a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2003 RAIL SAFETY AND 

SECURITY

Some Actions Already 

Taken to Enhance Rail 

Security, but 

Risk-based Plan 

Needed

GAO-03-435
After the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry and 

government took steps to improve the safety and security of hazardous 

material rail transportation. The railroad and chemical industries assessed 

their facilities’ exposure to attack and developed a security plan to address 

their risks. The Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security 

Administration has begun to address nonaviation security by starting 

development of an overall intermodal transportation system security plan, 

but has not yet developed specific plans to address the security of 

individual surface transportation modes, including rail. Such a plan is 

needed to determine the adequacy of security measures already in place 

to protect rail shipments and identify security gaps. 

Officials from local jurisdictions that GAO visited, as well as other 

government and private sector experts, identified several unresolved issues 

pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials by 

rail. These include the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous 

materials temporarily stored in rail cars while awaiting delivery to their 

ultimate destination and the advisability of requiring companies to notify 

local communities on the type and quantities of such materials stored or 

passing through their communities. 

While no standardized tool exists to gauge local preparedness, officials from 

nine of the ten cities that GAO visited said that they are generally prepared 

to respond to hazardous materials incidents. By the end of 2004, the 

Department of Homeland Security plans to determine the response 

capabilities of the nation by developing an assessment tool for use by states 

in performing assessments of their local communities’ emergency response 

capabilities. 

A Hazardous Material Rail Tank Car 

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001, concerns 

have been raised that the nation’s 

shipments of hazardous materials 

by rail may be vulnerable to 

terrorist attack. Millions of tons of 

hazardous materials are shipped 

yearly across the United States. 

Serious incidents involving these 

materials have the potential to 

cause widespread disruption or 

injury. GAO was asked to examine 

recent steps taken by industry and 

government to improve the safety 

and security of these shipments 

and steps taken by local 

jurisdictions to prepare to respond 

to hazardous material rail 

incidents. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security 

work with the Secretary of 

Transportation to develop a riskbased plan to specifically address 

rail security. The plan should 

establish time frames for actions to 

protect hazardous material rail 

shipments. Department of 

Transportation and Homeland 

Security officials generally agreed 

with the report and acknowledged 

that no plan to specifically address 

rail security has been developed, 

but noted that they have taken 

some actions to enhance the 

security of hazardous material rail 

shipments.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-435.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact 

Peter F. Guerrero at (202) 512-2834 or 

guerrerop@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-435, a report to 

Congressional Requesters 

April 2003

RAIL SAFETY AND SECURITY 

Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance 

Rail Security, but Risked-based Plan 

Needed
Page i GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Industry Has Taken Steps to Address the Security of Transportation 

of Hazardous Materials by Rail, but TSA Has Not Yet Developed 

and Implemented a Rail Security Plan 10

Several Issues Regarding the Safety and Security of Hazardous 

Materials Transported by Rail Remain Unresolved 18

Most Localities Visited Report They Are Generally Prepared to 

Respond to Hazardous Material Rail Incidents, but Sufficiency of 

Actions Taken Cannot Be Determined 26

Conclusions 33

Recommendation for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36

Organizations Visited and Contacted 36

Appendix II: Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials by the 

Department of Transportation and Other Federal Agencies 40

DOT and DHS Oversee Rail Safety and Security 40

EPA Oversees Fixed Facilities That Handle Hazardous Materials 41

OSHA Focuses on the Safety of Plant Workers and Emergency 

Responders 42

NRC and DOE Oversee Shipments of Nuclear Material 42

DOD Oversees the Safety and Security of Military Hazardous 

Material Shipments 43

Appendix III: Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in the United 

States 44

Department of Transportation Categorizes Hazardous Materials by 

Nine Classes 44

Overall Volume of Rail Shipments of Hazardous Materials for Rail, 

Truck, and Water are Similar by Ton-mile 45

Rail Shipments Represent a Much Higher Share of Volume for Some 

Hazardous Material Classes 48

Poisonous Inhalation Hazardous Materials Were Among the Ten 

Most Commonly Shipped Hazardous Materials from 1998 to 2001 
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Rail Shipments of Radioactive and Military Hazardous Materials 

Represent a Small Fraction of All Rail Shipments of Hazardous 

Materials 51

Appendix IV: Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible Future Rail 

Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel 53

Proposed Private Fuel Storage and Yucca Mountain Repository 

Plans Will Result in Substantial Increases in Rail Shipment of 

Radioactive Materials 53

Historically Low Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment Volumes Make Risk 

Assessment from Increased Shipments Difficult 56

Appendix V: Emergency Response Procedures and Available Resources to 

Assist Local First Responders 61

General Procedures for Emergency Response 61

Multiple Federal Plans and Agencies Provide Additional Resources 

to Address Hazardous Material Incidents 62

Federal Agencies Provide a Variety of Assistance for Responding to 

and Improving Preparedness for Hazardous Material Rail 

Incidents 66

Private Organizations Also Play a Role in Emergency Response to 

Hazardous Material Incidents 71

Multiple Standards and Guidelines of Preparedness Exist 72

Appendix VI: Letter from the Federal Railroad Administration, May 28, 

2003 76

Appendix VII: GAO Response to Federal Railroad Administration Letter 78

Tables Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First 

Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents 30

Table 2: 1997 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton-miles 

46

Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material 

Shipments by All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class 

and Division, 1997 49

Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by 

Volume, 1998–2001 50

Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 

1979–1996 54

Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to 

Hazardous Material Incidents 66
Contents

Page iii GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and 

Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of Domestic Preparedness (Formerly a 

Department of Justice Program) 68

Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and 

Grants Provided by the Department of Transportation’s 

Research and Special Programs Administration 68

Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance 

Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and 

Response 69

Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and 

Grants Provided by the Department of Health and Human 

Services 70

Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and 

Grants Provided by the Department of Energya 70

Figures Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities 14

Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend 

Against Terrorism 18

Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 

1998–2001 47
Contents

Page iv GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads

CFDA Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

CFS Commodity Flow Survey

CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation Emergency Center

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DOJ Department of Justice

DOL Department of Labor

DOT Department of Transportation

EMAP Emergency Management Accreditation Program

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HM hazardous materials

LEPC local emergency planning committee

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board

ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness

OREIS Operation Respond Emergency Information System

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PFS Private Fuel Storage, LLC

RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration

SNF spent nuclear fuel

TRANSCAER Transportation Community Awareness Emergency 

Response Program

TSA Transportation Security Administration

USCG U.S. Coast Guard

WMD weapons of mass destruction

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Page 1 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 30, 2003 Letr

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable James L. Oberstar

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings

The Honorable Martin T. Meehan

House of Representatives

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns have 

been raised that the nation’s shipments of hazardous materials by rail may 

be vulnerable to terrorist attack. Millions of tons of hazardous materials are 

shipped yearly across the continental United States. Much of this volume is 

shipped on rail networks that travel through populated areas, increasing 

the concern that accidents or attacks during these shipments could have 

severe consequences. While the vast majority of shipments arrive safely at 

their destination, serious incidents involving these materials have the 

potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. Additionally, the 

proposed shipments of spent nuclear fuel at sites from 39 states across the 

country to the Yucca Mountain Repository have highlighted the need to 

safeguard hazardous materials against both accident and attack.1

 

Two federal agencies have primary responsibility for overseeing the safety 

and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail—the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) and the new Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). Though originally a part of DOT, the Transportation Security 

Administration is now part of DHS. The Transportation Security 

Administration is charged with overseeing the security of all modes of 

transportation, including rail. Within DOT, the Federal Railroad 

Administration promotes railroad safety and enforces rail safety 

1

The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is not scheduled to begin operations until 2010. 

For information on the safety and security issues posed by possible future rail shipments of 

spent nuclear fuel, see appendix IV.
Page 2 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

regulations, while the Research and Special Programs Administration 

regulates the transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable 

risk to health, safety, and property. Other federal agencies having related 

responsibilities for the rail shipment of hazardous materials include the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of 

Defense (DOD), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of 

Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and DHS’ 

Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response. See appendix II for 

additional information on the oversight roles of DOT and other federal 

agencies in the safety and security of hazardous material rail shipments.

In response to your request that we review the safety and security of 

transporting hazardous materials by rail in the United States, we examined 

(1) recent steps taken by industry and government for improving the safety 

and security of hazardous materials transported by rail, (2) issues 

pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport of hazardous materials 

identified by federal and private sector hazardous material transportation 

experts and local officials as being unresolved, and (3) the preparedness of 

ten local jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents involving hazardous 

materials, whether accidental or intentional. To address these issues, we 

used a variety of approaches and methodologies, including interviews with 

regulatory officials, analyses of hazardous materials volume and incident 

data, a panel of experts, and interviews with local officials. To report on the 

preparedness of local jurisdictions to respond to a potential terrorist attack 

or accident involving the shipment of hazardous materials by rail, we 

performed case studies at ten jurisdictions selected because they varied in 

size and experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving 

hazardous materials or typically experienced large amounts of hazardous 

material shipments passing through their communities. These jurisdictions 

are not named due to the sensitive nature of the issues discussed in this 

report. While providing information on the preparedness actions taken by 

these specific localities to respond to a hazardous material rail incident, 

results from these case studies cannot be generalized to other jurisdictions. 

We conducted our review from December 2001 through March 2003 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 

appendix I for additional information on our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, industry and 

government have taken steps to improve the safety and security of the 

transportation of hazardous materials by rail. The railroad industry 

conducted an industry-wide assessment to identify and prioritize the 
Page 3 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

exposure of rail facilities to the risk of attack and developed a security plan 

to address these risks. The security plan, completed in December 2001, 

established four alert levels and described a series of actions to prevent 

terrorist threats to railroad personnel and facilities that could be taken at 

each alert level, including rail operations and police actions. In March 2003, 

DOT’s Research and Special Programs Administration finalized a rule, 

Hazardous Materials—Security Requirements for Offerors and 

Transporters of Hazardous Materials—which imposes new security 

requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials. The 

Transportation Security Administration has also begun to address rail 

security. According to Transportation Security Administration officials, 

while much of its resources have been focused on aviation security, it has 

assumed responsibility for transportation security in all modes of 

transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an overall 

intermodal transportation system security plan, which these officials 

consider a major component of the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. The Transportation Security Administration has signed a 

memorandum of agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration, 

which these officials said would serve as a guide for relations between the 

Transportation Security Administration and modal administrations within 

DOT, including the Federal Railroad Administration and Research and 

Special Programs Administration. However, while the Transportation 

Security Administration has begun work on an overall intermodal 

transportation system security plan, it has not yet developed specific plans 

to address the security of individual surface transportation modes, 

including rail, and does not have time frames established for completing 

such an effort. We are recommending that DHS and DOT work jointly to 

develop such a plan to assist the departments in determining the adequacy 

of security measures already in place to protect hazardous material rail 

shipments and identifying any gaps that need to be addressed.

Government and private sector hazardous material experts and officials 

from some local jurisdictions that we visited identified several issues 

pertaining to the safety and security of transporting hazardous materials by 

rail that have not been resolved. These issues include the need for 

measures to better safeguard hazardous materials temporarily stored in rail 

cars while awaiting delivery to their ultimate destination—a practice 

commonly called “storage-in-transit,” the advisability of requiring 

companies to notify local communities of the type and quantities of 

materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information rail 

companies should be required to provide local officials regarding 

hazardous material shipments passing through their communities. Federal 
Page 4 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Railroad Administration and Transportation Security Administration 

officials recognize that security concerns have grown since the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks regarding the vulnerability of hazardous 

materials stored in transit in, or passing through, local communities. 

However, they are just beginning to address this issue. 

In our review of the actions taken by the ten local communities that we 

visited to prepare and respond to hazardous material rail incidents, 

officials from nine of the ten localities told us that they believe that their 

cities are generally prepared to respond to these incidents. Actions taken 

by these communities include ensuring that emergency response plans are 

in place, employing hazardous material response teams, and planning and 

conducting training and drills. However, because no standardized tool 

currently exists to gauge preparedness, we were unable to determine the 

sufficiency of these localities’ actions to prepare for hazardous material rail 

incidents. Officials from DHS’ Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and 

Response2

 are in the process of determining the response capabilities of 

the nation by developing a standardized tool for performing selfassessments of local communities’ emergency response capabilities. They 

estimate that this effort will be completed by the end of 2004.

DHS and DOT generally agreed with our report and acknowledged that no 

plan to specifically address rail security has been developed, but stressed 

that they have taken some actions to enhance the security of hazardous 

material rail shipments. 

Background In 2001, over 83 million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by rail in 

the United States across a 170,000-mile rail network which extends through 

every major city as well as thousands of small communities. Federal 

hazardous material transportation law defines a hazardous material as a 

substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined

2

This Directorate includes the entire functions of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, formerly an independent federal agency.
Page 5 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property 

when transported in commerce.3

 It includes hazardous substances such as 

ammonia, hazardous wastes from chemical manufacturing processes, and 

elevated temperature materials such as molten aluminum.4

According to reported incident data from the DOT’s Research and Special 

Programs Administration (RSPA), the number of hazardous material 

incidents occurring during rail transportation declined from 1,128 in 1992 

to 894 in 2001 and accounted for approximately 7 percent of all incidents 

involving the transportation of these materials in all modes. For the period 

1997 to 2001, hazardous material rail shipments represented an annual 

average of approximately 11 incidents and less than 1 serious incident per 

million tons of hazardous materials shipped by rail.5

 For 1997, the latest 

year for which data on intermodal hazardous material shipment volumes 

are available, there were approximately 14 incidents and less than 1 serious 

incident per million tons of hazardous materials shipped by truck. 

Although rail moves only a small percentage of all hazardous materials, it is 

the predominant method of transportation for some types of these 

materials, such as flammable solids.6

 When measured in ton-miles,7

hazardous materials shipped by rail are nearly equivalent to hazardous 

materials transported by road and water.8

 The vast majority of shipments 

arrive safely at their destination. However, recent accidents in urban areas, 

such as the 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore, 

Maryland, involving a fire fueled by hazardous materials, and a leak of 

hydrochloric acid from a parked tank car in an urban area in Lowell, 

3

49 U.S.C. § 5103.

4

Where specific references to flammable, radioactive, or other subsets of material are 

needed, the distinction will be made in the report. 

5

RSPA defines an incident as an unintentional release of hazardous materials during the 

course of transportation. A serious incident is defined as an incident that involves a fatality 

or major injury, substantial property damage, closure of a major transportation artery or 

facility, or evacuation due to a hazardous material release. 

6

Appendix III contains additional information on the amounts and types of hazardous 

materials shipped by rail throughout the United States. 

7

A ton-mile is a measure of volume that accounts for the distance a commodity is shipped. 

One ton-mile is equal to one ton shipped one mile.

8

See appendix III for additional discussion on ton-mile shipments by transportation mode.
Page 6 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Massachusetts, have called attention to the safety of hazardous materials 

shipped by rail. The events of September 11, 2001, and subsequent reviews 

of the vulnerability of the transportation sector, including rail, to terrorist 

attack have further focused attention on the security of hazardous 

materials in rail transport.

The proposed plan to ship spent nuclear fuel, as soon as 2010 and most 

likely by rail, to the Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada—the nation’s 

first long-term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level 

radioactive waste—has raised concerns about the safety and security of 

possible transportation to this site.9

 A second proposal to ship spent 

nuclear fuel to temporary storage in a private facility in Utah has 

heightened these concerns.10 Such shipments would substantially increase 

the volume of nuclear material transported in this country.11

Two administrations within DOT, RSPA and the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), have responsibilities, respectively, for developing 

regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous materials and for 

rail safety. RSPA is responsible for identifying and regulating the 

transportation of materials that may pose an unreasonable risk to health, 

safety, and property when transported in commerce.RSPA develops the 

hazardous material regulations, coordinating its work with other DOT 

administrations, including FRA. These regulations specify how shipments 

must be identified, packaged, and handled in transit. 

RSPA published a final rule in the March 25, 2003, Federal Register–-

Hazardous Materials: Security Requirements for Offerors and Transporters 

of Hazardous Materials, also known as HM-232—which imposes new 

security requirements on shippers and carriers of certain hazardous 

materials. The final rule requires people who offer or transport hazardous 

9

Nuclear fuel is generally used in a nuclear reactor for a number of years before losing its 

ability to efficiently create energy. When the fuel can no longer effectively produce energy, it 

is considered "spent" and is replaced, but the spent fuel remains radioactive and hazardous.

10In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board blocked, for the time 

being, the issuance of a license to this private facility because of the risks that military 

aircraft operations conducted near the facility might pose. 

11Appendix IV contains additional information on safety issues associated with Yucca 

Mountain and the Utah facility. We are also currently undertaking a study assessing the 

findings of federally-sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving spent 

fuel. 
Page 7 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

materials in amounts that require placarding to develop and implement a 

written security plan. The security plan must include an assessment of 

possible transportation security risks for the material(s) to be transported 

and appropriate measures to address identified risks. Specific measures 

established by the plan may vary depending on the level of threat at a 

particular time. In addition, the final rule requires all employees handling 

hazardous materials to receive security awareness training, beginning no 

later than the date of their first scheduled recurrent training. New 

employees must receive security awareness training within 90 days of 

employment. Employees handling hazardous materials in companies 

subject to the security plan requirement must receive in-depth training 

concerning the security plan and its implementation.

FRA oversees the safety of railroad equipment and operating practices and 

has authority to enforce compliance with the hazardous material 

regulations. DOT’s regulation of the transport of hazardous materials under 

federal hazardous material transportation law preempts similar regulation 

by state and local agencies. States and local jurisdictions may not establish 

stricter or less stringent regulations governing hazardous material 

transportation.12

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), created within DOT in 

the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 

now part of the newly created DHS, initially focused primarily on aviation 

issues but, along with DOT, is responsible for the security of all modes of 

transportation, including rail. According to TSA officials, the Secretary of 

Transportation and the Administrator for TSA have exchanged letters 

regarding the ongoing cooperation and relationship between TSA and the 

DOT operating administrations after the March 1, 2003, transfer of TSA 

from DOT to DHS. This correspondence sets forth a number of principles 

to guide this relationship. 

12Preemption occurs when Congress enacts a statute intending to preclude inconsistent 

state or local law. Depending upon the circumstances, Congress may choose to preempt all 

or only some forms of state or local rulemaking. The law preempts any inconsistent state or 

local rulemaking. 
Page 8 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Several other federal agencies also play a role in regulating rail shipments 

of hazardous materials. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 

Department of Energy (DOE) oversee shipments of nuclear material. 

Although DOT regulates the transportation of radioactive material, 

including spent fuel, as a hazardous material, NRC also regulates the 

transportation of radioactive material by its licensees. The primary role of 

NRC, under a memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of 

packaging standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive 

materials exceeding certain limits.13 NRC certifies spent fuel casks and 

other radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and 

requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also plays a 

significant role through safety and security requirements and through 

inspection and enforcement. In its role as developer of the Yucca Mountain 

Repository, DOE is responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel from 

nuclear plants. In addition, DOE coordinates policies and program 

implementation for shipments of radioactive waste with DOT and NRC. 

The Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Traffic Management 

Command is responsible for DOD’s surface transportation shipments and 

requires that everyone participating in the shipment of DOD hazardous 

materials comply with hazardous material regulations. DOD also requires 

inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous materials, to be 

conducted by railroad police officers, trained railroad employees, or 

members of private security firms under contract to DOD.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) each have oversight responsibility regarding 

facilities that handle hazardous materials and are the source or destination 

of many hazardous material rail shipments. EPA, along with the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG), has authority for implementing and enforcing legislation 

governing the protection of public health and the environment against 

chemical and other polluting discharges and for abating and controlling 

pollution when spills occur. EPA has provided training and technical 

assistance to states and localities to enhance contingency planning and 

emergency response capabilities. EPA sometimes participates with other 

agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents. 

OSHA promulgates and enforces standards to protect the safety and health 

13Fissile material is any material fissionable by slow neutrons. This involves splitting a 

nucleus into at least two other nuclei and the release of a relatively large amount of energy. 

The three primary fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239.
Page 9 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

of employees, including workers at facilities that handle hazardous 

materials and emergency responders to hazardous material incidents.

The USCG enforces spill prevention regulations on vessels and on the 

marine transfer portion of waterfront facilities. Under the National 

Contingency Plan, the USCG serves as the federal on scene coordinator for 

oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal zone. All oil and 

hazardous material incidents are required to be reported to the National 

Response Center, which in turn is to notify state and local agencies and the 

appropriate on scene coordinator (either EPA for inland or USCG for 

coastal incidents). In each case, the on scene coordinator is to assess the 

need for federal involvement and, if appropriate, may respond, bringing 

additional response resources (such as contractors), special teams, and 

access to federal funding for hazardous material or oil spills.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate within 

DHS provides federal assistance to supplement the resources of state and 

local governments in major disasters, which could include emergencies 

involving hazardous material releases. Its assistance is governed by the 

Federal Response Plan that provides the mechanism for delivery of federal 

assistance and resources to augment state and local government efforts in 

a major disaster or emergency. In conjunction with NRC, DOE, DOD, EPA, 

and other agencies, DHS’ EP&R also participates in the Federal 

Radiological Emergency Response Plan to establish an organized and 

integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by federal agencies 

to peacetime radiological emergencies. For more details on the roles of 

various federal agencies in assisting state and local governments to 

respond to emergencies, see appendix V. 
Page 10 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Industry Has Taken 

Steps to Address the 

Security of 

Transportation of 

Hazardous Materials by 

Rail, but TSA Has Not 

Yet Developed and 

Implemented a Rail 

Security Plan

The railroad and chemical industries have taken a number of steps to 

enhance the security of transportation of hazardous materials. Some of 

these measures include the development of a rail security plan and an 

increase in security measures at some facilities. According to TSA officials, 

while much of TSA’s resources have been focused on aviation security, TSA 

has assumed its responsibility for transportation security in all modes of 

transportation, including rail, and is beginning to develop an intermodal 

national transportation system security plan, which TSA officials consider 

to be a major component of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

Another TSA effort in this area involves the development of a 

memorandum of agreement with DOT’s Federal Aviation Administration, 

which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for relations between TSA 

and modal administrations within DOT, including FRA and RSPA. 

Although TSA has begun work on an overall intermodal transportation 

system security plan, it has not yet developed a plan to specifically address 

the security of individual surface transportation modes, including rail, and 

does not have time frames established for completing such an effort. The 

development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of hazardous 

materials that uses a risk-based management approach, such as that used 

by other federal agencies, government commissions, and multinational 

corporations to defend against terrorism, would assist TSA in identifying 

threats that exist to the shipment of hazardous materials by rail, 

vulnerabilities that may be exploited in the system used to ship these 

materials, and high-risk, high-consequence facilities that need protection.

Railroad Industry Has 

Developed a Security Plan 

and Taken Other Steps

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, railroad companies’ 

security efforts focused primarily on the prevention of theft at rail facilities. 

Representatives of several major railroad companies told us that they had 

toll-free emergency telephone numbers to report suspicious activity, 

including theft, in place before the terrorist attacks. According to a 

representative from the Association of American Railroads (AAR), which 

represents the major freight railroads in the United States, Mexico, and 

Canada, railroad companies currently employ over 1,000 police officers. 
Page 11 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Within two weeks of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, AAR 

created a railroad security task force to analyze the industry’s risk from and 

response to the threat of terrorism. AAR worked jointly with several 

chemical industry associations and consultants from a security firm to 

develop the industry’s security management plan.14 As part of this effort, 

AAR created critical action teams to assess the rail industry’s security in 

five areas: infrastructure, military operations, information technology and 

communications, security of operations, and hazardous materials. The plan 

that resulted from this effort was presented to its member railroads and 

TSA in December 2001. It established four alert levels and described a 

graduated series of actions to prevent terrorist threats to railroad 

personnel and facilities that correspond to each alert level. The actions 

include progressively rigorous countermeasures to be taken in the areas of 

operations, information technology and communications, and police. The 

countermeasures include actions to heighten security awareness, limit the 

sharing of information about sensitive shipments, and test that security 

systems are operating as intended. With U.S. military action in Iraq, the 

railroad industry has taken additional security steps, including real-time 

monitoring and additional surveillance of designated trains; increased 

security at some rail yards; and increased inspection of priority railroad 

tracks, tunnels, and bridges.

Representatives of several major railroad companies and the railroad 

industry told us that the railroads have implemented a number of new 

security measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

including the following:

• increasing the awareness of employees about potential security threats;

• enhancing dispatch command and control centers;

• monitoring hazardous materials with video surveillance;

• restricting access to facilities through the use of key cards;

• installing better lighting, fencing, and barricades at rail facilities;

14See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are 

Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown,

GAO-03-439 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2003) for information on voluntary actions that the 

chemical industry has taken to address security preparedness and the challenges that it 

faces in protecting its assets and operations.
Page 12 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• monitoring of critical infrastructure locations by police officers and 

contracted security guards; 

• employing additional security officers to protect hazardous materials in 

storage;

• instituting more threat information sharing with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, as well as state and local government agencies;

• conducting security evaluations of rail facilities;

• limiting access to electronic tracking of shipments of hazardous 

materials; and 

• conducting “red team” assault tests in which rail companies send 

undercover security officers to test employees’ responses to 

trespassers.

We visited rail facilities at five locations, in part to observe security 

measures there. Overall, we observed more physical security measures at 

large rail facilities than at smaller facilities. Both the small and large 

facilities we visited had signs indicating that trespassing was not permitted 

and that railroad personnel were on duty part of or all day. In addition, the 

large facilities had security video cameras, lights, observation towers 

staffed by railroad personnel that can be used as security lookouts, and 

fencing along some parts of the facility. However, all of the facilities we 

visited could be readily accessed because they are not fenced or fences did 

not completely separate the facilities from adjacent areas, and some of the 

facilities did not have gates around them. Figure 1 shows photos of rail 

facilities in some of the case study locations we visited. We observed the 

following during our visits:

• rail companies relied heavily on the vigilance of employees;

• employees provided photo identifications upon request, but were not 

required to display them;

• the presence of security guards varied; and

• at intermodal facilities, where hazardous material products are 

transferred between rail cars and trucks for continued shipment, 
Page 13 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

procedures were in place to check for tampering with the valves of tank 

cars transporting hazardous materials.
Page 14 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Figure 1: Photos of Rail Facilities

Observation tower at a 

rail facility

Gated entrance at an 

intermodal rail facility

Source: DHS.

Source: GAO.

Entrance to a rail facility

Source: GAO.
Page 15 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Despite reporting that they had implemented enhanced security measures, 

railroad industry representatives told us that it is not possible to eliminate 

all vulnerabilities and, without government assistance, the industry lacks 

the resources to counter a significant terrorist attack.

TSA Is Beginning to Address 

Rail Security 

Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has primarily focused on 

improving aviation security to meet the deadlines established in the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act for TSA to assume civil aviation 

security functions and responsibilities, such as implementing federal 

passenger screening. As a result, TSA has not yet assumed full 

responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as rail. 

The establishment of TSA’s Office of Maritime and Land Security in March 

2002 marked the beginning of TSA’s efforts to address security in other 

modal areas, including the security of rail transportation. The goals for this 

office are to prevent terrorist attacks, protect transportation without 

impeding movement, and respond to transportation accidents or incidents 

promptly. 

TSA’s Office of Maritime and Land Security plans to hire 200 employees to 

cover all 50 states by 2004, subject to resource constraints. As of March 

2003, the office had filled 83 of the 200 positions. TSA officials said that 

since the office’s eventual staff will be relatively small, the office plans to 

work jointly with DOT to maximize resources by relying on other modal 

administrations to cover day-to-day security operations. According to TSA 

officials, the office will focus on identifying security gaps and improving 

security plans in each mode.

TSA Has Taken Some Steps 

to Address the Security of 

Hazardous Material 

Transportation by Rail, but 

Has Not Yet Developed a 

Rail Security Plan

TSA has taken some steps to address the security of hazardous material rail 

shipments, including starting the development of an intermodal 

transportation system security plan, establishing working relationships 

with DOT’s modal administrations, and conducting an initial review of the 

rail industry’s own security rail plan. In March 2003, DHS launched 

Operation Liberty Shield to help protect the nation’s infrastructure and 

deter possible terrorist attacks. Among other things, this national plan calls 

for (1) state governors to provide additional police or National Guard 

forces at selected railroad bridges; and (2) railroad companies to improve 

the security of major rail facilities and hubs, monitor shipments of 

hazardous materials, and increase the surveillance of trains carrying these 

materials. Nevertheless, TSA has not yet developed a security plan for rail 
Page 16 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

that systematically determines the adequacy of security measures already 

in place and identifies gaps that need to be addressed. 

TSA officials told us that they and officials in other components of DHS are 

working on a national transportation system security plan to address the 

security challenges of the nation’s transportation system using a threatbased and risk management approach. This plan is to address the 

intermodal aspects of the transportation system first and then to provide a 

strategic framework for future TSA activities in transportation security. 

TSA officials said that they hope to have the key components of this 

intermodal plan in place by May 2003 and after that time they will consider 

security on individual transportation modes, including rail. TSA has also 

signed a memorandum of agreement with DOT’s Federal Aviation 

Administration, which DOT officials said would serve as a guide for 

relations between TSA and DOT’s modal administrations, including FRA 

and RSPA. 

TSA’s Office of Maritime and Land Security officials told us that they have 

reviewed AAR’s security plan, and they credited AAR for its efforts in 

conducting a very aggressive vulnerability assessment. The TSA officials 

said that they are considering using aspects of the AAR assessment as the 

basis for a model that TSA plans to develop on how to conduct 

vulnerability assessments. However, the officials noted that some areas of 

AAR’s plan need to be clarified, such as what specific measures individual 

railroad companies will be expected to implement. FRA officials have also 

reviewed AAR’s plan and commented that AAR needs to identify mitigating 

actions more specifically.

TSA officials told us they are planning to undertake projects in the future 

that we believe could become part of a rail security plan, including the 

development of physical security standards and an assessment of 

vulnerable hazardous material transportation areas. As a first step, officials 

said that they plan to visit seaport facilities, which face similar threats to 

protecting hazardous material shipments as rail facilities do, to determine 

what physical security standards could be applied to other modes of 

transportation, in areas such as facility lighting levels or monitoring by 

closed-circuit televisions. Given their initial focus on aviation security 

priorities, TSA officials said they have not yet established time frames for 

developing these physical security standards or conducting a vulnerability 

assessment of the rail industry. FRA officials told us that they are working 

with TSA on their efforts to develop and implement federal standards for 

railroad security.
Page 17 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

The development of a security plan addressing rail transportation of 

hazardous materials that uses a risk-based management approach would 

assist TSA by providing a strategy to identify threats to these shipments, 

vulnerabilities that may be targeted in the system used to ship these 

materials, and high-risk, high consequence facilities that need protection. 

Although TSA has taken steps and is considering future measures to 

address the security of hazardous material rail shipments, it does not yet 

have a risk-based plan to guide its actions specifically in this area. Until 

TSA develops such a plan, it will not know whether resources are being 

deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the risk of 

possible terrorist attacks. 

In our previous work on homeland security, we have determined that the 

federal government can benefit from a risk management approach to 

defend against terrorism.15 This approach can provide organizations with a 

process for enhancing their preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks 

and to permit better direction of national finite resources to areas of 

highest priority. Figure 2 shows the components of a risk management 

approach to defend against terrorism. This approach includes the 

following:

• a threat assessment to identify and evaluate potential threats on the 

basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and impact of an attack;

• a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that may be exploited 

by identified threats and suggest options to address those weaknesses; 

and

• a criticality assessment to evaluate and identify assets and 

infrastructure in terms of specific criteria such as their importance to 

public safety and the economy.

15For additional information on the applicability of risk management to homeland security, 

see: U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach 

Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2001).
Page 18 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Figure 2: Components of a Risk Management Approach to Defend Against Terrorism

Several Issues 

Regarding the Safety 

and Security of 

Hazardous Materials 

Transported by Rail 

Remain Unresolved

Our discussions with federal and private sector hazardous material 

transportation experts and local community officials identified several 

issues that, in their opinion, remain unresolved regarding the safe and 

secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail. These issues include 

the need for measures to better safeguard hazardous materials stored in 

rail cars while awaiting delivery to a final destination—a practice 

commonly referred to as “storage-in-transit”—the advisability of requiring 

companies to notify local communities of the type and quantities of 

materials stored in transit, and the appropriate amount of information rail 

companies should be required to provide local officials regarding 

hazardous material shipments passing through their communities. 

Concerns about the Safety 

and Security of Hazardous 

Materials Stored in Transit 

Have Not Yet Been Fully 

Addressed 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have raised concerns about the 

exposure and vulnerability of hazardous materials stored in transit in 

chemical rail cars on rail sidings and in rail yards. Emergency response 

officials in three of the locations we visited identified storage-in-transit as a 

safety and security concern for their communities. 

The local officials said that they were aware of rail cars that were 

unsecured and, in some cases, provided photographs or videotape as 

evidence of the lack of security. According to these local officials, 

unmonitored chemical cars could develop undetected leaks that could 

Risk

Management Approach

Threat

assessment

Vulnerability

assessment

Criticality

assessment

Source: GAO.
Page 19 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

threaten the nearby population and environment. A May 31, 2002, 

hydrochloric acid leak from a rail car in Lowell, Massachusetts, is a recent 

example of such an incident. In this incident, a rail car parked on a siding 

developed a leak that produced a cloud of hazardous vapor before the 200-

gallon leak of hazardous materials was contained. 

Local Government Officials 

Believe Some Shipments Stored 

in Transit May Violate a Rule to 

Expedite Shipments 

Although they could not provide documentation to support their beliefs, 

local government officials we interviewed in two locations stated that they 

believed that, in some cases, shipments stored in transit in their local areas 

might be in violation of DOT’s 48-hour rule16 that generally requires a 

carrier to move each shipment of hazardous materials promptly and within 

48 hours after its receipt at any yard, transfer station, or interchange point. 

Although local officials believe the 48-hour rule is a safety and security 

standard for shipments of hazardous materials stored in transit, FRA 

officials told us that the 48-hour rule was not instituted for storage safety 

concerns. According to FRA officials, the 48-hour rule was implemented for 

economic reasons, not safety reasons. FRA officials said that the rule was 

developed in the early 1900s because oil companies were using rail yards as 

convenient storage warehouses and not promptly moving their shipments.17

The rail companies did not want their property to be used as a storage 

warehouse without compensation. FRA officials said that they do not 

necessarily encourage rail companies to move rail cars affected by the 48-

hour rule to another destination just to meet the time limit because this 

might result in moving a car from a safe to a hazardous location. 

1649 CFR §174.14, Movements To Be Expedited. 

17We were not able to corroborate FRA’s explanation. What became the 48-hour requirement 

for expedited movement is found in the 1914 published rules of the Interstate Commerce 

Commission, Regulations for the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous 

Articles by Freight and Express and Specifications for Shipping Containers, Interstate 

Commerce Commission, ¶¶ 1433, 1714, (GPO eff. October 1, 1914). The origin of the rules 

themselves can be traced from even earlier Interstate Commerce Commission rules, which 

grew out of the need to regulate the safe transportation of explosives. The 1914 regulations 

appear to have remained largely unchanged until 1939, when they were included in the first 

version of the Code of Federal Regulations. At that time, 49 C.F.R. § 80.262 (1939), provided:

“Movement to be expedited. Carriers must forward shipments of explosives and other 

dangerous articles promptly and within 48 hours after acceptance at originating point or 

receipt at any yard, transfer station, or interchange point.”
Page 20 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

FRA Is Beginning to Address 

Potential Safety and Security 

Issues Regarding Storage-intransit

FRA officials recognize that the security concerns regarding storage-intransit have grown since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. From a 

security standpoint, the officials said that new regulations for storage-intransit materials should be considered. According to these officials, such 

measures may include not allowing rail cars containing certain highly 

hazardous commodities to be stored in transit. 

FRA is currently reviewing the safety and security of hazardous materials 

stored in transit through initiatives such as collaboration with the 

American Chemistry Council to examine how storage-in-transit shipments 

typically move, how the chemical industry can better expedite these 

movements, and viable alternatives to storing chemicals in transit. TSA is 

leading an initiative to follow chlorine shipments from origin to 

destination. Its overall goal is to determine best practices for shipments as 

well as the types of measures needed to secure shipments, including those 

stored in transit. TSA has reached out to the Chlorine Institute, American 

Chemistry Council, FRA, RSPA, and AAR. TSA hopes to expand the lessons 

learned from this initiative to other hazardous material rail shipments. 

RSPA Plans to Clarify the 

Regulatory Oversight of the 

Safety and Security of Hazardous 

Materials Stored in Transit

In addition to expressing concern about the safety and security of 

hazardous materials stored in transit and their need for information on the 

types and quantities of these materials, a local official that we interviewed 

told us that he was unclear about which federal agency has regulatory 

oversight for the safety and security of this area. Some issues pertaining to 

the specific scope of DOT and EPA’s roles in the regulatory oversight of 

hazardous materials stored in transit have not been fully determined. 

According to RSPA, confusion exists in the regulated community and 

among federal, state, and local agencies with hazardous material safety 

responsibilities regarding whether and to what extent DOT hazardous 

material transportation safety regulations apply to particular operations 

related to the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce, such as 

storage-in-transit on tracks leased to fixed facilities.18

18Leased tracks are railroad tracks in rail yards or railroad sidings that manufacturers, such 

as chemical companies, lease from railroad companies to temporarily store their 

commodities until needed. Commodities are stored in rail cars on these “leased” tracks. 

Leases may be “fixed,” when a company enters into a lease of specific track, or “rolling,” 

when the company pays a storage fee for whatever track the car may be sitting on. The 

location where the car is held may be the destination identified on the shipping papers but 

not the final destination where the hazardous materials will be unloaded. Fixed facilities are 

business premises where extremely hazardous materials are produced, stored, or used in 

amounts exceeding legally proscribed threshold quantities.
Page 21 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

In response to requests for clarification on whether particular activities, 

such as storage-in-transit, should be considered transportation operations, 

RSPA has issued a proposed rule—Applicability of the Hazardous Materials 

Regulations to Loading, Unloading, and Storage, also known as HM-223—to 

clarify the applicability of DOT’s hazardous material regulations to specific 

functions and activities, including loading and unloading of hazardous 

materials and their storage during transportation. RSPA officials have 

concluded that, given the potential for continuing terrorist threats and the 

critical need to assure the security of hazardous materials at fixed facilities 

and in transportation, it is more important than ever to clarify its 

jurisdiction over hazardous materials in transportation.

According to RSPA, confusion exists concerning whether EPA or DOT 

regulations apply to storage-in-transit on leased tracks because federal 

regulations do not clearly articulate whether this operation is 

transportation or nontransportation related. Under HM-223, RSPA is 

considering two options for regulatory oversight of storage-in-transit 

occurring on leased tracks. Under the first option, storage on leased tracks 

would be considered as storage after movement in transportation of the rail 

car has been completed whether the hazardous material is to be unloaded 

at that destination or not. The hazardous material transportation 

regulations would not apply under this option and hazardous material 

inspectors could not apply DOT’s hazardous material rail safety 

requirements concerning proper shipping papers, operational handling of 

rail cars, or placards to indicate the hazardous content of rail cars. 

According to EPA officials that we interviewed, under this option, EPA’s 

risk management program regulations under the Clean Air Act might apply 

if storage on leased tracks contained more than a threshold amount of 

certain regulated highly toxic materials, such as chlorine. These officials 

note that EPA has stated that the Clean Air Act is not preempted by DOT’s 

authority. They said that while EPA generally does not regulate activities 

regulated by DOT, there are circumstances where both agencies’ 

authorities might apply, for example, with respect to long-term storage or 

facility equipment involved in loading or unloading.

Under the second option being considered, storage on leased tracks would 

be considered storage related to transportation and thus subject to all the 

applicable requirements of the DOT hazardous material regulation, even if 

the leased tracks were the final destination identified on the shipping 

papers. This would ensure that rail cars would be subject to all pertinent 

DOT hazardous material requirements. 
Page 22 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

While RSPA’s efforts to propose rule making on the applicability of the 

hazardous material transportation regulations to loading, unloading, and 

storage of hazardous materials began with an advanced notice of public 

rule making in 1996, RSPA officials said that HM-223, which culminates 

those efforts, will be not be finalized until June 2003. Over this period, to 

address issues involved in clarifying jurisdiction in this area, RSPA 

published another advanced notice of public rule making in 1999 and held 

public meetings to obtain proposals and recommendations on the 

applicability of hazardous material regulations from the regulated 

community, which includes shippers, carriers, warehouses, and federal, 

state, and local public safety agencies. In 2001, RSPA published a notice of 

proposed rule making requesting written comments on proposals from 

these organizations.

Notifying Local 

Communities on the Type 

and Quantities of Hazardous 

Materials Stored in Transit 

Has Not Been Addressed

While chemical manufacturers are required to notify their communities of 

the existence of hazardous materials at their facilities, the advisability of 

requiring companies to notify local communities on the type and quantities 

of materials stored in transit has not been similarly addressed by DOT. 

Based on their observations, local officials from two of the 10 jurisdictions 

that we visited told us that they believe storage-in-transit shipments remain 

in rail yards for periods longer than 48 hours. To ensure adequate safety 

and security for hazardous materials stored in transit, the officials at one 

location suggested that the 48-hour rule be more strongly enforced to 

expedite shipments or, if hazardous material shipments remain stationary 

for extended periods of time (beyond the 48-hour period), these shipments 

should be regulated in a manner similar to hazardous materials stored in 

fixed facilities—with reporting requirements for companies to provide 

information to emergency response officials on the types and quantities of 

materials stored in transit. 
Page 23 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

The local officials said that, because these hazardous materials stored in 

transit are parked in their community for extended periods of time, they 

present a risk similar to the potential health and safety risk posed by 

chemicals at a fixed facility. They expressed a need to have information on 

the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in transit in their 

communities to ensure that they have the proper training and equipment to 

respond to incidents involving these materials, and told us that they had 

experienced difficulty in obtaining information on these materials stored in 

transit. The local officials that we interviewed in one location feel that 

companies should be required to provide information on the contents of 

the rail cars in a manner similar to that required of fixed facilities under the 

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986.19 Under 

the requirements of this act, chemical manufacturers are required to notify 

their communities of the existence, as well as some routine and accidental 

releases, of hazardous materials at their facilities to aid in emergency 

planning. 

While some local officials that we interviewed cited the need to receive 

information on the types and quantities of hazardous materials stored in 

transit, FRA officials told us that they were not in favor of sharing real-time 

data on these shipments. FRA officials said that it would be a significant 

logistical challenge for railroads to share real-time data regarding 

individual freight movements stored in transit. These officials said that 

providing advance notification information could also create new security 

concerns as detailed information on the whereabouts of hazardous 

materials becomes known in great detail by a large number of individuals. 

In addition, FRA officials commented that it would be inappropriate to 

require railroads to report to local communities on all hazardous materials 

stored in transit because the railroads have limited advance knowledge of 

what will be stored at these locations. 

19P.L. 99-499.
Page 24 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Opinions Differ on 

Adequacy of Hazardous 

Material Shipment 

Information Provided to 

Communities, but No 

Determination Has Been 

Made on Appropriate 

Amount of Disclosure

While differing opinions exist concerning the adequacy of hazardous 

material shipment information currently provided to local communities, no 

determination has been made at a federal level on the appropriate amount 

of information rail companies should be required to provide to 

communities regarding overall hazardous material shipments to enhance 

their emergency preparedness. Officials from five of the ten communities 

that we visited said they did not need advance notification information on 

specific shipment types and quantities. Due to the high volume and variety 

of hazardous material shipments through his area, an official from one of 

these communities said that they employ an approach to respond to all 

types of chemical emergencies. He believes that this approach is more 

effective for his community’s circumstances rather than trying to prepare 

for specific chemicals that might be involved in incidents. However, some 

officials from two of these five communities told us that they would like to 

receive advance notification of special shipments, such as high-level 

radioactive materials or explosives. Officials from the other five 

communities that we visited said that they would like to receive advance 

notification of certain shipments for emergency planning purposes. 

AAR suggests to its member railroads that, as a voluntary policy, they 

provide, when requested, historical information on hazardous materials 

that have been shipped through a community. Officials from AAR member 

railroads that we interviewed said that they complied with this voluntary 

policy. For example, a railroad, when asked, will inform a community of the 

types of hazardous materials most frequently shipped through that 

community over the past year. This policy covers AAR member railroads, 

which account for more than 96 percent of intercity rail freight service and 

100 percent of intercity passenger service in the United States.20 

Emergency response officials that we spoke to at one of our site visits said 

that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining limited historical 

information about shipments of hazardous materials from a railroad that 

was not an AAR member. The local officials told us that it took 4 years of 

requests before the company agreed to provide this information to assist 

them in their emergency management planning. In the interim, the locality 

had to respond to a hazardous material incident on the company’s tracks

20AAR’s membership includes the major Class I railroads, two of the larger short line 

railroads, and 500 smaller railroads represented through an AAR operating committee.
Page 25 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

involving a tank car leaking hydrochloric acid, which emergency 

responders were unaware had been stored on rail tracks in the community.

Officials that we spoke to from national rail industry organizations offered 

their opinions on the subject of advance notification. An official from one 

organization said that he does not support providing advance notification 

information on specific upcoming shipments to local communities because 

of the high volume of materials shipped and the low probability of release. 

An official from another organization said that his organization is not in 

favor of providing advance notification because it would be too much 

information sent on a daily basis and would soon be ignored. He further 

cautioned that releasing information about planned shipments could pose a 

security risk because such information could be used to identify 

vulnerabilities. 

FRA officials told us that careful consideration needs to be given to the full 

implications of advance notification. They said that this includes security 

implications, community capability to make constructive use of the data, 

the potential costs and benefits of such requirements, and whether these 

requirements should be applied to other modes of transportation, such as 

motor carriers. Furthermore, in commenting on the overall consideration 

of new security measures for the rail industry, FRA officials told us that 

whatever security enhancements might be required for rail shipments of 

hazardous materials should be accompanied by appropriate security 

requirements for truck shipments so that shippers not switch to a 

potentially more vulnerable but less expensive alternative. 
Page 26 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Most Localities Visited 

Report They Are 

Generally Prepared to 

Respond to Hazardous 

Material Rail Incidents, 

but Sufficiency of 

Actions Taken Cannot 

Be Determined 

Even though a host of voluntary standards and self-assessment tools are 

available to assist localities in assessing aspects of their emergency 

response capabilities, no standardized tool currently exists to objectively 

determine a locality’s level of preparedness to respond to hazardous 

material incidents. As such, the localities that we visited provided 

information on their preparedness based on their own self-assessments 

rather than on uniform national criteria. These localities took actions to 

prepare for and respond to hazardous material incidents based on selfassessments formed from a variety of factors. For the most part, these 

localities said that they found themselves prepared to respond to 

hazardous material rail incidents based on their own selected criteria. Due 

to the absence of a standardized tool to gauge the level of preparedness, we 

were unable to determine the sufficiency of local community actions to 

prepare for hazardous material rail incidents given the risk factors that they 

face.21

Case Study Findings Show 

Varying Preparedness 

Actions Taken by Local 

Communities

To assess local community capability to prepare for and respond to 

potential terrorist attacks or accidents involving rail shipments, we visited 

10 localities in the United States. Each of these localities was judgmentally 

selected based on at least one of following three criteria:

• experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving hazardous 

materials,

• had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped through 

it by rail, and

• had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped 

through it by rail.

Officials from most localities that we visited reported that their cities are 

generally prepared to respond to these incidents. Officials from the 

localities told us that they have emergency response plans in place, access 

to either their own or another hazardous material response team, and that 

they plan and conduct training and drills. In addition, these localities report 

21Appendix V contains additional information on the federal government and private sector 

resources available to localities for emergency response to rail incidents involving the 

transportation of hazardous materials.
Page 27 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

that they have most of the basic equipment necessary to respond to a 

hazardous material incident on hand. Although officials said they were 

generally prepared to respond to incidents involving hazardous chemical 

materials, they said that they were less prepared to deal with incidents 

involving radioactive materials, with some locations citing a lack of 

equipment and training needed to respond. Also, local officials that we 

interviewed said that technical communication compatibility could be 

improved, but they have developed ways to accommodate communication 

needs, such as the use of cellular phones. Finally, local officials from over 

half of the locations that we visited said that their communities lacked 

sufficient funds to cover the positions left temporarily vacant by personnel 

taking training. 

Self-assessments Show That 

Most Locations Are Prepared to 

Respond to Hazardous Materials 

Incidents, but Not to Incidents 

Involving Radioactive Materials

Based on their own self-assessments, local fire department officials from 

most of the cities that we visited said that they are generally prepared to 

respond to a hazardous material incident. A few officials whom we 

interviewed said that although their city is prepared to respond to a 

hazardous material incident, their in-house capability would depend on the 

types of hazardous materials involved and the scope of the incident. For 

example, one fire department official said that he is comfortable with his 

city’s capabilities to respond to chemical accidents such as leaking tank 

cars, spills, and derailments. He believed that his city could adequately 

respond to a hazardous material incident unless it was a catastrophic 

event, such as a major derailment involving multiple cars. This official 

stated, however, that in the event of a large-scale hazardous material 

incident, his city would use additional resources from private, state, and 

federal organizations, as well as mutual aid plans, where neighboring 

jurisdictions agree to provide emergency response resources to one 

another in the event that they are needed to augment their own response 

capabilities. 
Page 28 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

When asked if they were prepared to respond to a hazardous material 

incident involving radioactive materials, officials from most of the 

locations we visited said that they were less capable of responding to such 

incidents, with some locations citing a lack of equipment and training to 

respond. To prepare for the increase in spent nuclear fuel shipments 

expected with the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository, which is 

scheduled to begin operations in 2010, the federal government has begun 

preliminary planning to ensure local preparedness for the safe transport of 

spent nuclear fuel. If the Yucca Mountain Repository is licensed, DOE will 

be required, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,22 to implement a 

program to train local public safety officials through whose jurisdictions 

DOE plans to ship radioactive materials to the repository. According to 

DOE, this program will be funded 5 years prior to the start of Yucca 

Mountain operations.

Emergency Response Plans Are 

in Place at All Locations 

Emergency response plans are in place at all the localities we visited. These 

plans address all the hazards applicable to each location and include 

emergency responses to hazardous material incidents, including rail 

incidents. The plans vary according to the resources that each locality 

relies on and the specific courses of action each identifies to be taken in the 

event of an emergency. For example, the plans document which city agency 

is designated as a lead response agency in the event of an incident,23

identify support agencies that can be called in, such as police and health 

departments, and outline civil defense procedures. Plans also vary on how 

often they are updated. In light of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 

officials from half of the locations we visited told us that they have 

incorporated new terrorism response procedures into their emergency 

planning, including training or response protocols. 

2242 U.S.C. § 10175(c).

23For hazardous material incidents, a locality’s fire department is the lead designated agency. 
Page 29 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Most Cities We Visited Have 

Dedicated Hazardous Material 

Teams and All Have Access to 

Public Hazardous Material 

Teams

More than half of the cities we visited have their own dedicated hazardous 

material teams to respond to incidents involving the release of hazardous 

materials, including those occurring at fixed facilities or in rail 

transportation. These are all large or medium-sized cities.24 Cities that do 

not have their own hazardous material teams have access to a local, 

regional, state, or private hazardous material response team. For example, 

an official from one small city said that the city has access to the resources 

of the state police hazardous material team. As part of their emergency 

response plans, other cities have access to chemists from private industry 

or universities to provide technical assistance in identifying chemicals and 

their hazards in the event of an incident. 

All Fire Department Personnel 

Have at Least Some Hazardous 

Material Response Training

Local fire department officials that we interviewed in all the locations we 

visited said that their fire department personnel have received at least 

awareness-level training, the lowest level of training recommended in 

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 472, Professional 

Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents. However, a 

representative of a national emergency response organization suggested 

that the minimum level of training for first responders should actually be at 

the operations level, the second highest level of training described in NFPA 

Standard 472. Fire departments in the locations we visited varied in 

providing operations level training for their fire fighting personnel. 

However, for the locations with specialized hazardous material teams, all 

hazardous material team personnel received technician level training, the 

third highest level of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472. Table 

1 lists the four levels of training recommended by NFPA Standard 472.

24We defined a small city as one having a population of less than 100,000 people, a mediumsized city as one having a population between 100,000 and 500,000 people, and a large city as 

one having a population of over 500,000 people. The population figures are based on the 

2000 U.S. Census.
Page 30 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 1: NFPA Levels of Professional Competence for First Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents

Source: National Fire Protection Association. Reprinted with permission from NFPA 472-2002, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents, Copyright © 2002, National Fire 

Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02269. 

Note: This reprinted material is not the complete and official position of the NFPA on the referenced 

subject, which is represented only by the standard in its entirety.

In addition to fire departments, officials in some cities we visited told us 

that they have trained other departmental personnel, such as police, health, 

and public works, for response to hazardous material incidents. The 

officials we interviewed said that, while these other agencies are not 

expected to serve a primary role in the containment of hazardous material 

incidents, this training familiarizes these personnel with response 

procedures in the event that they are the first on the scene to an incident or 

are required to assist responding fire fighters, such as by rerouting traffic.

More Than Half of The Cities We 

Visited Have Conducted 

Hazardous Material Response 

Drills and Cited Lessons Learned

Officials from more than half of the case study locations that we visited 

said that they conducted response drills to prepare for hazardous material 

incidents. These cities have had at least one hazardous material drill within 

the last 3 years. Officials from some cities said that they have conducted 

rail-specific hazardous material response drills.

Among the cities that have conducted drills or experienced prior hazardous 

material rail accidents, officials told us that these experiences had 

highlighted the need for

Level Definition 

Awareness The basic competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to a hazardous materials incident. The training 

includes providing first responders with the knowledge and skills to identify a hazardous materials incident and to 

contact the appropriate response resource in accordance with local standard operating procedures.

Operational The second level of competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials incidents. First 

responders trained at this level will meet the competency of the NFPA’s awareness level training as well as any 

additional competency designed to allow the responder to plan and initiate a response to the incident.

Technician The third level of competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials incidents. First 

responders trained at this level will meet the competency of the NFPA’s awareness and operational standards. 

Additional training includes appropriate measures to meet federal and other state, local, or provincial occupation 

health and safety regulator requirements.

Incident 

Commander

The highest level of competency developed by the NFPA for first responders to hazardous materials incidents. First 

responders trained at this level will meet all NFPA standards for awareness and operational levels. In addition, 

responders trained at the command level will have the necessary knowledge to analyze a hazardous material 

incident and plan for and mitigate incidents.
Page 31 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• better communication and coordination, including the use of the 

incident command system, among departments or mutual aid districts 

during an emergency;

• joint training;

• better dissemination of information to the public including better public 

awareness of civil defense procedures; and

• better crowd control in a mass decontamination situation.

Equipment Is Lacking in Some 

Locations

In addition to a firefighter’s standard turnout gear, several pieces of 

equipment are commonly used to respond to hazardous material 

incidents.25 These include airborne chemical detection equipment, spare 

turnout gear, protective gear, air hazard detection equipment, and chemical 

identification kits.

While officials that we interviewed said that they have the majority of this 

equipment on hand to use in response to a hazardous material incident, 

some locations said they lacked some additional equipment that was not on 

this list, such as patient extraction equipment and hazardous material 

response vehicles to carry equipment to the scene. More than half the 

locations specifically cited a need for additional radiological response 

equipment, such as detectors, decontamination equipment, and personal 

protective equipment.

Compatibility of Communication 

Equipment Varies by Location 

Officials in half of the case study locations we visited told us that 

communication systems are not compatible between city agencies. In 

addition, officials in most of the case study locations we visited said that 

they could not communicate with other jurisdictions without the use of an 

intermediary communication device, such as a dispatch center. While 

officials we interviewed said that communication compatibility could be 

improved, most said that they have developed ways to accommodate 

communication needs, such as the use of cellular phones. However, in one 

location that had experienced a recent rail accident involving hazardous 

materials, officials cited radio communication incompatibility as a 

problem. These local officials said that they did not have the compatibility 

25Typically, a firefighter’s standard turnout gear includes a helmet, coat, gloves, pants, boots, 

and a self-contained breathing apparatus, which provides the user with respiratory 

protection in a toxic or oxygen deficient environment.
Page 32 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

to speak by radio to officials from other agencies outside the city. Officials 

from some case study locations also told us that communication systems 

do not work as well underground.

Officials Said That Training Can 

Be Difficult to Access Because of 

Personnel Funding Constraints 

Officials from over half of the case study locations we visited said that they 

had difficulty accessing hazardous material response training opportunities 

because of the cost of providing replacements for those first responders 

taking training. In addition, one national response organization stated it 

visits localities to provide training to help alleviate costs that may be 

associated with travel to off-site training courses.

DHS’ Directorate of 

Emergency Preparedness 

and Response Is Beginning 

Work on a Baseline 

Assessment Tool to 

Determine Preparedness 

Levels 

With the development of a national homeland security strategy, DHS’ EP&R 

Directorate has also recognized a need for the federal government to 

conduct an assessment of state emergency response preparedness levels 

that would allow it to determine a baseline to measure preparedness across 

the country. Since most local emergency response standards and 

procedures are voluntary in nature and states employ a wide variety of 

guides in their planning, the EP&R Directorate chose to adopt one of these 

assessment tools—the Emergency Management Accreditation Program 

(EMAP) criteria—to standardize the data collection process and help the 

agency ascertain factors in vulnerabilities on a national level. EP&R 

Directorate officials characterized EMAP standards as being very rigorous. 

In fiscal year 2003, as a first step toward developing a preparedness 

baseline, EP&R Directorate officials plan to request that all 50 states 

complete a self-assessment of their level of preparedness to respond to 

emergencies using EMAP standards as a guide. From the assessment 

program, EP&R Directorate officials said that they hope that communities 

evaluate their own capabilities, identify deficits, and establish performance 

standards to improve emergency response. EP&R Directorate officials also 

plan to work with a team of EMAP peer reviewers to validate the 

operability of state emergency response plans as an additional tool in 

gauging preparedness. This information would then be used to determine 

the EP&R Directorate’s baseline of national preparedness levels. 

To validate state emergency response planning, the EP&R Directorate 

plans to train assessment teams to evaluate preparedness using a common 

methodology. These teams would spend from 3 to 8 days evaluating each 

state. Their methodology would include checks of state emergency plan 

resources. For example, if a certain organization within a state is expected 

to provide a specific resource or serve a role in the plan, the reviewers 
Page 33 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

would contact that organization and verify that the resource contacts know 

what is expected of them and can perform the tasks. EP&R Directorate 

officials said that assessments of all states are due to be completed by the 

end of 2004. The EP&R Directorate plans on assessing about half the states 

annually in this program and issuing a midprogram assessment report. 

Conclusions The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have focused attention on the 

security and potential vulnerabilities of the nation’s transportation 

infrastructure. In response to heightened awareness, the railroad industry 

took action to develop a security plan using a risk management approach to 

address perceived vulnerabilities. The adequacy of this industry plan to 

protect communities and the railroad infrastructure is still unclear since 

TSA, which is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, 

including rail, has not yet developed a plan to specifically address the 

security of rail transportation, even though it has started developing a riskbased intermodal transportation system security plan. Without such a 

specific plan, TSA lacks a framework for systematically evaluating and 

prioritizing actions needed to ensure the safety and security of the 

transportation of hazardous materials by rail. 

Some of the communities that participated in our case studies expressed 

concerns regarding the safety and security of hazardous materials in rail 

cars passing through or stored in their communities. They wanted 

additional information on the types and quantities of these materials since, 

without this information, it is difficult for communities to know how to 

prepare for possible incidents involving hazardous releases. However, this 

need for information must be balanced against the security risks that 

disclosure could pose. 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action

To help meet the requirement to secure all modes of transportation under 

the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security work jointly with the Secretary of 

Transportation to develop a risk-based plan that specifically addresses the 

security of the nation’s rail infrastructure. This plan should build upon the 

railroad industry’s experience with rail infrastructure and the 

transportation of hazardous materials and establish time frames for 

implementing specific security actions necessary to protect hazardous 

material rail shipments. Among the areas that should be addressed in 

developing this plan are 
Page 34 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• the appropriate roles of the private sector and federal, state, and local 

governments;

• minimum security standards for hazardous materials stored in transit in 

rail cars; and

• the appropriate level of disclosure to local communities of the types and 

quantities of hazardous materials passing through or stored in transit in 

these communities.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided the Departments of Defense, Energy, Health and Human 

Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Labor, and Transportation, as well as 

the Environmental Protection Agency, National Transportation Safety 

Board, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with copies of a draft of this 

report for their review and comment. The Departments of Defense, Justice, 

and Labor, as well as the National Transportation Safety Board, did not 

provide comments. The Departments of Health and Human Services and 

Energy, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, provided technical comments and generally 

agreed with our report. The Departments of Transportation and Homeland 

Security provided oral comments. They generally agreed with our report 

and acknowledged that no plan to specifically address rail security has 

been developed, but stressed that they have taken some actions to enhance 

the security of hazardous material rail shipments. We incorporated these 

comments where appropriate. In addition, the Department of 

Transportation raised other issues regarding rail security, which are 

discussed below. 

The Administrator of FRA commented that our report gave the impression 

that, in the absence of explicit federal security requirements, railroad 

companies were paying insufficient attention to security risks. This was not 

our intention. Rather, our report credits the timely effort to address rail 

hazardous material risk by the Association of American Railroads, which 

was performed with a number of chemical manufacturers. It further lists 

security measures reported by individual railroads in the aftermath of 

September 11, 2001. 

FRA officials also commented that the safety risks associated with the 

storage-in-transit of hazardous materials received inappropriate emphasis 

in the report, suggesting that the concern is based only on anecdotal 

information. We did not attempt to define the magnitude of the safety risks 
Page 35 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

associated with storage-in-transit. Rather, we reported the concerns 

expressed by some local communities about this practice without 

attempting to determine the extent of the problem at a national level.

On May 28, 2003, we subsequently received from FRA a clarification of 

their views on the risk-based plan for rail security that we recommended. 

FRA wanted to be on record as recognizing the merits of risk-based 

management and supportive of its use in day-to-day business. The agency’s 

position is contained in a letter to GAO that we have included as appendix 

VI. Our response to this letter is contained in appendix VII.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the agencies 

listed above. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report included Colin J. 

Fallon, Bert Japikse, Jane S. Kim, Victoria E. Miller, John W. Mingus Jr., 

Thomas M. Phan, Maria J. Santos, Michael J. Simon, and Robert E. White.

Peter F. Guerrero

Director

Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 36 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

We used a combination of approaches and methodologies to examine

(1) recent steps taken by industry and government to improve the safety 

and security of hazardous materials transported by rail, (2) issues 

pertaining to the safety and security of rail transport of hazardous materials 

that, in the opinion of the hazardous material experts, remain unresolved, 

and (3) the preparedness of local jurisdictions to respond to rail incidents 

involving hazardous materials. We completed interviews with regulatory 

officials and representatives of private industry, analyses of hazardous 

material volume and incident data, and case study interviews with local 

officials. 

To obtain the views of experts on the safety and security of rail 

transportation of hazardous materials, we sponsored a 1-day panel through 

the National Academy of Sciences that brought together representatives 

from academia, industry, and local government. The views of panel 

members were used to identify issues and perspectives on the current 

system, policies, and practices for transporting hazardous materials by rail. 

Specifically, we asked the panel members to discuss their opinions on: (1) 

the effectiveness of current industry policies for the safe and secure 

shipment of hazardous materials by rail, (2) the effectiveness of current 

federal regulatory and assistance programs, and (3) suggestions for 

improved industry and government cooperation. Their views served to 

support our identification of issues that still remain to be addressed in 

ensuring the safety and security of hazardous materials shipped by rail.

We did our work at 10 federal agencies, several private organizations 

representing the railroad and chemical industries and emergency 

responders, private rail companies, and state and local government 

agencies in 10 locations nationwide. A complete list of the agencies and 

organizations visited and contacted follows. We do not list the local 

community case study locations that we visited because of the sensitive 

nature of our review in light of homeland security concerns.

Organizations Visited 

and Contacted

Cabinet Departments • Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.; and Fort Eustis, Virginia

• Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.; and Albuquerque, New Mexico
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C.

• Department of Homeland Security (including the Transportation 

Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, Directorate of Emergency 

Preparedness and Response), Washington, D.C. 

• Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

• Department of Transportation (including the Federal Railroad 

Administration and the Research and Special Programs Administration), 

Washington, D.C. 

• Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.

Other Agencies • Environmental Protection Agency, Washington D.C.

• National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C.

• Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, Maryland

National Organizations • International Association of Chiefs of Police, Alexandria, Virginia

• International Association of Emergency Managers, Falls Church, 

Virginia

• International Association of Fire Chiefs, Fairfax, Virginia

• International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D.C.

• National Emergency Management Association, Lexington, Kentucky

• National Volunteer Fire Council, Washington, D.C.

Private Sector • American Chemistry Council, Arlington, Virginia

• Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, Washington, 

D.C.

• American Petroleum Institute, Washington, D.C.

• The Chlorine Institute, Washington, D.C.

• Dangerous Goods Advisory Council, Washington, D.C.

• CSX Transportation, various locations

• Burlington Northern-Santa Fe Railroad, various locations

• Union Pacific Railroad, various locations.

To examine the current safety and security infrastructure of the rail 

industry, we conducted a series of interviews with agency officials, local 

first responders, railroad companies, and industry and trade groups. We 

then examined supporting documentation from these interviews, 

Department of Transportation databases, federal laws and regulations, and 

previous GAO findings. We also conducted site visits of rail facilities to 

record observations about security and safety practices. 

To report on local jurisdictions’ capability to respond to potential terrorist 

attacks or chemical accidents, we performed case studies of 10 localities in 

the United States. We judgmentally selected two small cities, four mediumsized cities, and four large cities. The localities met at least one of following 

three criteria:

• had experienced a recent and significant rail incident involving 

hazardous materials,

• had a large population and flow of hazardous materials shipped through 

it by rail, and/or

• had a small population and large flow of hazardous materials shipped 

through it by rail.

We obtained locations of recent and significant hazardous material 

incidents by researching available reports and information from the 

National Transportation Safety Board. We analyzed the Surface 

Transportation Board’s carload Waybill Sample, an annual stratified sample 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

of national rail flows within the United States, to determine flows of 

hazardous materials by rail.1

 To estimate carload and tonnage data, we also 

used the Waybill Sample. We analyzed the waybill origin and destination 

data using the Department of Energy’s Transportation Routing Analysis 

Geographic Information System to identify localities with a high level of 

hazardous material flows. We reviewed documentation provided with the 

waybill sample and the data we received from the sample, and determined 

that these data were sufficiently accurate for our purposes. 

To obtain information about our case study localities and their 

preparedness to respond to incidents involving rail transportation of 

hazardous materials, we interviewed officials from city government 

agencies such as the fire, police, public works, transportation, emergency 

management, and public health departments. We also interviewed local 

emergency planning committees and state environmental and emergency 

response agencies. In addition, we obtained and examined supporting 

documentation from interviews with local officials as part of the study. As 

discussed in the report, no standardized tool exists to gauge the 

preparedness of a community for a hazardous material incident.

The report encompasses all aspects of rail transport of hazardous 

materials, including loading, unloading, and storage, as well as the time 

these materials spend in motion. This report uses the definition of 

hazardous materials in federal hazardous material transportation law, 

which includes flammable and radioactive materials.2

 Although some 

hazardous materials enter the United States overland by rail from Canada 

and Mexico, this report does not address issues that may be associated 

with international shipments. Further, this report does not directly address 

issues associated with computer security and possible cyber attacks.

1

The Waybill Sample is a stratified random 1 percent sample of waybills prepared by 

railroads. This sample is stratified by the collection method (electronic vs. hardcopy) and 

number of carloads included in a given waybill. Because the Surface Transportation Board 

has different sampling rates for each stratum, each stratum has its own weight. These 

weights are applied to the sample calculations of carloads and tonnage to estimate 

population values. 

2

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5103(a), defines a hazardous 

material as a substance or material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined is 

capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in 

commerce. It includes hazardous substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, and 

elevated temperature materials. 
Page 40 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix II

Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous 

Materials by the Department of 

Transportation and Other Federal Agencies ApendxiI

In addition to the Department of Transportation (DOT), several federal 

agencies have authority over certain aspects of rail shipments of hazardous 

materials. These include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Labor’s 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of Energy (DOE), and 

Department of Defense (DOD).

DOT and DHS Oversee 

Rail Safety and 

Security

Two administrations within DOT—the Research and Special Programs 

Administration (RSPA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)—have 

responsibilities for developing regulations pertaining to the transportation 

of hazardous materials and rail safety. Under the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, the Department of Transportation shares responsibility with the 

Transportation Security Administration, within DHS, for rail security. 1 

RSPA is responsible for discharging the responsibilities of the Secretary of 

Transportation under federal hazardous material transportation law to 

identify and regulate the transportation of materials that may pose an 

unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in 

commerce. RSPA develops hazardous material regulations, coordinating 

its work with other DOT administrations, including FRA. These regulations 

specify how shipments must be identified, packaged, and handled in 

transit. RSPA also sets hazardous material transportation training 

requirements, helps enforce the hazardous material regulations, and funds 

hazardous material emergency preparedness grants to assist localities. 

RSPA has the authority to pursue civil and criminal penalties for deliberate 

violations of hazardous material transportation regulations, focusing 

primarily on packaging standards and shippers of hazardous materials. 

According to RSPA officials, RSPA conducts some, but not many, 

radioactive material inspections. 

FRA oversees the safety of track, signal and train controls, motive power 

and equipment, operating practices, highway-rail grade crossing safety, and 

hazardous materials. To ensure compliance with railroad safety 

regulations, FRA conducts thousands of inspections annually in these six 

1

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), § 1711(a)(1) and (2) directed the 

Secretary of Transportation to regulate transportation security and safety (49 U.S.C. 5103), 

and § 1711(a)(3) and (b)(1) through (3) of the act directed the Secretary of Homeland 

Security to issue transportation security regulations.
Appendix II

Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous 

Materials by the Department of 

Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

Page 41 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

areas. FRA has several enforcement tools, such as civil and criminal 

penalties, if railroad companies do not comply with safety regulations.

For the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive materials, 

FRA has developed a safety compliance and oversight plan to examine the 

safety and security of prospective shipping routes, rail crews, and 

equipment prior to shipment of these materials and to provide an additional 

level of inspection for such shipments. To ensure the safety and security of 

these shipments, FRA performs several procedures such as inspections of 

rail cars and locomotives and coordination with federal intelligence and 

local law enforcement agencies to identify where shipments could be 

stored temporarily en route if needed. FRA, in conjunction with the 

Association of American Railroads, DOE, and rail representatives, is 

updating its safety compliance and oversight plan to address security 

concerns related to terrorism.

Within DHS, TSA, created in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, has focused primarily on aviation issues, but 

it is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, including 

rail. Though originally a part of DOT, TSA became a part of DHS, along with 

22 other agencies in an effort to better coordinate the federal government’s 

resources to prevent and protect the United States from domestic 

terrorism. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard has the responsibility for 

preventing spills from vessels and waterfront facilities. The Coast Guard 

also serves as the federal on scene coordinator under the National 

Contingency Plan for oil or hazardous substance releases in the coastal 

zone.

EPA Oversees Fixed 

Facilities That Handle 

Hazardous Materials 

EPA has authority for implementing and enforcing legislation governing the 

protection of public health and the environment against chemical and other 

polluting discharges and for abating and controlling pollution when spills 

occur. The regulatory focus of EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness 

and Prevention Office is on fixed facilities, such as chemical factories, that 

handle large quantities of hazardous materials. Under the Emergency 

Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,2

 EPA helps 

coordinate preparedness among federal, state, and local emergency 

responders. The purpose of this act is to encourage and provide support for 

2

P.L. 99-499.
Appendix II

Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous 

Materials by the Department of 

Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

Page 42 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

emergency planning efforts at the state and local levels and provide the 

public and local governments information concerning potential chemical 

hazards present in their communities. As part of its responsibilities under 

this act, EPA identifies substances and quantities that qualify as extremely 

hazardous. EPA has also provided training and technical assistance to 

states and localities to enhance contingency planning and emergency 

response capabilities. Under the Clean Air Act,3

 as amended, EPA 

implements a risk management program that requires stationary chemical 

facilities to prevent and mitigate accidental releases of extremely 

hazardous chemicals. EPA also has responsibilities concerning oil spills. 

EPA’s Office of Air and Radiation sometimes participates with other 

agencies in responding to hazardous material transportation incidents 

involving radioactive materials.

OSHA Focuses on the 

Safety of Plant Workers 

and Emergency 

Responders

The Occupational Safety and Health Act, administered by OSHA, requires 

employers, including chemical and railroad companies, to provide safe 

workplaces. It requires that OSHA promulgate standards to protect the 

safety and health of employees. Additionally, the statute and implementing 

regulations require employers to, among other things, inform employees 

about potential hazards, provide safety training, keep records of workplace 

injuries, notify government administrators of serious accidents, and post 

notices informing workers about their rights to complain about safety and 

health violations. OSHA establishes hazardous material training and safety 

requirements for emergency responders through its general industry 

standards, including its hazardous waste operations and emergency 

response standard.

NRC and DOE Oversee 

Shipments of Nuclear 

Material

Although DOT regulates the transportation of nuclear material, including 

spent fuel, as hazardous material, NRC also regulates the transportation of 

nuclear material by its licensees. The primary role of NRC, under a 

memorandum of agreement with DOT, is the establishment of packaging 

standards for fissile materials and for other radioactive materials 

exceeding certain limits. NRC certifies spent fuel casks and other 

radioactive material package designs that meet these standards and 

requires its licensees to use certified casks for transport. NRC also plays a 

3

P.L. 84-159.
Appendix II

Oversight of Rail Shipments of Hazardous 

Materials by the Department of 

Transportation and Other Federal Agencies

Page 43 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

significant role through safety and security requirements and through 

inspection and enforcement. 

The responsibilities of DOE regarding spent nuclear fuel are related to its 

role as an operator of nuclear facilities, including its role in developing the 

proposed Yucca Mountain Repository. DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive 

Waste Management is responsible for shipping spent nuclear fuel and 

oversees nuclear waste fund activities related to the Yucca Mountain 

Repository, which include the transportation of spent nuclear fuel. The 

shipping is done in accordance with NRC packaging and advance 

notification requirements and DOT’s hazardous material regulations. Both 

DOE and NRC have authority to approve packages, such as casks as 

suitable for transport under the hazardous material regulations, NRC’s rule 

for the packaging and transportation of radioactive material,4

 and the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.5

 DOE’s authority is for defense or 

DOE-owned materials, while NRC’s authority is for shipments by its 

licensees. In addition, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management 

coordinates policies and program implementation for shipments of 

environmental radioactive waste for DOE, coordinating its operations with 

DOT. NRC also performs inspections to determine whether companies that 

transport radiological materials take appropriate safety measures to 

package these materials. For the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, NRC 

performs inspections of shipments by its licensees to ensure that this 

material is physically protected against acts of sabotage.

DOD Oversees the 

Safety and Security of 

Military Hazardous 

Material Shipments

DOD’s Military Traffic Management Command, which oversees the 

shipments of DOD hazardous materials by rail companies and ensures that 

they are shipped according to DOD’s safety and security standards, 

requires that everyone participating in the shipment of hazardous materials 

comply with the hazardous material regulations. This includes compliance 

with requirements for labeling, placarding, and transportation. DOD also 

requires inspections for sensitive shipments, including hazardous 

materials, to be conducted by railroad police officers, trained railroad 

employees, or members of private security firms under contract to DOD.

4

10 C.F.R. 71.

5

P.L. 83-703.
Page 44 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States ApendxiI

Millions of tons of hazardous materials are shipped yearly on a 170,000-mile 

rail network that crisscrosses the continental United States. The Class I 

railroads, the largest of the railroad companies, operate more than 120,000 

miles of this road. 1 The rail network touches every major urban center and 

hundreds of smaller communities in between. While the vast majority of 

shipments arrive safely at their destination, serious incidents involving 

these materials have the potential to cause widespread disruption or injury. 

In July 2001, the derailment of a CSX Transportation train in an 

underground tunnel and the ensuing fire fueled by hazardous materials 

disrupted the city of Baltimore, Maryland, for several days. In January 2002, 

a Canadian Pacific Railway derailment outside Minot, North Dakota, 

ruptured seven tank cars carrying anhydrous ammonia, creating a vapor 

plume approximately 5 miles long and 2 1⁄2 miles wide. The hazardous 

material release affected approximately 15,000 people, causing one death 

and more than 300 injuries. 

Department of 

Transportation 

Categorizes Hazardous 

Materials by Nine 

Classes 

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) hazardous material regulations 

classify hazardous materials into nine hazard classes. Among other things, 

the classification system helps communicate the hazards of these materials 

to emergency responders and transportation workers. The nine classes of 

hazardous materials are

• Class 1, explosives;

• Class 2, gases;

• Class 3, flammable liquids;

• Class 4, flammable and solids;

• Class 5, oxidizing substances and organic peroxides;

• Class 6, poisonous and infectious substances;

• Class 7, radioactive materials;

1

DOT’s Surface Transportation Board designates three classes of freight railroads based on 

annual operating revenues. Class I railroads are the largest of these, with annual operating 

revenues of $261.9 million or more (in 2000 dollars). Class II and III railroads are defined by 

their revenues, but are often referred to as regional, short line, or switching railroads.
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 45 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

• Class 8, corrosives; and

• Class 9, miscellaneous materials.

Some of these nine classes are further divided into subclasses to denote 

different hazards. For example, Class 2 is divided into three divisions: 2.1, 

flammable gases; 2.2, nonflammable, nonpoisonous compressed gases; and 

2.3, poison gases. Any hazardous materials that are properly packaged and 

labeled and suitable for transportation by rail are eligible for shipment on 

any class of railroad track.

Overall Volume of Rail 

Shipments of 

Hazardous Materials 

for Rail, Truck, and 

Water are Similar by 

Ton-mile 

DOT estimates that there are over 800,000 shipments of hazardous 

materials daily by all modes of transportation in quantities varying from 

several ounces to many thousands of gallons. For comprehensive data 

related to flows of hazardous materials for all modes of transportation, 

DOT and the Department of Commerce jointly conduct the Commodity 

Flow Survey (CFS). To examine the flow across modes, we used data from 

the 1997 CFS, the most recently completed survey. We reviewed the 

published methodology and determined that the data were sufficiently 

accurate for our purposes.

The 1997 CFS data, shown in table 2, estimated that approximately 97 

million tons of hazardous materials were shipped by rail during that year, 

fourth among all modes behind truck, water, and pipeline. However, railtransported commodities travel a far greater average distance, with the 

result that the shipments by ton-mile for rail, truck, and water are similar.
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 46 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 2: 1997 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Tons and Ton-miles 

Legend

N/A = These estimates were not published in the CFS because they did not meet publication 

standards due to high sampling variability or other reasons. Some unpublished estimates can be 

derived from other data published in this table. However, figures obtained in this manner are subject to 

these same limitations.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and Department of Commerce data.

a

Percent figures may not add exactly due to rounding.

b

CFS data exclude most shipments of crude oil.

While the 1997 CFS provides the most recent comprehensive data across 

modes, total tonnage shipped on rail can also be obtained through analysis 

of Waybill Sample data. Figure 3 shows tons of hazardous materials 

shipped by rail for 1998-2001 based on Waybill Sample data.

Mode

Tons

(thousands) Percenta

Ton-miles

(millions) Percenta

All modes 1,565,196 100% 263,809 100%

Truck 869,796 56% 74,939 28%

Rail 96,626 6% 71,711 27%

Water 143,152 9% 68,212 26%

Air (includes truck and air) 66 <1% 95 <1%

Pipelineb 432,075 28% N/A N/A

Multiple modes 6,022 <1% 3,061 1%

Other and unknown 17,459 2% 1,837 1%
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 47 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Figure 3: Tons of Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail, 1998–2001

Note: Estimates from the Waybill Sample have sampling errors associated with them. The 95 percent 

confidence level associated with the 1998 estimate of approximately 95 million tons ranges from 

approximately 93 million tons to approximately 97 million tons. Except as noted in the text, all 

percentage estimates have sampling errors not exceeding plus or minus 5 percentage points, and all 

numerical estimates other than percentages have sampling errors not exceeding 5 percent of the value 

of those estimates.
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 48 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Rail Shipments 

Represent a Much 

Higher Share of 

Volume for Some 

Hazardous Material 

Classes

When data from the 1997 CFS is examined according to hazard classes and 

across transportation modes, it becomes clear that, despite accounting for 

only 6 percent of the overall hazardous material tonnage and 27 percent of 

ton-miles, rail has a much higher share for other hazard classes for which 

data are available. The reason for this divergence is the predominance of 

flammable liquids, such as gasoline and diesel fuel, in hazardous material 

shipments.2

 When the commodities are looked at individually, the large 

role that rail plays in shipping other hazardous materials becomes 

apparent. For example, rail moves 55 percent of Class 4, flammable solids, 

and 31 percent of Class 6, toxic materials.

If volume data are further separated by division within hazard class, the 

prevalence of rail as a shipment mode for some specific subcategories of 

materials comes into even sharper focus. For example, as shown in table 3, 

59 percent of the tonnage of toxic-by-inhalation gases moves by rail, 

representing 95 percent of the ton-miles of these gases. 

2

Flammable liquids are approximately 81 percent of all hazardous materials shipped, about 2 

percent of which are transported by rail. 
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 49 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 3: Rail Shipments as Percentage of Hazardous Material Shipments by All Transportation Modes by Hazard Class and 

Division, 1997

Legend

N/A = Data do not meet publication standards because of high sampling variability or other reasons. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

a

The 1997 CFS uses different names for hazard classes than DOT currently uses.

Classa Division Hazard divisiona

Tons

(thousands)

Tons

(percent)

Ton-miles

(millions)

Ton-miles

(percent)

1-Explosives N/A N/A N/A N/A

1.1 Explosives with a mass explosion hazard N/A N/A N/A N/A

1.2 Explosives with a projection hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1%

1.3 Explosives with predominantly a fire hazard < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1%

1.4 Explosives with no significant blast hazard N/A N/A N/A N/A

1.5 Very insensitive explosives, blasting agents < 1 < 1% < 1 < 1%

2-Gases 15,203 13% 11,447 52%

2.1 Flammable gases 6,362 10% 4,671 50%

2.2 Nonflammable, nontoxic compressed gases 3,075 8% 1,836 25%

2.3 Gases toxic by inhalation 5,766 59% 4,940 95%

3-Flammable liquids 26,642 2% 19,548 12%

4-Flammable solids 6,477 55% 8,639 90%

4.1 Flammable solids 5,904 58% 7,815 93%

4.2 Spontaneously combustible materials 390 46% 613 82%

4.3 Dangerous when wet materials 183 22% 211 50%

5-Oxidizers and organic peroxides 3,182 34% 2,820 63%

6-Toxic (poison) 1,949 31% 1,446 51%

7-Radioactive materials N/A N/A N/A N/A

8-Corrosive materials 24,427 27% 16,998 41%

9-Miscellaneous dangerous goods 18,334 28% 13,064 58%

Total 96,626 6% 74,711 28%
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 50 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Poisonous Inhalation 

Hazardous Materials 

Were Among the Ten 

Most Commonly 

Shipped Hazardous 

Materials from 1998 to 

2001

The quantities of specific chemicals shipped by rail can be determined by 

analyzing the Waybill Sample data. Table 4 shows the top 20 materials 

shipped by rail from 1998 to 2001 and the average number of carloads 

shipped annually during this period. Nonbulk cargoes such as freight 

forwarder traffic and freight rate shipments, both of which may consist of 

mixed materials, were the top two types of hazardous materials shipped. 

The top bulk hazardous material cargoes can be in the form of solids, 

liquids, or liquefied gases, and include flammable, corrosive, and toxic 

hazardous materials. Poison-by-inhalation hazardous materials, such as 

ammonia and chlorine, are in the top 10 carloads shipped for this time 

period.

Table 4: The Top 20 Hazardous Materials Shipped by Rail by Volume, 1998–2001

Hazardous materials

Estimated

total

carloadsa

Estimated average annual

number of carloads

1. Freight forwarder trafficb 1,188,109 297,027

2. All freight rate shipments, not elsewhere coded (NEC), or trailer on flat car 

shipments, commercial, except where identified by commodity 716,177 179,044

3. Sulfur liquid or molten nonmetallic minerals except fuels 273,005 68,251

4. Liquefied petroleum gas, NEC, compressed 253,234 63,308

5. Sodium (soda), caustic (sodium hydroxide) 236,455 59,114

6. Asphalt pitches or tars, from petroleum, coal tar, coke oven, or natural gas 222,163 55,541

7. Sulfuric acid or oil of vitriol 200,875 50,219

8. Ammonia, anhydrous 163,057 40,764

9. Chlorine gas, liquefied 128,600 32,150

10. Gasolines, blended, consisting of motor fuels containing 50% or more of 

gasolinesc 97,192 24,298

11. Ethyl alcohol, anhydrous denatured in part with petroleum products and/or 

chemicals (not to exceed 5%) 95,333 23,833

12. Phosphatic fertilizer solution, containing not more than 77% of phosphoric 

anhydride by weight 90,779 22,695

13. Chemicals, NEC 86,854 21,713

14. Vinyl chloride (chloroethane or chloroethylene) 73,033 18,258

15. Methanol (methyl or wood alcohol) liquid 67,903 16,976

16. Propane gas, liquefied 65,702 16,425

17. Carbon dioxide gas, liquefied, or carbonic acid gas 63,020 15,755

18. Ammonium nitrate fertilizer 62,563 15,641
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 51 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Source: GAO analysis of DOT data.

a

Because the waybill sample data is extrapolated from a 1 percent sample, there will be uncertainties 

associated with the totals in this table.

b

Nonbulk shipments that may consist of mixed materials.

c

The sampling error for this estimate is approximately 25 percent of the value of the estimate. The 

sampling errors for all other estimates in this table do not exceed 5 percent of the value of those 

estimates.

Rail Shipments of 

Radioactive and 

Military Hazardous 

Materials Represent a 

Small Fraction of All 

Rail Shipments of 

Hazardous Materials

Rail shipments of radioactive and military hazardous materials are few 

compared with overall rail shipments of hazardous materials. Through its 

Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Department of 

Defense (DOD) contracts with U.S. rail companies for the shipment of 

arms, ammunition, explosives, and other hazardous materials. The 

Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy (DOE) each ship 

radioactive material, including high-level spent nuclear fuel. 

DOD Hazardous Materials 

Rail Shipments Include 

Arms, Ammunition, 

Explosives, Spent Nuclear 

Fuel, and Other Materials

From 1997 to 2001, MTMC shipped 728,000 tons of hazardous materials by 

rail, which represents a very small percentage of the 459 million tons of all 

hazardous materials shipped by rail during this time period. Although some 

DOD hazardous materials are shipped on dedicated trains, more often they 

are shipped in one- or two-car shipments and attached to trains with other 

nonmilitary cargoes. The dedicated shipments are usually done in 

conjunction with a planned exercise where a large amount of materials are 

needed.

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a joint organization within both 

the Department of Navy and Energy, ships naval spent nuclear fuel from 

shipyards to DOE’s Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 

Laboratory for examination and temporary storage. According to program 

data, spent nuclear fuel from nuclear-powered warships accounts for 

approximately 0.05 percent of all spent nuclear fuel in the United States. 

From 1957 to 2001, the program shipped 738 containers of radioactive 

19. Muriatic (hydrochloric) acid 58,165 14,541

20. Styrene (liquid) 55,910 13,977

(Continued From Previous Page)

Hazardous materials

Estimated

total

carloadsa

Estimated average annual

number of carloads
Appendix III

Annual Hazardous Material Rail Shipments in 

the United States

Page 52 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

material without a harmful release of radiation. According to the 

Department of the Navy, naval reactor components are designed robustly 

to withstand combat conditions. 

DOE Ships Radioactive 

Waste Materials from Its 

Own Operations by Rail 

DOE ships its own radioactive waste material shipments, including lowlevel radioactive material, transuranic waste, and spent nuclear fuel.3

 

Within DOE, the Office of Environmental Management coordinates policies 

and program implementation for shipments of environmental radioactive 

waste. DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management would have 

responsibility for the proposed shipments to the Yucca Mountain 

Repository. Shipments made under the Office of Environmental 

Management are currently made mostly by truck; however, DOE is 

exploring the possibility of increasing rail shipments in the future. DOE 

officials estimate that of the approximately 500 shipments a month of lowlevel radioactive material made by DOE, less than 1 percent are made by 

rail.

Volume of Commercial 

Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Shipments Is Expected to 

Increase Substantially if the 

Yucca Mountain Repository 

Is Approved

According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission statistics, approximately 2 

million pounds of spent nuclear fuel were transported by rail in the United 

States between 1979 and 1996. These amounts will increase greatly if a 

proposed private fuel storage facility in Utah is licensed for operation and 

will increase again if the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository is approved. 

Total shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the private fuel storage facility are 

estimated to be 88 million pounds, and the estimated total shipment to 

Yucca Mountain is 154 million pounds over a 24-year period. All the 

shipments to the private fuel storage facility would be by rail, while 

shipments to Yucca Mountain will be by both rail and truck.

3

Transuranic waste is a type of radioactive waste created from the processing of nuclear 

materials. Transuranic elements include plutonium, americium, curium, and neptunium, all 

of which are created during nuclear reactor operations. Some transuranic elements are used 

in production of nuclear weapons, spacecraft batteries, and consumer products. The 

remaining unusable material containing transuranic elements is transuranic waste. 

Transuranic waste includes not only the transuranic elements themselves, but also ordinary 

items contaminated with transuranic elements: tools, gloves, protective suits, tarpaulins, 

soil, and sludge. 
Page 53 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel ApendxiIV

Proposed Private Fuel 

Storage and Yucca 

Mountain Repository 

Plans Will Result in 

Substantial Increases 

in Rail Shipment of 

Radioactive Materials 

If the proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada is licensed and 

begins operation, the number of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments by rail 

would greatly increase in the future. Even without the operation of Yucca 

Mountain, there may be a substantial increase in the shipment of SNF from 

private efforts to ship and temporarily store SNF.

The most common method for storing SNF is in dry or wet fuel storage 

facilities on-site at nuclear plants. Some plants, however, are concerned 

about reaching full capacity for storage on-site and the ongoing expense 

associated with this type of storage. Under the Nuclear Waste Fund 

provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the operators of nuclear 

plants have been paying fees for a fund maintained by the Department of 

Energy (DOE) to pay for the proper disposal of SNF in a national 

repository,1 proposed for Yucca Mountain.2 To date, operators have not 

been able to ship any of their spent fuel off-site to the repository.

To address SNF on-site storage capacity issues, private power companies 

with more than one nuclear plant may ship SNF by rail from one plant to 

the storage facility of another if available storage capacity exists. Such 

intrautility transfers have constituted most commercial spent fuel 

shipments in the past. According to Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) statistics, 1,057 metric tons of SNF were commercially transported 

by rail in the United States between 1979 and 1996 in 147 separate 

shipments. According to NRC data, no radioactive releases above the 

regulatory limit have occurred during any of these shipments. Table 5 

shows the total metric tons and shipments of commercial spent nuclear 

fuel transported by rail and truck from 1979 to 1996.

1

For storage purposes, SNF material is put into water pools to cool, both thermally and 

radioactively. The pools are known as wet storage. Dry storage is a newer technology that 

uses concrete and steel to allow heat and radioactivity to dissipate.

2

42 U.S.C. § 10222.
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 54 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 5: Transport of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel, 1979–1996

Source: Congressional Research Service. 

DOE Estimates That 70,000 

Metric Tons of SNF Would 

Be Shipped to the Proposed 

Yucca Mountain National 

Repository over a 24-Year 

Period

The proposed Yucca Mountain Repository in Nevada would be the largest 

to hold SNF in the country. Although the repository is not yet licensed, and 

would not be scheduled to begin operations until 2010, studies and 

preparations for these shipments have been under way for some time. 

According to DOE’s Environmental Impact Statement for Yucca Mountain, 

approximately 70,000 metric tons of SNF would be shipped to the 

repository over a 24-year period. DOE officials currently favor the use of 

trains versus trucks as the primary mode of transporting SNF to Yucca 

Mountain. This decision, however, has not been finalized. The use of rail 

would require fewer overall shipments than the use of trucks due to the 

larger transport capacity of trains. If trains are chosen as the primary mode 

of transportation for SNF to Yucca Mountain, DOE estimates that, on 

average, 130 trains carrying approximately 400 casks would transport SNF 

every year for 24 years.3

 A rail shipment may include up to three rail casks. 

If trains were to be used, a new rail line would need to be constructed to 

connect the repository to main line railroad tracks. The rail line would be 

approximately 100 to 300 miles in length depending on the corridor 

selected. In addition, specific routes for SNF shipments would also have to 

be selected. Finally, DOE would have to determine whether or not to use 

dedicated trains to make these shipments.

Association of American 

Railroads Endorses the Use of 

Dedicated Trains for SNF 

Shipments to Yucca Mountain

The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has endorsed the use of 

dedicated trains for shipments of SNF to Yucca Mountain. Dedicated trains 

would allow shipments to travel from origin to destination as quickly as 

possible, thereby minimizing exposure en route and time spent in rail 

Mode

Metric tons

of spent fuel Shipments

Average metric

tons per shipment

Rail 1,057 147 7.2

Truck 356 1,172 0.3

Total 1,413 1,319 1.1

3

A cask is a hardened container designed specifically for holding SNF. NRC certifies cask 

designs. 
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 55 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

yards. AAR’s position is that advanced technology that is not routinely used 

in regular trains, such as that used for derailment prevention, could be 

incorporated in a dedicated train. The Department of Transportation (DOT) 

is currently drafting a report on the safety of using dedicated trains for the 

rail shipment of spent nuclear fuel. 

Proposed Shipment of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel by Private Fuel 

Storage, LLC, Would Also 

Result in a Substantial 

Increase in Shipments 

In order to gain additional storage capacity for SNF, a consortium of eight 

private utility companies, called Private Fuel Storage (PFS), LLC, working 

with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute tribe, is pursuing a storage 

facility on tribal land. The Goshute reservation is located approximately 50 

miles west of Salt Lake City, Utah. This proposed storage facility would 

also result in a substantial increase in SNF shipments. 

If licensed, the facility would receive up to 40,000 tons of SNF for storage. 

Unlike the Yucca Mountain repository, the PFS facility would be a 

temporary storage site rather than a permanent repository. An NRC license 

to store SNF lasts 20 years and is renewable. After the license expires, the 

facility would be decommissioned and the material taken off of the 

reservation. If the Yucca Mountain repositorywere in operation at that 

time, Yucca Mountain would be the likely recipient of this material. 

Provisions would need to be made to safely transport material to and from 

the Goshute Reservation.4

PFS anticipates receiving one to two trains weekly, each carrying two to 

four shipping casks containing 10 metric tons of uranium. Dedicated trains, 

stopping only for crew changes, refueling, and periodic inspections, would 

ship the material. A 32-mile rail line would be constructed by PFS on 

federal government owned land to connect the facility with the nearest 

railroad.

4

In March 2003, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing board blocked for the time 

being the issuance of a license to PFS because of the risks that military aircraft operations 

conducted near the facility might pose.
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 56 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Historically Low Spent 

Nuclear Fuel Shipment 

Volumes Make Risk 

Assessment from 

Increased Shipments 

Difficult

It is difficult to assess the risk from the shipment of SNF using historic 

data, since the SNF shipments to date amount to only a small fraction of 

those proposed for shipment to the Yucca Mountain Repository and PFS. 

The 1,057 metric tons of spent fuel that was shipped by rail between 1979 

and 1996 is small compared to proposed shipments to the Yucca Mountain 

Repository and PFS. 

Even though no harmful radiation releases have occurred in past shipments 

of SNF, several questions still remain regarding the potential risk posed by 

these shipments, including

• whether the past safety record is indicative of potential future accidents 

given the difference in volume of materials shipped,

• what type of potential release is possible given cask design and 

proposed shipping practices, and

• what harm could be done by attacks on SNF shipments.

In addressing concerns about the potential for future accidents given the 

expected increase in spent nuclear fuel shipments, NRC officials told us 

that they believe that historical transport data for accident rates, in general, 

and for spent fuel shipments, in particular, support the conclusion that 

current regulatory programs result in a high degree of safety, even if 

applied to a larger shipment campaign. The officials said that NRC has 

sponsored risk studies that address the potential impacts related to 

changes in shipment parameters for future shipments to a waste facility.5

 

They said that they believe there is an adequate technical basis to conclude 

current shipments are safe and that future compliant shipments will be 

safe.

5

NUREG/CR-6672, Reexamination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates, March 2000, 

which is also discussed in this appendix.
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 57 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Studies Suggest That There 

is a Low Probability of 

Accidental Release of 

Radiation during 

Transportation of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel

Past federal studies have examined risks to the safety of the shipment of 

SNF and suggest that there is a low probability of accidental release of 

radiation during its transportation. To address safety issues associated with 

the shipment of SNF, NRC sponsored a series of studies to develop a 

predictive model of shipment risk. These include a study conducted by the 

Livermore National Laboratory. In addition, we convened a National 

Academy of Sciences panel of rail industry experts to identify issues 

involved in the safe and secure transport of hazardous materials by rail, 

including SNF.

Livermore National Laboratory 

Study

The Livermore National Laboratory “Modal Study,” completed in 1987 and 

updated in 1995, concluded that 99.8 percent of all accidents involving SNF 

would not result in a harmful release of radiation. The Livermore Study 

relied on existing accident data to develop

• accident rates for trains and trucks, 

• a distribution of accident speeds, and 

• a distribution of types of accidents.

All of these data were then applied against the structural characteristics of 

SNF shipment casks to determine whether the type of accident described 

would result in a harmful release of radiation. 

The Livermore Study is consistent with Research and Special Programs 

Administration data, which indicate that less than 0.10 percent of all 

current carloads of hazardous materials are involved in an accident that 

causes a release of hazardous material. This study also examined the 

effects of four severe scenarios derived from actual transportation 

accidents and concluded that in only one of the scenarios, which included 

an engulfing fire lasting several days, would the casks have failed to 

prevent package radiation levels from exceeding NRC limits.

The state of Nevada sponsored an assessment of the Livermore Study 

criticizing its findings on several counts. According to the assessment, (1) 

the methodology for deriving the accident rates may not have considered 

all the potential causes for cask failure, (2) the study does not take into 

consideration the possibility for human error in SNF cask construction and 

the effects that this could have in the severity of an accident, and (3) the 

computer simulation used in the Livermore study did not account for all 
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 58 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

potential effects from high heat fires such as the breakdown of spent fuel 

pellets into gases or vapors.

In March 2000, NRC sponsored another study to update these earlier 

findings, entitled Re-examination of Spent Fuel Shipment Risk Estimates. 

The 2000 NRC study confirmed the results of an earlier 1977 NRC study and 

quantified the expected risk of transporting SNF. The 2000 study concluded 

that the rail accident risk was only 2 percent of the risk estimate in the 

prior study.

National Academy of Sciences 

Panel Expressed Confidence in 

the Safety and Security of 

Hazardous Material Rail 

Shipments

Experts at the GAO-sponsored National Academy of Sciences panel on the 

safety and security of hazardous material rail shipments also expressed 

that the risks of the transport of SNF were low relative to the risks of 

transporting other hazardous materials. An AAR representative at the 

panel, for example, did not cite SNF when discussing the hazardous 

materials that are of special concern for security in shipment. Panel 

participants noted that radioactive and nuclear material has historically 

been a source of anxiety in the United States, and that this public 

perception makes the shipment of radioactive material seem more of a 

problem than it is. One panelist noted that, although an attack on 

radioactive material in transit would be sure to attract a lot of media 

attention, the hardness of the cask would minimize damage and the 

potential for a radiation release. In comparison with SNF, he noted, other 

materials have the potential for a much greater lethal effect. One panelist, 

an emergency first responder, stated that he would rather have SNF going 

through his town than a shipment of gasoline because of the strength of the 

SNF container.

DOE Rebuts Aspects of Study on 

Safety Issues Regarding the 

Transportation of SNF Casks

In the aftermath of the July 2001 incident in the Howard Street Tunnel in 

Baltimore, Radioactive Waste Management Associates prepared a study 

that concluded that, had SNF casks been part of the train involved in that 

accident, the fire in the tunnel would have resulted in a release of 

contaminating radiation throughout a section of the city. This report stated 

that there are currently no requirements that SNF be transported 

separately from other hazardous cargo, and that the tunnel is part of a 

route identified as a potential rail corridor for SNF shipments, concluding 

that it is feasible that a cask could have been part of the burning train in the 

tunnel. DOE provided us with a criticism of the study prepared by staff 

from Sandia National Laboratory disputing the conclusions of the report. 

According to DOE officials, at least one buffer car must separate a SNF car 

from a car containing any hazardous materials. DOE officials said because 

of the separation of at least one car length and the slow, rather than 
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 59 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

catastrophic, leak of the tripropylene, the most intense fire heat would 

have been localized at the tripropylene car and not at adjacent cars. 

In March 2003, NRC also released a report that examined the Baltimore 

tunnel fire incident and evaluated what the consequences would have been 

had a spent nuclear fuel transportation cask been in the train accident in 

the tunnel.6

 NRC concluded in its report that, for a spent nuclear fuel 

transportation cask approved under NRC rules for packaging and 

transportation of radioactive materials7

 and subjected to the conditions 

encountered in the Howard Street tunnel fire, no release of radioactive 

materials would have resulted from this postulated event. In addition, the 

health and safety of the public would have been maintained. 

Safety and Security Issues 

Posed by the Substantial 

Increase in Future SNF 

Shipments and Potential 

New Threats for These 

Shipments Are Being 

Studied

Since the 1970s, DOE and NRC have conducted several studies of the effect 

of sabotage on the transportation of SNF. These studies found that a 

successful sabotage attack on spent nuclear fuel being transported would 

have a limited effect on human health. A study published by DOE’s Sandia 

National Laboratory in 1999 confirmed earlier studies that, under certain 

worst-case scenarios, NRC-certified transportation containers could be 

penetrated by armor-piercing weapons and release small quantities of 

radioactive materials.8

Nevertheless, despite their general confidence in the safety of current 

regulations for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel shipments, federal 

regulators are preparing to address new safety and security issues posed by 

the substantial increase in the number of these shipments in the future and 

new threats posed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. DOE’s 

Sandia National Laboratory is currently conducting a cask sabotage 

investigation project. Upon its completion, DOE plans to use results of the 

project to support its decisions with regard to proposed SNF safeguard and 

security procedures. According to DOE, closer estimates of the 

consequence of a successful sabotage attack would support policy 

decisions relating to the safeguard levels required for SNF shipments, and a 

6

NUREG/CR-6799, Analysis of Rail Car Components Exposed to a Tunnel Fire 

Environment, March 2003.

7

10 C.F.R. 71.

8

Sandia National Laboratories, Projected Source Terms for Potential Sabotage Events 

Related to Spent Fuel Shipments, SAND99-0963 (Albuquerque, New Mexico: 1999).
Appendix IV

Safety and Security Issues Posed by Possible 

Future Rail Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Page 60 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

better-defined consequence might also be expected to reduce the cost of 

safeguards. DOE and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) are also 

reexamining the potential need for routing requirements for SNF rail 

shipments given the increase in the expected volume of shipments 

traveling through heavily populated rail corridors. NRC is also studying the 

potential vulnerabilities to the security of spent fuel and has ongoing work 

related to the performance of spent nuclear fuel containers in accident 

scenarios. 

Finally, we are currently undertaking a study assessing the findings of 

federally-sponsored studies of sabotage and severe accidents involving 

spent nuclear fuel. 
Page 61 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix V

Emergency Response Procedures and 

Available Resources to Assist Local First 

Responders ApendxiV

General Procedures for 

Emergency Response 

The recognized method for managing an emergency response is the 

incident command system, an on-site management system applicable to all 

types of emergencies. It includes a standard organizational structure, 

training requirements, procedures, and terminology that enable 

participating agencies to function together effectively and efficiently in 

response to an emergency. Hazardous material rail incidents involve a 

multidiscipline emergency management response approach. While the 

immediate response is primarily local, both state and federal governments 

also provide additional resources if the need arises. 

Typically, at the local level, fire, law enforcement, public works, emergency 

medical service, and railroad personnel would be the first responders to a 

hazardous material rail incident. For these incidents, a locality’s fire 

department is the lead agency in a hazardous material incident response. 

Within fire departments that have hazardous material teams, these teams 

lead the response to a hazardous material rail incident. Chemical experts or 

responders from private industry may provide additional response 

assistance. 

In response to any suspected hazardous material incident, responders near 

or first arriving at the event do an initial reconnaissance to determine the 

materials involved and the need for additional resources. Initial responders 

determine if an evacuation or shelter in place is needed based on 

recommendations from the Emergency Response Guidebook.

1

 If hazardous 

material incidents are major events, the response would also include an 

activation of an emergency operations command center (if one is in place), 

the Red Cross, state environmental protection agencies, state emergency 

management agencies and, in some cases, federal agencies. 

To prepare for responding to hazardous material incidents, local 

communities—frequently with state, federal, and industry partners—often 

conduct preparedness drills, develop emergency response plans, obtain 

technical training, and procure specialized equipment for first responders. 

Although there is no difference in an emergency response to a hazardous 

material incident whether it is the result of an accident or terrorist attack, 

in cases of terrorism, law enforcement would play a greater role in a 

1

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of 

Transport and Communications of Mexico developed the Emergency Response Guidebook

jointly for use by fire fighters, police, and other emergency services personnel who respond 

to hazardous material incidents.
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Page 62 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

locality’s overall response and coordinate a criminal investigation. Local 

law enforcement would make a determination whether federal law 

enforcement assistance is necessary for an investigation.

At the state level, a hazardous material response team typically assists 

those localities needing additional resources. In the states that we visited, 

such teams provided hazardous material response capability for locations 

that did not have their own hazardous material teams. In addition, state 

environmental agencies provide assistance in incident mitigation and 

monitoring of the environment.

In some instances, federal emergency response assistance may be called 

for by state and local governments or by the circumstances of the 

hazardous material incident. For example, the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) 

Directorate may be requested to provide federal disaster assistance to an 

area. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG), which is now housed within DHS, are required by the 

National Contingency Plan to be notified and may send representatives to 

the incident scene to assist in evaluating the environmental damage 

resulting from a hazardous material release. However, more robust state 

and federal resources are generally reserved for more serious incidents, 

such as the July 2001 derailment in Baltimore that involved a release of 

hazardous materials in a populated area. 

Multiple Federal Plans 

and Agencies Provide 

Additional Resources 

to Address Hazardous 

Material Incidents 

Three federal response plans address emergencies involving hazardous 

material releases during rail transport: the Federal Response Plan, the 

National Contingency Plan (part of the National Response System), and the 

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These plans all involve 

multiple federal agencies in their administration. The primary federal 

agencies with a role in emergency response for hazardous material 

incidents are DHS’ Transportation Security Administration (TSA), EP&R 

Directorate, and USCG, EPA, DOT, Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The Office of Domestic 

Preparedness (ODP)—formerly part of the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

and now in DHS—, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 

and OSHA provide funding for equipment procurement, planning, or 

training activities. HHS and OSHA also provide consultations in 

emergencies when requested. 
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Page 63 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Federal Response Plan 

Addresses All Types of 

Hazards 

The Federal Response Plan is an all hazard response plan carried out by the 

DHS EP&R Directorate and 26 other partner federal organizations. The 

plan provides the mechanism for delivery of federal assistance and 

resources to augment state and local government efforts in a major disaster 

or emergency. The plan provides for response with initial resources such as 

food, water, and emergency generators. The plan also provides additional 

resources to state and local governments to recover from an emergency. 

The plan categorizes the types of federal assistance that a state is most 

likely to need into 12 emergency support functions. These functions are: 

transportation, communications, public works and engineering, 

firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health 

and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, 

and energy. Each emergency support function is headed by a primary 

agency designated on the basis of its capability in that area. 

Federal Radiological 

Emergency Response Plan 

Coordinates Federal 

Response to Radiological 

Emergencies

The objective of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, also 

published by DHS’ EP&R Directorate, is to establish an organized and 

integrated capability for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies 

to peacetime radiological emergencies. According to the plan, the lead 

federal agency for incidents involving the transportation of radioactive 

materials varies by circumstance: the NRC is the lead federal agency for an 

emergency that involves radiological material licensed by the NRC or an 

agreement state, DOD or DOE are the lead federal agencies when 

radiological material is shipped by these agencies at the time of an 

accident, and EPA is the lead federal agency when an emergency involves 

radiological material that is not licensed or owned by a federal agency or an 

agreement state. 2

National Contingency Plan 

Addresses Oil Spills and 

Hazardous Substance 

Releases

The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 

more commonly called the National Contingency Plan, is the federal 

government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous 

substance releases. The lead federal agencies for responding to hazardous 

substance releases under the National Contingency Plan are EPA for inland 

2

Agreement states are states establishing programs under 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) to permit 

states to exercise some of NRC’s authority.
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Page 64 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

zones and the USCG for coastal zones, although DOD, DOE, and other 

federal agencies are the lead agencies in certain circumstances. 

The National Response Center, created by the National Contingency Plan, 

receives notifications of chemical, radiological, oil, and biological releases. 

Transportation accidents involving hazardous materials must be reported 

to the National Response Center by the carrier involved if the accident 

meets one or more of the criteria developed by the center. Some of these 

criteria include the following: a person is killed, a person receives injuries 

requiring hospitalization, property damage exceeds $50,000, an evacuation 

of the general public is required lasting 1 hour or more, and there is a 

release of marine pollutant in a quantity exceeding 119 gallons for liquids or 

882 pounds for solids. In addition, the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 requires that all releases 

of hazardous substances exceeding reportable quantities be reported by 

the responsible party to the center.

National Contingency Plan Has 

Three Organizational Levels: 

National Response Team, 

Regional Response Teams, and 

On scene Coordinators

The National Response Team’s membership consists of 16 federal agencies 

with expertise in various aspects of emergency response to pollution 

incidents. EPA serves as the chair agency and the USCG serves as the vicechair agency of the National Response Team. The team is a national 

planning, policy, and coordinating body and does not physically respond to 

incidents.

The National Contingency Plan has 13 regional response teams that are 

also planning, policy, and coordinating bodies and do not physically 

respond to the scene of an incident. The regional response teams provide 

assistance to state and local governments in preparedness, planning, and 

training for emergency response. Another function of the teams is to 

provide technical assistance to local and state emergency planning 

committees to enhance local emergency response planning. The teams also 

coordinate the regional deployment of assets.

On scene coordinators are federal officials predesignated by EPA for inland 

areas and by the USCG for coastal areas. The on scene coordinators have 

the authority to coordinate containment, removal and disposal efforts, and 

resources during an oil spill or hazardous substance release. On scene 

coordinators for the USCG handle incidents within or threatening the 

coastal zone, while their EPA counterparts are responsible for discharges 

into, or threatening, the inland zone. This responsibility includes 

coordinating federal, state, local, and responsible party efforts. The USCG 

National Strike Force, which consists of three strike teams and a 
Appendix V

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Page 65 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

coordination center equipped to respond to major oil spills and chemical 

releases, assists on scene coordinators in incident response. On scene 

coordinators also have access to special teams, both those listed in the 

National Contingency Plan, such as the USCG National Strike Force and 

EPA Environmental Response Teams, and those not specifically listed in 

the plan, such as Department of Defense teams.

National Contingency Plan is 

Part of the National Response 

System to Prepare and Respond 

to Oil and Hazardous Material 

Incidents

The National Contingency Plan is a component of the National Response 

System, a structure for preparedness and response to oil and hazardous 

material incidents that has been in place for over 30 years. The National 

Response System consists of a network of interagency coordinating groups 

at the national, regional, area, and local levels that are responsible for 

preparedness activities. The system establishes a network of contingency 

plans with different levels of geographical scope that form the federal 

government’s efforts to prepare and coordinate responses to emergency 

incidents. In addition to the National Contingency Plan, there are regional 

and area contingency plans that coordinate effective responses within each 

of the 10 standard federal regions and other designated areas covering 

Alaska, the Caribbean, and several islands in the Pacific. These plans 

include preparedness information on a regional level and identify useful 

response facilities and resources available from government, commercial, 

academic, and other sources. At the local level, the National Response 

System includes local contingency plans to prepare and organize local 

resources in the event of accidental releases of hazardous substances.

USCG officials told us that the National Response System’s coordinating 

bodies strive for continual improvement through an ongoing process of 

plan development, exercises, and evaluation. Plans and capabilities are 

tested through exercises; exercise evaluations provide lessons learned 

which, in turn, may result in changes to the plan or modifications to 

resource capability. USCG officials told us that, while there currently exists 

no national assessment tool to measure preparedness, the National 

Response System’s process provides a mechanism for evaluation and 

improvement.
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Emergency Response Procedures and 

Available Resources to Assist Local First 

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Page 66 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Federal Agencies 

Provide a Variety of 

Assistance for 

Responding to and 

Improving 

Preparedness for 

Hazardous Material 

Rail Incidents

Many federal agencies are responsible for providing either on-scene 

response assistance or offering technical expertise in the event of a 

hazardous material rail incident. As discussed above, many of these 

agencies play a role in the administration of federal response plans. Table 6 

lists the agencies responsible for providing either on-scene assistance or 

technical expertise in the event of a hazardous material rail incident and 

outlines their roles.

Table 6: Federal Agencies Involved in Emergency Response to Hazardous Material Incidents

Agency Role

DHS TSA

TSA is involved in managing transportation security in the event of a threat via hazardous materials. TSA also has 

emergency powers in the event of a national emergency.a

EP&R Directorate

The EP&R Directorate is responsible for implementing and managing federal disaster assistance. Federal assistance 

is available to supplement the resources of state and local governments in major disasters, such as emergencies 

involving hazardous material releases. Most federal assistance becomes available only following a declaration by the 

President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act at the request of a state 

governor or the immediate declaration by the President.

USCG

USCG maintains the National Strike Force, which is comprised of three strike teams and the National Strike Force 

Coordination Center. The strike force is responsible for providing highly-trained responders and equipment in support 

of the USCG and EPA federal on scene coordinators who respond to oil discharges and hazardous substances 

releases. The USCG’s Emergency Response Notification System database also records releases. The USCG 

maintains this database. The USCG can respond to a hazardous material rail incident in the coastal zone whenever 

there is a threat to public health or the environment. The National Contingency Plan outlines the appropriate response 

in the event of a spill. 

DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)

RSPA issues the Emergency Response Guidebook to assist first responders by identifying the potential effects of 

hazardous materials by type. RSPA has been issuing this guidebook in various formats since the late 1970s, and it 

recently distributed over 1.5 million copies of the latest edition. In 1997, RSPA, in conjunction with the Canadian and 

Mexican governments, issued a joint North American copy of the guidebook. 
Appendix V

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Page 67 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS’ EP&R Directorate, USCG, DOT, EPA, DOE, and NRC data.

a

Per 49 U.S.C. § 114(g).

In addition to providing on-scene assistance or technical expertise in the 

event of a hazardous material incident, some of the same federal agencies 

listed above provide training or grant assistance to local communities to 

improve their emergency preparedness for hazardous material incidents. 

Tables 7 to 11 list the federal agencies that have some role in providing a 

variety of assistance and grants to emergency responders.

EPA EPA can respond to a hazardous material rail incident whenever there is a threat to public health or the environment. 

Typically, EPA is invited to incident scenes by first responders or local emergency management agencies. The National 

Contingency Plan outlines appropriate responses by EPA in the event of an oil spill or hazardous substance release.

Under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, EPA is the lead agency when the source of the 

radioactivity is unknown. Examples of unknown sources include scrap shipped from overseas and materials with 

unknown owners. 

DOE DOE participates in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan that coordinates the federal government 

response to radiological emergencies. DOE participates in the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating 

Committee. DOE is the lead federal agency for response to an emergency involving materials that are in DOE custody. 

DOE also has the initial responsibility for coordinating off-site federal radiological monitoring and assessment 

assistance during response to a radiological emergency. DOE may respond to a state or lead federal agency request 

for assistance by dispatching a Radiological Assistance Program team. According to DOE officials, if the situation 

requires more assistance than a team can provide, DOE will alert or activate additional resources, including the Aerial 

Measuring System, Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, Accident Response Group, Federal Radiological 

Monitoring and Assessment Center, Nuclear Emergency Search Team, and Radiation Emergency Assistance Center 

and Training Site. 

NRC NRC is the lead federal agency for emergency response to radiological events involving NRC-licensed facilities and 

the transportation of licensed materials. Although state and local governments would be the actual responders to an 

accident or incident involving radioactive material, NRC’s response teams follow events as they unfold in a radiological 

shipment incident and provide federal resources to responders. When the source of shipments of radioactive materials 

cannot be identified during an incident, NRC would assist the EPA’s Radiological Response Teams to identify the 

source. 

OSHA OSHA is a member of the National Response Team and provides assistance to ensure the safety and health of 

personnel deployed at emergency response sites.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Role
Appendix V

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Available Resources to Assist Local First 

Responders

Page 68 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 7: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of Domestic Preparedness (Formerly a Department of Justice Program)

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS and CFDA data.

a CFDA is the governmentwide source document of federal domestic assistance program information 

produced by the executive branch. 

b

 According to ODP officials, the total amount awarded in fiscal year 2002 does not include contracts or 

interagency agreements, which is approximately $24 million.

c According to ODP officials, this program includes multifunding for different purposes.

Table 8: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants Provided by the Department of Transportation’s 

Research and Special Programs Administration 

Sources: GAO analysis of DOT and CFDA data.

a

Established under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, LEPCs must 

develop an emergency plan and review it at least annually. LEPC membership includes 

representatives from police, fire, civil defense, public health, transportation, environmental agencies, 

as well as representatives from facilities subject to emergency planning requirements, community 

groups, and the media.

b

$7.8 million of this funding is for the training of emergency responders, $5 million is for LEPC

planning, and $250,000 is for International Association of Fire Fighter instructor training in hazardous 

material response operations.

Catalog of Federal 

Domestic 

Assistance (CFDA) 

numbera

Assistance program

grant title Purpose

FY 2002 

fundingb

16.007 State Domestic 

Preparedness 

Equipment Support 

Program

Funding provided to states to plan for and execute a comprehensive 

threat and needs assessment to develop a three-year plan to enhance 

first responder capabilities, and to provide for equipment purchases 

and the provision of specialized training.

$481 million

16.008 Domestic Preparedness 

Training and Technical 

Assistance Program

Funding to train state and local jurisdictions to respond to weapons of 

mass destruction domestic terrorist incidents, involving nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and explosive devices

$62 million

16.580 

16.597

16.599c

Organizations, rather than state and local entities, are the one-time 

recipients of these funds. Grants are used for a multitude of purposes 

including, but not limited to, meetings to share best practices and 

facilitate discussion on public and private partnerships. 

$17 million

CFDA Number

Assistance program

grant title Purpose

FY 2002 

funding

20.703 Hazardous material 

emergency preparedness 

training and planning grants 

Intended to provide financial and technical assistance as well as 

national direction and guidance to enhance state, territorial, tribal, and 

local hazardous material emergency planning and training. This 

program distributes fees collected from shippers and carriers of 

hazardous materials to emergency responders for training and to local 

emergency planning committees (LEPCs) for planning.a

$13.05 millionb
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Responders

Page 69 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 9: Hazardous Material Emergency Response and Assistance Grants Provided by the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response

Sources: GAO analysis of DHS, CFDA, and National Volunteer Fire Council data.

CFDA number

Assistance program

grant title Purpose

FY 2002 

funding

83.012 Hazardous materials 

assistance program

Provides technical and financial assistance through the states to 

support state, local, and American Indian tribal governments in oil and 

hazardous materials emergency planning and exercising and to 

enhance state, tribal, and local governments capabilities to 

interoperate with the National Response System.

$264,000

83.547 First responder counterterrorism training assistanceDesigned to enhance the capabilities of first responders in managing 

the consequences of terrorist acts. 

$4 million

83.552 Emergency management 

performance grants

Designed to develop comprehensive emergency management, 

including terrorism consequence management preparedness, at the 

state and local levels and to improve emergency planning, 

preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery capabilities.

$134 million

83.554 Assistance to firefighters 

grant 

Designed to enhance abilities with respect to fire and fire-related 

hazards. This program seeks to identify departments that lack the 

basic tools and resources necessary to protect the health and safety 

of the public and their firefighting personnel.

$144 million

83.009

83.010

Hazardous 

materials/weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) training 

standards and requirements

guidance and training 

quality control technical 

assistance

(under interagency 

agreement with DOT)

Provides guidance and technical assistance to state and major 

metropolitan training departments on managing and implementing 

hazardous material and WMD responder training. Purpose is to 

improve the quality of hazardous material/WMD responder training 

nationally and the cost-effectiveness of state and local use of federal 

training funds in hazardous material and WMD response training.

$1.5 million

83.527 

83.530

Hazardous materials/WMD

responder

training 

curriculum

The National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute 

offer complete and definitive curricula for all facets of local responder 

training for hazardous material and WMD incidents. 

$1.2 million

83.549 Chemical stockpile 

emergency preparedness 

program 

To enhance emergency preparedness capabilities of the states and 

local communities at each of the chemical agent stockpile storage 

facilities. The purpose of the program is to assist states and local 

communities in efforts to improve their capacity to plan for and 

respond to accidents associated with the storage of chemical warfare 

materials.

$82 million

83.562

83.563

83.564

FY 2002 supplemental 

grants for state and local 

preparedness

Provide funding assistance to state and local governments to update 

their emergency operations plans for all hazards with special 

emphasis on WMD terrorism preparedness. Funds will also be used 

to support the formation of citizen corps councils, expansion of the 

community emergency response team program, and to improve state 

emergency operations centers.

$181 million
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Available Resources to Assist Local First 

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Page 70 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Table 10: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants Provided by the Department of Health and Human 

Services

Sources: GAO analysis of HHS and CFDA data.

Table 11: Hazardous Material Emergency Response Assistance and Grants Provided by the Department of Energya

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and CFDA data.

a

In addition to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant program, DOE officials said that the Transportation 

Emergency Planning Program provides tools, including training materials and access to go-kits for 

instructors, and assists states and tribes in developing their transportation emergency capabilities 

through plans, procedures and training. DOE officials said that this is not a grant program and does 

not provide funding directly to states or tribes for emergency preparedness.

CFDA number

Assistance program

grant title Purpose

FY 2002 

funding

93.003 Metropolitan Medical 

Response System Program 

(part of the Public Health 

and Social Services 

Emergency Fund) 

Provides assistance to U.S. cities, via contracts, to prepare for a rapid, 

coordinated medical response to large-scale public emergencies. The 

contracts enable cities to coordinate emergency first responders, 

public health systems, and hospitals to better respond to the needs of 

their citizens in times of crisis.

$10 million

93.204 Surveillance of hazardous 

substance emergency 

events

To assist state health departments in developing a state-based 

surveillance system to monitor hazardous substance emergency 

events and public health impact. The Hazardous Substances and 

Emergency Events Surveillance Program, managed by the Agency for 

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry’s Division of Health Studies, 

provides data to show what the health impacts have been of previous 

hazardous material releases, which could be used in preparing threat 

assessments. 

$1.5 million

CFDA Number

Assistance program grant 

title Purpose

FY 2002 

funding

81.106 Transport of Transuranic 

wastes to the Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant: States 

and tribal concerns, 

proposed solutions

Financial assistance is provided to support cooperation among the 

tribes, the southern, western, and midwestern states on the Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant corridors, and DOE in developing plans and 

procedures for the safe and uneventful transportation of transuranic 

waste from current temporary storage facilities to the plant. 

Restrictions on the use of funds depends on the specific collaborative 

agreement. According to DOE officials, applicants must meet the 

guidelines established by DOE.

$3.2 million
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Available Resources to Assist Local First 

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Page 71 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Private Organizations 

Also Play a Role in 

Emergency Response 

to Hazardous Material 

Incidents

Rail and chemical companies, both through their member organizations 

and individually, participate in a variety of outreach efforts to better 

prepare local emergency responders for hazardous material transportation 

incidents. Key private efforts include the Transportation Community 

Awareness Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER), the Chemical 

Transportation Emergency Center (CHEMTREC), and the Operation 

Respond Emergency Information System (OREIS). Individual rail and 

chemical companies also work with local communities to prepare for 

hazardous material rail incidents through their participation in drills and 

sharing of emergency response plans. 

Transportation Community 

Awareness Response 

Program Helps Prepare 

Local Communities for 

Hazardous Material 

Transportation Incidents

The American Chemistry Council; the Association of American Railroads; 

Chemical Education Foundation; National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc.; and 

the Chlorine Institute sponsor the TRANSCAER program to provide 

support to communities in preparation for transportation emergencies 

involving hazardous materials. TRANSCAER is supported through sponsor 

resources as well as monetary and in-kind contributions. TRANSCAER 

sponsors are directed to engage in a variety of activities with local 

communities to improve response capabilities in the event of a hazardous 

material transportation incident, including establishing contact with 

LEPCs, reviewing existing LEPC emergency response plans, assisting 

LEPCs with the establishment of transportation advisory groups, assisting 

LEPCs with the implementation of transportation flow studies, and 

participating in local emergency response training exercises.

24-hour Emergency 

Response Information Is 

Available to First 

Responders 

CHEMTREC is a public service of the chemistry industry that provides 

services to shippers of hazardous materials, including a 24-hour, 7-day a 

week emergency call center that provides emergency response information 

in the event of a hazardous material incident. CHEMTREC was established 

in 1971 by the chemical industry as a public service hotline for firefighters, 

law enforcement, and other emergency responders to obtain information 

and assistance for emergency incidents involving chemicals and hazardous 

materials. If an accident occurs, an emergency responder can call 

CHEMTREC for information on the product being shipped. 
Appendix V

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Available Resources to Assist Local First 

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Page 72 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

First Responders Can 

Access Database of Rail 

Carriers in the Event of a 

Hazardous Material Incident

The rail transportation industry supports OREIS, a software system 

designed for use in passenger train and hazardous material incidents that 

connects first responders to the databases of railroad and motor carriers to 

allow them to obtain information quickly and accurately on the specific 

types of hazardous materials that may be involved in an incident and how 

these materials should be handled. All Class I railroads in the United States 

and Canada and several short line and regional railroads participate in the 

program. The program can be accessed over the Internet or with a 

computer software package. Operation Respond is a not-for-profit 

institution that distributes OREIS software and assists localities and 

transportation companies during a transportation emergency.

Individual Rail and 

Chemical Shipping 

Companies Participate in 

Local Emergency Response 

Activities

In addition to the industry-wide outreach initiatives discussed above, 

individual rail and chemical shipping companies work with local 

communities to develop preparedness for hazardous material incidents. 

For example, rail company officials that we interviewed said that they 

participated in preparedness drills, provided communities with emergency 

response guidelines, and participated in local emergency planning 

committee activities. Rail and chemical shipping company representatives 

also told us that they have hazardous material teams available on an on-call 

basis to travel to the scene of an incident to assist local communities in 

response.

Cooperative relationships between private sector industry and local 

communities to improve preparedness may be formalized or ad hoc. For 

example, in some cities, mutual aid agreements are used to leverage 

industry technical expertise to assist a community in responding in the 

event of an incident. In some cases, there are less formal relationships 

where rail companies provide copies of their emergency response plans to 

communities and meet with local officials only as the need arises. Overall, 

in our case study visits to 10 cities, we found that most cities had informal 

emergency response relationships with private sector industry, where 

resources were leveraged when needed.

Multiple Standards and 

Guidelines of 

Preparedness Exist

A variety of standards and self-assessment tools are available for local 

communities to address their own preparedness needs for hazardous 

material incidents. Some standards are focused on general emergency 

preparedness, while others are specific to preparing for and responding to 

hazardous material incidents or weapons of mass destruction events. 
Appendix V

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Page 73 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

These standards come from several federal agencies and private 

organizations. However, the use of these standards is voluntary and not 

required by federal regulations, and local communities adopt their use 

based on individual needs. Our research identified a variety of emergency 

preparedness standards that have been adopted by local communities to 

respond to and prepare for hazardous material incidents by rail. These 

standards are described in the next section. 

National Fire Protection 

Association Standards

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is an international 

nonprofit organization that promotes fire safety through the consensus 

development of scientifically-based codes, standards, training, and 

education. There are three NFPA standards related to hazardous material 

incident response, with a fourth related standard for emergency 

management. The standards are as follows: 

• Recommended Practices for Responding to Hazardous Materials 

Incidents (NFPA Standard 471) outlines recommended procedures for 

all organizations responsible for responding to incidents involving 

hazardous materials. These recommended practices include conducting 

annual training exercises to determine the adequacy and effectiveness 

of hazardous material emergency plans and updating hazardous 

material emergency response plans on an annual basis.

• Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous 

Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 472) identifies the levels of 

competency required of responders to hazardous materials incidents. 

The standard defines four different levels of first responders, including 

the awareness level, operational level, technician level, and incident 

commander level as well as the types of competencies expected at each 

of these first responder levels.

• Standard for Competencies for Emergency Medical Services Personnel 

Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents (NFPA Standard 473) 

identifies the levels of competency required of emergency medical 

service personnel who respond to hazardous material incidents.

• Standards on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity 

Programs (NFPA Standard 1600) establishes minimum criteria for 

disaster/emergency management. The standards provide common 

program elements, techniques, and processes for disaster/emergency 

management planning and operations in the private and public sectors.
Appendix V

Emergency Response Procedures and 

Available Resources to Assist Local First 

Responders

Page 74 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration 

Worker Protection Standard

The OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

Standard establishes worker protection standards for emergency 

responders to hazardous material incidents. The standard provides 

• procedures for handling emergency response, 

• training requirements (including refresher training), and 

• procedures for postemergency response operation.

EPA Hazardous Material 

Team Planning Guidance

EPA’s hazardous material team-planning guidance provides assistance to 

local fire departments in identifying, acquiring, and maintaining the 

hazardous material response equipment and trained personnel appropriate 

for their locale. This manual provides guidance on

• determining requirements for hazardous material response,

• establishing the necessary level of expertise to meet those requirements,

• developing cost estimates for emergency response budget needs, and

• preparing emergency response and standard operating procedures to 

include all participants in a local response community. 

Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Vulnerability 

Assessment and Training 

Standards 

In order to receive grant funds from DHS’ Office of Domestic Preparedness 

(which was formerly part of the Department of Justice) for weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) preparedness, states are required to complete a 

vulnerability assessment to benchmark a current vulnerability profile with 

regard to a WMD terrorist incident. In addition, in August 2002, the Office 

of Domestic Preparedness issued new guidelines to assist first responders 

in determining their training needs and improve their performance to 

respond to a WMD terrorist incident. 

HHS Guidance on Managing 

Hazardous Materials 

Incidents 

HHS has developed a three-volume series of guidelines entitled Managing 

Hazardous Materials Incidents to help emergency response and health 

care professionals plan for and respond to hazardous material 

emergencies. Volumes I and II are generic planning guides to assist first 

responders and hospital personnel to plan for incidents that involve 
Appendix V

Emergency Response Procedures and 

Available Resources to Assist Local First 

Responders

Page 75 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

hazardous materials. Examples of the types of guidance offered include 

appropriate personal protection equipment and suggested patient 

decontamination procedures. HHS is also developing training in incident 

stress management. Volume III is a guide for health care professionals who 

treat individuals who have been exposed to hazardous materials. Volume 

III describes 51 specific chemical protocols that provide recommendations 

for the on-scene and hospital medical management of patients exposed 

during a hazardous material incident. 

State Capability Assessment 

for Readiness 

In 1996, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations asked the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is now part of DHS’ EP&R 

Directorate, to develop a system of performance criteria that measures 

emergency management capabilities and operational readiness throughout 

the United States. The State Capability Assessment for Readiness is the 

EP&R Directorate’s yearly status report on this effort. States self-assess 

their level of capability for 13 emergency management functions, such as 

hazard identification, risk assessment, and hazard mitigation, and the 

results are aggregated. 

Officials from the EP&R Directorate told us they are working with the 

National Emergency Management Association and the International 

Association of Emergency Management to develop a local assessment tool 

that will provide local emergency managers the opportunity to evaluate 

their emergency management programs. According to EP&R Directorate 

officials, the local assessment tool is designed to complement a state’s 

assessment tool to provide more accurate results. The EP&R Directorate 

has completed a draft of this document and it is currently under review by 

the National Emergency Management Association, the International 

Association of Emergency Management, states, and other organizations.

Emergency Management 

Accreditation Program 

Standards

The Emergency Management Accreditation Program is a voluntary 

accreditation process for state and local programs responsible for disaster 

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. An independent team of 

emergency managers assesses states and local communities to determine 

whether their emergency response programs meet national standards. 

These standards are based on NFPA Standard 1600 for emergency 

management and business continuity programs and adapts them 

specifically for state and local use. 
Page 76 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix VI

Letter from the Federal Railroad 

Administration, May 28, 2003 ApenVdxiI
Appendix VI

Letter from the Federal Railroad 

Administration, May 28, 2003

Page 77 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security
Page 78 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security

Appendix VII

GAO Response to Federal Railroad 

Administration Letter ApenVdxiI
Appendix VII

GAO Response to Federal Railroad 

Administration Letter

(545010) Page 79 GAO-03-435 Rail Safety and Security
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