of this experience, Alexander

noted: “We find no evidence that punishing parents

has any effect whatsoever on the curbing of juvenile

delinquency... imprisonment means breaking up

the family; fining means depriving the children and

family of sustenance.”85

In addition, a 1963 study undertaken by the U.S.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare examined 16 States that had enacted civil parental

liability statutes and compared the rate of juvenile

crime in those States with those in the rest of the

81. Kathryn Parsley, Constitutional Limitations on State Power to

Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 446, 453 (1991).

82. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

83. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

84. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d. 507 (1993).

85. Geis & Binder, supra note 75, at 319.
21

country. The study revealed that the rate of juvenile

delinquency in the 16 States was slightly higher than

the national average.86

Recent examples of self-reporting, however, offer a

more promising evaluation of parental responsibility

legislation. One well-publicized ordinance was

adopted in Silverton, OR, in the fall of 1995, where

parents are charged with the misdemeanor of “failing to supervise a minor” when a child under the age

of 18 years violates any provision of the Silverton

Municipal Code.87 Although the ordinance had only

86. Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The

Legality of Criminal Parental Responsibility Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L.

REV. 863, 878 (1991).

87. Silverton, Ore., Ordinance 95–117 (1995).

88. Hope Viner Sanborn, Kids’ Crimes Can Send Parents to Jail,

A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 28.

89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272.

been in effect a short time, Silverton Mayor Ken

Hector reported that the community of 6,400 had

experienced a 44.5-percent reduction in juvenile

crime and reduced levels of truancy. Further, school

officials reported increases in the level of involvement of parents with their children.88

Combating Street Gangs

An important piece of the juvenile justice reform

movement in this Nation has been devoted to finding new ways to reduce gang-related crime and

90. Parents Getting Jailed for Kids’ Gang Activities, DENVER POST,

May 7, 1989, at 4A.

91. Gang Member’s Mother Denies ‘Failure’ Charge, L.A. TIMES, May

20, 1989, at 2.

92. Geis & Binder, supra note 75, at 315.

93. Adam Culbreath, Parental Liability Law Upheld in California,

YOUTH LAW NEWS, Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 12.

California’s Statute Prevails Against Constitutional Challenge

When it was shown that Gloria Williams had participated in a parenting course 2 months earlier, however, a local prosecutor indicated that it would violate the spirit of the law to try her because she had

indeed taken steps to control her children by participating in parent education. As a result, the case

against Williams was dropped.92

On behalf of Ms. Williams, Gary Williams, a professor

of law at Loyola University Law School in Los Angeles,

partnered with the ACLU in filing a taxpayers’ lawsuit

in California superior court. The plaintiff’s contention

was that the parental responsibility law was impermissibly vague and infringed upon the established

right to privacy in family matters. Williams contended

that the implementation of the law would be a

waste of taxpayer funds.

Through a series of judgments and appeals, the Supreme Court of California upheld the language of the

legislation, finding that the statute set a reasonable

standard for parents who are making attempts to

guide and control their children and that a statutorily

defined notion of perfect parenting would be both

inflexible and impractical.93

California’s law imposing criminal parental responsibility is one of the most stringent in the Nation. Enacted

in 1988 as part of the Street Terrorism and Prevention

Act, the law amended the State’s CDM law by making

it a crime when parents or guardians do not “... exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and

control” over their children.89

One case from the Los Angeles area brought this provision before the State supreme court. In 1989, Gloria

Williams was the first woman to be charged under the

amended CDM statute. Williams’ then-12-year-old son

was suspected of having participated in a gang rape

of a young girl. When police visited Williams’ home,

they found “...family photo albums [containing] pictures of the 37-year-old Williams posing with gang

members known as ‘Crips,’” and “... pictures of her

4-year-old son pointing a pistol at the camera [and]

spray-painted graffiti adorning the bedroom walls of

the modest stucco house of Williams and her three

children.”90 The investigating detective, after searching

the house, was quoted as saying, “I couldn’t believe

my eyes. In all my 20 years on the police force, I have

never seen anything like this. It was obvious that the

mother was just as much part of the problem because

she condoned this activity.”91
22

violence. A number of States have enacted laws that

enhance the penalties for gang-related offenses, and

many local jurisdictions have adopted ordinances

that are designed to curb or outlaw gang-related

activities. Federal authorities and local law enforcement agencies also have combined resources to create multijurisdictional task forces and other bodies

to investigate and prosecute gang members. Meanwhile, a host of prevention and intervention measures have been implemented in the schools to

dissuade children and adolescents from joining

gangs and engaging in crime and violence.

The term “gang” has no fixed legal meaning.94 Definitions of gangs have varied over time, according to

the perceptions and interests of the definer, academic fashions, and the changing social reality of the

gang. Once even defined as “play groups,” the term

gang has increasingly taken on pejorative connotations. In the most recent view, gangs are considered

more pathological than functional organizations, so

that the term has become almost synonymous with

violent and criminal groups.95 Therefore, inherent in

most recent definitions of a gang is the idea of criminality. Under one definition, a group is considered a

gang if it has a formal organizational structure, identifiable leadership, identifiable territory, and recurrent interaction, and is engaged in serious or violent

criminal behavior. 96

This view of gangs—as pathological and criminal—

underlies many of the initiatives that States and local

jurisdictions have adopted in the past decade. Because many acts of juvenile delinquency are committed by groups, the notion of juvenile delinquency

has become closely associated with gang activity.

Still, without an accepted definition to fall back on,

State and local jurisdictions have tended to develop

their own ideas of what constitutes “gang activity.”

California, for example, defines “criminal street

gang” as an ongoing organization, association, or

group of three or more persons whose primary activities include the commission of one or more serious or violent criminal acts; that has a common

name or identifying sign or symbol; and “whose

members individually or collectively . . . have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.”97

The Spread of Gangs

By the early 1980’s, gangs had sprung up in most of

the large cities in the Nation, especially in the poorer

inner-city and ring-city areas. In 1989, delinquent

gangs were located in almost all 50 States. Together,

35 cities reported 1,439 gangs, with California,

Florida, and Illinois leading the Nation in gang concentrations. Of the total 120,636 gang members

reported in all surveyed cities, 70,000 were estimated to reside in Los Angeles County and 12,000

in Chicago.98 As of 1991, an estimated 4,881 gangs

with 249,324 members existed across the Nation.99

Using the results of a 1993 national survey of law

enforcement agencies, researchers estimated that the

number of gangs jumped 77 percent between 1991

and 1993 to 8,625 gangs. They put the number of

gang members at 378,807 and estimated that there

were 437,066 gang-related crimes. Researchers,

however, noted that the gang-crime problem is underestimated because many cities do not have the

capacity to compile statistics and report on gangrelated criminal activity. If estimates for the missing

jurisdictions are included in their calculations, researchers put the number of gangs at 16,643, the

number of gang members at more than 555,181, and

the number of gang-related crimes at 580,331.100

Less urban areas are no longer safe from the infiltration of gangs and gang violence. Although some of

the gangs are branches of megagangs, such as Los

Angeles’ Crips and Bloods, most gangs in midsized

or smaller cities either originate locally or “are

94. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

RESEARCH IN BRIEF, PROSECUTING GANGS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 2 (Feb. 1995) [hereinafter PROSECUTING GANGS].

95. ARNOLD GOLDSTEIN, DELINQUENT GANGS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVE 3–6 (1991).

96. JAMES C. HOWELL, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET

No. 12 at 1 (April 1994) [hereinafter HOWELL FACT SHEET].

97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West Supp. 1996).

98. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 22–23.

99. HOWELL FACT SHEET, supra note 96.

100. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

RESEARCH IN BRIEF, ESTIMATING THE NATIONAL SCOPE OF GANG

CRIME FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA 3 (Aug. 1996).
23

started by nonresident gang members via kinship,

alliance, expansion of turf boundaries, or movement

of gang members’ families into new areas.”101 The

FBI and local police have reported the presence of

Crips and Bloods in as many as 45 western and

midwestern cities.102 Again, family migration, not

relocation, appears to be the main reason for the

emergence of gangs in smaller cities.103

The average gang is composed of males, ages 12 to

21, who reside in poor, central areas of cities with

populations of more than 200,000. Although research

on gang ethnicity is sketchy at best, one survey of

gangs in large cities indicated that approximately

48 percent of all gang members are AfricanAmerican, 43 percent Hispanic, 5 percent Asian,

and 5 percent white.104

Gangs, Drugs, and Violence

Little empirical research exists on gang involvement

in drug trafficking. One 1991 study in Los Angeles

found that while as many as one-quarter of gang

members were somehow involved in crack cocaine

distribution, drug trafficking was not a primary

gang activity.105 News media accounts and conventional wisdom have linked inner-city violence to

gang drug wars, but research has shown that most

inner-city homicides are the result of turf battles, not

drug violence.

In a 1995 study of Pomona and Pasadena, CA, two

smaller cities outside Los Angeles, gang members

were found to be involved in about 27 percent of

arrests for cocaine sales and about 12 percent of the

arrests for sales of other drugs. Crack cocaine was

often present in gang cases, and gang-related drug

cases were more likely to involve young AfricanAmerican males than members of other age or racial

groups. However, most aspects of cocaine sales,

including location, firearm presence, and amount of

cash, did not vary because of gang involvement.

Firearms were involved in only 10 percent of the

cases, and violence was present in only 5 percent of

the incidents.106

A 1993 study of the four largest and most criminally

active street gangs found only 8 of the 285 gangmotivated homicides between 1987 and 1990 to be

related to drugs. Approximately 90 percent of the

violent crimes involving youth gangs in the Boston

area between 1984 and 1994 did not involve drug

dealing or drug use.107

Approaches to Gang Control

and Intervention

Gang problems traditionally have been local, urban

problems, and governmental responses to gang

problems traditionally have been focused at the local

level. Yet, while the past decade has been marked by

the spread of gangs and gang-related violence, it has

also seen the growing confluence of Federal, State,

and local efforts to control gang activity and reduce

gang violence. Moreover, it has seen the rise of more

proactive, community-based strategies for dealing

with gangs.

Three general strategies for preventing gangs have

been evaluated: preventing youth from joining

gangs, transforming existing gangs into neighborhood clubs, and mediating and intervening in conflicts between gangs. Of the three approaches,

prevention programs that integrate school curriculums with afterschool recreational activities seem to

hold the most promise for preventing gang crime

and violence.108

In areas where gang problems are endemic, such as

Los Angeles County, prevention and intervention

strategies combined with long-term, proactive investigations of entire gangs work better than reactive,

101. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 95, at 22–23.

102. HOWELL FACT SHEET, supra note 96.

103. Gang Migration, NCJA JUSTICE RESEARCH (National Criminal Justice Association, Washington, D.C.), Nov.–Dec. 1995,

at 9–10.

104. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

RESEARCH IN BRIEF, GANG CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

RECORDKEEPING 8–9 (Aug. 1994).

105. HOWELL FACT SHEET, supra note 96, at 2.

106. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,

RESEARCH IN BRIEF, STREET GANGS AND DRUG SALES IN TWO

SUBURBAN CITIES 7 (Sept. 1995).

107. HOWELL FACT SHEET, supra note 96, at 2.

108. HOWELL GUIDE, supra note 32, at 96.
24

short-term investigations and prosecutions of individual gang members.109

State Initiatives

States have done their part in the fight against

gangs by enhancing penalties for gang-related crime

and fostering cooperation between jurisdictions and

disciplines. Illinois, for example, has adopted a coordinated, holistic approach to addressing gang problems. In 1995, Governor Jim Edgar established by

executive order the 35-member Governor’s Commission on Gangs, with Attorney General Jim Ryan

serving as chairman. The commission was composed

of Federal and State prosecutors, police, educators,

parents, clergy, health professionals, lawmakers, and

representatives of business and labor.110

The commission has held 16 public hearings, a

youth forum, and a 2-day conference at locales

across the State, gathering testimony from nearly

150 witnesses. As a result of commission findings

and recommendations, the Governor, in June 1996,

signed legislation drafted by the commission establishing a witness protection program. He also appropriated $1 million for a pilot program, which will

run through June 1998, to protect victims and witnesses who testify against gang members. The new

law includes strict sanctions for gang members who

commit crimes, including an imposition of harsher

penalties for gang leaders convicted of drug dealing

and mandatory reporting of any firearm-related

incidents at public schools to law enforcement within 24 hours. The commission is expected to issue a

report that will stress the need for get-tough measures balanced by more intervention and prevention

programs.

Another recent antigang measure from Illinois creates offenses for compelling another to join a gang or

deterring resignation from a gang. Moreover, the

State has enacted a law that prohibits a person who

has coerced another to join a gang from receiving

probation, a conditional discharge, or periodic imprisonment.111

Enhanced sentencing is yet another State response

to combating crime committed by gangs and gang

members. Arkansas and California, among other

States, have increased the penalties for specific

gang-related violence, such as drive-by shootings. In

September 1996, California Governor Pete Wilson

signed a law extending indefinitely the California

Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act,

which was due to expire in January 1997 and which

enhances penalties for gang-related activities.112

Other States have enacted statutes that enhance

penalties for any criminal act committed by a gang

member. For example, Tennessee enacted a law that

adds criminal street gang membership as an enhancement factor for sentencing defendants who

have committed a prior offense within the past 3

years. Provisions of a Nevada law include forfeiture

of personal property that has been used in a gang

crime and authorize schools to enforce antigang

rules and develop gang-prevention problems.113

Local Initiatives

Local jurisdictions have a number of law enforcement approaches to controlling gang activity and

reducing gang-related crime.114 Cities have passed

ordinances prohibiting cruising, loitering, and many

forms of belligerent public behavior, such as discharging weapons on private property, consuming

alcohol in public, and playing loud music. Other

cities have cracked down on graffiti and other forms

of vandalism by regulating the sale, purchase, or

possession of materials used to deface property115

and by adopting parental responsibility laws that

make parents liable for the damage illegally caused

109. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, VIOLENT CRIME: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE IN FIGHTING LOS ANGELES GANG VIOLENCE 3 (Sept.

1996) [hereinafter GAO, VIOLENT CRIME].

110. Attorney General Ryan: State Must Adopt Coordinated Approach to

Gang Problem, THE COMPILER (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Chicago, Ill.), Fall 1996, at 14.

111. DONNA LYONS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATURE REPORT, 1995 JUVENILE CRIME AND

JUSTICE STATE ENACTMENTS 9 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter LYONS].

112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West Supp. 1996).

113. LYONS, supra note 111, at 9.

114. NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, NEW WAYS OF

WORKING WITH LOCAL LAWS TO REDUCE CRIME 41 (Nov. 1996).

115. Id. at 9.
25

by their children.116 Still other cities closely enforce

truancy and curfew ordinances.

Some cities have attempted to discourage gang

membership by prohibiting behavior that manifests

gang membership, such as wearing gang colors or

using gestures that communicate gang affiliation.

For example, the city of Harvard, IL, prohibits individuals from wearing gang-related colors, emblems,

or insignia in public or from making any utterances

or gestures that communicate gang membership or

insult to other street gangs. Since the ordinance became effective, the number of gang-related arrests has

decreased from 87 in 1994 to 0 as of July 11, 1996.117

To control gang-related violence in and near public

housing projects, housing authorities are authorized

by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to insert provisions into leases

prohibiting the use, display, or possession of firearms. Gang members or family members and associates of gang members face eviction if caught using

or possessing guns.118 Cities also have passed temporary ordinances banning access by gang members to

public parks that have been the sites of confrontations between gangs.

Other cities have sought civil injunctions against

gangs as “unincorporated associations” that prohibit

targeted gang members from congregating in certain

areas. Prosecutors in Los Angeles and nearby cities

have implemented four gang injunctions, serving

gang members with court documents and discussing

with them activities prohibited by the court. Before

a civil injunction against the Blythe Street Gang in

April 1993, drive-by shootings were a weekly occurrence and a neighborhood grocery store was forced

to close down. Since the injunction, the store is

back, and at least a year has passed between driveby shootings. A local community organization has

received a major grant to make improvements to the

neighborhood.119

Multijurisdictional Initiatives

Many counties and cities have found success in

pooling resources with Federal and State agencies to

fight and control gangs and gang-related violence.

With the size and diversity of its gang problem, California, particularly Los Angeles County, has become

a national leader in developing and implementing

gang initiatives that draw on both Federal and local

resources.

An estimated 150,000 members belong to more than

1,000 gang factions in the Los Angeles area, according to media reports. The Los Angeles Times reported

that gang-related murders have accounted for

roughly 40 percent of homicides in Los Angeles

County in recent years. Although there has been an

on-again, off-again truce between the two major

gang divisions, the Crips and the Bloods, since the

rioting surrounding the Rodney King verdict in the

summer of 1992, gang-related violent crime continues to plague the region.120

As a response, Federal officials, in cooperation with

local law enforcement authorities, launched the largest crackdown ever on Los Angeles gangs. They

called their effort the Los Angeles Metropolitan

Task Force (LA Task Force). The LA Task Force

increased law enforcement efforts to combat violent

gang crime—the FBI increased the number of

agents who investigate gangs and gang-related

crimes from about 74 to 100;121 the U.S. attorney’s

office brought in an experienced gang prosecutor;

and the local Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) office announced plans to hire another

10 agents, largely to investigate gang members.

By using Federal racketeering laws and other tactics

such as wiretapping, Federal and local officials attempted to break down gang factions, including

State prison gangs, which contribute to the drug

dealing and violence that plague the inner-city areas.

Federal sentencing laws are more stringent than

State laws, and because there is no Federal parole,

convicted felons serve their full sentences. Gang

116. Id. at 10.

117. Id. at 42.

118. Id.

119. Id. at 44.

120. Terence Monmaney, Medical Researchers Call Gang Killings

‘Epidemic’ in County, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at B1.

121. Jim Newton, U.S. Mounts Sweeping Crackdown on L.A. Gangs,

L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1992, at A1.
26

members can also be spread across the Federal system rather than being housed in State prisons where

many of their fellow inmates may have been members of their gang outside prison walls.

As part of a self-initiated review of the effort, the

U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) interviewed

37 members of local law enforcement agencies who

had participated in the LA Task Force. The participants were asked which investigative methods

worked best, if Federal contributions had been useful, and if multijurisdictional cooperation had been

helpful in reducing gang violence.122

Participants reported that Federal assistance to Los

Angeles law enforcement had been helpful in fighting the area’s gang epidemic and was used for wiretapping and witness protection under Federal rules,

overtime pay, equipment, office space, and money

for informants and undercover purchases of drugs

and firearms.

Most of the 24 line officers interviewed pointed to

the task force’s focus on long-term investigations of

entire gangs, rather than reactive investigations of

individual gang members, as a key to the LA Task

Force’s success. According to statistics provided to

GAO, the LA Task Force was responsible for more

than 2,000 arrests—almost half for violent crimes—

between February 1992 and September 1995. Threefourths of all Federal and State convictions coming

from task force arrests were for violent crimes. GAO

did not independently verify the statistics.

The LA Task Force was cited as an example of an

effective program targeting violent crime in the U.S.

Department of Justice’s Attorney General’s Progress

Report to the President on the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, released in September 1996. In particular,

the Attorney General’s report mentioned a 1-day

effort in 1995 that resulted in a 57-percent drop in

violent crime in one Los Angeles neighborhood.

The effort, called Operation Sunrise, was the result

of more than 2 years of joint investigation of activities by the Eight Trey Gangster Crips. The gang

made up less than 1 percent of the community’s

population but accounted for more than 80 percent

of the area’s violent crime, according to the GAO

report. During the operation, Federal and local

agents swept a 30-by-30-block area of South Central

Los Angeles controlled by the gang, serving 120

search warrants in 1 day. The operation resulted in

several Federal and State prosecutions, the confiscation of 67 firearms and 2,000 rounds of ammunition,

and the seizure of 2 kilograms of methamphetamine.

Other initiatives that bring together Federal, State,

and local resources and manpower are being tried

across the country. Some of these efforts were highlighted in the Attorney General’s progress report,

including the following:

◆ In Michigan, the Safe Streets-Violent Crime Task

Force conducted an investigation of the Home

Invaders, a gang that had gained entrance to

more than 100 homes in the Detroit area while

posing as police officers. Twenty-two members

were indicted on charges under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(RICO) and Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statutes and for weapons possession.

◆ In Rhode Island, a Federal and State task force

conducted a 21-month investigation of the Latin

Kings called Operation Check. The task force,

which was sponsored by the ATF, included State

and local police, State corrections officers, the

Rhode Island National Guard, the FBI, HUD,

the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S.

Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The probe led to an

18-count RICO indictment against 11 Latin

Kings. Four defendants had pleaded guilty as of

September 1996. The rest were awaiting trial.

◆ In New York, a task force composed of the FBI,

the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, INS, the

U.S. attorney’s office in Buffalo, the New York

State Police, the Erie County Sheriff’s Department, the Erie County and Genesee County district attorney’s offices, and the police departments

of Rochester, Amherst, and Buffalo conducted an

18-month investigation of several drug trafficking

organizations and street gangs. Using courtauthorized wiretaps, undercover operations, and

other investigative techniques, the joint task force

122. GAO, VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 109, at 17.
27

probe resulted in the indictment of 71 defendants,

including the leader of the Goodyear Crew, a

street gang operating in Buffalo. Forty defendants

have pleaded guilty, and the rest were awaiting

trial, as of September 1996.123

Gang Prosecution

While specialized gang units are common in police

departments of cities with gang problems, they are

less common in prosecutors’ offices. Those that have

been established have begun to use a “vertical prosecution” process, whereby one attorney, or a group

of attorneys, stays with a case from inception to

conclusion. In California, several jurisdictions have

combined vertical prosecution strategies with a type

of proactive community policing-like prosecution.124

Whereas reactive prosecution means responding to

crimes and closed investigations, a prosecutor’s office using a proactive, community prosecution strategy attempts to stop the crime before it occurs or at

least attempts to participate in the initial investigation. Instances of the former can include using city

ordinances to force absentee landlords to clean up,

fix up, or close down suspected crack houses. Examples of the latter include going with police to interview victims and witnesses, talking to gang

members, and taking steps to protect witnesses. The

San Diego County, CA, district attorney’s office has

a gang unit that has served as a national model for

this approach.

The Movement Toward

Graduated Sanctions

The development of graduated, or accountabilitybased, sanctions programs is one way that States attempt to ensure that juveniles adjudicated delinquent

receive an appropriate disposition by the juvenile

court. Inherent in graduated sanctions programs is the

notion of providing swift and appropriate punishment

to youth offenders based on the gravity of their offense and an assessment of the potential risk for

reoffending, coupled with appropriate treatment to

reduce the risk of recidivism. According to a recent

report on juvenile justice initiatives published by the

NCSL, a graduated sanctions system “. . . hold[s]

young people accountable for their actions every step

of the way—from the least to the most serious patterns of offending—while maintaining public safety. It

provides swift and sure punishment when a youngster

first commits a crime followed by progressively

tougher sanctions if he or she continues to offend.”125

The factors that led to the exploration of graduated

sanctions in the administration of adult criminal

justice in the early 1980’s have served as a catalyst

for similar action in the juvenile justice system. The

first factor is a significant national shift toward the

“just deserts” model in criminal justice policies. The

model shifts away from a more rehabilitative focus

to one that stresses offender accountability through

more punitive sanctions as the most appropriate way

to address criminal and violent behavior. According

to a study on boot camps published by the U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice

(NIJ), “the Nation entered the 1980’s disillusioned

by research that appeared to debunk the potential of

rehabilitation . . . throughout much of the 1980’s the

pendulum swung the other way; public concern with

safety and giving offenders their just deserts dominated sentencing policy.”126

Howard Snyder, director of systems research for the

National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ) in

Pittsburgh, PA, commented in a State Legislatures

article, “It is clear that there has been an attitude

change toward the juvenile justice system. It’s

thought it cannot handle the perceived larger number of serious offenders. The pendulum has swung

away from rehabilitation of the child and toward

community protection.”127

123. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTIVIOLENT CRIME INITIATIVE: THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL’S PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 5–10

(Sept. 1996).

124. PROSECUTING GANGS, supra note 94, at 5.

125. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33 at Graduated

Sanctions.

126. ROBERTA C. CRONIN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S.

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOOT CAMPS FOR ADULT AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS: OVERVIEW AND UPDATE 5 (Oct. 1994).

127. Juvenile Crime, Grown Up Time, STATE LEGISLATURES (National Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.), May

1995, at 14–16.
28

This focus on accountability, when combined with an

overly burdened juvenile justice system and growing

detention costs, lends itself to the development of

alternative sanctions for juvenile offenders. “Using

risk and needs assessment in conjunction with graduated sanctions combines public safety with cost efficiency,” according to the NCSL report. “It increases

the likelihood that serious offenders will be incarcerated while those who present a lesser danger are

placed in less expensive, community-based programs.”128 Typically defined as options that include a

wide variety of correctional approaches, most intermediate sanctions claim multiple goals: saving

money, deterring crime, protecting the public, and

rehabilitating offenders.129

The model program of graduated sanctions developed by OJJDP “combines treatment and rehabilitation with reasonable, fair, human, and appropriate

sanctions, and offers a continuum of care consisting

of diverse programs.”130 The continuum set forth

includes the following components for targeted

populations:

◆ Immediate sanctions within the community for

first-time, nonviolent offenders.

◆ Intermediate sanctions within the community for

more serious offenders.

◆ Secure care programs for the most violent offenders.

◆ Aftercare programs that provide high levels of

social control and treatment services.131

Recent State Action

More and more States are looking toward developing graduated sanctions programs to treat delinquent

youth effectively and to spend State dollars wisely.

Policymakers are undertaking a systematic study of

how these types of sentencing options exist in current correctional programming and how they could

be improved upon for the future. “Although it is not

unusual for States to have a variety of programs for

juvenile offenders,” suggests the NCSL report, “few

States have a statutorily provided means for applying

different levels of sanctions and treatment as part of a

structured, comprehensive juvenile justice system.”132

Attention to graduated sanctions programs has come

as a result of juvenile justice reform initiatives in

some States that have emphasized local control and

autonomy in the administration of juvenile justice.

For example, the 1995 Texas juvenile code reform

requires the adoption of a seven-step progressive

sanctions policy. Each step defines sanction options

available to juvenile court judges and probation officials for different classifications of delinquent juveniles. These classifications are based on the type of

offense committed; past criminal or delinquent behavior; the effectiveness of previous interventions;

and an assessment of special treatment, counseling,

or training needs. Local boards governing the administration of juvenile justice may deviate from the

progressive sanctions guidelines established by the

code when the imposition of other sanctions is

deemed more appropriate.133

A similar initiative, the Virginia Juvenile Community

Crime Control Act, was enacted in 1995 as a precursor

to the State’s 1996 juvenile code reform. The intent of

the legislation was to “establish a community-based

system of progressive intensive sanctions and services

that corresponds to the severity of offense and treatment needs.” Among other things, the law allows counties and cities to develop community-based systems

that include services such as diversion programs, community service, restitution, house arrest, intensive juvenile supervision, substance abuse assessment, first-time

offender programs, family counseling and treatment,

day treatment, aftercare, and other residential and

nonresidential programs.134

128. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33, at Graduated

Sanctions.

129. BLAIR B. BOURQUE ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BOOT CAMPS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS:

AN IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION OF THREE DEMONSTRATION

PROGRAMS 2 (Jan. 1996).

130. HOWELL GUIDE, supra note 32, at 133.

131. Id.

132. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33, at Graduated

Sanctions.

133. TEX FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 59.001–59.010 (West 1995).

134. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1–309.2 to –318 (Michie Supp. 1996).
29

Other States are taking action to initiate graduated

sanctions programs for youth. The State of Kansas

created the Kansas Youth Authority in 1995 to study

and make recommendations for the improved delivery

of juvenile justice services in the State, including the

development of alternative sanctions programs and

confinement options. Likewise, an initiative in Illinois

mandates that the State supreme court’s Division of

Probation Services must determine viable, structured

intermediate sanctions for juveniles on probation or

under State supervision.135 A 1996 Nebraska enactment requires the Office of Juvenile Services to establish an array of community-based services for juveniles

and their families across the State, with a minimum of

eight geographic sites, based upon expansion of pilot

projects developed by the office.136

Inherent in this concept of providing a systematic

range of appropriate sanctions and treatment is the

idea that State and local criminal justice staff must

approach each juvenile delinquent as an individual.

According to the OJJDP comprehensive strategy,

risk assessment tools “should be employed to determine the most appropriate sanction for each youth,

with assessments based on the risk the offender poses

to society, the nature of the offense for which the

youth is committed, the number and nature of prior

offenses, and the presence of other risk factors.”137

States continue to amend existing assessment tools to

fit the appropriateness of the population of youth offenders. Under the comprehensive juvenile justice

reform enacted in Connecticut, the Office of Alternative Sanctions must develop risk assessment tools and

professional evaluation teams for youth adjudicated

delinquent in order to facilitate their appropriate placement in existing prevention, intervention, and sanction

programs.138 Intake procedures were amended with a

juvenile justice revision in Kansas in 1996. Now, juvenile intake and assessment workers are required to use

a standardized risk assessment tool developed by the

newly created Commission of Juvenile Justice to collect relevant information concerning the criminal and

social histories of alleged youth offenders.139

Juvenile Boot Camps

Boot camps for juveniles have evolved from their

counterparts in the adult criminal justice system.

Currently, juvenile boot camps are operating in 10

States—Alabama, California, Colorado, Indiana,

Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New

York, and Ohio.140 Although boot camps have been

popular in recent years and have maintained their

appeal with policymakers, corrections officials, and

the public in general, results from recent evaluations

suggest that the efficacy of these programs is questionable at best.

The first adult boot camp program started in Georgia in 1983. Today, more than 70 boot camp programs are operating in more than 30 States.

Programmatic features of boot camps include rigorous physical conditioning; discipline; activities to

bolster self-esteem, confidence, and leadership; and

an emphasis on militarylike rules. Also included in

most programs is a combination of physical labor,

drug and psychological treatment, and education

initiatives. Participants have typically been convicted of nonviolent crimes and are sentenced to

boot camp programs for between 90 and 180 days.

Following this stay, the offender is returned to the

community, usually with some kind of intensive supervision and aftercare.141

The most comprehensive evaluation of boot camps

done to date was undertaken by Doris LaytonMacKenzie and her colleagues at the University of

Maryland, with funding from NIJ. The study compared eight boot camp programs—those in Florida,

Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma,

South Carolina, and Texas—and examined the extent to which they met their goals of reducing prison

crowding and changing the behavior of offenders.

135. LYONS, supra note 111, at 7.

136. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83–925.05 (Michie Supp. 1996).

137. HOWELL GUIDE, supra note 32, at 133.

138. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–120 (1995).

139. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38–1601 (Supp. 1996).

140. GEORGE M. CAMP ET AL., 1995 CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK:

JUVENILE CORRECTIONS 47 (1995).

141. Arizona, Maryland Close Boot Camps, Citing Questionable

Impact, Costs, JUSTICE BULLETIN (National Criminal Justice

Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1996, at 1, 18.
30

The results of the extensive survey indicate that boot

camps must have a myriad of factors in place before

they can elicit cost savings or impact recidivism.

According to an article by Layton-MacKenzie summarizing the survey, “The principal findings are that

most [boot camp] programs produce positive attitudinal changes in participants, have few if any effects

on subsequent criminality, and are likely to reduce

prison crowding only if program admissions are

tightly controlled to assure that spaces are allotted to

prison-bound offenders ... We do not know yet how

to organize boot camps with reasonable confidence

that they will achieve their intended results.”142

Evaluation of Juvenile Boot Camps

The factors behind the creation of juvenile boot

camps mirror those that led to their creation in the

adult criminal justice system: an increasing incidence

of youth crime, overburdened juvenile courts, and

the growing costs of youth detention. According to

NIJ, juveniles in custody for delinquent offenses

increased 35 percent from 1978 to 1989, a period

when the youth population of the United States declined by 11 percent. As a result, “satisfactory alternatives to long-term institutionalization are as

welcome in the juvenile system as they are in the

adult system.”143

The first juvenile boot camp was developed in Orleans Parish, LA, in 1985. Since then, 10 States have

begun operating juvenile boot camps, which vary in

size, eligibility requirements, and programming. Due

to the relative newness of these programs, a limited

body of research is available on their makeup and

efficacy. The American Institutes for Research

(AIR), the Institute for Criminological Research

(ICR) at Rutgers University, and Caliber Associates,

with support from NIJ and OJJDP, have researched

existing juvenile boot camp programs and have sponsored and evaluated OJJDP-funded pilot juvenile

boot camp programs in three U.S. cities.

The results of telephone and mail surveys conducted

by ICR, supplemented by written reports on existing

programs, indicate that juvenile boot camps deem as

eligible for participation “mid-range” offenders, that

is, those who have been involved with the juvenile

justice system before and not performed well with

lesser sanctions, like probation, but who are not yet

established criminals. Juvenile boot camp programs

typically exclude some types of offenders, but only a

very few limit eligibility to those who are nonviolent

or first-time offenders.144 Most have determined that

youth in their mid- to late-teens are the appropriate

age group for this type of sanction.

Although the goals of reducing recidivist behavior

and rehabilitating youth are common to both juvenile and adult programs, boot camps for juveniles

have retained more of the rehabilitative focus that

remains an underpinning in the juvenile justice system. “In keeping with the juvenile justice system’s

historical focus on rehabilitation, the rationale for

boot camps typically incorporates explicit assumptions about the needs and deficits of delinquent

youth, and the remedial, counseling, and aftercare

programs necessary to address those needs,” according to the recent ICR/NIJ report.145 The ICR/NIJ

survey results support this statement and report that

these camps typically allocate more than half a day

on education and counseling activities, spending a

minimum of 3 hours on academic education. Further, substance abuse treatment, rehabilitative counseling, and intensive community supervision upon

release are common features of most boot camp

programs.146

Much of what is known about the efficacy of juvenile boot camps has come about as a result of the

research sponsored by OJJDP and NIJ, in collaboration with AIR and ICR, and by an evaluation conducted for OJJDP by Caliber Associates. In fall

1990, OJJDP initiated a juvenile boot camp demonstration study to examine the feasibility and appropriateness of developing a boot camp model for

youth offenders. In 1991, three sites received awards

to establish and implement juvenile boot camps:

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Cleveland, OH, in association with the North American

142. Doris Layton-MacKenzie, Boot Camps: A National Assessment,

5 OVERCROWDED TIMES 1, 14–15 (Aug. 1994).

143. BOURQUE ET AL., supra note 129, at 2.

144. CRONIN, supra note 126, at 36.

145. Id. at 36.

146. Id. at 38.
31

Family Institute; Colorado Division of Youth Services, Denver, CO, in association with New Pride,

Inc.; and Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile,

Mobile, AL, in association with the Strickland

Youth Center of the Mobile County Juvenile Court

and the University of South Alabama. NIJ, working

with AIR and ICR, sponsored the demonstration

programs’ process evaluation, while an impact

evaluation was conducted by Caliber Associates.

The three boot camps involved in the study adopted a

structured selection process to recruit nonviolent,

nonhabitual offenders under the age of 18 for the pilots. A 90-day residential boot camp phase was established with an aftercare component of 6 to 9 months.

Youth were exposed to militarylike routine, discipline,

and physical conditioning and to rehabilitative programming, such as academic instruction, counseling,

and substance abuse education. All sites encouraged

participants to pursue academic and vocational training or employment during the period of intensive, yet

progressively diminishing, supervision.147

The evaluation found that all three programs reported

high attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism,

and new arrests. Evaluators found that although the

youth assigned to boot camps completed the residential program at high rates (96 percent in Cleveland,

87 percent in Mobile, and 76 percent in Denver),

many failed to complete the aftercare portion of the

program. Evaluators concluded that:

What appeared to be a promising prognosis at

the conclusion of the boot camp disintegrated

during aftercare. All three programs were

plagued by high attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism, and new arrests during the

aftercare period. No other indicators of progress

were observed during this phase that would help

pinpoint where the problems lay. In all fairness to

the programs, aftercare was particularly affected

by unexpected cuts in Federal support, especially

in Denver and Mobile, where budget reductions

resulted in programs far less comprehensive than

originally planned . . . at this juncture, it does not

appear that the demonstration programs solved

the problem that typically plagues residential

correctional programs: inmates who appear to

thrive in the institutional environment but falter

when they return home.148

The initial evaluation results were not conclusive

with respect to program costs or impact. They

drew no conclusions about the long-term impact

of the programs because the study did not track

postprogram recidivism and only recorded when a

participant’s arrest prompted his termination in the

program. Of youth entering the boot camps, nearly

33 percent in Cleveland, 25 percent in Denver, and

11.5 percent in Mobile were dropped from the program for being rearrested. “Without knowing what

the arrest rates would have been for a control group

of comparable youths [youths convicted of similar

crimes, with similar backgrounds who were not

committed to a boot camp program], it is difficult to

interpret what these attrition rates mean,” the report

said. “Neither can the program’s impact on correctional crowding or cost savings be assessed without

more information about recidivism and the costs of

alternative placements.”149

Although the outcomes in the three demonstration

sites were not yet known, the process evaluators

concluded that boot camps can be implemented in

the juvenile justice system. They developed several

recommendations concerning the implementation of

juvenile boot camp programs, including:

◆ Boot camp programs should delineate specifically

the programmatic features that they expect will

elicit the desired changes in participant behavior.

◆ Boot camp programs should carefully define and

select target populations in light of their goals for

rehabilitation, recidivism, cost containment, and

punishment.

◆ Aftercare, as the period during which most program attrition occurred, should be focused on,

improved, and possibly restructured.

◆ When multiple agencies are involved with monitoring participants, the responsibilities of each

agency should be spelled out in detail.

147. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET NO. 36 JUVENILE BOOT

CAMPS: LESSON LEARNED (June 1996) [hereinafter BOOT CAMP

FACT SHEET].

148. BOURQUE ET AL., supra note 129, at 111.

149. Id. at 111.
32

◆ Programs should adopt consistent and continuous

staff training.

◆ Boot camps for juveniles warrant additional study

and research.150

In 1993, OJJDP tasked Caliber Associates to conduct an impact evaluation of these same sites utilizing data from the first 17 months of boot camp

operations collected by the AIR/ICR team. The

study concluded that despite debilitating operational

problems, significant numbers of experimental youth

were able to demonstrate important positive outcomes. Substantial improvements in academic skills

were noted in Mobile and Cleveland, the two sites

where educational gains were measured. Where

employment records were available, a significant

number of participants found jobs while in aftercare.

Despite these positive outcomes, in 21/2 years of operations, none of the three boot camps appeared to

have reduced recidivism. No statistical significance

between boot camp youth and control youth was

found in Denver and Mobile. In Cleveland, the boot

camp youth evidenced a higher recidivism rate than

juvenile offenders in traditional juvenile correctional

facilities. The evaluators pointed out that more intensive monitoring of boot camp participants during

aftercare may have increased their risk of detection,

and thus recidivism, while the control youth had

considerably fewer contacts with authorities following release.

Regarding cost, the findings concluded that when

boot camps are used as an alternative to confinement, savings are achieved. If boot camps are used

as an alternative to probation, savings are not realized. Similar to the AIR/ICR findings, the Caliber

findings remain preliminary because the experiment

had not run its full course when these interim reports were published. OJJDP has noted that “none

of the sites fully implemented OJJDP’s model juvenile boot camp guidelines, and that some critical

aftercare support services were not provided.”151

Recent State Action

Recent State action concerning boot camps for juveniles has been significant. Policymakers in Michigan

enacted a law in the 1996 legislative session to create

a boot camp for juveniles with the Family Independence Agency. The Juvenile Boot Camp Act provides for a 90- to 180-day term of militaristic

training, academic curriculums, and counseling,

followed by a 4- to 6-month period of aftercare.152

Broad-based juvenile justice reform in Texas in 1995,

which included many tough sanctions for violent juvenile offenders, allows the Texas Youth Commission

to establish juvenile boot camps with physical, academic, and moral training and aftercare programs to

“aid in successful community reintegration.”153

In New Mexico, the Governor signed into law in

1995 an initiative that will provide for work camps

with a concentration on occupational skills in forestry, conservation, or ranching for serious, violent

offenders and plans for a 50-bed boot camp for less

dangerous delinquents.154 The juvenile justice reform

initiative enacted in Oregon requires the establishment of eight regional youth accountability camps,

with a focus on work and physical training, a cognitive restructuring component, and a drug and alcohol treatment phase. To qualify for the program,

participants must be offenders who otherwise would

have been sent to the State’s training school, but are

considered acceptable security risks for work and

training in such camps.155

Some States with existing juvenile boot camp provisions expanded those services in recent legislative

sessions. California changed its boot camp programs

in 1995 by amending the Community Based Punishment Act of 1994 to authorize the establishment and

funding of educational and vocational services for

juvenile offenders. The legislation gave county-level

administrators and probation officers more latitude

in the maintenance of education programs in existing boot camps. Appropriations for these programs

150. Id. at 113–114.

151. BOOT CAMP FACT SHEET, supra note 147.

152. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 400.1301 (Supp. 1996).

153. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.101 (West Supp. 1996).

154. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE

JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 49

(July 1996).

155. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 420.120–420.235 (Supp. 1996).
33

are derived from Federal funds for juvenile crime

prevention purposes and distributed through the

State’s Department of Youth Authority.156 In addition, the legislation enabled the county board of

supervisors to establish residential and nonresidential boot camp programs at county expense.157

The Louisiana legislature expanded the State’s existing boot camp program to 400 beds and created a

short- and long-term program based on the prior

history of the youth offender and the seriousness of

his or her offense. This initiative followed the establishment of a juvenile boot camp clearinghouse in

the State under the jurisdiction of the Louisiana

Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal Justice. The charge of the

clearinghouse is to provide guidelines for local jurisdictions in the implementation of juvenile boot camp

programs.158

While initiatives to expand boot camp programs for

youth were undertaken in several States, a program

in Maryland was terminated after less than 2 years.

Established in August 1994, the Maryland juvenile

boot camp served 157 youth before being closed in

March 1996. The program combined military-style

discipline with academic instruction. Upon release,

the juveniles were placed under intensive mentoring

and provided with counseling. Only nonviolent juveniles who had committed repeat offenses were

eligible for the boot camp.

The program was terminated based on its inconclusive impact on juvenile recidivism. Although the

program was relatively new and there were few

ways to measure the effect of the boot camps on

youth behavior, the acting administrator of the program estimated that 1 in 10 graduates of the boot

camp had already returned to the juvenile justice

system by the time the boot camp closed in March

1996. Maryland State officials report that a Baltimore County facility that deals with hardcore delinquents will benefit from funding made available by

the boot camp closing and that the adult boot camp

program, the Herman L. Toulson Boot Camp, will

remain operational.159

Youth and Guns

Youth in America today have access to, are using,

and are being victimized by firearms more than ever

before. According to a recent report on juvenile

justice legislative initiatives conducted by NCSL,

deaths caused by juveniles using guns increased

fourfold during the 10 years between 1984 and 1994.

In addition, the heightened accessibility of largecaliber guns has increased the likelihood of a victim

of an assault being seriously injured or killed as a

result of a gunshot wound.160 While a broader debate

over gun control is being waged in this country, discussion concerning juveniles and firearms has centered upon handguns and the need to enact greater

limitations on juveniles’ ownership, possession, and

use of these weapons.

States have responded to this heightened accessibility by maintaining and strengthening current laws

restricting the possession, licensing, storage, and

transfer of guns to juveniles and by enacting tough

new laws for youth who bring guns to school. Many

States also have enacted laws that allow for prosecution in adult criminal court for those juvenile offenders who allegedly perpetrate certain violent crimes

with the use of a firearm.

Possession, Licensing, and Transfer

of Firearms

State laws typically restrict a juvenile’s possession of

various firearms based on the age of the juvenile, the

activity for which the gun is issued, and the juvenile’s

previous adjudication as delinquent, if applicable. A

survey of State laws enacted through the 1994 legislative sessions found that 18 States restrict possession

of handguns by youth under the age of 18. Another 14

States prohibit the possession of all firearms by persons

under age 18, with various exceptions, including

involvement in authorized recreational or educational

156. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47700 (West Supp. 1997).

157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 940 (West Supp. 1996).

158. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1202 (West Supp. 1996).

159. Arizona, supra note 141.

160. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33, at Emerging Issues.
34

activities or participation in firearm safety courses.161

In 1994, the State of Maine enacted a law that allows

youth more than 10 years of age to possess firearms

when hunting if they are accompanied by a parent

or another adult approved by a parent or guardian.162

Adjudicated delinquents are prevented from possessing firearms in 22 States, with restrictions usually placed on those youth who were adjudicated

delinquent for acts that would be considered felonious offenses if they had been committed by an adult.

Other States prohibit possession of a firearm for a

specific period of time (usually 10 years) after an

offender’s adjudication or release from juvenile detention, while other possession restrictions remain in

place until the Governor or a court orders the restoration of the right to possess a firearm.163 Still other

measures, including 1994 enactments in Arizona and

Delaware, provide an enhanced penalty for juveniles

previously adjudicated delinquent if they are found

in possession of a firearm.164

Restricting licensing and imposing liability for the

transfer—by sale, gift, or loan—of a firearm to a

youth are other tactics States have used to keep

firearms out of the hands of children. At least 35

States regulate the age at which a person may obtain

a license to carry certain types of firearms, while 43

prohibit the transfer of firearms to minors, with specific exceptions. Many of these latter States’ laws

allow for enhanced penalties when an individual is

found guilty of more than one transfer offense.165

Some States have taken action to hold parents liable

when youth gain access to a family firearm. These

types of “safe storage” or “child access prevention”

laws have been enacted with increasing frequency in

recent State legislative sessions in an effort to promote accountability when family firearms are not

stored securely. According to a legislative analysis

compiled by Handgun Control, Inc., 13 States in

1995—Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Missouri,

New Hampshire, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,

Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington—had enacted legislation of this sort.166

Gun-Free Schools and Transfer Provisions

The creation of “gun-free schools” and “safety

zones” are yet other ways States have, in recent

years, protected children, teachers, and school staff

from gun violence on school grounds. Statistics compiled by the National Center for Education in Maternal and Child Health indicate that gun violence on

school grounds has become increasingly prevalent

and disruptive. Examples of these statistics include:

◆ The number of guns confiscated in California

public schools doubled from 1985 to 1988. High

schools experienced the greatest increase in the

number of confiscations, but more guns were found

at all grade levels, including elementary school.

◆ In a national survey conducted in the late 1980’s,

one of every thirty-six 10th-grade boys said they

had carried a handgun to school in the past year.

One in every one hundred boys brought that gun

to school every day. In one U.S. city, one out of

every fifteen 11th-grade boys had carried a handgun to school at some point.

◆ In a survey of 10 high schools in four States, 15

percent of inner-city high school students said

they were scared at school almost all the time.167

A State survey of laws affecting juvenile access to

firearms identified several types of statutes under

which weapons possession in schools or safety zones

is criminalized. The most common type of statute, in

place in at least 33 States, prohibits the possession of

a weapon on school property or in a safety zone and

provides punishments for violations whether or not

the offender knowingly possesses the weapon in that

restricted area.168 As a result of legislative action

taken in the 1995 session, such a statute recently

was enacted in Tennessee, where students are prohibited from possessing unauthorized firearms on

161. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 33.

162. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7107-A (West Supp. 1996).

163. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 33.

164. Id. at 35.

165. Id. at 35–36.

166. 1995: The First 6 Months, THE MONITOR OF FEDERAL AND

STATE GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION (Handgun Control, Inc.,

Washington, D.C.), July 1995, at 2.

167. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION IN MATERNAL AND CHILD

HEALTH, FIREARM FACTS (Laurie Duker ed., n.d.).

168. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 37.
35

school property. Policymakers in Delaware in that

same year created the crime of “possession of a

weapon in a safe-school recreation zone,” which

forbids possessing a firearm on or within 1,000 feet

of school property and school vehicles.169 Other laws

that restrict the use of guns on school property or

within a safety zone include punishing the knowing

possession of a firearm on school property or in a

safety zone, punishing those who intend to use firearms on school property, and prohibiting the discharge or attempted discharge of a firearm on school

grounds or in a safety zone.170

Penalties for violation of a gun-free school provision

are varied. A popular sanction in the past 2 years

includes suspension or expulsion of a student for

possessing weapons on school grounds. A majority

of the States’ laws—19 of which were enacted in

1995—mandate expulsion of a student found carrying a weapon on school property.171 For example,

the State of Washington passed a law in 1995 that

requires a 1-year expulsion of students who have

been found possessing a firearm on elementary or

secondary school premises,172 while a similar law

enacted by policymakers in Oregon in 1996 mandates expulsion for a year when students bring, use,

or possess weapons at school or at interscholastic

activities or events.173 A new law in Illinois provides

that a student suspended from school for various

acts of delinquency, including possession of a

weapon, shall not be permitted to transfer to or attend classes at another school in the district until the

term of the suspension or expulsion expires.174

Other punishments include suspending the driver’s

permit of a youth found in violation of a gun-free

school zone law. In at least seven States—Alabama,

Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode

Island, and Utah—a youth may have his or her

driver’s license suspended if found possessing a firearm on school grounds.175

It should be noted that statutes of this type generally

have several exceptions or defenses to prosecution.

The most common exceptions are for government

agents, students, and staff who are participating in

lawful, educational activities. Other exceptions include an individual possessing a firearm with special

permission from school authorities, an individual

who has a firearm that is safely secured in a motor

vehicle that is on school property, an individual who

is on private property within the safety zone, an individual who is hunting lawfully, and an individual

who has a valid permit to possess a firearm.176

Another popular sanction in recent years allows juveniles to be transferred to criminal court when suspected of committing certain serious and violent acts

with a gun. Although every State provides some

mechanism for children to be transferred to criminal

court for habitually perpetrating crimes or committing specific crimes of violence, several States allow

juveniles to be tried in adult court for committing

weapons offenses as well. For example, a 1995 law in

Nevada allows 14-year-old youth who commit an

offense that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult to be transferred to an adult criminal

court jurisdiction if the offense in question involved

the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon.177 In

Indiana, Mississippi, and Oregon, a youth must be

prosecuted as an adult if he or she violates a firearm

law, while laws in Arkansas, Kansas, and the District

of Columbia allow for the transfer of juveniles of

statutorily specified ages to be transferred to adult

criminal court for violating gun-free school zones.178

Finally, some States are trying to encourage youth to

surrender their weapons in an effort to get guns off the

streets. A 1996 law in New York creates immunity from

prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm when

an individual voluntarily surrenders the weapon to the

superintendent of the State police or a designee.179

169. 1995: The First 6 Months, supra note 166, at 9, 15.

170. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 37.

171. NCSL LEGISLATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 33, at Emerging Issues.

172. 1995: The First 6 Months, supra note 166, at 16.

173. OR. REV. STAT. § 339.115 (Supp. 1996).

174. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–3 to –13a (West 1996).

175. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 37.

176. Id. at 38.

177. NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (Supp. 1996).

178. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 38.

179. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
36

Juvenile Proceedings

and Records

Until recently, State laws and judicial norms were

established with the understanding that the preservation of the privacy of juveniles adjudicated in the

juvenile court is a critical component of the youth’s

rehabilitation. Today, however, in the face of increasing public concerns over juvenile crime and

violence, government agencies, school officials, the

public, and victims are seeking more information

about juvenile offenders. An increasing number of

States are responding to this need by allowing public access to and victim participation in juvenile proceedings, broadening access to juvenile records,

fingerprinting and photographing delinquent youth,

and altering expungement laws for juvenile records.

The establishment of protective measures for guarding the privacy of youth offenders can be traced

back to the separation of juvenile courts from criminal court systems. When the first juvenile court was

created in Chicago, IL, in 1899, it was designed to

“spare juveniles from harsh proceedings of adult

court, punitive and unseemly conditions of adult

jails and penitentiaries, and the stigma of being

branded ‘criminal,’” according to an article by

Tamryn J. Etten and Robert F. Petrone in the Juvenile and Family Court Journal.

180 This new system of

juvenile justice administration was designed to be

less punitive and more therapeutic than the adult

system and included the idea of keeping juvenile

proceedings and records private.

As States began to establish separate juvenile court

systems, much of the original enabling legislation

did not include specific provisions for protecting the

confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings or

records. However, confidentiality was practiced by

most early juvenile courts, where it was deemed

unfair to label a juvenile as a criminal because such a

characterization would inhibit a youth’s rehabilitation.181

However, with juvenile crime becoming more prevalent and increasingly violent, State policymakers

have felt pressure to enact laws that emphasize juvenile accountability for the commission of violent

offenses. According to a recent report by NCJJ, the

juvenile court’s focus on the rehabilitation and protection of minors from public exposure was not

problematic when the indiscretions committed by

these youth were of a less serious nature. However,

as juvenile crime has become more violent, community protection and the public’s right to know has

begun to displace confidentiality and privacy issues

as an underpinning in the juvenile court system.182

The movement toward expanding the rights of victims in both the criminal and juvenile justice systems

and establishing some form of “restorative justice” has

spurred States to expand the role of victims in the

adjudication of their offenders. Currently, 29 States

have victim bill of rights amendments to their State

constitutions. Voters in eight States—Connecticut,

Indiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia—adopted their

provisions during the November 1996 elections.183

State initiatives have also specifically addressed bills

of rights for victims of juvenile crime. According to

NCJJ, Alabama and Arizona each established a

victim bill of rights in 1995 to apply expressly to

victims of juvenile crime. In that same year, Idaho

and Utah included victims of juvenile crime in existing victim bill of rights amendments.184

Even with significant legislative activity resulting in

more access to juvenile proceedings and records, it is

important to note that substantial legal barriers exist

that restrict the sharing of information on juvenile

offenders between and among agencies in the absence

of some type of enabling legislation. Most agencies

that maintain records on juveniles must comply with

a variety of Federal and State statutes, local ordinances, resolutions, regulations, court orders, and

legal opinions in formulating policies for the collection

and dissemination of records information, according

to Etten and Petrone. Despite the complexity of these

various confidentiality mandates, courts on both the

180. Tamryn J. Etten & Robert F. Petrone, Sharing Data and

Information in Juvenile Justice: Legal, Ethical, and Practical Considerations, JUV. & FAM. CT. 65–89 (1994).

181. Id.

182. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 53.

183. Memorandum from Jim Turpin, American Correctional

Association, to Interested Parties (Nov. 13, 1996) (on file with

author).

184. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 72–75.
37

Federal and State levels have held that there is no

constitutional confidentiality right for an alleged or

adjudicated delinquent. Rather, in challenges brought

in the past 25 years, the courts have disregarded the

confidentiality provision when it impedes the constitutional rights of another.185

Juvenile Proceedings

Recent State legislative activity indicates that expanding victim participation in the juvenile justice system

is an important policy issue across the country, as 16

States have enacted legislation broadening victims’

roles in juvenile proceedings in the past 2 years.186

Action on this front includes opening the courtroom

to victims during juvenile hearings and informing

victims of adjudicatory proceedings. For example,

legislation enacted in South Dakota in 1996 allows a

judge to open the courtroom to victims if the offense

committed by a juvenile would be a crime of violence

if committed by an adult. The law also requires the

State’s attorney to notify the victim of the time and

place of hearings involving the alleged delinquent

offender.187 A recent initiative in Nevada requires the

judge to consider the interests of the victim when

deciding to close juvenile proceedings for youth

charged with committing certain violent crimes.188 A

similar measure in Indiana additionally mandates that

a judge consider the nature of the allegation, and the

age and maturity of youth victims, when deciding

whether to close a proceeding.189

Some States have gone beyond notification provisions

to allow victims to become active participants in juvenile proceedings. For example, a provision in Arizona’s

bill of rights for victims of juvenile crime allows victims

to be present and heard at any predisposition or disposition proceeding. Victims also are allowed to present

to probation officials an impact statement outlining the

effect that the juvenile’s crime has had on the victim

and the victim’s immediate family.190

Expanding juvenile court access to the public is yet

another approach States are using to make youth

accountable for the crimes they commit. Currently,

at least 21 States require or permit the court to open

juvenile proceedings if the youth involved are charged

with serious or violent offenses or if the juveniles are

repeat offenders.191 The State of Georgia enacted a

provision of this sort in 1995 when the State legislature voted to open juvenile courtrooms to the public

for the first time. The new law allows the general

public admission to adjudicatory hearings for youth

accused of committing acts that would be felonies if

committed by adults or youth who have previously

been adjudicated delinquent. The provision also

requires written notice to school officials of such

adjudicatory proceedings.192

Inherent in this shift of thinking is the idea that juveniles should be held accountable when their criminal behavior has an impact on the community as a

whole. According to the American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI), “The public has the right to

know the identities of serious, violent, and habitual

offenders who commit crimes in their communities

. . . the opening of juvenile court proceedings in

these cases will ensure greater accountability for the

juvenile offender and the process [as] a whole.”193

Although the public historically has been denied

access to juvenile courts, longstanding support has

existed for media access on the condition that the

names and identities of the juvenile offenders remain

confidential. According to a statement published by

the Children’s Bureau in 1954, judges who use their

discretion to decide who will be admitted to the

courtroom should include members of the press. “If

the juvenile courts are to function efficiently, their

philosophy and practice ought to be known.”194

185. Etten & Petrone, supra note 180, at 48.

186. Id. at 72–75.

187. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26–7A–36, –36.1 (Michie Supp. 1996).

188. NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.193 (Supp. 1996).

189. IND. CODE ANN. § 31–6–7–10 (West Supp. 1996).

190. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8–290.01 (West Supp. 1996).

191. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 55.

192. GA. CODE ANN. § 15–11–28 (Supp. 1996).

193. AMERICAN PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROSECUTORS’

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND HABITUAL

YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 22 (1996) [hereinafter APRI].

194. Richard D. Hendrickson, Media Access to Juvenile Court: An

Update, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 27, 34 (1993) (citations omitted).
38

More recent support for media access to the juvenile

court is outlined in a 1992 report on the role of the

juvenile court judge in juvenile justice administration. Commissioned by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ), the

report encourages judges to admit the media to juvenile proceedings to elicit community support for the

services provided by the juvenile court. “Because of

the confidentiality laws which restrict the flow of

information about most juvenile court cases, it is

critical that the juvenile court judge ensure that information about the juvenile court system is made

available to the public,” according to the NCJFCJ

report. “Only in this way will the public receive a

balanced view of the work of the juvenile court and

not rely solely on the spectacular headlines which

appear at regular intervals.”195

Although States have enacted laws to allow media

access to juvenile proceedings, the U.S. Supreme

Court has held that the courts should retain discretion in this determination, based upon characteristics of an individual case. The U.S. Supreme Court

recently refused to hear an appeal in United States v.

Three Juveniles,

196 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit upheld a U.S. district court

judge’s restriction of media access to proceedings in

which three juveniles were being tried for committing a hate crime. The refusal to hear the case let the

First Circuit’s decision stand, allowing judges to

retain jurisdiction to determine if and when protecting the privacy of a minor during delinquency proceedings will serve the broader public interest of

furthering the juvenile’s rehabilitation.

United States v. Three Juveniles arose when the government charged three youth with civil rights violations after they allegedly conspired to impinge upon

the civil rights of Jews and African-Americans living in the Brockton and Randolph, MA, areas. The

three, initially prosecuted in 1994 under a Federal

hate crime statute, purportedly had been members

of a white supremacy skinhead group called the

New Dawn Hammerskins.

Before the juveniles were arraigned, The Boston Globe

intervened in an attempt to gain access to the proceedings and court documents filed in the case. Although the district court allowed the newspaper

limited access to some documents, the court denied

its request for admittance to the proceedings. The

court reasoned that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Code197 required the closure of a Federal juvenile delinquency proceeding if a juvenile is amenable

to rehabilitation and has no prior criminal or juvenile

delinquency record and if the case has not been transferred to adult criminal court.

The Globe appealed the decision, arguing that the public right of access to the proceedings was guaranteed

by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The

Globe also contended that the court’s reason for closing the proceedings was not sufficiently articulated.

The First Circuit determined there was not a need

to address The Globe’s first amendment argument because the case could be resolved by considering the

law’s statutory intent and provisions. Although the

court noted that an essential element of the Federal

code is the “[p]rotection of the juvenile from the

stigma of a criminal record by preserving the confidentiality of proceedings,”198 it concluded that several

provisions of the law, when read as a whole, show that

Congress did not intend to require that all proceedings be fully closed. While various provisions of the

law do not require closure, they do authorize courts

to protect a juvenile’s confidentiality either by closing

proceedings or through some other means, according

to the court.

The court rejected The Globe’s argument that the logic

behind the trial court’s decision to close the court

proceedings was not sufficiently articulated. The appellate court noted that the district court had stated

that the “overarching objective” of the juvenile court

was to protect juveniles from a negative social stigma

in order to facilitate rehabilitation and that the youth

in this case would likely be responsive to that rehabilitative effort.

Juvenile Records

Juvenile records typically reflect both the legal and

social history of a youth, based on the juvenile’s contact

195. Id.

196. United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995).

197. Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5031 et seq.

198. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 90.
39

with various State and local agencies and service providers. Social history records often include information

about a youth’s family and academic records and any

history of abuse or neglect or problems with drug and

alcohol use. Legal records, on the other hand, contain

information relating to court proceedings involving the

juvenile and information introduced and used as evidence. These records include petitions, complaints,

motions, court findings, and court orders. Legal and

social history records are kept private by various Federal and State laws, which traditionally have inhibited

the exchange of such information between and among

agencies charged with administering policies that affect

children, according to APRI.199

Recent State action has recognized that many agencies that serve children may be better equipped to do

so if provided with comprehensive access to a youth’s

records. According to a recent article from the Juvenile

and Family Court Journal, agencies charged with the

implementation of juvenile justice and children and

family services often have common objectives, and

these objectives yield a need for common information.200 Policy initiatives that support this idea include

expanding access to juvenile records to youth corrections personnel, to courts, and to other State agencies

and school officials in some cases.

Some States, in response to a growing number of

crimes committed by repeat youth offenders, have

created a collaborative, systematic approach to information sharing. One example is the Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program

(SHOCAP). Originally developed by OJJDP,

199. APRI, supra note 193, at 23.

200. Etten & Petrone, supra note 180, at 67.

201. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET NO. 35 SERIOUS HABITUAL OFFENDER COMPREHENSIVE ACTION PROGRAM (August

1996) [hereinafter FACT SHEET NO. 35].

202. Id.

203. APRI, supra note 193, at 23.

204. FACT SHEET NO. 35, supra note 201.

SHOCAP in Brief

Several longitudinal studies conducted by OJJDP have found that

most violent and serious juvenile crime is committed by a minority

of offenders. For example, the ongoing OJJDP Program of Research

on the Causes and Correlates of Delinquency study in three communities (Denver, CO; Rochester, NY; and Pittsburgh, PA) has found that

about one-sixth of all juvenile offenders in the study communities

are accounting for more than three-fourths of all violent offenses.201

Efforts in the past decade to deal with these serious, violent, and

chronic offenders led OJJDP to develop the SHOCAP model as a

tool for communities to identify their most dangerous and violent

juvenile offenders while focusing community resources on immediate intervention or detention when they reoffend.202

Traditionally, agencies charged with the administration of juvenile

justice have been reluctant to share information on individual cases

with other agencies, which reflects the juvenile justice system’s focus on rehabilitation in contrast with the adult system’s punishment

and incapacitation model. Although many States have eased the legal barriers to exchanging information on juveniles, many internal

and informal barriers exist, as agencies often refuse to trust other

agencies.

One of the goals of SHOCAP is to encourage agencies to share information with those with “a need to know,” such as prosecutors,

probation, corrections, social service and law enforcement agencies, and education institutions. By sharing information, these agencies can coordinate reform efforts and develop more thorough,

structured strategies for dealing with the habitual offenders.203

Another byproduct of local SHOCAP agreements is the establishment of more organized and useful records. By having standards

for recording information, those shared documents are more likely

to be readily useful to a variety of agencies and less likely to contain gaps in information.

Both serious habitual offenders and juveniles identified as on pathways to becoming serious habitual offenders (pre-SHO’s) can be

recognized and provided with appropriate services when they are

identified as such in a standardized, meaningful way for all agencies working to help youth. An OJJDP Fact Sheet on SHOCAP

notes that, “The program prevents youth from falling through the

cracks by ensuring that their case information is available immediately for juvenile justice decisionmakers.” This also helps in targeting

intervention initiatives for youth at risk of becoming serious habitual

offenders.204
40

SHOCAP facilitates agency collaboration and information sharing to provide the most relevant sanction, treatment, or intervention for serious habitual

offenders. Since the first SHOCAP programs were

established in the late 1980’s, several States, including California, Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Virginia, have enacted SHOCAP legislation to expand

access to relevant data and information collected on

juvenile offenders by State and local agencies.

Other States have altered juvenile recordkeeping

procedures by providing school officials with access

to juvenile records so that they can handle the misbehavior of individual youth and preserve the safety

of faculty and students in the best way. An initiative

in California encourages information sharing among

law enforcement, juvenile courts, and schools to

determine the most appropriate sanction or rehabilitation option for youth offenders. The law amended

another section of the California code to ensure that

dissemination of this information is limited and used

only to appropriately serve students, educators, and

employees charged with the administration of juvenile justice in the State.205 A new law in Wisconsin

allows school officials to disclose information about

an adjudicated youth to anyone determined by the

local school board to have a safety interest in obtaining that information.206

Other recent initiatives provide agencies charged

with the administration of juvenile justice and youth

programs with access to juvenile records. A 1995

Illinois amendment allows child protection investigators of the State’s Department of Children and Family Services to inspect and copy police records of

minors.207 Since 1995, Connecticut has provided

court officials, the adult probation office, the parole

board, and the bail commission with limited access

to juvenile records.208

Increased access to juvenile records by the public

and victims is yet another tactic that States are using

to facilitate accountability for juvenile offenders. A

New Hampshire law, enacted in 1995, opens records

of juveniles adjudicated delinquent for violent

crimes, while an initiative in Wyoming allows the

court or prosecuting attorney to release the name,

offense record, or disposition of a minor in any delinquency proceeding filed in juvenile court to the

victim or members of a victim’s immediate family.209

Other Administrative Responses

States have also facilitated access to juvenile records

by changing the administrative processes governing

juvenile records—loosening rules on their collection,

centralizing their maintenance, and limiting their

disposal. Policy initiatives of this sort include holding juvenile records in a central repository, fingerprinting and photographing juveniles, making

changes to expungement and sealing laws, and expanding access to juvenile records.

Holding juvenile records in a central location or

repository makes relevant information about juvenile

offenders more easily available to law enforcement

and criminal and juvenile justice officials across the

State. Central repositories may include adult records

only, adult records separate from juvenile offenders,

or adult and juvenile records combined.210

In 1994, 27 States permitted the inclusion of juvenile

arrest and/or court disposition records in central

record repositories. Four of these States—Hawaii,

Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Virginia—authorized a

separate juvenile record center. In some States,

criminal history records for juveniles tried as adults

may be stored in the central repository, with fingerprints serving as the basis for the records.211

Fingerprinting juvenile arrestees also has become

more common in recent years. According to an NIJ

Research in Brief, fingerprinting is a useful tool for

State agencies charged with recordkeeping to ensure

that records accurately identify a specific juvenile.

Recent amendments and changes make fingerprinting provisions more available to law enforcement

by lowering the age threshold or adding to the types

of offenses for which the practice is acceptable.

The authorization to fingerprint, however, does

205. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 827, 828.1 (West Supp. 1996).

206. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.127(3) (West Supp. 1996).

207. 705 COMP. STAT. ANN. § 405/1–7 (West Supp. 1996).

208. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54–76l (West Supp. 1996).

209. LYONS, supra note 111, at 12.

210. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 60.

211. Id. at 61.
41

not usually apply to all arrested juveniles. For example, New York allows youth to be fingerprinted

as young as age 11. More common age thresholds,

according to the NIJ document, begin at 14 in other

States.212 As of 1995, 48 States authorized law enforcement agencies to fingerprint arrested juveniles.213

The types of crimes for which fingerprinting of juveniles is allowed vary by State but most often include

serious offenses and felonies. Iowa, Oregon, and

Washington, however, have permitted the fingerprinting of juveniles arrested for some misdemeanors.214 A

1995 amendment in Pennsylvania broadened the

existing fingerprinting law to allow the fingerprinting

of youth who have allegedly committed misdemeanors. Previously, the Pennsylvania law limited fingerprinting of juveniles to youth who allegedly had

committed felonies and firearms offenses.215

Several States have added laws that require photographs of an alleged delinquent juvenile to be taken

with their fingerprints at the time of arrest. Since

1995, Ohio has allowed fingerprinting of juveniles

ages 14 or over who have been accused of committing

crimes that would be felonies if perpetrated by

adults.216 A similar measure in North Dakota allows

law enforcement officials to photograph juveniles

arrested for various crimes, including murder, sexual

assault, theft, or the unlawful possession or use of a

handgun. Prosecutors also may request that the photograph of the alleged delinquent be taken and stored

in the juvenile record if the youth commits a misdemeanor at the direction of a criminal street gang.217

Sharing access to juvenile records with adult criminal courts has promoted information accessibility,

with the hope of encouraging the appropriate sanction for youth offenders. According to the NIJ

document, every State gives a prosecutor or court

access to juvenile records of adult defendants at

some point in the judicial process. States achieve this

end in different ways: by providing for prosecutor

access explicitly in State code; by prescribing the

inclusion of juvenile records in reports filed by the

court; or by authorizing or requiring the court to

consider a defendant’s juvenile record when setting a

sentence.218

Many of the changes to juvenile recordkeeping procedures have been coupled with changes to the sealing and expungement of juvenile records. Expungement

laws allow for the erasure or destruction of juvenile

records once a juvenile reaches the age of majority,

whereas sealing records removes them from review or

examination except by court order or by designated

officials. Currently, all States have some laws on the

books ordering the expungement or sealing of

records for certain juvenile offenders, based upon

their age or the gravity of their crimes.219 To expand

access to juvenile records, States have moved to restrict the expungement or sealing of juvenile records

or forbid entirely those restrictions on information

about youth adjudicated delinquent. A recent example comes from North Carolina, where in 1994 a

law was passed that forbids the expungement of the

court records for youth adjudicated delinquent for

certain violent felonies or for repeat offenders.220

Juvenile Transfer to Criminal Court

Over the past 20 years, States have significantly expanded legislation allowing for prosecution of juveniles in adult criminal court. This trend has increased

in recent years to permit transfer to adult court at

212. NEAL MILLER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T

OF JUSTICE, STATE LAWS ON PROSECUTORS’ AND JUDGES’ USE OF

JUVENILE RECORDS 2 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter MILLER, STATE

LAWS].

213. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 61. According to a recent

report by NCSL, Hawaii enacted juvenile fingerprinting legislation in 1995. This change brings the total number of States with

juvenile fingerprinting provisions to 48, up from the 47 States

listed in the NCJJ report.

214. MILLER, STATE LAWS, supra note 212, at 3.

215. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341 (West 1995).

216. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.313 (Banks-Baldwin Supp.

1995).

217. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27–20–56 (Supp. 1995).

218. MILLER, STATE LAWS, supra note 212.

219. Id. at 15–16.

220. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A–676 (1995).
42

lower ages and for more offenses.221 According to

NCSL, 17 States in 1995 further expanded or

amended their waiver statutes.222

Today, all 50 States and the District of Columbia

allow for juvenile prosecution in criminal court by

one or more transfer mechanisms, according to

GAO.223 The most common mechanism is judicial

waiver, which gives juvenile court judges discretion

to waive juvenile cases to adult criminal court. Other

transfer mechanisms include direct file, which provides prosecutorial discretion to file criminal charges

against juveniles directly in criminal court, and

statutory exclusion, which mandates juvenile prosecution in adult court.224

The widespread enactment of legislation enhancing

juvenile exposure to criminal prosecution is a direct

response to reported escalations of juvenile violent

crime in recent years. According to OJJDP, the

number of serious crimes, such as murder and aggravated assault, committed by juveniles increased 68

percent from 1988 to 1992.225 Despite recent declines,

these rates may worsen, according to reports cited by

the Campaign for an Effective Crime Policy (CECP),

which predicts that juvenile violent offenses will continue to rise as the number of youth ages 14 to 17

increases 20 percent by the year 2005.226

The dramatic expansion in transfer legislation is

based on the premise that some offenses warrant

criminal prosecution and some juveniles are beyond

rehabilitation. Consequently, State legislation emphasizing accountability by violent juvenile offenders

focuses on transferring serious, violent juvenile offenders and habitual offenders, according to GAO.227

The impact of recent legislation providing for enhanced

transfer is unclear. Less than 2 percent of all formal juvenile delinquency cases were judicially waived each year

from 1988 to 1992. In 1988, only 1.2 percent of all cases

were waived to adult criminal court, or 7,005 of 569,596

cases. The number of judicially waived cases steadily

climbed to 11,748 of 743,673 cases in 1992, to comprise

1.6 percent of all cases.228

Of the small number of juvenile cases waived to

criminal court, more nonviolent offenders were

waived than violent offenders. Nonviolent offenders

comprised 66 percent of all juveniles waived to adult

court in 1992, according to GAO.229 CECP reports

that nonviolent offenders represented 57 percent of

all cases waived in 1993.230

These statistics do not include juvenile transfers to

criminal court via a prosecutor’s exercise of concurrent jurisdiction (direct file) authority and statutory

exclusion. It is unlikely that the above-mentioned

statistics would change significantly, however, given

a recent GAO survey indicating that judicial waiver

accounts for the majority of juveniles prosecuted in

adult court.231 Nor do these statistics include waivers

made pursuant to recent expansions of transfer legislation. Clearly, additional studies are needed to

determine whether this expansive transfer legislation

has led to increased juvenile criminal prosecution of

serious, violent, and repeat juvenile offenders.

In addition, more analysis needs to focus on the impact of juvenile criminal prosecution. The current

data, including results from studies in Idaho, New

Jersey, and New York, indicate that expanded

transfer provisions over the past 20 years have not

deterred juvenile crime. Separate studies in Florida

and Minnesota confirm that juveniles transferred to

adult criminal court have higher recidivism rates

than juvenile offenders retained in juvenile court.232

221. TORBET, supra note 154; CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE CRIME

POLICY, PUBLIC POLICY REPORTS: A SERIES OF REPORTS ON

MAJOR ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE VIOLENT JUVENILE

OFFENDER: POLICY PERSPECTIVE 5 (July 1996) [hereinafter

CAMPAIGN].

222. LYONS, supra note 111, at 3, 13–14.

223. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED

IN CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS 1 (Aug. 1995)

[hereinafter GAO TRANSFER].

224. CAMPAIGN, supra, note 221, at 5.

225. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 1 (citations omitted).

226. CAMPAIGN, supra note 221, at 2.

227. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 7.

228. Id. at 2. The fractional rise from 1.2 to 1.6 percent represents an increase of 33 percent from 1988 to 1992.

229. Id. at 11.

230. CAMPAIGN, supra note 221, at 5.

231. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 20.

232. CAMPAIGN, supra note 221, at 6.
43

For example, a study reported by CECP that analyzed recidivism rates of juveniles prosecuted in

Florida criminal courts found that juveniles prosecuted as adults were more likely to commit additional crimes and more serious offenses upon release

than their counterparts adjudicated in juvenile court.233

Moreover, studies report conflicting findings on

whether juveniles receive harsher or longer sentences

in adult court.234 Thus, it is not clear whether transfer

policies are serving their intended goal of enhancing

punishment and deterring recidivism.

Types of Juvenile Transfers

Judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, and direct file

are three mechanisms used to transfer juvenile offenders to adult court. Judicial waiver is the most

popular method; 47 States and the District of Columbia provide judicial discretion to waive certain

juveniles to criminal court. Thirty-seven States and

the District of Columbia have one or more statutory

exclusion provisions, and 10 States and the District

of Columbia have direct file provisions.235

Other mechanisms to enhance juvenile transfers to

adult criminal court include presumptive waiver,

which mandates juvenile transfer unless the juvenile

offender can prove he or she is suited to juvenile

justice system rehabilitation. Usually the State bears

the burden of proof to show that a juvenile should

be transferred to adult court. Presumptive waiver

shifts the burden of proof to the juvenile to show

that he or she should not be transferred. Twelve

States and the District of Columbia provide for presumptive waiver in certain instances, such as serious

felonies, according to NCJJ and the Institute for

Law and Justice (ILJ). NCJJ reports that nine of

these jurisdictions have enacted their statutes since

1992. ILJ reports that New Jersey relies solely on

presumptive waiver.236

Eighteen States have enacted “once waived, always

waived” legislation, under which a juvenile once

waived to adult court subsequently must be charged

in criminal court regardless of the offense. For example, in Virginia, any juvenile previously convicted

as an adult is excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction.237 In addition, 10 States permit and 12 States

mandate a judge to order waiver in circumstances in

which the offender previously has been adjudicated

delinquent.238

Regardless of the statute, prosecutors maintain a critical role in determining the forum of prosecution. In

addition to direct file legislation, prosecutors may

charge a youth with an offense mandating statutory

exclusion and transfer to adult court. NCJJ observed

that prosecutorial discretion in the absence of guidelines for the exercise of that discretion can result in

inconsistent treatment of juvenile offenders and urged

legislation providing uniform prosecutorial guidelines.239 NCJJ notes that a 1995 Utah State court

decision found unconstitutional the State’s direct file

legislation on the basis that the legislation infringed

on a State constitutional provision guaranteeing the

uniform operation of State law.240

In addition, several States provide statutory measures for ameliorating the consequences of waiver

and transfer decisions. For example, 22 States allow

criminal court judges to return statutorily excluded

or direct-filed cases to juvenile court, which accounts

for more than 40 percent of the States that exclude

youth from juvenile court or direct file juveniles to

adult court, according to NCJJ.241 In addition, 17

States authorize criminal courts to review juvenile

court waiver decisions and/or prosecutorial direct

filings, according to ILJ.242

233. Id. at introduction, p. 6.

234. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 11.

235. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 21.

236. NEAL MILLER, INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, JUDICIAL

WAIVER AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A LEGAL FACT SHEET (DRAFT

REPORT) 2 (Oct. 18, 1996) [hereinafter MILLER, JUDICIAL

WAIVER]; TORBET ET. AL., supra note 154, at 8.

237. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 17.

238. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 38.

239. TORBET ET AL.,supra note 154, at 12.

240. Id. (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995)).

241. Id. at 8.

242. MILLER, JUDICIAL WAIVER, supra note 236, at 4.
44

Transfer Provisions and Trends

State policymakers designate different ages at which

individuals no longer may be adjudicated delinquent

in juvenile court. For example, original juvenile

court jurisdiction extends through age 17 in 37

States and the District of Columbia, age 16 in 10

States, and age 15 in 3 States.243 Beyond those ages,

individuals are deemed to be adults and must be

held criminally responsible for their actions and

prosecuted in criminal court.

Juvenile court judges may weigh a variety of factors

in determining whether to waive juveniles under

their jurisdiction to adult court. All States have incorporated the constitutionally required factors

enumerated by the U.S. Supreme Court.244 These

factors include the seriousness of the alleged offense

and the need to protect the community; whether the

alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; whether the

alleged offense was against a person or property; the

prosecutive merit of the complaint; whether the

juvenile’s associates will be tried in adult criminal

court; the juvenile’s sophistication, maturity, record,

and previous history; and the reasonable likelihood

of rehabilitation.245

Legislators have expanded transfer provisions by

providing or mandating transfer for certain offenders based on offense and age. During the past 4

years, 24 States added crimes for which juveniles

can be criminally prosecuted, and 6 States lowered

the minimum age for transfer to 14.246

Many of these State provisions mandate or allow

transfer of those juveniles charged with any conduct

that would constitute a felony if committed by an

adult. Thirteen States mandate and four States permit this type of transfer for juveniles 16 and older.

Mandatory transfer provisions also apply to certain

offenders age 14 and older in Connecticut, Idaho,

the Virgin Islands, and West Virginia, and age 13

and older in New York. Discretionary transfers apply to offenders as young as age 10 in South Dakota

and Vermont.247

Alarmed by reports that gun homicides have nearly

tripled since 1983,248 several States have enacted

transfer provisions for juveniles who commit offenses with firearms. In Indiana, Mississippi, and

Oregon, juveniles who violate certain firearms laws

must be prosecuted as adults. Illinois mandates

criminal prosecution of juveniles age 15 and older

who violate the State’s gun-free-school-zone laws. A

juvenile age 14 or older in Arkansas, age 16 or older

in Kansas, and under age 18 in the District of Columbia may be transferred to adult criminal court

for a violation of those jurisdictions’ weapon-freeschool-zone laws.249

Some legislatures require any juvenile, regardless of

age, to be transferred for certain offenses. For example, in West Virginia, any child who commits a

violent criminal act must be prosecuted in adult

criminal court.250 In New York, any child with a

specific prior record of offenses who commits a

felony must be criminally prosecuted.251 In Florida,

any juvenile who commits auto theft or carjacking

resulting in serious injury must be prosecuted in

criminal court.252 In addition, several States provide

judicial discretion to waive any juvenile regardless of

age to criminal court based on the specific offense.

According to NCSL, 16 States expanded their transfer provisions in 1995. Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware,

Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota,

Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia added

offenses for discretionary or mandatory juvenile

prosecution in adult criminal court. Arkansas,

Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, and Ohio enacted different

types of once waived, always waived legislation.253

243. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 6.

244. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 13–14.

245. Id.

246. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 8.

247. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 38.

248. Prosecuting Juveniles as Adults, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1996, at A14.

249. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79, at 38–39.

250. Id.

251. NEAL MILLER, INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, JUDICIAL

WAIVER AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: STATE LEGISLATIVE SUMMARIES

(DRAFT REPORT) 33 (Oct. 17, 1996) [hereinafter MILLER, SUMMARIES].

252. Id. at 10.

253. MILLER, JUDICIAL WAIVER, supra note 236, at 3, 13–14.
45

In addition, in 1995 many States established lower

ages at which juveniles may be prosecuted in criminal

court. For instance, Idaho passed legislation providing for waiver of juveniles under age 14 who commit

certain felonies. Nevada lowered from 16 to 14 the

age at which juveniles are subject to discretionary

judicial waiver. West Virginia also lowered from 16 to

14 the age of discretionary transfer for certain juveniles charged with serious crimes. New Hampshire

and Wisconsin lowered the maximum age of original

juvenile court jurisdiction from 17 to 16.254

New York has enacted broad legislation providing

for the transfer of juveniles to adult criminal court.

In that State, juveniles may be prosecuted in adult

criminal court at age 13 and older when charged

with a violent felony. Juveniles with a specific prior

record of offenses are prosecuted in adult criminal

court at age 14 and older when charged with robbery, burglary, or assault and at any age when

charged with a felony.255 Moreover, in New York, all

16- and 17-year-olds are prosecuted in criminal

court.256 According to a New York Times editorial,

Governor George Pataki wants to send all 16-yearolds currently in juvenile facilities to adult prisons,

regardless of the offense.257

Florida has followed in this legislative trend. In that

State, prosecutors may file charges directly in criminal court against any juvenile age 16 or older who

commits a felony, any juvenile age 14 or older who

commits a violent felony or burglary, and any juvenile who commits a homicide. In addition, juvenile

court judges may waive to criminal court any juvenile age 14 or older based on certain findings.258

Offenders Judicially Waived to

Criminal Court

Of the small fraction (less than 2 percent) of juvenile cases judicially waived to criminal court, drug

offenders from 1988 to 1992 had the highest likelihood of waiver, according to a GAO study. The judicial waiver rate for drug offenders was 3.1 percent

in 1992, down from 4.4 percent in 1991. Offenses

against the person consistently ranked second, with

a 1992 waiver rate of 2.4 percent. Offenses against

property ranked third, with a 1992 rate of 1.3 percent, and offenses against public order had a rate of

0.8 percent.259

Moreover, nonviolent offenders comprised 66 percent—the clear majority—of all juveniles waived to

adult criminal court in 1992, according to GAO’s

transfer study. Nonviolent offenders included property offenders, who constituted the largest proportion

of all waived cases at 45 percent; drug offenders, who

made up 12 percent of waived cases; and other offenders, at 9 percent. In contrast, 34 percent of cases

waived were offenses against the person.260

According to OJJDP, another study reported that

nonviolent offenders in 1993 continued to make up

the majority of waived cases, representing 57 percent of all cases waived (38 percent of cases waived

were property offenders, 10 percent were drug offenders, and 9 percent committed offenses against

the public order). On the other hand, that study

reported that offenses against the person rose to 42

percent of all waived cases.261

As mentioned, transfer legislation targets violent

offenders as well as repeat offenders. These studies

do not indicate, however, if any of the large numbers

of nonviolent offenders waived to adult criminal

court had a history of violent offending or were repeat nonviolent offenders.

254. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 6.

255. MILLER, SUMMARIES, supra note 251, at 33.

256. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2 (McKinney 1983 & Supp.

1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. CRIM.

PROC. § 180.75 (McKinney 1993).

257. Prosecuting Juveniles, supra note 248.

258. MILLER, SUMMARIES, supra note 251, at 10.

259. GAO TRANSFER, supra note 223, at 11–12.

260. Id. at 11.

261. CAMPAIGN, supra note 221, at 5.
46

Impact of Waiver and Transfer

Juvenile waiver and transfer provisions have a tremendous impact on a young person’s life. Prosecution

in criminal court exposes juveniles to the same penalties as adults. They may face a life or death sentence,

incarceration in State prison, and a permanent criminal record with attendant disabilities. Juveniles adjudicated in juvenile proceedings, on the other hand,

generally must be released at age 21, receive rehabilitative treatment in a juvenile facility, and may be permitted to have their juvenile records expunged.262

Moreover, as mentioned previously, studies suggest

that juveniles criminally prosecuted and incarcerated in an adult facility have the same or higher recidivism rates. Other studies have also found that

youth incarcerated in adult institutions are five times

more likely to be sexually assaulted, twice as likely

to be beaten by staff, and 50 percent more likely to

be attacked with a weapon than their counterparts

in a juvenile facility.263

The NCJFCJ advocates caution in juvenile transfer.

The council maintains that:

Juvenile delinquency jurisdiction should be to

age 18 in every State. In most cases, juvenile

offenders can be effectively maintained in the

juvenile justice system. In rare instances, the

most violent offenders cannot be rehabilitated

within the juvenile system and should be transferred for adult prosecution. However, the

decision to transfer should only be made by the

juvenile or family court judge.264

Sentencing Authority

Traditionally, the focus of the juvenile justice system

has been on the rehabilitation of the juvenile. The

juvenile court was seen as the common guardian of

the youth who came before it, and the court was

charged with ensuring that the child’s best interests

were considered when determining the proper disposition of a juvenile case. As a result, individuals

adjudicated in the juvenile justice system were not

subject to the same punitive standards and stringent

sentences commonly imposed in adult criminal

court. As violent juvenile crime and recidivism have

increased, incapacitation in the interest of public

safety and deterrence have become important system goals. State trends indicate that punishment and

accountability have become equally important, if not

primary, priorities in juvenile justice policy.265

A number of States have created “blended” sentencing structures for cases involving serious and repeat

juvenile offenders as a mechanism for holding these

youth accountable for their offenses, while retaining

the court’s ability to provide the most effective sanction option. According to its recent report on State

responses to violent youth crime, NCJJ has defined

these blended sentencing measures as “the imposition of juvenile and/or adult correctional sanctions to

cases involving serious and violent juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated in juvenile court or

convicted in criminal court.”266 In other words, this

expanded sentencing authority may allow criminal

and juvenile courts to impose either juvenile or adult

sentences, or both, in cases involving juveniles.

One type of blended sentence allows juvenile courts

to levy both juvenile and adult sanctions or dispositions simultaneously, while suspending the adult sanction. If the youth follows the conditions of the juvenile

sentence and commits no further violation, the adult

sentence is revoked. This type of sentencing authority

has become popular in recent years, with Connecticut, Kentucky, and Minnesota among the States

adopting this type of sentencing authority since 1994.

In Minnesota, a system of intermediate sanctions was

developed as a result of recommendations made by a

State supreme court task force that facilitated major

juvenile justice reform in 1994. Based on the newly

created extended jurisdiction of juvenile prosecution

(EJJP), juvenile court judges can impose both a

juvenile dispositional order and an adult criminal

sentence, with the latter stayed on the condition that

the offender not violate the provisions of the juvenile

262. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 12.

263. CAMPAIGN, supra note 221, at 6.

264. Id. at 6–7.

265. MODEL HANDGUN CODE, supra note 79 (citing Brian R.

Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philosophy

in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REV. 885 (1994)).2

266. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 18.
47

disposition order and not commit a new offense. Under EJJP, youth up to age 21 may be under continuing juvenile court jurisdiction. Sanctions for these

youth are suited to meet individual needs, and if a

participant violates the conditions of the stayed sentence or is alleged to have committed a new offense,

the court may revoke the stay without notice and

activate the adult sentence.267

Extensive juvenile justice revision in Connecticut

(1995) and Kentucky (1996) mandates similar code

provisions. As a result of these reform initiatives, the

juvenile court may now impose both a juvenile and

an adult sentence, with the latter being stayed on the

condition that the youth neither violates the conditions of the juvenile sentence nor commits a new

offense. If a violation occurs, the court may revoke

the stay, revoke the probation, and direct that the

juvenile be taken into immediate custody.268

In Texas, the juvenile court may impose a juvenile

sanction that extends beyond the extended age of

juvenile justice system jurisdiction (21), at which

time transfer of the offender to an adult correctional

facility is required. The terms of this statutory sentencing scheme mandate that a grand jury consider

the original petition charging the youth and require

a 12-person jury to determine guilt or innocence.

Under this expanded sentencing authority, the juvenile court judge or jury is able to impose a sentence

of up to 30 years, depending on the seriousness of

the crime. After sentencing, the juvenile is held in a

secure Texas Youth Commission facility until he

reaches the age of majority, at which time, as a result

of new legislation enacted in 1995, the youth may be

required to complete the full term of the sentence.

This broad jurisdiction of the juvenile court was

augmented further by the 1995 legislation, which

added several offenses for which a juvenile may

receive a determinate, fixed term of up to 40 years.269

Other types of sentencing initiatives allow the adult

criminal court to levy a wide array of dispositions—

including juvenile sanctions—on youth offenders who

are transferred to its jurisdiction. According to ILJ

research, adult court judges in 12 States have this

authority for some offenders, usually those who have

committed less violent crimes.270 In Florida, where the

provisions for transferring a youth to adult criminal

court were made easier in 1994, the legislature also

gave the criminal court broader discretion in its sentencing authority by allowing it to levy both juvenile

and adult dispositions on the youth appearing before

it. Now, the criminal court judge is presented a report

by the Department of Corrections and the Department of Juvenile Justice on the sentencing options

for the offender within both systems. This, coupled

with statutorily defined factors, guides the judge’s

determination of whether to impose juvenile or adult

sanctions on the offender.271

The State of Missouri in 1995 created a sentencing

system much like the reform initiatives in Connecticut and Kentucky, under which the adult criminal

court may levy both a juvenile and an adult sentence, as opposed to this authority being vested in

the juvenile court. The new law allows juveniles ages

12 to 17 to be transferred to adult criminal court for

various felony offenses or if the youth is found to be

a habitual offender. The criminal court judge may

impose simultaneously a juvenile and criminal sentence, with the latter being stayed on the condition

that the youth successfully completes the term of the

juvenile disposition.272

Another common way the adult criminal court can

levy juvenile sanctions is through the creation of

youthful offender programs. These systems, otherwise known as “intermediate” or “third systems,”

provide a mechanism that allows States to impose

strict, adult sanctions on juveniles or young adults

convicted of violent crimes, while maintaining a

rehabilitative focus. Since the State of Colorado

enacted the first program of this type in 1993, at

least 11 other States have followed suit.273 Participation in youthful offender-type programs is an option

for offenders deemed by a judge to deserve one last

267. MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (Supp. 1995).

268. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b–120 (Supp. 1996), KY. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 38–1663 (Michie Supp. 1996).

269. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 21.

270. MILLER, JUDICIAL WAIVER, supra note 236, at 6.

271. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 22.

272. Id. at 8.

273. MILLER, JUDICIAL WAIVER, supra note 236, at 4.
48

chance before being sent to an adult facility. Youthful offenders are able to reach these intermediate

systems, typically components of adult corrections

departments, when an adult criminal court judge

suspends a regular adult criminal sanction for a juvenile waived to criminal court or when a young

adult convicted of a crime is believed to be particularly amenable to rehabilitation.

A premise of many youthful offender programs is

that effective sanctions for more violent juveniles are

those that emphasize a wide range of services with

focused, individual attention on the participants,

principles that are included in the Colorado Youthful Offender System (YOS). YOS is designed to

challenge patterns of thinking and behavior that

result in criminality and acts of violence, including

gang-initiated criminal behavior. The YOS focus

emphasizes treatment, discipline, and a successful

transition back into society with a low staff-tooffender ratio.

The Colorado YOS has four distinct phases. The

first, an intake, diagnostic, and orientation program,

is an attempt to change the anti-authority attitudes

common in most YOS youth. Phase II begins the

period of institutional confinement, with requirements that consist of a range of “core programs,

supplementary activities, and educational and

prevocational programs.”274 The time an offender

spends in phase I depends on the length of the YOS

sentence. During phase III, which occurs during the

last 3 months of the period of institutional confinement, the Colorado Department of Corrections is

authorized to transfer the youthful offender to any

residential program serving youth. Finally, phase IV

is a period of aftercare and community supervision

in which the offender, under intensive monitoring, is

reintegrated into society.275

Under the Colorado YOS, criminal court judges

impose a regular adult sentence on the youth, but

suspend it if the youth successfully completes the

YOS sentence. Typically, juveniles and young adults

are sentenced to 2 to 6 years in the YOS, with a

community placement and aftercare provision for

the last 6 to 12 months of the sentence. Youth may

have their adult sentences revoked after successful

completion of the YOS program, providing they do

not commit new crimes and follow the regulations of

the YOS program.276

Effectiveness of Expanded

Sentencing Authority

Different perspectives can he heard regarding the

efficacy of these types of sentencing dispositions.

For example, in an analysis of judicial waiver and its

alternatives, the ILJ has studied the issue of blended

sentences and expanded sentencing authority and

postulates that this augmented jurisdiction could

facilitate a more efficient administration of justice:

The sometimes contradictory commands of the

waiver laws’ punishment objectives and the

concern for individualized treatment embodied

in the amelioration laws can result in opposing

decisions being made in the two courts. Justice

system inefficiency and ineffectiveness can

result, for example, where the juvenile court

waives a juvenile to the criminal court and then

the case is remanded back to the juvenile court.

A similar contradiction arises where the juvenile court determines that a juvenile cannot be

treated and waives the youth to the criminal

court where the juvenile is sentenced to a

youth offender treatment program. One solution is to authorize a single court to determine

whether punishment or treatment is preferable

in the instant case. This is done by transferring

sentencing authority from the opposing juvenile or criminal court to the court with jurisdiction over the juvenile defendant’s case.277

However, research recently completed by NCJJ

indicates that blended sentencing initiatives may

cause more confusion than good. “Blended sentencing creates confusing options for all system actors,

including offenders, judges, prosecutors, and

274. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16–11–311 (Supp. 1996).

275. Id.

276. Juvenile Crime, supra note 127, at 18.

277. MILLER, JUDICIAL WAIVER, supra note 236, at 5.
49

corrections administrators. Contact with juvenile

and criminal justice personnel across the country

revealed that confusion exists about these statutes

and the rules and regulations governing them, especially with respect to the juvenile’s status during case

processing and subsequent placement. This has repercussions on the definition of a juvenile with regard to compliance with the Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Act mandates.”278

Another consideration for policymakers contemplating these sentencing alternatives relates to the constitutional rights of juveniles. More States are

278. TORBET ET AL., supra note 154, at 18.

expanding the mechanisms by which juveniles are

ultimately disposed—either by the juvenile or adult

criminal court—to adult sanctions and sentences.

Alleged juvenile offenders who are prosecuted in the

adult criminal justice system, subject to adult sanctions, or serving time in adult facilities must be afforded the same substantive and procedural rights as

alleged and convicted criminal offenders. A related

issue for States is determining the availability of

resources through which States can provide for jury

trials, bail, and other criminal justice system rights

for juveniles subject to blended sentencing or incarceration in adult correctional facilities.
51

Chapter III

Selected Case Studies of Juvenile

Reform Initiatives

reform package as it moved through the legislative process will be discussed. Further, each case will not only

identify and summarize the various programmatic

elements and legal changes of the reform, but will go

beyond that to identify obstacles that may hamper the

implementation of the reform initiative and highlight

those factors that facilitate support for changes in the

administration of juvenile justice. Finally, each case

study will report on the current status and prognosis

for each subject State’s reform initiative.

Colorado: Review of Children’s

Code Brings Significant Change

for Juvenile Justice Administration

Introduction

The passage of House Bill 96–1005 in the 1996 legislative session completed a 3-year assessment of juvenile justice administration in the State of Colorado.

Beginning with a special legislative session called by

Governor Roy Romer in 1993 to address the increasing number of youth in need of services from

the human services and judicial systems in the State,

Colorado has undertaken a comprehensive review of

State juvenile services.

Through the work of the Interim Committee on

Youth Violence, the Task Force on the Recodification of the Children’s Code, and the Legislative

Oversight Committee (LOC), several initiatives

were introduced in the 1996 legislative session that

proposed significant changes to the administration

of child welfare and juvenile justice policies in the

State. The legislative process brought many changes

and amendments to the proposals and resulted in a

system that seeks to balance youth accountability for

delinquent and violent behavior with the best and

Although some States have been enacting a series of

single legislative measures aimed at juvenile justice,

many others have embraced the idea of comprehensive juvenile code revision. Since 1994, several

States have enacted laws that make broad changes

to the types of treatment options and sanctions available for juveniles, the jurisdiction and sentencing

authority of the juvenile and adult courts as they

relate to juvenile cases, and the accessibility of information on juvenile offenders.

Each State that undertakes juvenile justice reform

must be responsive to the unique political, social,

and fiscal conditions that make up its environment.

In this chapter, case studies from four States that are

at various stages of implementing juvenile justice

reform initiatives—Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio,

and Oregon—will describe the strategy employed

by each State in implementing its reform initiative.

The four States were chosen for several reasons.

First, they represent different regions of the country

and have distinct demographic makeups. Also, each

reform initiative differs in its focus and stage of

implementation: Colorado’s is the newest reform

initiative, enacted in 1996, while Connecticut and

Oregon are grappling with implementation issues

for initiatives passed in their legislatures in 1995.

Meanwhile, Ohio’s juvenile justice reform measure

is well into statewide implementation following its

enactment in 1993.

The case studies will explore what the context or

climate was that encouraged policymakers to initiate

changes in the juvenile justice system and whether

these contextual factors were single events or the

products of multiple influences. The proponents and

opponents of change to the administration of juvenile

justice will be identified, and the role that their support or opposition played in the evolution of the
52

most appropriate services to help youth become

contributing members of society.

Although it is too early to assess the long-range impact of the measure, officials expect that a full implementation of the law will result from their 3-year

commitment to finding “what works” and soliciting

the views of hundreds of Coloradans concerned with

the administration of juvenile justice in their State.

Impetus for Reform:

A Summer of Violence

The juvenile justice reform effort in Colorado was

prompted by what the local press termed a “summer

of violence” in the State in 1993. In the span of only

a few months, a series of random violent acts seriously injured or killed several people in the Denver

metropolitan area. The media recounted incidents in

which a 10-month-old child was wounded by a stray

bullet while visiting the Denver Zoo and a young

boy was hit in the arm by a random gunshot while

playing on his aunt’s porch. In another incident, a

young man was murdered and his wife abducted

and assaulted as they were en route to their neighborhood grocery store.279

The availability of firearms to youth in the community in large part accounted for the increased

violence. According to an article that appeared that

summer in the Denver Post, “[Local] authorities agree

that the prevalence of weapons among youths is at

an all-time high. In the first five days of a highintensity gang sweep, Denver officers confiscated

69 guns, mostly from teenagers.”280

The rash of violence caused significant concern

among the public and among State and local officials, who noted the shocking nature of the randomness and unpredictability of the violence in the area.

Denver District Attorney Bill Ritter noted that “the

violence we are seeing has, to some extent, a random

nature. And while it has a gang dynamic, we have

innocent people who are not gang involved who are

being injured and killed...and that is something

new.”281 The Governor expressed the same concern

with random and impersonal violence, which is especially frightening to citizens. The drive-by shooting, and the irrationality of such an act, indicated to

the Governor “an abandoning of our moral code.”282

In response, Romer called a special legislative session in September 1993. A result of the 10-day session was the creation of an Interim Committee on

Youth Violence that studied juvenile justice activity

in the State and concluded that the children’s code

was in need of revision.283 The committee determined that, although the laws governing children

and families had been reviewed and partially recodified in 1988, the changes made in that year were not

comprehensive. It noted that the number of children

in need of support services overwhelmed the human

service and judicial systems. The committee found

that there was an imbalance between treatment and

aftercare for children receiving services, which were

fragmented and duplicative in some cases. Further,

little substantive information was available on the

effectiveness of the services and interventions provided to youth and their families. State leaders also

realized the importance of the community’s role in

providing services to youth and the necessity of interagency communication in providing appropriate

sanctions and services to children.284

This conclusion, coupled with the work and recommendations of the Interim Committee, led to the

1994 introduction and enactment of S. 94–21, Concerning a Task Force Study for the Recodification of

the Colorado Children’s Code.

Task Force for the Recodification

of the Children’s Code

The primary charge of the task force was to determine

whether the Colorado Children’s Code needed to be

279. Steve Lipsher, Denver’s Summer of Violence: Irrational

Shooting Sparks Fear in Areas Previously Untouched, DENVER

POST (Aug. 8, 1993).

280. Id.

281. Id.

282. Id.

283. TASK FORCE FOR THE RECODIFICATION OF THE COLORADO CHILDREN’S CODE, S. 94–21 (COLO. 1994) (on file with

author) [hereinafter RECODIFICATION].

284. Id., LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, LEGISLATIVE

OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE FOR THE RECODIFICATION OF THE

COLORADO CHILDREN’S CODE, p. v. (n.d.).
53

rewritten entirely or only modified in places. The statutorily defined duties of the task force were as follows:

◆ To evaluate the overall effectiveness of the Colorado Children’s Code, identify areas in need of

revision, and provide guidance and make recommendations to the Legislative Oversight Committee in its development of a legislative proposal for

the recodification of the children’s code.

◆ To communicate with and obtain input from

groups throughout the State affected by the recodification of the code.

◆ To create subcommittees as necessary to include

individuals not serving on the task force in order

to aid in the completion of the task force study

and the development of a legislative proposal.285

For the next 12 months, beginning in the fall of 1994

and extending through the entire 1995 legislative

session, a diverse task force was assembled. It was

composed of representatives from State and local

agencies, family court judges, probation officers,

attorneys, representatives from nonprofit agencies

charged with the treatment of families and children,

and a family that would experience the impact of

changes in children and family law in the State.

To facilitate the task force objectives, subcommittees

were formed in eight topic areas that included juvenile justice; child protection; relinquishment of parental rights and adoption, paternity, and child

support; development of a single uniform assessment

instrument; family-focused legal and administrative

procedures; performance-based standards for service providers; homeless youth; and parental rights

and responsibilities.286 Members of the task force

solicited 120 additional Coloradans to participate on

these subcommittees. Subcommittees met frequently

and reported monthly to the subcommittee chair,

who was a task force member, on their progress and

recommendations.

According to the task force’s final report submitted

to the LOC in September 1995, the chairman of the

task force noted in his opening comments that:

[T]he Colorado Children’s Code contained a

basic structure, focus, and legislative process

that needed only clarification and some

modification rather than an entirely new

code ... and that most of the changes made by

the special session in 1994 related to delinquency addressed the needs of public safety.

There were, however, a number of recommendations made to allow the system to be more

responsive to the principles of responsibility.

This meant that public safety is suggested as

needing a higher priority with consequences

for criminal behavior being imposed more

rapidly and more meaningfully.287

The Juvenile Justice Subcommittee

Findings and Recommendations

The juvenile justice subcommittee began its work by

articulating the goal of creating “an effective juvenile

justice system that addresses the needs of children

and their families and preserves the safety of the

community, and under which early intervention and

prevention services are available.” The salient policy

issues it identified for discussion were public safety

and accountability for behavior; out-of-home placement of delinquent youth; the relationship between

the juvenile justice and education systems; juvenile

social and delinquency history and records; juvenile

parole, detention, and diversion; fragmentation of

services across the State; the statutory creation of

the Division of Youth Services within the Department of Human Services; the role of juvenile courts;

the needs of special offenders; and direct file and

other transfer provisions.288 Further, the subcommittee wanted to create a system that coordinated assessment procedures and youth services into a

system whose base was at the community level and

to suggest feasible revisions that would result in

more expeditious processing of juvenile caseloads.289

285. Id. at v, vi.

286. RECODIFICATION, supra note 283.

287. TASK FORCE FOR THE RECODIFICATION OF THE CHILDREN’S

CODE: FINAL REPORT (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

288. RECODIFICATION, supra note 283.

289. RECODIFICATION TASK FORCE, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REVISIONS (on file with author)

(n.d.) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS].
54

In its work, the panel also battled with the perception

that government was intervening in the lives of families and children inappropriately and circumventing a

parent’s right to raise his or her child. The chairman

of the juvenile justice subcommittee, who also served

as the director of the Department of Human Services,

was particularly responsive to many of these issues,

according to the task force’s final report. “[The director] consistently looked for ways to reduce government interference while maintaining the department’s

ability to properly respond to the needs of children

and families when appropriate.”290

Through the work of the juvenile justice subcommittee, the task force presented nearly 20 juvenile code

recommendations to the LOC. The recommendations

included establishing a cabinet-level position for

youth crime prevention; augmenting the role of the

municipal courts in processing juvenile cases; setting

aside funds to supplement community corrections

allocations; and changing procedures regarding the

transfer of information about delinquent youth between the juvenile justice and education systems,

while getting tough on parents of truant children.291

The majority of the subcommittee recommendations,

however, related to a juvenile offender’s entry into

the juvenile justice system and subsequent adjudication. Presentencing assessment and sentencing options also were addressed. The provisions of these

four primary categories include:

◆ Arrest and Entry. The task force proposed that a

juvenile could be interrogated without a parent if

both the youth and parent agreed. It also suggested the creation of a Juvenile Assessment and

Intake Program (JAIP) in each judicial district.

The JAIP would be required to use a uniform

assessment tool to gauge the needs of the offender

and the risks the juvenile poses to the public. Finally, a common juvenile justice information system was proposed.

◆ Adjudication. The task force sought to make

more specific the acceptable timeframes for case

processing, reflecting the importance of providing

an immediate sanction for youth misbehavior. It

also sought to change the way the State transferred juveniles into criminal court by expanding

direct filing authority to 12- and 13-year-olds

charged with a class 1 or 2 felony. As a result of

that change, the body proposed to eliminate a

prosecutor’s ability to file a motion to have a case

transferred to district court. The task force suggested expanding the definition of aggravated

juvenile offender to those youth charged with

sexual assault on a child.

◆ Presentencing. These task force recommendations

focused on presentencing assessment procedures.

The recommendations called for incorporating

specific areas of assessment into the statute and

combining the probation; social services; and Department of Human Services, Office of Youth

Services’ evaluations into one interdisciplinary

evaluation. Finally, the task force recommended

that interagency community review teams be

developed to screen and recommend placements

in levels beyond normal probation supervision,

a concept already in place in many Colorado

jurisdictions.

◆ Sentencing. The task force sought to clarify and

make more consistent the criteria by which juveniles are sanctioned in Colorado. It recommended

that the minimum juvenile sentence be based on

offense type and proposed expanding placement

options for juveniles adjudicated delinquent. It

advocated for an increased role for parents in

delinquency proceedings and proposed removing

the cap on parental responsibility for restitution

payments. Further, the task force proposed to

allow juvenile court judges to use indeterminate

sentencing procedures and retain authority to

reduce the sentence in certain cases. Community

review teams would play a role in sentencing as

well, by reviewing enhanced and community placement sentencing options. The teams also would be

responsible for parole plan review and approval

under the recommendations. Parole terms would

have a mandatory minimum of 1 year.292

290. FINAL REPORT, supra note 287.

291. ACTION TAKEN BY THE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

ON THE FINAL REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE FOR THE RECODIFICATION OF THE CHILDREN’S CODE 5–7 (n.d.) [hereinafter ACTION].

292. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 289, at 1–5.
55

The task force combined the juvenile justice subcommittee recommendations with the recommendations

of the other seven subcommittees and submitted its

final recommendations to the LOC for review.

Legislative Oversight Committee Action

The LOC reviewed the task force’s recommendations for incorporation into a legislative proposal to

be introduced before the General Assembly in the

1996 session. The LOC was composed of three representatives and three senators concerned with issues facing children and families: Representative

Jeanne Adkins, chairman; Representative Russell

George; Representative Jeannie Reeser; Senator

Sally Hopper, vice chairman; Senator Gloria Tanner; and Senator Dottie Wham.

The LOC reviewed and debated the task force’s

recommendations and adopted many of the task

force’s provisions, including proposals to statutorily

create the Department of Youth Services; establish

the JAIP risk assessment program and instrument;

make juvenile records more accessible; create a juvenile justice information system; lift the cap on parental liability for juvenile restitution payments; and

enact measures to ensure consistent sanctioning

through indeterminate sentencing and mandatory

parole. The LOC amended and adopted several

other provisions, including:

◆ Requiring municipal court judges to sentence

juveniles to appropriate community programs

when they are available and appropriate. The task

force had suggested encouraging the judges to use

community-based alternatives.

◆ Allowing for placement of juveniles into the Regimented Juvenile Training Program (boot camp),

in combination with another secure placement.

The task force suggested that the court should not

combine boot camp placement with any other

sanction involving secure confinement.

◆ Expanding direct filing authority via transfers for

juveniles ages 12 to 14 for class 1 and 2 felonies

and repealing the transfer provisions for all other

cases. The task force recommended repealing the

transfer statute entirely and augmenting direct

file provisions for 12- and 13-year-olds charged

with class 1 and 2 felonies.293

Although the LOC accepted many of the core ideas

set forth by the task force, it also rejected several

key components of the task force’s findings. For

example, it rejected the idea of setting aside a portion of State appropriations to judicial districts to be

combined with community funds for community

corrections programs for nonfelony offenders. LOC

members were concerned that this plan would result

in a first-come, first-served delivery of services.

They questioned the availability of services under

this plan if a juvenile entered the system after the

State and community-raised funds were expended.

Further, the LOC was concerned this would result

in localized services and circumvent the goal of reducing fragmented service delivery across the State.

In rejecting this portion of the proposal, the LOC

also rejected the community review team concept.294

The LOC also rejected several initiatives related to

parental responsibility for truant behavior. The committee members agreed that parents should be somewhat accountable for truant children but noted that

often parents did not have control over their children. They also were not in favor of keeping unruly

children in class and, as a result, voted to repeal the

compulsory school attendance law. According to the

LOC report, the committee “agreed that students

who do not want to attend school will not attend

school,” and that some committee members “questioned the State law, which requires the attendance

of disruptive students who don’t want to be in

school . . . [thus] rendering schools as houses of

detention.”295

Finally, the LOC did not support the recommendation to create a cabinet-level position for prevention

purposes. It voted instead to establish a function in

293. ACTION, supra note 291, at 35–43.

294. Id. at 35.

295. Id. at 37.
56

the State auditor’s office that would coordinate and

evaluate prevention and intervention strategies and

programs in the State and identify duplicative efforts.

Elements of Reform

H.R. 96–1005, as introduced before the 1996 General Assembly, reflected the conclusions of the LOC.

During the 1996 legislative session, however, a series of hearings and testimony exposed some dissent

from the plan put forth by the LOC. Myriad views

were heard and represented as the bill moved

through the legislative process. For example, some

groups, including State prosecutors, believed the

LOC proposal had deviated significantly from the

task force’s findings. Still other groups were concerned about any expansion of the role of the State

in making decisions about sanctioning and services

for children and its impact on the privacy right in

child rearing.296

As the bill moved through the legislature, however,

it became clear to all interested parties that the

children’s code needed significant revision. Because

this bill would have an impact on the children’s code

in its totality, interested parties believed this was an

opportunity for broad change in the administration

of child welfare programs. A collective mindset was

created from two somewhat opposing camps: those

who supported the reforms and valued increased

accountability in the juvenile justice system and

those who perceived the discussion of children’s

code reform as an opportunity to contribute more

broadly to the climate of change. This environment

lent itself to compromise and collaboration as the

four primary pieces of legislation representing the

work of the task force—recodification of juvenile

code definitions, juvenile justice reform, child welfare amendments, and information management for

multiagency access to information on youth—moved

through the legislature.297

Although the reform initiative, as enacted, differed

significantly from the original task force recommendations, many of the core ideas and concepts were in

place in the final bill. For example, the legislature,

through its action, created a measure that prioritized

increased accountability and a swift sanction against

juvenile delinquency and youth misbehavior. It retained the provisions for transferring juveniles to

criminal court to allow them to be held accountable

for violent behavior. The law also clarified the roles

and expectations of various State and local officials

who come into contact with these youth as they are

processed through the juvenile justice system.

House Bill 96–1005. The juvenile justice reform

initiative resulting from Colorado’s 3-year study of

the delivery of services to youth in the State made

several significant changes to the manner in which

juvenile justice is administered. The continued attempt to balance both a youth’s accountability and

his or her rehabilitation and treatment is evident in

the legislative declaration of the State’s juvenile justice system reform:

The General Assembly hereby finds that the

intent of this article is to protect and improve

the public safety by creating a system of juvenile

justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles

who violate the law. The General Assembly

further finds that, while holding paramount the

public safety, the juvenile justice system shall

take into consideration the best interests of the

juvenile in providing appropriate treatment to

reduce the rate of recidivism in the juvenile justice system and to assist the juvenile in becoming a productive member of society.298

In addition, the law required a 1-year mandatory parole period, removed the cap on restitution for parents

of delinquent youth, and provided increased agency

access to youth records—provisions that were included

in both the task force and LOC recommendations.299

296. Telephone Interview with Pat Cervera, Juvenile Justice

Specialist, and Joe Thome, Program Administrator, Office of

Juvenile Justice, Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal Justice (Jan. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Cervera and

Thome Interview].

297. Id. According to officials, all the bills but the child welfare

initiative passed. It is expected to be reintroduced in the 1997

legislative session.

298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19–2–102 (1996).

299. STATE OF COLO. OFFICES OF LEGISLATIVE LEGAL SERVICES

AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, JUVENILE JUSTICE HB 96–1005

(Mar. 1996).
57

The enacted measure slightly amended most of the

LOC recommendations set forth in H.R. 96–1005.

The enacted provisions include:

◆ Facilitating speedy case processing through expanded deadlines and provisions for the court to

grant continuances for good cause.

◆ Creating a new Division of Youth Corrections in

the Department of Human Services.

◆ Providing for juvenile intake teams to assess the

needs of alleged youth offenders as they enter the

system, replacing the JAIP proposal. The law

eliminated the proposed required assessment tool,

allowing local authorities to adopt assessment

instruments appropriate to local needs.

◆ Redefining “aggravated juvenile offenders” to

include juveniles ages 10 to 12 charged with a

crime of violence. This class of young offenders

had the right to a six-person jury trial.

◆ Clarifying and changing LOC recommendations

for sentencing youth to boot camp programs.

◆ Requiring parental involvement in juvenile proceedings and hearings before the juvenile court,

with exceptions for good cause.

◆ Adding crimes for which a district attorney may

elect to file adult criminal charges and allowing for

transfer to criminal court of juveniles ages 12 and

13 charged with class 1 or 2 felonies, rather than

juveniles ages 12 to 14 as proposed by the LOC.300

Implementation and Outlook

Because many of the provisions of H.R. 96–1005

were not effective until January 1, 1997, it is still too

early to tell what issues, if any, will help or hinder

implementation of the juvenile justice reform effort.

The parties involved in this effort took steps to increase support and buy-in for juvenile justice reform

in hopes of facilitating full implementation of the

measure. For example, the Colorado State Advisory

Group advocated for the task force to be composed

of members who represented different perspectives

and priorities for juvenile justice reform. Having

diverse representation forced those individuals with

opposing views and interests to listen to the opinions

of others and allowed a mechanism for all voices to

be heard and represented. According to State officials, this broad inclusion and availability “at the

table” helped facilitate support for the bill.301

Further, the involvement of more than 100 additional Coloradans participating on the subcommittees was significant in ensuring that all interests

were represented. Subcommittee selections were

made with attention to geographic, racial, and gender diversity, and a person’s group identification—

social worker, government attorney, therapist, parent,

or father’s rights. This avoided overrepresentation of

a particular group on a subcommittee.302

Although the sensational media accounts in 1993

likely inspired juvenile justice reform by enhancing

the public’s perception and concern about the problem of juvenile crime, the media presentation of the

proposed changes to the juvenile justice code in 1996

were much more substantive and informative. One

observer noted the absence of sensational headlines in

the local papers and the inclusion of more substantive

information in articles about the policy changes being

debated before the legislature. For example, at one

point early in the debate on juvenile justice reform, a

provision was introduced to drop the age of direct file

to 10 for some offenses. The media stories discussed

the advantages and disadvantages of making a change

of that type in the law.303

With significant statewide support for the legislation, it is expected that the effort will be sustainable.

State officials already have anticipated some changes

in current infrastructure to accommodate the changes

made by the law. For example, the mandatory 1-year

parole provision has led policymakers to appropriate

additional funds to help judges and court personnel

prepare for more juvenile parole cases. An additional allocation was made to the judicial department

300. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES & DIVISION

OF YOUTH CORRECTIONS, SUMMARY OF HOUSE BILL 96–1005,

THE COLORADO JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM.

301. Cervera and Thome Interview, supra note 296.

302. RECODIFICATION, supra note 283.

303. Cervera and Thome Interview, supra note 296.
58

to help the courts hire administrative staff or parttime magistrates.304

Only time will tell if the initiatives set forth by the

legislature will achieve the goals of holding juveniles

accountable for their behavior, reducing recidivism,

and helping delinquents become contributing members of society. Supporters anticipate that the modifications to the juvenile justice system and the other

changes to the children’s code will enable the State

to have a positive impact on the lives of all its youth.

Connecticut: Balancing Service

and Public Safety Objectives in

Juvenile Justice System Reform

Introduction

With the enactment in June 1995 of Public Act

(P.A.) 95–225,305 An Act Concerning Juvenile Justice, Connecticut set out to reform its juvenile justice

system. The principal thrust of the State’s reform

initiative was to make major corrections in a system

that was viewed as both too lenient with serious and

violent juvenile offenders who posed public safety

risks and unresponsive to the treatment needs of

juvenile offenders.

The centerpiece of Connecticut’s reform initiative

was a set of provisions that would require the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds who commit serious felonies to adult court, permit access to confidential

juvenile records, transfer prosecutorial jurisdiction

for juvenile crime from the State’s judicial branch to

the Division of Criminal Justice, and expand services for and supervision of juvenile offenders.306

P.A. 95–225 also called for the development of a

plan to bring about an across-the-board reorganization of the State’s juvenile justice system. The act

charged a task force composed of executive, judicial,

and legislative branch officials with developing the

plan for consideration by the Governor and the

State legislature.

By fall 1996, the State had completed its reorganization plan and moved forward to implement various

features of its reform initiative. Earlier that year,

however, the reorganization effort had suffered a

setback when, despite overwhelming support for the

initiative, the State legislature did not pass enabling

legislation needed to support implementation of two

key components of the plan: the transfer of juveniles

awaiting trial as adults to the Department of Corrections and expedited renovation and construction of

juvenile facilities.307

Enabling legislation was to be reintroduced in January 1997. Officials closely involved with the reform

initiative are optimistic that the needed legislation will

be enacted and that the goals of P.A. 95–225 will be

achieved.

Impetus for Reform

Connecticut’s reform of its juvenile justice system

evolved in many ways from major reforms accomplished in the State’s adult system beginning in the

early 1990’s.308 By 1994, the State had delivered on

its promise that adults convicted of violent offenses

would serve longer terms. The State had acted to

ensure that adults convicted of violent offenses

would serve the sentences that they received, and it

had built the new prisons needed to hold them.

However, by the mid-1990’s, it was clear to the public and its elected and appointed officials that during

the period of improving the adult system the juvenile

justice system had been largely neglected. “When

the improvements in the adult system were complete, all of a sudden all of the problems in the

juvenile justice system were glaringly obvious,”

according to one State executive branch official.309

A principal catalyst for the public’s focus on the

juvenile justice system in the State was an evolving

304. Id.

305. 1995 Conn. Acts 225 (Reg. Sess.). This act was signed into

law by Connecticut Gov. John Rowland on June 28, 1995.

306. Id.

307. Telephone Interview with Thomas A. Siconolfi, Director,

Policy Development and Planning Division, Connecticut Office

of Policy and Management (Oct. 30, 1996) [hereinafter

Siconolfi Interview].

308. Id.

309. Id.
59

gang problem that encompassed not only Connecticut’s urban centers but some of its more suburban

communities.310 Law enforcement officials were finding large numbers of juveniles in broad sweeps of

gangs. These juveniles, though young in age, were

often experienced gang members who were committing serious and violent crimes and receiving minimal sanctions for their activities. Their youth was

being exploited by older gang leaders who knew

that these young gang members would receive lesser

penalties for their actions in the juvenile justice system than their older, adult counterparts would in the

criminal justice system. Moreover, there was only a

slim chance that a juvenile gang member adjudicated

for a serious or violent crime would serve any significant time in a correctional facility. The Long

Lane School, the most secure and prisonlike facility

for juveniles in the State, was seriously overcrowded,

and it was widely known that stays at the school were

limited to only a few months.311

The contrast in the justice system’s treatment of

adult and juvenile offenders who committed similar

crimes was obvious to all observers. To one State

official, it seemed as if the State was hammering the

adult members of the gang and being manipulated

with respect to the juvenile members of the gang.312

The public wondered why 16- and 17-year-olds

(adults under Connecticut law) who committed serious crimes had to serve serious time in prison, but

15-year-olds who committed similar crimes did not.

Elements of Reform

P.A. 95–225 is an expansive law that establishes the

framework, and sometimes prescribes the specifics,

for dramatic change in the operations of the State

of Connecticut’s juvenile justice system. The law

sets out numerous organizational and operational

changes in agencies of the juvenile justice and related systems, including the courts, probation, children and family services, and corrections.313 It calls

for the development of risk assessment, case classification, and purchase-of-services systems; enumerates and describes programs to be included in an

expanded network of services for juvenile offenders;

and makes changes in judicial proceedings concerning both delinquent children and juveniles accused

of serious crimes.

The three principal goals of P.A. 95–225 are to ensure that:

◆ Juveniles are held accountable for their unlawful

behavior.

◆ Programs and services are designed to meet the

needs of juveniles.

◆ Communities are adequately protected.314

The statute states:

It is the intent of the general assembly that the

juvenile justice system provide individualized

supervision, care, accountability and treatment

in a manner consistent with public safety to

those juveniles who violate the law . . . . The

juvenile justice system shall also promote prevention efforts through the support of programs and services designed to meet the needs

of juveniles charged with the commission of a

delinquent act.315

At the heart of P.A. 95–225 are provisions that reflect the divergent viewpoints of the two principal

constituencies that helped to shape the reform initiative: policymakers who favored concentrating

system improvements on the serious and violent

juvenile offender and those who focused their efforts

on making substantial investments in expanding and

improving services for all juvenile offenders. The

following four key elements of the statute further

reflect these two constituent interests:

310. Id.

311. Id.

312. Id.

313. 1995 Conn. Acts 225, §1 (Reg. Sess.).

314. JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY GROUP, CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, JUVENILE JUSTICE REORGANIZATION

PLAN 2 (1996) [hereinafter POLICY GROUP].

315. 1995 Conn. Acts 225, § 1 (Reg. Sess.).
60

◆ Providing access to previously confidential juvenile records.

◆ Developing a workable mechanism to transfer

14- and 15-year-old juveniles who commit serious

felony crimes to criminal court.

◆ Transferring prosecutorial jurisdiction for juvenile crime from the State’s judicial branch to the

Division of Criminal Justice of the Office of the

Chief State’s Attorney.

◆ Providing appropriate supervision, programming,

and services for all levels of juvenile offenders.316

The Reform Strategy

The new law envisioned sweeping changes in the

State’s traditional approach to managing juvenile

offenders. Accordingly, implementation of the new

law would require a massive reshuffling of the juvenile justice system and additional laws and resources

to support the mandated changes. The State legislature called for the development of a juvenile justice

reorganization plan to be submitted to the Governor

and the State legislature by February 1, 1996.317 To

develop that plan, the legislature created a task force

composed of the chief court administrator, the commissioner of children and families, and the under

secretary of the Planning Division of the Office of

Policy and Management.318

The legislature charged the task force, known as the

Policy Group, with producing recommendations in

16 areas that ranged from studying the feasibility of

transferring the State’s juvenile detention centers

from the judicial branch to the Department of Children and Families, to entering into contracts with

service providers, to producing a comprehensive

plan for juveniles who are substance abusers.319 The

legislature instructed the Policy Group to consult

with the attorney general, the State treasurer, the

chief State’s attorney, the Division of Public Defender Services, and the cochairs and ranking

members of the State legislature’s judiciary and

appropriations committees in formulating the reorganization plan. Overall, the reorganization plan

would address the allocation of staff and responsibilities between the Department of Children and

Families and the judicial branch and would “include

recommendations for revisions and reallocations in

the . . . [state] budget to implement . . . [the] reorganization plan.”320

Three principles guided the work of the Policy

Group:

◆ A range of structured alternatives for juveniles

should be created that would be available to

judges handling juvenile matters.

◆ A balance should be achieved between institutional and community-based services to ensure

that the full range of needs of delinquent juveniles

is met.

◆ A flexible, multiyear approach should be pursued

in implementing the reorganization plan.321

To ensure that its mandate was met fully, the Policy

Group developed a planning process under which

five committees—State facilities, community-based

programs and services, mental health services, substance abuse services, and State-operated services—

were convened and the 16 legislative requirements

divided among the committees. The Policy Group

and its committees were aided in their work by a

planning and management group, which provided

assistance in project management, and by designated

committee facilitators, who provided assistance in

meeting timetables and in preparing the final report.322 The State’s gubernatorially appointed juvenile justice advisory committee, created to oversee

administration of the State’s participation in the

Federal Juvenile Justice Formula Grants Program,

also provided advice and support for the reorganization effort.

316. POLICY GROUP, supra note 314, at 15.

317. 1995 Conn. Acts 225, § 8 (Reg. Sess.).

318. POLICY GROUP, supra note 314, at 17.

319. 1995 Conn. Acts 225, § 8 (Reg. Sess.).

320. Id.

321. POLICY GROUP, supra note 314, at 20.

322. Id. at 17.
61

On February 1, the Policy Group formally transmitted its reorganization plan to Governor John

Rowland and the Connecticut General Assembly.

On February 7, the Governor forwarded his budgetary and legislative proposals to implement the reorganization plan to the General Assembly.

The reorganization plan presented some two dozen

detailed recommendations for achieving the legislative goals set forth in P.A. 95–225. Chief among

them were recommendations to provide access to

previously confidential juvenile records; implement

a mechanism to transfer 14- and 15-year-old juveniles who commit serious felony crimes to adult

court; transfer prosecutorial jurisdiction for juvenile

crime from the State’s judicial branch to the Division of Criminal Justice of the Office of the Chief

State’s Attorney; and enhance supervision, programming, and services for all levels of juvenile offenders.

The reorganization plan also identified four areas in

which new legislation would be needed to support

implementation of its principal recommendations:

Expedited Construction. To realize the goal of

providing a continuum of services for juvenile offenders, it would be necessary to renovate the Long

Lane School, the State’s principal juvenile corrections facility, and build another juvenile detention

facility and a courthouse at Bridgeport, CT. Standard

State construction procedures would not permit the

necessary work to be completed in the timeframe

envisioned by the reorganization plan. The Policy

Group called for enactment of legislation that would

authorize expedited construction procedures.

Transfer of Juveniles. P.A. 95–225 mandated that

14- and 15-year-olds who are charged with committing serious felony crimes be transferred to criminal

court. The legislature charged the Policy Group with

developing appropriate transfer procedures. The

Policy Group recommended that juveniles transferred to criminal court be committed to the custody

of the Department of Corrections for pretrial detention and for serving their sentences. Legislation

would be required to effect the custody transfer.

New Funding. The Policy Group recommended

that the State legislature repeal § 8(C) of P.A. 95–

225, which required that there be “no increase in

323. Id.

budget allocations for the department of children

and families, the judicial branch, the department of

corrections or the office of policy and management

for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997, but the

State legislature may deploy staff and redirect funding among these agencies.” The reorganization plan

called for new funds in the amount of $16 million to

implement the plan fully over 3 years, from the

State’s fiscal year 1996–97 to 1998–99. An additional

$61.9 million in existing funds would be allotted

over the 3-year program to support plan implementation. Legislation was needed to repeal the section

of P.A. 95–225 that prohibited the allocation of new

resources for the implementation plan.

Transfer of Juvenile Justice Centers. The reorganization plan called for the transfer of the management and operation of the Juvenile Justice Centers

from the Office of Policy and Management to the

judicial branch. The centers provide short-term,

nonresidential services statewide for juvenile probation clients. However, under § 44 of P.A. 95–225,

this transfer could not be made until the centers no

longer received any Federal funding. Because the

centers regularly received funding from Federal

programs, including funds from the Federal Juvenile Justice Formula Grants Program—transfer of

the centers could be postponed indefinitely. Legislative measures were recommended to remove this

restriction.323

Implementing Reform

P.A. 95–225 represents a compromise between reformers whose principal focus was on serious juvenile offenders and reformers who, while not in

disagreement with harsher treatment of serious and

violent juvenile offenders, primarily were advocates

for expanding programs and services to address the

needs of juvenile offenders across the board.

The first reform-oriented bills introduced in the

Connecticut legislature sought to require the transfer of 14- and 15-year-old juvenile offenders who

commit serious felonies to criminal court. The
62

reform initiative, which evolved from Governor

Rowland’s campaign promise to pursue a transfer

provision, became the centerpiece of his first spending proposal for juvenile justice. The Governor’s

juvenile justice proposal also sought downsizing of

the Long Lane School and the expansion of services

for juvenile offenders. An alternative legislative proposal deemphasized spending to support a steppedup response to serious and violent juvenile crime

and emphasized instead a substantial increase in

juvenile justice programs and services.

Early in the 1995 legislative session, the legislature’s

Judiciary Committee began hearings on pending

juvenile justice proposals, and it seemed that a major

clash over system reform was likely. However, as the

first hearings were about to be convened, opposing

parties agreed to pursue a compromise that would

reflect the strengths of both proposals. Driven by a

general agreement that something needed to be done

about the direction of the State’s juvenile justice

system, the two camps forged a compromise. P.A.

95–225 was enacted and signed into law on June 28,

1995. “When the reform bill finally passed, it contained something for everyone,” a State official

observed.324

By early 1996, Connecticut had moved forward to

implement provisions of P.A. 95–225. Confidential

juvenile records had been opened to prosecutors,

police, and other justice system officials; the new

transfer mechanism for juveniles who had committed serious crimes was in place; and prosecutorial

jurisdiction for juvenile crime was scheduled for

transfer from the judicial branch to the Division of

Criminal Justice, an executive branch agency that

handles all prosecutions of adult offenders.325

In February, legislation was introduced in the Senate to make the necessary statutory changes called

for in the reorganization plan.326 Also in February, a

supplemental funding measure was introduced in

the House that included $6.7 million in new funding

that the reorganization plan recommended for

implementation of the plan in the State’s fiscal year

1996–97 biennium.327 The State legislature authorized funding to support implementation of other

key components of the reform plan but with $1.4

million less in new funding than had been requested

by the Governor. In addition, the legislature approved

an amendment to P.A. 95–225 that would facilitate

the transfer of the management and operation of the

juvenile justice centers from the Office of Policy

Management to the judicial branch.

However, in 1996, despite continued bipartisan support for P.A. 95–225, legislation to implement two

key provisions of the reform package died in the

House. S. 81 would have allowed juveniles awaiting

trial as criminals to be detained pretrial and to serve

their sentences in adult correctional facilities and

also would have provided for expedited renovation

and construction of juvenile detention facilities and

the courthouse at Bridgeport.

The implementation bill failed when it became embroiled in controversy surrounding unrelated issues,

including two contentious intraparty leadership debates.328 In addition, in the Republican-controlled

Senate, the bill passed handily, but not before being

amended to include a prison privatization measure

that raised budget issues in the executive branch

and was opposed vehemently by labor interests.

Opponents of new spending on juvenile institutions

were vocal about their dislike of the expedited construction provision.

Ultimately, the implementation bill was kept off the

House calendar and thereby prevented from coming

to the floor for a vote. But S. 81 was not defeated on

its merits. One State official observed, “If the [transfer/expedited construction bill] had been subject to a

vote strictly on its merits, it would have passed overwhelmingly.”329

324. Id.

325. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, GOVERNOR ROWLAND’S PROPOSAL FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE REORGANIZATION, 2–3 (1996). The

transfer of prosecutorial jurisdiction over juvenile offenders from

the judicial branch to the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney’s

Division of Criminal Justice took place on July 1, 1996.

326. S. 81, An Act Concerning the Implementation of the Juvenile Justice Reorganization Plan (Conn. 1996).

327. H.R. 5038, An Act Making Adjustments of the State Budget for the Biennium Ending June 30, 1997 (Conn. 1996).

328. Siconolfi Interview, supra note 307. Telephone Interview

with William H. Carbone, Director, Office of Alternative Sanctions, Judicial Department (Nov. 7, 1996.) [hereinafter

Carbone Interview].

329. Siconolfi Interview, supra note 307.
63

S. 81’s defeat in the legislature presented State officials with an immediate need to find an administrative solution to the confinement issues raised by

implementation of P.A. 95–225’s provision that

authorized the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to

criminal court. Without the legal authority that S. 81

would have provided to confine certain juveniles in

adult facilities, State officials needed to find placements for juveniles who were awaiting transfer to

or who were adjudicated and sentenced in criminal

court. With the aid of $500,000 in Federal funds

from the Justice Department’s Violent Offender/

Truth in Sentencing grant program, a building on

the grounds of an existing adult corrections facility

was converted to a temporary detention facility to

hold an estimated 30 to 40 juveniles awaiting transfer

to criminal court. It is an expensive solution, costing

the judicial branch an estimated $1 million a year

to operate the facility—significantly more than it

would cost the Department of Corrections to house

these youth. State officials hope that it will be a temporary solution and that a bill that would fully support the transfer and be effective upon passage will

be enacted in the 1997 legislative session.

A Window of Opportunity

“For every public policy issue, there exists a window

of opportunity when you can most effectively address an issue. Conversely, poor timing will often

doom an otherwise credible initiative,” a Connecticut

official observed.330 A variety of circumstances and

conditions collectively created a window of opportunity that was a major factor in Connecticut’s juvenile

justice system reform initiative.

Because of demographic factors, changing Connecticut’s juvenile justice system arguably is easier than

changing systems in many other States. Connecticut

is a relatively small State with a small juvenile offender population and an even smaller population of

serious and violent juvenile offenders. Such numbers

can be dealt with, according to one Connecticut

official.331 Connecticut’s small size likewise makes it

easier to reach and convene all the people who may

be needed to address a problem.

A second factor that facilitated the juvenile justice

reform initiative is the State’s highly centralized

government. All functions of Connecticut’s criminal

and juvenile justice systems, except policing, are

carried out at the State level. Local prosecutors are

appointed by a gubernatorially appointed commission. Their activities are overseen by the Office of

the Chief State’s Attorney, a State executive branch

agency that operates under the supervision of that

commission. A decision that might involve scores of

high-level officials in most States requires only a

handful of very powerful executive, legislative, and

judicial branch officials.332

Perhaps the single most significant factor in

Connecticut’s overhaul of its juvenile justice system

was the widely supported view that the system

needed reform. The public had reached the limits of

its patience with the State’s juvenile justice system,

in particular with its handling of serious juvenile

offenders. The public wanted serious and violent

juvenile offenders off the street, and the bill proposed to do that. The transfer provision became the

centerpiece of Connecticut’s reform initiative. A

State official asserted that proponents of the reform

package could not have sold it without the transfer

provision.333

Supporters of juvenile justice reform in Connecticut

were aided considerably by the absence of any major

opposition. Overall, there were numerous reform

advocates and few detractors. The Governor, then in

his first term and a strong advocate of tax cuts and

reduced government spending, was willing to put

forward a significant reform proposal and to find the

money to pay for it.334 The chief court administrator

was a major proponent and facilitator of the reform

initiative, and the State legislature, while not in complete agreement with all aspects of the Governor’s

proposal, was willing to support reform.

330. Id.

331. Id.

332. Carbone Interview, supra note 328.

333. Siconolfi Interview, supra note 307.

334. Id.
64

“There were folks who might have wanted a more

minimal program than what we had, who might

have been satisfied with transfer alone,” a State official said.335 “And there were folks who thought that

spending on Long Lane would be a waste and that

we should spend money on more programs and

smaller facilities. There was no one standing up and

shouting it [the reform plan] down.”

Even the news media, which had followed closely

the State’s reform of its adult corrections system,

paid modest attention to P.A. 95–225’s progress

through the State legislature.336 The publicity that

juvenile justice reform did receive was largely favorable to the Governor’s plan.

P.A. 95–225’s focus on the most serious juvenile

offenses resonated well and helped to minimize opposition to the measure from constituencies that

wished to preserve the traditional distinctions between the juvenile and criminal systems of justice.337

Reticence about transferring 14- and 15-year-olds

was assuaged by the knowledge that the transfer

provision would affect a relatively small number of

offenders in the State. Any concerns about housing

juveniles adjudicated in criminal court in adult corrections facilities were offset by the knowledge that

these youth would in fact be placed in a special Department of Corrections facility that would house

only younger inmates. Clearly, juveniles would not

be housed with significantly older adult offenders.338

Sustaining Momentum

Connecticut has put in motion the most extensive

reformation of its juvenile justice system in the

State’s history. State officials point with pride and

some amazement at what has been accomplished in

a little more than a year. Most Connecticut State

officials who have played a part in juvenile justice

reform are optimistic that the reform plan contained

in P.A. 95–225 will be fully implemented.

Legislation to implement the custody transfer provision was to be reintroduced in the new legislature, to

be seated in January 1997. Implementation legislation is needed, and there undoubtedly will be challenges on that front.

Likewise, Governor Rowland’s continued support

of the implementation plan is critical. The Governor

has consistently championed the necessary funds for

juvenile justice system reform in Connecticut. His

continued support will be essential in the months to

come.

Juvenile justice system reform seems well underway

in Connecticut. “We’ve made a lot of progress; it’s a

very good change,” one State official concluded.339

Ohio: Sharing Responsibility for

Administration of Juvenile Justice

Introduction

The administration of juvenile justice has been reformed significantly in the State of Ohio over the

past 3 years. The primary reform initiative, the

RECLAIM (Reasoned and Equitable Community

and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors) Ohio program, provides for a communitybased response to the problem of youth delinquency

through the establishment of local, graduated sanctions programs. This initiative, coupled with the Ohio

Families and Children First initiative (OF & CF)

(a collaborative effort among all State agencies concerned with family and children’s issues to support

local youth-serving programs) and amended substitute H.R. 1340 from the 1995 legislative session

(which provides for more adult sanctions for serious,

violent, and chronic juvenile offenders), completes

the continuum of juvenile justice policy and service

delivery in the State.

RECLAIM Ohio, which was implemented statewide

in 1995, has served to remedy the previously strained

relations between the Ohio Department of Youth

335. Id.

336. Id.

337. Id.

338. Id.

339. Carbone Interview, supra note 328.

340. Act of Aug. 10, 1995, Ohio Laws 48.
65

Services (DYS) and local juvenile court judges by

creating shared ownership and responsibility for the

administration of juvenile justice in Ohio.

Today, RECLAIM Ohio is well received by local

courts and appears to be working. A fiscal year 1996

program overview indicates that admissions to DYS

decreased 4 percent compared with fiscal year

1995 and more than 10,400 youth were served by

community-based programs administered by local

juvenile courts and funded with RECLAIM Ohio

appropriations.341

RECLAIM Ohio

RECLAIM Ohio evolved from Governor George

Voinovich’s dedication to building families and investing in children. The OF & CF helps facilitate

children’s readiness for learning. The program, a

predecessor of RECLAIM Ohio, places a policy and

funding emphasis on prevention and early intervention activities that will minimize the need for more

costly efforts later, according to an Ohio annual

progress report.342

With this more preventive component in place,

RECLAIM Ohio was developed to facilitate a similar

community response for a different set of juveniles—

youth already in trouble with the law. RECLAIM

Ohio is a unique program that enables local juvenile

courts to respond immediately and effectively to

youth misbehavior by developing their own local

community-based disposition programs or contracting with private and nonprofit organizations to establish them. RECLAIM Ohio was piloted in 9

Ohio counties in 1994 and became available to all

88 of Ohio’s counties in January 1995.

Several factors led to the enactment of the RECLAIM

Ohio legislation in 1993. Prior to the development

of the program, DYS, which manages the State’s

juvenile corrections facilities, was allocated separate

funding for the juvenile institutions it managed.

County judges, often faced with pressure from their

limited local budgets, thought committing a youth to

a DYS secure facility was free, since sending youth

to the State juvenile prison system came at no cost to

the county. Thus, there was a fiscal incentive in

place to commit youth to secure juvenile facilities, no

matter how nonviolent the crime for which they had

been adjudicated. According to a RECLAIM Ohio

program overview, “It was becoming readily apparent that many of the youth committed to DYS [secure facilities]—particularly first-time, nonviolent

offenders—would be better served in their local

communities.”343

This sentencing trend helped contribute to significant crowding in juvenile institutions around the

State. As of May 1992, the population of juveniles in

secure youth facilities had significantly exceeded the

design capacity of the facilities. According to a State

official, the population of youth offenders in DYS

custody was 2,538, greatly surpassing the facilities’

design capacity of 1,400.344

The overcrowded conditions created a dangerous

situation for both residents and staff. Youth in DYS

custody were getting hurt, and one female staff person was nearly killed. These and other unfortunate

incidents caught the attention of the local press,

whose reporting helped bring the issue to the public’s

attention. Voinovich named then-Lieutenant Governor

Michael DeWine, now one of Ohio’s U.S. Senators, to

lead a task force to investigate the problem.345

The end result was RECLAIM Ohio, a collaborative, bipartisan effort developed by DeWine; Geno

Natalucci-Persichetti, DYS’ director; and Carol

Rapp Zimmermann, DYS’ assistant director, with

financial and ideological support from Voinovich.

According to a consultant for RECLAIM Ohio,

“Governor Voinovich bought into RECLAIM Ohio

100 percent and put in some serious money. He and

Geno Persichetti were very progressive to acknowledge kids were coming out worse from State institutions, and many less serious offenders would be

341. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES: RECLAIM OHIO,

PROGRAM OVERVIEW (1996) [hereinafter RECLAIM OHIO

OVERVIEW].

342. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OHIO 6TH ANNUAL PROGRESS

REPORT 6 (1996).

343. RECLAIM OHIO OVERVIEW, supra note 341.

344. Telephone Interview with Linda Modry, Administrator,

Ohio Department of Youth Services (Dec. 9, 1996) [hereinafter

Modry Interview].

345. Bill Howard, Ohio Reinvents Community Youth Corrections,

YOUTH TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 1996, at 38.
66

better off in corrections programs at home than being locked up with hardened delinquents.”346

Elements of Reform. Designed to provide more

local autonomy in the administration of juvenile

justice, RECLAIM Ohio is a funding initiative that

encourages local juvenile courts to develop or contract for a range of community-based sanctions options. The program goals are twofold: to empower

local judges with more sentencing options and disposition alternatives for the juvenile offender and to

improve DYS’ ability to treat and rehabilitate youthful offenders.347 RECLAIM Ohio allows local juvenile courts to create a series of different services and

sanctions appropriate to the juvenile offenders who

come before them.

Under the program, counties receive a funding allocation based on the number of youth adjudicated for

acts in the previous 4 years that would have been

felonies if committed by adults. Each month, a

county’s allocation is charged 75 percent of the daily

costs for youth housed in secure DYS institutions

and 50 percent of the daily costs for youth placed in

DYS community corrections facilities. Community

corrections facilities are State-funded, locally operated, dispositional alternatives for juvenile offenders

who commit acts that would be considered felonies

if committed by adults and who are in need of treatment in a residential facility but whose offenses do

not warrant a long-term commitment to a secure

DYS facility.

DYS rebates the remainder of the allocation, after

the debits, to the counties each month. With those

funds, counties contract for or develop communitybased programs for youth adjudicated delinquent

who would have otherwise been committed to DYS

facilities. Examples of the 279 programs in place in

Ohio counties include day treatment, intensive probation, electronic monitoring, home-based services,

offense-specific programs, residential treatment, and

reintegration or transitional programs. The only

current limitations on the use of RECLAIM Ohio

funds are that they must be funneled into programs

serving youth who have been before the juvenile

courts and that they cannot be used for construction, renovation, or supplanting local funds.348

To ensure public safety, DYS guarantees that the

juvenile court may commit violent youth to DYS

secure facilities even if that county has exhausted its

RECLAIM Ohio allocation. This “hold harmless”

clause guarantees that the juvenile courts will not

have to use local funds to house more violent youth

who belong in secure custody. In addition, RECLAIM

Ohio includes a provision for “public safety beds”

for which counties are not debited. As a result, the

counties are not charged against their RECLAIM

Ohio allocation for youth committed to DYS for

enumerated violent crimes, such as murder, rape,

manslaughter, and certain firearms offenses.

Reform Strategy. Under the RECLAIM Ohio program, the responsibility for crowding in juvenile

facilities and the delivery of services to delinquent

youth is not a State or a local problem but a systems

challenge. The developers of RECLAIM Ohio soon

realized that communities lacked resources to treat

some juvenile offenders locally with appropriate and

cost-effective services. At the same time, DYS found

it could not provide all of the services necessary to

accommodate the entire range of offenders in its 16

secure facilities.349 By recreating the process by

which juvenile sanctions are funded, RECLAIM

Ohio has achieved its goal of allowing local juvenile

courts to design juvenile corrections to fit community needs. DYS benefited as well from the creation

of environments that best serve young offenders.

The impetus behind the reform had a historical base

in the stormy relationship between many Ohio juvenile court judges and DYS. When DYS came into

existence in 1980, replacing the Ohio Commission of

Youth Services, Ohio juvenile court judges lobbied

for more control of community-based programs and

sanctions for status offenders. Thus, the DYS purview initially was limited to handling only juvenile

346. Id.

347. DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI,

FINAL EVALUATION OF THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES RECLAIM OHIO PILOT PROJECT vi (1996) [hereinafter

PILOT EVALUATION].

348. RECLAIM OHIO OVERVIEW, supra note 341.

349. RECLAIM, A Reasoned Approach, DYS TODAY (Dep’t of

Youth Svcs., Columbus, Ohio), Autumn 1996.
67

felons, with statutory provisions in place dictating

the minimum sentences they were required to serve.

This loss of State agency control stemmed from a

lack of confidence on the part of juvenile judges in

DYS’s ability to manage.350

However, DYS controlled the money for community

corrections—the appropriation was funneled directly to the agency, which then allocated the money

to the counties. The relationship was adversarial,

and there was continuing conflict over appropriations. Local judges wanted more money to send

more juveniles to community corrections programs,

but commitments to DYS had increased and the

staff needed those funds to operate the secure facilities appropriately. This adversarial relationship left

both sides frustrated, with neither taking ownership

of the problem.

In May 1992, when facilities were populated at 180

percent of design capacity, with no end to these levels in sight, and with 1 in every 90 African-American

youth in Ohio being committed to DYS facilities,351

those concerned with the administration of juvenile

justice in the State knew it was time to take action.

Governor Voinovich encouraged DYS officials to

begin a dialog with juvenile judges over developing

a collaborative approach to the care, treatment, and

sanctioning of delinquents. At that point, an informal dialog began between DYS officials and judges

in some counties. At the same time, DYS started to

review the efforts of other States to implement juvenile justice reform initiatives. DYS also tried to develop ways of incorporating the positive aspects of

other programs into one that would meet the needs

of Ohioans while avoiding the obstacles and unintended consequences that had emerged in other

jurisdictions.

What resulted was RECLAIM Ohio, with a marketdriven company (DYS) providing a service to its

customers (the juvenile court judges). The DYS

budget was aggregated and State officials then distributed essentially all of the appropriation to the

counties. By framing the issue in economic terms

and deferring significant programmatic control and

funding to the local level, the RECLAIM Ohio proposal seemed like a clear choice for investing in the

youth of the State.

A Skillful, Strategic Choice for Public Peace. With

a program plan in RECLAIM Ohio on the table,

DYS officials had one other obstacle to overcome

when it brought the idea before the Governor—the

proposed budget for the program plan was 133 percent of the agency’s 1992 allocation. This obstacle

came at a time when the Governor was asking all

State agencies to cut spending, requesting that all

agencies start constructing their new budgets at 80

percent of their current appropriation.

Despite the plan’s additional expense and the uncertainty of how the approach would work in practice,

Governor Voinovich supported the revolutionary

initiative for several reasons. According to a DYS

official, the Governor understood the seriousness of

failing to make a sweeping change to the juvenile

justice system; he also recognized that building more

and more juvenile facilities was not an appropriate

long-term answer. Perhaps an even greater influence, according to the official, was the Governor’s

pledge to help Ohio’s children, which served as the

catalyst for his support.352

The proposal put forth by the Voinovich administration gained significant bipartisan support as it

moved through the legislature as part of the 1993

budget plan, and it did not go through significant

revision during the legislative process. Legislators

were concerned about the efficacy of the juvenile

justice system and were dedicated to effecting

change in the lives of these young people. Further,

the DYS proposal had created an accountable system using a simple formula and “clean data”—the

number of youth adjudicated for acts that would

have been felonies if committed by adults—and this

information was to be compiled by the counties

themselves. Yet another selling point to the legislature was giving power and funding to local juvenile

courts, with a good-faith effort to keep a primary

component of the administration of juvenile justice

350. Telephone Interview with Carol Rapp Zimmermann, assistant director, Ohio Department of Youth Services (Dec. 17,

1996) [hereinafter Zimmermann Interview].

351. Id.

352. Id.
68

at the county level. A DYS official characterized the

decision to embrace RECLAIM Ohio as a skillful,

strategic choice for public peace.353

A Context Conducive to Change. The disconnection between DYS and local juvenile courts prior to

the enactment of RECLAIM Ohio had created a

situation in which system improvements were sorely

needed. This situation, coupled with a series of articles in the Dayton and Columbus press, highlighted problems in the juvenile justice system and

contributed to a public understanding that reform

was imperative; building more and more facilities

was not the answer.

The unions supported the initiative, which was critical to the passage of the measure. The labor representatives understood that RECLAIM Ohio did not

represent an effort by DYS to downsize staff positions; rather, a higher staff-to-offender ratio would

come about as a result of less crowded conditions.

This served the union’s interest by ensuring safe working conditions in secure institutions. Thus, labor

supported the allocation of money to the counties

because it understood that its interests were protected overall.354

Even though DYS had been soliciting input from

juvenile court judges while the program was being

developed, some remained opposed to the plan. A

few local judges wanted to be trusted to make the

right decisions for the youth who came before them

and advocated for a shift of funds with no other ties.

However, a majority of the county courts came out

in full support of the program and praised the initiative for giving local courts the fiscal power to support sanctioning and treatment decisions based on

the needs of the communities they serve. Today, an

overwhelming majority of Ohio’s juvenile courts

strongly support the RECLAIM Ohio initiative and

the transfer of decisionmaking power to local judges,

despite the additional time and work involved in

developing a comprehensive plan for juvenile services and sanctions options.355

A recently released study conducted by the University of Cincinnati, which evaluated the nine county

programs that participated in the 1994 pilot of

RECLAIM Ohio, found that 85 percent of county

court judges, administrators, and probation officials

were very satisfied with their experiences as pilot

program participants. What the respondents liked

most about participating in the pilot program was

the ability to develop alternative ways of dealing

with delinquent youth.356 This enthusiasm and support for the program’s first run spread to other

counties, many of which embraced RECLAIM Ohio

as soon it was available statewide in January 1995.

Another strong inducement for many county courts

to participate was the financial incentives built into

the program’s debiting system. Before RECLAIM

Ohio, local courts were appropriated funds for community corrections under the Community Corrections Grants program, which allocated $6 million to

counties for community corrections. In fiscal year

1996, juvenile courts received $17.1 million after

they paid their debits for DYS commitments—

nearly three times the amount of State money previously channeled to the juvenile courts.357

Moving Toward the Future. Embracing the new

program as an evolution in service delivery, the State

is consistently looking at ways to improve RECLAIM

Ohio by making it more user-friendly and facilitating the program’s ability to effectively serve the

needs of adjudicated youth. Future changes to the

State’s parole system may minimize the county’s

responsibility for those juvenile offenders who

reappear before the court for a parole violation,

currently an issue of concern to RECLAIM Ohio

participants. Officials are also working to combine

the appropriations and reporting requirements for

RECLAIM Ohio and the DYS Youth Services

Grants program, which provides money to local

juvenile courts to fund prevention programs that

attempt to keep youth from becoming involved in

the juvenile justice system.

In an effort to sustain the momentum and positive

feedback surrounding RECLAIM Ohio, DYS has

adopted a customer service-oriented approach to

353. Id.

354. Id.

355. Modry Interview, supra note 344.

356. PILOT EVALUATION, supra note 347.

357. RECLAIM OHIO OVERVIEW, supra note 341.
69

maintaining its relationships with the local courts. A

RECLAIM Ohio conference is held every year, and

program meetings occur every other month for all

counties that wish to participate. Both venues offer

an opportunity for RECLAIM Ohio participants to

discuss successes and challenges in the program’s

implementation.358

Further, DYS officials spend a significant amount of

time in the field, offering counties technical assistance

with the administration of their programs. DYS

officials hope that these meetings and outreach efforts

will lead to the preservation and sustainability of

RECLAIM Ohio and facilitate a continued positive

relationship with local court judges and administrators.359

A more accurate picture of the efforts of State and

local officials and community service providers will

be presented by a statewide analysis by the University of Cincinnati to elicit information on the status

of the program in all 88 Ohio counties. Further, the

study will look longitudinally at the impact of the

program by tracking youth sentenced to various

community sanctions, gauging their readjustment in

their own communities, and measuring the rates of

recidivism of RECLAIM Ohio participants.

Since the introduction of RECLAIM Ohio, DYS

officials have seen decreased institutional populations and a greater opportunity to address treatment

issues for youth in need. However, the best result,

according to officials, is the shared effort in reclaiming delinquent children among the juvenile courts,

DYS, and other State agencies. This newly created

vision would have been unimaginable 5 years ago,

officials report.360

Amended Substitute House Bill 1

With the successful OF & CF and RECLAIM Ohio

initiatives in place, policymakers looked toward

enhanced penalties for violent juvenile offenders.

Legislation enacted in 1995 brought significant

changes to the procedures governing the transfer of

violent juveniles to adult criminal court, provided

for minimum sentences in DYS facilities for youth

adjudicated delinquent for certain crimes, and

changed recordkeeping laws for violent juvenile

criminals in the custody of the State.

Amended substitute H.R. 1, sponsored by Representative E.J. Thomas, was enacted to serve two purposes: to send a clear and powerful message to youth

across Ohio that heinous and repeat violent offenses

will not be tolerated in the State and to seek justice

for the victims of juvenile crime and their families.361

H.R. 1 started as a reverse waiver provision, under

which juveniles transferred to adult criminal court

could petition the court to be certified back to the

juvenile court. The youth had the burden of proving

why he or she should be adjudicated in juvenile

court. When DYS realized that RECLAIM Ohio

and local jurisdictions could be adversely affected by

some of these early H.R. 1 provisions, the agency

participated in a collaborative effort to limit transfers to adult criminal court to habitual and violent

offenders only. As a result, the Senate Judiciary

Committee and the House Committee on Judiciary

and Criminal Justice held hearings and facilitated a

working group composed of interested parties, including State legislators, prosecutors, juvenile and

adult court judges, law enforcement officials, the

State attorney general, and DYS.362

The law, as it was enacted, makes significant changes

to transfer provisions by which violent juveniles in

Ohio are tried as adult criminals. The law defines

category 1 and category 2 violent offenses as they

relate to juveniles. Category 1 offenses include aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder,

and attempted murder. Category 2 offenses include

kidnaping; rape; voluntary manslaughter; involuntary manslaughter; felonious sexual penetration; and

aggravated arson, robbery, and burglary.363 The

definition of “public safety bed” was amended to

include all category 1 and 2 offenses, with the exception of aggravated robbery and burglary.

358. Modry Interview, supra note 344.

359. Id.

360. Zimmermann Interview, supra note 350.

361. DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, HOUSE BILL ONE SUMMARY (on file with author) [hereinafter HOUSE BILL ONE SUMMARY].

362. Zimmermann Interview, supra note 350.

363. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, FINAL ANALYSIS OF

AMENDED SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL ONE (1996).
70

The law also created a mandatory bindover or

waiver provision for violent youth. Juveniles must

now be tried in adult criminal court when there is

probable cause to believe that:

◆ A youth 14 years old or older has committed a

criminal offense and has previously been found or

pleaded guilty to a felony-level offense in adult

court.

◆ A youth 14 years old or older has committed a

criminal offense and is a resident of another State

where he or she would be considered an adult for

that offense.

◆ A youth 16 or 17 years old has been charged with

a category 1 offense.

◆ A youth 14 or 15 years old has committed a category 1 offense and has previously been committed to DYS for a category 1 or 2 level offense.

◆ A youth 16 or 17 years old has committed a category 1 or 2 offense other than kidnaping and has

previously been committed to DYS for a category

1 or 2 offense.

◆ A youth 16 or 17 years old has committed a category 2 offense other than kidnaping and has

displayed, brandished, indicated possession of, or

used a firearm in the commission of the crime.364

The discretionary waiver provisions were expanded

to permit the transfer of 14-year-olds who have committed acts that would have been felonies if committed

by an adult if the victim was 5 years old or younger

or 65 years old or older. Additional considerations

include whether the juvenile alleged to have committed the offense physically harmed or injured the

victim, possessed a firearm when allegedly committing the offense, or failed to successfully complete

previous attempts at rehabilitation.

Minimum sentences for violent youth who remain in

the custody of DYS were added as a result of the

amended substitute H.R. 1. Youth committing attempted aggravated murder or attempted murder

will serve a 6- to 7-year DYS commitment, while

those committing a category 2 offense will be required to serve 1 to 3 years. Juveniles committing

crimes while brandishing guns will receive a 3-year

minimum sentence, while those who have a firearm

in their possession during the commission of a crime

will serve at least 1 year. Finally, the act lowers to 14

the age of youth adjudicated delinquent for a category 1 or 2 offense who may be photographed and

fingerprinted.

The passage of amended substitute H.R. 1 represents the “best judicial practice and temperament.”365

It provides serious sanctions for violent offenses that

most participants agreed were best handled with

tough sanctions. The definitions for category 1 and 2

offenses were of the type that DYS would have previously tied to public safety beds and thus did not

affect the formula for the county allocation. The

interested parties worked together to identify offenses that all could agree belonged in the definition

of public safety beds.

Amended substitute H.R. 1 will have a long-term

affect on RECLAIM Ohio. By sending older, more

violent juveniles to the adult system, DYS will house

younger delinquents who will have longer minimum

sentences to serve. DYS officials expect this shift to

happen slowly, and when it does, they acknowledge

a likely need to build additional juvenile facilities

based on the prototype and the needs of the offenders committed to DYS custody at that time.

Oregon: Making Juvenile

Offenders Accountable

Introduction

In 1995, the State of Oregon set out to fix a juvenile

justice system that the citizens and their elected officials had come to view as having failed both juveniles

and the public.366 The State’s juvenile justice system

“wastes lives and it wastes resources,” observed

Oregon Attorney General Theodore R. Kulongoski

when the final report of a gubernatorially appointed

364. HOUSE BILL ONE SUMMARY, supra note 361.

365. Zimmermann Interview, supra note 350.

366. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, FINAL

REPORT 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter OREGON FINAL REPORT].
71

task force, charged with developing a plan to reform

the system, was released in January 1995.367 The

attorney general further noted:

Right now there are no consequences for unlawful actions. There is no certainty of punishment. There is no accountability. The result?

An escalation of offenses until the conduct is so

outrageous that the system is forced to respond.

Is it any wonder that younger criminals consider the system a joke? Is it any wonder that

Oregonians are fed up?368

S. 1, crafted from the recommendations of the

Governor’s Task Force on Juvenile Justice and

endorsed by the State legislature, was signed into

law on June 30, 1995, by Oregon Governor John

Kitzhaber.369 The bill prescribed a dramatic change

in the philosophy of the State’s juvenile justice

system, calling for a shift from a child welfare

orientation to an approach that would demand

accountability from juvenile offenders who entered

the system.370 The measure also called for a wholesale reorganization of the system itself and proposed

a broad expansion in the availability and range of

services for juvenile offenders.

Oregon has made major strides in implementing key

provisions of S. 1, despite having less funding than

requested from the State legislature for some of the

initiatives authorized in that measure. In a little

more than a year from enactment of S. 1, a Department of Youth Authority had been established; four

regional juvenile corrections facilities had been sited;

work had commenced on the development of architectural plans for these facilities; and the expansion

of existing and the creation of new programs and

services for juvenile offenders had begun across the

State.371

Oregon’s Governor, State legislators, and citizens

remain committed to full implementation of the reforms envisioned by the task force and S. 1.372 However, resources and competing priorities will affect

how quickly and smoothly Oregon will be able to

move forward on these initiatives.

Impetus for Reform

Juvenile justice system reform in Oregon “was a

long time coming,” according to an Oregon State

criminal justice official.373 When it arrived, the proponents of reform set out to move the State’s juvenile justice system from a child welfare model to an

accountability model.374 The Oregon juvenile justice

system as it existed did not do a consistent job with

juvenile offenders and did not follow through on its

promises. No punishment—or at best inconsistent

punishment—was the rule. Prior to the enactment of

S. 1, most youth who entered Oregon’s juvenile justice system were handled at the county level.375 The

majority of these juveniles received no substantial

sanction in their first six or seven encounters with

the system.

According to a former task force coordinator, a

juvenile’s first and second contacts with Oregon’s

juvenile justice system most often would result in an

official letter. On the third or fourth contact with the

system, the juvenile and the county juvenile department would enter into an informal disposition agreement under which the juvenile would agree to

certain terms and conditions and the county juvenile

department would agree to withhold the juvenile

petition if these terms and conditions were met. In

effect, the department was saying, “If you do these

things, we won’t pursue a petition.” If the juvenile

violated the informal disposition agreement, the

367. Id. at 1.

368. Id.

369. Act of June 30, 1995, Or. Laws Ch. 422.

370. OREGON FINAL REPORT, supra note 366, at 6.

371. Telephone Interview with L. Craig Campbell, Vice President and Legal Counsel at The Victory Group, Inc., formerly

Special Assistant Attorney General, Coordinator of the

Governor’s Juvenile Justice Task Force (Dec. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Campbell Interview].

372. Id.

373. Telephone Interview with Greg Peden, Director, Criminal

Justice Services, Oregon State Police (Dec. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Peden Interview].

374. Id.

375. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.
72

department might proceed with a petition. Even

when a petition was filed, the dispositions often

were ineffective because resources were not available to back up the sanction.

When a petition finally is filed against a repeat

juvenile offender, he or she is usually placed on

probation. By the time a youth has had six or seven

contacts with the State’s juvenile justice system, the

youth has “a pretty healthy contempt” for a system

that has done little more than slap his or her hand, in

the opinion of the former task force coordinator. If

delinquent behavior persists, the youth is sent to a

training center, probably for an act similar to those

committed in the past. Consequently, the juvenile

sees little distinction between the prior acts and the

one that lands him or her in the training center. The

youth might think, “I didn’t do anything different

this time than last time. Why am I going to the

training center?”

Current and former State officials who were involved in Oregon’s juvenile justice reform initiative

say that its roots can be found in the State legislature’s

1986 capping of the number of beds in the State’s

juvenile corrections system.376 The prevailing philosophy of juvenile justice in the State legislature at

that time was that juvenile offenders should receive

treatment in the community and not be locked up in

juvenile corrections institutions.377 The State was not

at the point of considering juvenile offenders criminals, and fewer violent offenses were being committed by juveniles 10 years ago than are committed

today.378 The capping of the number of juvenile corrections beds was intended to limit the number of

juveniles incarcerated and to force the State to find

alternative methods of dealing with some of these

offenders. Under the State legislature’s plan to decentralize juvenile corrections at that time, the State

would disburse funds to the counties to support

their management of juvenile offenders.379

By 1993, the State legislature had begun to sense the

public’s frustration with the State’s management of

the juvenile justice system and Oregon citizens’ willingness to take matters into their own hands if the

State would not take control of the juvenile crime

problem. The public was telling its elected officials

that if the government did not do something, the

people would do it for them. Citizens can put forth a

ballot initiative in the State of Oregon with relative

ease.380 Kulongoski also sensed the public’s strong

dissatisfaction with the State’s juvenile justice system and the need to do something to keep citizens

from taking matters into their own hands.

Providing further impetus to the call for accountability in Oregon’s juvenile justice system was a shift

in the political leadership in the State legislature that

took place between 1993 and 1995. In 1993, the

leadership in the House for the first time in recent

history changed from Democratic to Republican.

Two years later, Republicans also took over the Senate leadership. With these changes, the nature of the

legislature became more conservative, according to

the former task force coordinator.381

In the early 1990’s, Oregon entered a recession. As a

result, local revenues were cut by a citizen referendum that reduced local property taxes. In addition,

counties’ timber receipts were reduced as a result of

restrictions imposed on timber cutting under the

Federal Endangered Species Act to protect the spotted owl. As State and local revenues declined, juvenile justice reform also became a resource issue.

Counties found themselves being asked to do more

with less.382

Elements of Reform

The . . . purposes of the Oregon juvenile justice

system . . . are to protect the public and reduce

juvenile delinquency and to provide fair and

impartial procedures for the initiation, adjudication and disposition of allegations of delinquent conduct. The system is founded on the

principles of personal responsibility, accountability

and reformation within the context of public safety

376. Campbell Interview, supra note 371; Peden Interview,

supra note 373.

377. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

378. Id.

379. Id.

380. Id.

381. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.

382. Peden Interview, supra note 373.
73

and restitution to the victims and to the community.

The system shall provide a continuum of services that emphasize prevention of further

criminal activity by the use of early and certain

sanctions, reformation and rehabilitation programs and swift and decisive intervention in

delinquent behavior. The system shall be open

and accountable to the people of Oregon and

their elected representatives. [Emphasis

added.]383

S. 1 prescribed and authorized sweeping changes in

Oregon’s juvenile justice system. At the heart of the

measure was a philosophical reorientation of that

system. The preamble of S. 1 reflected a shift from a

rehabilitation- and restoration-oriented juvenile justice

system to one of accountability and punishment.384

The State’s juvenile corrections system was a particular target of Oregon’s juvenile justice system

reform initiative. “Juvenile corrections is the orphan

of both our child welfare and criminal justice systems . . . [w]henever a choice is made about resources

for adult corrections, child welfare or juvenile corrections, juvenile corrections ends up at the bottom

of the list,” Attorney General Kulongoski stated.385

The juvenile corrections system must become “the

advocate for the bad kid,”386 he asserted, by ensuring

that there are certain and consistent responses to the

youth’s actions.

To provide separate and independent status for juvenile corrections in the State, the bill called for the

creation of a Department of Youth Authority (DYA)

that would ensure, as its central mission, that

adequate, available funding and administrative resources would be focused on juvenile crime.387 This

action would elevate responsibility for oversight of

juvenile corrections from an office within the Child

Services Division of the Oregon Department of

Human Resources to executive cabinet-level status.388

S. 1 also authorized the construction and operation

of regional maximum security juvenile corrections

facilities to provide the highest level of custody and

staff supervision in the State’s juvenile justice system.389 It also provided the newly created DYA

emergency siting authority to expedite the location

and construction of these secure facilities.390

Under S. 1, the State’s juvenile code was amended

to expand the list of serious and violent crimes for

which a juvenile must be prosecuted as an adult to

include aggravated murder; conspiracy, solicitation,

and attempt to commit aggravated murder; and conspiracy, solicitation, and attempt to commit murder.391 S. 1 also amended existing law to require

adult prosecution for 12-year-olds charged with

aggravated murder, murder, or one of the forcible

sex offenses,392 and to allow public access to most393

juvenile records, specifically information in those

records concerning the juvenile’s name and date of

birth; the act that the juvenile is alleged to have

committed; the date, time, and location of any proceeding against the juvenile; and the disposition of

any petition filed against the juvenile.394

Equalizing Service Needs. S. 1 also called for the

creation of a multitier infrastructure for its juvenile

justice system. This strategy would provide a broad

range of disposition options and services for juvenile

offenders in addition to providing services to those

youth who would require placement in secure juvenile facilities.395

With their proposal to create a multitier system of

services for juvenile offenders, the Governor’s Task

Force on Juvenile Justice and the State legislature

balanced the call for tougher sanctions for repeat

383. S. 1, § 1a (1), 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 422.

384. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

385. OREGON FINAL REPORT, supra note 366, at 8.

386. Id.

387. Id. at 7.

388. Id. at 6.

389. Id. at 9.

390. Id. at 6.

391. Id. at 13.

392. Id.

393. Id. at 8.

394. S. 1 § 68 (5), 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 422.

395. OREGON FINAL REPORT, supra note 366, at 8.
74

juvenile offenders with a commitment to provide the

same level of program and services at each tier of the

juvenile justice system. “The difference between each

tier of the system is the level of security and direct

supervision required and provided. Each tier will

have the same core programs, services, and policy,”

the task force explained in its recommendations.396

The consensus of advocacy groups opposed to the

initiative to create a punishment-centered juvenile

justice system was that by increasing the “back end”

of the system, the task force was ensuring that these

youth would not improve their chances of reforming.397 The task force’s recommendation to equalize

services at all levels of security in the juvenile justice

system was an attempt to balance the focus on punishment by responding to the concerns of advocates

that Oregon’s juvenile justice system provide a broad

continuum of services for juvenile offenders.398

To further its objective to create a multitier juvenile

justice system, S. 1 authorized the operation of youth

corrections assessment centers at each regional

maximum security juvenile corrections facility to

provide accurate, thorough screening and evaluation

of young offenders in order to ensure appropriate

placement within the system.399 S. 1 also called for

the creation of youth accountability camps and restitution centers to provide a highly structured regimen of work, physical and mental discipline, and

community service sanctions to instill a work ethic,

build vocational skills, and develop individual accountability and responsibility through payment of

restitution to both the victim and the community.400

In addition, S. 1 provided for the creation of regional residential academies to provide year-round

educational, vocational, and life-skills training on

secure, closed campuses,401 while authorizing DYA

to contract with counties to handle services for and

supervision of first-time, nonviolent juvenile offenders.

Finally, S. 1 created a sentencing review procedure

for juveniles sentenced as adults for nonviolent offenses. Under the second-look procedure, the sentencing court would review the progress of eligible

juveniles in the custody of DYA who had served at

least one-half of the sentence imposed. The court

would determine further commitment or appropriate

disposition.402 The sentencing court would have the

option of continuing the juvenile’s sentence as imposed or ordering the juvenile’s conditional release

under the supervision of the Oregon Department of

Corrections. The juvenile would have the right to

counsel and to examine witnesses and records offered in evidence during the hearing. The Department of Corrections would have the right to appeal a

sentencing court’s decision to place a juvenile on

conditional release.403

The Reform Strategy

The engine of Oregon’s far-reaching juvenile justice

reform initiative was the Governor’s Task Force on

Juvenile Justice, created by former Governor

Barbara Roberts. Under Executive Order 94–01,

issued by Governor Roberts in January 1994, the

task force “was directed to examine Oregon’s juvenile justice system, to identify the components of the

system that are working and those that were not,

and to help amend and reform the system to meet

current and future needs.”404

Attorney General Kulongoski was appointed task

force chair by Governor Roberts and authorized to

appoint the other task force members, who included

the president of the State Senate, two circuit court

judges, the State police superintendent, a local chief

of police, a law professor, a private attorney, and a

businessman.

The task force was aided in its work by 10 subcommittees and working groups involving more than 80

individuals. Between January 1994 and the release

of its final report a year later, the task force and its

subgroups met 52 times. The task force accepted as

its mission the drafting of a comprehensive and

396. Id. at 9.

397. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

398. Id.

399. OREGON FINAL REPORT, supra note 366, at 9.

400. Id. at 10.

401. Id.

402. S.1, § 53 (1)(b), 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 422.

403. S.1, Ch. VI, 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 422.

404. OREGON FINAL REPORT, supra note 366, at 3.
75

specific blueprint for reform of the State’s juvenile

justice system. That blueprint would be based on

seven standards and principles:

◆ Accountability and responsibility for an

individual’s conduct.

◆ Community and family protection and safety.

◆ Certainty and consistency of response and

sanctions.

◆ Effective and closely supervised reformation and

rehabilitation plans and programs.

◆ Early intervention and prevention.

◆ Parental involvement and responsibility.

◆ Highest and best use of available resources.405

Implementing Reform

Oregon’s multifaceted initiative to reform its juvenile

justice system has not been without hurdles and compromises. S. 1 itself reflects major wins and losses for

all parties involved in the initiative.

Two concurrent patterns of thought were evident

among proponents of juvenile justice system reform

in Oregon.406 One group of reform advocates asserted that the State did not do enough when a youth

first enters the system. Those reformers argued that

if appropriate action were taken the first time a juvenile comes in contact with the system, there might

not be a second time. The second school of thought

argued that consistent measures need to be taken over

a longer period with persistent juvenile offenders.

At the same time, both the task force report and S. 1

reflect nonpartisan, broad-based support for reform.

No major source of opposition to juvenile justice

system reform was present in Oregon. The greatest

danger to the reform initiative was that some partisan opposition to the initiative would evolve around

the proposal to build new juvenile corrections facilities.

One key task force proposal calling for the creation

of a Youth Offender Review Panel never made it

into S. 1. The review panel, as conceptualized by the

task force, would have been an independent, gubernatorially appointed body that would make decisions

about placements of juvenile offenders in programs

and facilities managed by DYA. The review panel

was intended to insulate administrators of juvenile

institutions from the negative consequences of placement decisions. Proponents of the proposal asserted

that juvenile corrections administrators had to make

placement decisions based on resources. According

to the former task force coordinator, the question

was how to transition a person from one place to

another and “take it away from the [juvenile corrections] administrator. Superintendents [of juvenile

institutions had been] burned by probation decisions. They [the juvenile corrections administrators]

were looking for protection. The panel [would not

be] bound by these restrictions.”

When asked how proponents of the Youth Offender

Review Panel proposal would free the panel from

resource constraints in their placement decisions,

the former task force coordinator responded, “I

don’t know. We were hoping that we would get

more resources [from the State legislature] than we

did for juvenile crime.”

The panel proposal ultimately was dropped from the

State’s juvenile justice reform initiative because of its

resemblance to a parole board and concerns about

the potential cost of financing the panel. The Oregon State legislature does not view parole boards

favorably. The State no longer allows early release

from prison or good time because the parole board

made decisions on offenders who went on to commit

some crimes against children. Opponents of the

panel proposal also saw a possibility that a review

panel would be more liberal and would continue the

past approach of emphasizing treatment for juvenile

offenders rather than accountability.407 The legislature also viewed the panel as potentially too costly,

whether it was administered centrally by the State

or regionally by the counties. The panel would be

required to meet frequently, and expenses would

mount up quickly. The panel would also require a

405. Id.

406. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.

407. Id.
76

large travel budget unless two or more youth review

panels were established.

The State legislature also rejected a proposal to amend

Ballot Measure 11 and remove certain offenses from

the mandatory minimum requirement, including

unlawful sexual penetration II and kidnaping II.408

Likewise, the legislature applied the second-look

provision to youth 13 and 14 years old, a much narrower focus than the task force recommendation.409

By the end of 1995, the regional secure juvenile correctional facilities had been sited. As 1996 drew to a

close, the development of architectural plans for

those facilities was underway.410 Proposed siting for

the secure facilities met with mixed reviews around

the State, with some communities objecting to the

location of a juvenile corrections facility in their

midst and others welcoming the possibility, largely

on economic grounds. In the end, the State succeeded

in selling its proposal to site the facilities by proving

that these institutions would be secure and safe.411

Making Things Happen

When the momentum for juvenile justice system

reform began to build in Oregon, things fell into

place, according to one State official.412 Once the

task force report came out, it became clear changes

would be made in the juvenile justice system.

Three principal factors facilitated juvenile justice

reform in Oregon: the leadership of Attorney General Kulongoski, who chaired the Governor’s Task

Force on Juvenile Justice; the belief of criminal

justice professionals around the State that changes

needed to be made in the system; and the evolving

power of the citizen initiative in Oregon.413

The most important element of Oregon’s juvenile

justice reform movement was the leadership of the

attorney general.414 The former task force coordinator asserted that no one was ever able to get people

together on juvenile justice before the task force was

convened. Most of the officials who came together

to develop a plan for juvenile justice reform in Oregon did so because of the attorney general.

Attorney General Kulongoski recognized the need

to respond to criticisms of the State’s juvenile justice

system.415 His office and the State’s juvenile

administrators’ association cohosted a statewide

juvenile justice summit in the summer of 1994

during which participants identified numerous

changes that needed to be made in the juvenile justice system. One of the more glaring deficiencies

identified was the way the State was dealing with

violent juvenile offenders.416 Many more violent

offenses were being committed in Oregon than the

State was prepared to deal with, according to a State

official. The State legislature’s cap on the number of

State juvenile corrections beds was still in place,

because the intent of the old system was to provide

for juveniles on the community level.417

Criminal justice professionals across the State were

beginning to fear that change in the State’s juvenile

justice system might be driven by a citizen initiative.

The criminal justice professionals believed that they

needed to take action if they were to avoid being

steamrollered by the ballot measure process.

The State Ballot Initiative. Oregon citizens’ increased use of the ballot initiative to influence its

elected and appointed government officials was a

major factor in setting into motion the State’s reform

of its juvenile justice system. Through these ballot

initiatives, Oregon citizens were expressing their

dissatisfaction with the current system and their

desire for immediate change.418

In Oregon, this citizen initiative movement moved

quickly from the reform of the State’s tax structure

to reform of the State’s criminal justice system. Although early criminal justice citizen initiatives aimed

408. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

409. Id.

410. Id.

411. Id.

412. Id.

413. Id.

414. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.

415. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

416. Id.

417. Id.

418. Id.
77

at reform of the State’s sentencing structure and

crime victims issues were largely unsuccessful, the

political clout of advocates of these reforms was

growing in the State legislature, and elected and

appointed officials saw a need to take seriously the

potential of these initiatives as the public began

to clamor for reform of Oregon’s juvenile justice

system.419

The fear felt by juvenile justice professionals was

realized by the passage of Ballot Measure 11 in November 1994. The initiative requires that youth ages

15, 16, and 17 be tried in adult criminal court if alleged to have committed specified violent crimes,

including robbery, kidnaping, and various sex offenses. Further, the measure outlines mandatory

minimum sentences for these offenses, ranging from

5- to 25-year sentences. If convicted, the youth may

be placed in the physical custody of the Oregon

Youth Authority until he or she reaches the age of

25, although the offender remains in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections.

Realizing Reform Objectives

Proponents of juvenile justice system reform in Oregon know that they will continue to face new challenges as they seek to sustain the reform momentum

generated by the work of the Governor’s Task Force

on Juvenile Justice and the enactment of S. 1. The

State legislature is not expected to devote as much

attention to juvenile justice system reform initiatives

in the 1997 session, and securing adequate funding

to continue progress on implementation of S. 1 provisions will continue to be an issue.420

Oregon’s counties are expected to ask the State legislature to provide them with the authority and

funding to assume a greater responsibility for management of juvenile offenders than currently is authorized under the 1996 law.421 The counties would

like the legislature to authorize their management of

juvenile offenders from first contact with the juvenile justice system to the offender’s commitment to a

State-operated juvenile corrections institution. Under current law, the counties are authorized to

handle juvenile offenders until they are placed on

probation with an out-of-home placement.

In the 1997 legislative session, Governor Kitzhaber

was expected to pursue enactment of legislation to

revise the second-look provision of S. 1 to authorize

its broader application as originally envisioned by the

task force.422 In addition, the legislature may consider

narrowing the list of offenses that require a mandatory minimum sentence under Ballot Measure 11.423

Governor Kitzhaber also would like to complement

reform of the State’s juvenile justice system with

increased spending on programs and services to

prevent juvenile crime.424 The State legislature is

sympathetic to the Governor’s views, insofar as such

programs can be shown to be effective, L. Craig

Campbell, the former coordinator of the Governor’s

Juvenile Task Force explained, but could be expected to continue its focus on juvenile corrections

in the 1997 session.425 Although everyone agrees that

the solution to the juvenile crime problem is not at

the back end of the juvenile justice system and although Oregon remains committed to prevention,

the line must be held on juvenile corrections due to

limited resources, he observed.

The former coordinator calls juvenile justice reform

in Oregon a “10-year story.”426 Likewise, implementation of the reforms authorized by S. 1 will be a

multiyear endeavor.

419. Id.

420. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.

421. Id.

422. Peden Interview, supra note 373.

423. Id.

424. Campbell Interview, supra note 371.

425. Id.

426. Id.
79

Chapter IV

Observations Concerning State Juvenile

Justice Reform

the development of graduated sanctions programs

are an attempt by policymakers to address errant

behavior of delinquent youth before it becomes

problematic or violent in nature. In other words, the

focus on and media attention paid to so-called violent juvenile “superpredators” has raised the issue of

juvenile justice on a general level and has exposed

gaps in the way offenders at all stages of delinquency are treated in State juvenile justice systems.

Further, States are moving toward curbing juvenile

crime by cutting across agency, institutional, and

jurisdictional boundaries. Although States differ in

their political, social, and economic climates, most

are responding to changes in patterns of juvenile

crime and violence by creating policies that incorporate many of the following core concepts and

institutions: strengthening and preserving families;

taking steps to facilitate agency collaboration in the

treatment and punishment of young offenders; encouraging local responses and community-based

solutions to juvenile violence and victimization; and

ensuring accountability and tough sanctions for

those juveniles who do commit crimes of violence.

Whether States enact single juvenile justice initiatives or undertake comprehensive revisions of their

juvenile codes, policymakers are often treading in

uncharted waters. Many of the system reforms being

undertaken, whether traditional or innovative, are

based on little evidence to support their efficacy.

Thus, potentially, there are 50 miniature laboratories

in which juvenile justice policy is being tried and

tested. Programs designed with evaluation in mind

will contribute the most to the future of juvenile

justice policy development by determining what

works and what does not.

Although State juvenile justice reform initiatives and

policies vary from State to State, several common

themes characterize State responses to juvenile delinquency and violent youth behavior. Further, the

opportunities and obstacles encountered by States

that have undertaken comprehensive juvenile justice

reform efforts can provide useful lessons for other

States looking to undertake broad juvenile code

revision, or for those looking to amend and revise

very specific pieces of legislation governing juvenile

justice in the State.

Several observations or themes can be generalized

from the research and analysis done by National

Criminal Justice Association staff concerning the

initiation, formulation, and implementation of juvenile justice legislation in the States. The most visible

legislative impetus is the perception of juvenile offenders as acting ruthlessly and without remorse.

The resulting fear and anger over violent juvenile

crime has caused a shift of the overall purpose of

many juvenile codes and juvenile courts to one

focusing on the accountability and punishment of

young offenders. This emphasis replaces or complements the former, more rehabilitative approach to

juvenile justice policy common to most States’ laws

since the inception of a separate system of juvenile

justice nearly 100 years ago.

Although recent juvenile justice reform often focuses

on this more punitive objective through “get tough”

policies—such as waiver to adult criminal court,

enhanced penalties for firearms offenses, and open

records—States also have enacted legislation that

facilitates early intervention services for juvenile

offenders who are acting out or have exhibited delinquent behavior of a less serious or violent nature.

Initiatives such as parental responsibility laws and
80

Recommendations

Several lessons can be learned and cautions should

be heeded when policymakers consider revising

juvenile justice legislation. One lesson relates to the

impact that a new program will have on the juvenile

justice system as a whole. Changes made to one part

of the system will not exist in isolation, but will have

an impact on the delivery of juvenile justice services

for all who have contact with it. This phenomenon,

which is compounded by limited programs, services,

and budgets, may mean that appropriations to pay

for a new program may come at the expense of other

juvenile justice programs. For example, how does

the enactment of a law holding parents responsible

for the delinquent behavior of their children affect

probation caseloads? Does the implementation of a

curfew ordinance diminish available law enforcement resources and personnel? These and similar

questions should be addressed in order to avoid the

negative consequences of well-intentioned policy

initiatives. On a similar note, policymakers should

be aware that a comprehensive change in juvenile

justice policy or law will affect not only the juvenile

justice system but other State agencies whose primary responsibilities are to provide services to

children and families.

Aside from resource obstacles and unintended consequences, logistics, systems inconsistencies, and

administrative burdens may impede the implementation of well-designed legislation. States enacting

comprehensive juvenile justice reform legislation

should consider the practices already in place and

calculate whether changes to them are necessary,

how difficult the changes will be, and what new

administrative options are available. In addition,

policymakers should be aware that the actions of

other players, especially those in the juvenile justice

system, affect the implementation and use of sanction

options. For example, it is important for policymakers

to draft legislation broadly enough to encourage

juvenile court judges to use their discretion in determining whether to impose a specific sanction or,

conversely, to narrowly construct a statute to support a more consistent use of certain dispositions.

Further, States need more effective tools for determining what implementation challenges are inherent

in juvenile justice reform and administration. Much

of the information available to State policymakers

focuses on the types of policies being initiated.

Much less information is available on what works,

why it works, how it came to be effective, and what

factors States need to consider in replicating it. By

looking beyond policy initiation to the formulation

of programs and the implementation and evaluation

of existing policies, States may be better able to

decide what types of juvenile justice prevention,

sanction, and treatment programs should be made

available to the youth of the State or jurisdiction.

One tool that States have available, in the absence

of empirical analysis, is to study existing juvenile

justice policies and initiatives in other States. States

can look at initiatives previously undertaken in other

States when formulating new juvenile justice policies to familiarize themselves with what works, what

does not, and what types of obstacles may interfere

with policy implementation. Further, the preliminary

blueprint provided by looking at other State initiatives can be honed and modified to fit local environments and the specific needs of the State. The

National Conference of State Legislatures, for example, provides information to State legislators on

trends in State legislation, innovative and effective

programs and strategies, and available resources at

the Federal level.

Conclusion

State efforts to combat youth violence and delinquency have taken many forms. From prevention to

deterrence through tough, accountability-based

sanctions to innovative blended sentencing options,

policymakers are searching for programs and policies that effectively stop juveniles from becoming

lifelong criminals. Efforts to facilitate an immediate

and appropriate response to juvenile violence and

delinquency have resulted in many States enacting

legislation to promote a continuum of services to

juvenile offenders, although the efforts have been

piecemeal in some States, because not all States have

passed laws or possess the necessary funding to offer a full range of services to juvenile offenders.

Many States in the past few legislative sessions have

made dramatic changes to their juvenile codes, with

a policy emphasis on promoting accountability of
81

youth offenders, while devising new programs to

intervene effectively in the lives of delinquent youth.

The case studies from Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio,

and Oregon reflect the opportunities that abound

through comprehensive reform initiatives and the

difficulties in formulating and implementing new

policies to have an impact on the incidence of juvenile violence and delinquency.

State lawmakers need current information about the

challenges and difficulties in legislating programs

and policies to combat youth crime. Consideration

of the political, budgetary, and administrative obstacles and opportunities present in the milieu in

which these critical policy decisions are made is

crucial to ensuring that services and sanctions for

delinquent youth are both appropriate and reflective

of the legislative policies and goals that States are

seeking to achieve. This report has supplied some of

that information.
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Using Agency Records To Find Missing

Children: A Guide for Law Enforcement.

1995, NCJ 154633 (20 pp.).

Status Offenders

Curfew: An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency

and Victimization? 1996, NCJ 159533 (12 pp.).

Truancy: First Step to a Lifetime of Problems.

1996, NCJ 161958 (8 pp.).

Unlocking the Doors for Status Offenders: The

State of the States. 1995, NCJ 160803 (85 pp.),

$16.50.

Violence and Victimization

Child Development–Community Policing:

Partnership in a Climate of Violence. 1997.

NCJ 164380 (8 pp.).

Conflict Resolution Education: A Guide to

Implementing Programs in Schools, YouthServing Organizations, and Community and

Juvenile Justice Settings. 1996, NCJ 160935

(134 pp.).

Conflict Resolution for Youth Teleconference

(Video). 1996, NCJ 161416 (150 min.), $17.00.

Epidemiology of Serious Violence. 1997,

NCJ 165152 (12 pp.).

Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive

Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic

Juvenile Offenders. 1995, NCJ 153571 (6 pp.).

Reducing Youth Gun Violence: An Overview

of Programs and Initiatives. 1996, NCJ 154303

(74 pp.).

State Responses to Serious and Violent

Juvenile Crime. 1996, NCJ 161565 (61 pp.).

OJJDP also publishes Fact Sheets, two-page

summaries on agency programs and initiatives.

Contact JJC for titles and further information.

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention Brochure (1996, NCJ 144527 (23

pp.)) offers more information about the agency.

The OJJDP Publications List (BC000115) offers

a complete list of OJJDP publications and is

also available online.

Through OJJDP’s Clearinghouse, these publications and other information and resources

are as close as your phone, fax, computer, or

mailbox.

Phone:

800–638–8736

(Monday–Friday, 8:30 a.m.–7:00 p.m. ET)

Fax:

301–519–5212

Fax-on-Demand:

800–638–8736, select option 1 for

Fax-on-Demand instructions

Online:

OJJDP Home Page:

http://www.ncjrs.org/ojjhome.htm

E-mail:

askncjrs@ncjrs.org

JUVJUST Mailing List:

e-mail to listproc@ncjrs.org

leave the subject line blank

type subscribe juvjust (your name)

Mail:

Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse/NCJRS,

P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000

Publications From OJJDP
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

BULK RATE

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

DOJ/OJJDP

Permit No. G–91

NCJ 165697

 Program Report Program Report