IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARK JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROHM & HAAS COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 05-4988

OPINION

Pollak, J. April 12, 2006

On March 9, 2006, I issued an opinion and order granting defendants’ motion for

sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. That opinion contains a discussion of the history of this

litigation, and that discussion is incorporated by reference here. Plaintiff has filed a

motion for reconsideration of the March 9 decision. Most of the arguments offered by

plaintiff in his motion are familiar, as they closely track the arguments made in opposition

to the motion for sanctions. Such reargument does not provide a basis for granting a

motion for reconsideration. See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.

1985); Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Asensio, 2000 WL 1052045 at *1 (E.D. Pa. July

17, 2000).

I will address those arguments that are new. One new argument is that the Jackson

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II original complaint that was the subject of my March 9 opinion complied with Rule 8

and that I erred in holding the pleading to a higher standard. Plaintiff correctly points out

that Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to plead all facts supporting his cause of action in

detail; rather, the federal courts apply a liberal “notice pleading” standard. However,

plaintiff is incorrect in his assertion that the March 9 opinion somehow held his Jackson

II original complaint to a higher pleading standard. The difficulty identified in the March

9 opinion was not that plaintiff failed to plead in adequate detail the facts on which he

based his claims. The difficulty was that the facts plaintiff chose to plead, and on which

he chose to base his claims, did not come close to supporting his claims. The proposition

that the facts plaintiff alleged provided adequate support for his legal contentions was so

faulty a legal construct as to render plaintiff’s pleading frivolous and unwarranted. Rule

8 was not implicated in my March 9 opinion, and it does not provide a basis for

reconsideration of that decision. 

Plaintiff also argues that I invaded the province of a jury when I determined that the

defendants’ submission of allegedly false evidence in connection with Jackson I could not

support a claim for obstruction of justice because defendants did not offer the evidence for

its truth. Plaintiff contends that defendants’ purpose in offering the allegedly false

evidence is a question of fact that can only be resolved by a jury. The contention is wide

of the mark. Judges are often called upon to determine the purpose for which evidence is

offered – for example, in order to decide whether an out-of-court statement is inadmissible

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 Plaintiff does assert that there is some tension between Rule 11 and Rule 15. He points

out that, by filing a Rule 11 motion, a defendant can force a plaintiff to use his one opportunity to

amend his complaint as of right sooner than he would otherwise be required to do so under Rule

15. Plaintiff is correct that Rule 11 and Rule 15 operate together to create such a possibility, but

it is not clear what conclusion plaintiff would have this court draw from that fact. If plaintiff

intends to suggest that there is something in Rule 15 that is inconsistent with Rule 11 – and that,

accordingly, Rule 15 should trump Rule 11 such that a plaintiff may amend his complaint as of

right without regard to Rule 11's 21-day safe harbor period and thereby avoid the Rule 11

consequences of his original pleading – he is mistaken. There is no inconsistency between the

two rules that would compel a court to give effect to one and shunt the other aside.

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hearsay, a court must determine whether it is offered for its truth. This is not a question of

fact to be submitted to a jury, but rather a question of law for the court. I resolved just

such a legal question when, in my March 9 opinion, I found that defendants had done

nothing improper by submitting evidence – evidence plaintiff claims to be false – only to

show that the evidence had been considered by a state court in prior litigation.

Plaintiff points to his Jackson II amended complaint several times in his motion

for reconsideration. It is not clear why he does so, as my March 9 opinion explained that

only the original complaint was at issue for purposes of the sanctions motion – a

determination that plaintiff does not dispute in his motion for reconsideration1. Argument

based on the Jackson II amended complaint fails to provide any basis for reconsideration

of the March 9 opinion.

Plaintiff also urges that the March 9 opinion’s award of attorneys’ fees to

defendants is excessive. As plaintiff recognizes, the amount of the sanction is within the

discretion of the court. Nothing in plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration persuades me

that the prescribed award is inappropriate.

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For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration will be denied. 

An order effectuating this opinion is attached hereto.

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