MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 103 Docket: Yor

- 19

- 280 Argued : May 11,	2020 Decided: August	11,	2020 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , HUMPHREY, HORTON,	and	CONNORS, JJ ., and	HJELM,	A.R.J

. Majority : MEAD,	GORMAN, and HUMPHREY,	JJ .,	and	HJELM,	A.R.J

. Dissent : HORTON ,	JABAR,	and	CONNORS,	JJ

.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v. EMANUEL	J.	SLOBODA

GORMAN ,	J. [¶1] Emanuel	 J.	 Sloboda	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction for violating	 a	 condition	 of	 release	 (Class	 C), 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 1092(1)(B)	 (2020) , entered	by	 the	 trial	court	 (York	County, Douglas,	J. )	after	a	jury

- waived	 trial. Sloboda	 contends	 that	 the	 court	 lacked subject	 matter	 jurisdiction over	 his prosecution	because	 the violation at	issue occurred	in	New	Hampshire. 1 We
agree , vacate	the	conviction ,	and	remand for	dismiss al	of	the	indictment

.

1 Briefs	of	amic i curiae	were	submitted	by	the	Office	of	the	Maine	Attorney	General;	AEquitas;	and Lawrence	C.	Winger,	Esq.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] In	201 9 ,	Sloboda	was	indicted	 for	violating	a	co ndition	of	release (Class	 C),	 15	M.R.S.	 §	 1092(1)(B),	 to	which	 he	 pleaded	 not	 guilty. 2 During	 a

one - day	 jury

- waived	 trial	 on	 the	 indictment, Sloboda	 challenged	 the	 court’s subject	matter	jurisdiction	based	on	the	fact	that	his	alleged	violation	occurred outside	 Maine, in	 New	 Hampshire. Among	 its	 findings	 and	 conclusions rendered	at	the	end	of	the	trial ,	t he	court d e termined that	it	had	jurisdiction. [¶ 3 ] The	 court also found,	 based	 on	 competent	 record	 evidence,	 that Sloboda	was	on	preconviction	bail, a	condition	of	which	was	 that	he	have	no direct	or	indirect	contact	with a particular individual ,	when,	on	November	25, 2018,	he	violated	that	condition	by	having	contact	with	th at individual at a	store in	Rochester,	New	Hampshire. Based	on	these	facts,	t he	court	found	Sloboda

2 Sloboda	was	also	charged	with	aggravated	assault	(Class	A),	17

- A	M.R.S.	§§	208(1)(C),	1252(4

- A) (2018);	 domestic	 violence	 assault	 (Class	 C),	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 207

- A(1)(A)	 (2020);	 17

- A M.R.S. § 1252(4

- A);	 and	 two	 additional	 counts	 of	 violating	 a	 condition	 of release	 (Class	 C),	 15	 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B)	(2020).		Section	208	has	since	been	amended,	P.L.	2019,	ch.	91,	§	1	(effective	Sept.	19, 2019),	and	section	1252	has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced,	P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§	A

- 1	(emergency, effective	May	16,	2019)	( codified	at	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1604	(2020)),	but	these	subsequent	enactments	do not	affect	this	appeal. The	State	dismissed	the	charges	of	aggravated	assault,	domestic	assault,	and	one	count	of	violating a	condition	of	release.		Sloboda	was	found	not	guilty	of the	other	charge	of	violating	a	condition	of release.		None	of	these	charges	is	at	issue	in	the	present	appeal.3 guilty	of	 the	offense	and	sentenced him to serve six	months	in	jail. 3 Sloboda timely	appeals. See 15	M.R.S.	§	2115	(20 20 ) ;	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 4 ] Sloboda	 contends	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 lacked	 subject	 matter jurisdiction	because the	court	found	that	he violated	the	condition	of	release	in New	Hampshire.		We	review	de	novo	the	trial	court’s	subject	matter	jurisdiction by	interpreting	 the	criminal	juris diction	 statute, 17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	7	 (20 20 )

. See State	v.	McLaughlin ,	2018 ME	97,	¶	9,	189 A.3d	262 ; State	v.	St.	Onge ,	2011	ME 73,	 ¶	 13,	 21	 A.3d	 1028 ; see	 also M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 12(b)(2); State	 v.	 Liberty , 2004 ME	 88,	 ¶	 7,	 853 A.2d	 760 (stating	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 trial	 court’s jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any	time during	the	pendency	of	the	proceeding ). We	first interpret the	provision in	accordance	with its	unambiguous	meaning based	on	the	plain	language	of	the	statute

. See McLau ghlin ,	2018	ME	97,	¶	9, 189	A.3d	262. [¶ 5 ] A trial	court’s “ [ t ] erritorial” criminal	jurisdiction	is	limited	 to	 the seven	bases	for	which	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)	provides:
1. Except	as	otherwise	provided	in	this	section,	a	person	may be	convicted	under	the	laws	of	this	State	for	any	crime	committed

3 The	 judgment	 and	 commitment	 incorrectly	 reflects	 that	 the	 findings	 were	 reached	 by	 jury verdict	rather	than	by	the	court’s	determination,	that	Sloboda	pleaded	guilty	to	the	charge,	and	that Sloboda	was	convicted	of	a	second	count	of	violating	a	condition of	release.4 by	the	person’s	own	conduct	or	by	the	conduct	of	another	for	which the	person	is	legally	accountable	only	if:
A. Either	the	conduct	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	or	the result	that	is	such	an	element	occurs	within	this	State	or	has a	territorial	relationship	to	this	State;
B. Conduct	 occurring	 outside	 this	 State	 constitutes	 an attempt	to	commit	a	crime	under	the laws	of	this	State	and the	intent	is	that	the	crime	take	place	within	this	State;
C. Conduct	 occurring	 outside	 this	 State	 would	 constitute	 a criminal	conspiracy	under	the	laws	of	this	State,	an	overt	act in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy	occurs	within	 this State	or has	a	 territorial	relationship	 to	 this	State,	and	 the	object	of the	conspiracy	is	that	a	crime	take	place	within	this	State;
D. Conduct	occurring	within	this	State	or	having	a	territorial relationship	to	this	State	would	constitute	complicity	in the commission	 of,	 or	 an	 attempt,	 solicitation	 or	 conspiracy	 to commit	an	offense	in	another	jurisdiction	that	is	also	a	crime under	the	law	of	this	State;
E. The	 crime	 consists	 of	 the	 omission	 to	 perform	 a	 duty imposed	on	a	person	by	 the	law	of	 this	Sta te,	regardless	of where	that	person	is	when	the	omission	occurs;
F. The	crime	is	based	on	a	statute	of	this	State	that	expressly prohibits	conduct	outside	the	State,	when	the	person	knows or	should	know	that	the	person’s	conduct	affects	an	interest of	the State	protected	by	that	statute;	or
G. Jurisdiction	is	otherwise	provided	by	law.
See Ginn	v.	Penobscot	Co. ,	342	A.2d	270,	274	(Me.	1975) (“The	court	is	created by	statute,	and	has	that	jurisdiction	only	which	the	statute	has	conferred	upon5 it,	and	that is	a	limited	jurisdiction.		It	has	no	other	authority.”	(quotation	marks omitted)); State	v.	Baldwin ,	305	A.2d	555,	559	(Me.	1973) (“It	is	elementary law that	the	statutes	of	a	state	have	no	extra

- territorial	force,	nor	do	its	courts	have any	 jurisdiction of	 offenses	 committed	 in	 other	 states	 or	 foreign	 countries.” (quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶ 6 ] Viewed	most	simply ,	s ection	7(1)(A)	sets	out	four	alternatives	by which	a	Maine	court	has	subject	matter	jurisdiction	in	a	criminal	matter:	when (1)	 conduct that	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 has	 a	 territorial	 relationship	 to Maine,	(2)	the	result	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	has	a	territorial	relationship to	 Maine,	 (3) conduct	 that	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 occurred	 in	 Maine,	 or (4) the	result	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	occurred	in	Maine.		The	court	found jurisdiction	 in	 this	 matter	 based specifically on	 one	 of	 the	 territorial relationship	alternatives ;	it	determined that	Maine	had	a	sufficient	nexus	to	the
crime because the	 rele vant	 bail	 condition	 that	 Sloboda	 was	 alleged	 to	 have violated	was	issued	in	Maine	as	to	an	underlying	crime	committed	in	Maine.		As
17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	7(4)	 states,	however,	 territorial	 relationship	jurisdiction exists only	when	it	is	impossible	to	determine	whe re	the	conduct	occurred	in	relation to	the	state	boundary	line:
4. Conduct	 or	 a	 result	 has	 a	 territorial	 relationship	 to	 this State	if	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt6 that	it	occurred	inside	or	outside	of	this	State,	because	a	b oundary cannot	be	precisely	located	or	the	location	of	any	person	cannot	be precisely	 established	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 boundary,	 and	 if	 the	 court determines	that	this	State	has	a	substantial	interest	in	prohibiting the	 conduct	 or	 result.	 In	 determining	 whether this	 State	 has	 a substantial	interest,	the	court	shall	consider	the	following	factors:
A. The	relationship	to	this	State	of	the	actor	or	actors	and	of persons	 affected	 by	 the	 conduct	 or	 result,	 whether	 as citizens,	residents	or	visitors;
B. The	location	of	the	actor	or	actors	and	persons	affected	by the	conduct	or	result	prior	to	and	after	the	conduct	or	result;
C. The	 place	 in	 which	 other	 crimes,	 if	 any,	 in	 the	 same criminal	episode	were	committed;	and
D. The	 place	 in	 which	 the	 intent	 to commit	 the	 crime	 was formed. Because,	based	 on	 the	court’s	supported	 findings,	it is possible	 to	determine precisely	 where	 Sloboda’s	 conduct	 occurred,	 the	 territorial	 relationship	 of Sloboda’s	crime	to	Maine	provides	no	basis	for	jurisdiction. See State v.	Collin , 1997	 ME	 6,	 ¶	 10,	 687	 A.2d	 962 (vacating	 the	 trial	 court’s	 employment	 of territorial	 relationship	 jurisdiction	 because	 there	 was	 no	 “reasonable	 doubt about	the	location	of	a	boundary	or	the	location	of	a	person	in	relation	to	the boundary”	and	n oting	that	“[t]he	state’s	substantial	interest	in	prohibiting	the conduct	 is	 not	 sufficient	 by	 itself	 to	 support	 a	 finding	 of	 a	 territorial7 relationship”). The	court’s	reliance	on	territorial	relationship	jurisdiction	was therefore	error. [¶ 7 ] T he State argues that ,	 despite	 this	 error,	 we	 should	 affirm	 the conviction	because the	court	had	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	one	of	the	other	two alternatives	in	section	7(1)(A)	based	on	where	the	conduct	or	result	element occurred. We	therefore	consider	what	constit utes	a	conduct	element	or	a	result element. [¶ 8 ] Title 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	32	(20 20 ) organizes	the	elements	of	a	crime	into four	categories:	“the	forbidden	conduct;	the	attendant	circumstances	specified in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 crime;	 the	 intention,	 knowledge ,	 recklessness	 or negligence	 as	 may	 be	 required;	 and	 any	 required	 result .” 4 A	 state

- of

- mind element	 is	 statutorily	 defined	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 mental	 processes	 of	 the defendant

— i.e.,	the	defendant’s	awareness	of	a	risk	or	whether	the	defendant has	a	 “co nscious	 object.” 17

- A M.R.S.	 §	 35	 (20 20 ) (defining	 “[i]ntentionally,” “[k]nowingly,”	 “[r]ecklessly,”	 and	 “[c]riminal	 negligence”).	 	 This	 is distinguished	from	the	“conduct”	category	of	elements,	which	is	the	only	one among	 the	 four in	 section	 32 that	 could	 reasonably	 be	 read	 to	 refer	 to	 the defendant’s	physical	actions. See Model	Penal	Code	§	1.13(5)	(Am.	 Law	 Inst.

4 We	will	use	the	phrase	“state

- of

- mind”	to	discuss	the	third	element.8 1962) (defining	“conduct”	as	“an	action	or	omission	and	its	accompanying	state of	 mind,	 or,	 where	 relevant,	 a	 series	 of	 acts	 and	 omi ssions”); Conduct ,	 New Oxford	American	Dictionary	(3d	ed.	2010)	(stating	that	“conduct”	means	“the manner	in	which	a	person	behaves”); see	also State	v.	Lindell ,	2020	ME	49,	¶	19,

--- A.3d

--- (concluding	that	“the	jury	was	entitled	to	interpret	[‘conduct’ ]	within its	common	meaning”); State	v.	Gladu ,	2014	ME	23,	¶	9,	86	A.3d	1182 (stating that,	“as	a	general	rule,	words	and	phrases	that	are	not	expressly	defined	in	a statute	must	be	given	their	plain	and	natural	meaning	and	should	be	construed according	to their	natural	import	in	common	and	approved	usage,”	including according	to	dictionary	definitions	(quotation	marks	omitted)). [¶ 9 ] A ttendant	circumstances elements refer	to	factors	such	as	the	status of	a	defendant,	the	age	or	other	attributes	of	the	victim,	or	the	existence	of	prior convictions	that	increase	the	class	of	a	crime. See State	v.	Sumulikoski ,	110	A.3d 856, 858, 862

- 64	 (N.J.	 2015) (holding	 that	 the	 fact that	 the	 defendant	 had assumed	 responsibility	 for	 the	 victims	 as	 chaperone	 for	 a	 school	 trip constituted	 an	 attendant	 circumstance	 rather	 than	 conduct,	 and	 defining “status”	 as	 “a	 person’s	 legal	 condition,	 whether	 personal	 or	 proprietary;	 the sum	total	of a	person’s	legal	rights,	duties,	liabilities,	and	other	legal	relations” ( alteratio n	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted)); Attendant ,	 New	 Oxford9 American	 Dictionary	 (3d	 ed.	 2010)	 (“occurring	 with	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of; accompanying”); Circumstance ,	New	Oxford American	Dictionary	(3d	ed.	2010) (“a	fact	or	condition	connected	with	or	relevant	to	an	event	or	action”). [¶1 0 ] As	to	the	result	element ,	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	33	(20 20 ) provides,	“Unless otherwise	provided,	when	causing	a	result	is	an	element	of	a	crime,	causa tion may	be	found	when	the	result	would	not	have	occurred	but	for	the	conduct	of the	 defendant,	 operating	 either	 alone	 or	 concurrently	 with	 another	 cause.” Thus,	a	result	element	is	one	that	requires	the	defendant	to	have	caused	some specified	harm or	oth er	outcome

. See	Result ,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary (3d	ed.	2010)	(“a	consequence,	effect,	or	outcome	of	something”). [¶1 1 ] Interpreting	 section	 7(1)(A)	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 section	 32 reveals that	 not	 all	 elements of	 a	 crime are	 relevant	 to	 jurisdiction.	 	 Only conduct	elements	and	result	elements	affect	subject	matter	jurisdiction;	if	only an	 attendant	 circumstances	 element	 or a	 state
- of

- mind element	 occurs	 in Maine,	Maine	has	no	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	section	7(1)(A). For example,	if a defendant	with	a Maine felony	conviction then	obtained possession	of	a	firearm in	 New	 Hampshire, Maine	 would	 not	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crime committed	 by	 the	 defendant	 because	 only	 the defendant’s	 underlying	 felony

status

— the	attendant c ircumstance

— occurred	in	Maine

.10 [¶1 2 ] In	order	to	determine	which	elements	of	the	crime	of violating	a condition	of	release should	be	considered	in	determining	Maine’s	jurisdiction,

we determine in	which	category

— conduct,	result,	state

- of

- mind,	and	atten dant
circumstances

— those	 elements belong

. Violation	 of	 a	 condition	 of	 release requires	proof	that	the	defendant	is	on	preconviction	or	postconviction	bail	at the	 time	 that	 he	 or	 she	 “in	 fact,	 violates	 a	 condition	 of	 release.” 15	 M.R.S. § 1092(1)	(20 20 ) ; see State	v.	Le B lanc

- Simpson ,	2018	ME	109,	¶	17,	190 A.3d 1015 .		It	is	a	Class	C	crime	when	the	underlying charge on	which	the	defendant was	bailed	was	“punishable	by	a	maximum	period	of	imprisonment	of	one	year or	more	and	the	condition	of	release	violate d	is	one	specified	in	section	1026, subsection	3,	paragraph	A,	 subparagraph	 (5),	 (8),	 (10

- A)	 or	 (13).”		15	M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B).	 	 Violation	 of	 a	 condition	 of	 release	 is	 a	 strict	 liability	 crime, 15 M.R.S.	§	1092(3), meaning	no	proof	of	a	culpable	state	of	m ind	is	required, but	 the	 State	must	 establish	 that	 the	 defendant	 “had	 prior	 knowledge	 of	 the relevant	conditions	of	release.” Le B lanc

- Simpson ,	2018 ME	109,	¶	18,	190	A.3d 1015. [¶1 3 ] As	discussed	above,	the	State	charged Sloboda	with	a violation	of

a	con dition	of	release based	on	its allegations that	(1)	Sloboda	was	subject	to preconviction	bail	on	November	25,	2018 , that	required	him	to	have	no	contact11 with	 certain	 individuals ; (2) the	 underlying	 bail	 was	 for a	 burglary	 charge (Class	B), 17

- A M.R.S.	§ 401(1)(B)(4)	(2020) ,	punishable	by	up	to	ten	years	in prison , see 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1252(2)(B)	 (2018);	 and (3) he	 violated	 the	 bail	 by having	contact	with	one	of	the	prohibited	individual s . Two of	these	elements

— that	 Sloboda	was	 subject	 to a preconviction	 bai l	 condition	 on	November	 25, 2018,	that required	him	to have	no	contact	with a	particular	individual,	and that the	underlying charge on	which	he	was	bailed	was	for	burglary,	punishable	by up	 to	 ten	 years	 in	 prison

— constitute	 attendant	 circumstances	 elements pursuant	to	section	32.		15	M.R.S.	§	1092(1)(B). The requirement	that	Sloboda had	prior	knowledge	that	he	was	subject	to	that	condition	of	release is either a
state
- of

- mind element or	an	attendant	circumstances	element,	but we	need	not determine	which	be cause the	fact	that his knowledge	of	the	condition may	have occurred	in	Maine	is	irrelevant	to	a	jurisdiction	analysis	pursuant	to	the	plain language	of	section	7(1)(A)

. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	32

. [¶1 4 ] The	conduct	element	in	Sloboda’s	crime	is	the	act	of	having	contact with	the	victim,	and	the	court	found,	based	on	competent	record	evidence,	that such	conduct	occurred	only	in	New	Hampshire.		Thus,	the	location	of	Sloboda’s conduct	is	no	basis	for	the	cou rt’s	jurisdiction	in	Maine.12 [¶1 5 ] The	only	remaining	source	of	jurisdiction

— and	the	alternative	to which	 the	 parties	 dedicate	 their	 arguments

— is	 if	 the	 crime	 of	 violation	 of	 a condition	of	release	requires	proof	of	a	result	element	and	that	result	occur red
in	Maine. 5 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A). [¶1 6 ] The	State	contends	that	a	result	element	exists	in	the	requirement that	Sloboda’s	contact	with	the	victim	“in	fact,	violates	a	condition	of	release , ”
in	Maine. T hat	is, the	State	argues	that although the	defendant’s conduct was the	contact	with	the	victim	in	New	Hampshire,	the result was	a	bail	violation	in Maine	because	Sloboda	was	not	subject	to	a	bail	order	in	New	Hampshire	and

5 Section	7	contains	additional	limitations	applicable	to	jurisdiction	based	on	the	location	of	a result	that	is	an	element:
2. Subsection	1,	paragraph	A	does	not	ap ply	if:
A. Causing	a	particular	result	or	danger	of	causing	that	result	is	an	element	and	the result	occurs	or	is	designed	or	likely	to	occur	only	in	another	jurisdiction	where	the conduct	charged	would	not	constitute	an	offense;	or
B. Causing	a	particu lar	result	is	an	element	of	the	crime	and	the	result	is	caused	by conduct	occurring	outside	the	State	which	would	not	constitute	an	offense	if	the	result had	occurred	there.
17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(2)	(2020).		By	these	exclusions,	Maine	has	no	jurisdiction	if	a	b ail	violation	“would not	constitute	an	offense”	in	New	Hampshire.		17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(2)(A)

- (B).		These	exclusions	do	not apply	 in	 the	 instant	 matter	 because	 violating	 a	 bail	 condition is an	 offense	 in	 New	 Hampshire. Although	it	is	not	a	crime	pursuant	to	Ne w	Hampshire	statute,	the	New	Hampshire	Supreme	Court has	held	that	violating	a	bail	condition	constitutes	criminal	contempt,	which	is	a	common	law	crime punishable	by	 fines	 or	imprisonment. State	v.	Smith ,	35 A.3d	646,	649

- 50	(N.H.	2011)	 (“We	have express ly	rejected	the	argument	that	contempt	is	not	a	crime	simply	because	it	is	not	defined	in	the Criminal	Code.”); State	v.	Nott ,	821	A.2d	976,	978	(N.H.	2003)	(holding	that	“violation	of	a	bail	order” constitutes	“criminal	contempt”); State	v.	Martina ,	600 A .2d	132,	137

- 38	(N.H.	1991)	(requiring	that the	State	must	prove	criminal	contempt	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	and	noting	 that	 the	 resulting “imposition	of	a	fine	or	imprisonment	is	punitive	rather	than	remedial”	(quotation	marks	omitted)).13 it	was	Maine’s	bail	order	that	Sloboda	“in	fact,	violate[d]”	by	having contact	with the	 victim. 15 M.R.S.	 § 1092(1). Contrary	 to	 the	 State’s	 assertion,	 however, section	1092(1)(B)	has	no	result	element. As	we	have	already	concluded,	t he fact	 that	 the	 defendant	 was	 on	 preconviction	 or	 postconviction	 bail	 is	 not	 a result	 ele ment .	 	 It is	 instead	 an	 attendant	 circumstance	 element.	 	 Thus,	 the State’s	 argument	 fails	 because	 jurisdiction	 cannot	 be	 conveyed	 pursuant	 to section	 7(1)(A)	 based	 on	 the	 locus	 of	 an	 attendant	 circumstance. See Sumulikoski ,	110	A.3d	at	862	(“[A]	defendant ’s	status	alone	does	not	provide	a basis for jurisdiction.”). [¶1 7 ] Although	there	are myriad	criminal	statutes	that	expressly	require proof	of	a	particular	harm or	result caused	by	the	defendant, 6 the	plain	language of	section	1092(1)(B)	does	not	requi re	any	particular	harm.		The	requirement in	 section	 1092(1)(B) that	 Sloboda	 “in	 fact,	 violates	 a	 condition	 of	 release” refers both to	 the conduct element,	which,	it	is	undisputed,	 occurred	in	New

6 See,	e.g. ,	17

- A	M.R.S.	 §	201(1)(A)	(2020)	(defining	murder	 to	include	 “caus[ing]	 the	death	of another	human	being”);	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	454(1)(A)	(2020)	(including,	as	an	element	of	tampering	with a	witness,	that	the	defendant	“[i]nduces	or	otherwise	causes	.	.	.	a	witness	. .	.	[t]o	testify	or	inform	in a	manner	the	actor	knows	to	be	false”);	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	501

- A(1)(A)(1)	(2020)	(stating	that	one	means of	committing	disorderly	conduct	is	by	“caus[ing]	annoyance	to	others	by	intentionally	.	.	.	[m]aking loud	and	unreasonable	n oises”);	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	703(1)(B)	(2020)	(setting	out	the	elements	of	forgery, including	that	the	defendant	“causes	another,	by	deception,	to	sign	or	execute	a	written	instrument”); 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	805(1)(C)	(2020)	(providing,	as	an	element	of	aggravated	crim inal	mischief,	that	the defendant’s	 act	 “thereby	 causes	 a	 substantial	 interruption	 or	 impairment	 of	 [gas,	 water, transportation,	etc.]	service	rendered	to	the	public”);	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	1002

- A(1)(A)	(2020)	(stating	that the	criminal	use	of	laser	pointers	is	c ommitted	when,	inter	alia,	the	defendant’s	use	of	a	laser	pointer “[c]auses	bodily	injury	to	[an]other	person”).14 Hampshire ,	and to the	attendant	circumstances	element,	which	cannot	confer jurisdiction

. [¶1 8 ] Pursuant	to	the	unambiguous	language	of	section	7(1)(A) ,	only	the occurrence	 of	 the	 conduct	 or	 the	 result	 elements	in	Maine	will	 afford	Maine jurisdiction .		Because Sloboda’s	co nduct	occurred	in	New	Hampshire	and	his offense	contains	no	 result	element,	 section	7(1)(A) provides no basis	 for	 the court’s	exercise	of subject	matter	jurisdiction	over	Sloboda’s	prosecution. This conclusion	is	also	consistent	with	the	holding	in Collin ,	in	which the	defendant was	convicted	of	 theft	by	receiving	stolen	property	 that	belonged	 to	a	victim from Maine. 1997	ME	6,	¶ ¶ 2

- 4 ,	687	A.2d	962.		Although	the	defendant acted only in	Canada,	the	State	argued	that Maine	had	jurisdiction	to	prosecute	him because the	result	of	the	theft	was	to	deprive	a	Maine	company	of	its	property. Id. ¶ ¶ 3, 11.		We	declined	to	apply	section	7(1)(A)	because	the	asserted	result

— loss	to	the	victim

— was	not	an	element	of the	crime	of theft	by	receiving	stolen property,	and, therefore,	the	fact	that	the	victim	was	in	Maine	was	“irrelevant.” 7 Collin ,	1997 ME	6,	¶	11,	687	A.2d	962.

7 This	is	unlike	the	analysis	employed	in	those	states	whose	statutes	provide	for	jurisdiction	when the	result	occurs	in	that	state	but	that	d o	not	require	that	the	result	be	an	element	of	the	crime.		In Arizona,	 for	 example,	 the	 legislature	 has	 “maximize[d]	 the	 reach	 of	 its	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 by omitting	 the	 restriction	 that	 the	 result	 occurring	 within	 the	 state	 must	 be	 an	 element	 of	 the off ense. Thus,	under	Arizona	law,	if	[the	defendant’s]	conduct	had	a	direct	effect	in	Arizona,	Arizona can	assert	jurisdiction.” State	v.	Flores ,	188	P.3d	706,	713	(Ariz.	Ct.	App.	2008)	(emphasis	omitted) (citation	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).15 [¶1 9 ] We	also discern no basis	for the	court’s	exercise	of jurisdiction	in the	 other	 sub divisions of	 section	 7.	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and
A E quitas ,	as	amici, suggest	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	section 7(1)(E),	which	applies	when	“[t]he	crime	consists	of	the	omission	to	perform	a duty	imposed	 on	 a	 person	 by	 the	law	 of	 th is	 State,	 regardless	 of	where	 that person	is	when	the	omission	occurs.” 8 By	its	plain	language,	an	“omission”	is	“a failure	 to	do	something.” Omission ,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	(3d	ed. 2010). T he	essence	of	the amici’s argument	is	that	Sloboda	fai led	to	perform his	legal	duty	to	comply	with	the	bail	order by	affirmatively	acting in	violation of	 the	bail	 order. Th is attempted application	 of	 section	7(1)(E)	 to	Sloboda’s prosecution	is ,	however, an	exercise	in	semantic	gymnastics.

8 We	note	that	neither	of	the parties themselves	presented	an	argument	relating	to 17

- A	M.R.S. § 7(1)(E) (2020) ,	either	in	the	trial	court	or in this	appeal ,	and	o nly	two	of	the	amici	have	done	so here.		Ordinarily,	we	will	 recognize	a	contention	 raised	by	a n	amicus	curiae	 only	if	the	issue was raised	in	the	trial	court	and	at	least	one	of	the	parties	also	pursues	the	argument	on	appeal. See	Ross v.	Acadian	Seaplants,	Ltd. ,	2019	ME	45,	¶	5	n.2,	206	A.3d	283 ;	Jacobs	v.	Jacobs ,	507	A.2d	596 ,	597 n.1 (Me.	1986)

. J urisdictional	questions are not hampered	by	these	preservation	principles ,	however, because	jurisdiction	is	foundational. See,	e.g.	Ford	Motor	Co.	v.	Darling’s ,	2014	ME	7,	¶	41,	86	A.3d 3 5 ( stating	that “ the	issue	of	jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any time	in	a	proceeding,	including	sua	sponte by	this	Court”); Guardianship	of	Gabriel	W .,	666	A.2d	505,	507

- 08	(Me.	1995)	(“Lack	of	subject	matter jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any	time , including	in	collateral	proceedings	when	lack of	subject	matter jurisdiction	appears	on	the	face	of	the	record	of	the	judgment	attacked.”	(citation	omitted)); Pederson v.	Cole ,	501 A.2d	23,	25	n.2	(Me.	1985) (“The	defense	of	lack	of	subject

- matter	jurisdiction	may	be raised	at	any	time,	even sua	spont e by	an	appellate	court.”) ; Moody	v.	Port	Clyde	Dev

. Co .,	102	Me.	365, 384 ,	66 A.	967 (1907)	(“The	very	foundation	of	judicial	proceedings	is	jurisdiction.	The	question	of jurisdiction	 may	 therefore	 be	 raised	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 by	 any	 suggesti on	 that	will apprise	the	court	of	the	want	thereof.”). Here,	given	that	we could notice	and	resolve	jurisdictional issues	even	if	not	otherwise	raised	at	all,	and	given	that	the	amici	have	presented	argument	regarding section	7(1)(E)	through	an	establishe d	procedural	mechanism, see M.R.	App.	P. 7A(e) ,	we	consider that	argument.16 [¶ 20 ] We	rejecte d	a	similar	approach	i n State	v.	Branch

- Wear , in	which the	 defendant	 was	 convicted	 of	 tampering	 with	 a	 victim	 by	 preventing	 her daughter	from	testifying	in	a	prosecution. 1997	ME	110,	¶¶ 2

- 6,	695	A.2d	1169

. The	defendant	argued	 that	 the	State	had	impermissibly	prosecuted	her	 for	a crime	of	omission	for	failing	to	meet	her	legal	obligation	of	producing	the	child at	the	trial. Id. ¶	8.		We	characterized	the	defendant’s	argument	as	“a	play	on words,”	 noting that	 the	 “failures	 to	 act”	 that	 the	 defendant	 described	 were instead	“acts	of	evasion	.	.	.	and	deceit	.	.	.	that	caused	her	daughter	to	withhold testimony.” Id. ¶¶	8,	10	(“The	State	and	[the	defendant]	are	looking	at	the	same conduct.		They	are	simply	de scribing	it	differently.”).		We	concluded	 that	 the State	 had	 “presented	 evidence	 of	 a	 crime	 of	 commission,	 not	 voluntary
omission , ”	 in	 the	 defendant’s	 efforts	 to	 keep	 the	 child	 from	 reaching	 the courthouse. Id. ¶ 10. [¶ 2 1] The	 crimes	 of	 omission	 to	 which	 section	 7(1)(E)	 might	 apply instead	 include the failure	 to	 pay taxes	 or child	 support	 due	 in	 Maine,	 for example

— instances	 of	 criminal nonfeasance rather	 than	 any	 affirmative criminal	 act. See Model	 Penal	 Code	 &	 Commentaries § 1.03	 cmt.	 5	 at	 52

- 53 (Am. Law	Inst.	1985); cf.	Lindell ,	2020	ME	49,	¶	25,

--- A.3d

--- (concluding	that17 the	defendant’s	affirmative	conduct	in	falsifying	tax	returns	in	Maine	allowed the	Maine	court	jurisdiction	over	his	prosecution	pursuant	to	section 7(1)(A))

. [¶ 22 ] Our	decision today is	entirely	a	function	of	our	construction	and application	of	 the	jurisdictional	statute	as	 the	Legislature	has	enacted	it.		For the	reasons	we	have	discussed, through	its	enactments , the	Legislature	has	not conferred Maine’s	courts	with	authority	to	adjudicate	the	charge	filed	against Sloboda. In	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 basis	 for	 the	 court’s	 exercise	 of	 jurisdiction pursuant	to	section	7(1),	Sloboda’s	conviction	cannot	stand. 9 [¶ 23 ] Contrary	 to	 the	State’s	suggestion,	however,	our	conclusion	 that Maine	 lacks	 jurisdiction	 to	 prosecute	 Sloboda on	 a	 charge	 of	 violating	 a condition	 of	 release for	 his	 conduct	 in	 New	 Hampshire	 does	 not altogether deprive	Maine	of	a	means	of	enforcing	its	ba il	conditions. Bail	c ondition s	are imposed “in	 order	 to	 reasonably	 ensure	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 defendant	 as required,	 to	otherwise	reasonably	ensure	 the	integrity	of	 the	judicial	process and,	 when	 applicable,	 to	 reasonably	 ensure	 the	 safety	 of	 others	 in the community.” 15 M.R.S.	§	1002 (2020) .		Where,	as	here,	a	defendant	violates	bail conditions

— even	in	New	Hampshire

— Maine is free	to	initiate	bail	revocation proceedings and	 ask	 that	 the	 defendant	be	held pending	 trial

. See 15	M.R.S.

9 Because	we	agree	with	Sloboda	that	the	trial	court	lacked	subject	matter	jurisdiction,	we	do	not address	Sloboda’s	challenge	to	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	supporting	his	co nviction.18 §§ 1095

- 1097	 (2020) .	 	 Moreover, when	 a	 defendant’s	 violation	 of a bail condition constitute s a new criminal	 act

— if, for	 example,	 Sloboda	 had assaulted the	protected	individual

— that	new	criminal	act could	be	prosecuted as	 such	 in	 the	 appropriate	 jurisdiction. This,	 however,	 does	 not	 change	 the conclusion that ,	as	written, the	unambiguous	provisions	of section	7(1)	do	not give	Maine	courts	subject	matter	jurisdiction	in	this	case.		For	us	to	conclude otherwise,	we	would	be	required	to	rewrite	the	statute,	and	th at	we	cannot	do. The	entry	is: Judgment vacated

. Remanded	 for	 entry	 of dismissal of	the	indictment

.

HORTON,	J., with	whom	JABAR	and	CONNORS,	J J .,	join, dissenting. [¶ 24 ] I	 respectfully	 dissent	 from	 the	 Court’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 trial

court lacked	statutory	jurisdiction	to	convict	Emanuel	J.	Sloboda	for	violating the	no

- contact	bail	condition. I	would	affirm	the	conviction	based	on	the	court’s jurisdiction	 over	 the	 subject	matter	 and	 Sloboda’s	 person,	 and	 based	 on	 the sufficiency	of	the	evid ence	to	prove	the	alleged	violation	beyond	a	reasonable doubt.19 [¶ 25 ] Jurisdiction	existed	because	Sloboda’s	failure	to	comply	with	his conditions	of	release	fell	within	the	statutory	provision	conferring	jurisdiction on	the	Maine	courts	to	convict	a	defen dant	of	a	crime	if	“[t]he	crime	consists	of the	omission	to	perform	a	duty	imposed	on	a	person	by	the	law	of	this	State, regardless	 of	 where	 that	 person	 is	 when	 the	 omission	 occurs,” 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 7(1)(E)	(2020) ; see 15	M.R.S.	§	1092	(2020)

. 10 [¶ 26 ] The	ba il	code authorizes	Maine	courts	 to	impose	upon	criminal defendants	 the duty	 to	 comply	 with	 conditions	 of	 release. See 15	 M.R.S. § 1026(1),	 (3)(A)	 (2020) (authorizing	 imposition	 of	 conditions	 of	 release); 15 M.R.S.	 §	 1092	 (criminalizing	 the	 failure	 to	 comp ly	 with	 conditions	 of release).		That	duty	is	“imposed	on	a	person”	for	purposes	of	section	7(1)(E) when	a	court with	jurisdiction	over	the	person issues	a	bail	bond,	commitment order,	and	conditions

- of

- release	form	consistent	with 15	M.R.S.	§	1026	(2020)

. As is	typically	true	of	a duty	imposed	by	court	order,	Sloboda’s	duty	to	comply

10 Although	I	conclude	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction,	I	do	so	on	different	grounds	than	the	trial court. See	Bouchard	v.	Frost ,	2004	ME	9,	¶	8,	840	A.2d	109	(“[W]e	can	affirm	a	judgment	on	rationale different	 than	 that	 relied	 on	 by	 the [trial	 c]ourt.”).	 	 I	 therefore	 do	 not	 address	 the	 trial	 court ’ s conclusion	 that	 it	 had	 jurisdiction	 based	 on	 a	 “territorial	 relationship”	 between	 the	 results	 of Sloboda’s	conduct	and	the S tate	of	Maine. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A),	(4)	(2020).		In	addition, because I	conclude	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction	to	convict	Sloboda	pursuant	to	17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 7(1)(E)	(2020), I	need	not	address	the	State’s	contention	that	the	result	of	Sloboda’s	offense	occurred	in	Maine	and the	court	therefore	had	jurisdiction	pursu ant	to	17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A).		But	I	would	not	foreclose	the possibility	that	section	7(1)(A)	was	intended	to	encompass	results	inherent	in	offenses	that	do	not specify	 a	 certain	 harm. See , e.g. , Brehm	 v.	 State ,	 558	 N.E.2d	 906,	 907

- 09 (Ind.	 Ct.	 App.	 1990) (discussing	a	statute	with	substantively	identical	“result”	language	and	reaching	a	conclusion	similar to	the	one	urged	by	the	State	in	this	case).20 with his bail	 conditions,	 which	 was	 imposed	 by	 a	 court	 having	 personal jurisdiction	over	him, 11 continued	to	apply regardless	of	where	he	was,	within the	meaning	of	section	7 (1)(E)

. See Commonwealth	v.	Maguigan ,	511	A.2d	1327, 1332	(Pa. 1986) (explaining	that	a	criminal court’s	personal	jurisdiction	over an	absent	defendant	includes	the	authority	to	compel	the	defendant	to	return for	 trial).		The	Court’s	observation	 that	 the State	could	or	should	have	 filed	a motion	 to	 revoke	 Sloboda’s	 bail	 instead	 of	 prosecuting	 him	 implicitly acknowledges	 that	 his	 duty	 to	 comply	 with	 bail	 conditions	 applied	 outside
Maine

— otherwise,	there	would	be	no	basis	for	the	State	to	move	to	revoke	bail

. See Court’s	Opinion	¶ 23

. [¶ 27 ]	 	 The	 bail	 bond	 that	 Sloboda	 signed	 included	 the	 following provision:	“As	a	condition	of	my	release,	I shall	comply	with	any	condition(s) set	forth	on	the	Conditions	of	Release	form.” 12 The	attached	commitment	order and	co nditions

- of

- release	form	included	a	condition	prohibiting	contact	with	a specific	 person.	 	 The	 court	 found,	 based	 on	 competent	 evidence	 admitted

11 “It	is	well	settled	that	a	[criminal]	court	has personal jurisdiction	over	any	party	who	appears before it,	regardless	of	how	his	appearance	was	obtained.” United	States	v.	Lussier ,	929	F.2d	25,	27 (1st	Cir.	1991).

12 In	 signing	 the	 bail	 bond,	 Sloboda	 also	 acknowledged:	 “ I	 agree	 to	 obey	 the	 following conditions	of	my	release	so	long	as	this	bail	bond remains	in	effect. I	understand	that	it	is	a	crime for	me	to	violate	any	of	these	conditions,	and	that	if	I	violate	these	conditions	I	will	be	subject	to	arrest, jail	and/or	a	fine .”		( Italic	e mphasis	added.)21 during	 a	 trial,	 that	 Sloboda	 failed	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 no

- contact	 condition. Pursuant	 to	 the	 plain	 language	 of section	 7(1)(E),	 Sloboda’s	 conduct constituted	an “ omission	to	perform”	his	duty	of	compliance. See,	e.g. , State	v. Conroy ,	2020	ME	22,	¶	19,	225	A.3d	1011 (“We	look	first	to	the	plain	language of	the	statute	to	determine	its	meaning	if	we	can	do	so	while	avoiding	absurd, illogical,	or	inconsistent	results.”)

. [¶ 28 ] F ocusing	on	the	affirmative	act	constituting	the	bail	violation, the Court	concludes,	to	the	contrary,	that	Sloboda’s	conduct c ould	no t	constitute	an “omission”	to	perform	a	duty	within	the	meaning	of	section	7(1)(E): The essence	 of	 [the	 argument	 that	 jurisdiction	 exists	 under section 7(1)(E)]	is	that Sloboda failed	to perform	his	legal	duty	to comply	with	the	bail	order by	affirmatively	acting in	violation	of	the bail	 order. Th is attempted	 application	 of	 section	 7(1)(E)	 to Sloboda’s	 prosecution	 is ,	 however, an	 exercise	 in	 semantic gymnastics. Court’s	Opinion	¶ 19 .		Th e	Court	notes	that	“[t]he	crimes	of	omission	to	which section	 7(1)(E)	 might	 apply instead include	 the	 failure	 to	 pay	 taxes	 or	 child support	due	in	Maine,	for	example

— instances	of	criminal	nonfeasance	rather than	any	affirmative	criminal	act.”		Court’s	Opin ion	¶ 21

. [¶ 29 ]		The	Court’s	conclusion	is	inconsistent	with	the	language	of	the	bail code. The	bail	code	defines	all	of	the	conditions	of	release	that	it	authorizes in mandatory	 terms	 so	 as	 to	 create an affirmative	 dut y to	 comply with	 all22 conditions	 of release ,	 even	 when	 the	 substantive	 effect	 of	 a	 condition	 is prohibitory. 13 See 15	M.R.S.	§	1026(3)(A)(1)

- (19).		Indeed,	the	imposition	of	a

no - contact	condition	such	as	the	one	in	this	case	requires	a	defendant	to [a]void	 all	 contact with	 a	 victim	 of	 the	 a lleged	 crime,	 a	 potential witness	 regarding	 the	 alleged	 crime	 or	 with	 any	 other	 family	 or household	members	 of	 the	 victim	 or	 the	defendant	 or	 to	contact those	individuals	only	at	certain	times	or	under	certain	conditions. 15	M.R.S.	§	1026(3)(A)(5)	(emphas is	added). [¶ 30 ]	 	 Thus,	 the	 bail	 code	 defines	 conditions of	 release	 as	 affirmative mandates.		A	failure	to	comply	with	a	bail	condition

— even	a	failure	that	takes the	 form	 of	 an	 affirmative	 act

— must	 therefore	 constitute	 an	 “omission	 to perform	 a	 duty”	 for	 p urposes	 of section 7(1)(E). 14 See State	 v.	 Jones ,

13 For	 example,	 conditions	 that	 restrict	 resid ence	 or	 travel,	 impose	 a	 curfew,	 or	 prohibit possession	 of	 firearms	are	all	defined	in	mandatory	 rather	 than	prohibitory	 terms. See 15	M.R.S. § 1026(3)(A)(4)	(2020)	(“Abide	by	specified	restrictions	on	personal	associations,	place	of	abode	or travel”);	 15 M.R.S.	 § 1026(3)(A)(7)	 (2020)	 (“Comply	 with	 a	 specified	 curfew”);	 15	 M.R.S. § 1026(3)(A)(8)	(2020)	(“Refrain	from	possessing	a	firearm	or	other	dangerous	weapon”).		The	plain effect	of	the	Legislature’s	chosen	phrasing	is	to	create	affirmative	duties	of	c ompliance,	such	that	a failure	to	comply	is	an	omission	to	perform	a	mandated	duty.

14 This	conclusion	is	consistent	with	our	decision	in State	v.	Damon ,	317	A.2d	459	(Me.	1974). There,	we	equated	 the	affirmative	act	of	 “[e]scape	of	 furlough”	with	 the	 “w ilful	 failure	 to	 resume physical	confinement	at	the	Maine	State	Prison.” Id. at	460

- 61.		Courts	in	other	jurisdictions	have also	held,	in	other	contexts,	that	defendants	omitted	to	perform	legal	duties	by	acting	affirmatively, as	opposed	to	by	failing	to act.		The	District	Court	of	Appeal	of	Florida,	for	example,	concluded	that the	 state	 had	 jurisdiction	 to	 convict	 a	 defendant	 of	 the	 affirmative	 criminal	 act	 of	 identity	 theft because	the	crime	constituted	an	omission	to	perform	a	duty	to	obtain	consent	fro m	the	victim. See State	v.	Roberts ,	143	So.	3d	936,	936

- 39	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	2014); see	also	Commonwealth	v.	Thompson , 50 N.E.3d	 845,	 857

- 58	 (Mass.	 App.	 Ct.	 2016)	 (examining	 credit	 card	 fraud,	 discussing	 similar principles,	and	deciding	the	same); Stat e	v.	James ,	79	P.3d	169,	173

- 77	(Kan.	2003)	(concluding	that the	state	had	jurisdiction	where	the	defendant	violated	a	duty	to	refrain	from	mistreating	dependent adults	by	leaving	the	victims	in	a	hot	car,	causing	their	deaths).		The	Florida	court	also	con cluded	that the	state	had	jurisdiction	to	convict	a	defendant	of	a	crime	prohibiting	the	removal	of	children	from23 673 P.2d 455,	456	(Kan.	Ct.	App.	1983) (noting	that	a	statute	extending	criminal jurisdiction	 to	 the	 omission	 to	 perform	 a	 duty	 imposed	 on	 a	 person	 by	 law regardless	of	 the	person’s	location	“ codifies	 the	c ommon	law	principle	 that	a person	may	commit	a	crime	within	 this	 state	while	remaining	outside	it, and such	crime	may	be	an	act	of	omission	as	well	as	an	act	of	commission ”	(emphasis added)). [¶ 3 1] The Court’s	 focus	 on	 the	 affirmative	 nature	 of	 Sloboda’s	 bail violation	as	the	sole	basis	for	its	conclusion	that	section	7(1)(E)	does	not	confer jurisdiction	implies	 a	 view	 that	 section	 7(1)(E) would apply	if Sloboda’s	 bail violation	consisted	of a failure to act. Court’s	Opinion	¶¶ 19

- 21

. In	that	case, section	 7(1)(E)	 would	 confer	 jurisdiction	 to	 prosecute	 out

- of

- state	 bail violations	involving	inaction	by	the	defendant,	such	as failing to	notify	the	court of	 an	 address	 change or	 to	 take	 medications	 as	 pres cribed ,	 but	 would	 not authorize	prosecution	of	out

- of

- state	violations	such	as	having	contact	with	an alleged	victim	or	committing	a	new	crime.

the	state	in	violation	of	a	court	order,	where	the	defendant’s	affirmative	acts	in	violation	of	the	order occurred	entirely	outside	of	the	sta te. State	v.	Costa ,	558	So.	2d	525,	526	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	1990) (citing	a	territorial	applicability	statute	providing	that	“[a]n	offense	that	is	based	on an	omission	to perform	a	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this	state is	committed	within	the	state,	rega rdless	of	the	location of	 the	offender	at	the	 time	of	 the	omission”	(quotation	marks	omitted)); see,	e.g. , People	v.	Caruso , 519 N.E.2d	 440,	 442

- 46	 (Ill.	 1987)	 (concluding	 that	 a	 child	 abduction	 crime	 that	 prohibited “violat[ing]	.	.	.	a valid court	order .	.	.	by	concealing	or	detaining	[a]	child	or	removing	[a]	child	from the	jurisdiction	of	the	court”	was	“based	on	an	omission	to	perform	a	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this State”	(quotation	marks	omitted)).24 [¶ 32 ] But	n othing	in	either	the	bail	code	or	section	7(1)(E)	indicates	that the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 confer jurisdiction	 over	 violations	 of	 some conditions	of	release	but	not	violations	of	other	conditions	of	release,	and	there would	be	no	cogent	basis	for	the	Legislature	to	draw	that	distinction. 15 In	fact, it	is	the	violations	involving	affirmative	acts	that	c an	result	in	direct	and	even lethal	 harm	 to	 victims,	 witnesses , and	 others. The	 Legislature	 cannot	 have intended	to	confer	jurisdiction	to	prosecute	an	out

- of

- state	violation	consisting of	 failure	 to	 take	 medications	 or	 to	 report	 an	 address	 change	 but	 not to prosecute	 an	 out
- of

- state	 violation	 consisting	 of	 contact	 (or	 worse)	 with	 an alleged	victim,	a	co

- defendant,	or	a	witness. [¶ 33 ]	 	 At	 oral	 argument,	 even	 Sloboda	 agreed	 that	 a	 defendant	 can	 be prosecuted	for	a	bail	violation	in	Maine	based	on	wholly	out

- of

- state	criminal

15 Nor	does	the	legislative	history	suggest	such an	interpretation.		Section	7(1)(E)	incorporates language	present	in	section	1.03	of	 the	Model	Penal	Code. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(E);	Model	Penal Code &	 Commentaries §	 1.03(1)(e)	 (Am.	 Law	 Inst.	 19 85 )	 (providing	 for	 jurisdiction	 where	 “the offense consists of	the	omission	to	perform	a	legal	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this	State with	respect	to domicile,	residence	or	a	relationship	to	a	person,	thing	or	transaction	in	the	State”	(emphasis	added)). Section	1.03	“propose[d]	broad	jurisdictional	bases,	within the	limits	of	due	process,”	based	“[o]n	the premise[s]	that	it	is	particularly	desirable	in	a	federated	state	to	increase	jurisdictional	options	and that	if	a	state’s	assertion	of	jurisdiction	does	not	result	in	unfairness	to	the	person	charged,	the	state should	 be	 accorded	 jurisdiction	 over	 all	 those	 who	 engage	 in	 conduct	 that	 affects	 the	 state’s interests.”		Model	Penal	Code &	Commentaries §	1.03	explanatory	note	(Am.	Law	Inst.	1985).		Given the	 express	 notice	 to	 Sloboda	 that	 he	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 prosec ution	 if	 he	 violated	 any	 of	 the conditions	of	his	release,	and	the	detrimental	effect	of	the	bail	violation	within	Maine,	jurisdiction	to convict	Sloboda	in	Maine	does	not	present	fairness	concerns. See	Strassheim	v.	Daily ,	221	U.S.	280, 284

- 85	(1911); Un ited	States	v.	Woodward ,	149	F.3d	46,	66	&	n.11	(1st	Cir.	1998); State	v.	Vetrano , 121	Me.	368,	380,	117	A.	460	(1922).25 conduct	committed	while	on	bail. 16 His	acknowledgment	is	significant	because a	 condition	 prohibiting	 criminal	 co nduct	 is	 no	 different,	 for	 purposes	 of
section 7(1)(E),	from	a	condition	prohibiting	contact	with	a	specific	person. See
State	 v.	 West ,	 512	 N.W.2d	 207,	 208

- 09	 (Wis.	 Ct.	 App.	 1993) (holding	 that	 a defendant	who	violated	a	Wisconsin	bail	order	by	committing	a	crime	in	Ohio could	 be	 prosecuted	 in	 Wisconsin	 for	 the	 crime	 of	 “bail	 jumping”); see	 also 15 M.R.S.	§ 1026(1)	(providing	that	“[e]very	order	for	the	pretrial	release	of	any defe ndant	must	include	.	.	.	the	conditio n[] that	the	defendant	refrain	from	new criminal	conduct”). [¶ 34 ]	 	 The	 Court’s	 interpretation	 means	 that	 defendants	 whose	 bail conditions	prohibit	them	from	having	contact	with	out

- of

- state	alleged	victims,

co - defendant s , or	 witnesses ; from	 possession	 of	 firearms	 or	 dangerous
weapons ; from	consuming	alcoholic	beverages ; from	operating	motor	vehicles ; from	accessing	the	Internet ; or	from	engaging	in	any	other	non

- c riminal	activity can	 circumvent	 prosecution	 simply	 by	 viol ating	 those	 conditions	 in	 another

16 Sloboda	gave	the	following	example:	“Say	it’s	a	domestic	case,	and	some	parent	neglects	their child.		They’re	prosecuted	in	New	Hampshire	 .	 .	 .	 .	They’re	convicted.		You	 take	 that	conviction	 to Maine	and	then	you	prosecute	them	under	the	Maine	bail	order and	say,	‘See,	you	didn’t	follow	your Maine	bail	order;	you	were	convicted	of	a	crime.’”		In	response	to	a	question	about	whether	the	State could	enforce	bail	conditions	by	moving	to	revoke	bail,	Sloboda	replied,	“Of	course,	or	by	proving	that he	had	cont act	in	Rochester	[New	Hampshire];	New	Hampshire	gives	full	faith	and	credit	to	the	Maine order;	he’s	convicted	of	violating	a	legal	order	in	New	Hampshire;	you	take	that	certified	conviction to	Maine,	and	then	prosecute	him.”26 jurisdiction.		To	protect	the	State’s	ability	to	prosecute	bail	violations,	it	would be	understandable	for	prosecutors	to	ask	more	frequently	for	bail	conditions prohibiting	defendants	 from	leaving	 the S tate	 of	Maine,	alth ough	 the	Court’s interpretation	now	calls	into	question	whether	a	defendant	subject	 to	such	a condition	could	be	prosecuted	for	leaving	the	state. [¶ 35 ]	 	 Finally,	 beyond	 the	 bail	 context,	 the	 Court’s	 interpretation	 of section	7(1)(E)	also	calls	into	questi on	whether	a	defendant	who	affirmatively violates	a Maine protection	order	can	be	prosecuted	if	the	defendant	and	the plaintiff	are	both	outside	the	state	at	the	time. See 17

- A	M.R.S.	§	506

- B	(2020) ; see	 also 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 4659(1)	 (2020) ; 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 321(6) (2020) ; 19

- A	 M.R.S. § 4011(1),	(4)	(2020) .		If	the	order	were	a	qualifying	protection order ,	the	full faith	and	credit	provision	of	the United	States	Code would	authorize	the	state in	 which	 the	 violation	 occurred	 to	 prosecute, see 18	 U.S.C.S.	 §	 2265 (LEXIS through	 Pub. L. No.	 116

- 149) ,	 but	 that	 state	 might	 not,	 and	 Maine definitely	could	not	under	the	Court’s	interpretation. [¶ 36 ]	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 I	 would	 affirm,	 because	 the	 court	 had jurisdiction and the	record	evidence	was	sufficient	to	support	the	con viction.27 Harry	 Center,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Woodman	 Edmands	 Danylik	 Austin	 Smith	 & Jacques,	P.A.,	Biddeford,	for	appellant	Emanuel	J.	Sloboda Kathryn	 Loftus	 Slattery,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Andrew	 E.	 Berggren,	 Esq. (orally),	Prosecutorial	District	# 1,	Alfred,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	Genera l,	and	Laura	A.	Yustak,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for amicus	cur iae Office	of	the Maine	Attorney General Jeff	Goldman,	Esq.,	Morgan,	Lewis	&	 B ockius	 LLP,	 Boston,	Massachus etts ,	 for amicus	curiae A E quitas Lawrence	C.	Winger, amicus	curiae	pro	se

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2018

- 1073 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY