IN THE



## S UPREME 

## C OURT OF THE 

## S TATE OF 

## A RIZONA

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

ROBERT FISCHER, Appellee

.

No . C R

- 15

- 0380

- PR

Filed April 17, 201 7

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Karen A. Mullins, Judge

No. CR2012

- 006869

AFFIRMED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 238 Ariz. 309, 360 P.3d 105 (App. 2015 )

VACATED IN PART

COUNSEL :

William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney, Diane Meloche (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Steven C. Biggs (argued), Steven C. Smith, Smith LC, Phoenix, Attorneys

for Robert Fischer

Timothy J. Eckstein (argued), Randy McDonald, Osb orn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal
Justice

Mark Brnovich, Arizona A ttorney General, Dominic Draye , Solicitor General, Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel, Linley Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney GeneralSTATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

2 JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE B ALES

, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICE S

TIMMER and BOLICK joined.

JUSTICE BRUTINEL

, opinion of t he Court:

¶1 A jury found Robert Fischer guilty of second degree murder.

But the trial court, under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 24.1(c)(1), determined that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and gr anted a new trial. Independently reexamining the
evidence, t he court of a ppeals concluded that the trial court erred by granting a new trial. We hold that the court of appeals exceeded the proper scope of deferential appellate review by independently rew eighing the

evidence rather than determining if substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s ruling

. Because substantial evidence support s th e trial court’s

determination

, we affirm the order granting a new trial

.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 Defendant Robert Fischer is a n attorney and a former police

officer. W hile visiting his family in late December 2010

, Fischer

, his step

daughter Beli nda, and Belinda’s husba nd

, Lee

, stay ed up talking and drinking. Around 10 p.m., Lee excused himself to make a phone call and

check his email. He returned worried and upset and showed Fischer an email about a non

- compete agreement. Belinda went to bed around 11:30

p.m. , and Fischer and Lee continued drink ing heavily

.

¶3 Fischer testified that he awoke the next morning to a popping

sound and found a man o n the kitchen floor in a pool of blood. Confused

and unaware of the man’s identity, he called 911

, and police officers arrived shortly thereafter. Lee

— t he man on the floor

— had a single gunshot

wound to his head ; th e re was a handgun in Lee’s right hand

, and his thumb

was in the trigger guard

.

¶4 During his police interview

, Fischer seemed confused and had difficulty keeping track of the time. Fischer admitted the gun was his

but explained that he had disassembled it upon arriving at Belinda and

Lee’s house

. Fischer stated that he wanted to help the police figure out what had happened but he was unable to remember.STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

3 ¶5 The police obtained a search warrant to acquire physical

evidence from Fischer an d Belinda. There was blood on Fischer’s left foot and on the left side of his left pajama pant leg. The police swabbed Fischer’s
feet, performed a gunshot residue test, and took fingerprints and a blood sample. Crime scene specialists seized and analyzed additional evidence

from the house

.

¶6 The State charged Fischer with second degree murder and

tried the case on the theor y that Fischer shot Lee and then manipulated the

scene to make it appear that the gunshot wound was self

- inflicted

. During trial, the court admitted expert testimony regarding the blood spatter, the gun and its position in Lee’s hand, the DNA and fingerprint evidence, the gunshot residue, and the likelihood of Fischer having blacked out from alcohol consumption.

¶7 Following the guilty verdict

, Fischer moved for a new trial

under Rule 24.1(c)(1)

. T he trial court consider e d the evidence and

determined:

There was, quite simply, no physical evidence that the Defendant fired the gun that killed Lee. The physical evidence establishes only that the Defendant was present in a chair near where Lee was sitting at the time of [sic] the gun was

fired. Det. Acosta’s opinion that the Defendant staged the scene by manipulating Lee’s body is not supported by t he physical evidence, lacks credibility, and is sheer speculation.

In its lengthy minute entry

, the court chronicle d the physical evid ence supporting its conclusion that the guilty verdict was contrary to the weight

of the evidence and granted the motion for a new trial.

¶8 T he court of appeals reversed. State v. Fischer , 238 Ariz. 309

, 322 ¶ 82, 360 P.3d 105, 118 (App. 2015). After independently examining the evidence, the court concluded that the jury properl y weighed the evidence

and its verdict was not a miscarriage of justice. Id . at 321 ¶ 76, 360 P.3d

at 117. The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court abused its discretion “by making factual findings that were not supported by theSTATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

4 record, and by failing to consider all the evidence in reaching its

conclusions.” Id. at 316 ¶ 29, 360 P.3d at 112.

¶9 We granted review to consider the proper role of the trial

court in deciding whether a verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence, a question of statewide importance. We also consider whether the court of appeals erred in its independent examination of the evidence

and conclu sion that the trial court abused its discretion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution
and A.R.S. § 12

- 120.24.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶10 We review a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial for an

abuse of discretion. Smith v. Moroney , 79 Ariz. 35, 38

- 39, 282 P.2d 470, 472
(1955). We review interpretation and application of court rules de novo.

Allen v. Sanders , 240 Ariz. 569, 571 ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 784, 786 (2016).

B. Motion for a New Trial

¶11 A court may grant a new trial if “[t]he verdict is contrary to

law or to the weight of the evidence.” Ari z. R

. Crim

. P

. 24.1(c) (1)

. Arizona

courts use essentially the same standard in civil and criminal cases

, and we

therefore consider both civil and criminal case law in our analysis. Compare Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(H) (authorizing the court to grant a new trial when

“ the verdict

. . . is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law”) with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1)

.

¶12 T he trial court’s authority to order a new trial whe n the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence is deeply rooted in our law

. In 1757, Lord Mansfield wrote that “ [t] rials by jury, in civil causes, could not subsist now, without a power, somewhere, to grant new trials.” Reeves

v. Markle , 119 Ariz. 159, 1 63, 579 P.2d 1382, 1386 (1978) (quoting Bright v. Eynon , 1 Burr. 390, 393, 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366 (1757) )

. The authority to grant

a new trial was included in Arizona’s original territorial code. Ariz. Howell
Code ch. XI § 409 , 115

– 16 (1865) (“The court in which a trial is had upon the issue of facts, has power to grant a new trial where a verdict has been rendered against the defendant, upon his application in the following casesSTATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

5 only:

. . . 6 th . When the verdict is contrary to law or eviden ce.”). Over the past century, this C ourt has consistently recognized that unjust verdicts

, while rare, can occur

. As we noted in Reeves , “ D ue to his unique position, the trial judge has become the primary buffer against unjust verdicts. He performs an indispensable function without which our system of justice could not hold out the promise of a [] uniform application of the law.” 119

Ariz. at 163 , 579 P.2d at 1386

.

¶13 I n 1926

, this C ourt delineated the trial judge’s “duty” to grant

a new trial:

The trial courts may weigh the evidence, and, if they think injustice has been done, should grant

a new trial. It is their duty to supervise the verdict of the jury and grant a new trial if the verdict in the opinion of the court is against the weight of the evide nce, or if it is arbitrary and manifestly or clearly wrong, or if it appears to be the result of passion, prejudice [ or ] misconduct of the jury.

Huntsman v. First Nat ’l Bank , 29 Ariz. 574, 578, 243 P. 598, 600 (1926). The

Huntsman c ourt held, “If after a full consideration of the case the trial court was satisfied that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that substantial justice had not been done between the parties, it was its duty , in the exercise of a sound discretion, to set the verdict aside.” Id . at 579, 243 P.

at 600 (emphasis added). Subsequent c ases have consistently recognized the trial judge’s authority to grant a new trial. 1

1 See Dennis v. Stukey , 37 Ariz. 299, 306

– 07, 294 P. 276, 279 (1930)

, overruled on other grounds by Butane Corp. v. Kirby , 66 Ariz. 272, 284, 187 P.2d 325 , 333 (1947); Young Mines Co. v. Citizens ’ St. Bank , 37 Ariz. 521, 525

– 26, 296 P. 247, 249 (1931); Brownell v. Freedman , 39 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1932); Richfield Oil Co. v. Estes , 55 Ariz. 81, 84, 98 P.2d 851, 852 (1940); Sadler v. Ariz

. F lour Mills Co., 58 Ariz. 486, 490, 121 P.2d 412, 413

– 14 (1942); Ruth v. Rhodes

, 66 Ariz. 129, 138

– 39, 185 P.2d 304, 310 (1947); Zevon v. Tennebaum , 73 Ariz. 281, 283, 240 P.2d 548, 549 (1952); Smith v. Moroney , 79 Ariz. 35, 38, 282 P.2d 470, 472 (1955); Ca ldwell v. Tremper , 90 Ariz. 241, 246, 367 P.2d 266, 269 (1962); State v. Ross , 97 Ariz. 51, 54, 396 P.2d 619, 621 (1964)

, overruled in part by Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin , 100 Ariz. 80, 83, 411 P.2d 809, 811 (1966) ; State v.STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

6 ¶14 The duty to grant a new trial whe n the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence has been labeled the “thirteenth juror rule,” or the “ninth juror rule” in a civil case. See Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists

Chartered , 229 Ariz. 193, 197

– 98 ¶¶ 15

– 16, 273 P.3d 645, 649

– 50 (2012). “The trial judge, so far as this duty is concerned, sits as a thirteenth juror, and he, as well as the jury, must be convinced that the weight of the evidence sustains the verdict, or it is his imperative duty to set it aside

. ” Brownell v.

Freedman , 39 Ariz. 385, 389, 6 P.2d 1115, 1116 (1932)

. More recently , this Court has described the judge’s role in granting a new trial as an exercise

of “broad” or “wide” discretion , rather than in terms of duty. See City o f

Glendale v. Bradshaw , 114 Ariz. 236, 237

– 38, 560 P.2d 420, 421

– 22 (1977).

¶15 Trial judges are given such broad discretion because

, like the jury, they observed the trial :

The trial judge has the same opportunity of seeing the witnesses, learning their interest, observing their manner of testifying, and of judging the probability of the truthfulness of

their testimony as has the jury, and, by reason of his experience and training, should be better able correctly to evaluate the testimony

. . . . If

the ev idence accredited by the jury is improbable or palpably untrue, he should not shirk his duty of granting a new trial. He should exercise his power to prevent injustice as well as to promote justice.

Dennis v. Stukey

, 37 Ariz. 299, 3 07, 294 P. 276, 279 (1 930)

, overruled on other grounds by Butane Corp. v. Kirby , 66 Ariz. 272, 284, 187 P.2d 325 , 333 (1947)

. A ppellate court s , by contrast, defer to the factual findings of the jury and generally will not set aside the verdict unless no evidence supports it, even if the verdict seems unjust or the result of prejudice. See Huntsman , 29 Ariz.

at 578

– 79 , 243 P. at 599

– 600. Therefore, a n unjust verdict that is against the weight of the evidence will stand unless the trial judge exercises the power

to set it aside. Dennis , 37 Ariz. at 307, 294 P. at 279.

Thomas , 104 Ariz. 408, 411

– 12, 454 P.2d 153, 156

– 57 (1969); Cano v. Neill , 12 Ariz. App. 562, 567

– 71 , 473 P.2d 487, 492

– 9 6 (1970); Lyle v. Boyle , 16 Ariz. App. 198, 200, 492 P.2d 447, 44 9 (1972).STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

7 ¶16 The State urges us to abandon the thirteenth juror rule and prohibit trial court s from independently reweigh ing the evidence or

examin ing witnes s credibility. Rather, the State argues

, and the court of appeals ruled, that a trial court should grant a new trial only in the extraordinary case where it is “ quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result and it is necessary to set aside the verdict to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” Fischer , 238 Ariz. at 315 ¶ 22, 360 P.3d at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted) ( quoting Cano v. Neill

, 12 Ariz. App. 562,
569, 473 P.2d 487, 494 (1970) )

. In the State’s view, a new trial is appropriate “only where the verdict is objectively unreasonable, manifestly unfair, or so outrageous as to shock the conscience .” The State finds support for this

assertion in Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix

, 192 Ariz. 51, 55 ¶ 23 , 961 P.2d 449, 453 (1998) (“The basic question [the trial judge] must ask is whether the jury

verdict is so ‘manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience.’”) (citation omitted)

.

¶17 As t he court of appeals noted

, it is “not uncommon” for the standards governing an order for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal to

be confused. Fischer , 238 Ariz. at 313 ¶ 18 n.3 , 360 P.3d at 10 9

. C ompare Ariz. R. Crim. P. 24.1(c)(1)

, with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20. The State proposes to address that confusion by effectively eliminating the difference between the

two motions. Under the existing Rule 20 standard, to decide a motion for acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge must review the evidence in the “light mo st favorable to the state, and all reasonable

inferences are to be resolved against the defendant ” to decide if a reasonable person could fairly con clude the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt

. State v. Clifton , 134 Ariz. 345, 348, 656 P.2d 634, 637 (App.

1982 ) ; see also State v. West , 226 Ariz. 559, 563 ¶ 18, 250 P.3d 1188, 1192 (2011) (“ Thus, in ruling on a Rule 20 motion, unlike a motion for a new trial under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.1(c) (1), a trial court may not re

weigh the facts or disregard inferences that might reasonably be drawn

from the evi dence. ”). By contrast, in deciding a motion for new trial, a trial

court may weigh the evidence and make its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses. I f, after full consideration of the case, the court is satisfied that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, it may set the verdict a side, even if substantial evidence supports it

. Young

Mines Co. v. Citizens’ St. Bank , 37 Ariz. 521, 525, 296 P. 247, 249 (1931) ; see
Huntsman , 29 Ariz. at 579, 243 P. at 600. Under the State’ s theory , a trial

court

, unable to weigh evidence or determine credibility

, could not set the verdict aside despite its firm conviction that the verdict was unjust

.STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

8 ¶18 We reject the State’s argument that we should strictly limit the judge’s role because to do so not only undermines Rule 24.1(c)(1) but also

con flates the standard s for a new trial and a judgment of acquittal

. Precluding the trial court from weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses effectively abrogate s the authority vested in trial

courts under Rule 24.1(c) (1) and overturns more than a century of Arizona

law . We decline to impose such a limitation and disavow the language in

Hutcherson to the contrary.

¶19 While we reject the State’s argument, we take this opportunity to clarify the trial judge’s role in granting a new trial under Rule 24.1(c)(1)

. We agree with the court of appeals that a trial court considering a motion

for a new trial must respect the role of the jury and the integrity of the jury trial system. Cal X

- Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, L.L.C. , 229 Ariz. 377, 403 ¶ 88

, 276 P.3d 11, 37 (App. 2012)

. I t is primarily the province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and to find the facts. State v. Boggs

, 218 Ariz. 325, 335 ¶ 39, 185 P.3d 111, 121 (2008) (“Determining veracity and credibility lies within the province of the jury”) ; Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd. , 198 Ariz. 283, 287 ¶ 12, 9 P.3d 314, 318 (2000) (“The credibility of a witness ’ testimony and the weight it should be given are issues particularly within t he province of the jury.” ) ( internal quotation

marks and citation omitted )

. The judge does not technically sit as a “thirteenth juror” in the sense that the judge has a vote in deciding the case, much less a vote equal to or greater than that of the jurors ; but given the judge’s training , experience, and unique vantage point

, the judge must have

substantial latitude in overseeing the jury verdict

.

¶20 W e are mindful that a judge considering a motion for new

trial did not have the benefit of participating in jury deliberations. Thus,

t he judge may not set aside a jury verdict simply because “if he had acted

as trier of the fact, he would have reached a different result.” Cano , 12 Ariz. App. at 569, 473 P.2d at 494 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)

. For this reason, we disavow our contrary characterization of the trial court’s

discretion made in Peak v. Acuna

, 203 Ariz. 83, 85 ¶ 9, 50 P.3d 833, 835 (2002) (suggesting that a trial court may order a new trial based on a verdict that is contrary to the weight of the evidence when “the trial judge simply disagrees with the jury’s res olution of conflicting facts”). A trial court’s discretion under Rule 24.1(c)(1) is not unlimited, nor does the court ha v e unbridled “ veto” power over a jury verdict s uch that the court may act as aSTATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

9 “super juror ” and overturn a verdict merely because the cour t personally disagrees with it.

¶21 The trial judge has broad discretion

, however, to find the verdict inconsistent with the evidence and grant a new trial, so as to guard against arbitrary verdicts. Walsh , 229 Ariz. at 197

– 98 ¶ ¶ 15

– 16, 273 P.3d

at 6 49

– 50

. We defer to the discretion of the trial judge who tried the case

and who personally observe d the proceedings. The judge may weigh the

evidence

, make credibility determinations, and set aside the verdict and grant a new trial even if there is s ufficient evidence in the record to support

the verdict. Clifton , 134 Ariz. at 348

– 4 9 , 656 P.2d at 637

– 38 . We emphasize

that the court does not usurp the role of the jury in granting a new trial

because the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury ; it only allows the parties a new trial before a different jury. In tha t regard, the judge ’ s role in granting a motion for new trial differs from the judge’s role

in granting a motion for acquittal

. When the court grants a new trial, the jury retains the ultimate decision

- making authority

. In directing a verdict of acquittal, the jury’s role is supplanted by the court

.

¶22 We recognize the difficult task the trial court faces in striking a balance between honoring the jury ’s constitutional role and ensuring that a seriously erroneous result does not stand. The purpose of Rule 24.1 is to prevent an arbitrary or unjust verdict from becoming an arbitrary or unjust judgment. Ultimately, the judge must determine if substantial justice has been done between the parties under the standard set forth in Rule 24.1(c)(1)

— whether “ [t] he verdict is contrary to law or to the weight of the

evidence

. ” See also State v. McIver , 109 Ariz. 71, 72, 505 P.2d 242, 243 (1973);

Smith , 79 Ariz. at 38, 282 P.2d at 472.

¶23 Our case law provides little additional guidance to the trial judge, and commentators have noted the difficulty of formulating a bright

line rule or generic test. “Necessarily all formulations are couched in broad and general terms that furnish no unerring litmus for a particular case.” 11

Charles Alan Wr ight et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2806, at 90

– 91 (3d ed. 2012). We are mindful that attempt s to refine the standard “ may run the significant risk of muddling more than they clarify.” Hunter v. Philip

Morris USA Inc ., 364 P. 3 d 439 , 448 ( Alaska 2015)

. But we note that in assessing whether the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence

, the trial judge should consider all the evidence presented in the light of the judge’s experience and training.STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

10 ¶24 The judge should assess the strengt h of the evidence, considering the credibility of the witnesses and conflicting testimony. 12

- 59 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice

– Civil § 59.13 (2016)

. The court should consider the duration of the trial, the complexity of the

issues in the case

, and whether the case involves subjects outside the ordinary knowledge of jurors, giving greater scrutiny to more difficult

cases. The court should make its assessment with a keen recognition of the importance of the jury’s role ; that t he judge would have reached a different verdict is not enough to grant a new trial. Finally, the court should explain with particularity the reasons why the jury’s verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59( i ) (2017) (previously Rule 59(m))

.

¶25 As the Alaska Supreme Court aptly said, “We commit this

determination to trial courts’ sound discretion based on our trust in their position, expertise, and humility. History has indicated that this trust is

well deserved .” Hunter

, 364 P.3d at 448. Arizona’s trial judges are in the best position to decide motions for new trial and are uniquely well

qualified to do so. Likewise, a review of our case law reflects that there is

little cause for concern about trial courts o rdering new trials too frequently

or without a substantial basis . Such motions are rarely granted, and when granted (or denied)

, are almost never reversed on appeal.

C. Appellate Review

¶26 A different standard applies to appellate review

. “ We have invariably held that this court will not disturb a verdict on the ground that it is contrary to the weight of the evidence. ” Brownell , 39 Ariz. at 389, 6 P.2d

at 1116. When an appellate court reviews an order granting a new trial for

abuse of discretion

, it “look [ s ] to the broad scope of the trial and do [ es ] not attempt to reweigh the facts. ” Hutcherson , 192 Ariz. at 56 ¶ 27, 961 P.2d

at 454. The appellate court’s role is to oversee the granting of new trials and

to e nsure that the exercise of a trial court ’ s broad discretion has a legal

, rather than an arbitrary

, basis. Estabrook v. J. C. Penney Co

. , 105 Ariz. 302, 305, 464 P.2d 325, 328 (1970)

. The reviewing court must “ inquire whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination.”

Reeves , 119 Ariz. at 164, 579 P.2d at 1387. If such evidence exists, then the

order is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should be

affirmed

. Id

.STATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

11 ¶27 We have repeatedly held that an appellate court “ will not disturb an order granting a new trial unless the probative force of the evidence clearly demonstrates that the trial court’s action is wrong and unjust and therefore unreasonable and a manifest abuse of discretion.”

Smith , 79 Ariz. at 39, 282 P.2 d at 472; s ee also McIver , 109 Ariz. at 72, 505 P.2d

at 243 (quoting with approval Smith , 79 Ariz. at 39, 282 P.2d at 472) ; State v.

Saenz , 88 Ariz. 154, 155, 353 P.2d 1026, 1027 (1960) (same)

. T he question for the appellate court is whether the probative force of the evidence supports

the order granting a new trial, not whether the evidence supports the jury

verdict

.

¶28 The appellate court does not sit as the “ fourteenth ” juror. See

Baker

- Thomas Lime & Cement Co. v. Ariz. Concrete Pipe Co., 1 Ariz. App. 233, 237, 401 P.2d 238, 242 (1965) (“The trial judge is a 13 th juror. An Appellate

Court is not a 13 th juror. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the

trial court.” ) (citation omitted). The appellate court’s role is not to weigh the evidence. It is to determine whether, resolving every conflict in the evidence in support of the order, substantial evidence supports the trial judge’s order. A trial court ruling granting a new trial “wher e the evidence is equiponderant or nearly so or where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict is not error

. ” Smith

, 79 Ariz. at 39 , 282 P.2d at 472

.

¶29 We see no reason to depart from this rule. We disavow the opinions that conflict with this appellate standard of review , such as State v. Moya, 129 Ariz. 64, 66, 628 P.2d 947, 949 (1981) ( stating, in review of a trial court’s order granting a new trial, “ I t is the duty of this court, under the
circumstances, to review all of the evidence and to determine whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder was committed with premedi t ation.”)

, and State v. Chase , 78 Ariz. 240, 242, 278

P.2d 423, 424 (1954) ( to same effect )

.

¶30 The court of appeals in this case exceeded the proper scope of review by independently reweighing the evidence. In her minute entry ordering a new trial, the trial judge exhaustively discussed the evidence presented at trial. Although the court of appeals ’ independent evalua tion of the evidence led it to disagree with the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence, we are not persuaded that the trial court disregarded or misstated key evidence in granting Fischer’s motion. Rather, the trial court focus ed on evidence that the court of appeals discounted, evaluate d witnessSTATE V

. FISCHER Opinion of the Court

12 credibility differently, and, ultimately, drew different inferences from the

evidence than did the court of appeals

.

¶31 Considering the trial court ’s broad discretionary authority to weigh the evidence as required under Rule 24.1(c)(1), we conclude that substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s determination. Thus, unlike the court of appeals, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly exceed its authority in granting a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

¶32 We vacate paragraphs sixteen through eighty

- two of the court of appeals’ opinion and affirm the trial court ’s order granting a new trial. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.