COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

WILLIAM ALBERT DODSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0981-95-2 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 OCTOBER 8, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY 

Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 

 

 John G. Berry (Berry & Early, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 William Albert Dodson (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of violating Code § 18.2-308.2, attempting to possess a 

firearm after having been convicted of a felony. On appeal, he 

argues that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that Code 

§ 18.2-308.2 does not violate the constitutional prohibition 

against ex post facto laws; (2) using a 1969 conviction for 

breaking and entering as the predicate felony when he was a 

juvenile at the time of the offense; (3) using his 1969 

conviction as the predicate felony when that conviction was void 

for lack of jurisdiction; (4) violating the double jeopardy 

clause by allowing the Commonwealth to prosecute him for 

attempting to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a 

felony when he was acquitted of making a false statement on his 

criminal history form; and (5) finding the evidence sufficient to 
 2 

 

convict. Finding no error, we affirm the conviction. 

 BACKGROUND

 In 1968, appellant, a seventeen-year-old juvenile, was 

arrested for the felony of breaking and entering. He was 

indicted as an adult with three other adult defendants in 

November 1968 and waived a preliminary hearing. An order of the 

circuit court recites that on January 2, 1969, before appellant 

entered a guilty plea, the circuit court recognized that 

appellant was a juvenile and ordered the probation officer to 

conduct an investigation and prepare a report pursuant to former 

Code § 16.1-176(b).1

 Although the report submitted to the court 

 1Former Code § 16.1-175, in effect in 1969, provided as 

follows: 

 If during the pendency of a criminal or 

quasi-criminal proceeding against any person 

in any other court it shall be ascertained 

that the person was under the age of eighteen

years at the time of committing the alleged 

offense, such court shall forthwith transfer 

the case, together with all papers, documents 

and evidence connected therewith, to the 

juvenile court of the city or county having 

jurisdiction, provided if such is pending in

a court of record, the judge thereof, in his 

discretion upon completion of an 

investigation as prescribed in § 16.1-176(b), 

may continue with the trial thereof. 

(Emphasis added). Former Code § 16.1-176(b) set forth the 

investigation requirements in juvenile cases as follows: 

 In all cases under this section the 

court may, unless such information is 

otherwise available to it from a prior 

investigation and report to another court, 

require an investigation of the physical, 

mental and social condition and personality 

of the child or minor and the facts and 
 3 

(..continued) 

was styled "pre-sentence report," it included information about 

appellant's physical, mental, and social condition, his 

personality, and the facts and circumstances of the offense as 

required by Code § 16.1-176(b). On March 3, 1969, the court 

considered the report and found appellant guilty as an adult of 

breaking and entering. Appellant received a two-year 

penitentiary sentence that was suspended, and he was placed on 

probation for three years conditioned on good behavior. 

 On July 16, 1994, appellant went to Mountaineer Sporting 

Goods in Madison. He spoke to the store owner, Harold Woodward 

(Woodward), about purchasing a .22 caliber rifle for his son. 

After Woodward showed appellant several rifles, appellant 

selected one and paid for it. He also filled out federal and 

state firearm transaction forms, and waited while Woodward ran a 

background check. Instant approval was not available, and 

Woodward told appellant to come back on the next business day. 

When appellant returned to the store, Woodward still had not 

received approval and told him to come back in a couple of days. 

 Woodward was later notified that appellant was not approved for 

a firearm purchase. On each visit to the store, appellant was 

alone. 

circumstances surrounding the violation of 

the law which is the cause of his being 

before the court. . . . [I]f the court 

requiring the investigation is a court of 

record, such investigation may be made by the 

officer provided for in § 53-243. 
 4 

 

 Appellant was charged with: (1) willfully making a 

materially false statement on the required criminal history 

consent form in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2:2; and (2) 

attempting to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a 

felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.2

 He filed a pretrial 

 2Code § 18.2-308.2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 A. It shall be unlawful for (i) any 

person who has been convicted of a felony or 

(ii) any person under the age of twenty-nine 

who was found guilty as a juvenile fourteen 

years of age or older at the time of the 

offense of a delinquent act which would be a 

felony if committed by an adult, whether such 

conviction or adjudication occurred under the 

laws of this Commonwealth, or any other 

state, the District of Columbia, the United 

States or any territory thereof, to knowingly 

and intentionally possess or transport any 

firearm or to knowingly and intentionally 

carry about his person, hidden from common 

observation, any weapon described in 

§ 18.2-308 A. A violation of this section 

shall be punishable as a Class 6 felony. Any 

firearm or any concealed weapon possessed, 

transported or carried in violation of this 

section shall be forfeited to the 

Commonwealth and disposed of as provided in 

 § 18.2-310. 

 B. The prohibitions of subsection A 

shall not apply to (i) any person who 

possesses a firearm or other weapon while 

carrying out his duties as a member of the 

armed forces of the United States or of the 

National Guard of Virginia or of any other 

state, (ii) any law-enforcement officer in 

the performance of his duties, or (iii) any 

person who has been pardoned or whose 

political disabilities have been removed 

pursuant to Article V, Section 12 of the 

Constitution of Virginia provided the 

Governor, in the document granting the pardon 

or removing the person's political 

disabilities, may expressly place conditions 

upon the reinstatement of the person's right 
 5 

motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that: (1) Code 

 § 18.2-308.2 violated the constitutional prohibition against ex

post facto laws; (2) under former Code § 16.1-179, his 1969 

offense did not result in a "conviction" that could serve as the 

predicate felony in a prosecution under Code § 18.2-308.2; and 

(3) his 1969 conviction was void for lack of jurisdiction. In a 

January 26, 1995 letter opinion, the trial court denied the 

motion. 

 On February 15, 1995, the trial court dismissed the part of 

the indictment charging that appellant made a materially false 

statement under Code § 18.2-308.2:2. The trial court found that 

the criminal history consent form did not comply with the 

requirement in Code § 18.2-308.2:2(A) that the "form to be 

provided by the Department of State Police . . . shall include 

only . . . the identical information required to be included on 

the firearms transaction record required by regulations 

administered by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of 

the U.S. Department of the Treasury." Appellant was convicted of 

(..continued) 

to ship, transport, possess or receive 

firearms. 

 C. Any person prohibited from 

possessing, transporting or carrying a 

firearm under subsection A, may petition the 

circuit court of the jurisdiction in which he 

resides for a permit to possess or carry a 

firearm. The court may, in its discretion 

and for good cause shown, grant such petition 

and issue a permit. The provisions of this 

section shall not apply to any person who has 

been granted a permit pursuant to this 

subsection. 
 6 

violating Code § 18.2-308.2, attempting to possess a firearm 

after having been convicted of a felony. 

EX POST FACTO PROHIBITION

 Appellant argues that Code § 18.2-308.2 violates the 

constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. 

Specifically, he contends that, by enacting a statute prohibiting 

a felon from possessing a firearm, the legislature added to his 

original punishment for the 1969 breaking and entering conviction 

by depriving him of his constitutional right to bear arms, and 

prohibited an act that was not unlawful at the time of his 

earlier conviction. 

 In considering this argument, the trial court determined 

that, "since defendant's allegedly illegal acts occurred in 1994, 

the 1989 proscription of possession of a firearm by a felon is 

not an ex post facto law although defendant's felony conviction 

was in 1969." 

 An ex post facto law has been defined as: 

 "any statute which punishes as a crime an act 

previously committed, which was innocent when 

done; which makes more burdensome the 

punishment for a crime, after its commission, 

or which deprives one charged with crime of 

any defense available according to law at the 

time when the act was committed." 

Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (quoting Beazell v. 

Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)). "The mark of an ex post

facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be designated 

punishment for past acts." De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 
 7 

160 (1960). If "the restriction of the individual comes about as 

a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation," the 

law is not ex post facto. Id. (emphasis added). 

 No ex post facto violation could have occurred in this case 

because "the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm 

was not committed until after the effective date of the statute 

under which [the appellant] was convicted." United States v. 

Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 246 

(1994). See also United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 

(7th Cir.) (holding that no ex post facto violation occurred 

because the defendant was being punished for possessing a firearm 

as a felon, not for the three robberies he committed prior to the 

enactment of the firearm possession statute), cert. denied, 493 

U.S. 831 (1989). 

 Code § 18.2-308.2 does not criminalize "an act previously 

committed," and in the instant case, the attempted firearm 

purchase occurred several years after the legislature amended 

Code § 18.2-308.2 to prohibit the possession of a firearm by any 

convicted felon. Additionally, like the federal firearm statute, 

Code § 18.2-308.2 does not impose "punishment" for the underlying 

felony. Instead, the prohibition of firearm possession by 

convicted felons "comes about as a relevant incident to" the 

state regulation of firearms. Thus, we hold that Code 

§ 18.2-308.2 is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. 

THE USE OF 1969 CONVICTION
 8 

 Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in using 

his 1969 conviction as the predicate felony because he was a 

juvenile at the time of the commission of the prior offense. He 

argues that, by using his 1969 conviction, the trial court 

deprived him of the statutory protection of Code § 16.1-179. 

 Former Code § 16.1-179, in effect at the time of appellant's 

1969 conviction, provided, in relevant part: 

 Except as otherwise provided, no adjudication 

or judgment upon the status of any child 

under the provisions of this law shall 

operate to impose any of the disabilities 

ordinarily imposed by conviction for a crime, 

nor shall any such child be denominated a 

criminal by reason of any such adjudication, 

nor shall such adjudication be denominated a 

conviction. 

 The trial court found as follows: 

 This court finds that § 16.1-179, in 

effect in 1969, excluded defendant from its 

protective terms. Defendant at time of 

conviction was properly before a court of 

record and was sentenced in accordance with 

the criminal laws of Virginia. The statute 

did not apply to one in his situation. 

The trial court also determined that, because appellant was not 

entitled to the protections of Code § 16.1-179, Code § 18.2-308.2 

was not an ex post facto law as applied to him. 

 In Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 

(1957), the Supreme Court of Virginia explained the rationale 

behind Code § 16.1-179 as follows: 

 [Code § 16.1-179] originated in a policy not 

to permit the same uses to be made of records 

of juvenile courts as are frequently made of 

criminal records of courts of general 

jurisdiction, for the reason that juvenile 
 9 

proceedings are corrective in nature rather 

than penal. The child is looked upon not as 

a bad man, who should be punished but as an 

erring child who needs help. The primary 

function of the juvenile courts properly 

considered is not conviction or punishment 

for crime; but crime prevention and juvenile 

rehabilitation. 

Id. at 844, 97 S.E.2d at 21 (emphasis added). However, the court 

had earlier recognized that the legislature had made different 

provisions for children who committed serious offenses. 

 The trial and punishment of minor 

offenders follows the regular criminal 

procedure, modified, in certain respects, by 

the statutes setting up juvenile and domestic 

relations courts. These statutes have 

established a system whereby most juvenile 

offenders are first subjected to the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile courts for 

proceedings therein designed to subject such 

offenders to the supervision and control of 

the State in a manner in which the delinquent 

ways of the child will be corrected and he be 

made to lead a correct life. 

 But the provisions contained in these 

statutes clearly show that the legislature 

recognized that children who have committed 

grave offenses could not be properly dealt 

with according to the methods and procedure 

established by such legislation. For this 

reason the regular criminal procedure . . . 

of circuit courts . . . [is] retained. 

Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 279, 16 S.E.2d 641, 643-44 

(emphasis added), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1941). See also

State v. Ross, 405 S.E.2d 158, 166-67 (N.C. 1991) (the defendant 

"was tried in the [Virginia] Circuit Court as an adult and 

sentenced in the Circuit Court as an adult" and thus "the 

Virginia conviction was not a juvenile adjudication"). 

 "[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is 
 10 

always preferred to any curious, narrow or strained construction; 

a statute should never be construed so that its leads to absurd 

results." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 

S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992). The plain meaning of former Code 

§ 16.1-179 is that it applies only to proceedings conducted in 

the juvenile and domestic relations district court, "under the 

provisions of [juvenile] law," and not to criminal proceedings 

conducted in the circuit court. The language of the statute 

distinguishes between an "adjudication" of the status of a child 

and a "conviction" as an adult.3

 The legislature has clearly 

determined that the policy of juvenile rehabilitation behind Code 

§ 16.1-179 is not served by expanding the statute's coverage to 

those juveniles who are properly retained by the circuit court to 

be tried as adults, convicted as adults, and sentenced as adults. 

 We hold that appellant was not entitled to the protections of 

 

 3In Georgia, the juvenile law similar to that of Virginia 

provides that, "when a juvenile is adjudicated to be a delinquent 

by a juvenile court, the adjudication is not regarded as a 

criminal conviction." Carrindine v. Ricketts, 223 S.E.2d 627, 

628-29 (Ga. 1976). However, the Supreme Court of Georgia has 

held as follows: 

 A juvenile whose case is properly 

transferred to the superior court is subject 

to the criminal sanctions which may be 

imposed in that court. Thus, it is clear 

from the Georgia jurisdictional scheme and 

the nature of adjudicatory proceedings in 

juvenile court that an adjudication of guilt 

of a juvenile in superior court is a criminal 

adjudication. 

Id. at 629 (emphasis added). 
 11 

former Code § 16.1-179 because the circuit court properly tried 

and sentenced him as an adult. No ex post facto violation 

occurred because Code § 18.2-308.2 did not retroactively deprive 

appellant of any protection under Code § 16.1-179. 

COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE PREDICATE FELONY

 Appellant next argues that his 1969 conviction is void for 

lack of jurisdiction because the report that the trial court 

received did not comply with the requirements of former Code 

§ 16.1-176(b). Specifically, he contends that the report was 

nothing more than an adult presentence report. The Commonwealth 

argues that the same rationale adopted by the United States 

Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 

(1980), should control this case. We agree. 

 In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court interpreted 18 

U.S.C. §§ 922 and 1202 (federal firearm possession statutes 

included in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 

1968) and held that the plain meaning of § 1202 indicated that 

"the fact of felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until 

the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his 

disability by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying 

pardon." 445 U.S. at 60-61. The defendant in Lewis argued that 

his prior felony conviction was invalid because he was not aided 

by counsel at the time of conviction. Id. at 57-58. However, 

the Supreme Court determined that the legislative history of the 

federal firearm possession statutes and the language of the 
 12 

statutes established an intent "that the defendant clear his 

status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' 

purpose 'broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress 

classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.'" Id. at 

64-65 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 

(1976)). The Supreme Court also noted that the Omnibus Act 

contained specific exceptions to the prohibition against the 

possession of a firearm by a felon, including any "person who has 

been pardoned and who has been expressly authorized to receive, 

possess, or transport a firearm." Lewis, 445 U.S. at 61-62 

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1203). 

 In United States v. Blevins, 802 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1986), 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 

followed the rationale of Lewis in a similar case. In Blevins, 

the defendant argued that, "because the juvenile court improperly 

transferred him to the circuit court for trial as an adult in 

1973, the circuit court never gained proper jurisdiction over 

[him]." 802 F.2d at 769-70. The court quoted former Code 

§ 16.1-176 and recognized that, when a court fails to make the 

required findings under Code § 16.1-176, "the circuit court never 

gains jurisdiction over the minor to try him as an adult," and 

its "judgment of conviction is void in Virginia and may be so 

declared by any court in any direct or collateral proceeding in 

which the validity of the conviction is a question to be 

determined." Id. at 770 (emphasis added). Assuming that the 
 13 

defendant's prior conviction was void under Virginia law, the 

court held as follows: 

 Lewis points out that there is no indication 

in the legislative history of § 1202(a)(1) of 

any Congressional intent to require the 

government to prove validity of predicate 

conviction. It is the fact that the 

conviction exists, valid or invalid, that 

imposes the firearms disability on the 

defendant felon, a disability that exists 

until the conviction is vacated or the felon 

is relieved of his disability by the action 

of the proper authority. Thus, in a 

prosecution under the federal gun statutes, 

the validity of the underlying conviction is 

simply not a question to be determined. 

Rather, the court need only consider whether, 

in fact, the defendant has been convicted, 

and, if he has, if the conviction has been 

rendered a nullity by action of proper 

authority. 

Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

 The rationale of Lewis and Blevins applies to this case. 

Like the federal firearms statutes examined in Lewis, Code 

§ 18.2-308.2 specifically provides exceptions to the broad 

prohibition against the possession of firearms by felons. Under 

subsection (B)(iii), a person who is pardoned is exempted from 

the proscription of Code § 18.2-308.2(A). Additionally, under 

subsection (C), any person with a firearm disability may petition 

the circuit court in the jurisdiction in which he resides for a 

gun permit. Thus, the plain meaning of Code § 18.2-308.2 

indicates that the legislature did not intend for a felon to be 

able to collaterally attack the validity of his or her predicate 

felony conviction in a prosecution under the statute. Relying on 
 14 

Blevins, we hold that the validity of the underlying conviction 

is not an issue in a prosecution under Code § 18.2-308.2, and 

therefore the trial court in this case properly used appellant's 

1969 conviction as the predicate felony. 

 Additionally, the trial court at the time of the 1969 

offense complied with former Code § 16.1-176(b) and properly 

exercised jurisdiction over appellant. In a January 26, 1995 

letter opinion, the trial court for the present offense found as 

follows: 

 [I]n defendant's case in 1969, prior to 

conviction the court recognized that 

defendant was a juvenile and ordered a report 

pursuant to the applicable statute. While 

the report on defendant, entitled 

"pre-sentence report", is formatted like 

those of his adult co-defendants . . . the 

contents of the report include information 

about the physical condition (height, weight, 

health history), mental condition (I.Q. test 

results from school), social conditions 

(family development, educational attainment), 

and the personality of the juvenile 

(addressed variously). Also addressed are 

the facts and circumstances of the offense 

including the juvenile's role therein. 

 This court does not find that the court 

in the earlier proceeding, aware that a 

juvenile was before it and having ordered a 

report as required by statute . . . and 

having received and considered a report on 

the juvenile before finding him guilty and 

sentencing him as an adult, was without 

jurisdiction so as to render the earlier 

conviction void. 

 Former Code § 16.1-176(b), in effect in 1969, provided as 

follows: 

 In all cases under this section the 

court may, unless such information is 
 15 

otherwise available to it from a prior 

investigation and report to another court, 

require an investigation of the physical, 

mental and social condition and personality 

of the child or minor and the facts and 

circumstances surrounding the violation of 

the law which is the cause of his being 

before the court. . . . [I]f the court 

requiring the investigation is a court of 

record, such investigation may be made by the 

officer provided for in § 53-243. 

Additionally, former Code § 16.1-175 stated as follows: 

 If during the pendency of a criminal or 

quasi-criminal proceeding against any person 

in any other court it shall be ascertained 

that the person was under the age of eighteen

years at the time of committing the alleged 

offense, such court shall forthwith transfer 

the case, together with all papers, documents 

and evidence connected therewith, to the 

juvenile court of the city or county having 

jurisdiction, provided if such is pending in 

a court of record, the judge thereof, in his 

discretion upon completion of an 

investigation as prescribed in § 16.1-176(b), 

may continue with the trial thereof. 

(Emphasis added). Under this statutory scheme, if a circuit 

court decided to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile, former Code 

§ 16.1-177 authorized the court to "sentence or commit the 

juvenile offender in accordance with the criminal laws of this 

State or . . . [to] deal with the juvenile in the manner 

prescribed in this law for the hearing and disposition of cases 

in the juvenile court." 

 The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the 

investigation required by the juvenile transfer statute is 

"mandatory" and that either the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court or the circuit court may order the investigation. 
 16 

Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 784-85, 85 S.E.2d 368, 374 

(1955). In Tilton, the Commonwealth proceeded against the 

juvenile defendant by seeking an indictment in the circuit court. 

 After the circuit court tried and convicted the juvenile, it 

ordered the probation officer to conduct a presentence 

investigation and prepare a report. Id. at 776-77, 85 S.E.2d at 

369-70. The Supreme Court held as follows: 

 "[A] full and complete investigation of the 

physical, mental and social condition and 

personality of the child or minor and the 

facts and circumstances surrounding the 

violation of the law which is the cause of 

his being before the court," whether made 

under the direction of the court of record or 

the juvenile court, will give the court of 

record information upon which to exercise its 

judicial discretion in determining whether, 

under the provisions of [Code § 16.1-176], 

the case should be transferred to the 

juvenile court or the trial proceeded with in 

the court of record. 

Id. at 787-88, 85 S.E.2d at 375. In Tilton, because the 

presentence report was not ordered pursuant to the juvenile 

transfer statute or before the trial and conviction of the 

juvenile defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 

Id. at 788-89, 85 S.E.2d at 376. 

 In the instant case, the court in the earlier proceeding 

complied with Code § 16.1-176(b) and properly exercised 

jurisdiction over appellant. The record shows that, in 1969, the 

circuit court ordered an investigation and report prior to an 

adjudication of guilt and pursuant to the juvenile transfer 

statute, Code § 16.1-176(b). Code § 16.1-175 authorized the 
 17 

circuit court to retain jurisdiction over appellant and order the 

investigation. Furthermore, in 1969, Code § 16.1-177 allowed the 

judge to try appellant as a juvenile or as an adult.4

 Thus, we 

hold that appellant's prior conviction is not void for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

 DOUBLE JEOPARDY

 Appellant next argues that his acquittal for making a false 

statement on the criminal history consent form barred his 

prosecution for attempting to possess a firearm after having been 

convicted of a felony. He asserts that the direct act supporting 

the attempt charge under Code § 18.2-308.2 was the same act 

prohibited by Code § 18.2-308.2:2. 

 Appellant's argument that he was acquitted of the charge 

under Code § 18.2-308.2:2(K) and thus improperly retried under 

Code § 18.2-308.2 is without merit. "A dismissal [of an 

indictment] qualifies as an acquittal for double jeopardy 

purposes when it is granted pursuant to a factual, as opposed to 

legal, defense." Greenwalt v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 498, 500, 

297 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1982). In this case, the trial court 

 

 4Since 1969, the juvenile transfer statutes have been 

modified extensively. Under Code § 16.1-241(A)(1), the juvenile 

and domestic relations district courts have exclusive, original 

jurisdiction over criminal offenses alleged to have been 

committed by a juvenile. A petition filed in the juvenile and 

domestic relations district court pursuant to Code § 16.1-260(A) 

and a transfer hearing conducted in accordance with Code 

§ 16.1-269.1 are prerequisites to the circuit court acquiring 

jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant. Burfoot v. Commonwealth, 

___ Va. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1996). 
 18 

dismissed the indictment under Code § 18.2-308.2:2(K), because 

the criminal history consent form did not comply with statutory 

requirements. Thus, the dismissal was not an acquittal for 

double jeopardy purposes, and double jeopardy did not bar 

prosecution of appellant under Code § 18.2-308.2. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 In Virginia, "'[a]n attempt to commit a crime is composed of 

two elements: (1) The intent to commit it; and (2) a direct, 

ineffectual act done towards its commission.'" Goodson v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 61, 74, 467 S.E.2d 848, 855 (1996). 

"When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal of a 

criminal conviction, we must view all the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the evidence all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Traverso v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). 

Appellant visited Woodward's store; examined several guns; 

selected the gun to be purchased; paid for the gun; and returned 

to the store to take possession of the gun. Although appellant 

told Woodward that he was buying the gun for his son, appellant 

was alone each time he visited the store. His argument that 

someone other than he could have picked up the gun is not 

supported by the record. Under these circumstances, we hold that 

sufficient evidence supported appellant's conviction for 

attempting to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a 

felony. 
 19 

 Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 
 20 

Benton, J., concurring. 

 I concur in the opinion except for a portion of the section 

styled "COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE PREDICATE FELONY." I do not 

agree that Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), and United 

States v. Blevins, 802 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1986), which applies 

Lewis, are applicable to this case. The holding in Lewis is 

based upon the United States Supreme Court's (1) review of 

legislative history to determine Congress' intent in passing the 

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and (2) 

application of federal criminal law. The congressional intent 

when enacting that law and general rules of federal criminal law 

do not control our obligation to apply Virginia law in cases that 

do not implicate federal constitutional rights or the Supremacy 

Clause. 

 Furthermore, in this case we do not need to decide whether 

Lewis is dispositive in a Virginia proceeding where there is a 

valid claim that a conviction is void under Virginia law. Cf.

Humphreys v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890, 894 

(1947) (In Virginia, "where . . . jurisdiction is lacking in a 

particular case, it is a settled rule that any judgment . . . 

rendered therein is coram non judice, and void for all 

purposes"). The record clearly establishes that in 1969 the 

trial judge complied with former Code § 16.1-176(b) and properly 

obtained jurisdiction to try and sentence Dodson. Dodson has 

failed to establish that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction and 
 21 

that his conviction was void. Accordingly, the majority's 

discussion and application of the rule announced in Lewis is 

dicta. 

 For these reasons, and for the other reasons discussed in 

the majority opinion, I would affirm the conviction.