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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :

: CRIMINAL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 05-605

:

ALPHONSO WILLARD :

MEMORANDUM

Chief Judge Juan R. Sánchez January 30, 2023 

On April 18, 2022, Defendant Alphonso Willard filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate 

Release pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government opposes Willard’s motion, 

and because Willard fails to raise any grounds which merit relief, his motion shall be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In March 2006, Willard pled guilty to two counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and one count of using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). These charges arose out of two armed bank robberies in April 

and August of 2005, which took place in Exton and Southampton, Pennsylvania. In both robberies, 

Willard approached a bank employee in the parking lot, threatened them with a revolver, and 

forced them to open the bank’s vault before handcuffing them to the vault door and leaving with 

$47,000 and $125,000, respectively.

After pleading guilty to both bank robbery charges and one § 924(c) count related to the 

August offense, Willard was sentenced to 188 months on the § 2113(d) offenses and to a 

consecutive term of 300 months on the § 924(c) charge.

DISCUSSION

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In filing this motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Willard seeks to invoke an exception 

to the general rule that a federal court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 

imposed." Dillon v. U.S., 560 U.S. 817, 819 (2010). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Under § 

3582(c)(1)(A), 

in any case the court, upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully 

exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to 

bring a motion on the defendant's behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of 

such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may 

reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set forth in [18 

U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if it finds that – (i) 

extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction," ... "and that such 

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission. Id.

Willard bases his motion on four grounds. First, he asserts he was sentenced more harshly 

to a 488-month sentence because he refused the government's offered plea agreement of a 188-

month sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Def.'s Mot. Comp. Rel., 6-10, ECF No. 74.

Second, he challenges the 300-month minimum sentence under § 924(c) by arguing that his prior 

§ 924(c) conviction (in 1995) was invalid. Id. at 10-15. Third, Willard claims his rehabilitation 

efforts have been "extraordinary," as evidenced by his completion of many rehabilitation programs 

and he thus satisfies § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i). Id. at 15-17. Finally, Willard contends that his age and 

health, along with the threat posed by COVID-19 in his prison, present a compelling reason to 

reduce his sentence. Id. at 18-21. Each of these arguments shall be considered and addressed 

seriatim.

Willard first attacks the concept of plea bargains wholesale, arguing there are numerous

deficiencies in the practice and that his 488-month sentence was punishment for declining the 

government's offer of a fifteen-year sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Id. at 6-7. This is 

not a basis for compassionate relief.

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The Third Circuit has made clear that the duration of a lawful sentence cannot be the 

grounds for compassionate relief. In United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021), the 

defendant challenged a 312-year term of imprisonment resulting from stacked sentences which 

were properly imposed at the time of sentencing but which would not have been proper following 

subsequent amendments to the mandatory minimum sentences under § 924(c). Andrews, 12 F.4th

at 257. Andrews argued that the sentencing changes constituted "extraordinary and compelling"

reasons justifying early release. Id. at 258. The Third Circuit's response to this argument was 

definitive:

The duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or 

compelling circumstance. There is nothing 'extraordinary' about leaving untouched 

the exact penalties that Congress prescribed and that a district court imposed for 

particular violations of a statute. . . . Indeed the imposition of a sentence that was 

not only permissible but statutorily required at the time is neither an extraordinary 

nor a compelling reason to now reduce that same sentence. ... Moreover, 

considering the length of a statutorily mandated sentence as a reason for modifying 

a sentence would infringe on Congress's authority to set penalties. . . The 

nonretroactive changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums also cannot be a basis 

for compassionate release. In passing the First Step Act, Congress specifically 

decided that the changes to the § 924(c) mandatory minimums would not apply to 

people who had already been sentenced. . . . That is conventional: 'In federal 

sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet 

sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already sentenced.' 

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012).

Id. at 260-61 (other internal citations omitted). 

Neither is an asserted "non-cooperation penalty" a compelling reason to reduce a sentence. 

Willard likens his situation to that of a "trial penalty," whereby his longer sentence resulted from 

his rejection of an offered plea bargain. Def.s Mot. Comp. Rel., 9, ECF No. 74. However, 

defendants have no guarantee to receive a plea bargain to their liking, or to receive a plea bargain 

at all, and a "so-called 'trial penalty' is not an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce a 

defendant’s sentence." United States v. Sainsbury, No. 07-cr-165-2, 2022 WL 179125, at *6 (E.D. 

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Pa. Jan. 20, 2022) (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012)). Hence, Willard's rights 

were not violated when he did not receive the plea bargain he wanted. Because his sentence fell 

within the statutory guideline range when imposed, and Andrews is binding on this court, Willard's

first ground for relief is meritless. 

Willard next challenges the validity of his previous § 924(c) conviction. Def.s Mot. Comp. 

Rel., 10-11, ECF No. 74. Specifically, Willard contends attempted bank robbery is not a "crime of 

violence" under § 924(c) and his previous conviction was therefore invalid, and the mandatory 

minimum sentence imposed was improperly high. Id. at 11. Willard is thus attempting to challenge 

his previous sentence. This is impermissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. 

Rodriguez, No. 11-cr-251-1, 2021 WL 601510, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021) ("An argument that 

a sentence was improperly calculated and unlawful must be raised on a habeas motion. A defendant 

cannot circumvent the habeas restrictions by labeling his habeas motion as a motion for 

compassionate release."); United States v. Albanese, No. 97-cr-359, 2021 WL 2400762, *3 (E.D. 

Pa. June 11, 2021) ("Convictions and sentences can be challenged on direct appeal or in the habeas 

forum, but not in a compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).").

Willard's third contention is that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) ought to be construed 

according to its common meaning and his rehabilitation efforts recognized as "extraordinary" when 

taken into consideration with the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Def.s Mot. Comp. Rel., 16-

17, ECF No. 74. Willard also claims the rehabilitative efforts he made prior to enactment of the 

First Step Act should be given more weight. Id. While Willard’s pursuit of educational and 

vocational opportunities is commendable, it does not form the ground for compassionate release.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) allows a Court to grant a sentence reduction after considering the 

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). The Sentencing Commission Policy Statement for § 

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3582(c)(1)(A) contained in the Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 contains several examples of 

what may constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. While the Policy Statement 

is not binding on the courts, it still "sheds light on the meaning of extraordinary and compelling 

reasons" and is properly considered. Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260. The Statement's examples of 

extraordinary and compelling reasons include terminal illness, a serious physical or medical 

condition, serious functional or cognitive impairment, and deteriorating physical or mental health 

due to aging that substantially diminished the defendant’s ability to care for himself within the 

prison environment. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt.n.1(A). 

Willard has none of the foregoing conditions. Although he has participated in numerous 

vocational and educational programs and physical activities during his incarceration, rehabilitation 

of the defendant alone does not constitute an extraordinary or compelling reason for release under 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Id. 

Finally, Willard contends he warrants compassionate release because of the threat COVID19 poses to his health given his age and pre-existing hypertensive health condition. Willard is 58 

years old and, although he claims to suffer from hypertension, there is no evidence of this diagnosis 

in his prison health records. Rather, Willard appears to be in good health with his existing health 

conditions (diabetes, hyperlipidemia and anemia) well managed in the prison setting with 

medication and frequent check-ups. Willard has also received his COVID vaccine and booster and 

resides in an institution with no COVID-related deaths.1

1 Willard is held at FCI Beaumont Medium (Texas). At present, there are no reported positive 

cases at the institution, in a population of 1,569. There has not been a COVID-related death at the 

institution. BOP COVID-19 Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, 

https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covid19_statistics.html.

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As this Court has previously recognized, "COVID-19 poses a unique challenge to the 

prison system." United States v. Nunez, 483 F. Supp. 3d 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2020). Courts faced 

with precisely this issue have time and again held that vaccinated status mitigates the dangers 

posed to prisoners with pre-existing health conditions and have denied compassionate release to 

inmates at far greater risk than Willard. See e.g., United States v. Lopez-Batista, No. 16-cr-358, 

ECF No. 94 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2021) (diabetes and obesity do not warrant release in light of 

vaccination). United States v. Hannigan, No. 19-cr-373, 2022 WL 815449, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 

17, 2022) ("District Courts in the Third Circuit consistently agree that an FDA-approved 

vaccination against COVID-19 lessens the risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19 such 

that the threat of the pandemic, even combined with pre-existing medical conditions, does not 

constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.").

In addition, the Court must address the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Of particular relevance here are the nature and circumstances of the 

offense and the characteristics of the defendant. § 3553(a)(1). As noted, Willard was convicted of 

two armed bank robberies committed only months after his release from a decade spent in federal 

prison for attempted bank robbery. In each case, Willard brandished his weapon to intimidate and 

terrorize bank employees and then physically assaulted them by handcuffing them to the bank 

vault doors. The nature of this criminal conduct and recidivist behavior demonstrates that Willard 

poses great danger to the public which was and remains worthy of a significant term of 

imprisonment. The sentence which was imposed was intended to reflect the serious and dangerous 

nature of Willard's offenses, to protect the public from Willard's commission of further crimes, 

and to deter others from committing such offenses as well. In fact, if Willard were to be sentenced 

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today, the Court finds he could expect to receive a comparable sentence.2 The Court finds no reason 

to disturb Willard's sentence and, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby denies his motion. 

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT: 

 

/s/ Juan R. Sanchez

___________________

Juan R. Sanchez, C.J.

2

 The government agreed to dismiss the second § 924(c) count which spared Willard an additional 

mandatory 300-month term. Thus, even if the 1995 § 924(c) conviction was improper, a 

comparable sentence would still have been imposed in this case.

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