[Cite as McNee v. McNee, 2017-Ohio-7700.]

STATE OF OHIO, COLUMBIANA COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

EDWARD L. McNEE, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V. 

AMANDA L. McNEE, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

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CASE NO. 15 CO 0031 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas, Domestic Relations Division of 

Columbiana County, Ohio 

Case No. 2013-DR-0018 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Attorney Christopher A. Maruca 

201 E. Commerce St., Suite 316 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellee Attorney Charles E. Dunlap 

7330 Market Street 

Youngstown, Ohio 44512 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: September 14, 2017 
[Cite as McNee v. McNee, 2017-Ohio-7700.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Edward McNee, appeals from a Columbiana County 

Domestic Relations Court decision granting a divorce to him and defendant-appellee, 

Amanda McNee. 

{¶2} The parties were married on September 25, 2009. They have one 

child. Appellant filed for divorce on January 14, 2013. 

{¶3} The matter proceeded to a trial before a magistrate. Relevant to this 

appeal, the magistrate heard testimony regarding the valuation of appellant’s 

businesses, the ownership and valuation of certain guns and a jukebox, the amount 

of child support, the valuation of a parcel of real property in Michigan, and alleged 

financial misconduct by appellee. Appellant owns three businesses, JaSar 

Recycling, Inc., JaSar Enterprises, LLC, and Liquid Luggers, LLC. The magistrate 

heard testimony from both parties, experts who valued the business, and several 

other witnesses. 

{¶4} The magistrate made the following determinations relevant to this 

appeal. Appellant’s businesses’ value increased by $284,000 during the marriage. 

Appellant’s child support obligation is $1,062.60 per month. Appellee did not commit 

financial misconduct. A jukebox purchased by appellant is marital property. Nine 

guns are marital property. Certain real property located in Michigan has a value of 

$7,600. Appellant is required to pay for appellee’s litigation expenses in the amount 

of $7,700. 

{¶5} Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Specifically, 

appellant raised objections regarding the magistrate (1) failing to consider his spousal 

support payment in computing child support; (2) failing to credit him for a debt 

appellee discharged in bankruptcy; (3) designating a jukebox as marital property; (4) 

valuing property in Michigan at $7,600; (5) designating nine guns as marital property; 

(6) requiring him to pay for appellee’s expert; (7) determining the marital value of the 

businesses; and (8) terminating temporary spousal support when it did. 

{¶6} The trial court overruled appellant’s objections and adopted the 

magistrate’s decision as the order of the court. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal on December 23, 2015. The trial court issued a stay of its order pending this 
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appeal. 

{¶7} Appellant now raises six assignments of error. 

{¶8} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY 

IMPROPERLY VALUING THE BUSINESSES BASED UPON A LOAN 

GRANTED TO THE COMPANY AND WITHOUT ANY STATED 

METHODOLOGY OR FACTUAL BASIS. 

{¶9} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

ascertain the businesses’ premarital and post-marital values. Appellant points to the 

magistrate’s findings as to the businesses’ values. 

{¶10} The magistrate found that the businesses’ values increased by 

$284,000 during the marriage based on a loan from appellant made during the 

marriage. He further found the businesses continue to provide appellant an income 

in excess of $300,000 per year. 

{¶11} Appellant argues the court failed to consider the evidence he presented 

that the businesses had a premarital value of $776,000 and, during the course of the 

marriage, the businesses’ value fell to $104,192. Appellant’s appraiser, therefore, 

concluded the businesses had no marital value. Appellant does not dispute that the 

businesses provide him with an income. But he asserts the income stream is 

different from the actual value of the businesses. 

{¶12} Next, appellant asserts because the evidence was uncontroverted that 

the businesses’ premarital value was $776,000, it was an abuse of discretion not to 

accept this valuation. Appellant claims the trial court failed to use any type of 

methodology in valuing the businesses. 

{¶13} Finally, appellant points out that even under appellee’s valuation of the 

businesses, their value decreased from their premarital value. Therefore, he 

contends the court erred in finding that the businesses’ value increased during the 

marriage. 
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{¶14} The trial court is not required to adopt any particular methodology in 

determining a business's value. Brown v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 100499, 2014-Ohio2402, ¶ 32. “In determining a business's value, the trial court has discretion to weigh 

the testimony offered by the parties' valuation experts.” Id. It has broad discretion in 

determining which expert to believe in assigning a value to marital property. Cronin 

v. Cronin, 2d Dist. No. 02-CA-110, 03-CA-75, 2005-Ohio-301, ¶ 13. Thus, we will not 

disturb the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion 

connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court acted 

unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶15} Two of appellant’s businesses were in existence prior to the marriage 

(JaSar Recycling and JaSar Enterprises) while Liquid Luggers was started during the 

marriage. Both parties presented valuation experts who valued the businesses’ 

combined value. 

{¶16} The magistrate noted that appellant’s expert, William Leicht, valued the 

business in 2006, three years prior to the marriage, at a value of $776,000. As of the 

date of the trial, Leicht testified that the businesses were now valued at only 

$104,192. He opined the businesses had no marital value due to continuing losses. 

{¶17} The magistrate noted that appellee’s expert, Kelly Bianco, determined 

that the businesses increased in value during the marriage by $365,000. Bianco 

opined that $72,000 of the increase was due to an increase in value while $284,000 

of the increase resulted from a shareholder note. This note was a personal loan from 

appellant to the businesses during the marriage, which may or may not be repaid. 

{¶18} The magistrate found that the businesses increased in value by 

$284,000 during the course of the marriage based on the loan from appellant. The 

magistrate observed that another way to view this transaction would be to consider 

the note owed to appellant as a marital asset. However, the magistrate also found he 

was not persuaded that the businesses’ value had increased by $72,000, as Bianco 

had opined. 

{¶19} In considering appellant’s objection on this issue, the trial court found 
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that the magistrate’s findings were supported by Bianco’s testimony along with the 

testimony of Steve Higgins, another valuation expert. It determined that the 

$284,000 could either be considered a contribution to the capital of the businesses, 

which increased their value by $284,000, or it could be considered a martial debt 

owed to the parties. The court noted that Higgins testified that no matter how the 

$284,000 was classified, it was available to appellant who could take the money out 

for his own use. 

{¶20} Leicht, appellant’s expert, testified that on August 14, 2006, the date of 

appellant’s prior divorce, the businesses were valued at $776,000. (3/3/15 Tr. 129-

131). Leicht also gave his opinion as to the value of the businesses of March 4, 

2014, which was considered the end date of this marriage. Leicht testified that he 

determined the value of the businesses was $104,193. (3/3/15 Tr. 131; Pl. Ex. 25). 

Leicht stated that there are four common ways to value businesses: (1) capitalization 

of earnings; (2) discounted cash flow; (3) net book value; and (4) forecasting. (3/3/15 

Tr. 132). Leicht used the capitalization of earnings method to value appellant’s 

businesses. (3/3/15 Tr. 134). Leicht concluded there was no marital value to the 

businesses. (3/3/15 Tr. 138). 

{¶21} Leicht also took issue with the valuation by appellee’s expert. He 

approved of her methodology but he took issue with the way she paid down debts of 

the businesses. (3/3/ Tr. 138, 143). He testified she should not have taken into 

account $150,000 appellant used to pay down the debt. (3/3/15 Tr. 144-145). 

{¶22} Higgins, another expert called by appellant, testified that although he 

did not take issue with the method appellee’s expert used to value the businesses, 

he did take issue with how she arrived at her numbers. (3/3/15 Tr. 179). He too 

opined that she increased the businesses’ value by $150,000 and that she did not 

properly account for the shareholder note for the money appellant put into the 

businesses. (3/3/15 Tr. 181-182). 

{¶23} On cross examination, however, Higgins testified that no matter how 

the $284,000 that appellant put into the businesses was classified, it was available to 

appellant who could take the money out for his own use. (3/3/15 Tr. Tr. 189-190). 
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And Higgins also opined that it was not proper to rely on the valuation from 2006 in 

determining the premarital value of the businesses in 2009. (3/3/15 Tr. 207-208). 

{¶24} Kelly Bianco, appellee’s expert, testified that the 2006 valuation from 

appellant’s prior divorce had become “stale,” since it was more than a year old. 

(3/3/15 Tr. 214). She testified that she valued the businesses at $266,000 on March 

4, 2014. (3/3/15 Tr. 215). She stated that she valued the businesses as of 

September 25, 2009, the date of the marriage, to determine that from the beginning 

date of the marriage to the end date of the marriage the businesses increased in 

value by $72,000. (3/3/15 Tr. 231-232). She then added to the increased value, a 

shareholder’s note of $284,000. (3/3/15 Tr. 232). She stated that $284,000 could be 

considered either a loan from appellant to the businesses or it could be considered 

equity in the company. (3/3/15 Tr. 233). Adding the $284,000 note to the $72,000 

increase she had already determined, Bianco opined the businesses had increased 

by $356,000 since the date of the marriage. 

{¶25} This is a case of competing experts. Leicht testified as to what he 

believed the businesses’ marital value was and Bianco testified as to what she 

believed their marital value was. Higgins agreed with Leicht on some matters, such 

as his disapproval of Bianco’s valuation. But he also agreed with Bianco that the 

$284,000 that appellant put into the businesses was available to appellant. And 

Higgins agreed that it was not proper to rely on a valuation from 2006 in determining 

the premarital value of the businesses in 2009. 

{¶26} We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 

the businesses increased in value during the marriage by $284,000. The court 

simply had to choose which expert opinion to place more weight on. The court did 

not find credible the testimony that the businesses’ value increased by an additional 

$72,000 above the shareholder’s note. But it found that because appellant had put 

$284,000 into the businesses during the marriage, that money was either a debt 

owed by the businesses to appellant or that money was appellant’s to withdraw from 

the businesses when he saw fit. One of appellant’s experts even agreed with this. 

Either way, the court found that the money was a marital asset. 
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{¶27} Appellant also contends it was error for the court not to accept the 

businesses’ premarital value of $776,000. But this value was not placed on the 

businesses at the inception of the parties’ marriage. This value was placed on 

appellant’s businesses when he divorced his first wife in 2006. The parties to this 

case did not marry until September 25, 2009. Thus, the 2006 value was three years 

old by the time the parties married and there was no testimony as to how those three 

years between 2006 and 2009 affected the 2006 valuation. Thus, there was not 

evidence as to the premarital value of the businesses. 

{¶28} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶29} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: 

 THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING 

TO FACTOR IN APPELLANT’S CURRENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT 

OBLIGATION TO HIS EX-WIFE WHEN CALCULATING CHILD 

SUPPORT. 

{¶30} The magistrate stated that in calculating child support, he did not 

consider appellant’s spousal support from a prior marriage because that obligation 

was scheduled to end in July 2015 (the magistrate’s decision was issued in April 

2015). 

{¶31} On appellant’s objection, the trial court noted that the magistrate took 

judicial notice of appellant’s spousal support obligation from a prior marriage. The 

court found that appellant was ordered to pay spousal support to his first ex-wife in 

the amount of $4,800 per month for 108 months commencing on August 1, 2006. 

The court found that the magistrate considered the particular facts of this case 

including appellant’s spousal support obligation. The court also found that the 

magistrate capped appellant’s annual income at $150,000 and did not use his 

adjusted gross income of $330,000 in calculating child support. The court found the 

magistrate complied with R.C. 3119.04(B) and used a reasonable means to calculate 
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child support. Because this case involved a situation where the parties’ income 

exceeded $150,000, the court found the magistrate was not constrained by the child 

support worksheet in calculating appellant’s obligation. The court concluded that the 

magistrate correctly determined child support. 

{¶32} Here appellant contends the court erred in adopting the magistrate’s 

child support worksheet. He asserts the worksheet failed to take into consideration 

the spousal support he was paying his ex-wife of over $50,000 per year. Appellant 

claims that R.C. 3119.05(B) mandates that spousal support payments actually made 

must be deducted from his gross income when computing his current child support 

obligation. 

{¶33} In reviewing matters concerning child support, appellate courts look at 

whether the trial court abused its discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 

541 N.E.2d 1028 (1989). 

{¶34} R.C. 3119.05(B) provides that when computing a child support 

obligation: 

The amount of any pre-existing child support obligation of a parent 

under a child support order and the amount of any court-ordered 

spousal support actually paid shall be deducted from the gross income

of that parent to the extent that payment under the child support order 

or that payment of the court-ordered spousal support is verified by 

supporting documentation. 

(Emphasis added). 

{¶35} Generally, a court calculates child support using the worksheet 

provided in R.C. 3119.022 with reference to the child support schedule set forth in 

R.C. 3119.021. Bajzer v. Bajzer, 9th Dist. No.25635, 2012-Ohio-252, ¶ 5. But when 

the combined gross income of the parents exceeds $150,000, the court calculates 

child support under R.C. 3119.04(B), which provides: 

If the combined gross income of both parents is greater than one 
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hundred fifty thousand dollars per year, the court, with respect to a 

court child support order * * * shall determine the amount of the 

obligor's child support obligation on a case-by-case basis and shall 

consider the needs and the standard of living of the children who are 

the subject of the child support order and of the parents. The court or 

agency shall compute a basic combined child support obligation that is 

no less than the obligation that would have been computed under the 

basic child support schedule and applicable worksheet for a combined 

gross income of one hundred fifty thousand dollars, unless the court or 

agency determines that it would be unjust or inappropriate and would 

not be in the best interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to order that 

amount. If the court or agency makes such a determination, it shall 

enter in the journal the figure, determination, and findings. 

{¶36} In this case, the court determined appellant’s gross income to be 

$331,877. It imputed full-time, minimum wage income to appellee of $15,080. The 

court calculated child support based on a combined gross income of $150,000. It 

found this calculation appropriate in this case since, in addition to child support, 

appellant was providing health insurance for the child, paying all uninsured medical 

expenses for the child, paying the child’s tuition at a private school, and paying the 

costs associated with all school activities. And because appellant’s spousal support 

obligation to his first ex-wife was to end just three months after the magistrate’s 

decision, and before the trial court issued its final judgment entry, the court did not 

deduct it from appellant’s gross income. 

{¶37} Given the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining not to deduct appellant’s spousal support obligation from his gross 

income. Because the parties’ gross income exceeded $150,000, the court was not 

obligated to strictly adhere to the child support worksheet. Moreover, at the time of 

the magistrate’s decision, appellant’s spousal support obligation to his ex-wife was 

set to end in three months and at the time of the trial court’s judgment, his spousal 
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support obligation had ended. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not 

deducting the spousal support payment from appellant’s gross income. 

{¶38} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and 

is overruled. 

{¶39} Appellant’s third assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION BY FAILING TO PROPERLY CREDIT APPELLANT FOR 

THE DEBT APPELLEE OWED TO APPELLANT AND DISCHARGED 

THROUGH BANKRUPTCY. 

{¶40} Relevant to this assignment of error, the magistrate and the trial court 

found that in 2007, prior to the parties’ marriage, appellant loaned appellee $90,000 

to purchase a house on Pearl Street. Appellee signed a cognovit note for the loan. 

Appellee never made a payment on the note. In 2013, appellant received a judgment 

in common pleas court on the cognovit note for $90,000, plus interest. Appellant 

then filed a complaint in foreclosure seeking the sale of the Pearl Street property. 

Next, appellee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and listed the debt owed to appellant as 

$90,000 secured debt and $30,000 unsecured debt. Appellant argued at the divorce 

trial that appellee engaged in financial misconduct by discharging the unsecured 

portion of the debt in bankruptcy. 

{¶41} In this assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court failed to 

credit him for a debt that appellee discharged through bankruptcy while the divorce 

was pending. Appellant asserts that appellee discharged more than $30,000 in debt 

owed to him stemming from a judgment obtained by him in common pleas court. 

Appellant contends appellee engaged in financial misconduct by discharging the debt 

in order to escape a penalty in the divorce proceedings. Therefore, he claims the 

court should have created an offset in his favor in the amount of $30,000. 

{¶42} An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's finding regarding 

financial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 7th Dist. 

No. 06-NO-331, 2007-Ohio-1238. 
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{¶43} R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) provides guidance on financial misconduct during 

a marriage: 

If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but not 

limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, or fraudulent 

disposition of assets, the court may compensate the offended spouse 

with a distributive award or with a greater award of marital property. 

{¶44} The burden of proving financial misconduct for purposes of R.C. 

3105.171(E)(3) is on the complaining spouse. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 4th Dist. No. 

02CA2846, 2003-Ohio-3466, at ¶ 25. Financial misconduct implies that there was 

some type of wrongdoing by the offending spouse whereby that spouse will either 

profit from the misconduct or intentionally defeat the other spouse's distribution of 

marital assets. Wideman v. Wideman, 6th Dist. No. WD-02-030, 2003-Ohio-1858, at 

¶ 34. 

{¶45} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding no financial 

misconduct and by not awarding appellant a corresponding credit. 

{¶46} Appellant testified that while the parties were dating, he purchased the 

Pearl Street property and put the title in appellee’s name. (2/27/15 Tr. 169). He paid 

the entire $91,000 purchase price by writing a check for that amount. (2/27/15 Tr. 

169-170). Appellee signed a promissory note to pay appellant back for the purchase 

of the property. (2/27/15 Tr. 170). Appellee, however, never paid him back. (2/27/15 

Tr. 170). 

{¶47} While the divorce was pending, appellant sued appellee and received a 

judgment on the promissory note. (2/27/15 Tr. 170). Appellee then filed for 

bankruptcy. (2/27/15 Tr. 170). 

{¶48} Appellant testified that, now that the bankruptcy was concluded, he 

would be receiving the Pearl Street property worth $90,000, which was the appraised 

value. (2/27/15 Tr. 171). But he would not receive the $30,000 in interest, which his 

judgment reflected appellee owed him. (2/27/15 Tr. 172). Appellant testified he 

believed he deserved a credit for that amount. (2/27/15 Tr. 173). 
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{¶49} Appellee testified that she never made a payment to appellant for the 

Pearl Street house and he never asked her to make a payment. (3/3/15 Tr. 87). She 

stated that once appellant received a judgment on the note, she included it in her 

bankruptcy because she could not afford to pay it. (3/3/15 Tr. 88). 

{¶50} Appellant admitted that he would now receive the Pearl Street property 

worth $90,000 and appellee would have no right to it. Moreover, appellant never 

required appellee to make a payment on the note while the parties were married. 

Presumably, had they remained married, appellant would never have collected on the 

note. The court’s decision left the parties in the same position they would have been 

had appellant never purchased the property for appellee in the first place. By way of 

the bankruptcy, appellant was restored to the same position he would have been in 

had he not given the property to appellee in the first place. Thus, we cannot conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion in finding no financial misconduct and in 

deciding not to award appellant a credit in this matter. 

{¶51} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶52} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY CREDITING CERTAIN PIECES OF 

PERSONAL PROPERTY AS BEING MARITAL AND IMPROPERLY 

CREDITING THEIR VALUE, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING A JUKEBOX 

AND FIREARMS. 

{¶53} The magistrate found that appellant purchased a jukebox for $8,500 

shortly before the parties separated. The magistrate found the jukebox to be marital 

property in appellant’s possession. 

{¶54} On appellant’s objection, the trial court found appellant failed to prove 

the jukebox was his separate property. The court noted that appellant claimed he 

sold the jukebox to “Lou” on December 8, 2012, which was before the parties 

separated. Therefore, the court found the jukebox was marital property and appellant 
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was responsible for it even if he sold it as he claimed. 

{¶55} Appellant asserts that the trial court ignored the testimony and evidence 

that the jukebox was sold on December 8, 2012, during the marriage. He contends 

the court abused its discretion by imputing the value of the jukebox as a marital asset 

against him. Appellant claims that while he does presently own a jukebox, he 

purchased it after the parties separated. 

{¶56} We review a trial court's decision designating property as either a 

marital asset or separate property for abuse of discretion. Knox v. Knox, 7th Dist. 

No. 04 JE 24, 2006-Ohio-1154, ¶ 47. 

{¶57} As to the jukebox, appellant testified he purchased a 1955 Seeburg 

jukebox in 2011, from someone named “Lou.” (2/27/15 Tr. 192-193). Appellant 

testified that he no longer had that particular jukebox in his possession. (2/27/15 Tr. 

194). He testified that he sold that juke box back to Lou on December 8, 2012 

(before the parties separated). In support of this testimony, appellant submitted a 

handwritten receipt with the name “Unique Music Machines” written on the top and 

stating “1 1955 fully * * *& Juke Box Paid $8,500 CASH.” (Pl. Ex. 23). 

{¶58} Appellant then testified that he purchased another jukebox from Lou in 

November 2014 (after the parties separated). (2/27/15 Tr. 254). He also stated that 

the records in the jukebox came with it. (2/27/15 Tr. 255). 

{¶59} To the contrary, appellee testified that she saw the original Seeburg 

jukebox in appellant’s garage less than a month before the trial. (3/3/15 Tr. 68-69). 

She stated that she got a good look at the jukebox and it looked exactly the same as 

the one they had purchased during the marriage. (3/3/15 Tr. 69). Moreover, she 

stated that she had picked out the music that came with the original jukebox and 

when she looked at the one in appellant’s garage it was the same music. (3/3/15 Tr. 

69). 

{¶60} Appellant and appellee presented conflicting testimony on whether the 

jukebox in appellant’s garage was the same jukebox purchased during the marriage. 

Appellant did present a receipt that he claims supported his testimony that he sold 

the marital jukebox. But the receipt is handwritten on a generic blank receipt page. 
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And while it lists the amount of $8,500 cash, it does not say whether the jukebox was 

purchased from appellant or whether appellant purchased another jukebox for that 

amount. Thus, it was within the magistrate’s and court’s discretion to give the receipt 

little weight. Therefore, this issue is one of credibility. 

{¶61} Appellant testified he sold the marital jukebox. Appellee testified she 

recently saw the marital jukebox in appellant’s garage. The magistrate, as the factfinder, was in the best position to watch the witnesses and observe their demeanor, 

gestures, and voice inflections and to utilize these observations in weighing 

credibility. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 

1273 (1984). Given the conflicting testimony and our deferral to the trier of fact on 

credibility issues, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

the jukebox to be marital property. 

{¶62} The trial court also determined that nine guns were marital property 

worth $8,600. 

{¶63} In his findings, the magistrate acknowledged that Christopher Toy, 

appellant’s friend and employee, testified that six of the nine guns in question 

belonged to him, although they were kept at the marital home. The magistrate found 

Toy’s testimony was vague as to when he purchased them and his explanation as to 

why he kept the guns at appellant’s home was unconvincing. The magistrate further 

found Toy’s testimony was tainted by his personal and professional relationship with 

appellant. Therefore, the magistrate found all nine of the guns were marital property 

with a total value of $8,600. 

{¶64} In considering appellant’s objection, the trial court found that Toy was 

unable to provide many details regarding the six guns in question because he buys 

guns “on a whim” from friends and garage sales. The court noted that even appellant 

acknowledged that Toy’s testimony was confusing in at least one respect. And the 

court noted that although Toy testified that he kept “his” guns in a gun safe at the 

parties’ marital home, neither the gun safe nor its contents appeared on the inventory 

and appraisal of the parties’ personal property. The court further pointed out that 

appellee testified that all nine guns were in the marital home when she lived there 
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and all of the guns were marital. Moreover, the court found that appellee’s testimony 

undermined Toy’s testimony because she removed one of the guns from the marital 

home that Toy claimed to have given to his brother. 

{¶65} As to the guns’ value, the trial court pointed to Thomas Couche’s 

testimony that he is a police officer and firearms instructor. The court noted that 

Couche testified as to the steps he took to value the nine guns. 

{¶66} Therefore, the trial court overruled appellant’s objection and determined 

that the magistrate correctly determined the facts and applied the law. 

{¶67} Appellant urges this determination was in error in two respects. First, 

he asserts that both he and Christopher Toy testified that six of the nine guns 

belonged to Toy who stored them in appellant’s gun safe and, therefore, those six 

guns were not marital property. 

{¶68} Appellant’s friend and employee, Christopher Toy, testified that of the 

nine guns appellee claimed were marital property, six of them belonged to him. (Def. 

Ex. 15, 2/27/15 Tr. 49). Specifically, Toy identified a Teddy Roosevelt 30-30, a 700 

Remington, a 12-gauge shotgun, a Winchester 16-gauge double barrel, a Rock 

Island Armory, and a “little .22” as belonging to him. (2/27/15 Tr. 44-48). 

{¶69} When asked why he kept his guns at appellant’s house, Toy stated, 

“[b]ecause I’m married and I don’t like leaving guns laying around my house.” 

(2/27/15 Tr. 50). But he also stated that he did keep two guns at his house that he 

used for concealed carry. (2/27/15 Tr. 50). 

{¶70} Toy testified that he purchased the Teddy Roosevelt gun a year to ayear-and-a-half ago. (2/27/15 Tr. 58). He stated he bought the 12-gauge shotgun 

two years prior. (2/27/15 Tr. 46). Toy testified that he had acquired the Winchester 

16-gauge double barrel a year ago after it was traded to his brother. (2/27/15 Tr. 46-

47, 60). And he testified that he purchased the Rock Island Armory about two years 

ago. (2/27/15 Tr. 47-48). Toy did not have receipts or other proof of purchase for 

any of the guns. (2/27/15 Tr. 61-62). 

{¶71} Appellant testified that of the nine guns that appellee claimed as marital 

property, only three of them belonged to him. (2/27/15 Tr. 187). He identified a 
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Model 2B2 ultra, a Colt .357, and a Colt .22 as belonging to him. (2/27/15 Tr. 188). 

Appellant agreed that these three guns were marital property. (2/27/15 Tr. 189). The 

other six guns, appellant testified, belonged to Toy. (2/27/15 Tr. 188). 

{¶72} Appellee testified that when she left the marital residence, she took the 

guns with her. (3/3/15 Tr. 54). Appellant also acknowledged that on February 4, 

2013, he filed a motion to compel appellee to return the guns to him. (2/27/15 Tr. 

267-268). However, the motion did not identify any specific guns nor did it state that 

any of the guns belonged to anyone other than appellant. (2/27/15 Tr. 268). 

Appellee testified she returned the guns, including the Winchester 16-gauge, to 

appellant within a week of receiving the motion. (3/3/15 Tr. 55, 56-57). 

{¶73} Appellant stated that some of Toy’s dates were “off.” (2/27/15 Tr. 271). 

He stated that Toy was “off” by a whole year as to when he acquired the Winchester 

16-gauge from his brother. (2/27/15 Tr. 272). When asked then if he agreed that 

Toy’s testimony was “quite questionable” appellant responded, “Yes, I do.” (2/27/15 

Tr. 273). 

{¶74} Appellee stated that during the course of the marriage she was never 

told that any of the guns did not belong to her and appellant. (3/3/15 Tr. 55). She 

stated she was with appellant when he purchased some of the guns. (3/3/15 Tr. 55). 

She also stated that she and appellant went target shooting at Toy’s house and 

brought all of the guns and Toy never mentioned that any of them belonged to him. 

(3/3/15 Tr. 55-56). 

{¶75} Once again the issue here is one of credibility. Whether the six guns 

Toy claimed to own were in fact Toy’s or were instead marital property depended on 

whether the magistrate and the trial court found Toy’s testimony to be credible. And 

once again, the magistrate, as the fact-finder, was in the best position to weigh the 

witnesses’ credibility. Seasons Coal Co., Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80. It is significant 

that Toy testified that he had just acquired the Winchester 16-gauge in the year prior 

to trial, which would have been between March 2014 and March 2015. Yet the 

Winchester was with the rest of the guns in February 2013. This likely hurt Toy’s 

credibility and called into question whether his testimony was truthful. 
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{¶76} Because this was a matter within the trial court’s discretion and given 

the conflicting testimony, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in 

determining all nine guns to be marital property. 

{¶77} Next, appellant asserts the court should not have accepted the 

testimony of Thomas Couche, appellee’s boyfriend, as to the value of the guns. 

{¶78} A trial court's valuation of marital assets will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion. Callender v. Callender, 7th Dist. No. 03-CA-790, 2004-Ohio1382, ¶ 9. 

{¶79} Appellee’s boyfriend, Thomas Couche, is a detective-sergeant police 

officer and firearms instructor for a local police department. (3/3/15 Tr. 8). As part of 

his duties, Couche is in charge of trading/selling guns that are seized by the police 

department and using the money for other purposes at the police department. 

(3/3/15 Tr. 8). It is left up to his discretion to get a fair price on the guns. (3/3/15 Tr. 

8). Based on his experience, Couche considers the guns’ condition and what their 

value is. (3/3/15 Tr. 10). 

{¶80} Couche testified appellee brought the guns from the marital home and 

stored them in his gun safe. (3/3/15 Tr. 10). In response to appellant’s motion to 

return the guns, Couche suggested to appellee that they should photograph and 

inventory the guns before returning them to appellant. (3/3/15 Tr. 11). Couche 

stated that he personally examined each of the nine guns. (3/3/15 Tr. 12). Couche 

then valued each gun individually. (3/3/15 Tr. 17-18; Def. Ex. 22). He gave the guns 

a total value of $8,600. (Def. Ex. 22). 

{¶81} Appellant testified that the total value of the three guns that he admitted 

were his was $2,450. (2/27/15 Tr. 188-189). These same three guns Couche valued 

at $3,300. (Def. Ex. 22). 

{¶82} There is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in 

accepting Couche’s values on the guns. Couche is a police officer and firearms 

instructor who determines the values of firearms as part of his job. He personally 

examined each of the guns in question before valuing it. Appellant did not offer an 

opinion on the value of the six guns he claimed not to own. So for those six guns, 
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Couche’s valuation was the only evidence the trial court had with which to value the 

guns. And as to the three guns appellant agreed were marital property, the total 

difference in value between what Couche valued them at and what appellant opined 

they were worth was only $850. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in 

accepting Couche’s value of the guns. 

{¶83} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and 

is overruled. 

{¶84} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY VALUING A CERTAIN PIECE OF 

REAL PROPERTY LOCATED IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN. 

{¶85} The magistrate, and then the trial court, determined that a parcel of real 

property in Michigan was worth $7,600. It based this finding on the value listed on a 

tax bill. The parties agreed that it is marital property. 

{¶86} Appellant argues the valuation of the Michigan property was in error 

because there was never an appraisal done and there was no agreement as to its 

value. Appellant points to his own testimony that he purchased the property for 

$12,000. Therefore, he claims it was error to value the property for less than 

$12,000. 

{¶87} As to the value of the Michigan property, appellee submitted a copy of 

the tax record for the property. (Def. Ex. 17). The tax record listed the taxable value 

of the property for the year 2013 as $7,561 and listed the assessed value for 2014 as 

$7,600. 

{¶88} Appellant testified that he did not agree with the value listed in the tax 

records. (2/27/15 Tr. 139). He testified that he paid $12,000 for the property. 

(2/27/15 Tr. 139). However, he had no proof of the purchase price and did not have 

an appraisal of the property. (2/27/15 Tr. 140, 225). 

{¶89} As stated above, we will not reverse the trial court’s valuation of marital 

assets absent an abuse of discretion. Callender, supra. There is no indication here 
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that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the Michigan property. Appellant 

testified that he paid $12,000 for the property but he had no documentation to 

corroborate his testimony. Appellee submitted a copy of the tax records for the 

property, which assessed it a value of $7,600. Neither party submitted a formal 

appraisal. Given the limited evidence, the trial court acted within its discretion in 

accepting the tax value as the value of the Michigan property. 

{¶90} Accordingly, appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶91} Appellant’s sixth assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED THEIR 

DISCRETION BY ORDERING APPELLANT TO BE RESPONSIBLE 

FOR DEFENDANT’S COST OF EVALUATING PLAINTIFF’S 

BUSINESSES WITHOUT ANY TESTIMONY AS TO THE COST BASIS 

OF THE WORK PERFORMED. 

{¶92} The magistrate ordered appellant to pay the $7,700 incurred by 

appellee to hire an expert to value appellant’s businesses. In so doing, the 

magistrate reasoned that appellee clearly did not have the resources to pay this 

expense and appellant clearly did have the resources to pay. Therefore, the 

magistrate included this payment by appellant as part of the global settlement of 

assets. 

{¶93} On appellant’s objection, the trial court noted that the ability to pay was 

a relevant consideration here. It further determined that the business evaluations 

were necessary to determine the marital value of the businesses in this case. 

Therefore, the trial court overruled appellant’s objection and adopted the magistrate’s 

decision. 

{¶94} In his final assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in 

ordering him to pay for appellee’s business valuation. He notes that the valuation 

was not part of any court order and appellee did not present any evidence as to the 

reasonableness of the cost she incurred. Appellant claims that without a 
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determination as to the appropriateness of the cost and opportunity to cross examine 

regarding the cost, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to order him to pay for 

the valuation. 

{¶95} R.C. 3105.73(A) provides that in a divorce action, 

a court may award all or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation 

expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable. In 

determining whether an award is equitable, the court may consider the 

parties' marital assets and income, any award of temporary spousal 

support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors the 

court deems appropriate. 

{¶96} We will not reverse a trial court’s judgment awarding litigation expenses 

absent an abuse of discretion. Hogan v. Hogan, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2007-12-137, 

CA2007-12-141, 2008-Ohio-6571, ¶ 50. 

{¶97} In this case, appellee submitted her bill from Hill, Barth, & King for the 

cost of valuing appellant’s businesses. (3/3/15 Tr. 62; Def. Ex. 20). The total bill was 

$7,700. (Def. Ex. 20). 

{¶98} Appellant’s counsel cross-examined appellee about why she did not 

submit this litigation expense earlier when appellant was ordered to pay expenses 

incurred for appraising the parties real and personal property. (3/3/15 Tr. 106-108). 

However, she had not yet hired a business valuation expert at that time. (3/3/15 Tr. 

107-108). 

{¶99} A trial court may consider the parties' relative ability to pay attorney 

fees or litigation expenses when deciding what is equitable under the facts of a 

particular case. Lewis v. Lewis, 7th Dist. Nos. 06 JE 49, 07 JE 27, 2008-Ohio-3342, 

¶ 116. In this case, appellant was the sole income provider throughout the marriage. 

Appellee now works only one or two days per week. Given that appellant is gainfully 

self-employed, the trial court properly considered the parties’ relative ability to pay the 

cost of the business valuation. 

{¶100} Additionally, appellant claims he was not given the opportunity of 
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cross examination on the issue of the cost of the valuation. But appellee submitted 

her bill from her expert. (Def. Ex. 20). And appellant had the opportunity to cross 

examine both appellee and her expert. Thus, appellant could have inquired to the 

reasonableness of the cost of the valuation. 

{¶101} Accordingly, appellant’s sixth assignment of error is without merit and 

is overruled. 

{¶102} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs. 

Robb, P.J., concurs.