PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1749

___________

TROY REESE, Appellant

v.

WARDEN PHILADELPHIA FDC

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-18-cv-00902)

District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and 

I.O.P. 10.6

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and FUENTES,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 21, 2018)
2

_________

OPINION

_________

FUENTES. Circuit Judge.

Pro se appellant Troy Reese appeals the District 

Court’s order dismissing his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Reese, who is awaiting criminal trial in federal court, raised 

claims challenging the evidence supporting the charges 

against him, the conduct of the law-enforcement officers who 

arrested and interrogated him, and the District Court’s refusal 

to release him pending trial. As we have previously stated, a 

detainee’s challenge to the conduct of law enforcement 

officers in connection with his arrest or the validity of the 

charges against him must be addressed in an appropriate 

pretrial motion. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 

Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135, 1136 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam). 

We write to address a novel question in our Court: may a 

federal detainee challenge his pretrial detention via a § 2241 

habeas petition? We join the two other Circuits to have 

addressed this issue and conclude that a federal detainee’s 

request for release pending trial can only be considered under 

the Bail Reform Act and not under a § 2241 petition for 

habeas relief. See Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 

1017-19 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Pipito, 

861 F.2d 1006, 1009 (7th Cir. 1987).

The events leading to this appeal began in December 

2017, when Reese was charged in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania with one count of using a facility and means of 
3

interstate or foreign commerce to attempt to induce, entice, or 

coerce a minor into engaging in sexual activity in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). See E.D. Pa. Cr. A. No. 17-cr-0631. 

Reese was arrested, and the Government filed a motion for 

pretrial detention. The Government argued that there was 

probable cause to believe that Reese had committed the 

charged offense, which created a rebuttable presumption in 

favor of detention, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), and that 

other factors, including Reese’s criminal record and the 

length of the sentence he faced, further militated in favor of 

detention. A Magistrate Judge granted the Government’s 

motion.

In February 2018, Reese filed the § 2241 petition at 

issue in this appeal. In this petition, he claimed that the 

criminal charge was baseless, that the police had violated his 

constitutional rights in the course of arresting and 

interrogating him, and that he was entitled to be released 

pending trial. This filing was docketed separately from the 

criminal action, see E.D. Pa. Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00902, but 

assigned to the same District Judge. 

In March 2018, Reese, through counsel, filed a motion 

for pretrial release in the criminal case. The District Court 

held a hearing and denied the motion, concluding that the 

evidence against Reese was “overwhelming,” that Reese had

numerous prior criminal convictions, that Reese had 

previously violated conditions of bail, and that Reese lacked

ties to the community. Reese appealed that order. That 

appeal is pending at C.A. No. 18-1748.

1

 

 1 Counsel was appointed for Reese in that appeal, and the 

appeal has been stayed pending a final competency 
4

After denying Reese’s request for release in the 

criminal action, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 

petition, and Reese instituted the appeal now before the 

Court.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over the 

District Court’s legal conclusions. See Cradle v. United 

States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam). Because Reese is a federal prisoner appealing the 

dismissal of a § 2241 petition, he need not obtain a certificate 

of appealability to proceed. See United States v. Cepero, 224 

F.3d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on 

other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012).

Section 2241 confers on district courts the authority to 

entertain applications for a writ of habeas corpus filed by 

prisoners claiming to be “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” § 

2241(c)(3). Nevertheless, “a habeas court is ‘not bound in 

every case’ to issue the writ.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 

693 (2008) (quoting Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 

(1886)). Thus, even in cases where the habeas court has the 

authority to grant relief, it must consider “whether this be a 

case in which that power ought to be exercised.” Id.

(alteration omitted) (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 

Pet.) 193, 201 (1830)); see also Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 

525, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing prudential concerns 

that may counsel against using habeas power).

 

determination in the District Court. We express no opinion as 

to the merits of that appeal.
5

Courts have consistently refused to exercise their 

habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought

relief before standing trial. Instead, Courts have long stressed

that defendants should pursue the remedies available within 

the criminal action. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 

391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of 

exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular 

judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus 

should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v. 

United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905) (vacating order 

granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because 

there was “nothing in this record to disclose that there were 

any special circumstances which justified a departure from 

the regular course of judicial procedure” of pretrial motions 

and, if necessary, appeal); see also Medina v. Choate, 875 

F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting “the general rule 

that § 2241 is not a proper avenue of relief for federal 

prisoners awaiting federal trial”).2

 2 The Supreme Court has suggested that pretrial habeas relief 

might be available to a federal defendant in “exceptional

circumstances.” See Jones, 245 U.S. at 391; Johnson v. Hoy, 

227 U.S. 245, 247 (1913); see also Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 

702 F.2d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1983). Neither the Supreme Court 

nor this Court has delineated the circumstances that might 

qualify as “exceptional” in this context. See generally

Medina, 875 F.3d at 1029 (“If a federal prisoner is ever 

entitled to relief under § 2241 based on something that 

happened before trial, the circumstances are so rare that they 

have apparently not yet arisen.”). We have ruled that a state

prisoner may pursue a pretrial § 2241 petition without 

exhausting state remedies in “extraordinary circumstances,” 

which might exist when there is a showing of “delay, 
6

Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the 

criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of 

the issues, maintains respect for the appellate process, and 

prevents duplication of judicial work and judge-shopping. 

See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.10 

(1979) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus should not 

do service for an appeal,” and that “[t]his rule must be strictly 

observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained” 

(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 

269, 274 (1942)); see also Medina, 875 F.3d at 1028–29 

(identifying similar interests).

We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin 

Islands v. Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1970) (per 

curiam), to affirm the District Court’s denial of pretrial 

habeas petitions filed by federal defendants. We rejected the 

defendants’ challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the 

ground that a pretrial motion in the criminal case, “rather than 

their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the 

appropriate avenue of relief before trial.” Id. at 1136. We 

similarly held that the defendants’ claim that they had been

denied a speedy trial should be resolved “on an appropriate 

pretrial motion.” Id. Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to 

challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law-

 

harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity” on the part 

of the state. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 447 n.12 (3d 

Cir. 1975). We need not delimit the precise bounds of any 

exception here because Reese’s claims—run-of-the-mill 

challenges to his indictment, arrest, interrogation, and denial 

of pretrial release—are not “exceptional” under any plausible

definition of that term.
7

enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was 

required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal 

case, not via a pretrial § 2241 petition. See id.

Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for 

Reese to challenge his detention pending trial. The Bail 

Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150, provides a 

comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions. 

See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742–43 

(1987). First, a judicial officer will order the defendant’s 

release or detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142. If an initial 

detention order is issued by a magistrate judge, the defendant 

can file a motion asking the District Court to revoke or amend 

that order. See id. § 3145(b). And, if the District Court 

denies relief, the defendant can file an appeal, which “shall be 

determined promptly.” Id. § 3145(c). 

For all the reasons discussed above with respect to 

Reese’s other claims, federal defendants who seek pretrial 

release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail 

Reform Act, not through a separate § 2241 action. See

Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1017-19 (5th Cir. 

1988) (per curiam); United States v. Pipito, 861 F.2d 1006, 

1009 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 

(1951) (“the District Court should withhold relief in this 

collateral habeas corpus action where an adequate remedy 

available in the criminal proceeding has not been 

exhausted”).3

 The District Court therefore did not err in 

 3 In Bolones, we sustained a challenge to a denial of bail in a 

habeas corpus proceeding, but we did not consider, and it 

appears that the parties did not raise, the pertinent question 

here about whether § 2241 is an appropriate vehicle to assert 
8

refusing to entertain the request for pretrial release that Reese 

pressed in his § 2241 petition.

For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal 

presents “no substantial question,” and we will hence

summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Reese’s motion for appointment of 

counsel is denied. To the extent that any of Reese’s other 

filings in this Court request additional relief, they are denied.

 

such a claim. See Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332, 1341 (3d 

Cir. 1993) (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, 

neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, 

are not to be considered as having been so decided as to 

constitute precedents.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Webster 

v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)).