## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Wort h

___________________________ No. 02

- 23

- 00032

- CR No. 02

- 23

- 00033

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 Wise County, Tex as Trial Court No s . CR

- 82603, CR

- 83467

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Wallach, JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Chief Justic e Sud derth 

### R ICKY 

### D ON 

### M ARTINEZ 

### J R



### . , Appellant

V



### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPI NION Appellant Ricky D on Marti nez Jr. ap peals his convictions for assault causing bodily injury and for unlaw ful re straint

. See Tex. Pen al Code A n n. §§ 20.02 , 22.01(a)(1)

. He raises thre e issues on appeal : (1) the sufficiency of the evidence
i den tifying him as the perp etrator of the crim e s ; ( 2) the trial court ’ s refusal to charge the jury on assault by offensi ve cont a ct , which he claims is a lesser

- included off ense of assault causing b od ily injury; and (3) the trial court ’s admission , duri ng the punishment phase, of prior convictions that the State allegedly failed to produce in
violation of the Michael Morton Act , s e e Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14.
B ecause (1) the re was sufficient evidence of Marti nez ’ s identity , ( 2) assault by contact
is not a lesser

- include d offense of assault causing bodily injury as charged , and (3) Martinez failed to preserve his Michael Morton Act challenge , we will affirm.
I. B a ckgroun d
M artinez ’ s two crimes

— assault and unlawfu l restrain t

— stem from a single incident involving Mir na Rodriguez

. Rodriguez met Martinez on Faceb oo k , and the two began a romantic
relation sh ip about two weeks before the incident

. On the night of the incident, Rodriguez

— who wor ked an d lived at a Road way Inn

— walked with Martinez to his
house

. W hen they arr ived at his house , the c oup le went int o his bed room and had

s ex. A round 1:00 a.m., Rodrig uez to ld M a rtinez t hat she n eeded to go home because she had work the next morning

. A s she was putting her clothes on, “ a ll [of] the3 s udden he hit [her] in the head and

. . . just came at [h er] ,” “ saying bad words [ and] cussing at [h er ].” According to Ro drigue z , Martinez accused her of not being fai thful
and “ thought [she] had somebody at the hotel waiting f or [her]. ” 1
A fter about an hour o f Mart inez ’s hitting and cu rsing at Rodrigue z while she
continued to tell him she wanted to lea ve , she “ tried to j ump out [of] his window[,] but he grabbed [her] arm ” and came out of the wind ow with her

. Martinez f ollowed
Rodr iguez and continue d “ cussing at [her] and threatening [her ]” as she walked back
to the Road way Inn. Finally, she told him s he forgave him and would not report h im to the pol ice , so he “ gave [her] a hug ” and left

. Later that day, Rodriguez ’s friend took her to the police station to report the
incident

. Rodriguez’s friend identified Martinez by name, and Rodriguez confir med his identity from a photo graph and told the police where he lived

. A jury convicted Mar tinez of a ssau lt causing bodily injury and unlawful
restraint. 2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 20.02 (a) , 22.0 1(a)(1)

. After the parties presented punishment evidence —i ncluding four certi fied j udgments of Marti nez ’ s

1 The jury saw photograph s of Rodriguez ’s injuri es, and Rodriguez e xplaine d that the b ruises on her a rms were “ [w]here he was holding [

her so she] w ouldn ’t run ,” and the cuts on her face and b ruises on her back were from Martinez ’s hi tting he r with a cl osed fist

.

2 The State amended the information char ging Martinez with bodily -i njury assault to allege th at the assault was committed against a person with whom M artinez had a dating re lationship

. This allegation was omitted from the jury charge , though

.4 prior convictions

— the trial court sentenced him to 365 days ’ confinement for each
offense

. See id. §§ 12.21(2) , 20.02( c) , 22.01( b).
II
. Discussion
I n his first issue, Martinez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identi fying
him as the perp etrator of the crim es. A. Suffi ci ency of the Evidence Ident ifying M a rtinez
Martin ez claims that the State did not distinguish between him

— Ricky Don
Ma rtinez Jr.

— and his father

— Ricky Don M ar tinez Sr.— which, acc ording to Martinez, cr eated “ problematic ” ambiguities. 3 An d although Rodriguez ide ntified
Martinez and confirmed that her assaila nt was “ the D efendant ,” he argues t hat she

“ d[id] not have a strong grasp of legal term s, legal procedures, or of the English language ” so it is unc lear w het her she understood who th e term “D efendant ” referred

to
. 1. Standa rd of Review In our evidentiary

- sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational f actfind er cou ld have f ound
th e crime’ s esse ntial elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) ; Balderas v. State , 517 S.W.3d 756, 765

– 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

. An esse ntial element of any crime is the def endant ’s ide ntity; the

3 Martinez lived with his p ar ents and his daughter

.5 State m ust pr ove that the defendant is the person who committed the charged
offense. Ward v. State , No. 02

- 19

- 00246

- CR, 2021 WL 386936, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Feb. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., no t designated for publi cation); A nderso n

v. S tate , No. 05

- 16

- 01 157

- CR , 2017 WL 5897903, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Nov. 29, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. o p., not designated for publication). A de fendant ’ s identi t y may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence and by reasonable infe rences fro m that evide nc e. Balderas , 5 1 7 S.W.3d at 766 ; Meeks v. State , 897 S.W.2d 950, 95 4–55 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)

. The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to testimonial evidence

. Balderas , 517 S.W.3d at 766 ; Merritt v. St ate , 36 8 S.W. 3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

. Evidence of identification is sufficie nt to support a conviction if “from a totality of the circumstances the jury was adequately apprised that the witnesses were referring to [ the defendant ]. ” Rohlfing v. Stat e , 612 S. W.2d 598, 601 ( Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) ; Anderson , 2017 WL 5897903, at *4 ; Momentoff v. State , No. 02

- 12

- 00335

- CR, 20 13 WL 5967107, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Nov. 7, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for public ation); Purkey v. S tat e , 656 S.W.2d 519, 52 0 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 1983, pet. ref’d)

. 2
. Evidence Identi fying Ma rtinez
While Martinez concedes that Rodriguez identified him at trial by name and descriptor ( as opposed to by pointing at him or describing an article of cl othing he

was w earing at trial ), h e claims that this is in sufficient becau se (1) he share s a name6 with his father ; and (2) according to M a rtinez, Rodrigu ez did not understand the

“ Defendant ” d escriptor she was using

. First, as to the shared name, the jury could n ot hav e been confused because
Marti nez ’ s father ’ s name was never mentioned at trial

. And while the two men may ha ve lived at the same house , there is no evidence that his father played any role in the

event s at issue, apart from his potential presence els ewhere in the ho use on the n i ght
of th e incident

. 4 Plus , Rodriguez provided circumstantial d escriptors of her
assailan t— such as th e fact that h e shared a home wi th his parents a nd daughter

— and

t hose descriptors were not true of Ma rti nez ’s father. And Mar tinez ’ s mother testified
that it was her son

— not her husband

— who brought Rodriguez into the h ouse and spent the e vening alone with her in his bedroom

. Our sister court reject ed a name

- confusion argument almost identical to
Ro driguez ’s in Purkey v. State

. 656 S.W.2d at 520

. In that case , the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to identify him as the perpetrator because non e of
the w itnesses identified him in court , “ such as [by] pointing a t [him] o r describin g his attire, ” a nd because “ his le gal name [w as] ‘ James Otis Purkey, Jr., ’ [so] any references

. . . to a ‘ Jimmy Purkey ’ or ‘ Mr. Purkey ’ could have been references to his
father o r som e other individual b y that name . ” Id. The Be aumont Court of Appeals

4 Rodriguez tes t ified th at Martinez ’s father was leaving the house when she arrive d, but Ma rtinez ’s mother testified that her husband was in the living ro om watching TV w ith her while Rodriguez was at the house

.7 no ted th at the name used to in troduc e Purkey to the jury —“ James Otis Purkey ”—

was the name on the indictment and the name on the jury charge

. Id. Although h e

was refer enced as “Mr. Purkey, ” “Jimmy Purkey, ” “Jim my , ” o r “defen dant ”
th rough out the trial, he was the only person on trial for the offens e, and the

c omplainant testified “ that she had known the defendant [ for ] many years and that he
had r aped her

. ” Id. While the court of appe als acknowledged that “i t is always a desirable practice to have a witness gi ve an in [-] court identifi cation of the defendant beyond a mere reference to him or her by name , . . . the Code of Cri minal Procedure does not require this ritua l,” and “ in this cont ext, there could have be en no doubt i n any of the juro r’s minds as to whom each of the witnesses w as refer ring

. . . when using one of the stated names [or terms]

. ” Id. Consequently, “the lac k of a formal in[

- ]court identification beyond the mere referenc e to the def endant by name[] did not
render the evidence insufficient to esta blish appella nt ’s id entity as the alleged criminal
perpetrator. ” Id. Similarly here, t he jury was presented w ith o nly one R i cky Don Mart inez

. The jury was introduc ed to him at t he start of voir dire as “Ricky D o n Martinez ,” it heard
the State read th e two charges against “R icky Don Martinez , Jr. , Defendant ,” and it
heard Martinez ent er pleas to these char ges . Rodriguez then confirmed for the jury
that she knew “ Ricky D on M a rtinez , Jr. , ” that h e was in the courtroom, that he was

“ the D efen dant ,” and t hat he was the one who h ad assau lted and restrain ed her

. Although Martinez w as referred to as “Mr. Martinez, ” “Ricky, ” “ Ricky Martinez, ” and8 “the defendant ” at dif ferent points during trial, “ in this context, t here could have been

no doubt i n any of the j uror ’ s minds as to whom each of the witnes ses was referring to when using one of the stated names [or terms ].” Id. He was the only one o n trial
and

— despite the fact that he sh ared a name with hi s father

—he was the only relevant
actor refe rred to at trial as Ricky Do n Martine z, so there was no need to continuously distinguish between him and other in dividual s who might have shared his first name ,
surname, or both. S ee Meeks , 897 S.W.2d at 95 4–55 (holding evidence of identification
sufficien t despite lack of in

- co urt identific ati on when compla inant named perpetrat or

as b abysitter “Johnny ” and complainant ’s parents identified babysitter as defendant ).
Martinez also argues, though, that Rodriguez “ do es not have a strong grasp of legal terms

. . . or of the En glish language ,” so alth oug h she confirmed that her
assailant was “ the Defendant, ” Martine z questions whether Rodriguez knew which
person t he word “D e fendant ” referred to.
But the entirety of Rodriguez ’s testimony was in English

. While sh e ad mitted
tha t she “d[i d]n ’t know how to read [English] that well and

. . . d[id]n ’t know how to
write that well ei ther , ” her testimony demonstrates that she was able t o verbally
communicate in English. The word “D ef endant ” was used verbally ; Rodriguez was not asked t o conduct a n in

- court id entifica tion by reading or writing in English

. To
the extent that Mar tine z argues “ that another person, and not he, was identified by the
State ’ s witness [ through Rodriguez ’s use of the term “Defendant , ”]

. . . it was incumbent upon him, by ob jection to t he ident ification procedure employed

. . . , to9 preser ve the issue by making same part of the record. ” 5 Rohlfing , 612 S.W.2d at 60 1.
Oth erwise, Mart inez ’s challenge to the credibility of Rodriguez ’s English
communication was a jur y issue , and “ we will no t second

- guess the jury ’ s assessment of the credibility and weight of witness testimony

. ” Balderas , 517 S.W.3d at 76 5– 67 (overruli ng sufficiency cha llenge to identification of defendant ); see Meeks , 897 S.W.2d

at 95 5 ( recognizing t hat lack of in

- court ide ntificat ion at trial “ goes only to the weight
and cr edibility of the witnesses and was before the jury for their conside ration ”) ; cf.

5 M artinez sugges ts , for example, that a nother individual c ould ha ve been present at defense counsel ’s table , and Rodriguez could have been referring to that other individual as the defendant

. T here was no record of any such presence or c onfusion , though, and to the exten t that Martinez seeks to rely upon it, it was inc u mbent upon him to make it a part of the record. See Rohlfin g

, 612 S.W.2d at 601

. Although Ma rtinez was not required to object at trial to preserv e his sufficiency complai nt for appel late rev iew, he was r equired to present a reco rd that enable s us to cond u ct that review

. See i d. ( rejecting c hallenge to identification when witnesses described article of clothing perpetrator was wearing at trial ; noting that , “[i] f it be appe llant ’s contention that another person, and not he [] was identified by the State ’s
w

itnesses

. . . it was incumbent upon him, by objection

. . . or by an offer of a bill of exception

. . . to preserve the issue by making same part of the record ”) ; cf. Amador v. State , 221 S.W.3d 666, 675 (Tex. Crim. Ap p. 2007) ( noting that, altho ugh St at e bore burden of proof below , appellant b ore “ burden to bring forward a record on appeal sufficient to show that the trial court erred in [its] ruling on the motion to suppress ”) ; McDougal v. State , 105 S. W.3d 119, 121 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 2003, p et. ref’ d) ( recognizing in plea context that “ an appellant in a criminal case must bring forth a complete record ”)

. We will not pres ume the exis tence of a de fendant ’s hypothetical courtr o om scenario absent some i ndi cation in the record t hat the hypothetic al
scena r io in fact existed

. See Rohlfin g

, 612 S.W.2d at 601 ( noting that , “ [a]bsent any indication

. . . that the jury may have been misled by the in

- court identification procedu re, we will not presume that som e person other than appel lant may have been identif i ed ”) ; cf. Ex parte Wilson , 716 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (op. on reh ’g) (r ecognizing “ the presumption of the regularity of the judgment of conviction and the proceed ings absent a showing to t he contrary ”).10 Jordan v. State , 500 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Cri m. Ap p. 1973) ( rejecting argument that
defendant was singled out for in

- cour t identi fication because he sat at defense
counsel ’s table and stating that “ the accuracy of the witnesses ’ identificati on can be
tested on cross

- examination, and any taint arising from a defendant ’s presence with
his attorney can be thereby expose d ”).
O n this r ecord, there was thus sufficient evidence for a reasonable j ury to

conc lude that Martinez

— that is, Ricky Don M a rtinez Jr.— was the perpetrator of the
crimes

. 6 We overrule his first issue

. B
. Jury Instruction on Offensiv e-Contact Assault
Martine z next c ontends that the trial court erred by refus ing to charge the jury

on offensive

- contact assault because, accor ding to him , assault by offens iv e contact is

a lesser -i ncluded offe nse of assault c ausing bod ily injury and ther e is some evidence
that his actions a mount ed to the former rather t han the latter

. 1. Standard of Review
For a def endant to be entit led to a jury instruction on a less er

- included offense,

t he elements of the lesser

- included offense must be included within the proof

6 B ecaus e Martinez contends that “i dentity was n ot esta blished ,” he claims
cau sation was not established either. A ssuming that Martinez adequately brief ed this issu e, our reso lution of his iden ti fication challenge disposes of his causatio n challenge
as well. See Tex. R. App. P. 38 .1 (i) , 4 7.1.11 necess ary to e stablish the charge d offense’s elements

. 7 State v. Meru , 414 S.W.3d 159,
161

– 62 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2013); Hal l v. State , 225 S.W.3d 524, 528, 535

– 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. This is a legal question that compares the elements of the offense as alleged in th e inform ation with the elements of the requested lesser offense. Meru , 414 S.W.3d at 162 ; Hall , 225 S.W.3d at 535

. To establish the e lements of assault causing bodily injury, the S t ate was required to prove that Martinez “ intenti onally, knowingly, or re cklessly cause[d] b odily injury to [Rodriguez ], ” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a )(1) , which the information

a lleged he did by “ striking [her] with [ his ] hand on the face

. ” Meanwhile, the elements
of the requested lesser offense

— assa ult by offensive con tact

— would h ave required
the State to prove that Martinez “ intentionally or knowingly cause [d] p hysical contact
with [Rodriguez] when [ he ] kn [ew] or should reasonably [have] believe [d] that [ she ]

w [ould] regard the contact as offensive or provo cative. ” I d. § 22.01(a) (3).

7 Even if t he elemen ts of the lesser

- included offense are included within the proof necess ary to establish the charged offense’s elements , an instruction on the lesser

- includ ed offense is only warrant ed if “a rational jury co uld find that, if t he defe n dant is guilty, he is gu ilty only of the lesser offense. ” State v. Meru , 414 S.W.3d 159, 16 3 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 2013)

. We do not reach the latter s tep of th e ana lysis , tho ugh

. See Te x. R. App. P. 47.1.12 2
. Offensive -Contact Assault No t a Lesser

- Included Offense
T he Court of Crim inal A ppeals has held that , generally, offens ive

- co ntact
assault is not a lesser

- included offense of bodily

- injury assault

. McKithan v. State , 3 24 S.W.3d 582, 591

– 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

. In Mc Kithan , one of t he defendant s wa s char ged with assault causing bodily injury by kic king the complaina nt, and he

— like Martinez

— argu ed that offensive

contact assault was a lesser

- included offense and was erroneously omitted from th e jury charge

. Id. at 591

. But the Court of C riminal Appe als re jected that argument

. Id.

a t 591

– 94. Because the State was not required to prove offensive

- contact assault ,

“ i.e., that appellant knew or shoul d reasonably ha ve believed that the complainant

wo uld regard this contact as offensive ,” to estab lish its charge of assault caus ing bodily injury, “i.e., that appellant caused the complainant bodily injury by kicking ,” t he
Court of Criminal Appeals held that offens ive

- co ntac t assault was not a lesser

i ncluded offense of bodily

- injury assa ult

. McKithan , 324 S.W.3d at 591 ; see Tex. Penal
C ode An n. §§ 22.02(a) (1), (3)

. The same is true here

. To prove the charg ed offense, the State was required to
offer evidence that Marti nez “ intentionally, know ingly, o r reckles sly ca u sed bodily injury to Mirna Rod riguez

. . . by striking [her] wit h [ his ] hand on the face , causing pain

. ” Se e Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). T he State was n ot required to

esta blish t hat Martinez knew or reaso nably should have known th at Rodriguez would
consider the contact offen s ive or provocative

. Comp are id. § 22.01(a) (1) , with id.13 § 22.01( a)(3)

. Althou gh Martinez argues that there was ev idence Rodriguez
considered the cont act of fensive, “[t] he relev ant inquiry is not what the evid ence may show but what the State is required to prove to establish the charged offense. ”
McKithan , 324 S.W.3d at 593

. Again, the State was required t o prove th at Martinez

“ cause [d ] b odily injury to [Rodriguez ], ” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a )(1) , so as long

as Martinez ’s strike caused bo dily i njury , it was ir relevant whether the contact was offensive

. See McKithan , 324 S.W.3d at 59 1.

“ Because a ssault by contac t is not established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establ ish the commission of assault causing bodily inju ry, assault by contact . . . i s not, under the circumstances of t his case, a lesser

- included offense of assault causing bodily injury

. ” Wel sh v. State , No. 2- 08

- 169

- CR, 2 009 WL
14251 94, at *2 (Tex. App.

— For t Worth Ma y 21 , 2009) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for pu blication) , aff ’d sub nom. , McKithan , 324 S.W.3d at 591

– 94

. We
overrule Martinez ’ s second issue. 8

8 It is un clear whether Ma r tinez intends to ar gue tha t assault by offens ive contact is a lesser

- included offense of unlawf ul restraint as well

. The S tate understands Martinez to be making th is argument, but Ma rtinez does not discuss the
e lem ents of unlawful restraint in his brief

— at l east not in the portion of his b rief
re levant to this issue

— much less does Martinez compare the elements of unlawful restra int to those of offensive

- contact a ssa ult

. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. §§ 20.02(a), 22. 01(a)(3)

. Nonethe l ess, to the extent that Mar tinez intends to raise this argument, a nd assuming without deciding that he adequately briefed it , see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 ( i) , it is meritless. To prove un lawful restra int , the S tate was required to establish that14 C
. Preservation of Mic hael Morton Act Objection
In his third and final issue, Martinez ar gues tha t the trial court erred b y admitting his prio r judgments of conviction during the punishment phase

. T he State

gave timely notice of its intent to use Marti nez ’s prior convictions , see Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 37.07 , § 3 (g) ; Tex. R. Evid. 40 4( b) , bu t he claim s that the
Michael Mo rton Act require d the State to produce copies of the prior judgments of
convict ion before trial as well , and because the S t at e a ll egedly failed to provide such copies , the judgments should have been excluded

. See Tex . Code C rim. Proc. Ann.

a rt. 39.14. Martinez did not raise this objection at trial , though

. 1. Standard of Review To preserve a Mich ael Morton Act complaint for our review, a party must
present the timely , specific c omplain t to the trial court , and th e complai nt on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the trial court

. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); see Rodriguez v. State , 553 S.W.3d 733, 746 (Tex. App.

— Amarill o 2018, no pet.) (“ [T] he statutory right s created by [A] rticle 39.14 [] are neither syst emic or fundame ntal, [s o] they are subject to waiver by failing to properly object to their alleged violation. ”);
Glover v. State , 496 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, p e t. ref’d)

Martinez “in tent ionally or know ingly restra in[e d]” Rodri guez
. Te x. Penal Code Ann

. § 2 0.02(a). The S tate was not required to show that Ma rtinez “ cause [d] physical
co nta ct w ith [Rodriguez ],” nor was it required to show that he knew or should have known that she would “re gard the contact as offensi ve or provoca tive. ” Id

. § 22.01(a)( 3).15 (holding defendant failed to pr eserve Article 39.14 com plaint ) ; s ee also L ovill v. State , 319 S.W.3d 687, 691

– 92 (Tex. C rim. App. 2009 ) ( “ A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at
trial

. ” ).
2
. Failure to Pre serve Michael Mort on Act Objecti o n
D uring the punishment phase, the State offered i nto evidence four certified judgments of Martinez ’s prior co nviction s . Martinez objected to th ese exhibi t s, telling
the trial court that he had not been provided with c opi es of the documen ts a nd that

“ th e local r ules require [d] their produ ction seven days before trial

. ” M artinez did not identify the local rule he had in mind, and

— more to the po int

— he did not mention
the Michael Morton Act at all

. B ecause the State had giv en timely notice of its intent

t o use Ma rtinez ’ s extraneous offenses, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. a rt. 37.07 , § 3 (g) ; Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b) , the trial court overrul ed his objection under the l ocal

r ules

. Martinez th en reiterated his objection

— again wi thout reference to the M ichael
M orton Act

. Moments after the trial court overruled M a rtinez ’s objection, the S t ate

a sked him to stipulate to the certified judgments, and he instead reurged his object ion
that “ [ t ] he local rules of this Court require the S t ate to
. . . give us the se thing s seven days prior to trial , ” noting that the uni dentified section of the local rules was not conditioned on a defendant ’s request

. The trial court stood b y its ruling , explaining16 that it considered “notice being give n b y 404 (b) [to be ] sufficie nt ” becaus e the judgments were “public record [s] .” 9
Now o n appeal, Martinez complains that the trial court ’ s admissio n of the four
certified judgments vi olated the Michael Morton Act

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 3 9.14. But th e Michael Morton Ac t is di sti nct from a trial court ’ s l ocal r ules , so

“ the legal basis of th e complaint [Martinez] raise [s] on app eal varies from the complaint [he] made at trial .” Lovill , 319 S.W.3d at 691

– 92

. Martinez thus forfeited
his Mi chael M orton Act complaint by fa il ing to b ring it to the trial court ’s attention.
See Smith v. State , No . 03

- 17

- 00694

- CR, 2019 WL 2426595, at *11 (Tex. Ap p.

— Austin June 11, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not des ignated for publication) ( holding that
because “ appel lant failed to r aise his complaint concerning the record keeping requirements of the Michael Morto n Act with the trial court [,]

. . . he failed to
preserve these complaints ”); Rodriguez , 553 S.W.3d at 74 6 ( holding appella nt failed to
preserve allege d Artic le 39.14 error because he “ only obj ected to the State ’ s un timely request to submit [the challenged evidence] during the punishment ph ase based upon an alleged violation of the pretrial discovery order ”); Glover , 496 S.W.3d at 816 ( holding that “e ven if app ellant had complied with th e requirements of [A] rticle 39.14,
h e forfeited his complaint by faili n g to bring it to the attention of the trial court ”).

9 Only later, when the State o ffered a d ifferent publi c record into e vi dence

— a dea th c ertificate

— did Martinez mention the Michael Morton Act

. And in that instance , the trial court sus tain ed the objec tion , and the d ea th cer tific ate was ex cluded.17 B ecause Martinez did not preserve his Michael Morton Act challenge, w e overrule his final issue.
II I
. Conclusion
H aving overrul e d Martine z ’s three issues, we affirm the trial court ’s judgments

. S ee T ex. R. App. P. 43.2(a). /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonn ie Sudde rth Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered : N ovember 16, 2023