Report to the Secretary of Defense

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

June 2003 MILITARY HOUSING 

Opportunities That 

Should Be Explored to 

Improve Housing and 

Reduce Costs for 

Unmarried Junior 

Servicemembers 

GAO-03-602 
GAO found three areas where DOD could potentially reduce costs in its 

unmarried servicemember housing program: 

• DOD and the services have not determined whether “privatization,” or 

private sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of 

military barracks is feasible and cost-effective. Barracks privatization 

involves a number of unique challenges ranging from the funding of 

privatization contracts to the location of privatized barracks. Recently, 

each service has independently given increased attention to developing 

privatization proposals. A collaborative, rather than independent, 

approach could minimize duplication and optimize lessons learned. 

• DOD could reduce the construction costs of government-owned barracks 

through the widespread use of residential construction practices rather 

than traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block. The Army 

estimated that residential type construction could reduce barracks 

construction costs by 23 percent or more. However, concerns about 

barracks durability and unanswered engineering questions have prevented 

widespread use of these practices. 

• DOD’s full use of required existing barracks space could reduce the cost of 

housing allowances paid to unmarried junior members to live off base in 

local communities. GAO found that the services have authorized housing 

allowances for unmarried members to live off base even when existing 

barracks space was available. This occurred because of lenient barracks 

utilization guidance, which in some cases does not require full use of 

existing barracks, and possible noncompliance with guidance. The Air 

Force could have potentially reduced annual housing allowances by about 

$20 million in fiscal year 2002 by fully using available barracks space. 

New Style Barracks at Fort Eustis 

Source: GAO.

Newly constructed barracks at Ft. Eustis, Va., feature private sleeping rooms and semi-private 

bathrooms, improving the servicemember quality of life. 

Each year, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) spends billions of 

dollars to house unmarried junior 

enlisted servicemembers, primarily 

in military barracks. Over the next 

several years, the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force plan to spend about $6 

billion to eliminate barracks with 

multi-person bathroom facilities 

and provide private sleeping rooms 

for all permanent party members. 

Given the cost of the program, 

GAO looked at (1) the status of 

efforts to examine the potential for 

private sector financing, 

ownership, operation, and 

maintenance of military barracks; 

(2) the opportunity to reduce the 

construction costs of barracks 

through widespread use of 

residential construction practices; 

and (3) whether opportunities exist 

to make better use of existing 

barracks. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Defense promote a 

coordinated, focused effort to 

determine the feasibility and cost 

effectiveness of barracks 

privatization. GAO also 

recommends that DOD undertake 

engineering studies to resolve 

questions about the use of 

residential construction practices, 

issue guidance to direct the 

maximum use of required existing 

barracks space, and identify and 

eliminate any barracks space 

determined to be excess. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD generally agreed with 

the recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-602.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-602, a report to the 

Secretary of Defense 

June 2003

MILITARY HOUSING

Opportunities That Should Be Explored 

to Improve Housing and Reduce Costs 

for Unmarried Junior Servicemembers 
Page i GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

DOD and the Military Services Have Not Determined the Feasibility 

of Barracks Privatization 9

Residential Construction Practices Offer Opportunities to Reduce 

Costs of Government-Owned Barracks 14

Opportunities Exist to Make Better Use of Existing Barracks 21

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Photographs of Old and New Style Barracks and 

Quarters Aboard Navy Ships 32 

Appendix III Details on Cost Differences in Barracks Built with 

Residential and Traditional Construction Practices 35 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 37 

Tables 

Table 1: Cost Comparison of Army Barracks with a Private Sector 

Extended Stay Hotel 15

Table 2: Cost Comparison of the Different Construction Practices 

at Fort Meade, Maryland, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina 19

Table 3: Utilization of Air Force Permanent Party Barracks in the 

United States as of September 30, 2002 23

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Figures 

Figure 1: Photographs of the Fort Meade, Maryland, Barracks 

Project and a Traditional Barracks at Langley Air Force 

Base, Virginia 18

Figure 2: Old and New Style Barracks at Fort Eustis, Virginia 32

Figure 3: Typical Living Quarters and Gang Latrines in Old Style 

Barracks and Aboard Ship 33

Figure 4: Typical Living Quarters in New Style Barracks 34

Abbreviation 

DOD Department of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Permission from the copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAO’s product. 
Page 1 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

June 10, 2003 

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld 

Secretary of Defense 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

Each year the Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars to 

house unmarried servicemembers at their permanent duty locations in the 

United States. Unmarried junior enlisted members are normally required 

to live on base in furnished living quarters commonly referred to as 

barracks. If barracks space is unavailable, these members can be 

authorized a housing allowance and live off base in local civilian 

communities. Because DOD views housing as a key factor affecting quality 

of life, the services have initiated plans to improve barracks living 

conditions. Over the next several years, the services plan to spend about 

$6 billion to eliminate barracks with multi-person bathroom facilities, or 

“gang latrines,” and provide private sleeping rooms for all permanently 

assigned members.1

 The Navy has an additional goal to provide barracks 

for approximately 20,000 sailors who currently live aboard ships even 

when in homeport. To improve military housing faster than could be 

achieved if only traditional military construction funds were used, 

legislation was enacted in 1996 at DOD’s request to authorize private 

sector financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military 

housing, including barracks.2

 Because of the cost of the program and the 

importance of housing on servicemembers’ quality of life, we examined, 

on the basis of the Comptroller General’s authority, DOD’s housing 

program for unmarried members and explored whether opportunities 

exist to reduce costs. 

 1

 For reasons of unit cohesion, the Marine Corps plans to provide barracks rooms shared 

by two junior enlisted members. 

2

 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106), Feb. 10, 1996. 

The “alternative authority for construction and improvement” (i.e., the military housing 

privatization program) provided in this legislation was to expire 5 years after the date of 

enactment on February 10, 2001. However, authority for the program was first extended by 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398), Oct. 30, 2000, 

from February 10, 2001, to December 31, 2004. Subsequently, the authority for the program 

was extended by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 

(P.L. 107-107), Dec. 20, 2001, from December 31, 2004, to December 31, 2012. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Since 1998, we have issued six reports on DOD’s military housing 

program—three about the military housing privatization initiative, one 

about the services’ barracks design standard, one about DOD’s process for 

determining military housing requirements, and one about the opportunity 

for the services to reduce future barracks construction costs and improve 

quality of life by allowing more unmarried members to live off base. This 

report examines additional opportunities for reducing unmarried enlisted 

servicemember housing costs and discusses (1) the status of DOD and 

military service efforts to examine the potential for private sector 

financing, ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks; 

(2) the opportunity to reduce the construction costs of government-owned 

barracks through widespread use of residential construction practices; 

and (3) whether opportunities exist to make better use of existing 

barracks. 

Our review included interviews with DOD and service housing officials; 

analysis of DOD and service data; and site visits to Fort Eustis, Virginia; 

Fort Meade, Maryland; Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; Langley Air Force 

Base, Virginia; and Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I. 

Although the authority for private sector financing, ownership, operation, 

and maintenance of military housing was initially approved in 1996, DOD 

and the military services have not determined the concept’s feasibility and 

cost-effectiveness as it relates to military barracks. In contrast, DOD has 

actively pursued this privatization concept for its military family housing 

program. Compared to family housing privatization, however, barracks 

privatization involves unique challenges, such as the potentially higher 

amount of appropriated funds needed to secure a privatization contract, 

differences in where private developers and the military prefer barracks to 

be located, impacts from unit deployments, and the availability of funds 

for housing allowances paid to members occupying privatized barracks. 

While each service has separately studied barracks privatization over the 

years, DOD has concentrated on family housing privatization and has 

provided little centralized direction and focus to help overcome these 

challenges. Recently, each service has independently given increased 

attention to developing project proposals, with the Navy hoping to do so 

by the end of 2003. Without more coordination of activities to address the 

challenges associated with barracks privatization, efforts might be 

duplicated and potential opportunities to optimize lessons learned might 

be lost. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Construction costs of government-owned barracks built and operated on 

military installations could be significantly reduced through widespread 

use of residential construction practices. Traditional barracks 

construction practices call for commercial-type construction that includes 

the use of steel frame, concrete, and cement block. Similar multi-unit 

housing in the private sector, such as apartments, college dormitories, and 

extended stay hotels, normally use residential-type construction practices 

that include the use of wood frame construction. Compared to steel frame, 

concrete, and cement block construction, the Army estimated that 

residential type construction could reduce typical barracks construction 

costs by 23 percent or more. For example, at its pilot barracks project 

under construction at Fort Meade, Maryland, the Army estimates that 

using residential construction practices will cost from $12,600 to $31,800 

less per occupant. Army analyses also indicate that a barrack’s total costs 

over its lifetime would be less if constructed with residential practices 

because of its lower initial construction costs and comparable operations 

and maintenance costs for many building components. Although the Army 

and Navy have undertaken three pilot projects, barriers—including 

concerns about durability and unanswered questions about the ability of 

wood-frame barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection 

requirements—have prevented widespread adoption of these cost-saving 

practices. 

Additional DOD efforts to fully use existing government-owned barracks 

space could reduce the cost of housing allowances paid to unmarried 

junior members to live off base in local civilian communities. Our review 

corroborated previous reviews from Army and Air Force audit groups, 

which found that these services have authorized housing allowances for 

unmarried junior members to live off base even when existing barracks 

space was available. This occurred because of lenient barracks utilization 

guidance, which in some cases does not require full use of existing barracks,

and possible noncompliance with guidance. Simultaneously paying for 

unused barracks spaces and housing allowances obviously wastes 

available resources. We estimated that the Air Force alone could have 

potentially prevented about $20 million in annual housing allowances in 

fiscal year 2002 by fully using available barracks space. At the same time, 

if the services were to change their barracks occupancy requirements and 

permit more junior members to live off base, then the services could 

reduce costs by identifying and eliminating excess barracks space. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense promote a 

coordinated, focused effort to determine the feasibility and costeffectiveness of barracks privatization by addressing the associated 
Page 4 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

challenges and facilitating the development of pilot project proposals. We 

also are recommending that DOD undertake engineering studies to resolve 

questions about the use of residential construction practices for barracks, 

issue guidance to direct the maximum use of required existing barracks, 

and identify and eliminate any barracks space determined to be in excess 

of needs. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with 

the report’s recommendations. 

Under the overall direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, the military services provide onbase furnished living quarters for over 200,000 unmarried enlisted 

servicemembers at their permanent duty locations in the United States. 

Commonly referred to as barracks, housing for unmarried members is 

often cited by DOD officials as a problem area because many military 

barracks are old, rundown, and otherwise do not meet contemporary DOD 

standards for size, privacy, and other amenities designed to enhance the 

quality of life of unmarried members. Junior unmarried members often 

share dilapidated barracks rooms with one or two other members and a 

gang latrine with occupants from several other rooms. Also, about 20,000 

junior enlisted members assigned to Navy ships continue to live in 

cramped onboard quarters even when their ships are in homeport. The 

living conditions in barracks are far different from an apartment or 

townhouse with two bedrooms, living area, bath, and full kitchen that is 

the normal housing standard for junior enlisted married members. 

The services have established specific goals and milestones for improving 

the housing provided to unmarried junior enlisted members. First, the 

services plan to eliminate permanent party barracks—i.e., barracks for 

servicemembers at their permanent duty locations—with common bath 

and shower facilities, or “gang latrines,” through barracks replacement or 

renovation. The Air Force already has achieved this goal and the Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps plan to eliminate gang latrines by fiscal years 

2008, 2007, and 2005, respectively. Second, the Army and the Navy plan to 

provide each junior enlisted member in the United States a private 

sleeping room with a kitchenette and bath shared by one other member—

referred to as the 1+1 barracks design standard—by fiscal years 2010 and 

2013, respectively. The Air Force, which already provides private sleeping 

rooms, plans to eliminate its barracks deficit and replace its worst 

barracks by fiscal year 2009. The Marine Corps, given a permanent waiver 

from the Secretary of the Navy to use a different barracks design standard, 

plans to provide barracks with sleeping rooms and baths shared by two 

junior members by fiscal year 2012. Third, the Navy plans to complete its 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

homeport ashore initiative by fiscal year 2008, which will provide barracks 

spaces for about 20,000 junior members who are currently required to live 

aboard their ships while in homeport. To improve barracks conditions and 

achieve these goals, the services plan to spend about $6 billion over the 

next 6 years. Appendix II shows photographs of old and new style 

barracks as well as typical living conditions aboard Navy ships. 

Service officials state that unmarried junior enlisted servicemembers 

should live in barracks to help instill service core values, provide for team 

building and mentoring, and meet operational requirements. However, 

significant differences exist among the services regarding personnel who 

are required to live in barracks. More specifically: 

• the Army requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through E6 to 

live in barracks, 

• the Navy requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through E4 

with fewer than 4 years of service to live in barracks, 

• the Air Force requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 through 

E4 to live in barracks, and 

• the Marine Corps requires unmarried personnel in pay grades E1 

through E5 to live in barracks. 

The Military Housing Privatization Initiative, authorized by law on 

February 10, 1996, provided new authorities that, among other things, 

allows DOD to provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and other incentives 

to encourage private developers to construct and operate military family 

and unaccompanied housing (barracks) either on or off military 

installations.3

 According to DOD, the initiative was aimed at solving its 

inadequate housing problem faster and more economically by taking 

advantage of the private sector’s investment capital and housing 

construction expertise. With private-sector investment, DOD planned to 

obtain at least 3 dollars in military housing improvements for each dollar 

that the government invested, thereby reducing the amount of government 

funds initially required to revitalize housing and accelerating the 

elimination of inadequate housing. Although there can be exceptions, 

DOD’s position is that the government’s estimated total costs for a 

privatization project also should be equal to or less than the total costs for 

the same project financed by military construction funding. 

Servicemembers who live in privatized housing receive a housing 

 3

 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106), Feb. 10, 1996. 
Page 6 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

allowance to pay for rent and utilities. In fiscal year 1997, the Congress 

appropriated $5 million for the services to use to initiate privatized 

barracks projects. However, the Congress rescinded these funds in fiscal 

year 1999 because the services had developed no plans for privatized 

barracks. 

In June 1997, DOD and the Office of Management and Budget agreed to a 

set of guidelines that would be used as a frame of reference for scoring 

privatization projects.4

 The guidelines state that if a project provides an 

occupancy guarantee, then funds for the project must be available and 

obligated “up front” at the time the government makes the commitment of 

resources. In other words, if a project provides an occupancy guarantee, 

then the value of the guarantee—the cumulative value of the rents to be 

paid for the housing over the entire contract term—must be obligated at 

the beginning of the project. As a result, DOD officials stated that such a 

project might not be financially attractive because the amount of 

appropriated funds required would be approximately equivalent to the 

military construction funding that would be required to build the barracks. 

According to DOD officials, this issue has not been a problem for family 

housing privatization projects because DOD does not provide occupancy 

guarantees and does not mandatorily assign members to family housing. 

Military families can choose where to live and the project contracts 

 4

 Each privatization contract that DOD enters into must be scored for budget purposes. 

Scoring seeks to determine the cost that should be recognized and recorded as an 

obligation of DOD at the time the contract is signed. The Office of Management and 

Budget’s Circular A-11 provides guidelines on how obligations should be recorded in the 

budget. The guidelines are designed to ensure that the budget records the full amount of 

the government’s commitments when a commitment is made. 
Page 7 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

include provisions for civilians to rent privatized housing if military 

families choose not to live there.5

Since 1998, we have issued six reports on DOD’s military housing 

program—three about the military housing privatization initiative, one 

about the services’ barracks design standard, one about DOD’s process for 

determining military housing requirements, and one about the differences 

among the services concerning who is required to live in barracks. 

• In July 1998, we reported on several concerns related to the new 

military housing privatization program.6

 These included (1) whether 

privatization would result in significant cost savings and whether the 

long contract terms of many projects might result in building housing 

that will not be needed in the future; (2) whether controls were 

adequate to protect the government’s interests in the event developers 

might not operate and maintain the housing as expected; and (3) 

whether DOD would face certain problems if privatized housing units 

were not fully used by military members and were subsequently rented 

to civilians, as the contracts permit. 

• In March 1999, we reported on the status of the services’ 

implementation of the 1+1 barracks design standard.7

 The report also 

 5

 In February 2003, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report, The Budgetary 

Treatment of Leases and Public/Private Ventures, on budget scoring. The office concluded 

that (1) DOD’s family housing privatization projects have been treated in the budget in a 

manner inconsistent with federal budgeting principles that require federal financial 

commitments to be recognized up front in the budget, and (2) military housing privatization 

projects that result in the construction of family housing on military bases should be 

reflected in the budget as if they were investments. This would require the up-front scoring 

including the value of the rental payments that will be made over the life of the project. The 

report also noted that the Office of Management and Budget disagrees with this view 

because DOD may have little, if any, equity ownership in privatized housing, DOD may not 

be legally liable for the projects’ debts, and the rental payments are made by individual 

servicemembers. The report made no recommendations, stating that the report’s purpose 

was to identify the challenges that financing federal projects through leases and 

public/private ventures, such as the military housing privatization program, pose for 

congressional control over spending as well as for the transparency of the budget and its 

ability to facilitate cost-effective investment decisions. 

6

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: Privatization Off to a Slow Start and 

Continued Management Attention Needed, GAO/NSIAD-98-178 (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 

1998). 

7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: Status of the Services’ 

Implementation of the Current Barracks Design Standard, GAO/NSIAD-99-52

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 1999). 

Prior GAO Reports on the 

Military Housing Program 
Page 8 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

discussed DOD’s rationale for adopting the standard, the costs of 

alternatives to the standard, and service views of the impact of the 

standard from a team-building, individual isolation, or similar 

perspective. 

• In March 2000, we reported that initial implementation progress for the 

privatization program was slow, the services’ life-cycle cost analyses 

provided inaccurate cost comparisons because DOD had not issued 

standardized guidance for preparing the analyses, and DOD lacked a 

plan for evaluating the effectiveness of the program.8

 DOD 

subsequently quickened the pace of family housing privatization, issued 

standard guidance for privatization life-cycle cost analyses, and 

developed a program evaluation plan. 

• In August 2001, we reported that despite earlier recommendations, 

DOD had not implemented a standard process for determining military 

housing requirements.9

 In that report, we pointed out that the initiative 

to increase housing allowances heightened the urgency for a consistent 

process, because the initiative could lessen the demand for military 

housing by making housing in local communities more affordable. In 

January 2003, DOD approved a new standard family housing 

requirements determination process. 

• In June 2002, we noted that by investing about $185 million of military 

construction funds in the first 10 family housing privatization projects, 

DOD should obtain housing improvements that would have required 

about $1.19 billion in military construction funds had only government 

funds been used.10 We also reported that privatization projects were not 

supported by reliable or consistent needs assessments, and the overall 

requirement for military housing was not well defined. Further, 

although DOD had included provisions in project contracts designed to 

protect the government’s interests, our report identified several areas 

where DOD could further enhance protections to the government. DOD 

responded by outlining ongoing and planned management actions to 

address the concerns noted in the report. 

 8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: Continued Concerns in 

Implementing the Privatization Initiative, GAO/NSIAD-00-71 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 

2000). 

9

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: DOD Needs to Address LongStanding Requirements Determination Problems, GAO-01-889 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 

2001). 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: Management Improvements Needed 

As the Pace of Privatization Quickens, GAO-02-624 (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002). 
Page 9 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

• In January 2003, we reported on the widely varying standards among 

the services regarding who should live in barracks and the effect this 

can have on program costs and quality of life.11 We noted that requiring 

more personnel (more pay grades) to live in barracks than is justified 

results in increased barracks program and construction costs and has 

negative quality-of-life implications because most junior 

servicemembers would prefer to live off base. We noted that by 

allowing junior enlisted personnel already living off base with a 

housing allowance to continue to live off base, the Air Force could 

reduce planned barracks construction spending by $420 million. 

Accordingly, we recommended that the rationale behind the services’ 

barracks occupancy requirements be based, at least in part, on the 

results of objective, systematic analyses that consider the 

contemporary needs of junior servicemembers, quality-of-life issues, 

the services’ mission requirements, and other relevant data that would 

help provide a basis for the services’ barracks occupancy requirements. 

While DOD agreed in principle with our recommendation, it reiterated 

the importance of military judgment in such decisions and left unclear 

the extent to which it is likely to make changes. 

While the services have considered barracks privatization over the past 

several years, they have not yet initiated pilot project proposals to 

determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of private sector financing, 

ownership, operation, and maintenance of military barracks. According to 

DOD officials, barracks privatization involves unique challenges compared 

to family housing privatization. These challenges range from the 

potentially higher amount of appropriated funds needed to secure a 

privatization contract (as a result of the services’ requirement that 

unmarried junior members live in barracks) to the differences in where 

private developers and the military prefer barracks to be located. 

Deferring to the individual services, DOD has provided limited centralized 

direction and focus to help overcome the challenges associated with 

barracks privatization. Recently, each service has independently given 

increased attention to developing project proposals, with the Navy hoping 

to do so by the end of 2003. Still, there are unresolved issues associated 

with barracks privatization and, without more coordination of activities to 

address these issues, efforts might be duplicated and the benefits from 

collaboration might be lost. 

 11 U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Housing: Opportunity for Reducing Planned 

Military Construction Costs for Barracks, GAO-03-257R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 7, 2003). 

DOD and the Military 

Services Have Not 

Determined the 

Feasibility of 

Barracks Privatization 
Page 10 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Compared to family housing privatization, barracks privatization includes 

unique challenges that, thus far, have prevented the development of pilot 

project proposals. DOD has actively pursued privatization of military 

family housing and has awarded contracts to construct or improve about 

26,000 family housing units by the end of fiscal year 2002 and has plans to 

privatize an additional 96,000 units by the beginning of fiscal year 2006. 

The primary problem with privatizing barracks lies in the services’ 

mandatory assignment policy for unmarried junior enlisted 

servicemembers and whether this policy implies that DOD would provide 

private-sector housing developers with an occupancy guarantee. 

Mandatory assignment, if viewed as an occupancy guarantee, might make 

a proposed barracks privatization project financially unattractive because 

a higher amount of appropriated funds would be needed to secure the 

contract than would be needed for a similar military construction project. 

Other challenges are related to barracks locations, unit deployments, and 

funding for housing allowances. 

The current policy in each service requires mandatory assignment of 

unmarried junior members to barracks located on base, provided that 

space is available. According to DOD officials, most military leaders 

support this policy because they believe that mandatory assignments 

provide for military discipline and unit integrity. Mandatory assignments, 

however, might result in the need for more appropriations—in comparison 

to military construction financing—to cover the obligations that the Office 

of Management and Budget determines should be recorded at contract 

award. This could make a proposed barracks privatization project 

financially unattractive. The amount of appropriations needed hinges on 

whether the mandatory assignment policy would provide private-sector 

housing developers with a DOD guarantee of occupancy. 

Because there have been no barracks privatization project proposals to 

date, it is unclear whether the services’ mandatory barracks assignment 

policies for junior members might be viewed as an occupancy guarantee. 

Office of Management and Budget officials stated that having a mandatory 

assignment policy alone would not necessarily guarantee that the rent paid 

to the developer over the life of the project would have to be scored up 

front. However, if the privatization contract specifically stated that 

mandatory assignment would occur, the officials stated that the office 

probably would view this as an occupancy guarantee and the project’s 

projected rent would be scored up front. 

As with family housing projects, Office of Management and Budget 

officials stated that the scoring of a barracks project depends on the 

Barracks Privatization 

Involves Unique 

Challenges Compared to 

Family Housing 

Privatization 
Page 11 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

details and circumstances involved in a proposed project and the 

associated risk to the government. Key issues that might be considered 

include whether the project allows the private developer enough 

autonomy to manage the project without significant military control and 

whether the contract includes provisions for civilians to rent vacant 

barracks spaces in the event of reduced government demand. Obviously, 

such issues present problems for the services—specifically, the 

willingness of the services to relinquish their control of barracks and allow 

civilians to occupy vacant barracks spaces. With a specific barracks 

privatization proposal, the Office of Management and Budget officials 

stated they would work with DOD to address the associated scoring 

questions. 

Although the potentially high amount of appropriated funds needed to 

secure a contract appears to be the most significant challenge to barracks 

privatization, there are other challenges as noted below. 

• Barracks location. According to DOD officials, private developers have 

indicated that they would prefer that privatized barracks be located off 

base or along an installation’s boundary and be severable from the 

installation. Developers would then have greater flexibility in renting 

the units to civilians in the event of reduced government demand. 

However, the services do not want barracks located off-base or near 

installations’ perimeter fences largely for force protection reasons and, 

currently, most existing barracks are not located along installation 

boundaries. 

• Deployments. In the event of unit deployments, many servicemembers 

would not be in the barracks and possibly entire buildings could be 

empty for months. As a result, the developer’s normal rental income 

could be reduced or eliminated even though the developer would still 

need to pay for expenses such as mortgage payments and operations 

and maintenance costs. This is less of a problem in privatized family 

housing because family members normally continue to occupy the 

housing and pay rent if the servicemember deploys. 

• Funding for housing allowances. Service officials stated that identifying 

and shifting funds to pay housing allowances to servicemembers living 

in privatized barracks could be an administrative problem. This is less 

of a problem with privatized family housing because military family 

housing has a separate operations and maintenance budget account. 

When a private developer takes over existing military family housing, 

funds from the family housing operations and maintenance account 

can be shifted to help pay for housing allowances used to pay rent for 

the families living in the housing. However, barracks operations and 

maintenance is not funded by a similar separate account. Instead, 
Page 12 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

barracks operations and maintenance funds are included in each 

installation’s overall base operating budget. According to service 

officials, it is more difficult to identify, break out, and shift barracks 

funding to the personnel accounts to pay housing allowances for a 

privatized barracks project. 

With its attention largely concentrated on initiating and managing 

privatization of military family housing, DOD has provided limited 

centralized direction and focus to help the services overcome the 

challenges associated with barracks privatization and proceed with pilot 

project proposals. Also, in August 1998, 2 years after the military housing 

privatization legislation was enacted, DOD shifted primary responsibility 

for implementing the privatization program to the individual services. 

Since that time, the services have independently studied the barracks 

privatization concept but have not developed actual project proposals. 

More recently, the services have given increased attention to exploring 

barracks privatization, but their efforts continue to be independent and 

non-coordinated. The status of barracks privatization in each service 

follows. 

While no service has yet initiated a barracks privatization project, the Navy 

and the Marine Corps currently appear to be the most active among the 

services in examining its potential use. Navy officials stated that they 

believe barracks privatization offers an opportunity for the Navy to more 

quickly meet its barracks improvement goals, including the goal of 

providing barracks space for all junior sailors currently required to live on 

their ships even while in homeport. 

In order for barracks privatization to be feasible, Navy officials believed 

that the Navy needed additional authorities not contained in the Military 

Housing Privatization Initiative legislation. Specifically, Navy officials 

believed that existing housing allowance rates provided more money than 

would be needed to develop a privatized barracks project. The housing 

allowance rate for unmarried junior members is targeted to cover the 

costs of a one-bedroom apartment in the civilian community. Yet, the 

barracks occupancy standard is based on a lesser standard—the modern 

1+1 barracks design standard where two members share a module 

consisting of two small bedrooms with a kitchenette and bath. As a result, 

Navy officials believe the current housing allowance could provide more 

money than would be needed to pay rent for a similar design standard in a 

privatized barracks, and the rental income received by the private-sector 

developer would be more than is needed to finance the construction and 

DOD Has Provided Limited 

Centralized Direction and 

Focus for Barracks 

Privatization 

Navy and Marine Corps Efforts 

to Privatize Barracks 
Page 13 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

management of the project. To address this situation, the Bob Stump 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 provided the Navy 

with specific legislative authority to undertake three pilot projects to 

privatize barracks.12 According to Navy officials, the legislation will allow 

the Navy to pay occupants’ allowances in the amounts needed to provide 

the rental income to support the privatized barracks projects and will 

allow junior sailors on ships to be assigned to privatized barracks. 

With this authority, Navy and Marine Corps officials stated that they plan 

to develop specific proposals for privatization. Candidate installations for 

barracks privatization include the Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia; the 

Naval Station San Diego, California; and the Marine Corps Base Camp 

Pendleton, California. Although remaining challenges, such as those noted 

above, must be addressed, Navy officials hope that specific proposals will 

be developed by the end of calendar year 2003. 

In May 1997, the Air Force issued the results of a barracks privatization 

feasibility study. The study concluded that privatization was feasible and 

recommended that the Air Force pursue development of a barracks 

privatization project at one base to further define the concept. However, 

the study, which was performed prior to issuance of the budgetary scoring 

guidelines for privatization projects, stated that occupancy guarantees 

would be provided in order to facilitate private financing. According to Air 

Force officials, the study recommendation was not implemented because 

of the costs associated with occupancy guarantees and the other 

challenges associated with barracks privatization. 

More recently, however, the Air Force has again begun to explore the 

issue. In August 2002, an Air Force team was formed to establish a 

baseline for an Air Force barracks privatization program including the 

development of policy and guidance. Air Force officials also stated that Air 

Force major commands have been asked to identify potential privatization 

candidates. One potential candidate identified was Elmendorf Air Force 

Base, Alaska, where a family housing privatization project is already 

underway. However, officials stated that they do not expect any privatized 

barracks proposals in the near future and that they planned to monitor the 

Navy’s progress under its pilot program. 

 12 The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-314), 

Dec. 2, 2002. 

Air Force Efforts to Privatize 

Barracks 
Page 14 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Army officials stated that they have explored the concept of barracks 

privatization but that they have made relatively little progress toward 

reaching a consensus that the concept should be pursued. They also stated 

that they were not optimistic that the many challenges facing barracks 

privatization could be overcome and did not expect any project proposals 

in the near future. Nevertheless, the Army is continuing to review the 

issue. For example, in an April 2002 memorandum, the Army Assistant 

Secretary for Installations and Environment stated that the time was right 

to pursue the issue and requested the support of the Army’s Training and 

Doctrine Command and the Army’s Forces Command in formal studies of 

barracks privatization. At the time of our review, no studies had been 

completed. In addition, Fort Lewis, Washington, has a barracks 

privatization study underway that is expected to be completed in 2003. 

To the extent the services continue to rely on government built and 

operated barracks on military installations, opportunities exist to reduce 

costs of constructing those barracks through adoption of residential 

construction practices. In the past, DOD policies generally required that 

traditional barracks construction practices use commercial-type 

construction including use of steel frame, concrete, and cement block. 

Similar multi-unit residential housing in the private sector, such as 

apartments, college dormitories, and extended stay hotels, normally use 

residential construction practices that include the use of wood frame 

construction. Compared to steel frame, concrete, and cement block 

construction, Army analyses show that residential construction practices 

could reduce typical barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. 

DOD policies now generally allow use of residential construction 

practices. However, some barriers still exist to DOD’s adoption of these 

cost-reducing practices as a normal way of doing business, including 

concern about durability and unanswered questions about the ability of 

wood-frame barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection 

requirements. 

Concerned with the high construction costs of barracks built to the 1+1 

design standard, the Army began to search for savings opportunities and 

concluded that using residential construction practices to build barracks 

would cost less than using traditional construction practices. In June 2000, 

the Army revised its barracks construction guidance to permit Army 

construction projects to be of any construction type. Subsequently, the 

Army began a pilot barracks project using residential construction 

practices at Fort Meade, Maryland. 

Army Efforts to Privatize 

Barracks 

Residential 

Construction 

Practices Offer 

Opportunities to 

Reduce Costs of 

Government-Owned 

Barracks 

Army Analyses Show That 

Residential Construction 

Practices Cost Less 
Page 15 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

As the Army began building new barracks in accordance with the 1+1 

barracks design standard adopted in 1995, Army officials became 

concerned with the high construction costs of these barracks. To explore 

reasons for the high costs and opportunities for savings, the Army Corps 

of Engineers performed a study in 1996 that compared the construction 

costs of three typical Army 1+1 barracks with the construction costs of a 

similar private sector multi-unit project—specifically a national brand, all 

suites, extended stay hotel. After making adjustments to account for 

differences in geographic location and dates of construction, the Army 

Corps of Engineers found significant cost differences between the projects 

as shown in table 1. 

Table 1: Cost Comparison of Army Barracks with a Private Sector Extended Stay Hotel 

 Difference 

Factor Average for Army barracks 

Average for private 

extended stay hotel Amount Percent

Construction cost per occupant $48,700 $34,600 $14,100 29

Construction cost per square foot $131 $56 $75 57

Key amenities and square feet per occupant • Two occupants share a 

bath and kitchenette. 

• Common area for 

socializing. 

• 372 square feet per 

occupant. 

• Private bath and full 

kitchen. 

• Private living room. 

• 621 square feet per 

occupant. 

 

Source: Army Corps of Engineers. 

The extended stay hotel provided each occupant with more amenities and 

space than the Army barracks at a construction cost per occupant of 

$14,100, or 29 percent, less than the barracks’ average construction cost 

per occupant. The Army Corps of Engineers determined that although 

many factors accounted for the cost difference between the projects, the 

primary reason was the type of construction used to build the projects. 

The barracks were constructed in accordance with Uniform Building Code 

type I/II (commercial) standards that call for non-combustible 

construction built from concrete, masonry, and/or steel. The private 

extended stay hotel was constructed in accordance with Uniform Building 

Code type V (residential) standards that permit use of any building 

material allowed by the code, including wood. The Army Corps of 

Engineers’ data showed that if the barracks had been built using 

residential construction practices instead of traditional barracks 

construction practices, the Army’s average construction cost per occupant 

would have been about $37,500, a reduction of about $11,200, or 23 

percent, per occupant. This study did not address differences in the 

barracks’ total costs—i.e., construction costs and operations and 

Army Concern Over Barracks 

Costs Resulted in Search for 

Savings Opportunities 
Page 16 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

maintenance costs—over their lifetimes. However, subsequent Army 

analyses indicate that a barrack’s total costs over its lifetime would be less 

if constructed with residential practices because of its lower initial 

construction costs and comparable operations and maintenance costs for 

many building components. (See app. III for additional details on the 

Army’s analyses.) 

A subsequent Army study also concluded that the materials and methods 

traditionally used to construct government-owned barracks were more 

costly than the materials and methods normally used to construct similar 

multi-unit residential buildings in the private sector. In a joint February 

2001 report, the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 

Management and the Army Corps of Engineers concluded that using 

residential construction practices, similar to the practices used to build 

apartment buildings, could achieve considerable cost reductions without 

adversely impacting barracks’ durability or maintainability.13 The report 

included an additional example comparing barracks built using traditional 

construction practices with a residential condominium built using 

residential construction practices. Specifically, the report cited an Army 

1+1 barracks built in fiscal year 2000 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Each 

two-bedroom, bath, and kitchenette module had 506 square feet and cost 

$193,000. During this time frame, the construction cost of a 1,500 square 

foot residential unit with two bedrooms, two baths, full kitchen, living 

room, laundry room, and balcony in a new private condominium complex 

in Maryland was $180,000. Although the condominium unit was almost 

three times larger than the barracks module, it cost $13,000 less. 

The Army revised its barracks construction guidance in recent years to 

permit construction projects to be of any construction type, largely in 

response to its analyses. When building barracks, the Army had been 

following guidance in Military Handbook 1008C, which provides direction 

on the design and construction of DOD facilities.14 The handbook stated 

that construction of new buildings should be limited to use of traditional 

barracks construction practices. However, in June 2000, the Army Corps 

 13 U.S. Department of the Army, Report on the Barracks Mid-Program Review 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2001). 

14 U.S. Department of Defense, Military Handbook: Fire Protection For Facilities 

Engineering, Design, And Construction, Military Handbook 1008C (Washington, D.C.: 

June 10, 1997). Because the handbook provided an exception for Navy and Marine Corps 

barracks, the handbook’s requirements for barracks construction applied only to the Army 

and the Air Force. 

Army Revised Barracks 

Construction Guidance 
Page 17 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

of Engineers issued guidance that authorized Army construction projects 

to be of any construction type as long as they complied with the Uniform 

Building Code requirements for the construction type used. Further, in a 

July 2002 memorandum, the Army Vice Chief of Staff stated that use of 

less restrictive residential practices in barracks construction would 

improve soldier quality of life and provide better value to the Army. An 

enclosure to this memorandum stated that, although Army barracks 

traditionally have been designed in many cases to exceed industry codes 

and standards, such an approach is not in the Army’s best economic 

interests. 

A 1+1 barracks design project currently under construction at Fort Meade, 

Maryland, is the Army’s first barracks to be built using residential 

construction practices. According to Army officials, the project calls for 

eight new three-story barracks buildings with a total of 576 private 

sleeping rooms. The project’s initial design assumed use of traditional 

construction practices. However, on the basis of this design, the Army 

Corps of Engineers estimated that the project would cost $48 million—

about $11 million more than had been approved for the project. In an 

effort to reduce construction costs, the Army decided to redesign the 

project using multi-unit residential 1-hour fire resistive construction 

practices. After the redesign and solicitation process, the project was 

awarded for about $31 million. With the project 83 percent complete in 

January 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers estimated that the final project 

cost—including supervision and overhead costs and costs of changes and 

enhancements to the contracted design—would be about $39 million. In 

addition, the project’s estimated completion date was about 8 months 

ahead of the contracted completion date of January 2004. 

In January 2003, we visited the Fort Meade barracks construction site. 

Visually, we noted few differences in the appearance of these barracks 

compared to traditional barracks. Figure 1 shows photographs of the Fort 

Meade barracks project contrasted with a traditionally constructed 

barracks at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. 

Fort Meade Barracks Project Is 

Army’s First to Use Residential 

Construction Practices 
Page 18 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Figure 1: Photographs of the Fort Meade, Maryland, Barracks Project and a Traditional Barracks at Langley Air Force Base, 

Virginia 

For a comparison with the Fort Meade project, we asked the Army for cost 

data on two 1+1 barracks projects under construction at Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina. One project is building 960 rooms using traditional noncombustible construction practices and the other project is building 608 

rooms using traditional 1-hour fire resistive construction practices. 

Compared to the Fort Bragg projects, it appears that use of the residential 

construction practices in the Fort Meade project will result in 

considerable cost reductions—from $12,600 to $31,800 per occupant (see 

table 2). 
Page 19 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Table 2: Cost Comparison of the Different Construction Practices at Fort Meade, 

Maryland, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina 

Project Type of construction 

Cost per square 

foot 

Cost per 

occupant

Fort Meade Residential: 

1-Hour Fire Resistive $113 $38,800

Fort Bragg 1 Traditional: 

1-Hour Fire Resistive 136 51,400

Fort Bragg 2 Traditional: 

Non-Combustible 193 70,600

Range of cost 

reductions using 

residential construction 

practices $23 to $80 

$12,600 to 

$31,800

Source: Department of the Army. 

Note: The Army provided costs directly related to the barracks portion of the projects and adjusted the 

costs to account for the differences in construction time frames and geographic locations of the 

projects. We estimated cost per occupant by multiplying the cost per square foot by the project’s 

gross square feet per occupant. The Fort Meade, Fort Bragg 1, and Fort Bragg 2 projects provided 

343, 378, and 366 gross square feet per occupant, respectively. 

There are barriers to DOD’s widespread adoption of residential 

construction practices as a normal way of doing business. Because Army 

studies and the pilot project at Fort Meade indicate the potential to reduce 

some costs by using residential construction practices, it would seem that 

the services would be eager to adopt these practices for all future barracks 

construction projects. However, this has not been the case due to 

concerns about barracks durability and concerns related to antiterrorism 

force protection issues. 

According to Army officials, the services have been reluctant to change 

construction practices because of the concern that switching to residential 

construction practices would result in barracks that are less attractive and 

less durable. However, the officials noted that the exterior appearance of 

barracks constructed with residential and traditional practices normally 

would be the same. Also, Army analyses indicate that there is little 

difference in durability with each type of construction and a barrack’s 

total costs over its lifetime would be less if constructed with residential 

practices because of its lower initial construction costs and comparable 

operations and maintenance costs for many building components. (See 

app. III for additional details.) Still, the officials stated that the idea of 

switching construction practices continues to face resistance. Because of 

this, even the Army had no definite plans, as of February 2003, for 

additional barracks construction using residential construction practices. 

Barriers Exist to Greater 

Use of Residential 

Construction Practices 
Page 20 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

The Air Force also had no plans to use residential construction practices 

for its barracks projects. The Navy, which has completed two barracks 

projects using residential construction practices, has no additional 

barracks projects underway or planned using these practices.15

Another barrier to widespread adoption of residential construction 

practices for barracks relates to unresolved questions on whether use of 

these practices would result in barracks that fully complied with new 

antiterrorism guidance for force protection. In July 2002, DOD finalized 

guidance requiring military components to adhere to common criteria and 

minimum construction standards to mitigate antiterrorism vulnerabilities 

and terrorist threats.16 The standards seek to minimize the likelihood of 

mass casualties from terrorist attacks against DOD personnel in the 

buildings where they work and live. 

As applied to barracks construction, two standards in the antiterrorism 

force protection guidance are particularly important—standoff distance 

and prevention of building collapse. Standoff distance refers to the 

minimum distance that buildings should be situated from roads, parking 

lots, trash containers, and an installation’s perimeter. According to the 

guidance, the easiest and least costly way to achieve appropriate levels of 

protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate sufficient standoff 

distance into project designs. In situations where the standoff distance 

standards cannot be achieved because land is unavailable, the guidance 

calls for building hardening or other techniques to mitigate possible blast 

effects. According to Army officials, because most barracks projects in the 

United States could be situated to meet required standoff distances, use of 

residential construction practices and compliance with this standard 

would not be a problem in most instances. Navy officials, however, stated 

that enough land to meet required standoff distances was not available at 

many of its installations. 

The DOD standard for preventing building collapse applies to buildings of 

three or more stories and requires that they be designed with provisions 

 15 The Navy used residential construction practices to build barracks projects at Naval Air 

Station Brunswick, Maine, and Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island. Compared to the use 

of traditional construction practices, Navy officials stated that the use of residential 

construction practices reduced the cost per occupant by about one-third. 

16 U.S. Department of Defense, Unified Facilities Criteria: DOD Minimum Antiterrorism 

Standards For Buildings, UFC 4-010-01 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2002). 
Page 21 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

that permit the structure to sustain local damage without the entire 

building collapsing. According to Army officials, questions remain as to 

whether barracks built using residential practices would comply with the 

collapse standard. They stated that the primary issue is lack of engineering 

data. Most available building collapse information addresses structural 

systems typical of taller buildings that were not built using residential 

construction practices. Army officials also stated that complying with the 

collapse standard using residential barracks construction practices might 

not be a problem or might be solved with inexpensive adjustments to 

construction techniques. Designers do not have sufficient data on exactly 

what, if anything, needs to be done to ensure compliance with the 

standard when using residential construction practices. 

At the same time, some Army officials also questioned whether the 

collapse standard should apply to low-rise three-story barracks buildings. 

They noted that industry design standards usually make a distinction in 

structural requirements at four stories and above—not at three stories and 

above as required by the collapse standard. They further noted that today’s 

1+1 barracks design standard provides relatively low occupancy densities 

that are more similar to family housing which is exempt from the force 

protection requirements as long as a family housing building contains no 

more than 12 family units. 

The services could minimize housing costs by ensuring full use of existing 

barracks space. Having unused government-owned barracks spaces and 

paying housing allowances at the same time wastes available resources. 

Air Force and Army barracks instructions, however, do not require 

installations to use all vacant space before authorizing housing allowances 

for junior members to live off base.17 Our review, as well as previous 

reviews by military service audit groups, found that the lenient barracks 

utilization guidance, and in some cases noncompliance with the guidance, 

resulted in installations paying housing allowances when barracks 

vacancies existed. The services could also reduce costs by identifying and 

eliminating excess barracks infrastructure if they were to change their 

barracks occupancy requirements and permit more junior members to live 

off base. 

 17 Service instructions also permit installation commanders to authorize junior members to 

live off base with a housing allowance for certain reasons other than lack of barracks 

space, such as for personal hardship reasons or for members with extensive household 

goods. 

Opportunities Exist to 

Make Better Use of 

Existing Barracks 
Page 22 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Army instructions allow its installations to authorize junior members to 

live off base with a housing allowance when barracks occupancy reaches 

95 percent. Air Force instructions only require that 90 percent of an 

installation’s available barracks spaces be used before authorizing junior 

members to live off base with a housing allowance. Prior to June 1998, the 

Air Force required 95-percent occupancy. Air Force officials stated that 

the change was made to facilitate flexibility and to help maintain unit 

integrity in barracks assignments. To put these instructions in perspective, 

such policies, if practiced in the private sector, would be the equivalent of 

the owner of a private apartment complex turning away prospective 

tenants even though 5 to 10 percent of the apartments were vacant—an 

action not likely to happen if the owner is concerned about costs and 

revenues. Further, allowing 5 to 10 percent of barracks spaces to go 

unused appears contrary to the services’ policies requiring that all 

unmarried junior members live in the barracks as long as space is 

available. 

In contrast to Army and Air Force instructions, Navy and Marine Corps 

instructions state that maximum practical occupancy should be achieved 

before junior members are authorized to live off base with a housing 

allowance. The Navy instruction specifically states that barracks 

utilization should routinely approach 100 percent. 

In view of the differences in the services’ barracks utilization guidance, we 

attempted to review barracks utilization and payment of housing 

allowances for unmarried junior members in each of the services. 

However, our analysis was limited to the Air Force and the Marine Corps 

because only those services require their installations to collect and 

centrally report barracks utilization data and the number of members 

authorized to live off base. The Navy requires barracks utilization reports, 

but the reports do not include the number of members authorized to live 

off base. Army officials stated that although utilization data is maintained 

by each installation, they had eliminated central reporting requirements 

years ago in order to reduce paperwork costs. With centralized data only 

available from the Air Force and the Marine Corps, we focused our review 

on an analysis of that information. 

The Air Force reported an inventory of about 43,400 adequate permanent 

party barracks rooms in the United States as of September 30, 2002. Table 

3 shows that on September 30, 2002, about 4,700 of these rooms were 

diverted from normal use for maintenance and other reasons. Of the 

remaining rooms, about 35,300, or 91 percent, were occupied and about 

Army and Air Force 

Instructions Do Not 

Require Full Utilization of 

Barracks Space 

Actual Barracks Utilization 

Varied 

Many Air Force Barracks 

Rooms Were Vacant 
Page 23 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

3,400 rooms, or 9 percent, were vacant. Among major Air Force 

installations, the occupancy rates for the available barracks rooms ranged 

from 100 percent at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, to 82 percent at 

Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. 

Table 3: Utilization of Air Force Permanent Party Barracks in the United States as of 

September 30, 2002 

Number of 

roomsa

Percentage of 

total rooms 

Percentage of 

net available 

rooms

Total 43,400 100 

Diverted for maintenance 1,900 4 

Diverted for other reasons 2,800 6 

Net available 38,700 89 100

Occupied 35,300 81 91

Vacant 3,400 8 9

Source: Department of the Air Force. 

a

 Numbers rounded. Rooms diverted for reasons other than maintenance include 1,219 rooms set 

aside for temporary and student lodging, 527 rooms set aside to temporarily house members arriving 

at an installation until they are assigned to a permanent room, 275 rooms set aside for offices, 218 

rooms set aside for storage, 60 rooms set aside for training, and 507 rooms set aside for other 

miscellaneous reasons. 

The Air Force also reported that as of September 30, 2002, it had 

authorized about 24,100 unmarried junior servicemembers in pay grades 

E1 through E4 to live off base with a housing allowance. We analyzed this 

data to estimate the housing allowance funds that the Air Force could 

potentially have prevented if members living off base had been assigned to 

the vacant barracks rooms. To do this, we compared—on an installationby-installation basis—the number of junior servicemembers living off base 

with a housing allowance to the number of barracks vacancies on 

September 30, 2002. Our analysis showed that the vacant barracks spaces 

could have accommodated about 2,900 of the junior members who were 

living off base—suggesting a practice at variance with the Air Force’s 

stated policy of requiring E1 through E4 to live on base in barracks. Had 

these members been assigned to the barracks, the Air Force potentially 

could have reduced its annual housing allowance costs by about 

$20 million. Because the data used in this analysis reflected barracks use 

on a single date, September 30, 2002, our analysis reflects results as of this 

single date. Also, because barracks occupancy can change daily, results 

would have differed if utilization data on another date had been used or if 

data had been available to show daily utilization over a period of time. 
Page 24 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Although Air Force instructions require that 90 percent of an installation’s 

available barracks spaces be used before authorizing junior members to 

live off base, some Air Force installations apparently were not in 

compliance with this guidance. For example, data for Kirtland Air Force 

Base, New Mexico, indicated an 85-percent occupancy rate with 105 

vacancies and 392 junior members living off base with a housing 

allowance. Similarly, data for McChord Air Force Base, Washington, 

indicated an 86-percent occupancy rate with 101 vacancies, and 118 junior 

members living off base with a housing allowance. Air Force officials 

noted that installation occupancy rates are reported only twice a year and 

represent a snapshot in time. Thus, to determine whether installations 

reporting less than 90-percent occupancy were not complying with policy 

would require a detailed installation level review of occupancy rates over a 

period of time and the reasons why members living off base were allowed 

to do so. Air Force officials also noted that Air Force commands are 

reminded on a regular basis of the importance of complying with 

utilization policy and making full use of their barracks. 

The Marine Corps data as of September 30, 2002, showed that barracks at 

most Marine Corps installations were fully used. Of the few major 

installations that reported less than 100-percent utilization, only one also 

reported unmarried junior enlisted members living off base with a housing 

allowance. In this instance, however, the installation reported only three 

junior members with a housing allowance. 

Previous reports from service audit groups also have noted that 

noncompliance with existing guidance has resulted in installations paying 

housing allowances when barracks vacancies existed. For example, in a 

February 1999 report on barracks management at Langley Air Force Base, 

Virginia, the Air Force Audit Agency stated that housing managers did not 

require individual barracks to meet the occupancy goal before authorizing 

members to live off base.18 The report also stated that maintaining 

barracks occupancy rates above the Air Force goal would provide direct 

savings to the Air Force budget. The Army Audit Agency reported in 

January 1997 that Fort Benning, Georgia, had authorized members to live 

off base even though barracks utilization was below the Army goal of 

 18 U.S. Air Force Audit Agency, Installation Report of Audit: Dormitory Management 1st 

Fighter Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, EL099036 (Langley Air Force Base, Va.: 

Feb. 3, 1999). 

Nearly All Marine Corps 

Barracks Were Occupied 

Audit Groups Have 

Reported Noncompliance 

with Utilization Guidance 
Page 25 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

95 percent.19 The report stated that the unnecessary authorizations were 

issued because Fort Benning decentralized barracks management to the 

unit level and did not make sure that each unit fully used its barracks 

before authorizing members to live off base with a housing allowance. 

While it is important to make full use of existing barracks space, it is also 

important that the services maintain an inventory of barracks spaces only 

in the numbers actually required. In our January 2003 report, we discussed 

the widely varying standards among the services regarding who should 

live in barracks and the effect this can have on program costs and quality 

of life and recommended that the services review the rationale behind 

their barracks occupancy requirements.20 DOD has left unclear the extent 

to which it is likely to make changes in its barracks occupancy 

requirements. However, if the services were to change their barracks 

occupancy requirements and permit more junior members to live off base 

with a housing allowance, then the services could reduce housing costs by 

identifying and eliminating excess barracks infrastructure. To use the Air 

Force case as an illustration, instead of bringing junior members back on 

base to fill up barracks vacancies, the Air Force could officially decide that 

many of these members should be allowed to continue to live off base. 

This decision would reduce barracks needs and the Air Force could then 

consider vacant barracks spaces as excess infrastructure that could be 

eliminated to reduce costs. 

DOD and the services have not fully explored barracks privatization to 

determine whether the concept could provide a better economic value to 

the government than the use of military construction financing. Although 

the services have separately studied the issues and unique challenges 

associated with barracks privatization, DOD has largely concentrated on 

family housing privatization and not on promoting a coordinated, focused 

effort to address the challenges and develop pilot project proposals to 

determine the overall feasibility and merits of barracks privatization. 

Without more coordination of activities to address the challenges 

associated with barracks privatization, efforts might be duplicated and 

potential opportunities to optimize lessons learned might be lost. 

 19 U.S. Army Audit Agency, Space Utilization: U.S. Army Infantry Center and Fort 

Benning, Georgia, AA 97-97, (Alexandria, Va.: Jan. 6, 1997). 

20 See GAO-03-257R. 

Changing Occupancy 

Requirements Could 

Reduce the Need for 

Barracks Spaces 

Conclusions 
Page 26 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

For several reasons, DOD and the military services have not taken 

advantage of opportunities to potentially reduce their housing costs for 

unmarried servicemembers through use of residential construction 

practices in government-owned barracks construction and better 

utilization of existing government-owned barracks. First, widespread 

adoption of residential construction practices in building governmentowned barracks has been hampered because of concerns about barracks 

durability and unanswered questions about the ability of wood-frame 

barracks to meet all antiterrorism force protection requirements. Without 

engineering studies to resolve these questions and, if appropriate, 

adoption of residential construction practices, the services could be 

spending more than is needed on barracks construction. Second, lenient 

barracks utilization guidance—which in some cases does not require full 

use of existing government-owned barracks before authorizing housing 

allowances for junior members to live off base—and limited enforcement 

of existing guidance have led in some cases to the routine acceptance of 

less than maximum use of barracks and the payment of housing 

allowances when vacancies exist. The establishment of and compliance 

with guidance that requires maximum use of required existing barracks—

specifically, utilization that routinely approaches 100 percent before 

unmarried junior members are authorized housing allowances—could 

result in reducing the services’ housing costs for junior members. It is also 

important that the services maintain an inventory of barracks spaces only 

in the numbers actually required. If the services were to change their 

barracks occupancy requirements based on their review of the 

requirements’ rationale and permit more junior members to live off base, 

then they could also reduce costs by identifying and eliminating barracks 

space that is no longer needed. 

To capitalize on opportunities for reducing housing costs for unmarried 

servicemembers, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to: 

• Promote a coordinated, focused effort among the military services to 

determine the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of barracks 

privatization by addressing the associated challenges and facilitating 

the development of pilot project proposals. This effort should support 

the Navy’s use of the pilot housing privatization authority provided to 

the Navy in the Fiscal Year 2003 Bob Stump National Defense 

Authorization Act, with lessons learned applied to the other services’ 

efforts. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 
Page 27 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

• Direct the Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities 

Engineering Command to jointly undertake an engineering study to 

resolve questions about use of residential construction practices for 

barracks and compliance with antiterrorism force protection 

requirements. 

• Direct the military services to adopt residential construction practices 

for future barracks construction projects to the maximum extent 

practical, providing that the engineering studies show that barracks 

built with residential construction practices can economically meet all 

force protection requirements. 

• Issue guidance directing that the services maximize use of required 

existing barracks space—defined as utilization that routinely 

approaches 100 percent—before authorizing unmarried junior 

members to live off base with a housing allowance. 

• Direct the military services to identify and eliminate excess barracks 

infrastructure if, by reviewing the rationale behind their barracks 

occupancy requirements, they determine that more unmarried junior 

members should be permitted to live off base with a housing 

allowance. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Director, Competitive 

Sourcing and Privatization, fully agreed with four and partially agreed with 

one of our recommendations and indicated that actions were underway or 

planned to deal with most of them. DOD stated that it was supportive of 

initiatives to energize barracks privatization and planned to build on 

lessons learned from the Navy’s pilot project to encourage barracks 

privatization. DOD also stated that it supports the study and use of 

commercial and residential construction standards and use of the 

privatization authorities to improve the living conditions for 

unaccompanied members as quickly as possible. In addition, it stated that 

the Army Corps of Engineers has already begun a study of residential 

construction methods and compliance with antiterrorism force protection 

requirements using the Fort Meade barracks project as a basis for the 

study. Further, as the first step to maximizing use of existing barracks, 

programming for new barracks, and divesting of excess infrastructure, 

DOD stated that the actual need for barracks space must be determined by 

establishing a common requirements process consistent with individual 

service missions. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to issue guidance 

directing the services to maximize use of required existing barracks space. 

DOD stated that barracks requirements must first be determined before 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 28 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

issuing such guidance. We agree that the services should maintain an 

inventory of barracks spaces only in the numbers actually required and 

that if the services were to reduce their barracks occupancy requirements 

and permit more junior members to live off base, then they could reduce 

costs by identifying and eliminating barracks space that is no longer 

needed, as DOD suggests in its comments. However, on the basis of their 

current barracks occupancy requirements and construction plans, the 

services have individually determined that most of their existing barracks 

spaces are needed. Unless stated barracks occupancy requirements are 

reduced, we believe that these spaces should be fully used before 

authorizing housing allowances for junior members to live off base and 

that additional DOD guidance is needed now to help achieve this. To do 

otherwise, results in having unused government-owned barracks spaces 

and paying housing allowances at the same time, which wastes available 

resources. 

DOD’s comments are included in appendix IV of this report. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit 

a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on 

Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A 

written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees 

on Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made 

more than 60 days after the date of this report. 
Page 29 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, and it will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions on the matters 

discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-8412, or my 

Assistant Director, Mark Little, at (202) 512-4673. Gary Phillips, Jim Ellis, 

Sharon Reid, Harry Knobler, and R.K. Wild were major contributors to this 

report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Barry W. Holman, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Our review of DOD’s housing program for unmarried servicemembers 

focused on enlisted members at their permanent assignment locations in 

the United States—after the members completed recruit and advanced 

individual training. We interviewed DOD and service headquarters housing 

officials; reviewed applicable DOD and military service policies and 

procedures; reviewed barracks improvement plans and milestones; and 

visited selected installations to view barracks conditions and discuss local 

management practices. Specifically, we visited the Naval Station Norfolk, 

Virginia; Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Marine 

Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. 

To examine opportunities for reducing costs through barracks 

privatization and the barriers to developing barracks privatization project 

proposals, we examined the laws authorizing and funding the program, 

reviewed DOD’s experiences with family housing privatization, 

interviewed DOD and service officials, and reviewed available 

documentation to identify past efforts and current plans related to 

barracks privatization. We also discussed privatization plans and 

challenges with local officials at the installations visited and discussed 

budget scoring issues for barracks privatization with officials at the Office 

of Management and Budget. 

To examine opportunities for reducing costs through adoption of 

residential construction practices for barracks construction, we reviewed 

Army studies and analyses in this area. We also obtained and compared 

selected cost information for barracks constructed using traditional 

practices and for barracks constructed using residential practices. We did 

not attempt to validate this cost information. Further, we interviewed 

service officials to discuss the services’ use of residential construction 

practices for barracks and to determine the reasons why the concept has 

not been widely adopted. We also visited Fort Meade, Maryland, to 

observe construction progress on the Army’s first barracks project that 

has incorporated residential construction practices. 

To examine opportunities for reducing costs through better utilization of 

barracks, we reviewed the services’ policies and instructions related to 

barracks use, occupancy goals, and justification for authorizing unmarried 

junior members to live off base with a housing allowance. To determine 

whether greater use of barracks could reduce housing allowance costs, we 

obtained and analyzed readily available data showing the number of 

barracks vacancies and the number of junior servicemembers living off 

base with a housing allowance on September 30, 2002. To estimate the 

potential cost reductions, we multiplied the number of members who 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

could have been assigned to the barracks vacancies by the national 

average basic allowance for housing rate. We also reviewed prior audit 

reports related to barracks utilization from military service audit 

organizations. 

We conducted our review between May 2002 and April 2003 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Photographs of Old and New 

Style Barracks and Quarters Aboard Navy 

Ships 

Page 32 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

The military services are replacing old barracks, where junior members 

often share a sleeping room with one or two others and share a gang 

latrine with occupants from several other rooms, with new barracks, 

where in most cases junior members have a private sleeping room and 

share a bath and kitchenette with one other member. The Navy’s 

“homeport ashore” initiative intends to provide barracks spaces on base 

for junior members who are currently required to live in cramped quarters 

aboard their ships even when their ships are in homeport. During our visits 

to installations, we observed a variety of barracks in conditions ranging 

from outdated to newly constructed. Figure 2 shows photographs of 

typical old and new style barracks. 

Figure 2: Old and New Style Barracks at Fort Eustis, Virginia 

At the older barracks, we saw cramped living quarters, peeling paint, 

damaged walls and ceilings, and poor heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning systems. On board ship, the space was cramped. Some 

examples of the living quarters and gang latrines in old style barracks and 

aboard ship are shown in figure 3. 

Appendix II: Photographs of Old and New 

Style Barracks and Quarters Aboard Navy 

Ships 
Appendix II: Photographs of Old and New 

Style Barracks and Quarters Aboard Navy 

Ships 

Page 33 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Figure 3: Typical Living Quarters and Gang Latrines in Old Style Barracks and Aboard Ship 

In contrast, we observed several newly constructed barracks that provided 

living quarters using the 1+1 barracks design standard. Some examples of 

the bedrooms, shared baths, and shared kitchenettes are shown in 

figure 4. 
Appendix II: Photographs of Old and New 

Style Barracks and Quarters Aboard Navy 

Ships 

Page 34 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Figure 4: Typical Living Quarters in New Style Barracks 
Appendix III: Details on Cost Differences in 

Barracks Built with Residential and 

Traditional Construction Practices 

Page 35 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Compared to traditional steel frame, concrete, and cement block 

construction, Army analyses show that use of residential construction can 

reduce typical barracks construction costs by 23 percent or more. Army 

analyses also indicate that a barrack’s total costs over its lifetime—i.e., 

initial construction costs and annual operations and maintenance costs—

would be less if constructed with residential practices. The lower “lifecycle costs” from use of residential construction practices results not only 

from the lower initial construction costs, but also from comparable 

operations and maintenance costs for many building components 

regardless of the type of construction practices used—traditional or 

residential. Use of residential construction practices to build barracks 

could also reduce renovation costs and result in additional cost reductions 

in labor construction costs. 

Army officials noted that actual differences in barracks operations and 

maintenance costs are dependent on the particular building designs. In 

general, however, the officials stated that there should be no significant 

operations and maintenance cost differences with use of either traditional 

or residential construction practices in many architectural features, such 

as exterior and interior finishes, electrical and plumbing systems, doors 

and hardware, and windows. For other building components, such as roofs 

and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, operations and 

maintenance costs could be lower with traditional construction. But, 

because of the lower initial construction costs, use of residential 

construction practices for such components could still result in lower 

costs over the life of the barracks. For example, the roof system for many 

traditionally constructed barracks consists of metal and concrete that 

would normally last for the entire life of the barracks. When using 

residential construction practices, the barracks roof system would 

normally consist of heavy-duty shingles that would require replacement 

during the life of the barracks. Yet, Army analyses show that a shingle roof 

system would have lower life-cycle costs than a metal and concrete roof 

system because of its lower initial construction costs. 

Army officials also noted that use of residential construction practices for 

barracks would result in buildings that could be renovated at lower costs 

than traditionally constructed barracks. They stated that many military 

buildings, including barracks, become functionally obsolete in 25 years or 

less because of changed missions or design standards, such as the change 

in the barracks design standard in 1995 from multi-person to private 

sleeping rooms. The costs to renovate and reconfigure a traditionally 

constructed barracks with masonry interior walls would normally be 

Appendix III: Details on Cost Differences in 

Barracks Built with Residential and 

Traditional Construction Practices 
Appendix III: Details on Cost Differences in 

Barracks Built with Residential and 

Traditional Construction Practices 

Page 36 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

greater than the costs to renovate and reconfigure a barracks built with 

residential construction practices using wood frame and sheetrock walls. 

According to Army officials, use of residential construction practices to 

build barracks could result in additional reductions in construction labor 

costs. Federal statutes, commonly referred to as the Davis-Bacon Act and 

related legislation, require that workers on most government construction 

projects be paid according to the prevailing local wage rates as determined 

by the Department of Labor. However, there are different prevailing local 

wage rate scales depending on the type of construction being performed. 

Traditionally, barracks construction has been considered commercial 

construction and the commercial wage rate scale has been used for these 

projects. In contrast, military family housing construction has been 

considered residential construction and the residential wage rate scale has 

been used for these projects. According to Army officials, the residential 

wage rate scale is normally 5 to 30 percent less than the commercial wage 

rate scale. Thus, using residential construction practices in a low-rise 

(three stories or less) barracks construction project and application of the 

residential, instead of commercial, wage rate scale, could result in 

additional reductions in barracks construction costs. 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-03-602 Military Housing 
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-03-602 Military Housing (350215) 
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