8296 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

Done at Washington, DC, on February 20, 

2007. 

Bryce Quick, 

Acting Administrator. 

[FR Doc. E7–3155 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–DM–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM370; Notice No. 25–07–06–

SC] 

Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 7X Airplane; Side Stick 

Controllers, Electronic Flight Control 

System: Lateral-Directional and 

Longitudinal Stability, Low Energy 

Awareness, Flight Control Surface 

Position Awareness, and Flight 

Characteristics Compliance via the 

Handling Qualities Rating Method; 

Flight Envelope Protection: General 

Limiting Requirements, High Incidence 

Protection Function, Normal Load 

Factor (g) Limiting, and Pitch, Roll, and 

High Speed Limiting Functions 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for the Dassault Aviation 

Model Falcon 7X airplane. This airplane 

will have novel or unusual design 

features when compared to the state of 

technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for transport 

category airplanes. These design 

features include side stick controllers, 

electronic flight control systems, and 

flight envelope protections. These 

special conditions pertain to control and 

handling qualities of the airplane and 

protection limits within the normal 

flight envelope. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. Additional 

special conditions will be issued for 

other novel or unusual design features 

of the Dassault Model Falcon 7X 

airplanes. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

by March 28, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies 

of your comments to: Federal Aviation 

Administration, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Attn: Rules Docket (ANM–

113), Docket No. NM370, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington, 

98057–3356. You may deliver two 

copies to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the above address. You 

must mark your comments: Docket No. 

NM370. You can inspect comments in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joe 

Jacobsen, FAA, Airplane and Flight 

Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2011; 

facsimile (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive, as well as a 

report summarizing each substantive 

public contact with FAA personnel 

concerning these special conditions. 

You can inspect the docket before and 

after the comment closing date. If you 

wish to review the docket in person, go 

to the address in the ADDRESSES section 

of this preamble between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On June 4, 2002, Dassault Aviation, 9 

rond Point des Champs Elysees, 75008, 

Paris, France, applied for FAA type 

certificate for its new Model Falcon 7X 

airplane. The Dassault Model Falcon 7X 

airplane is a 19 passenger transport 

category airplane powered by three aft 

mounted Pratt & Whitney PW307A high 

bypass ratio turbofan engines. 

Maximum takeoff weight will be 63,700 

pounds, and maximum certified altitude 

will be 51,000 feet with a range of 5,700 

nautical miles. The airplane is operated 

using a fly-by-wire (FBW) primary flight 

control system. This will be the first 

application of a FBW primary flight 

control system in an airplane primarily 

intended for private/corporate use. 

The Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 

7X design incorporates equipment that 

was not envisioned when part 25 was 

created. This equipment includes side 

stick controllers, and an electronic flight 

control system that provides flight 

envelope protection. Therefore, special 

conditions are required that provide the 

level of safety equivalent to that 

established by the regulations. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Dassault Aviation must show that the 

Model Falcon 7X airplane meets the 

applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, 

as amended by Amendments 25–1 

through 25–108. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for the Model Falcon 

7X airplane because of novel or unusual 

design features, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Dassault Model Falcon 

7X airplane must comply with the fuel 

vent and exhaust emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise 

certification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue 

a finding of regulatory adequacy under 

§ 611 of Public Law 93–574, the ‘‘Noise 

Control Act of 1972.’’

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and 

they become part of the type 

certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The Dassault Falcon 7X airplane will 

incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design features: 

• Side stick controllers; 

• Electronic flight control system: 

lateral-directional and longitudinal 

stability, low energy awareness, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8297 

• Electronic flight control system: 

flight control surface position 

awareness, 

• Electronic flight control system: 

flight characteristics compliance via the 

handling qualities rating method 

(HQRM); 

• Flight envelope protection: general 

limiting requirements, 

• Flight envelope protection: high 

incidence protection function, 

• Flight envelope protection: normal 

load factor (g) limiting, 

• Flight envelope protection: pitch, 

roll, and high speed limiting functions. 

Because of these rapid improvements in 

airplane technology, the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions address 

equipment which may affect the 

airplane’s structural performance, either 

directly or as a result of failure or 

malfunction. These proposed special 

conditions are identical or nearly 

identical to those previously required 

for type certification of other airplane 

models. Additional special conditions 

will be issued for other novel or unusual 

design features of the Dassault Model 

Falcon 7X airplane. Those additional 

special conditions will pertain to the 

following topics: 

• Dive speed definition with speed 

protection system, 

• Sudden engine stoppage, and 

• Operation without normal electrical 

power. 

Final special conditions have been 

issued for the Model Falcon 7X with the 

novel or unusual design feature 

pertaining to Pilot Compartment ViewHydrophobic Coatings in Lieu of 

Windshield Wipers (January 10, 2007; 

72 FR 1135). Special conditions have 

been proposed for the Model Falcon 7X 

with the novel or unusual design 

features pertaining to Interaction of 

Systems and Structures, Limit Pilot 

Forces, and High Intensity Radiated 

Fields (HIRF) (October 18, 2006; 71 FR 

61427). 

Discussion 

Because of these rapid improvements 

in airplane technology, the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. Therefore, in 

addition to the requirement of part 25, 

subparts C and D, the following special 

conditions are proposed. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 1. Side 

Stick Controllers 

The Falcon 7X will use side stick 

controllers for pitch and roll control. 

Regulatory requirements for 

conventional wheel and column 

controllers, such as requirements 

pertaining to pilot strength and 

controllability, are not directly 

applicable to side stick controllers. 

Certain ergonomic considerations such 

as armrest support, freedom of arm 

movement, controller displacement, 

handgrip size and accommodations for 

a range of pilot sizes are not addressed 

in the regulations. In addition, pilot 

control authority may be uncertain, 

because the side sticks are not 

mechanically interconnected as with 

conventional wheel and column 

controls. Pitch and roll control force and 

displacement sensitivity must be 

compatible, so that normal inputs on 

one control axis will not cause 

significant unintentional inputs on the 

other. 

These proposed special conditions 

require that the unique features of the 

side stick must be demonstrated through 

flight and simulator tests to have 

suitable handling and control 

characteristics. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 2. 

Electronic Flight Control System: 

Lateral-Directional Stability, 

Longitudinal Stability, and Low Energy 

Awareness 

In lieu of compliance with the 

regulations pertaining to lateraldirectional and longitudinal stability, 

these special conditions ensure that the 

Model Falcon 7X will have suitable 

airplane handling qualities throughout 

the normal flight envelope. 

The unique features of the Model 

Falcon 7X flight control system and 

side-stick controllers, when compared 

with conventional airplanes with wheel 

and column controllers, do not provide 

conventional awareness to the 

flightcrew of a change in speed or a 

change in the direction of flight. These 

special conditions require that adequate 

awareness be provided to the pilot of a 

low energy state (low speed, low thrust, 

and low altitude) below normal 

operating speeds. 

a. Lateral-directional Static Stability: 

The electronic flight control system 

(EFCS) on the Falcon 7X contains flyby-wire control laws that result in 

neutral lateral-directional static 

stability. Therefore, the conventional 

requirements of the regulations are not 

met. 

The Model Falcon 7X airplane has a 

flight control design feature within the 

normal operational envelope in which 

side stick deflection in the roll axis 

commands roll rate. As a result, the 

stick force in the roll axis will be zero 

(neutral stability) during the straight, 

steady sideslip flight maneuver of 

§ 25.177(c) and will not be 

‘‘substantially proportional to the angle 

of sideslip,’’ as required by the 

regulation. 

With conventional control system 

requirements, positive static directional 

stability is defined as the tendency to 

recover from a skid with the rudder free. 

Positive static lateral stability is defined 

as the tendency to raise the low wing in 

a sideslip with the aileron controls free. 

These proposed special conditions are 

intended to accomplish the following: 

• Provide additional cues of 

inadvertent sideslips and skids through 

control force changes. 

• Ensure that short periods of 

unattended operation do not result in 

any significant changes in yaw or bank 

angle. 

• Provide predictable roll and yaw 

response. 

• Provide acceptable level of pilot 

attention (i.e., workload) to attain and 

maintain a coordinated turn. 

b. Longitudinal Static Stability: The 

longitudinal flight control laws for the 

Falcon 7X provide neutral static 

stability within the normal operational 

envelope. Therefore, it is inappropriate 

to require the airplane design to comply 

with the static longitudinal stability 

requirements of §§ 25.171, 25.173, and 

25.175. 

Static longitudinal stability on 

conventional airplanes with mechanical 

links to the pitch control surface means 

that a pull force on the controller will 

result in a reduction in speed relative to 

the trim speed, and a push force will 

result in higher than trim speed. 

Longitudinal stability is required by the 

regulations for the following reasons: 

• Speed change cues are provided to 

the pilot through increased and 

decreased forces on the controller. 

• Short periods of unattended control 

of the airplane do not result in 

significant changes in attitude, airspeed, 

or load factor. 

• A predictable pitch response is 

provided to the pilot. 

• An acceptable level of pilot 

attention (i.e., workload) to attain and 

maintain trim speed and altitude is 

provided to the pilot. 

• Longitudinal stability provides gust 

stability. 

The pitch control movement of the 

side stick is a normal load factor or ‘‘g’’

command which results in an initial 

movement of the elevator surface to 

attain the commanded load factor. That 

movement is followed by integrated 

movement of the stabilizer and elevator 

to automatically trim the airplane to a 

neutral (1g) stick-free stability. The 

flight path commanded by the initial 

side stick input will remain stick-free 


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8298 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

until the pilot gives another command. 

This control function is applied during 

‘‘normal’’ control law within the speed 

range from the speed at the angle of 

attack protection limit to initiation of 

the angle of attack protection limit. 

Once outside this speed range, the 

control laws introduce the conventional 

longitudinal static stability as described 

above. 

As a result of neutral static stability, 

the Falcon 7X does not meet the part 25 

requirements for static longitudinal 

stability. It would not be appropriate to 

apply the conventional part 25 

requirements for static longitudinal 

stability to the unconventional control 

systems of the Falcon 7X. These 

proposed special conditions would 

require that the airplane be shown to 

have suitable static longitudinal 

stability in any condition normally 

encountered in service. 

c. Low Energy Awareness: Static 

longitudinal stability provides an 

awareness to the flightcrew of a low 

energy state (low speed and thrust at 

low altitude). Past experience on 

airplanes fitted with a flight control 

system which provides neutral 

longitudinal stability shows there are 

insufficient feedback cues to the pilot of 

excursion below normal operational 

speeds. The maximum angle of attack 

protection system limits the airplane 

angle of attack and prevents stall during 

normal operating speeds, but this 

system is not sufficient to prevent stall 

at low speed excursions below normal 

operational speeds. Until intervention, 

there are no stability cues because the 

airplane remains trimmed. Additionally, 

feedback from the pitching moment due 

to thrust variation is reduced by the 

flight control laws. Recovery from a low 

speed excursion may become hazardous 

when the low speed is associated with 

low altitude and the engines are 

operating at low thrust or with other 

performance limiting conditions. 

Because § 25.173 requires that the 

pilot receive speed change cues through 

increased or decreased forces on the 

controller, it would be inappropriate to 

apply those requirements for feedback 

cues to the Falcon Model 7X systems. 

These proposed special conditions 

would require that the airplane provide 

adequate awareness of a low energy 

state to the pilot. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 3. 

Electronic Flight Control System: Flight 

Control Surface Position Awareness 

With a response-command type of 

flight control system and no direct 

mechanical coupling from cockpit 

controller to control surface, the 

controller does not provide the Falcon 

7X pilot with an awareness of the actual 

surface deflection position during flight 

maneuvers. Some unusual flight 

conditions, arising from atmospheric 

conditions or airplane or engine failures 

or both, may result in full or nearly full 

surface deflection. Unless the flightcrew 

is made aware of excessive deflection or 

impending control surface deflection 

limiting, the pilot or auto-flight system 

may encounter situations where loss of 

control or other unsafe handling or 

performance characteristics occur. 

These special conditions would 

require that suitable annunciation be 

provided to the flightcrew when a flight 

condition exists in which nearly full 

control surface deflection occurs. 

Suitability of such a display must take 

into account that some pilot-demanded 

maneuvers (e.g., rapid roll) are 

necessarily associated with intended 

full or nearly full control surface 

deflection. Therefore, simple alerting 

systems which would function in both 

intended or unexpected control-limiting 

situations must be properly balanced 

between needed crew awareness and 

nuisance warnings. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 4. 

Electronic Flight Control System: Flight 

Characteristics Compliance Via the 

Handling Qualities Rating Method 

(HQRM) 

The Model Falcon 7X airplane will 

have an electronic flight control system 

(EFCS). This system provides an 

electronic interface between the pilot’s 

flight controls and the flight control 

surfaces (for both normal and failure 

states). The system also generates the 

actual surface commands that provide 

for stability augmentation and control 

about all three airplane axes. Because 

EFCS technology has outpaced existing 

regulations—written essentially for 

unaugmented airplanes with provision 

for limited ON/OFF augmentation—

suitable special conditions and a 

method of compliance are required to 

aid in the certification of flight 

characteristics. 

These special conditions and the 

method of compliance presented in 

Appendix 7, FAA Handling Qualities 

Rating Method, of AC 25–7A, Flight 

Test Guide Certification of Transport 

Category Airplanes, would provide a 

means to evaluate flight 

characteristics—for example, 

‘‘satisfactory,’’ ‘‘adequate,’’ or 

‘‘controllable’’—to determine 

compliance with the regulations. The 

HQRM in Appendix 7 was developed 

for airplanes with control systems 

having similar functions and is 

employed to aid in the evaluation of the 

following: 

• All EFCS/airplane failure states not 

shown to be extremely improbable and 

where the envelope (task) and 

atmospheric disturbance probabilities 

are each 1. 

• All combinations of failures, 

atmospheric disturbance level, and 

flight envelope not shown to be 

extremely improbable. 

• Any other flight condition or 

characteristic where 14 CFR part 25 

proves to be inadequate for proper 

assessment of unique Falcon Model 7X 

flight characteristics. 

The Handling Qualities Rating 

Method provides a systematic approach 

to the assessment of handling qualities. 

It is not intended to dictate program size 

or need for a fixed number of pilots to 

achieve multiple opinions. The airplane 

design itself and success in defining 

critical failure combinations from the 

many reviewed in Systems Safety 

Assessments would dictate the scope of 

any HQRM application. 

Handling qualities terms, principles, 

and relationships familiar to the 

aviation community have been used to 

formulate the HQRM. For example, we 

have established that the well-known 

COOPER–HARPER rating scale and the 

proposed FAA three-part rating system 

are similar. This approach on the flying 

qualities of highly augmented/relaxed 

static stability airplanes in relation to 

regulatory and flight test guide 

requirements is reported in DOT/FAA/ 

CT–82/130, Flying Qualities of Relaxed 

Static Stability Aircraft, Volumes I and 

II. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 5. 

Flight Envelope Protection: General 

Limiting Requirements 

These special conditions and the 

following ones—pertaining to flight 

envelope protection—would present 

general limiting requirements for all the 

unique flight envelope protection 

features of the basic Model Falcon 7X 

Electronic Flight Control System (EFCS) 

design. Current regulations do not 

address these types of protection 

features. The general limiting 

requirements are necessary to ensure a 

smooth transition from normal flight to 

the protection mode and adequate 

maneuver capability. The general 

limiting requirements also ensure that 

the structural limits of the airplane are 

not exceeded. Furthermore, failure of 

the protection feature must not create 

hazardous flight conditions. Envelope 

protection parameters include angle of 

attack, normal load factor, pitch angle, 

and speed. To accomplish these 

envelope protections, one or more 

significant changes occur in the EFCS 

control laws as the normal flight 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8299 

envelope limit is approached or 

exceeded. 

Each specific type of envelope 

protection is addressed individually in 

the special conditions that follow. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 6. 

Flight Envelope Protection—High 

Incidence Protection Function 

The Falcon 7X is equipped with a 

high incidence protection function that 

limits the angle of attack at which the 

airplane can be flown during normal 

low speed operation and that cannot be 

overridden by the flightcrew. This 

function prevents the airplane from 

stalling and therefore, the stall warning 

system is not needed during normal 

flight conditions. If there is a failure of 

the high incidence protection function 

that is not shown to be extremely 

improbable, the flight characteristics at 

the angle of attack for CLMAX must be 

suitable in the traditional sense, and 

stall warning must be provided in a 

conventional manner. This special 

condition would address these and 

other unique features of this function on 

the Model Falcon 7X. 

The special conditions define a 

MINimum steady flight speed, VMIN, to be 

demonstrated during flight test, at 

which the airplane can develop lift 

normal to the flight path and equal to 

its weight at the angle of attack limit of 

the protection function. It further 

defines procedures for establishing the 

reference stall speed, VSR, to be used for 

defining reference speeds during takeoff 

and landing. 

In the absence of specific regulations 

in 14 CFR Part 25, these special 

conditions present High Incidence 

Protection Function requirements for 

the capability and reliability of the 

function, stall warning with a failure 

condition, handling qualities and 

characteristics at high incidence or 

angle of attack flight maneuvers, and 

specific applications of the newly 

defined VMIN in lieu of current 

regulations. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 7. 

Flight Envelope Protection: Normal 

Load Factor (G) Limiting 

The Falcon 7X flight control system 

design incorporates a normal load factor 

limiting function on a full time basis 

that will prevent the pilot from 

inadvertently or intentionally exceeding 

the positive or negative airplane limit 

load factor. This limiting feature is 

active in the normal flight control mode 

and cannot be overridden by the pilot. 

There is no requirement in the 

regulations for this limiting feature. 

This normal load factor limit is 

unique in that traditional airplanes with 

conventional flight control systems 

(mechanical linkages) are limited in the 

pitch axis only by the elevator surface 

area and deflection limit. The elevator 

control power is normally derived for 

adequate controllability and 

maneuverability at the most critical 

longitudinal pitching moment. The 

result is that traditional airplanes have 

a significant portion of the flight 

envelope in which maneuverability in 

excess of limit structural design values 

is possible. 

Part 25 does not require a 

demonstration of maneuver control or 

handling qualities beyond the design 

limit structural loads. Nevertheless, 

some pilots have become accustomed to 

the availability of this excess maneuver 

capacity in case of extreme emergency, 

such as upset recoveries or collision 

avoidance. 

Because Dassault has chosen to 

include this optional design feature on 

the Falcon 7X, for which part 25 does 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards, special conditions 

pertaining to this feature are included. 

These special conditions would 

establish MINimum load factor 

requirements to ensure adequate 

maneuver capability during normal 

flight. Other limiting features of the 

normal load factor limiting function, as 

discussed above, that would affect the 

upper load limits are not addressed in 

these special conditions. The phrase ‘‘in 

the absence of other limiting factors’’

has been added relative to past similar 

special conditions to clarify that while 

the main focus is on the lower load 

factor limits, there are other limiting 

factors that must be considered in the 

load limiting function. 

Proposed Special Condition No. 8. 

Flight Envelope Protection: Pitch, Roll, 

and High Speed Limiting Functions 

The Model Falcon 7X will incorporate 

pitch attitude and high speed limiting 

functions via the Electronic Flight 

Control System (EFCS) normal operating 

mode. In addition, positive spiral 

stability and partial pitch compensation 

will be introduced in the lateral and 

pitch axes through the control laws for 

bank angles greater than 35 degrees. 

The purpose of the pitch attitude 

limiting function, in conjunction with 

the high incidence protection function, 

is to prevent airplane stall during low 

speed, high angle of attack excursions. 

The high speed limiting protection 

function prevents the pilot from 

inadvertently or intentionally exceeding 

the airplane maximum design speeds, 

VD/MD. Part 25 does not address such a 

function that would limit or modify 

flying qualities in the high speed region. 

There are no specific hard limits on 

the Falcon 7X for bank angle. At bank 

angles up to 35 degrees, side movement 

of the controller commands roll rate 

depending on the amount of deflection. 

Bank angle is immediately 

accomplished by the control law 

function and deflection of the control 

surfaces. With the stick released to its 

neutral point, the airplane will maintain 

the commanded bank angle (neutral 

spiral stability). Positive spiral stability 

is introduced at and above 35 degrees 

band angle such that a stick force is 

required to maintain bank angle, and 

releasing the stick will return the 

airplane to 35 degrees. 

In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.143, this special condition would 

establish requirements to ensure that 

pitch and high speed limiting functions 

do not impede normal maneuvering and 

that pitch and roll limiting functions do 

not restrict or prevent attaining bank 

angles necessary for emergency 

maneuvering. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the Dassault 

Model Falcon 7X. Should Dassault 

Aviation apply at a later date for a 

change to the type certificate to include 

another model incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design features, these 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features of the 

Dassault Model Falcon 7X airplane. It is 

not a rule of general applicability, and 

it affects only the applicant which 

applied to the FAA for approval of these 

features on the airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

AdMINistrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Dassault 

Aviation Model Falcon 7X airplane. 

1. Side Stick Controllers 

In the absence of specific 

requirements for side stick controllers, 

the following special conditions apply: 

a. Pilot strength: In lieu of the 

‘‘strength of pilots’’ limits shown in 


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8300 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

§ 25.143(c) for pitch and roll, and in lieu 

of the specific pitch force requirements 

of §§ 25.145(b) and 25.175(d), it must be 

shown that the temporary and 

maximum prolonged force levels for the 

side stick controllers are suitable for all 

expected operating conditions and 

configurations, whether normal or nonnormal. 

b. Pilot control authority: The 

electronic side stick controller coupling 

design must provide for corrective and/ 

or overriding control inputs by either 

pilot with no unsafe characteristics. 

Annunciation of the controller status 

must be provided, and must not be 

confusing to the flightcrew. 

c. Pilot control: It must be shown by 

flight tests that the use of side stick 

controllers does not produce unsuitable 

pilot-in-the-loop control characteristics 

when considering precision path 

control/tasks and turbulence. In 

addition, pitch and roll control force 

and displacement sensitivity must be 

compatible, so that normal inputs on 

one control axis will not cause 

significant unintentional inputs on the 

other. 

d. Autopilot quick-release control 

location: In lieu of compliance with 

§ 25.1329(d), autopilot quick release 

(emergency) controls must be on both 

side stick controllers. The quick release 

means must be located so that it can 

readily and easily be used by the 

flightcrew. 

2. Electronic Flight Control System: 

Lateral-Directional and Longitudinal 

Stability, and Low Energy Awareness 

In lieu of the requirements of 

§§ 25.171, 25.173, 25.175, and 25.177(c), 

the following special conditions apply: 

a. The airplane must be shown to 

have suitable static lateral, directional, 

and longitudinal stability in any 

condition normally encountered in 

service, including the effects of 

atmospheric disturbance. The showing 

of suitable static lateral, directional and 

longitudinal stability must be based on 

the airplane handling qualities, 

including pilot workload and pilot 

compensation, for specific test 

procedures during the flight test 

evaluations. 

b. The airplane must provide 

adequate awareness to the pilot of a low 

energy (low speed/low thrust/low 

height) state when fitted with flight 

control laws presenting neutral 

longitudinal stability significantly 

below the normal operating speeds. 

‘‘Adequate awareness’’ means warning 

information must be provided to alert 

the crew of unsafe operating conditions 

and to enable them to take appropriate 

corrective action. 

c. The static directional stability—as 

shown by the tendency to recover from 

a skid with the rudder free—must be 

positive for any landing gear and flap 

position and symmetrical power 

condition, at speeds from 1.13 VSR1 up 

to VFE, VLE, or VFC/MFC (as appropriate). 

d. In straight, steady sideslips 

(unaccelerated forward slips), the 

rudder control movements and forces 

must be substantially proportional to 

the angle of sideslip, and the factor of 

proportionality must be between limits 

found necessary for safe operation 

throughout the range of sideslip angles 

appropriate to the operation of the 

airplane. At greater angles—up to the 

angle at which full rudder control is 

used or a rudder pedal force of 180 

pounds (81.72 kg) is obtained—the 

rudder pedal forces may not reverse, 

and increased rudder deflection must 

produce increased angles of sideslip. 

Unless the airplane has a suitable 

sideslip indication, there must be 

enough bank and lateral control 

deflection and force accompanying 

sideslipping to clearly indicate any 

departure from steady, unyawed flight. 

3. Electronic Flight Control System: 

Flight Control Surface Position 

Awareness 

In addition to the requirements of 

§§ 25.143, 25.671 and 25.672, the 

following special conditions apply: 

a. A suitable flight control position 

annunciation must be provided to the 

crew in the following situation: 

A flight condition exists in which—

without being commanded by the 

crew—control surfaces are coming so 

close to their limits that return to 

normal flight and (or) continuation of 

safe flight requires a specific crew 

action. 

b. In lieu of control position 

annunciation, existing indications to the 

crew may be used to prompt crew 

action, if they are found to be adequate. 

Note: The term ‘‘suitable’’ also indicates an 

appropriate balance between nuisance and 

necessary operation. 

4. Electronic Flight Control System: 

Flight Characteristics Compliance Via 

the Handling Quantities Rating Method 

(HQRM) 

a. Flight characteristics compliance 

determination for electronic flight 

control system (EFCS) Failure Cases: 

In lieu of compliance with § 25.672(c), 

the HQRM contained in Appendix 7, 

FAA Handling Qualities Rating Method, 

of the Flight Test Guide for Certification 

of Transport Category Airplanes, AC 25–

7A, (or an equivalent method of 

compliance found acceptable to the 

FAA), must be used for evaluation of 

EFCS configurations resulting from 

single and multiple failures not shown 

to be extremely improbable. 

The handling qualities ratings are: 

(1) Satisfactory: Full performance 

criteria can be met with routine pilot 

effort and attention. 

(2) Adequate: Adequate for continued 

safe flight and landing; full or specified 

reduced performance can be met, but 

with heightened pilot effort and 

attention. 

(3) Controllable: Inadequate for 

continued safe flight and landing, but 

controllable for return to a safe flight 

condition, safe flight envelope and/or 

reconfiguration, so that the handling 

qualities are at least Adequate. 

b. Handling qualities will be allowed 

to progressively degrade with failure 

state, atmospheric disturbance level, 

and flight envelope, as shown in Figure 

12, ‘‘Minimum HQ Requirements,’’ of 

Appendix 7. Specifically, for probable 

failure conditions within the normal 

flight envelope, the pilot-rated handling 

qualities must be satisfactory in light 

atmospheric disturbance and adequate 

in moderate atmospheric disturbance. 

The handling qualities rating must not 

be less than adequate in light 

atmospheric disturbance for improbable 

failures. 

Note: AC 25–7A, Appendix 7 presents a 

method of compliance and provides guidance 

for the following: 

• Minimum handling qualities rating 

requirements in conjunction with 

atmospheric disturbance levels, flight 

envelopes, and failure conditions (Figure 12), 

• Flight Envelope definition (Figures 5A, 6 

and 7), 

• Atmospheric Disturbance Levels (Figure 

5B), 

• Flight Control System Failure State 

(Figure 5C), 

• Combination Guidelines (Figures 5D, 9 

and 10), and 

• General flight task list, from which 

appropriate specific tasks can be selected or 

developed (Figure 11). 

5. Flight Envelope Protection: General 

Limiting Requirements 

a. General Requirements 

(1) Onset characteristics of each 

envelope protection function must be 

smooth, appropriate to the phase of 

flight and type of maneuver, and not in 

conflict with the ability of the pilot to 

satisfactorily change the airplane flight 

path, speed, or attitude, as needed. 

(2) Limit values of protected flight 

parameters (and if applicable, associated 

warning thresholds) must be compatible 

with the following: 

(a) Airplane structural limits, 

(b) Required safe and controllable 

maneuvering of the airplane, and 


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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8301 

(c) Margins to critical conditions. 

Dynamic maneuvering, airframe and 

system tolerances (both manufacturing 

and in-service), and non-steady 

atmospheric conditions—in any 

appropriate combination and phase of 

flight-must not result in a limited 

flight—parameter beyond the nominal 

design limit value that would cause 

unsafe flight characteristics. 

(3) The airplane must be responsive to 

intentional dynamic maneuvering to 

within a suitable range of the parameter 

limit. Dynamic characteristics, such as 

damping and overshoot, must also be 

appropriate for the flight maneuver and 

limit parameter in question. 

(4) When simultaneous envelope 

limiting is engaged, adverse coupling or 

adverse priority must not result. 

b. Failure States: EFCS failures, 

including sensor failures, must not 

result in a condition where a parameter 

is limited to such a reduced value that 

safe and controllable maneuvering is no 

longer available. The crew must be 

alerted by suitable means, if any change 

in envelope limiting or maneuverability 

is produced by single or multiple 

failures of the EFCS not shown to be 

extremely improbable. 

6. Flight Envelope Protection: High 

Incidence Protection Function 

a. Definitions. For the purpose of this 

special condition, the following 

definitions apply: 

Electronic Flight Control System 

(EFCS) The electronic and software 

command and control elements of the 

flight control system. 

High Incidence Protection Function 

An airplane level function that 

automatically limits the maximum angle 

of attack that can be attained to a value 

below that at which an aerodynamic 

stall would occur. 

Alpha Limit The maximum angle of 

attack at which the airplane stabilizes 

with the high incidence protection 

function operating and the longitudinal 

control held on its aft stop. 

VMIN The minimum steady flight 

speed is the stabilized, calibrated 

airspeed obtained when the airplane is 

decelerated at an entry rate not 

exceeding 1 knot per second, until the 

longitudinal pilot control is on its stop 

with the high incidence protection 

function operating. 

VMIN1g VMIN corrected to 1g 

conditions. It is the minimum calibrated 

airspeed at which the airplane can 

develop a lift force normal to the flight 

path and equal to its weight when at an 

angle of attack not greater than that 

determined for VMIN. 

b. Capability and Reliability of the 

High Incidence Protection Function. 

(1) It must not be possible to 

encounter a stall during pilot induced 

maneuvers, and handling characteristics 

must be acceptable, as required by 

paragraphs e and f below, titled High 

Incidence Handling Demonstrations and 

High Incidence Handling Characteristics 

respectively. 

(2) The airplane must be protected 

against stalling due to the effects of 

environmental conditions such as 

windshears and gusts at low speeds, as 

required by paragraph g, Atmospheric 

Disturbances, below. 

(3) The ability of the high incidence 

protection function to accommodate any 

reduction in stalling incidence resulting 

from residual ice must be verified. 

(4) The reliability of the function and 

the effects of failures must be 

acceptable, in accordance with 

§ 25.1309 and Advisory Circular 

25.1309–1A, System Design and 

Analysis. 

(5) The high incidence protection 

function must not impede normal 

maneuvering for pitch angles up to the 

maximum required for normal 

maneuvering, including a normal allengines operating takeoff plus a suitable 

margin to allow for satisfactory speed 

control. 

c. Minimum Steady Flight Speed and 

Reference Stall Speed. 

In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.103, the following special 

conditions apply: 

(1) VMIN The minimum steady flight 

speed, for the airplane configuration 

under consideration and with the high 

incidence protection function operating, 

is the final stabilized calibrated airspeed 

obtained when the airplane is 

decelerated at an entry rate not 

exceeding 1 knot per second until the 

longitudinal pilot control is on its stop. 

(2) The minimum steady flight speed, 

VMIN, must be determined with: 

(a) The high incidence protection 

function operating normally. 

(b) Idle thrust. 

(c) All combinations of flap settings 

and landing gear positions. 

(d) The weight used when VSR is 

being used as a factor to determine 

compliance with a required 

performance standard. 

(e) The most unfavorable center of 

gravity allowable, and 

(f) The airplane trimmed for straight 

flight at a speed achievable by the 

automatic trim system. 

(3) VMIN1g is VMIN corrected to 1g 

conditions. VMIN1g is the minimum 

calibrated airspeed at which the 

airplane can develop a lift force normal 

to the flight path and equal to its weight 

when at an angle of attack not greater 

than that determined for VMIN. VMIN1g is 

defined as follows: 

V g V

n

min min 1 =

zw

Where: 

n z w = load factor normal to the flight path 

at VMIN

(4) The Reference Stall Speed, VSR, is 

a calibrated airspeed selected by the 

applicant. VSR may not be less than the 

1g stall speed. VSR is expressed as: 

V Vs

V

n SR

CL

zw

MAX ≥ = 1g

Where: 

VCLMAX = Calibrated airspeed obtained when 

the load factor-corrected lift coefficient 

n W

qS

zw 



 





is first a maximum during the maneuver 

prescribed in paragraph (5)(h) of this 

special condition. 

nzw = Load factor normal to the flight path 

at VCLMAX

W = Airplane gross weight 

S = Aerodynamic reference wing area, and 

q = Dynamic pressure. 

(5) VCLMAX must be determined with 

the following conditions: 

(a) Engines idling or—if that resultant 

thrust causes an appreciable decrease in 

stall speed-not more than zero thrust at 

the stall speed 

(b) The airplane in other respects, 

such as flaps and landing gear, in the 

condition existing in the test or 

performance standard in which VSR is 

being used. 

(c) The weight used when VSR is being 

used as a factor to determine 

compliance with a required 

performance standard. 

(d) The center of gravity position that 

results in the highest value of reference 

stall speed. 

(e) The airplane trimmed for straight 

flight at a speed achievable by the 

automatic trim system, but not less than 

1.13 VSR and not greater than 1.3 VSR. 

(f) [Reserved] 

(g) The high incidence protection 

function adjusted to a high enough 

incidence to allow full development of 

the 1g stall. 

(h) Starting from the stabilized trim 

condition, apply the longitudinal 

control to decelerate the airplane so that 

the speed reduction does not exceed one 

knot per second. 

(6) The flight characteristics at the 

angle of attack for CLMAX must be 

suitable in the traditional sense at FWD 

and AFT center of gravity in straight 


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8302 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

and turning flight at IDLE power. 

Although for a normal production EFCS 

and steady full aft stick this angle of 

attack for CLMAX cannot be achieved, the 

angle of attack can be obtained 

momentarily under dynamic 

circumstances and deliberately in a 

steady state sense with some EFCS 

failure conditions. 

(7) The reference stall speed, VSR, is 

a calibrated airspeed defined by the 

applicant. If VSR is chosen equal to 

VMIN1g, an equivalent safety finding to 

the intent of § 25.103 may be considered 

to have been met. The applicant may 

choose VSR to be less than VMIN1g but 

not less than VS1g if compensating 

factors are provided to ensure safe 

characteristics. 

d. Stall Warning. 

(1) Normal Operation If the 

conditions of paragraph b, Capability 

and Reliability of the High Incidence 

Protection Function, of this special 

conditions are satisfied, a level of safety 

equivalent to that intended by § 25.207, 

Stall Warning, must be considered to 

have been met without provision of an 

additional, unique warning device. 

(2) Failure Cases Following failures of 

the high incidence protection function 

not shown to be extremely improbable, 

if the function no longer satisfies 

paragraph b, Capability and Reliability 

of the High Incidence Protection 

Function, paragraphs b(1), (2), and (3) of 

this special condition, stall warning 

must be provided in accordance with 

§ 25.207. The stall warning should 

prevent inadvertent stall under the 

following conditions: 

(a) Power off straight stall approaches 

to a speed 5 percent below the warning 

onset. 

(b) Turning flight stall approaches 

with at least 1.5g load factor normal to 

the flight path at entry rate of at least 2 

knots per second when recovery is 

initiated not less than one second after 

warning onset. 

e. High Incidence Handling 

Demonstrations. 

In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.201, the following special 

conditions apply: 

Maneuvers to the limit of the 

longitudinal control in the nose up 

direction must be demonstrated in 

straight flight and in 30 degree banked 

turns under the following conditions: 

(1) The high incidence protection 

function operating normally. 

(2) Initial power condition of: 

(a) Power off. 

(b) The power necessary to maintain 

level flight at 1.5 VSR1, where VSR1 is the 

reference stall speed with the flaps in 

the approach position, the landing gear 

retracted, and the maximum landing 

weight. The flap position to be used to 

determine this power setting is that 

position in which the stall speed, VSR1, 

does not exceed 110% of the stall speed, 

VSR0, with the flaps in the most 

extended landing position. 

(3) [Reserved] 

(4) Flaps, landing gear and 

deceleration devices in any likely 

combination of positions. 

(5) Representative weights within the 

range for which certification is 

requested, and 

(6) The airplane trimmed for straight 

flight at a speed achievable by the 

automatic trim system. 

f. High Incidence Handling 

Characteristics. 

In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.203, the following special 

conditions apply: 

(1) In demonstrating the handling 

characteristics specified in paragraphs 

(2), (3), (4), and (5) below, the following 

procedures must be used: 

(a) Starting at a speed sufficiently 

above the minimum steady flight speed 

to ensure that a steady rate of speed 

reduction can be established, apply the 

longitudinal control so that the speed 

reduction does not exceed one knot per 

second until the control reaches the 

stop. 

(b) The longitudinal control must be 

maintained at the stop until the airplane 

has reached a stabilized flight condition 

and must then be recovered by normal 

recovery techniques. 

(c) The requirements for turning flight 

maneuver demonstrations must also be 

met with accelerated rates of entry to 

the incidence limit, up to the maximum 

rate achievable. 

(2) Throughout maneuvers with a rate 

of deceleration of not more than 1 knot 

per second, both in straight flight and in 

30 degree banked turns, the airplane’s 

characteristics must be as follows: 

(a) There must not be any abnormal 

airplane nose-up pitching. 

(b) There must not be any 

uncommanded nose-down pitching that 

would be indicative of stall. However, 

reasonable attitude changes associated 

with stabilizing the incidence at alpha 

limit as the longitudinal control reaches 

the stop would be acceptable. Any 

reduction of pitch attitude associated 

with stabilizing the incidence at the 

alpha limit should be achieved 

smoothly and at a low pitch rate, such 

that it is not likely to be mistaken for 

natural stall identification. 

(c) There must not be any 

uncommanded lateral or directional 

motion, and the pilot must retain good 

lateral and directional control by 

conventional use of the cockpit 

controllers throughout the maneuver. 

(d) The airplane must not exhibit 

buffeting of a magnitude and severity 

that would act as a deterrent to 

completing the maneuver. 

(3) In maneuvers with increased rates 

of deceleration, some degradation of 

characteristics is acceptable, associated 

with a transient excursion beyond the 

stabilized alpha-limit. However, the 

airplane must not exhibit dangerous 

characteristics or characteristics that 

would deter the pilot from holding the 

longitudinal controller on the stop for a 

period of time appropriate to the 

maneuvers. 

(4) It must always be possible to 

reduce incidence by conventional use of 

the controller. 

(5) The rate at which the airplane can 

be maneuvered from trim speeds 

associated with scheduled operating 

speeds, such as V2 and VREF, up to 

alpha-limit must not be unduly damped 

or significantly slower than can be 

achieved on conventionally controlled 

transport airplanes. 

g. Atmospheric Disturbances. 

Operation of the high incidence 

protection function must not adversely 

affect aircraft control during expected 

levels of atmospheric disturbances or 

impede the application of recovery 

procedures in case of windshear. 

Simulator tests and analysis may be 

used to evaluate such conditions but 

must be validated by limited flight 

testing to confirm handling qualities at 

critical loading conditions. 

h. [Reserved]. 

i. Proof of Compliance. 

In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.21, the following special conditions 

apply: 

The flying qualities must be evaluated 

at the most unfavorable center of gravity 

position. 

j. Longitudinal Control: 

(1) In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.145(a) and (a)(1), the following 

special conditions apply: 

It must be possible—at any point 

between the trim speed for straight 

flight and Vmin—to pitch the nose 

downward, so that the acceleration to 

this selected trim speed is prompt, with: 

The airplane trimmed for straight 

flight at the speed achievable by the 

automatic trim system and at the most 

unfavorable center of gravity; 

(2) In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.145(b)(6), the following special 

conditions apply: 

With power off, flaps extended and 

the airplane trimmed at 1.3 VSR1, obtain 

and maintain airspeeds between Vmin

and either 1.6 VSR1 or VFE, whichever is 

lower. 

k. Airspeed Indicating System. 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 37 / Monday, February 26, 2007 / Proposed Rules 8303 

(1) In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.1323(c)(1), the following special 

conditions apply: 

VMO to Vmin with the flaps retracted. 

(2) In lieu of the requirements of 

§ 25.1323(c)(2), the following special 

conditions apply: 

Vmin to VFE with flaps in the landing 

position. 

7. Flight Envelope Protection: Normal 

Load Factor (g) Limiting 

In addition to the requirements of 

§ 25.143(a)—and in the absence of other 

limiting factors—the following special 

conditions apply: 

a. The positive limiting load factor 

must not be less than: 

(1) 2.5g for the Electronic Flight 

Control System (EFCS) normal state. 

(2) 2.0g for the EFCS normal state 

with the high lift devices extended. 

b. The negative limiting load factor 

must be equal to or more negative than: 

(1) Minus 1.0g for the EFCS normal 

state. 

(2) 0.0g for the EFCS normal state 

with high lift devices extended. 

Note: This special condition does not 

impose an upper bound for the normal load 

factor limit, nor does it require that the limit 

exist. If the limit is set at a value beyond the 

structural design limit maneuvering load 

factor ‘‘n,’’ indicated in §§ 25.333(b) and 

25.337(b) and (c), there should be a very 

positive tactile feel built into the controller 

and obvious to the pilot that serves as a 

deterrent to inadvertently exceeding the 

structural limit. 

8. Flight Envelope Protection: Pitch, 

Roll, and High Speed Limiting 

Functions 

In addition to § 25.143, the following 

special conditions apply: 

a. Operation of the high speed limiter 

during all routine and descent 

procedure flight must not impede 

normal attainment of speeds up to the 

overspeed warning. 

b. The pitch limiting function must 

not impede airplane maneuvering, 

including an all-engines operating 

takeoff, for pitch angles up to the 

maximum required for normal 

operations plus a suitable margin in the 

pitch axis to allow for satisfactory speed 

control. 

c. The high speed limiting function 

must not impede normal attainment of 

speeds up to VMO/MMO during all 

routine and descent procedure flight 

conditions. 

d. The pitch and roll limiting 

functions must not restrict nor prevent 

attaining bank angles up to 65 degrees 

and pitch attitudes necessary for 

emergency maneuvering. Positive spiral 

stability, which is introduced above 35 

degrees bank angle, must not require 

excessive pilot strength on the side stick 

controller to achieve bank angles up to 

65 degrees. Stick force at bank angles 

greater than 35 degrees must not be so 

light that over-control would lead to 

pilot-induced oscillations. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 

15, 2007. 

Stephen Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–3213 Filed 2–23–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–27338; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–148–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell 

Douglas Model 717–200 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to 

supersede an existing airworthiness 

directive (AD) that applies to all 

McDonnell Douglas Model 717–200 

airplanes. The existing AD currently 

requires revising the Airworthiness 

Limitations Section (ALS) of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to incorporate new 

removal limits for certain components 

of the flap system and to reduce the 

interval of inspections for fatigue 

cracking of certain principal structural 

elements (PSEs). This proposed AD 

would require revising the ALS of the 

Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness to incorporate reduced 

initial inspection and repeat inspection 

intervals for certain PSEs. This 

proposed AD results from a revised 

damage tolerance analysis. We are 

proposing this AD to detect and correct 

fatigue cracking of certain PSEs, which 

could adversely affect the structural 

integrity of the airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by April 12, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

proposed AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 

Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, 

California 90846, Attention: Data and 

Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A 

(D800–0024), for the service information 

identified in this proposed AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

David Rathfelder, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120L, FAA, Los 

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 

627–5229; fax (562) 627–5210. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to submit any relevant 

written data, views, or arguments 

regarding this proposed AD. Send your 

comments to an address listed in the 

ADDRESSES section. Include the docket 

number ‘‘FAA–2007–27338; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–148–AD’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

the proposed AD. We will consider all 

comments received by the closing date 

and may amend the proposed AD in 

light of those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this proposed AD. 

Using the search function of that web 

site, anyone can find and read the 

comments in any of our dockets, 

including the name of the individual 

who sent the comment (or signed the 

comment on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78), or may can visit http:// 

dms.dot.gov. 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 


hsrobinson on PROD1PC76 with PROPOSALS