This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 33,871 4 MARIO ANTHONY DEPPERMAN, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 7 Drew D. Tatum, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Steven H. Johnston, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 14 Sergio Viscoli, Appellate Defender 15 B. Douglas Wood III, Assi stant Appellate Defender 16 Santa Fe, NM 17 for Appellant 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 202 {1} Does a valid warrant targeted at a sp ecific residence permit the search and 1 seizure of an unidentified duffel bag f ound on the premises even though it belongs to 2 someone who is not a resident or occupant of the home? In the circumstances of this 3 case we hold that it does, and affirm. 4 BACKGROUND 5 {2} Defendant Mario Depperman was sentenced to six and one-half years of 6 incarceration for the possession of a contro lled substance and the possession of drug 7 paraphernalia obtained pursuant to a searchwarrant. Defendant appeals the district 8 court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence which led to his conviction. 9 {3} A district court granted a search warrant after determining there was sufficient 10 probable cause for its issuance based on anthe affidavit submitted by Agent Patrick 11 Bucksath of the New Mexico St ate Police. The affidavit targ eted a particular residence 12 and its owner, Paul Chavez. The affi davit asserted that Chavez was selling 13 methamphetamine, and that there were illegal narcotics located in his residence. The 14 affidavit was based on an investigation th at culminated in an operation in which a 15 confidential informant, working with Ag ent Bucksath, purchased methamphetamine 16 from Chavez at his residence. The affidavit included a description of the agent’s 17 training, experience, and knowledge concerning “the habits and methods used by 18 those persons involved in the illegal . . . concealment methods of illegal controlled 19 substances.” 203 {4} In accordance with the information provide d in the affidavit, the search warrant 1 authorized the search of Chavez and his residence and the seizure of 2 “[m]ethamphetamine, marijuana and stolen property” and “[a]ny and all classifiable 3 drug paraphernalia that is used to weigh, p ackage, ingest, inhale, inject, or otherwise 4 be consumed.” Defendant was not name d or referenced in the affidavit. 5 {5} During the execution of the search warrant, agents disc overed a duffel bag 6 sitting on a shelf in the master bedroom of the residence. A search of the duffel bag 7 revealed drug paraphernalia and a wallet containing Defendant’s social security card. 8 Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his duffel 9 bag. At the close of the suppression heari ng, the district court denied Defendant’s 10 motion. In its decision letter, the district court ruled that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 11 requires that a warrant specifically name: (1 ) the places to be searched; and (2) the 12 items to be seized,” and that “[t]he validwarrant authorizes the executing officer to 13 look for a particular item in any place it coul d be logically found . . . A [duffel] bag 14 would be a logical place.” 15 {6} Defendant does not dispute the validity of the search warrant as to Chavez and 16 his residence. Instead, Defendant’s arguments below and here focus on whether the 17 search of Defendant’s duffel bag fell w ithin the scope of the warrant. At the 18 suppression hearing, Agent Phil Caroland, the first person to discover and search 19 Defendant’s duffel bag, was the sole testifying witness. His testimony included his 204 role in the search and seizure of Defe ndant’s duffel bag, in cluding his understanding 1 of the purpose of the warrant and the items to be seized. 2 {7} Agent Caroland testified that, during th e execution of the warrant, he found the 3 duffel bag sitting on a shelf located in the master bedroom of the Chavez residence. 4 Additionally, he stated that he did not see anyone in the bedroom when he entered and 5 began his search. When he opened the bag, he found a smaller bag (which he referred 6 to as a “meth kit”) containing drug paraphernalia, including baggies, spoons, and 7 needles. After discovering the drug paraphernalia, Agent Caroland ceased his search 8 of the bag and handed it over to Agent Bucksath. He later testified at trial that he did 9 not see the wallet; instead it was Agent Bucksath who finally discovered it. 10 {8} At trial, Agent Bucksath testified as tohis search of Defendant’s duffel bag. He 11 stated that, when he initially opened the duffel bag, he saw a smaller bag which he 12 opened up to discover drug paraphernalia. Following his discovery of the drug 13 paraphernalia, Agent Bucksath found a wallet that contained Defendant’s social 14 security card. Defendant was later identified as the owner of the social security card 15 and the person who had fled from the resi dence when the search was executed. 16 {9} Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Because 17 this is a memorandum opinion and because th e parties are familiar with the case, we 18 reserve further discussion of the facts for our analysis of Defendant’s arguments on 19 appeal. 205 DISCUSSION 1 {10} Defendant makes two arguments on appeal. Defendant first argues that, 2 although the search warrant was valid as toChavez and his residence, the supporting 3 affidavit did not establish probable cause to search Defendant’s personal property and, 4 therefore, the duffel bag was not within the warrant’s scope. Defendant next argues 5 that even if his duffel bag was searchedby an officer in good faith, the evidence 6 should be suppressed because New Me xico does not recognize the good faith 7 exception to the exclusionary rule. 8 A. Standard of Review 9 {11} We review the order denying Defendant ’s motion to suppress as a mixed 10 question of fact and law. State v. Almanzar , 2014-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 316 P.3d 183. In 11 doing so, we view “the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” State 12 v. Cline , 1998-NMCA-154, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 77, 966 P.2d 785. However, “[w]hile 13 deferring to the district court with respect to factual findings and indulging in all 14 reasonable inferences in support of that c ourt’s decision, we nonetheless review the 15 constitutional question of . . . reasonableness . . . de novo.” State v. Light , 2013- 16 NMCA-075, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 534 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 B. Scope of the Search Warrant 18 {12} Defendant first argues that the officers acted outside the permissible scope of 19 the warrant targeting Chavez and his reside nce. Article II, Section 10 of the New 206 Mexico Constitution provides that “[t]he people shall be secure in their . . . effects, 1 from unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” Not all searches and seizures are 2 protected under the New Mexico C onstitution, “only unreasonable ones.” State v. 3 Brusuelas , 2009-NMCA-111, ¶ 9, 147 N.M. 233, 219 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks 4 and citation omitted). Therefore, the “ultimate question in all cases regarding alleged 5 search and seizure violations is whether the search and seizure was reasonable.” State 6 v. Attaway , 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103. “A search warrant 7 is used as a means to estab lish the reasonableness of an intrusion [on an individual’s 8 privacy rights].” State v. Malloy , 2001-NMCA-067, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 222, 34 P.3d 611. 9 Moreover, New Mexico’s requirement that a search warrant has to be supported by 10 an affidavit showing probable cause ensures that individuals’ property “will not be 11 subject to unreasonable s earches by the state.” State v. Boyse , 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 18, 12 303 P.3d 830. 13 {13} The primary issue before us is whether Defendant’s duffel bag fell within the 14 scope of the search warrant. This Court recently addressed the question of whether 15 personal property belonging to a visitor, but found on the premises to be searched, 16 falls within the scopeof a valid warrant. Light , 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 33. In Light , the 17 defendant was attending an event at a public theater. Id. ¶¶ 15-18. A warrant to search 18 the theater was obtained following an investigation of the theater owner for hosting 19 parties where drugs weresold and consumed. Id. ¶ 3. The warrant authorized “a search 207 of [the theater owner], his residence, [and] the theater” and the “seiz[ure of] ‘ecstasy 1 pills in any shape, form, or size, and co caine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia’ ” Id. 2 ¶ 13. 3 {14} Pursuant to the warrant, officers secure d the theater and detained all people 4 present when the warrant was served, in cluding the defendant. All of the people 5 detained were searched and released. Id. ¶ 14. Before leaving, the defendant asked 6 officers for her jacket and purse, which werelocated in the theater’s storage room. Id. 7 ¶ 16. Without first obtaining consent from th e defendant, an officer searched her purse 8 and found a small metal container containing methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 17. The 9 defendant was charged with possession and moved to suppress the evidence found in 10 her purse. Id. ¶ 18. At the suppression hearing, the officer who searched the purse 11 testified “that before he opened the purse and container, he had no particularized 12 suspicion that the purse cont ained contraband . . . and, af ter opening it, that he saw no 13 obvious evidence of contraband or observe d anything suspicious about the metal 14 container.” Id. ¶ 17. The district court granted the motion to suppress. Id. ¶ 18. 15 {15} On appeal, we affirmed th e district court’s order. Id. ¶ 46. In agreeing with, and 16 expanding on, the district court’s ruling, weheld that the search of the defendant’s 17 purse was invalid because the officer knew the purse belonged tothe defendant, and 18 because “[t]here [was] nothing in the affidavit or in the officers’ testimony to suggest 198 that the purse was connected to the theateror to the illegal activity occurring there.” 1 Id. 2 {16} Defendant argues that the reasoning in Light should apply here because, 3 although the search warrant was valid as to Chavez and his residence, it “did not 4 demonstrate authorization or even probable cause related to the duffel bag.” In support 5 of his argument, Defendant argues that there was no probable cause because the 6 affidavit did not “address any suspicion as to activities involving [Defendant].” We 7 disagree. 8 {17} In Light , this Court did not determine that there was a lack of probable cause 9 as to the defendant’s purse merely b ecause the search warrant was based on a 10 suspicion only as to the owner of the theater and the illegal activities happening at that 11 location. Instead, we reasoned that the s earch was invalid because the officer was 12 aware that the purse belonged to the defendant and he failed to ask for consent. 2013- 13 NMCA-075, ¶¶ 16-17. Further, the officer te stified that he had no suspicion that the 14 purse contained contraband prior to his search. Id. ¶ 17. Thus, the search of the 15 defendant’s purse was invalidbecause no probable cause existed connecting the purse 16 to the reason for the warrant. 17 {18} Here, as Defendant concedes, the offi cers had no notice that the duffel bag 18 belonged to him. It was discovered in the master bedroom of th e targeted residence 19 and there was nothing on the outside of the bag indicating that it belonged to someone 209 other than the owner of th e residence. In fact, the duffel bag’s owner was not 1 identified until after the officers found the drug paraphernalia. Furthermore, unlike in 2 Light , there was testimony that, based on the officers’ experience and training, the 3 duffel bag was a reasonable place to search for the items being sought pursuant to the 4 search warrant. Therefore, th ere was sufficient probable cau se to search the duffel bag. 5 {19} In conclusion, because there was no notice that the duffel bag belonged to 6 Defendant, and testimony established that there was probable cause to support a 7 reasonable belief that the bag was connected to the purpose of the search warrant, the 8 duffel bag fell within the scope of the search warrant and its search was reasonable 9 under the New Mexico Constitution. 10 C. Good Faith Exception 11 {20} Defendant’s second argument is that, evenif the agent was unaware that the 12 duffel bag belonged to Defendant, the ev idence should be suppressed because New 13 Mexico does not recognize a good faith excep tion to the exclusionary rule. Courts 14 generally recognize that evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that is later 15 invalidated should be suppressed under both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, 16 Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. State v. Gutierrez , 1993-NMSC-062, 17 ¶ 45, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052. However, federal and New Mexico courts have 18 interpreted the application of this rule differently. 1910 {21} The federal approach provides that evidence suppressed due to an invalid 1 warrant under the exclusionary rule may beadmitted if the offi cer’s reliance on the 2 invalid warrant was objectively reasonable. See United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 3 922-23 (1984). This good faith exception was founded upon an interest “to deter 4 police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 5 916. In contrast, New Mexico rejects the federal good faith exception to the 6 exclusionary rule. 7 {22} In Gutierrez , our Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule in New Mexico 8 was “incompatible with any exception ba sed on the good[]faith reliance of the 9 officer.” 1993-NMSC-062, ¶ 55. The Court reasoned that Article II, Section 10’s 10 protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is best accomplished by 11 “[d]enying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conductat trial” and 12 “preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent as if the government’s officers 13 had stayed within the law.” Id. 14 {23} Here, New Mexico’s exclusionary rule does not apply because, as we concluded 15 above, the search of Defendant’s duffel bag was lawful under Article II, Section 10. 16 Thus, whether the search of Defendant’s duffel bag was conduc ted in good faith is 17 immaterial and we need not further address this argument. 18 CONCLUSION 1911 {24} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s 1 motion for suppression of the evidence found in his duffel bag. 2 {25} IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5 WE CONCUR: 6

__________________________________ 7 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 8

__________________________________ 9 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 10