UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4558

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TERRY LEON BLANKENSHIP,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. Thomas E. Johnston, 

District Judge. (1:08-cr-00073-1)

Submitted: March 29, 2010 Decided: April 15, 2010

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States 

Attorney, Karen B. Schommer, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM: 

Terry Leon Blankenship pled guilty pursuant to a plea 

agreement to one count of possession of child pornography, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2) (2006). At the 

conclusion of Blankenship’s plea hearing, the district court 

found that Blankenship was competent to plead guilty, that his 

plea was freely and voluntarily made, that Blankenship 

understood the consequences of his guilty plea, and that a 

factual basis existed for Blankenship’s plea. See Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 11. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Blankenship 

to 100 months’ imprisonment, which fell within Blankenship’s 

advisory guidelines range. Blankenship timely noted his appeal. 

On appeal, Blankenship contends that his guilty plea 

was not supported by a factual basis and that the district court 

erred in accepting his plea because he denied being guilty of 

the offense. Blankenship failed to challenge the validity of 

his guilty plea in the district court. Accordingly, his claims 

on appeal are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Vonn, 

535 U.S. 55, 61-62 (2002); United States v. General, 278 F.3d 

389, 394 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Blankenship

must demonstrate that: (1) there was error; (2) the error was 

“plain;” and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If the three 

elements of this standard are met, this court may exercise its 
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discretion to notice the error only if “the error seriously 

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Blankenship fails to demonstrate any error by the district court 

in accepting his guilty plea. 

First, Blankenship’s plea was supported by a 

stipulated factual basis signed by Blankenship, which 

established the elements of the offense of conviction. 

Blankenship’s stipulation was sufficient, in itself, to 

establish a factual basis for his plea. See United States v. 

DeFusco

Also, the district court did not err in accepting 

Blankenship’s plea because, despite Blankenship’s isolated 

denial at the conclusion of his Rule 11 hearing, Blankenship 

knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty to Count Three. At the 

conclusion of his Rule 11 hearing, Blankenship did state, “[n]o, 

I didn’t actually do the crimes.” However, after consulting 

with counsel, Blankenship reversed himself stating, “I take that 

, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Moreover, during 

Blankenship’s Rule 11 hearing, the Government restated the 

stipulation, and in response to the district court’s questions, 

Blankenship admitted that he had read the stipulation, that he 

had signed the stipulation, and that he agreed with the facts in 

the stipulation. Accordingly, Blankenship’s plea was supported 

by a sufficient basis in fact. 
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back, Your Honor. Yes, I did.” When the district court asked 

him why he initially denied responsibility, Blankenship stated,

“I’m not really sure, Your Honor, but I did put the images on 

the computer, yes.” 

The remainder of the Rule 11 transcript supports 

Blankenship’s knowing and voluntary admission. Blankenship 

testified during his Rule 11 hearing that he had reviewed his 

plea agreement with his attorney, that he had sufficient time to 

discuss his case with his attorney, and that his attorney had 

answered all of his questions. The district court explained to 

Blankenship the elements of the offense to which he was pleading 

guilty, and the maximum penalties he faced by pleading guilty. 

The district court then reviewed with Blankenship his various 

trial rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, and 

Blankenship acknowledged that he understood his rights. The 

district court then asked Blankenship, “[a]s to Count Three, 

sir, how do you plead: guilty or not guilty?” To which, 

Blankenship responded “guilty.” Blankenship’s plea was, 

admittedly, voluntary and not the result of threats, coercion or 

promises not contained in his plea agreement. Blankenship’s 

isolated denial simply fails to establish any error by the 

district court in accepting his guilty plea. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED