United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 23-2081

JOZELIA MARIA DE OLIVEIRA RODRIGUES; E.C.D.O.R.,

Petitioners,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Barron, Chief Judge,

Thompson and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.

Lidice D. Samper and Samper Law on brief for petitioners.

Adriana Lafaille and Julian Bava on brief for the 

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Massachusetts, Inc., 

amicus curiae.

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Civil Division, Dawn S. Conrad, Senior Litigation 

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, and Christopher G. 

Geiger, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.

August 8, 2024
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. An adverse credibility finding 

(or adverse credibility determination, as it is also commonly 

called) is a factual finding that a noncitizen's testimony during 

their removal proceedings was not credible. We've repeatedly 

explained (and find ourselves in the position to reiterate today) 

that such a finding can defeat a noncitizen's claim for immigration 

relief. See, e.g., Mashilingi v. Garland, 16 F.4th 971, 977 (1st 

Cir. 2021); Zaruma-Guaman v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 

2021). Today's immigration appeal is a prime example of an adverse 

credibility finding doing just that.

To explain, at the center of today's immigration appeal 

we have Jozelia Maria De Oliveira Rodrigues ("De Oliveira") and 

her minor daughter E.C.D.O.R. (collectively, "Petitioners"),

Brazilian citizens who fled to the United States after their 

neighbor, a drug dealer named Joao Carlos ("J.C."), began to 

threaten them. Once here in the United States, they applied for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), but an Immigration Judge 

("IJ") denied their applications primarily because she found De 

Oliveira's in-court testimony not credible. Petitioners 

thereafter appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" 

and, collectively with the IJ, "the agency"), which ultimately 

affirmed the IJ's adverse credibility finding. Fearing what might 

happen to them if removed to Brazil, Petitioners appealed once 
- 3 -

more and brought their case to us through a petition for review, 

urging us to reverse the agency's adverse credibility finding. 

For reasons we'll explain in due course, however, we find the 

adverse credibility finding is sufficiently supported by the 

record and, accordingly, we must deny the petition.

GETTING UP TO SPEED

As always, we begin by getting up to speed with a summary 

of the facts and of how Petitioners' case made its way to us. 

(Bear with us, as we do plunge into the particulars.) In laying 

out the facts and procedural history, we draw from the 

administrative record, including De Oliveira's testimony, which 

the IJ found not credible.1 M.S.C. v. Garland, 85 F.4th 582, 585 

n.2 (1st Cir. 2023).

Credible Fear Interview

On or about November 22, 2017, Petitioners entered the 

United States and applied for admission into the country. Upon 

arrival, De Oliveira expressed a fear of returning to Brazil so 

the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") referred her to an 

asylum officer ("AO") for a credible fear interview ("CFI").2 De 

1 The IJ made no credibility determination as to De Oliveira's 

minor daughter, E.C.D.O.R., because she did not testify. In fact, 

De Oliveira was the only witness to testify before the IJ.

2 A CFI is a preliminary screening conducted by an AO to 

determine whether a noncitizen "can establish a credible fear of 

persecution or torture" in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 208.30(d)-(e); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4). 
- 4 -

Oliveira's CFI took place over the course of two days, December 4 

and December 6, 2017, with the help of a Portuguese interpreter. 

The AO took notes during the course of the interview, but those 

notes include the following disclaimer:

The following notes are not a verbatim 

transcript of this interview. These notes are 

recorded to assist the individual officer in 

making a credible fear determination and the 

supervisory [AO] in reviewing the 

determination. There may be areas of the 

individual's claim that were not explored or 

documented for purposes of this threshold 

screening.

According to those notes, the AO started off the 

interview by gathering some basic personal information about De 

Oliveira, including that her last address in Brazil was in Santa 

Rita do Itueto. He also asked her several questions about her 

family, such as whether she was married and whether she had 

children. To the marriage question, De Oliveira responded that 

she was "[l]egally married but in real life [she was] not with 

[her] partner any[more]" and the "[l]ast time [she] heard of him 

he [was] in Brazil." To the children question, she responded that 

she had two children, E.C.D.O.R., who had entered the United States 

with her, and a son, who was still in Brazil.

With De Oliveira's basic personal information squared 

away, the AO shifted the focus of the interview to De Oliveira's 

fear of returning to Brazil. She explained that in Brazil she was 

threatened by three to five different "drug users" with weapons 
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near her house. This all started, De Oliveira went on, after she 

saw them "using and selling drugs" and "report[ed] them to the 

police." Although these individuals were arrested by the Brazilian 

police, they were soon released from custody and began threatening 

De Oliveira and her family. These individuals, De Oliveira 

explained, would "pass by [her] house and scratch the tip of [a] 

gun on [her] window."

The AO asked several follow-up questions to tease out if 

there were any other reasons these individuals (or anyone else) 

would harm De Oliveira if removed back to Brazil. For example, 

the AO asked her whether "being a member of [her] family" had 

"anything to do with" why these individuals targeted her. De 

Oliveira stated that she believed it did "[b]ecause [she] [no] 

longer live[d] with [her] husband, [she] live[d] alone with [her] 

daughter, being a single mother was easier for [her] to be 

targeted." The AO also asked her whether she had any problems in 

Brazil "because of [her] race, being indigenous." De Oliveira 

expressed that she "fe[lt] abused" in Brazil because "[w]hite 

people" would "call [her] bad names, that [she] came from the 

forest, the jungle." When asked who might harm her in Brazil 

because of her indigenous ethnicity, she responded "[p]eople from 

other race groups, people who like to despise indigenous people."

At the end of interview, the AO asked De Oliveira if the 

following summary of her testimony was correct:
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You testified that you were threatened by drug 

dealers in Brazil because you informed the 

police on them, . . . and you are a single 

mother. You fear that if you return to Brazil 

the gang members will kill you because of 

these same reasons . . . .

De Oliveira indicated that the AO's summary was correct. Nowhere 

in the interview notes does it reflect that De Oliveira ever 

specifically mentioned an individual by the name J.C. (we'll get 

to his relevance to De Oliveira's narrative shortly).

Ultimately, the AO deemed De Oliveira's fear credible 

and referred Petitioners to the immigration court for removal 

proceedings, during which they could seek asylum and related 

relief.

I-589 Applications and Written Affidavit

Less than a year later on October 23, 2018, De Oliveira 

filed with the Boston Immigration Court her I-589 application for 

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, listing 

E.C.D.O.R. as a derivative.3 To support their I-589 applications 

for asylum and related relief, Petitioners filed several 

additional documents, including a three-page written affidavit 

3 Two quick points. First, our use of "derivative" here 

refers to the fact that "[w]hen a noncitizen has been granted 

asylum, immigration law allows their spouse and children (who meet 

certain statutory criteria) to be granted asylum as derivatives." 

Cabrera v. Garland, 100 F.4th 312, 315 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024). That 

benefit applies only to asylum, not withholding of removal or CAT 

protection. Id. Second, in addition to being listed as a 

derivative on her mother's I-589 application, E.C.D.O.R. filed a 

separate I-589 application for herself, also on October 23, 2018. 
- 7 -

from De Oliveira drafted with the help of Petitioners' lawyer, 

seven country conditions reports, a copy of De Oliveira's passport, 

and copies of E.C.D.O.R.'s and her brother's birth certificates. 

One piece of supporting evidence worth getting into the 

weeds of is De Oliveira's written affidavit. In it, she stated 

that her neighbors in Brazil were having a loud party one night 

and she could see that they were drinking and doing drugs. 

Although she asked them to keep it down, they refused and 

"[e]ventually the police showed up and arrests were made [due] to 

the drug use." One of the arrestees was her neighbor J.C., who De 

Oliveira did not know at that time "was a well[-]know[n] drug 

dealer."

The day after the party, J.C. was released from police 

custody and began calling her house and threatening her family 

because J.C. believed she called the police on him, notwithstanding 

her denials to the contrary. Thereafter, J.C. frequently called

De Oliveira, sometimes "yelling and screaming" at her, sometimes 

"just breath[ing] heavily into the phone," sometimes "calling 

[her] horrible names," and sometimes threatening "to rape [her]." 

Despite De Oliveira reporting J.C.'s threats to the police 

"multiple times," the police "did nothing to stop him."

In fact, things worsened. J.C. began showing up at De 

Oliveira's work to follow her home. She became so concerned that 

J.C. would do something to her on her way home that she had a 
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co-worker start walking her home. One day, J.C. slashed De 

Oliveira's tires and that night he called her to ask her if she 

liked having her tires slashed. She "pleaded with him to leave 

[her] and [her] family alone," but J.C. just "laughed and said 

that he was going to kill one of [her] children as punishment." 

This interaction really frightened De Oliveira so she packed up 

her family's things and "went to stay with one of [her] cousin[s]"

in a different town. De Oliveira's efforts, it turns out, were 

all for naught because J.C. "found out where [they] were." This 

convinced her that J.C. "would continue to hunt [them] down there 

in Brazil," so she fled to the United States with E.C.D.O.R. in 

tow.

That was the extent of the information included in De 

Oliveira's written affidavit.

Direct Examination

Chugging along, on September 9, 2019, Petitioners 

appeared with their lawyer before the IJ for their merits hearing, 

seeking to avoid removal through their applications for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. At the hearing, De 

Oliveira took the stand, first for direct examination by her 

lawyer, through the help of a Portuguese interpreter.

After some preliminary biographical questions, De 

Oliveira's lawyer asked her why she came to the United States. 

She explained that she fled to the United States after J.C., her 
- 9 -

neighbor and a drug trafficker, began threatening and harassing 

her three to four years ago. Those threats and harassment began, 

De Oliveira testified, after she saw him using drugs in front of 

her house and she called the police. Although the police came and 

arrested him, he was released the next day and he began threatening 

to kill her and her family and to set her house on fire. In 

addition to the threats, De Oliveira testified that J.C. slashed 

her tires, that "[t]here were nights where he spent the entire 

night with a revolver outside of [her] house," and that he would 

"follow [her], and bother [her] at night." De Oliveira went to 

the police for help, but "they didn't do anything." With no 

protection from the police, she decided to move to Belo Horizonte, 

"[a]nother state [in Brazil] where [they] had some relatives." 

J.C., however, found them in Belo Horizonte and threatened to kill 

De Oliveira and her children.

De Oliveira also mentioned, in response to her lawyer's 

questioning, that she was the descendant of Indians and, therefore, 

indigenous. She added on that J.C. "many times would cuss [her] 

out as an Indian and say, like, Indian is like a . . . jungle 

animal."

At the end of her direct examination, De Oliveira stated 

that she feared returning to Brazil because J.C. was a dangerous 

person capable of carrying out his threats, as she previously 
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"witnessed him . . . beat[ing people] up." Since fleeing to the 

United States, however, she has not heard from him again.

Cross-Examination

Next up was the government's turn to cross-examine De 

Oliveira, during which she made some relevant clarifications to 

the issues on appeal today.

In response to the government's questioning, De Oliveira 

clarified that she contacted the police about J.C. three to four 

times in total; the first time for the loud party and drug use and 

the latter times for his threats against her and her family. After 

the government asked De Oliveira why she had not submitted any 

Brazilian police reports about these incidents in support of 

Petitioners' applications for immigration relief, she testified 

that she did try to acquire these reports but, when she called the 

Brazilian police to get copies, they told her that they would only 

give them to her if she first paid them 10,000 Brazilian reals.4

De Oliveira also made some important clarifications 

about her family. She testified that, at the time she called the 

police on J.C., she was living with her husband and their two 

children. The four of them left Brazil together at the same time, 

but her husband and son entered the United States on November 18, 

2017 and Petitioners entered four days later on November 22, 2017. 

4 In today's dollars, that sum would be around $1,800.
- 11 -

When asked why her husband and son entered before her and 

E.C.D.O.R., De Oliveira explained her husband "came ahead of [her], 

because he was going to find a place to stay for when [she] arrived 

with [E.C.D.O.R.]." She further explained that her husband was 

presently in the United States. The government followed up and 

asked De Oliveira if she had asked her husband to submit a written 

statement corroborating her testimony, to which she responded, 

"No."

The next clarifications regarded the move to Belo 

Horizonte to escape J.C. and his threats. De Oliveira explained 

that Belo Horizonte was about a twenty-six-hour drive from her 

home in Santa Rita do Itueto, she lived at her cousins' home there

for about a month, and her husband went there with her. She

further testified on cross-examination that J.C. made his way to 

her cousins' home, told her that "he had found [her]," and 

threatened "that he was going kill [her] and [her] family and 

anybody that [she] got involved in the middle of it." J.C. didn't 

actually do so at that moment, De Oliveira went on, because her 

family and cousins were there. She also stated that she never 

informed her cousins about the threats she was receiving from J.C. 

or the real reason as to why she and her family went to live with 

them for a month. When her cousins asked De Oliveira who J.C. was 

after he approached her at their home, she simply told them he 
- 12 -

"was just someone [she] knew" because she "w[as] afraid" and 

"didn't want to worry them."

Moving on, the government then asked De Oliveira if J.C. 

had ever gone to her parents' and siblings' home in Santa Rita do 

Itueto looking for her. De Oliveira testified that, after she 

came to the United States, J.C. had gone to their home and spoken 

with her brother Washington. When pressed by the government as to 

why she didn't have Washington submit a written statement 

explaining that J.C. had come by looking for her, she explained 

that it was "[o]ut of fear that [J.C.] would find out and then try 

to take [her] brother's life." De Oliveira believed J.C. capable 

of doing so because he previously "slash[ed] [Washington's] 

motorcycle tires trying to get at [her]" right after she "reported 

him" to the police.

Finally, the government asked De Oliveira about a few 

alleged discrepancies between her in-court testimony and the notes 

from her CFI. For example, the government asked her why she told 

the AO that she was "[l]egally married but in real life [she was] 

not with [her] partner any[more]" but testified that she, her 

husband, and their children were all living together in Brazil. 

De Oliveira explained that there was a "time frame" of "[o]ne or 

two months" during which her husband left their home to see if 

J.C.'s threats would "calm down." When the threats did not "calm 

down," she reunited with her husband in Belo Horizonte at his
- 13 -

cousins' home, where he had been staying during this 

one-to-two-months' time frame. The government quickly followed up 

and asked, "So when you went to live with your cousins it was your 

husband's cousins," to which De Oliveira responded, "Yes."

The government also asked De Oliveira if she knew J.C.'s 

name when she came to the United States, to which she indicated 

that she did. If that was the case, the government followed up by 

asking why she didn't mention J.C.'s name during her CFI. De 

Oliveira responded with the following: "If I didn't say it, it 

was due to forgetting because I had -- as far as I know, I had 

said it." Furthermore, the government asked De Oliveira why, 

throughout her CFI, she referred to people plural threatening her, 

as her in-court testimony suggested only J.C. had threatened her. 

She explained that J.C.'s "subordinates" "were always by [his] 

side."

After a bit more back and forth questioning, the 

government ended its cross-examination.

IJ's Questioning

After cross-examination there was no re-direct or 

re-cross, but the IJ did take an opportunity to ask De Oliveira 

some clarifying questions of her own.

Recounting just the highlights, the IJ asked De Oliveira 

why she had not mentioned Washington's tires being slashed in her 

I-589 application or written affidavit, to which she responded, "I 
- 14 -

don't know." Next, the IJ inquired as to whether De Oliveira had 

ever asked the co-worker who would sometimes walk her home from 

work to write a letter corroborating her story. She responded 

that she had not done so. The IJ also asked her why she hadn't 

listed the Belo Horizonte address in her I-589 application.5 De 

Oliveira explained that she had "stayed there for a very short 

amount of time, and [she] didn't even make note of and remember 

the address where [she] stayed." Notably, the IJ also asked De 

Oliveira why her written affidavit prepared with the help of her 

lawyer did not include any mention of the confrontation between 

her and J.C. in Belo Horizonte. De Oliveira stated that "when 

[she] was talking with [her] attorney [she] was bringing up the 

things that were . . . happening more frequently, and that was

just something that happened more, like, at a distance, so [she] 

didn't put that down." Then, the IJ asked De Oliveira why her 

written affidavit indicated that it was her cousins' home that 

they stayed at in Belo Horizonte, whereas she testified on 

cross-examination that it was her husband's cousins. She clarified 

that she "consider[s] them [her] cousins because they're [her] 

husband's relatives." Finally, the IJ asked De Oliveira if anyone 

had ever hurt her children. She indicated that J.C.'s son 

5 Among the many questions listed on the I-589 applications

Petitioners submitted are questions regarding their last address 

before coming to the United States and their addresses for the 

past five years.
- 15 -

frequently hit her son at school. After the IJ asked her why she 

didn't include this detail in her I-589 application or written 

affidavit,6 De Oliveira explained it was her understanding that 

her "case [was her] and [E.C.D.O.R.]" and didn't understand the 

I-589 application to be asking her about instances of harm to the 

rest of her family.

That was the end of the IJ's questioning. Before ending 

the hearing, the IJ indicated that she would be issuing a written 

decision and previewed, with some elaboration, that her decision 

would be a denial because she did not find De Oliveira's testimony 

"to be very credible."

The IJ's Decision

The IJ was true to her word and issued a written decision 

on September 24, 2019, denying Petitioners asylum, withholding of 

removal, and CAT protection and ordering their removal to Brazil. 

She denied them relief for the most part because of an adverse 

credibility finding but she concluded, in the alternative, that 

they would not be entitled to relief on the merits regardless.

Starting off with asylum, the IJ found that De Oliveira 

"did not testify credibly due to the inconsistencies between her 

written statement and her testimony before the court and her sworn 

6 Another question included on the I-589 applications

Petitioners submitted is whether "you, your family, or close 

friends or colleagues ever experienced harm or mistreatment or 

threats in the past by anyone." (Emphasis added).
- 16 -

statements to the . . . [AO] who conducted an interview, and due 

to significant omissions from her written statement." To support 

the adverse credibility finding, the IJ laid out nine alleged 

inconsistencies, which we recap below:

• De Oliveira testified that J.C. stood 

outside of her house with a revolver, but her 

written affidavit made no mention of this.

• De Oliveira's testimony reflected that 

the family internally relocated within Brazil 

to her husband's cousins' home in Belo 

Horizonte, whereas her written affidavit 

reflected that it was her cousins.

 

• While De Oliveira testified that J.C. 

actually made his way to her husband's 

cousins' home in Belo Horizonte and confronted 

and threatened her there, her written 

affidavit was silent as to this alleged 

confrontation. The IJ also commented that she 

found it "highly implausible that [J.C.] would 

have followed her to this house, but not 

physically harmed anyone there."

 

• De Oliveira's CFI notes and I-589 

application indicated that her most recent 

address in Brazil was in Santa Rita do Itueto, 

but she testified that she lived in Belo 

Horizonte before fleeing Brazil and did not 

include this address in her I-589 application.

• De Oliveira testified that J.C. used to 

call her ethnic slurs because of her 

indigenous ethnicity, but neither her written 

affidavit nor the CFI notes reflected her ever 

mentioning her ethnicity as a motivating 

factor behind J.C.'s threats. While the IJ 

noted that De Oliveira told the AO that she 

feared harm on account of being indigenous, 

when asked by the AO who would harm her, she 

only responded "[p]eople from other race 
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groups, people who like to despise indigenous 

people."

• De Oliveira told the AO that she was 

targeted because she was a single woman who no 

longer lived with her husband and that she was 

"[l]egally married but in real life [she was] 

not with [her] partner any[more]." To the IJ,

however, this statement was "most troubling" 

as it "was a far cry from the truth." The IJ 

explained that, based upon De Oliveira's 

testimony, De Oliveira, her husband, and both 

of their children "left Brazil together, 

entered Mexico together, only split apart to 

enter the United States, and reunited once 

within the United States." The IJ further 

noted that De Oliveira had "repeatedly told 

the [AO] that she was living alone with just 

her daughter."

• De Oliveira testified that her son had 

been threatened, but omitted any mention of 

this detail during her CFI.

 

• De Oliveira never mentioned J.C. by name 

to the AO; rather, she told the AO that she 

was threatened near her house by drug users 

who she saw using and selling drugs. Along 

these same lines, the IJ noted that De 

Oliveira's written affidavit explained that 

she did not know J.C. was a drug dealer before 

she called the police. 

• De Oliveira never mentioned Washington's 

tires being slashed in her CFI, I-589 

application, or written affidavit. The IJ 

further expressed that De Oliveira's 

explanation for not including that information 

was not "reasonable."

While these inconsistencies individually may not have 

raised concerns, the IJ explained, their cumulative effect casted 

doubt on the credibility of Petitioners' entire claim. "Based on 

the inconsistencies combined with [De Oliveira's] demeanor and 
- 18 -

unresponsiveness to questions,"7 the IJ went on, "further 

corroborating evidence regarding the past harm [De Oliveira] 

allegedly suffered or her fear of future harm" would be required 

to support Petitioners' claims. Aside from "generalized country 

conditions information," the IJ lamented, Petitioners had offered 

no other corroborating evidence. For example, De Oliveira had not 

provided police reports from the Brazilian authorities, claiming 

that the police demanded she first pay 10,000 Brazilian reals. 

The IJ highlighted that De Oliveira did not provide that 

explanation until specifically asked, and the omission of that 

explanation from her written affidavit was "striking," "given that 

her claim [was] hinged upon her assertion that the police will do 

nothing to assist her from the threats." Moreover, the IJ noted 

that De Oliveira did not provide any corroborating written 

statements or testimony from her co-worker, her brother 

Washington, her husband's cousins, or, "[m]ost significantly, her 

husband" who "is in the United States."

In sum, the IJ denied Petitioners asylum because De 

Oliveira "did not present credible testimony, and further that she 

ha[d] not adequately corroborated her claim with reasonably 

obtainable evidence, and thus ha[d] not met her statutory burden 

of proof for asylum." Having denied asylum, the IJ also denied 

7 The IJ did not provide any specific examples of De Oliveira's 

demeanor or alleged unresponsiveness.
- 19 -

withholding of removal, because it has an even higher standard of 

proof than asylum.8 As for CAT protection, the IJ denied that form 

of relief too because De Oliveira had not demonstrated that J.C. 

would subject her to harm that amounted to torture, nor had she 

demonstrated that the Brazilian government would acquiesce to her 

torture given the fact that the police already arrested him once 

at her insistence.

A timely appeal to the BIA followed.

The BIA's Decision

The BIA dismissed Petitioners' appeal on December 7, 

2023, upholding the IJ's adverse credibility finding. In its 

decision, the BIA adopted and deferred to the IJ's factual 

findings, including the adverse credibility finding, because the 

IJ "articulated specific, cogent reasons based in the record for 

finding that [De Oliveira] was not credible." In reaching that 

decision, the BIA highlighted the same inconsistencies outlined by 

the IJ in her decision.9 The BIA also agreed with the IJ that 

8 In addition, the IJ concluded that, in the alternative and 

assuming De Oliveira had testified credibly, Petitioners' asylum 

and withholding of removal claims would still fail because they 

had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of 

future persecution on account of a protected ground. For those 

immigration-law beginners, don't fret as we'll explain what this 

all means in just a few pages.

9 It's worth noting, though, that the BIA did not mention the 

following two inconsistencies that the IJ highlighted in her 

decision: (1) the discrepancy about whether it was De Oliveira's 

or her husband's cousins' home that they stayed at in Belo 
- 20 -

Petitioners did not submit corroborating evidence, such as police 

reports or statements from De Oliveira's brother, her husband's 

cousins, or her husband himself. Accordingly, the BIA affirmed 

the adverse credibility finding and the denial of asylum and 

withholding of removal.10 Finally, as to CAT protection, the BIA 

noted that Petitioners had not challenged the IJ's denial of that 

form of relief.

A timely appeal to us followed next and that gets us all 

the way to present day.

OUR TAKE

Now up to speed on the facts and procedural history, we 

turn our attention to our take on Petitioners' appellate arguments 

and there's a few things that are clear right out of the gate. 

First, Petitioners' brief challenges only the agency's 

denial of asylum and withholding of removal and does not "challenge 

the BIA's determination to deem waived the issue of CAT 

protection." Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22, 30 n.7 (1st Cir. 2023). 

"So, to the extent [they] wished to challenge that determination, 

Horizonte, and (2) the omission in her I-589 application and 

written affidavit that her son had been threatened. 

10 Because the adverse credibility finding was 

outcome-determinative of Petitioners' asylum and withholding of 

removal claims, the BIA declined to address the IJ's alternative 

conclusions that Petitioners had not suffered past persecution or

articulated a well-founded fear of future persecution on account 

of a protected ground.
- 21 -

any arguments [they] had to that effect are waived," id., and that 

will be our last mention of anything on the CAT-protection front. 

Second, as to asylum and withholding of removal, Petitioners argue 

that the agency not only erred as to its adverse credibility 

finding, but also that the IJ erred as to her alternative 

conclusion that Petitioners had not shown past persecution or a 

well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected 

ground. As explained above, however, the BIA expressly declined 

to address the IJ's alternative findings and rested its decisions 

solely on the adverse credibility finding. And where the BIA does 

not address "an IJ's alternative ground for denying relief, that 

ground is not before us." Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 81-82 

(1st Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the claims before us are 

Petitioners' challenge to the agency's denial of asylum and 

withholding of removal vis-à-vis only the adverse credibility 

finding, which we turn to now, kicking things off with asylum.

Asylum

A noncitizen is granted asylum only if they prove they 

are a "refugee," which is defined, in relevant part, as a person 

unable or unwilling to return to their home country "because of 

[past] persecution or a well-founded fear of [future] persecution 

on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 

particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Immigration law provides that a noncitizen's 
- 22 -

"testimony . . . may be sufficient to sustain [this] burden without 

corroboration, but only if the [noncitizen] satisfies the trier of 

fact that the [noncitizen's] testimony is credible, is persuasive, 

and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the 

[noncitizen] is a refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). In 

this way, therefore, a noncitizen's credible testimony can make

their asylum claim, while an adverse credibility finding can break 

it. That is so because, if the agency makes such a finding, "that 

determination strips the testimony of probative force and permits 

the agency to disregard or discount it." Segran v. Mukasey, 511 

F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). And once a noncitizen's testimony has 

been deemed not credible, "[a] failure either to provide readily 

available corroborating evidence or to offer a compelling 

explanation for such a failure" can be the straw that breaks the 

camel's back. Rivera-Coca v. Lynch, 844 F.3d 374, 379 (1st Cir. 

2016).

Additionally, part of the reason why an adverse 

credibility finding "can prove fatal" to an asylum claim, Pan v. 

Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 86 (1st Cir. 2007), is the standard under 

which we review such findings. As a factual finding, adverse 

credibility findings are reviewed under the deferential 

substantial evidence standard. Diaz Ortiz v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1, 

14 (1st Cir. 2022). While this standard of review is certainly 

not toothless, see Kartasheva v. Holder, 582 F.3d 96, 105 (1st 
- 23 -

Cir. 2009), "[t]he extent to which this standard is deferential 

bears emphasis," Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 5. Reversal is 

appropriate "only if the record is such as to compel a reasonable 

factfinder to reach a contrary determination." Mashilingi, 16 

F.4th at 977 (citation omitted). Such deference is afforded to 

adverse credibility findings because the IJ has a front-row seat 

at the merits hearing and is, therefore, uniquely situated to take 

stock of a witness's credibility and demeanor, as opposed to 

appellate courts, like ourselves, reviewing a cold record from the 

nosebleeds. See Mam v. Holder, 566 F.3d 280, 283 (1st Cir. 2009). 

All that said, not every adverse credibility finding

gets a judicial stamp of approval. See Segran, 511 F.3d at 5. 

Indeed, "[w]e will not accord deference . . . to the agency's 

findings or conclusions that 'are based on inferences or 

presumptions that are not reasonably grounded in the record, viewed 

as a whole, or are merely personal views of the [agency].'" 

M.S.C., 85 F.4th at 594 (quoting Cordero-Trejo v. I.N.S., 40 F.3d 

482, 487 (1st Cir. 1994)). Rather, adverse credibility findings 

will only be upheld if they are supported by the record and the 

agency "has given reasoned consideration to the evidence and has 

provided a cogent explanation for [its] finding." Cuesta-Rojas v. 

Garland, 991 F.3d 266, 270 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Huang v. 

Holder, 620 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2010)). And Congress has 
- 24 -

outlined a litany of factors the agency can rely on in assessing 

credibility:

[T]he demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

the applicant or witness, the inherent 

plausibility of the applicant's or witness's 

account, the consistency between the 

applicant's or witness's written and oral 

statements (whenever made and whether or not 

under oath, and considering the circumstances 

under which the statements were made), the 

internal consistency of each such statement, 

the consistency of such statements with other 

evidence of record (including the reports of 

the Department of State on country 

conditions), and any inaccuracies or 

falsehoods in such statements, without regard 

to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's 

claim, or any other relevant factor.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

Here, in adopting and affirming the adverse credibility 

finding, the BIA "relied largely on the IJ's decision," discussing 

in its own decision seven of the nine inconsistencies articulated 

by the IJ. Zaruma-Guaman, 988 F.3d at 5. As such, we review "the 

BIA's decision and the IJ's decision as a unit." Id. At the 

outset, we note that the highlighted inconsistencies are plain as 

day and Petitioners seem to agree because they repeatedly concede 

in their briefing that some inconsistencies between De Oliveira's 

statements, both written and oral, do exist. Despite these

multiple concessions, Petitioners offer two main comebacks. 

First, they argue that the discrepancies cited by the agency "are 

either not supported by the record or [De Oliveira] provided a 
- 25 -

convincing explanation for the discrepancies." Second, they argue 

that "[a]ny omissions in [De Oliveira's] testimonies are 

insufficient to call into question the entirety of [Petitioners'] 

claim." Neither argument withstands scrutiny.

Starting off with their first argument, in contending

that the discrepancies cited by the agency are not supported by 

the record, Petitioners spill ink discussing only two 

discrepancies: (1) whether De Oliveira was a single mother (which, 

to remind, was the discrepancy the IJ found "most troubling" and 

"a far cry from the truth"), and (2) whether she knew J.C. was a 

drug dealer when she called the police on him.11 As to whether De 

Oliveira was a single mother, the inconsistency is readily apparent 

from the record. On the one hand, she told the AO that she was 

"[l]egally married but in real life [she was] not with [her] 

partner any[more]"; that the "[l]ast time [she] heard of him he 

[was] in Brazil"; and that she no "longer live[d] with [her] 

husband, [she] live[d] alone with [her] daughter, being a single 

mother was easier for [her] to be targeted." On the other hand, 

she testified that she and her husband lived together in Brazil at 

the time she called the police on J.C.; he was threatened by J.C. 

11 Petitioners do spill some ink (two sentences, to be exact) 

on another discrepancy -- namely, whether it was De Oliveira's 

husband's cousins, as opposed to her cousins, with whom the family 

stayed in Belo Horizonte -- but the BIA did not get into this 

discrepancy in its decision, so neither do we.
- 26 -

too; he moved away only for one to two months, not because of any

marital strife, but in hopes J.C. would stop threatening them; she 

met up with her husband at his cousins' home in Belo Horizonte;

they left Brazil together;12 and her husband and son entered the 

United States a few days before her and E.C.D.O.R. "to find a place 

to stay for when [she] arrived with [E.C.D.O.R.]." These 

statements are irreconcilably at odds with each other so we need 

not dwell.13 

As to whether De Oliveira knew J.C. was a drug dealer 

when she reported him to the police, the record reflects that, 

during her CFI, De Oliveira told the AO that she called the police 

12 To be specific, De Oliveira testified that she, her husband, 

and their two children left Brazil together. Consequently, this 

testimony was not just inconsistent with the CFI notes in the sense 

that she told the AO that her husband was in Brazil, but she also 

told the AO that their son was still in Brazil, which was also

untrue. 

13 Petitioners take exception with the IJ's statement that De 

Oliveira and her husband "left Brazil together, entered Mexico 

together, only split apart to enter the United States, and reunited 

once within the United States" because there is supposedly nothing 

in the record to indicate they entered Mexico together, "only" 

split apart to enter the United States, or that they reunited in 

the United States. That, however, is not an accurate 

representation of the record. De Oliveira testified that the only 

reason they didn't enter the United States together was because 

her husband "was going to find a place to stay for when [she] 

arrived with [E.C.D.O.R.]" (which, contrary to Petitioners' 

contention, reasonably implies they traveled to the United States 

together and were planning on reuniting once the place to stay was 

found) and Petitioners' I-589 applications reflect that De 

Oliveira remains married to her husband and De Oliveira, her 

husband, and their two children all live in Massachusetts.
- 27 -

on J.C. and his subordinates and they began threatening her because 

she "saw them using and selling drugs." In her written affidavit, 

however, she stated explicitly that "[a]t the time [she reported 

J.C. to the police she] didn't know that [her] neighbor was a 

well[-]know[n] drug dealer." While these two statements appear

inconsistent, Petitioners argue any discrepancy can easily be 

explained away because her written affidavit can be understood to 

be saying De Oliveira knew J.C. was a drug dealer when she reported 

him, but didn't know he was a well-known drug dealer. In other 

words, "well-known" is, in Petitioners' view, the operative word 

in De Oliveira's written affidavit. Setting aside the fact that 

the written affidavit places no emphasis on that word, we've 

explained before that "[w]hen the facts give rise to competing 

inferences, each of which is plausible, the IJ's choice between 

those competing inferences cannot be found to be unsupported by 

substantial evidence." Mashilingi, 16 F.4th at 978. And here, 

the agency reasonably read De Oliveira's written affidavit to say 

she did not know J.C. was a drug dealer when she reported him, 

which was contrary to her statement to the AO. Accordingly, both 

these discrepancies are reasonably supported by the record and the 

agency properly relied on them in supporting its adverse 

credibility finding.14

14 Petitioners make a passing argument that neither of these 

discrepancies can support the agency's adverse credibility finding 
- 28 -

Next in line for our consideration is Petitioners' 

second argument, which (to refresh) is that any omissions "are 

insufficient to call into question the entirety of" Petitioners' 

claims. In their briefing, they make arguments only about certain 

omissions highlighted by the agency, namely, that De Oliveira did 

not mention (1) J.C.'s use of indigenous slurs in her CFI, I-589 

application, or written affidavit; (2) J.C.'s name during her CFI; 

(3) her son being threatened in her CFI, I-589 application, or 

written affidavit; (4) the confrontation between her and J.C. in 

Belo Horizonte in her CFI, I-589 application, or written affidavit; 

and (5) Washington's tires being slashed in her CFI, I-589 

application, or written affidavit. To Petitioners, these 

omissions cannot support the agency's adverse credibility finding 

for three reasons. None persuade.

First, Petitioners argue that where De Oliveira's 

testimonies "consistently describe the presence or absence of 

persecution," omissions cannot doom her asylum claim. For example, 

they note that De Oliveira testified consistently "about the nature 

of the threats she received, how J.C. followed her, and he slashed 

her tires." But again, we're aware of no authority (and 

because they did "not involve any fraudulent documents" and De 

Oliveira "remained consistent about the timeline of her 

victimization." But Petitioners cite no authority (and we are 

aware of none) that suggests an adverse credibility finding is 

only proper when the noncitizen submits fraudulent documents or is 

inconsistent about the timeline of victimization.
- 29 -

Petitioners point us to none) that suggests omissions cannot 

support an adverse credibility finding where certain other parts 

of a noncitizen's story remain consistent. Second, Petitioners 

argue that the agency unreasonably relied on omissions in the CFI, 

despite the CFI notes' explicit disclaimer that they are not a 

verbatim transcript and certain aspects of a noncitizen's claim 

might not have been explored. It is true that we have recognized 

that an agency may err when it "fails to treat the notes as the 

sketch that they represent themselves to be." Cuesta-Rojas, 991 

F.3d at 273. But even on that score, these omissions were not 

just absent from the CFI notes, but also from the I-589 

applications and De Oliveira's written affidavit, which, we 

highlight, were prepared with the benefit of counsel's guidance. 

Third, Petitioners argue that these omissions were either too 

"insignificant" or "tangential" to the harm they endured to call 

into question their claims. In making this argument, however, 

Petitioners seem to be turning a blind eye to Congress' instruction 

that the agency can base its adverse credibility determination on 

"any inaccuracies or falsehoods . . . without regard to whether an 

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the 

applicant's claim." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). It also seems 

to ignore our instruction that, "whatever may be said about any

particular inconsistency if that inconsistency is viewed in 

splendid isolation," "credibility determinations require a 
- 30 -

reviewing court to consider the record in its entirety," so "[t]he 

whole is frequently greater than the sum of the parts." 

Mashilingi, 16 F.4th at 978.15

Ultimately, the bottom line is that the agency 

highlighted a smorgasbord of inconsistencies, which "were 

specifically identified, well-documented, hard as a group to 

reconcile or explain,16 and cumulatively persuasive of a lack of 

credibility." Id. Under these circumstances, the agency was well 

within its discretion to require further corroborative evidence. 

See Avelar Gonzalez v. Whittaker, 908 F.3d 820, 827 (1st Cir. 

2018). The agency was also well within its rights to hold against 

Petitioners the failure to provide, aside from seven generalized 

country conditions reports, any corroborative evidence such as 

15 We also dispute the characterization that some of these 

omissions could be considered "insignificant" or "tangential." 

Take, for example, the omission of the confrontation between De 

Oliveira and J.C. in Belo Horizonte. Where immigration law 

provides that asylum can "be denied if the adjudicator determines 

that [the noncitizen] could avoid persecution by internally 

relocating within the country of removal and, under all the

circumstances, it would be reasonable to do so," Caz, 84 F.4th at 

27, we do not see how Petitioners' persecutor traveling to

"[a]nother state" in Brazil, which was a "26[-]hour[]" drive from 

Santa Rita do Itueto, to threaten De Oliveira and tell her "he was 

going to kill [her], [and] kill [her] children" could be reasonably 

viewed as "insignificant" or "tangential."

16 Indeed, some of De Oliveira's explanations for these 

inconsistencies did little to help her cause. For example, when 

asked by the IJ why she didn't mention Washington's tires being 

slashed in her I-589 application or written affidavit, De Oliveira 

merely responded, "I don't know."
- 31 -

police reports or statements from De Oliveira's co-worker, 

brother, husband, or husband's cousins. Petitioners respond that 

it would have been unreasonable to require her to produce the 

Brazilian police reports given "the widespread levels of police 

corruption" and the fact that the Brazilian police demanded that 

she pay them 10,000 Brazilian reals before giving her the reports. 

But the absence of the police reports was not what the agency found 

most "striking"; rather, the agency expressed its disbelief that 

De Oliveira did not mention this "police misconduct . . . within 

the body of her written application and statement," "given that 

her claim [wa]s hinged upon her assertion that the police will do 

nothing to assist her from the threats." Petitioners also fault 

the agency for seemingly requiring live, in-court testimony from

De Oliveira's husband when immigration law imposes no such 

requirement on spouses of noncitizens, but the BIA explicitly noted 

that he could have also provided a written affidavit, given that 

he is in the United States and lives in Massachusetts.

To tie it all together, viewing the inconsistencies as 

a whole, a reasonable factfinder could determine that De Oliveira's 

testimony wasn't believable. And with no supporting evidence to 

corroborate her otherwise incredible testimony, there was a dearth 

of proof that Petitioners satisfied immigration law's definition 

of a "refugee." In other words, the adverse credibility finding 
- 32 -

was supported by substantial evidence and the agency's denial of 

asylum was proper.

Withholding of Removal

Comparatively speaking, there's much less for us to 

write to dispose of Petitioners' withholding of removal claim, as 

opposed to their asylum claim. Because Petitioners' burden is 

heavier as to withholding of removal than as to asylum,17 Cabrera, 

100 F.4th at 324, our resolution of Petitioners' asylum claim 

brings their withholding-of-removal house of cards tumbling down 

too, see, e.g., Mashilingi, 16 F.4th at 980; Avelar Gonzalez, 908 

F.3d at 828.

Loose Thread

With the finish line in sight, we have one loose thread 

to address before we end. The American Civil Liberties Union of 

Massachusetts, Inc. ("ACLUM") filed an amicus curiae18 brief in 

this case regarding some clarifications to our caselaw it hopes we 

17 Whereas a noncitizen applying for asylum need only show a 

"reasonable possibility" of persecution in the country of removal, 

which includes possibilities as low as "10%," I.N.S. v. 

Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (citation omitted), a 

noncitizen applying for withholding of removal must show "it is 

more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on account 

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion upon removal to [a] country," 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(b)(2).

18 Subbing out the Latin in favor of everyday English, "amicus 

curiae" refers to a party who "assist[s] the court on matters of 

law" through briefing and, sometimes, oral argument. Banerjee v. 

Bd. of Trs., 648 F.2d 61, 65 n.9 (1st Cir. 1981).
- 33 -

make in today's decision. In its brief, the ACLUM argues that we 

should take today's case as an opportunity to (1) "abandon, or at

the least articulate limits to, the discredited falsus in uno, 

falsus in omnibus maxim,"19 and (2) "further clarify that mere 

omissions are not inconsistencies." We, however, decline both 

invitations because "[t]he customary praxis in this circuit is to 

eschew arguments raised only by amici and not by the parties," 

Ryan v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 974 F.3d 9, 33 n.10 (1st 

Cir. 2020), and here neither party raised either issue.20

CONCLUSION

As the IJ expressed in her decision, "[i]f what [De 

Oliveira] testified to did in fact occur, the Court by no means 

condones the reprehensible actions of [J.C.]," but, for the reasons 

articulated above, we must deny the petition.

19 To set aside the Latin lingo once more in favor of everyday 

English, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus means "false in one 

thing, false in everything." Quezada-Caraballo v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 

32, 33 (1st Cir. 2016). That maxim provides that, when a witness 

lies about one thing, their entire testimony can be deemed false. 

See Castañeda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 

2007). 

20 Indeed, Petitioners explicitly note in their brief that 

"the IJ did not make a falsus in uno, falsus in [omnibus]

inference." And nowhere do they suggest an omission cannot, nor 

should not, be considered an inconsistency that can support an 

adverse credibility finding.