IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–2099

Filed November 10, 2016

DANNY HOMAN, RICH TAYLOR, JERRY KEARNS, MARK SMITH, 

THOMAS COURTNEY, JANET PETERSEN, BRUCE HUNTER, CURT 

HANSON, TONY BISIGNANO, HERMAN QUIRMBACH, DICK 

DEARDEN, ART STAED, AKO ABDUL-SAMAD, JO OLDSON, RUTH 

ANN GAINES, SHARON STECKMAN, TODD TAYLOR, MARY GASKILL, 

KIRSTEN RUNNING-MARQUARDT, TIMI BROWN-POWERS, DAVE 

JACOBY, PAM JOCHUM, MATT MCCOY, MICHAEL GRONSTAL, and

BRUCE BEARINGER,

Appellants, 

vs. 

TERRY E. BRANSTAD, Governor, State of Iowa,

Appellee.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. 

Staskal, Judge.

The plaintiffs contend the Governor’s item veto of appropriations 

for the mental health institutes in Mount Pleasant and Clarinda, Iowa,

exceeded the scope of his constitutional authority. AFFIRMED.

Mark T. Hedberg, Nathaniel R. Boulton, and Sarah M. Wolfe of 

Hedberg & Boulton, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor 

General, and Meghan L. Gavin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The president of a public employee union and members of the 

general assembly filed a petition for injunctive relief and writ of 

mandamus challenging the Governor’s item veto of appropriations for the 

mental health institutes in Mount Pleasant and Clarinda. The parties 

both filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition. 

The plaintiffs appealed.

We find the appeal was timely and the issue of the Governor’s veto 

was not moot. On the merits, we find the Governor’s item veto of 

appropriations for the mental health institutes in Mount Pleasant and 

Clarinda did not exceed the scope of his constitutional authority. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the 

petition.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

During its 2015 session, the general assembly passed two bills 

intended to appropriate money from the state general fund for the 

operation of two mental health institutes operated by the state. House 

File 666 appropriated $1,810,000 to fund “the acute inpatient 

psychiatric mental health program and the geropsychiatric program” at 

the Clarinda Mental Health Institute for the period of July 1, 2015, 

through December 15, 2015. 2015 Iowa Acts ch. 142, § 12. Senate File 

505 appropriated $6,424,880 and $3,212,440 to fund the operation of 

the Mount Pleasant Mental Health Institute and its continued provision 

of “adult psychiatric services including inpatient acute care, inpatient 

substance abuse treatment, and inpatient dual diagnosis substance use 

disorder and mental illness treatment” for the periods of July 1, 2015, 
3

through June 30, 2016, and July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017, 

respectively. Id. ch. 137, §§ 23, 143. 

The Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes were 

closed on June 30, 2015, resulting in the layoffs of numerous state 

employees represented by the Iowa branch of the American Federation of 

State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Two days later on 

July 2, the Governor signed House File 666 and Senate File 505 but 

vetoed the appropriations intended to fund the Mount Pleasant and 

Clarinda Mental Health Institutes. In his veto message, the Governor set 

forth a brief written explanation for his veto of the appropriations 

provisions in Senate File 505, noting he believed it was not in the best 

interests of patients, taxpayers, or the mental health system to continue 

operating the Mount Pleasant Mental Health Institute. See id. ch. 137, 

veto statement. In a separate statement, the Governor addressed his 

veto of the appropriations provisions in House File 666, concluding the 

appropriation of funds to operate the Clarinda Mental Health Institute 

was “unnecessary” because he had already signed Senate File 505, which 

he described as closing the Clarinda Mental Health Institute on 

December 15. See id. ch. 142, veto statement. 

On July 9, the AFSCME Iowa Council 61 president and twenty 

state legislators brought this suit against the Governor and the director 

of human services. The plaintiffs alleged actions taken by the Governor 

and the director associated with the closings of the Mount Pleasant and 

Clarinda Mental Health Institutes exceeded the scope of their state 

constitutional and statutory authority. As the basis for their claims, the 

plaintiffs asserted the Iowa Code mandates the existence of the Mount 

Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes and their continued 

operation under the authority and control of the director of human 
4

services. See Iowa Code ch. 218 (2015)1; id. § 226.1. They sought (1) a 

temporary or permanent injunction barring the Governor from closing 

the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes or taking any 

actions in furtherance thereof including the misappropriation or 

impounding of funds apportioned thereto, (2) a writ of mandamus 

commanding the Governor and the director to keep the institutions open 

or commanding the Governor to convene an extraordinary session of the 

general assembly to appropriate funds for their operation, and (3) all 

other or further relief the district court deemed appropriate. 

The Governor filed a motion requesting the district court to dismiss 

the petition, asserting the political-question doctrine barred the action, 

the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the petition failed to state a claim 

upon which the court may grant relief. Alternatively, the Governor 

requested the district court order the plaintiffs to recast their petition. 

The district court denied the motion in part, concluding the 

political-question doctrine did not bar the action, the plaintiffs had 

standing, and the petition stated a cognizable challenge to the Governor’s 

exercise of his constitutional item veto authority for which the court 

could grant relief. However, the court granted the motion to dismiss as 

to the director of human services. The plaintiffs did not appeal that 

dismissal. The court also determined the basis for and nature of the 

claim asserted by the plaintiffs was clear, and it concluded there was no 

need to order the plaintiffs to recast their petition. 

Immediately thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment and a joint statement of undisputed facts. On 

November 3, the district court granted summary judgment to the 

1All references to the Iowa Code are to the 2015 Code unless otherwise noted.

 
5

Governor and dismissed the petition. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion 

to enlarge or amend the district court ruling. The district court denied 

the motion to enlarge or amend its order dismissing the case. 

The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and a request for an expedited 

appeal, which we granted. On its own motion after the parties had 

submitted their briefs on the merits, we requested the parties to file 

statements addressing the possible mootness of this appeal, and

assuming the case was moot, whether we should decide the appeal 

pursuant to the public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine or 

summarily dismiss it. 

II. Issues.

This case presents the following issues: (1) whether this appeal 

should be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ rule 

1.904(2) motion did not toll the time to take the appeal, (2) whether this 

appeal is moot because the general assembly did not appropriate funds 

for the operation of these institutions for fiscal year 2017, and 

(3) whether the Governor’s item veto of the appropriations for the 

Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes exceeded the 

scope of his constitutional authority.

III. Timeliness of Appeal.

The timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional 

question. State v. Olsen, 794 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 2011). The filing of 

an improper or untimely posttrial motion does not toll the deadline for 

filing a notice of appeal. Id. Under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 

6.101(1), a party must ordinarily file a notice of appeal within thirty days 

of the filing of the final order or judgment. Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b);

Sierra Club Iowa Chapter v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 832 N.W.2d 636, 640 

(Iowa 2013). However, a timely and proper motion to enlarge or amend 
6

the findings of fact or conclusions of law tolls the time to file an appeal

until such time the district court enters a ruling on the motion. Iowa R. 

App. P. 6.101(1)(b); In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 

2005). After the court rules on the motion, the party has to file its notice 

of appeal within thirty days of the ruling. Okland, 699 N.W.2d at 264. 

In other words, following the filing of a timely and proper posttrial motion 

under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.101(1), a notice of appeal is 

timely if a party files the notice within thirty days of the district court 

ruling on the motion. Sierra Club, 832 N.W.2d at 640. If the party has 

not filed a timely and proper motion, we lack jurisdiction to decide the 

merits of an appeal. Id.

The district court entered a final judgment dismissing the petition 

on November 3. The plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal within thirty 

days of the final judgment. However, on November 10, the plaintiffs filed 

a motion to enlarge or amend the district court judgment under Iowa 

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The district court denied the motion on 

December 7, and the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on December 9. 

To determine whether the filing of the rule 1.904(2) motion tolled 

the deadline to file their notice of appeal, we must determine (1) whether 

the plaintiffs timely filed the motion, and (2) whether the motion was 

proper. Id.

To be timely, a party must file a rule 1.904(2) motion by the 

deadline for filing a motion for new trial. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). Thus, 

a party must ordinarily file it within fifteen days after the district court 

enters the judgment or decree. See id. r. 1.1007 (stating a party must 

file a motion for new trial within fifteen days of the filing of the district 

court decision unless the court grants additional time for good cause 

shown). Here, the plaintiffs filed the motion to enlarge or amend the 
7

district court ruling seven days after its entry. We thus conclude the 

motion was timely.

Accordingly, the question of whether we have jurisdiction to decide 

the merits of this appeal turns on whether the plaintiffs filed the motion 

to enlarge or amend the district court ruling for a proper purpose. In 

this case, answering that question requires us to examine the motion, 

the portions of the petition referenced therein, and the summary 

judgment ruling dismissing the petition in light of our caselaw 

addressing the propriety of rule 1.904(2) motions. 

By its terms, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904 creates a 

procedure by which a district court may enlarge or amend a prior ruling 

made in a case not tried before a jury. Sierra Club, 832 N.W.2d at 641; 

Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Iowa 2002). In relevant part, 

the rule provides,

1.904(1) The court trying an issue of fact without a 

jury, whether by equitable or ordinary proceedings, shall find 

the facts in writing, separately stating its conclusions of law, 

and direct an appropriate judgment. . . .

1.904(2) On motion joined with or filed within the 

time allowed for a motion for new trial, the findings and 

conclusions may be enlarged or amended and the judgment 

or decree modified accordingly or a different judgment or 

decree substituted.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904. Because the filing of an improper motion to 

enlarge or amend a district court ruling does not toll the time for filing a 

notice of appeal, “the rule can create a trap for an unwary litigant who 

desires to appeal.” Okland, 699 N.W.2d at 265 n.2.

The propriety of a rule 1.904(2) motion depends on the nature of 

the request it makes of the district court. Rule 1.904(2) generally gives 

each party an opportunity to request a change or modification to each 

adverse judgment entered against it by the district court before deciding 
8

whether to incur the time and expense of an appeal. Okland, 699 

N.W.2d at 267. A proper rule 1.904(2) motion does not merely seek 

reconsideration of an adverse district court judgment. Sierra Club, 832 

N.W.2d at 641. Nor does it merely seek to rehash legal issues adversely 

decided. Id. A rule 1.904(2) motion is ordinarily improper if it seeks to 

enlarge or amend a district court ruling on a question of law involving no 

underlying issues of fact. Id.; Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 538. Likewise, a rule 

1.904(2) motion that asks the district court to amend or enlarge its prior 

ruling based solely on new evidence is generally improper. See McKee v. 

Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 864 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa 2015). Ordinarily, 

a proper rule 1.904(2) motion asks the district court to amend or enlarge 

either a ruling on a factual issue or a ruling on a legal issue raised in the 

context of an underlying factual issue based on the evidence in the 

record. See McKee, 864 N.W.2d at 525; Sierra Club, 832 N.W.2d at 641; 

Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 538.

Nonetheless, when a party has presented an issue, claim, or legal 

theory and the district court has failed to rule on it, a rule 1.904(2) 

motion is proper means by which to preserve error and request a ruling 

from the district court. Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 539; Explore Info. Servs. v. 

Iowa Ct. Info. Sys., 636 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 2001). When a rule 1.904(2) 

motion requests a ruling on an issue properly presented to but not 

decided by the district court, the motion is proper even if the issue is a 

purely legal one. Sierra Club, 832 N.W.2d at 641. 

In the plaintiffs’ rule 1.904(2) motion, they alleged the district 

court order dismissing the petition “failed to address the issues and 

arguments presented on the request for injunctive relief as well as the 

issues and argument presented on the request for a writ of mandamus.” 

The plaintiffs also alleged it was critical to the proper disposition of the 
9

case for the court to determine whether either of the vetoes “had an 

illegal or unconstitutional effect” as they “essentially . . . resulted in the 

state violating its own statutory obligations.” 

To assist us in determining whether the plaintiffs identified factual 

or legal issues that were the proper subject of a motion to enlarge or 

amend the district court ruling on their rule 1.904(2) motion, we must

examine the petition. In their request for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs 

alleged (1) the plaintiffs would be greatly and irreparably harmed unless 

an injunction was issued, (2) they were likely to succeed on the merits of 

their claim the Governor violated his duty to faithfully execute the laws of 

the state under article IV, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution, (3) a 

balancing of the equities favored the issuance of an injunction, and 

(4) no other remedy available at law was adequate. 

In their request for mandamus, the plaintiffs alleged (1) the 

Governor had a legal obligation and duty to faithfully execute the laws of 

the state; (2) the Governor violated this duty; and (3) no other plain, 

speedy, and adequate remedy was available in the ordinary course of 

law. Finally, as the basis for these requests for specific relief, the 

plaintiffs alleged the Iowa Code mandates the existence and continued 

operation of both the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health 

Institutes and the Governor exceeded the scope of his constitutional 

authority and violated provisions of the Iowa Code by vetoing the 

legislative appropriations intended therefore. 

In granting the Governor’s summary judgment, the district court 

held the existing statutes in the Code constitute neither a condition on 

future legislative appropriations to which the item veto power does not 

extend nor an independent limit on its exercise external to the 

constitution. Though the court concluded the vetoes fell squarely within 
10

the scope of the item veto authority afforded the Governor by article III, 

section 16 of the Iowa Constitution, it did not make any specific 

conclusions with respect to the question of whether the Governor failed 

to faithfully execute the laws as required by article IV, section 9 of the 

Iowa Constitution by vetoing the legislative appropriations for the mental 

health institutes. Rather, after stating its conclusion that the vetoes did 

not violate article III, section 16, the court simply stated they violated no 

other constitutional provision. 

Additionally, the court did not assess whether the statutory 

provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs mandated the continued 

operation of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes. 

Instead, because the court concluded the content of the statutory 

provisions made no difference in the outcome, it simply assumed they 

mandated the continued operation of the mental health institutes 

without actually interpreting them. 

Notably, the district court recognized that further analysis would 

be required if the petition alleged a claim involving an exercise of the 

pocket veto that pitted the authority granted the Governor by article III, 

section 16 against some constitutional limit on his power to exercise it. 

The order dismissing the petition acknowledged that the case would have 

presented a closer question if the vetoes had “placed two constitutional 

provisions at loggerheads.” Yet the petition alleged such a claim, and the 

order dismissing the petition failed to address it. Though the order 

stated the vetoes fell squarely within the Governor’s item veto authority 

under article III, section 16 and did not violate any other constitutional 

provision, the court reached the latter conclusion without engaging in 

any analysis that might explain the basis for its decision. 
11

From the order dismissing the petition, it was unclear whether the 

court actually considered whether the Governor had violated article IV, 

section 9 by failing to faithfully execute provisions of the Iowa Code 

mandating the continued funding and operation of the mental health 

institutes as the plaintiffs claimed. In fact, the court never even cited 

article IV, section 9 in its order dismissing the petition, nor did it provide 

any analysis as to how it reached its conclusion that the vetoes did not 

violate any constitutional provision. 

Given the content of the order dismissing the petition, it is evident 

the rule 1.904(2) motion sought consideration of related, solely legal 

issues presented to but not decided by the district court. Namely, the 

motion sought a ruling on the question of whether the Governor violated 

article IV, section 9 by vetoing the legislative appropriations intended to 

fund the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes and the 

related question of whether the Iowa Code mandated their continued 

funding and operation. The district court discussed neither question in 

the order dismissing the petition.

Because we conclude the rule 1.904(2) motion sought legal 

conclusions on issues presented to but not ruled upon by the district 

court, we conclude the plaintiffs filed the motion for a proper purpose 

and the filing of the motion tolled the deadline for filing the notice of 

appeal. Consequently, we retain jurisdiction to decide the merits of this 

appeal. 

IV. Mootness.

After the parties submitted their briefs, we asked them to file 

statements addressing the possible mootness of this appeal and, 

assuming it is moot, whether the court should decide it pursuant to the 

public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine or summarily 
12

dismiss it. In particular, we directed the parties to address this issue in 

light of Homan v. Branstad, 864 N.W.2d 321 (Iowa 2015), a prior 

unrelated case in which the Governor and the same lead plaintiff as the 

present appeal were parties. 

Homan involved the question of whether the Governor and the 

director of human services could impound funds for the continued 

operation of a juvenile home allocated in an appropriations bill the 

Governor had signed into law. Id. at 323–25, 327. Before considering 

the merits of the interlocutory appeal from a district court ruling 

granting a temporary injunction to the plaintiffs, we considered the 

threshold question of whether the appeal was moot because the general 

assembly had not appropriated funds for the continued operation of the 

juvenile home in the subsequent legislative session. Id. at 327–28. 

We determined the appeal was moot because we lacked authority 

to order state officials to continue operating the home because the 

general assembly had decided not to appropriate funds for its continued 

operation the following year. Id. at 330. Though we acknowledged the 

appeal raised an issue of public importance concerning the scope of the 

Governor’s impoundment authority, we declined to decide it pursuant to 

the public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 331–32. 

The Governor asserts this appeal is moot because the general 

assembly did not appropriate funds for the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda 

Mental Health Institutes during the 2016 legislative session. The 

plaintiffs assert the appeal is not moot because the Iowa Code still 

mandates the continued existence and operation of the mental health 

institutes. They further argue these Code provisions, together with the 

constitutional provision contained in article IV, section 9 of the Iowa 

Constitution requiring the Governor “shall take care that the laws are 
13

faithfully executed,” require us to resolve the issue. We agree that the 

general assembly’s failure to appropriate funds for the Mount Pleasant 

and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes during the 2016 legislative session

does not make this case moot because the constitutional provisions and 

the statutes are still in force. Consequently, we must determine if the 

constitutional provisions and the statutes limit the Governor’s item veto 

power.

V. Whether the Governor’s Item Veto of the Appropriations for

the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes Exceeded 

the Scope of His Constitutional Authority.

A. Standard of Review. We review a district court ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Pillsbury 

Co. v. Wells Dairy, Inc., 752 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Iowa 2008). Summary 

judgment is appropriate only when the moving party has demonstrated 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In determining whether a 

grant of summary judgment was appropriate, we examine the record in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all legitimate 

inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in his or her favor. 

C & J Vantage Leasing Co. v. Wolfe, 795 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Iowa 2011). 

Our review is limited to the questions of whether a genuine dispute 

concerning a material fact exists and, if not, whether the district court 

correctly applied the law. Id. at 73; Pillsbury Co., 752 N.W.2d at 434. A 

fact is material when its determination might affect the outcome of a 

suit. Walker v. State, 801 N.W.2d 548, 554 (2011). A genuine issue 

concerning a fact exists when reasonable minds can differ as to how a 

factual question should be resolved. Id. We may generally resolve a 

matter on summary judgment when the record reveals only the legal 
14

consequences of undisputed facts are in issue. City of Fairfield v. Harper 

Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 2005). 

In the context of a challenge to a summary judgment ruling 

concerning the propriety of an exercise of the item veto authority, a 

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to preclude a grant of summary 

judgment must concern an adjudicative fact related to the enactment of a 

bill by the general assembly in a particular form or the exercise of the 

item veto power with respect to a particular portion of the bill. See Welsh 

v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Iowa 1991). All other matters bearing 

on whether a vetoed provision within a particular bill constituted an item 

within an appropriation bill subject to the item veto power are legislative 

facts. Id. A dispute concerning legislative facts that essentially amounts 

to competing assertions of an evaluative nature on the issue of whether a 

particular provision within a particular bill is subject to the item veto 

power does not itself constitute a basis for the denial of summary 

judgment. See id. 

When resolving an appeal from a district court ruling on a 

summary judgment motion requires us to resolve a legal question 

involving statutory interpretation, we review the district court ruling on 

the statutory interpretation question for correction of errors at law. See 

City of Postville v. Upper Explorerland Reg’l Planning Comm’n, 834 N.W.2d 

1, 6 (Iowa 2013); C & J Vantage Leasing Co., 795 N.W.2d at 73. “In 

construing the Iowa Constitution, we generally apply the same rules of 

construction that we apply to statutes.” Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 

193, 199 (Iowa 2004). 

B. The Item Veto. The source of the Governor’s item veto power 

is article III, section 16 of the Iowa Constitution, which provides,
15

The governor may approve appropriation bills in whole 

or in part, and may disapprove any item of an appropriation 

bill; and the part approved shall become a law. Any item of 

an appropriation bill disapproved by the governor shall be 

returned, with his objections, to the house in which it 

originated, or shall be deposited by him in the office of the 

secretary of state in the case of an appropriation bill 

submitted to the governor for his approval during the last 

three days of a session of the general assembly, and the 

procedure in each case shall be the same as provided for 

other bills. Any such item of an appropriation bill may be 

enacted into law notwithstanding the governor’s objections, 

in the same manner as provided for other bills. 

Iowa Const. art. III, § 16. The citizens of Iowa granted the Governor the 

item veto power by ratifying an amendment to the Iowa Constitution in 

1968. Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 203. 

Our caselaw identifies two core limitations on the item veto power 

derived from the language of article III, section 16. See id. at 206. First, 

any bill on which the item veto power is exercised must be either a 

traditional appropriation bill that contains at least one monetary 

allocation on its face or a specialized appropriation bill that allocates 

funds by directly ordering an expenditure or commanding alterations to 

standing allocations directed by the Code. Id. Second, the Governor 

may exercise his item veto on an item within an appropriation bill. Id. 

Items subject to the item veto power include (1) specific appropriations 

appearing on the face of appropriation bills, (2) conditioned 

appropriations in their entirety, including the appropriation themselves 

and all accompanying conditions limiting or directing the use to which 

they may be put, and (3) riders within appropriation bills that 

substantively legislate but do not limit the uses to which an 

appropriation may be put. Id. at 205–06; Colton v. Branstad, 372 N.W.2d 

184, 191 (Iowa 1985). Whether a particular bill constitutes an 

appropriation bill and whether a particular provision within an 
16

appropriation bill constitutes an item subject to the item veto power are 

questions of law. See Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 206–07. 

In the district court, the parties filed a joint statement of 

undisputed facts and a joint appendix addressing every material 

adjudicative fact relevant to the question of whether the provisions 

intended to appropriate funds for the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda 

Mental Health Institutes in House File 666 and Senate File 505 

constituted items within appropriation bills. In granting summary 

judgment to the Governor, the district court determined that he exercised 

his vetoes on items within appropriation bills. Neither party disputes 

this determination on appeal. 

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the vetoed 

provisions at issue in this appeal unquestionably constituted items 

within appropriation bills. The provisions at issue in this case plainly 

met the two primary prerequisites for a constitutional exercise of the item 

veto power granted in article III, section 16. We therefore affirm the 

district court ruling in this respect.

C. Claimed Limitations on the Governor’s Item Veto Power. 

Having affirmed the district court ruling that the item vetoes met the 

prerequisites on exercises of the item veto power originating within 

article III, section 16, we now turn to the question of whether the 

Governor violated article IV, section 9 by exercising his item veto power 

to eliminate all legislative appropriations intended to fund the Mount 

Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes.

Article IV, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution provides the Governor 

“shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed.” Iowa Const. art. 

IV, § 9. The plaintiffs claim Iowa Code sections 226.1 and 218.1 

mandate the continued funding and operation of these mental health 
17

institutes. Therefore, they claim the Governor violated article IV, section 

9 when he exercised his item veto power to entirely eliminate their 

funding. 

Although there could be a limiting power on the Governor’s veto 

authority, to resolve this appeal we need not decide whether a limiting 

power on the Governor’s veto authority exists and, if it does, the contours 

of the limitation. We reach this conclusion because we disagree with the 

plaintiffs’ premise that Iowa Code sections 226.1 and 218.1 mandate the 

continued funding and operation of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda 

Mental Health Institutes.

When interpreting statutory provisions, we have previously stated,

The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative 

intent. We determine legislative intent from the words 

chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have 

said. Absent a statutory definition or an established 

meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their 

ordinary and common meaning by considering the context 

within which they are used. Under the guise of 

construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge, 

or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.

State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Auen v. 

Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations 

omitted)). 

Further, we have said, “legislative intent is derived not only from 

the language used but also from ‘the statute’s “subject matter, the object 

sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, 

remedies provided, and the consequences of the various 

interpretations.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 

2004)). We also give weight to explanations attached to bills as 

indications of legislative intent. City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., 

Inc., 701 N.W.2d 673, 677 (Iowa 2005).
18

We will not consider what the legislature “should or might have 

said” when it constructed a statute. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(m); Marcus 

v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995). In determining legislative 

intent, we may also look to the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio 

alterius,” meaning expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. 

Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 289. It is an established rule of statutory 

construction that “legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as 

by inclusion, and the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion 

of others not so mentioned.” Id.

Additionally, we aim to give meaning to the statutory changes the 

general assembly enacts. Davis v. State, 682 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004). 

“When an amendment to a statute adds or deletes words, a change in the 

law is presumed unless the remaining language amounts to the same 

thing.” Id. When considering statutory amendments, we must assume 

that the general assembly “sought to accomplish some purpose” and the 

amendment “was not a futile exercise.” Id.

We now turn to the statutory provisions upon which the plaintiffs 

base their claim to determine whether the general assembly intended to 

require the continued funding of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda 

Mental Health Institutes. 

Section 226.1 of the Iowa Code provides, in relevant part,

1. The state hospitals for persons with mental illness 

shall be designated as follows:

a. Mental Health Institute, Mount Pleasant, Iowa.

. . . .

c. Mental Health Institute, Clarinda, Iowa.

. . . .
19

2. a. The purpose of the mental health institutes is to 

operate as regional resource centers providing one or more of 

the following:

(1) Treatment, training, care, habilitation, and support 

of persons with mental illness or a substance abuse 

problem.

(2) Facilities, services, and other support to the 

communities located in the region being served by a mental 

health institute so as to maximize the usefulness of the 

mental health institutes while minimizing overall costs.

(3) A unit for the civil commitment of sexually violent 

predators committed to the custody of the director of human

services pursuant to chapter 229A.

b. In addition, the mental health institutes are 

encouraged to act as a training resource for communitybased program staff, medical students, and other 

participants in professional education programs.

Iowa Code § 226.1(1)–(2). The plaintiffs argue section 226.1 mandates 

the continued existence of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental 

Health Institutes. To determine whether the plaintiffs are correct 

requires us to ascertain the general assembly’s intent.

To do so, we next turn to the legislative history of section 226.1. 

The legislative assembly of the Territory of Iowa enacted the first statute 

concerning “insane persons” in its first session in 1838.2 If a jury found 

a person to be “insane,” the court appointed three people as guardians to 

take care of the person. The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa, Insane 

Persons § 2, at 292 (1839). The Code in 1851 provided the court shall 

appoint a guardian if a person is found to be “insane,” and the guardian 

may confine him or commit him to jail on an order of the county judge 

who may also release him. Iowa Code ch. 50, §§ 860, 862 (1851).

2All references to persons with mental illness are intended to be quotes and 

reflect the words the general assembly used in various statutes it enacted. 

 
20

In 1854, the fifth general assembly passed an act to establish 

Iowa’s first state “asylum for the Insane . . . at or near Mount Pleasant, 

in Henry county.” 1854 Iowa Acts ch. 134, § 1. In 1858, the seventh 

general assembly passed an act described by its summary as “[an act] for 

the government of the Iowa Insane Hospital, and the care of the Insane 

and Idiots.” 1858 Iowa Acts ch. 141. Section 1 of the act provided “[t]hat 

the Insane Hospital located at Mount Pleasant, shall be known by the 

title of the Iowa Insane Hospital, and shall be placed under the charge of 

a board of seven Trustees.” Id. at § 1. Section 64 repealed “Chapter 50 

of the Code and all Acts and parts of Acts in regard to the care of the 

insane and idiots, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.” 

Id. at § 64.

The Revision of 1860 again renamed the hospital and detailed the 

governance of the hospital. Revision of 1860 ch. 59, § 1471. Specifically, 

section 1471 provided “[t]hat the hospital for the insane, located in 

Mount Pleasant . . . shall be known under the name and by the title of 

the Iowa hospital for the insane, and shall be placed under the charge of 

seven trustees.” Id. at § 1471.

In 1868, the twelfth general assembly passed an appropriation bill

to “[p]ermanently [l]ocate, and to [p]rovide for the [e]rection of an 

[a]dditional [i]nstitution for the [i]nsane.” 1868 Iowa Acts ch. 97. 

Section 1 provided that “there shall be and is hereby permanently 

established at Independence . . . an [a]dditional [i]nstitution for the 

[s]upport and [c]are of the [i]nsane.” Id. at § 1. However, in 1870, the 

thirteenth general assembly passed a statute described as “[an act] for 

the [g]overnment of the [h]ospitals for the [i]nsane, [d]efining the [l]egal 

[r]elations of [i]nsane [p]ersons, and [p]roviding for their [c]are and 

[p]rotection.” 1870 Iowa Acts ch. 109. Section 1 provided,
21

That the Hospital for the Insane, located at Mount Pleasant, 

in Henry county, shall hereafter be known by the name of 

the Iowa Hospital for the Insane at Mount Pleasant; and the 

Hospital for the Insane located at Independence, in 

Buchanan county, shall be known by the name of the Iowa 

Hospital for the Insane at Independence. Each of said 

Hospitals shall be under the charge of seven Trustees. . . .

Id. at § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 1383 (1873)). Section 58 of the act 

repealed “[a]ll acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this 

act.” Id. at § 58. The permanency language from the 1868 appropriation 

bill that created the hospital in Independence was not included in the 

1870 act, and that language was therefore, presumably abandoned.

In 1884, the twentieth general assembly passed an act providing 

for an additional hospital for the “insane.” 1884 Iowa Acts ch. 201, § 1. 

Section 1 stated “[t]hat there shall be erected and permanently 

established at the place to be selected as hereinafter provided, an 

additional hospital for the support, care, and treatment of the insane of 

the state.” Id. Section 3 delineated that the hospital “shall be in the 

southwestern portion of the state.” Id. at § 3. The 1884 Supplement to 

McClain’s Annotated Statutes of the State of Iowa contained all the 

amendments to the Code, acts passed by the nineteenth and twentieth 

general assemblies, and notes of decisions made by the supreme court. 

However, in subsequent legislation the general assembly did not include 

the permanency language. See 1888 Iowa Acts ch. 75, §§ 1–2 (codified at 

McClain’s Ann. Code §§ 2182–2183 (1888)).

In 1888, the twenty-second general assembly passed an act 

establishing an additional “hospital for the insane” at Clarinda as well as 

organizing the board of trustees for the hospital. Id. Section 1 of the act 

provided “the hospital for the insane, located at Clarinda . . . shall be 

known by the name of the Iowa Hospital for the Insane at Clarinda.” Id. 
22

Section 2182 of the Code of 1888 naming the Clarinda hospital, mirrors

section 2170 of the Code providing for the naming and trustees for the 

hospitals at Mount Pleasant and Independence. Compare McClain’s Ann. 

Code § 2182 (1888), with id. § 2170 (1888)). 

In 1894, the twenty-fifth general assembly passed an act declaring 

“there shall be erected and permanently established at the place to be 

selected as herein provided an additional hospital for the support, care, 

and treatment of the insane of the State.” 1894 Iowa Acts ch. 80, § 1. 

The statute further provided for the manner in which the location should 

be selected and the appointment of commissioners as well as their 

duties. Id. §§ 2–13. This provision was never codified because the next 

Code was not published in 1897. 

Before the 1897 Code was codified, the twenty-fifth general 

assembly also passed an act creating a five-person commission to revise 

and codify the laws of Iowa and report necessary and desirable changes 

to the twenty-sixth general assembly. Id. ch. 115, § 1. Specifically, 

section 4 of the act provided,

Said commission shall carefully revise and codify the laws of 

Iowa, and shall rewrite the same and divide them into 

appropriate parts and arrange them under appropriate titles, 

chapters, and sections; omit all parts repealed or obsolete, 

insert all amendments and make the laws complete. Said 

commission shall have the power to transpose words and 

sentences, arrange the same into sections or paragraphs and 

number them, change the phraseology and make any and all 

alterations necessary to improve, systematize, harmonize 

and make the laws clear and intelligible. They shall omit 

from said revision all laws of a local or temporary character

. . . .

Id. § 4. 

In 1896, the Code Commission presented the twenty-sixth general 

assembly with a proposed Code and an explanatory report. The 
23

explanatory report explained the commission’s proposed revisions to title 

XII, chapter 2, relating to “the care of the insane.” Rep. of the Code 

Comm’n, 26th G.A., at 65 (Iowa 1896). The report listed the involved 

Code sections3 and stated that a uniform system of provisions was

created for all the hospitals. Id.; Proposed Revision of the Code of Iowa, 

26th G.A., at 443 (1896). The report also included that “[p]rovisions as 

to election of trustees, their qualifications, compensation, etc., are 

covered by a general chapter applicable to all state institutions.” Rep. of 

the Code Comm’n, at 65; Proposed Revision of the Code of Iowa, at 529.

In 1897, the state published the Code, and the general assembly 

approved and incorporated the proposed provisions for the “insane”

hospitals into the Code of 1897 with the exact language proposed by the 

Code Commission. Compare Iowa Code Ann. § 2253 (1897), with

Proposed Revision of the Code of Iowa, at 443. Section 2253 of the 1897 

Code provided,

Hospitals—trustees. The hospital for the insane at Mount 

Pleasant shall be known by the name of “The Hospital for the 

Insane at Mount Pleasant”; the one at Independence, “The 

Hospital for the Insane at Independence”; the one at 

Clarinda, “the Hospital for the Insane at Clarinda”; and the 

one at Cherokee, “The Hospital for the Insane at Cherokee”; 

each of which shall be under the management of five 

trustees, two of whom may be women, one of whom shall be 

a resident of the place in which the hospital is located. 

Iowa Code Ann. § 2253 (1897).

The phrase at issue in the case today, “shall be designated,” first 

appeared in the Code of 1954. Iowa Code § 226.1 (1954). Section 226.1

was entitled “[o]fficial designation,” and stated that “[t]he hospitals for 

3Iowa Code §§ 1383–1445, 3825, 3826; 15 G.A., chs. 26, 53; 16 G.A., ch. 28; 17 

G.A., chs. 84, 100, 183; 18 G.A., ch. 152; 20 G.A., ch. 66; 21 G.A., ch. 47; 22 G.A., 

chs. 68, 75, 76; 24 G.A., chs. 24, 48; 25 G.A., ch. 80. McClain’s Ann. Code §§ 2170–

2248, 5102, 5103 (1888).

 
24

the insane shall be designated as follows: 1. Mental Health Institute, 

Mount Pleasant, Iowa. . . . 3. Mental Health Institute, Clarinda, Iowa.” 

Id. Prior to the codification of section 226.1, the fifty-fourth general 

assembly passed an act “to change the official designation of the four 

state hospitals for insane to mental health institutes at the cities and 

towns wherein located.” 1951 Iowa Acts ch. 83 (codified at Iowa Code 

§ 226.1 (1954)). 

The explanation in the bill in which the 1951 act was derived from 

included the following: “This bill is suggested by the Board of Control. It 

is felt that the change in the official names of the state insane hospitals 

would be helpful to the mental welfare of the patients therein.” H.F. 592, 

54th G.A., explanation (Iowa 1951).

The legislative history of section 226.1 indicates the general 

assembly intended the use of the phrase “shall be designated” to ascribe 

specific names to the state mental health institutions, not to mandate 

their existence in perpetuity. This conclusion harmonizes with the 

common meaning of the word “designate.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

defines “designate” as “[t]o represent or refer to (something) using a 

particular symbol, sign, name, etc.” Designate, Black’s Law Dictionary

(10th ed. 2014). 

Further, based on the principles of statutory construction, we 

must conclude that the general assembly’s omission of the phrase 

“permanently established” in the Code after 1894 altered its meaning. 

We cannot read into the statute what we think it ought to say. Marcus, 

538 N.W.2d at 289. What the general assembly actually said guides our 

interpretation. Id. Thus, we cannot read into section 226.1 a mandatory 

existence of the mental health institutes referred to in section 226.1(1).
25

We now turn our attention to the second statute on which the 

plaintiffs rely. Section 218.1 provides,

The director of human services shall have the general 

and full authority given under statute to control, manage, 

direct, and operate the following institutions under the 

director’s jurisdiction, and may at the director’s discretion 

assign the powers and authorities given the director by 

statute to any one of the deputy directors, division 

administrators, or officers or employees of the divisions of 

the department of human services:

. . . .

4. Mental health institute, Clarinda, Iowa.

. . . .

6. Mental health institute, Mount Pleasant, Iowa.

Iowa Code § 218.1. 

The plaintiffs contend section 218.1 supports their claim that the

general assembly mandated the continued existence of the Mount 

Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes. However, like the 

legislative history of 226.1, the history of section 218.1 does not lend 

itself to the plaintiffs’ interpretation.

As previously discussed, the Code Commission of 1896 proposed 

moving the provisions relating to the trustees of the state hospitals to a 

separate chapter in the Code relating to the governance of all state 

institutions. Rep. of the Code Comm’n, at 65 (1896); Proposed Revision 

of the Code of Iowa, at 529. The twenty-sixth general assembly adopted 

the commission’s proposal, and section 2609(3) of the 1897 Code 

provided,

The general assembly shall elect the following regents 

and trustees of the state institutions . . . .

. . . .
26

3. For the college for the blind, each of the hospitals 

for the insane, and the industrial school, five trustees each, 

who shall hold office for six years . . . .

Iowa Code § 2609(3) (1897). 

A year later, the twenty-seventh general assembly passed a bill to 

create a state board of control to “manage, control, and govern . . . the 

state hospitals for the insane.” 1898 Iowa Acts ch. 118, § 8 (codified at 

Iowa Code § 2727-a8 (Supp. 1902)). Since then, the general assembly 

amended the chapter several times to add and remove specific 

institutions from under the governance of the board of control. See, e.g.,

1911 Iowa Acts ch. 141, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 2682-c (Supp. 

1913)) (transferring the control and management of the college for the 

blind at Vinton to the state board of education); 1917 Iowa Acts ch. 160, 

§ 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 2318 (1919)) (transferring control of the state 

school for the deaf to the state board of education); 1947 Iowa Acts ch. 

110, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 262.7 (1950)) (transferring the 

supervision of the state sanatorium to the board of education); 1983 Iowa 

Acts ch. 96, §§ 3, 66 (codified at Iowa Code § 217A.2 (1985)) (transferring 

control of state correctional institutions to the department of 

corrections). The general assembly has also amended the statute to 

change the names of the institutions under its authority. See, e.g., 1951 

Iowa Acts ch. 82, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 218.1 (1954)) (changing the 

name of the “soldiers’ orphans home to The Iowa Annie Wittenmyer 

Home”); 1951 Iowa Acts ch. 83, §§ 1–4 (codified at Iowa Code § 218.1 

(1954)) (“[an act] to change the official designation of the four state 

hospitals for insane to mental health institutes at the cities and towns 

wherein located”); 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 101, § 37 (codified at Iowa Code 

§ 218.1 (1985)) (amending “Soldiers Home” to “Iowa veterans home” and 

“Eldora training school” to “State training school”). Finally, the general 
27

assembly has amended the statute to change the governing authority to 

what is currently the director of human services. See, e.g., 1967 Iowa 

Acts ch. 209, § 40 (codified at Iowa Code § 218.1 (1971)) (granting the 

commissioner of the state department of social services authority to 

control, manage, direct and operate institutions under his jurisdiction).

Until 1897, each of the mental health institutes were placed “under 

the charge” of a board of trustees. Compare McClain’s Ann. Code 

§§ 2170, 2182–83 (1888), with Iowa Code Ann. § 2609(3) (1897). These 

provisions were contained in the same statutes from which section 226.1 

came to be. See Iowa Code §§ 2182, 2170 (1888). In 1897, the general 

assembly amended the Code to create a general chapter applicable to the 

governance of all state institutions, and it is the provision from which the 

modern section 218.1 exists. See Iowa Code § 2609(3) (1897). There is 

nothing in the legislative history of section 218.1 that leads us to 

construe the general assembly’s intent is to mandate the continued 

existence of the state mental health institutes. The legislative history of 

section 218.1 reveals that the general assembly established the statute to 

name the governing structure for state institutes and to name the 

institutions in which that governing structure has the authority to 

operate.

Another fact of significance is that Iowa Code section 218.1(8) 

currently lists the “Iowa juvenile home.” Iowa Code § 218.1(8). However, 

in 2014, the general assembly ended appropriations for the operation of 

the juvenile home, and it subsequently closed. Homan, 864 N.W.2d at 

327–28.

This fact cuts directly against the plaintiffs’ claim that section 

218.1 mandates the continued operation of the institutions listed and 

that the general assembly can only close the institutions by amending 
28

section 218.1. Clearly, the general assembly does not believe section 

218.1 mandates the operation of the facilities listed or that it must 

amend the statute in order for a facility listed to cease operation, because 

even though section 218.1 continues to list the juvenile home, it no 

longer exists.

Notably, in regards to other similar state institutions, the school 

for the deaf and the Iowa braille and sight saving school, the general 

assembly has adopted specific provisions for the merger and closure of 

those institutes. Iowa Code § 270.10 (1987). The Code outlines three 

requirements for the merger or closure of either of those institutions:

1. The department of management has presented to the 

general assembly a comprehensive plan, program, and fiscal 

analysis of the existing circumstances and the circumstances 

which would prevail upon the proposed merger or closing, 

together with data which would support the contention that 

the merger or closing will be more efficient and effective than 

continuation of the existing facilities. . . .

2. The general assembly has studied the plans, 

programs, and fiscal analysis and has reviewed their impact 

on the programs.

3. The general assembly has enacted legislation 

authorizing either the closing or the merger to take effect not 

sooner than two years after the enactment of the legislation.

Id. § 270.10(1)–(3) (1987). 

Sections 226.1 and 218.1 are silent as to any requirements or 

limitations on the merger or closure of the mental health institutes in 

Mount Pleasant and Clarinda. If the general assembly wanted to put 

conditions on a closure, it could have done so. The general assembly can 

express its intent by omission, and we cannot “enlarge or otherwise 

change the terms of a statute as the legislature adopted it.” Marcus, 538 

N.W.2d at 289. The general assembly’s omission of any requirements or 
29

limitations on the closure of the mental health institutes gives weight to 

our interpretation that the general assembly did not intend for the

perpetual existence of the mental health institutes in Mount Pleasant 

and Clarinda nor intended to reserve the power to close them to itself.

Because we find sections 226.1 and 218.1 do not mandate the 

existence of the Mount Pleasant and Clarinda Mental Health Institutes, 

the plaintiffs’ reliance on AFSCME/Iowa Council 61 v. State, 484 N.W.2d 

390 (Iowa 1992) is misplaced. In AFSME we did not hold that the 

governor’s veto was invalid. Id. at 395. There, we only found that 

arbitration decisions were binding obligations of the state, which had not 

been adjudicated at the time of the veto. Id. Here, there is no such 

obligation, contractual or statutory, for the state to maintain the 

existence of the mental health institutes.

The plaintiffs also rely on an opinion from the attorney general in 

1973 to support their claim that the Governor does not have the 

authority to close the Mental Health Institutes in Mount Pleasant and 

Clarinda. See Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. No. 73–12–6 (Dec. 20, 1973), 1973 WL 

324663, at *3. We find this opinion inconsequential to the issues we 

must address today. Whether the director of the department of human

services has the authority to close a mental health institute is not at 

issue in this case. At issue today is whether sections 226.1 and 218.1 of 

the Iowa Code limit the governor’s item veto power. 

Ultimately, the statutory interpretation of sections 226.1 and 218.1 

does not lend itself to mandate that the mental health institutes in 

Mount Pleasant and Clarinda exist in perpetuity. The legislative history 

of sections 226.1 and 218.1 suggests that the general assembly’s intent 

is to name the mental health institutes and establish a governing 

structure to operate those institutions. Based on the well-established 
30

principles of statutory interpretation, we cannot read into those sections 

of the Code more than what the general assembly has intended. 

Accordingly, we conclude these statutes do not limit the Governor’s 

ability to item veto appropriated funds for these institutions.

VI. Disposition.

We affirm the judgment of the district court finding the Governor’s 

exercise of his item veto did not exceed the scope of his constitutional 

authority and the court order dismissing the petition.

AFFIRMED.