IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA YOUNG o/b/o : CIVIL ACTION

J.C. (MINOR), :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JO ANNE E. BARNHART, :

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY :

Defendant : NO. 05-5226

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PRATTER, J. JANUARY 17, 2007

This is an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to review the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying the claim of Plaintiff J.C., by and

through her mother, Lisa Young, for supplemental social security income (“CSSI”). After filing

a request for review of the Administrative Law Judges’s (“ALJ”) decision that she was not

disabled under the Social Security Act, J.C. submitted additional evidence to the Appeals

Council. The Appeals Council made the additional evidence part of the record and subsequently

denied J.C.’s request for review.

J.C. argues that the ALJ’s finding of only a “less than marked” impairment in the domain

of interacting and relating to others was not supported by substantial evidence. Relying on the

additional evidence, which the ALJ did not consider, J.C. asks the Court to reverse the ALJ’s

decision and grant CSSI benefits. The Commissioner responds that the determination was

supported by substantial evidence, and the new evidence should not be considered by this Court. 

United States Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice filed a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the instant matter be remanded for further review to consider whether the

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 1 of 15
 Although previously filed them with the ALJ on September 24, 2004, J.C. included in 1

this submission the intake assessment and consultation notes from her September 12, 2004

hospitalization. 

2

new evidence changes the ALJ’s determination of J.C.’s limitation in the domain of interacting

and relating to others, and for an explanation of the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. After

conducting a review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b), and for the reasons discussed below, the Court

adopts the Report and Recommendation.

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On July 16, 2003, Ms. Young applied for CSSI benefits on behalf of J.C. On December

17, 2003, the state agency denied her application, and J.C. requested review by an ALJ. On

August 19, 2004, the ALJ heard testimony from J.C., Lisa Young and J.C.’s therapist, Diane

Townes. On September 24, 2004, prior to the ALJ’s decision, J.C.’s counsel submitted evidence

of J.C.’s September 12, 2004 hospitalization for suicidal thoughts. This evidence was marked as

an exhibit for the ALJ’s consideration. Six days later, the ALJ denied J.C.’s claim.

After filing a request for review by the Appeals Council on April 14, 2005, J.C. submitted

additional evidence, which the Appeals Council made part of the administrative record. On 1

August 4, 2005, the Appeals Council denied J.C.’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s

determination the final decision of the Commissioner. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d

Cir. 2001) (“If the Appeals Council denies the request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the

Commissioner’s final decision.”).

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 2 of 15
 “Opposition defiant disorder” is “a type of disruptive behavior disorder characterized by 2

a recurrent pattern of defiant, hostile, disobedient, and negativistic behavior directed towards

those in authority, including such actions as defying the request or rules of adults, deliberately

annoying others, arguing, spitefulness, and vindictiveness that occur much more frequently than

would be expected on the basis of age and development stage.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical

Dictionary 550 (30th ed. 2003).

 “Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder” is a childhood mental disorder characterized 3

by inattention, by hyperactivity and impulsivity, or by both types of behavior. The behavior

interferes with academic, social, or work functioning. Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary

547 (30th ed. 2003).

3

B. Evidence Before the ALJ

J.C. was born on September 19, 1991 and was 13 years old at the time of the ALJ’s

decision. J.C.’s father has been incarcerated for most of her life, and her mother, Lisa Young,

has been physically disabled since 1988 when she suffered two aneurysms and a stroke, losing

mobility on the left side of her body. As a result, Ms. Young is largely wheelchair-bound and

receives Social Security disability benefits.

On June 13, 2003, J.C. began attending Alternatives to Placement, where she was

examined and began receiving therapy from Dr. Phyllis Pole and medication management from

Dr. Cecil Harris. An evaluation prepared at Alternatives to Placement on June 13, 2003 noted

that J.C.’s problems included anger, lying, sneaking out of the home, sexual activity beginning at

the age of 9, hyperactivity, short attention span, poor impulse control, poor self esteem and poor

social skills. Dr. Pole diagnosed J.C. with Opposition Defiant Disorder (“ODD”) and adolescent 2

antisocial behavior, and Dr. Harris diagnosed J.C. with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

(“ADHD”). 3

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 3 of 15
 “GAF” scores reflect the mental health specialist’s assessment on a particular day of the 4

severity of a patient’s mental health, and are necessarily based on the patient’s state of mind and

self-reported symptoms. Nevertheless, the scores constitute an independent medical evaluation

of the patient’s subjective complaints.

 GAF scores in the 21 to 30 range indicate behavior that is considerably influenced by 5

delusions or hallucinations, serious impairment in communication or judgment, or the inability to

function in almost all areas. American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000).

 GAF scores in the 41 to 50 range indicate serious symptoms, such as suicidal ideation, 6

or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning. American Psychiatric

Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000).

4

On August 18, 2003, Lisa Matthews, J.C.’s school teacher, reported concern about J.C.’s

social and emotional growth and behavior over the previous year. In a letter to Ms. Young, Ms.

Matthews noted inappropriate behavior, such as speaking disrespectfully to authority figures,

refusing to do what adults asked her to do, receiving several detentions, name calling, teasing and

fighting with other students, and engaging in sexual activity. 

Throughout the following school year, J.C.’s behavior prompted several notes from

school authorities reporting various angry, aggressive, destructive and disrespectful acts on the

part of J.C. On June 22, 2004, after making threats about wanting to hurt herself, reaching for

kitchen knives and writing a suicide note, J.C. was admitted to the Belmont Center for

Comprehensive Treatment. At the time of her admission, J.C.’s Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) score was 30. On July 4, 2004, at the time of J.C.’s discharge to a partial 4 5

hospitalization program, her GAF score was 50, denoting ongoing serious symptoms. 6

C. Additional Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 4 of 15
 J.C. apparently resubmitted this evidence to the Appeals Council because the ALJ had 7

not considered it.

 “Posttraumatic stress disorder” is “an anxiety disorder caused by exposure to an 8

intensely traumatic event; characterized by reexperiencing the traumatic event in recurrent

intrusive recollections, nightmares, or flashbacks, by avoidance of trauma-associated stimuli, by

generalized numbing of emotional responsiveness, and by hyper-alertness and difficulty in

sleeping, remembering, or concentrating.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary at 550.

 “Schizophrenia” is a mental disorder characterized by disturbances in form and content 9

of thought, mood, sense of self and relationship to external world, and behavior. Dorland’s

Illustrated Medical Dictionary at 1664.

5

On April 14, 2005, J.C.’s counsel submitted additional evidence to the Appeals Council,

including evidence of J.C.’s September 12, 2004 hospitalization, which previously had been

submitted to the ALJ. The remainder of the additional evidence included: 7

• An evaluation produced by The Consortium, Inc. after J.C. underwent a

comprehensive biopsychosocial evaluation on August 12, 2004. The evaluation

notes that J.C. behaved inappropriately, oppositionally and impulsively; heard

voices in her room; had been sexually active since the age of 10; and had been

suspended from school multiple times for fighting and for being disrespectful to

teachers and other authority figures. The evaluation also noted that J.C. had been

diagnosed as having ADHD, posttraumatic stress disorder, and schizophrenia, 8 9

with a GAF score of 30.

• A report by Northeast Treatment Centers covering the period from April 22, 2004

to August 22, 2004 described J.C. as disruptive and disrespectful in class, having

difficulties focusing, and physically and verbally aggressive when angered.

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 5 of 15
 GAF scores in the 51 to 60 range indicate moderate impairment in social or 10

occupational functioning. American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000).

 The letter of November 18, 2004 post-dates the ALJ’s decision and, therefore, arguably 11

does not relate to the period at issue. See Szubak v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 745 F.3d

831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984) (new evidence must relate to a time period for which benefits were

denied and cannot be evidence of a later-acquired disability or subsequent deterioration of a

previously non-disabling condition). This letter, however, is not necessary to the Court’s

determination. The weight of the other evidence supports remand for further review.

6

• An initial assessment and evaluation performed on August 27, 2004 by the

Thomas Jefferson University Hospital Department of Psychiatry and Human

Behavior described J.C. to be of above average intelligence but to have restless,

impulsive and “destructible” behavior. The assessment also notes that J.C. was

defiant toward her mother, had limited anger management and low self-esteem,

and was diagnosed with ADHD and ODD, with a GAF score of 55. 1

0

• Letters from J.C.’s school principal and teachers, dated March 29, 2004 and

November 18, 2004, described J.C. as verbally abusive to teachers, disrespectful

of rules, and physically abusive of other students. 1

1

• Journal entries written by J.C. from January 2003 to February 2004 relating

violent and angry thoughts of wanting to hurt people, of being “fed up,” and of

hating her peers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner’s denial of benefits will be disturbed only if it is not supported by

substantial evidence or if it is based upon legal error. Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999).

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 6 of 15
 If objections are submitted, the Court reviews de novo those portions of the report or 12

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). Conversely, where a party has not filed specific objections to factual findings by

the magistrate judge, there is no requirement that the district court review those findings de novo. 

7

“Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hartranft v.

Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). The standard is “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999), but less than a

preponderance of the evidence, Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). The

district court may not conduct a de novo review of the Commissioner’s decision or re-weigh the

record evidence. Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986).

The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision based only

on the record before the ALJ. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). Remand is

warranted where additional evidence has been submitted that is new and material, and the

plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for its late submission. Id. In addition, remand is

appropriate on issues not raised by the plaintiff. 

Magistrate Judge Rice prepared a Report and Recommendation in this matter. Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed

findings and recommendations within ten days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). In the instant case, no objections were filed by either party. Therefore, the Court

is not obligated to conduct a de novo review. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). 

Nonetheless, the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge. Id. 1

2

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 7 of 15
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). As the Supreme Court explained in Thomas:

The statute [28 U.S.C. § 636] does not on its face

require any review at all, by either the district court

or the court of appeals, of any issue that is not the

subject of an objection. . . . This omission does not

seem to be inadvertent, . . . [n]or does petitioner

point to anything in the legislative history of the

1976 amendments mandating review under some

lesser standard. We are therefore not persuaded that

the statute positively requires some lesser review by

the district court when no objections are filed. . . . It

does not appear that Congress intended to require

district court review of a magistrate’s factual or

legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other

standard, when neither party objects to those

findings.

Id. However, most courts have held that the absence of objections does not eliminate the district

court’s obligation to determine whether to accept the recommendation. See, e.g., McCarthy v.

Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 236 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271

(1976)); see also Conley v. Crabtree, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1204 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that

when no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on

the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation of the Magistrate).

8

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

To determine whether a child under the age of 18 is disabled for the purpose of receiving

CSSI benefits, the ALJ considers the following, in sequence: (1) whether the child is working,

i.e., engaged in substantial gainful activity, 20 C.F.R. § 416.972; (2) whether the child has a

medically determinable “severe” impairment or combination of impairments, id. at § 416.924(c);

and (3) whether the child’s impairment or combination of impairments meets, medically equals,

or functionally equals the severity of a listed impairment, id. at § 416.924(d). 

A child’s impairment functionally equals a “listing-level” impairment if it causes a

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 8 of 15
 An “extreme” limitation is defined as very seriously interfering with the ability to 13

independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3).

 The ALJ also determined that J.C. had ODD and impulse control disorder, which the 14

ALJ characterized as “severe impairments.” 

9

“marked” limitation in two domains of functioning, or causes an “extreme” limitation in one

domain of functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). A limitation is considered “marked” if the

impairment “seriously interferes” with the ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete

activities. Id. at § 416.926a(e)(2). It is a limitation that is “more than moderate” but “less than

extreme.” Id. 1

3

The domains, or categories, reviewed under this standard are: (1) acquiring and using

information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4)

moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical wellbeing. Id. at § 416.926a(b)(1)(i) - (iv). These “domains” are broad areas of functioning intended

to capture all of what a child can or cannot do. Id. at § 416.926a(b)(1).

B. Findings of the ALJ

The ALJ determined that J.C. was not working and had a “marked” limitation

in the domain of caring for herself. However, the ALJ found only a “less than marked” 14

limitation in the domain of interacting and relating to others, and no “marked” impairment in any

other domain. Thus, concluded the ALJ, J.C.’s impairments functionally did not equal a listinglevel impairment and, therefore, J.C. was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act. Without explanation, the ALJ also found that J.C. and Ms. Young were “not fully credible.”

The ALJ did not consider the evidence of J.C.’s September 12, 2004 hospitalization, which was

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 9 of 15
 The applicable subsection of the regulation provides: 15

If new and material evidence is submitted, the

Appeals Council shall consider the additional

evidence only where it relates to the period on or

before the date of the administrative law judge hearing

decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the

entire record including the new and material evidence

submitted if it relates to the period on or before the

date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.

It will then review the case if it finds that the

administrative law judge’s action, findings, or

conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence

currently of record.

20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).

10

submitted on September 24, 2004, prior to the ALJ’s September 30, 2004 decision.

C. New Evidence

J.C. contends that the ALJ’s finding of only a “less than marked” limitation in the domain

of interacting and relating to others is not supported by substantial evidence. Asserting that the

Court may properly consider the additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, J.C.

seeks reversal of the ALJ’s determination.

A claimant may submit to the Appeals Council “new and material” evidence that relates

to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s hearing decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).15

“New” evidence must not be merely cumulative of evidence already on the record. It must also

be “material.” Evidence is “material” if it is relevant, probative, and related to “the period on or

before the date of the administrative law judge’s hearing decision,” and there is a reasonable

probability that it would have changed the outcome of the Commissioner’s determination. 20

C.F.R. § 404.970(b); Szuback v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir.

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 10 of 15
 The Commissioner argues that after J.C.’s hospitalization in June 2004, she seemed to 16

be stable and improving. The new evidence from August and September 2004 demonstrates that,

on the contrary, J.C.’s condition did not improve.

11

1984).

The Appeals Council will grant review only if it finds that the ALJ’s decision “is contrary

to the weight of the evidence currently of record.” Id. If the Appeals Council denies review, the

district court may not review the Appeals Council decision. “No statutory provision authorizes

the district court to make a decision on the substantial evidence standard based on the new and

material evidence never presented to the ALJ. Instead, the [Social Security] Act gives the district

court authority to remand the case to the Commissioner, but only if the claimant has shown good

cause why such new and material evidence was not presented to the ALJ.” Matthews, 239 F.3d

at 594; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Here, the additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council was both new and

material. In particular, it included evidence of a second hospitalization for mental health reasons. 

In her evaluation of the evidence, the ALJ noted that other than J.C.’s first hospitalization at the

Belmont Center in June 2004, “[t]here is no evidence of any other hospitalization for mental

health reasons.” This demonstrates that the ALJ did not consider J.C.’s September 2004

hospitalization. The remainder of the additional evidence, which was not presented to the ALJ,

documents changes in J.C.’s mental health and her ongoing behavioral and emotional 16

difficulties.

This additional evidence is new and not merely cumulative because it demonstrates the

different aspects of J.C.’s impairments and changes in her mental health functioning. J.C. was

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 11 of 15
 In general, “interacting” means initiating and responding to exchanges with other 17

people, for practical or social purposes, and relating to other people means forming intimate

relationships with family members and with friends your age, and sustaining them over time. 20

C.F.R. § 416.926a(i)(1)(i)-(ii).

12

hospitalized a second time for suicidal thoughts, and her GAF score dropped to 30 on two

occasions. The ALJ did not consider this evidence in making her determination. The additional

evidence is also material because it relates to J.C.’s mental health condition, is probative of the

severity of her condition, and relates to the period at issue. Moreover, there is a reasonable

probability that this evidence should change the outcome of the Commissioner’s decision. In

particular, the new evidence indicates significant impairment in the domain of interacting and

relating to others, a domain in which the ALJ found a “less than marked” impairment. If the 17

ALJ had found a “marked” or “extreme” impairment in this domain, J.C.’s impairments would

have functionally equaled a listing-level impairment and, therefore, would have constituted a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

There is a reasonable probability that, had the ALJ considered this evidence, her

determination of J.C.’s limitation in the domain of interacting and relating to others would have

changed from “less than marked” to “marked” or “extreme.” For example, J.C.’s journal entries

from 2003 and 2004 reveal feelings of hating her peers and wanting to hurt people. The second

hospitalization and lowered GAF scores in August and September 2004 indicate increasingly

serious impairments in communication and social functioning. The school and psychiatric

reports from the fall of 2004 document multiple school suspensions for fighting and defiance

toward teachers, and anger, physical aggressiveness toward authorities and physical abuse of

other students. Therefore, the additional evidence was pertinent and properly submitted to the

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 12 of 15
13

Appeals Council. 

Nonetheless, since the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision is the final

decision of the Commissioner, and the Court may not consider evidence that was not before the

ALJ in reviewing her decision. The Court may, however, remand the case to the Commissioner

if “the claimant has shown good cause why such new and material evidence was not presented to

the ALJ.” Matthews, 239 F.3d at 594.

Such “good cause” exists here. First, the evidence of J.C.’s second hospitalization was

presented to ALJ, who simply failed to consider it. Second, Ms. Young’s physical disability

prevented her from discovering the school records and journal entries in time to make them part

of the original record. Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that the medical reports from August

and September 2004 were not prepared or ready to submit in advance of the ALJ’s decision on

September 30, 2004.

Therefore, because the additional evidence submitted by J.C. was new and material, and

good cause exists for its late submission, the matter is properly remanded for further

consideration by the ALJ. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

D. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination

Although the fact-finder’s credibility determinations are normally entitled to deference,

Cao v. United States, 407 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2005), the ALJ is required to explain the basis

for an adverse credibility determination, Cress v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 644, 645 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 

The reasons for credibility findings must be substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the

finding, e.g., based on inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, inherently improbable

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 13 of 15
14

testimony, or the like. Cao, 407 F.3d at 152; accord St. Georges Warehouse, Inc. v. NLRB, 420

F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005) (ALJ credibility determination should not be reversed unless

“inherently incredible or patently unreasonable” as long as ALJ considers all relevant factors and

explains her decision).

In the instant case, the ALJ summarily concluded that J.C. and her mother, Ms. Young,

were not fully credible, but failed to explain her finding in this record. Since J.C. did not raise

this issue, it will be remanded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Rice’s Report and

Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the Commissioner

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g) for further review to consider whether the new evidence changes

the ALJ’s determination and for an explanation of the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. An

appropriate order consistent with this Memorandum follows.

BY THE COURT:

S/Gene E.K. Pratter

GENE E. K. PRATTER

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 14 of 15
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA YOUNG o/b/o : CIVIL ACTION

J.C. (MINOR), :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JO ANNE E. BARNHART, :

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY :

Defendant : NO. 05-5226

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17 day of January, 2007, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for th

Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10), Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No.

11), Plaintiff’s Reply (Docket No. 12) and the Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice (Docket No. 14), it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Report and Recommendation is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED;

3. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; and

4. The matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further review to consider

whether the new evidence changes the ALJ’s determination in the domain of interacting and

relating to others, and for an explanation of the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding. 

BY THE COURT:

S/Gene E.K. Pratter

GENE E.K. PRATTER

United States District Judge

Case 2:05-cv-05226-GEKP Document 15 Filed 01/18/07 Page 15 of 15