AFFIRM; Opinion Filed June 10, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-23-00528-CR 

No. 05-23-00529-CR 

No. 05-23-00530-CR 

DARIUS TREMAINE BRADFORD, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 416-83866-2022, 416-81217-2023, 416-81218-2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Nowell, and Kennedy 

Opinion by Justice Kennedy 

Darius Tremaine Bradford appeals his three convictions of burglary of a 

habitation with the intent to commit the felony of invasive visual recording. In each 

case, a jury assessed a life sentence in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In 

two issues, appellant asserts that the jury charges were erroneous and claims that the 

punishments assessed were grossly disproportionate to the offenses of which he was 

convicted in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. We affirm the trial 

court’s judgments. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum 

opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 
 –2– 

BACKGROUND

Appellant was a maintenance worker for the apartment complex in which he 

and the complainant lived. His duties as a maintenance worker included the repair 

of air conditioning units. On multiple occasions, he entered the complainant’s 

apartment in response to requests for repairs to her air conditioning unit. The 

complainant noticed that nearly every time he visited to make repairs, appellant 

would leave his tool bag in the bathroom, explaining that the air conditioning motor 

was located there. She also noticed that he would leave his phone in the tool bag, 

which seemed “weird because generally one would keep your phone close.” On one 

such visit, appellant asked to borrow the complainant’s key because he did not have 

a copy, and she asked him to text her when he completed the repair, so she could 

retrieve her key from him. Appellant sent her text messages asking her if she was 

happily married and asking how he could find “a woman like you, beautiful, sweet 

and sexy.” 

On August 24, 2022, appellant arrived at the complainant’s apartment in 

response to another request to repair the air conditioning unit. The complainant 

informed appellant she needed to take a shower and get ready for work. As he had 

done on previous occasions, appellant asked the complainant if he could leave his 

tool bag in her bathroom. When she went to the bathroom, the complainant noticed 

a box in the tool bag prompting her to examine the contents. She quickly discovered 

a phone inside the box and believed it to be recording her. Upset and afraid because 
 –3– 

she thought appellant was in her living room and they were the only individuals 

there, the complainant took the box containing the phone from the tool bag and 

placed it into a shopping bag. When she left the bathroom, the complainant saw that 

appellant was returning to her apartment with a ladder. She left her apartment and 

drove to the apartment management office. The complainant appeared “hysterical” 

to the manager of the apartment complex when she arrived and handed the manager 

the shopping bag. 

The manager took the box containing the phone from the shopping bag and 

found several videos she believed to have been taken without the permission of the 

individuals depicted therein. She called the Plano Police Department and her 

supervisor. She also recorded the contents of the phone, as the phone showed 

notifications and signs that it was being remotely wiped. 

The ensuing Plano Police Department’s investigation found 49 videos of 23 

individuals, many of whom were unidentified. However, it was apparent from the 

videos that the recordings were made without the individuals’ consent.1

 Review of 

those videos revealed that appellant had not only recorded the complainant on 

August 24, but also on July 30 and August 18 of 2022. Detectives discovered that 

appellant had a private photo vault and application to remotely wipe the hard drive. 

1

 One example repeated across several videos was that while asking a sales associate at a retail store 

for assistance appellant would aim his camera to record the associate from beneath her skirt. Other videos 

appeared to be recorded in the home of the individual, as was the case with several videos of the complainant 

in which she was recorded in various stages of undress. 
 –4– 

In addition, they found appellant had conducted online searches for spy cameras. 

Detectives found and seized additional phones and cameras, as well as large bag of 

keys, from appellant’s apartment. Some of the keys were labeled as belonging to 

the apartment complex, and the apartment manager indicated that all of the keys 

looked as though they belonged to the apartment complex, which appellant was not 

authorized to keep. 

Appellant was indicted for three counts of burglary of a habitation with the 

intent to commit the felony of invasive visual recording. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 30.02(d). The offenses were alleged to have occurred on July 30, August 18, and 

August 24 of 2022 and to have involved the complainant. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to the three offenses as charged. He exercised his 

right to a jury determination as to punishment in all three cases. The jury heard 

testimony of the complainant’s discovery of appellant’s phone in his tool bag and 

the subsequent police investigation, as well as evidence of a 2008 conviction in 

which appellant was found guilty of invasive visual recording and a 2010 incident 

when appellant used his phone to record a woman changing clothes in a store without 

her consent. The jury also heard from appellant’s ex-girlfriend who testified that 

while she and her minor daughter lived with appellant he made video recordings of 

them without their knowledge or consent. She described the intricate system 

appellant had set up in the bathroom of his residence, including a mirror placed on 

the floor, to capture the videos. The complainant, appellant’s ex-girlfriend, and the 
 –5– 

woman whom appellant recorded without her consent in 2010 all testified about the 

negative impact appellant’s actions had on them. 

At the conclusion of the punishment phase of trial, the jury assessed 

punishment at life imprisonment in each case. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the jury charge 

was impermissibly suggestive by placing the paragraph containing the option for a 

life sentence before the paragraph containing a timeframe of incarceration. Second, 

he claims that the punishment is so disproportionate to the crimes he was convicted 

of that it violates the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution and Article One of the 

Texas Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. 8; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13. 

The jury charge was proper. 

We review jury charge error under a two-pronged test, by looking first to 

whether the charge is erroneous. Cyr v. State, 665 S.W.3d 551, 556 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2022) (citing Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). 

Second, if we conclude the charge is erroneous, we ask whether appellant was 

harmed by the error. Id. (citing Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 606; Ngo v. State, 175 

S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Where there was a timely objection, 

appellant must show she suffered “some harm.” Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 

S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 36.19). Where there was no timely objection, appellant must show she 
 –6– 

suffered egregious harm, which we determine by considering the jury charge as a 

whole, the issues raised by the parties, the evidence at trial, and “anything else in the 

record that informs our analysis.” Id. (quoting Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 29 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021)). 

In all three cases, the charged offenses were first-degree felonies subject to 

either a life sentence or a term between 5 years’ and 99 years’ confinement and a 

fine. See PENAL § 12.32. Appellant contends that breaking the jury charge into two 

paragraphs, with the life sentence paragraph first, improperly suggested to the jury 

to choose that option. 

The trial court shall deliver a written charge distinctly setting forth the 

applicable law to the case. CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. Generally, a jury charge that 

tracks statutory language is not erroneous. Lewis v. State, No. 14-21-00691-CR, 

2023 WL 4873306, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 1, 2023, pet. ref’d) 

(citing Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (holding that 

charge tracking language of statute was not erroneous and “declin[ing] appellant's 

invitation to act as a super-legislature and rewrite [the statute]”); Martinez v. State, 

924 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“Following the law as it is set out by 

the Texas Legislature will not be deemed error on the part of a trial judge.”)). 

The only issue presented to the jury was punishment, which the court broke 

into two paragraphs that laid out two options for punishment as follows: 
 –7– 

We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Burglary of a 

Habitation, as charged in the indictment, and assess punishment 

at LIFE confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 

Correctional Institutions Division, and a fine in the amount of $ 

(answer with a dollar amount or “None”). 

OR, 

We, the Jury, find the Defendant guilty of Burglary of a 

Habitation, as charged in the indictment, and assess punishment 

at (5 to 99) years confinement in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, and a fine in the 

amount of $ (answer with a dollar amount or “None”). 

Each charge tracked the relevant statute, setting forth punishment options for 

the convictions. See PENAL § 12.32(a) (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony 

of the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 

years.”). 

Appellant urges that the charges are erroneous because they provided two 

separate paragraphs for the jury to choose from in assessing its punishment, instead 

of one paragraph, which increased the risk that the jury would only consider life 

confinement instead of the full range of punishment. He similarly argues that by 

placing the life option first, the charges unfairly drew the jury’s attention to it. 

However, the record is clear the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide 

whether to sentence appellant to a term between five and ninety-nine years or life in 

prison. Absent evidence indicating otherwise, we presume the jurors followed the 

trial court’s instructions. See Estelle v. State, No. 05-11-00353-CR, 2013 WL 
 –8– 

222268, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 16, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (citing Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009)). There is no evidence the jury in these cases ignored the trial court’s 

instructions and did not consider the full range of punishment. Accordingly, we 

cannot conclude any of the charges were erroneous. 

We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

Appellant’s Eighth Amendment argument was waived. 

In his second issue, appellant asserts his sentences were disproportionate to 

his crimes. He failed to object to the sentence at trial, but argues that the motion for 

new trial sufficiently preserved the issue for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). 

An objection must be made at the earliest possible opportunity. Gillenwaters v. 

State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A sentencing issue may be 

preserved by objection at the punishment hearing, or when the sentence is 

pronounced. Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A 

defendant may not raise a matter for the first time in a motion for new trial if they 

had the opportunity to raise it at trial. Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2019). Even a constitutional right may be forfeited by failure to object 

at trial. Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Appellant did not object to the verdicts when they were read. He failed to 

raise any objection after the verdicts and before the conclusion of the hearing. 

Because there was opportunity at trial to object and appellant failed to do so, he 
 –9– 

could not raise the matter for the first time in his motion for new trial. See Colone, 

573 S.W.3d at 260 (holding appellant failed to preserve due-process complaint in 

motion for new trial because he had opportunity to raise the matters at trial). 

Moreover, even if appellant’s complaint about the sentences could have been 

raised for the first time in his motion for new trial, he was required to “present” that 

motion to the trial court. Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6). Rule 21.6 states: “The defendant must present 

the motion for new trial to the trial court within 10 days of filing it, unless the trial 

court in its discretion permits it to be presented and heard within 75 days from the 

date when the court imposes or suspends sentence in open court.” TEX. R. APP. P. 

21.6. Nothing in the record indicates appellant sustained the burden of actually 

delivering the motion to the trial court or otherwise bringing the motion to the 

attention of the trial court. See Stokes, 277 S.W.3d at 22 (listing examples of how 

record might show presentment, including “obtaining the trial court’s ruling on the 

motion for new trial[,] . . . the judge’s signature or notation on a proposed order or 

by a hearing date set on the docket”). Accordingly, appellant’s complaint about his 

sentence was not properly preserved. 

We overrule appellant’s second issue. 
 –10– 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

DO NOT PUBLISH

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

230528F.U05 

 

/Nancy Kennedy/

NANCY KENNEDY 

JUSTICE 
 –11– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DARIUS TREMAINE BRADFORD, 

Appellant 

No. 05-23-00528-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 416-83866-

2022. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Kennedy. Justices Molberg and 

Nowell participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 10th day of June, 2024. 

 
 –12– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DARIUS TREMAINE BRADFORD, 

Appellant 

No. 05-23-00529-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 416-81217-

2023. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Kennedy. Justices Molberg and 

Nowell participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 10th day of June, 2024. 

 
 –13– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DARIUS TREMAINE BRADFORD, 

Appellant 

No. 05-23-00530-CR V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the 416th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 416-81218-

2023. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Kennedy. Justices Molberg and 

Nowell participating. 

 Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 10th day of June, 2024.