,/’ I 

THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION 

1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425 

ARLINGTON, VA 22209 

703-696-0504 ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN 

COMMISSIONERS: 

AL CORNELLA 

REBECCA COX 

GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET) 

S. LEE KLlNG 

RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, USN (RET) 

MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RETI 

WEND1 LOUISE STEELE 

July 1, 1995 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, D.C. 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

We are pleased to submit the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment report for your 

consideration. This report contains the Commission’s findings and recommendations based on a 

thorough review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense together 

with the Commission’s recommendations for closure and realignment of military installations 

within the United States. 

Over the past four months, the Commission has reviewed thousands of pages of testimony 

and written documentation. We held 16 regional hearings across the country, visited 167 military 

activities, and met with hundreds of local community groups. In 13 hearings in Washington, 

D.C., we received expert testimony from Department of Defense officials, the General 

Accounting Office and Members of Congress. All of the Commission’s activities and all of the 

documentation used by the Commission were open to the public. 

The decision to close a military installation is a painful one. Every installation 

recommended for closure or realignment has enjoyed a proud history and offered a priceless 

service to our nation. Our review indicates that, with a concerted effort, communities can recover 

fiom the impact of a base closure, but we realize that our recommendations will result in 

economic hardship for many families and communities. We also realize that it is essential to our 

national security that we reduce our defense infrastructure in a careful, deliberate way. We 

believe our recommendations will help the military services maintain readiness, modernize their 

forces and preserve the force structure necessary to protect our nation’s vital interests in the 

future. 

The Commission has also included some recommendations in this report regarding the 

post-closure activities of the federal government concerning military installations, as well as some 

ideas on how to address base closings in the future. 
This third and final report of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

brings to a close a unique and, in our view, remarkably successful experiment in open, 

participatory government. 

Rebecca G. Cop 

Commissioner 

s. Lee Kling U 

Commissioner 

n 

Alton W. Cornelia 

Commissioner fl 

GEN dmes B. Davis, USAF (Ret.) 

Commissioner 

WendiL. Steele 

Commissioner 
r' b--i 

i %/ 

5 

/- 

---'I 
8 
~ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

OF 1995 

ASE CLOSURE 

IGNMENT 

N ACTIONS 

Name 

o-Medical Research Lab, Fort 

Aviation-Troop Command 

(ATCOM), MO 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY 

Bergstrom AFB, TX 

Big Coppett Key, FL 

h US. Disciplinary Barracks, 

Lompoc, CA 

Camp Bonneville, WA 

Camp Kilmer, NJ 

Camp Pedricktown, NJ 

Chicago O'Hare IAP ARS, IL 

Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, MD 

DCMC International, Dayton, OH 

DCMD South, Marietta, GA 

DCMD West, El Segundo, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Memphis, TN 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Ogden, UT 

Defense Distribution Depot 

San Antonio, TX 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Detroit Arsenal, MI 

East Fort Baker, CA 

Eglin AFB, FL 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Letterkenny, PA 

Charleston, SC 

Oakland, CA 

Number 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

Name 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Holabird, MD 

Fort Hunter Liggett, CA 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Meade, MD 

Fort Missoula, MT 

Fort Pickett, VA 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Fort Totten, NY 

Grand Forks AFB, ND 

Griffiss AFB, 10th Infantry Airfield 

Griffiss AFB, 485th Engineering 

Hill AFB, UT 

Hingham Cohasset, MA 

Homestead ARB, 301st Rescue 

H'omestead ARB, 726th Air Control 

Information Systems Software Center, VA 

Investigations Control & Automation 

Kelly AFB, TX 

Kelly Support Center, PA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Lowry AFB, CO 

M,acDill AFB, FL 

M,almstrom AFB, MT 

MCAS, El Toro, CA 

MCAS, Tustin, CA 

McClellan AFB, CA 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ 

NAS, Agana, Guam 

NAS, Alameda, CA 

NAS, Barbers Point, HI 

support, NY 

Installation Group, NY 

Squadron, FL 

Squadron, FL 

Directorate, MD 
Number 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

95 

Name 

NAS, Cecil Field, FL 

NAS, Corpus Christi, TX 

NAS, Key West, FL 

NAS, South Weymouth, MA 

Nav. CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, 

In-Service, East Coast Det., Norfolk, VA 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater 

Sound Reference Det., Orlando, FL 

Naval Security Group Command 

Detachment, Washington, DC 

Naval Activities, Guam 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AJS 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL 

Naval Aviation Engineering Services 

Unit, Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, 

New Orleans, LA 

Naval CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, 

San Diego, CA 

Naval CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, 

Warminster, PA 

Naval Information Systems Management 

Center, Arlington, VA 

Naval Medical Research Institute, 

Bethesda, MD 

Naval Management System Support 

Office, Chesapeake, VA 

Naval Personnel Research & 

Development Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Recruiting Command, 

Washington, DC 

Naval Sea Systems Command, 

Arlington, VA 

Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL 

Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA 

NAWC, Aircraft Division, Open Water 

NAWC, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, IN 

NAWC, Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk 

NSWC, Louisville, KY 

NSWC, Carderock Detachment, 

Annapolis, MD 

Philadelphia, PA 

Test Facility, Oreland, PA 

Detachment, Philadelphia, PA 

Number 

96 

97 

98 

99 

100 

101 

102 

103 

104 

105 

106 

107 

108 

109 

110 

111 

112 

113 

114 

115 

116 

117 

118 

119 

120 

121 

122 

123 

124 

125 

126 

127 

128 

129 

130 

131 

132 

Name 

NSWC, Dahlgren Division Detachment, 

White Oak, MD 

Nuclear Power Propulsion Training 

Center, Orlando, FL 

NUWC, Keyport, WA 

NUWC, Newport Division, 

New London, CT 

Oakland Army Base, CA 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA 

Onizuka AGS, CA 

Ontario IAP AGS, CA 

Public Works Center, Guam 

Publications Distribution Center, 

Baltimore, MD 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer 

Processor Activity, Buffalo, NY 

Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Reese AFB, TX 

Reserve Center Santa Ana, Irvine, CA 

Reserve Center, Cadillac, MI 

Readiness Command Region 7, CharlesReserve Center, Huntsville, AL 

Reserve Center, Laredo, TX 

Readiness Command Region 10, 

Air Reserve Center, Olathe, KS 

Reserve Center, Pomona, CA 

Reserve Center, Sheboygan, WI 

Reserve Center, Staten Island, NY 

Reserve Center, Stockton, CA 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA 

Roslyn AGS, NY 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL 

Seneca Army Depot, NY 

Ship Repair Facility, Guam 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Space & Naval Warfare Systems 

Command, Arlington, VA 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT 

Sudbury Training Annex, MA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, 

Williams AFB, A2 

ton, SC 

New Orleans, LA 

Long Beach, CA 
E 

livelihood of their communities. 

The undeniable fact remains, however, that U.S. 

military requirements have been fundamentally 

altered. The end of the Cold War, combined with 

the growing urgency to reduce the Federal budget 

deficit, compels the United States to reduce and 

realign its military forces. To reduce the number 

of military installations in the United States, and to 

ensure the impartiality of the decision-making 

process, Congress enacted the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 

101-510, as amended). 

Signed by President George Bush on November 

5, 1990, this Act established the independent 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC). The Commission was established 

“to provide a fair process that will result in the 

timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.” Authorized to meet 

only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995, 

the Commission’s authority expires on December 

31, 1995. (See Appendix F). 

Because this is the third and final round under 

Public Law 101-510, the 1995 Commission is 

proud to have the opportunity to bring this process to a successful and prudent conclusion and 

to make suggestions regarding the future. The 

Commission has taken the approach that the base 

closure process should not be simply a budget 

cutting exercise. Base closures must be undertaken to reduce our nation’s defense infrastructure 

in a deliberate way that will improve long-term 

military readiness and ensure that taxpayer dollars 

are spent in the most efficient way possible. The 

Commission’s challenge was to develop a list of 

base closures and realignments that allows the 

Defense Department to maintain readiness, modernize our military, and preserve the force levels 

needed to maintain our security. The Commission 

believes that it has met this challenge. 

In compliance with the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990, the Secretary of Defense 

submitted a list of proposed military base closures 

and realignments to the Commission on February 

28, 1995. The Secretary’s 1995 recommended 

actions affected 146 domestic military installations, 

including 33 major closures, 26 major realignments, and an additional 27 changes to prior 

base closure round decisions, or “redirects.” (See 

Appendix I). The statute also required the Secretary of Defense to base all recommendations on a 

force-structure plan submitted to Congress with 

the Department’s FY 1996 budget request and on 

selection criteria developed by the Secretary of 

Defense and approved by Congress. For the 1995 

Commission process, the Secretary of Defense 

announced that the selection criteria would be 

identical to those used during the 1991 and 1993 

base closure rounds. 
1995 DoD Force-Structure Plan 

Army Divisions 

Active 

Reserve 

Active 

Reserve 

Marine Corps Divisions 

Aircraft Carriers 

Reserve Carriers 

Carrier Airwings 

Active 

Reserve 

Battle Force Ships 

Air Force Fighters 

Active 

Reserve 

Active 

Reserve 

Air Force Bombers 

FYI994 

13 

8 

3 

1 

12 

11 

2 

387 

978 

795 

139 

12 

DoD Personnel (End strength in thousands) 

Active Duty 

-Y 543 

Navy 468 

Marine Corps 174 

Air Force 426 

TOTAL 1,611 

Reserves and 

Civilians 

National Guard 997 

913 

FYI997 

10 

8 

3 

1 

11 

1 

10 

1 

363 

936 

504 

104 

22 

495 

408 

1 74 

385 

1,462 

w4 

79!9 

10 

8 

3 

1 

11 

1 

10 

1 

344 

936 

504 

103 

26 

495 

394 

174 

382 

1,445 

893 

759 

I 

1995 DoD Selection Criteria Return on Investment 

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and 

savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure 

or realignment, for the savings to exceed the 

costs. 

Military Value 

1. The current and future mission requirements 

and the impact on operational readiness of the 

Department of Defense’s total force. 

2. The availability and condition of land, facilities 

and associated airspace at both existing and 

potential receiving locations. 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at 

both existing and potential receiving locations. 

Impal:ts 

6. The economic impact on communities. 

7. The ability of both the existing and potential 

receiving communities’ infrastructure to support 

forces, missions and personnel. 

4. The cost and manpower implications. 8. The environmental impact. 

X 
Upon receipt of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the Commission is required to 

hold public hearings on the recommendations 

before making any findings. To change any of 

the Secretary’s recommendations, Public Law 101- 

510 requires the Commission to find substantial 

deviation from the Secretary’s force-structure plan 

and the final criteria approved by Congress. 

Like previous DBCRC rounds, the 1995 

Commission‘s process was a model of open government. Its recommendations resulted from an 

independent review of the Secretary of Defense’s 

recommendations, without political or partisan 

influence. As part of its review and analysis process, the Commission solicited information from a 

wide variety of sources. Most importantly, communities affected by the recommendations played 

a major role in the Commission’s process. Every 

major site proposed for closure or realignment 

was visited by at least one commissioner. These 

visits enabled the commissioners to gain a firsthand look at the installations. Commissioners also 

heard from members of the public about the 

effect that closures would have on local communities. The Commission held 13 investigative hearings, conducted 206 fact-finding visits to 167 

military installations and activities, held 16 

regional hearings nationwide, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress, and received thousands of letters from concerned citizens from 

across the country. All meetings were open to the 

public. All data received by the Commission, as 

well as all transcripts of Commission hearings, 

were available for public review. Throughout the 

process, the Commission staff members maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with communities, and met with community representatives 

at the Commission offices, during base visits, and 

during regional hearings. 

At the Commission’s investigative hearings, Commissioners questioned senior military and civilian 

officials of the Defense Department directly 

responsible for the Secretary’s recommendations. 

Defense and base closure experts within the Federal government, private sector, and academia 

provided an independent assessment of the base 

closure process and the potential impacts of the 

Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. Public 

Law 101-510, as amended, also requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to evaluate DOD’s 

selection process and recommendations, and provide the Commission and Congress a report containing their detailed analysis of the process by 

April 15, 1995. GAO testified before the Commission on April 17, 1995, presenting its findings and 

recommendations, All of the Commission’s hearings and deliberations were held in public. Many 

were broadcast on national television (see Appendices 0 and PI. 

Based on military installation visits, hearings, and 

its review and analysis, the Commission voted to 

consider alternatives and additions to the 

Secretary’s list. On March 7, 1995, and again on 

May 10, 1995, the Commission voted to consider a 

total of 32 installations as possible alternatives and 

additions to the 146 bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense 

(see Appendix I). 

Communitiles that contributed to our country’s 

national selcurity by hosting a military facility for 

many years should rest assured their concerns 

were heard, carefully reviewed, and analyzed. The 

Commission would also like to reassure communities there can be life after a base is closed. Economic recovery is, however, in large part 

dependent upon a concerted community effort to 

look towards the future. The same dedicated 

effort expended by communities over the last several months to save their bases should be redirected towards building and implementing a reuse 

plan that will revitalize the community and the 

local economy. 

The Department of Defense Office of Economic 

Adjustment (OEA) was established to help conmunities affected by base closures, as well as 

other defense program changes. The OEA’s principal objective is to help the communities affected 

by base closures to maintain or restore economic 

stability. According to an OEA survey, approximately 158,000 new jobs were created between 

1961 and 1992 to replace nearly 93,000 jobs lost 

as a result of base closures. The OEA has also 

been working with 47 communities located near 

bases recommended for closure by the 1988 

and 1991 Commissions, and has provided $20 

million in grants to help communities develop reuse plans. 

As part of the 1995 Commission’s interest in postclosure activities, the Commission also reviewed 

and developed recommendations on how to 

improve the Federal government’s performance in 

the area of conversion and reuse of military installations. The 1988, 1991, and 1993 base closure 

rounds have resulted in more than 70 major, and 

almost 200 smaller, base closings. The Federal 

EXECET~VE SUMMARY xi 
government has an obligation to assist local cornmunities in the challenge of replacing the base in 

the local economy. The Comrmss . ion held two 

hearings in which local elected officials, private 

sector groups, and officials from the Feded government presented testimony on post-closure 

activities of the Federal government, and includes 

its findings and recommendatiofls in chapter 2 of 

this report. 

The commissioners selected for the 1995 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment CormntSsKM have 

diverse backgrounds in public service, business, 

and the military (see Appendix Q). In accordance 

with Public Law 101-510, as amended, two commissioners were nominated in consultation with 

the Speaker of the US. House of Representatives, 

two in consultation with the U.S. Senate Majority 

Leader, and one commissimner with the advice of 

each of the Minority Leaden of the House and 

Senate. The remaining two nominations were 

made independently by the President, who also 

designated one of the eight commissioners to 

serve as the Chairman. 

.. 

The Commission staff included experts detailed 

from several government agencies, including the 

Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agemy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

the General Accounting Office, as well as the 

Department of Defense (see Appendix R). Ten 

pmfessionai sbff members were detailed by the 

General Accounting Office to serve full-time on 

the Commission’s Review and Analysis staff. All 

detailees fully participated in all phases of the 

review and analysis effort; they verified data, visited candidate bases, participated in local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its 

public deliberative hearings. 

Costs and Savings of the Commission’s 

Recommendations 

After thorough review and analysis, the Commission recommends the closure or realignment of 

132 military installations in the United States. This 

total includes 123 of the 146 closure or realignment recommendations of the Secretary of 

Defense, and 9 of the 36 military installations 

identified by the Commission as candidates for 

consideration during its deliberations. 

The Commission estimates that the closure or realignment of these 132 military installations will 

DoD Submission 

(28 February 1995) 

DoD Revised 

Baseline* 

1995 Closure & Recommendations 

($ in M~ons) 

1-Time Cost Annual Savings 20-Year Savings 

3,743 1,768 2 1,026 

Final Commission 

Results 

Change from DoD 

Revised Basehe 

3,521 1,569 18,994 

I 3,561 

+40 

19,317 

+37 +323 

‘Reflects revisions in costs and savings estimates subrnitted to the Commission by the Defense Department, as well as 

the removal of the following installations from the list as requested by the Secretary of Defense: Kirtland Air Force 

Base, NM; Dugway Proving Ground, VT; Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ; and Valley Grove Area Maintenance 

Support Activity, WV. 

Xii 
require one-time, upfront costs of $3.6 billion, and 

will result in annual savings of $1.6 billion once 

implemented. Over the next 20 years, the total 

savings will be approximately $19.3 billion. 

The preceding table summarizes the costs and 

savings estimates of the recommendations submitted to the Commission by the Secretary of 

Defense on February 28; the costs and savings of 

these estimates a5 revised by the military services 

as a result of site surveys taken after the submission of the original recommendations, as well as 

the removal of certain installations from the original list by the Secretary of Defense; and the costs 

and savings estimates of the Commission proposals contained in this report. 

While the Commission believes that the one-time 

costs of implementing its recommendations will 

exceed the Defense Department's revised estimates by S40 million, the annual savings and 20- 

year savings from the Commission's recommendations will exceed the Defense Department's 

revised estimates by $37 million and $323 million, 

respectively. These 1995 recommendations represent the first time that the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission has recommended 

savings greater than those proposed by the Secretary of Defense. 

The following list summarizes the closure and realignment recommendations of the 1995 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission. 

1995 Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission 

Recommendations 

Part I: Major Base Closures 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Oakland Army Base, CA 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Rayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ 

Seneca Army Depot, NY 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Fort Pickett, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Ship Repair Facility, GU 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

McCklkdn .4ir Force Base, CA 

Ontario International Airport Air Guard 

Chicago O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve 

Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX 

Reese Air Force Base, TX 

DEFENSE L,OGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN 

Defense Djstribution Depot San Antonio, "X 

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT 

Indianapolis, IN 

Detachment, Louisville, KY 

Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Warminster, PA 

Station, CA 

Station, IL 

Part II: Major Base Realignments 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Hunter Liggett, CA 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Fort Meade, MD 

Detroit Arsenal, MI 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Fort Lee, VA 

Department of the Navy 

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL 

Naval Activities, GU 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA 

~~ 

EXECUTIVE SLIMMAKY xiii 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Onizuka Air Station, CA 

Egltn Air Force Base, FL 

Mabtmm Air Force Base, MT 

Grand Forks Ah Force Base, ND 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Hill Air Force Base, UT (Utah Test and 

Training Range) 

Part Ill.. Smaller Base or Activity 

Closums, Redignments, 

~establisbments or Relocations 

DEPART"T OF THE ARMY 

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA 

East Fort Baker, CA 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT 

Big Coppett Key, FL 

Concepts AnaIysis Agency, MD 

Fort Holabird, MD 

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD 

Hingham Cohasset, MA 

Sudbury Training Annex, MA 

Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), MO 

Fort Missoula, MT 

Camp Kilmer, NJ 

Camp Pedricktown, NJ 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY 

Fort Totten, NY 

Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC 

Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA 

Camp Bonneville, WA 

DEPAR"T OF THE NAVY 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast 

Division, San Diego, CA 

Naval Personnel Research and Development 

Center, San Diego, CA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and 

Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA 

Naval Undersea Wa&m Center-Newport Division, 

New London Detachment, New London, CT 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound 

Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU 

Public Works Center, GU 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA 

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 

Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA 

Center, RDTM Division Detachment, 

Warminster, PA 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service weering East Coast 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Information Systems Management Center, 

Arlington, VA 

Naval Management Systems Support Office, 

Chesapeake, VA 

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities 

Naval Reserve Centers at 

Huntsville, AL 

stockton, CA 

Sam Ana, We, CA 

Pomona, CA 

Cadillac, MI 

Staten Island, NY 

Laredo, TX 

Sheboygan, WI 

Naval Air Reserve Center at: 

Olathe, KS 

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at: 

New Orleans, LA (Region 10) 

Charleston, SC (Region 7) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Real-Time Digitally Controlied Analyzer Processor 

Activity, Buffalo, NY 

DEFENSE LoGIsllcs AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District South, 

Defense Contract Management Command InternaDefense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA 

Marietta, GA 

tional, Dayton, OH 

DEFENSE INVESTIGATlVE SERVICE 

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, 

Fort Holabird, MD 

XiV 
Part IV Changes to Previously Approved 

BRA C Recom m enda tions 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA 

Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacoh, FL 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, 

Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL 

Naval Air Station Agana, GU 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, 

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC 

Naval Security Group Comniand Detachment 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

Lonq Air Force Base, CO 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL (301st Rescue 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL (726th Air Control 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support for 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (485th Engineering 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District West, 

Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD 

Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL 

Philadelphia, PA 

Arlington, VA 

Potomac, Washington, DC 

Squadron) 

Squadron) 

10th Infantry Division [Light]) 

Installation Group) 

El Segundo, CA 

Part V DoD Recommendations Rejected 

by the Commission 

PROPOSED CLOSURES REJECTED 

BY THE COMMISSION 

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA 

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA 

North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA 

Price Support Center, IL 

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Technical Training Center Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY 

Springfield-Beckley MAP Air Guard Station, OH 

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator 

Activity, Fort Worth, TX 

Brooks Air Force Base, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS REJECTED 

BY THE COMMISSION 

Lakehurst, NJ 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS REJECTED BY 

THE COMMISSION AT THE REQUEST OF THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ 

Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 

Dugway Proving Ground, UT 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity 

(AMSA), WV 

ExEcrrrivE SUMMARY xv 
CONTENTS 

COVER LETTER TO IRE PRESIDENT ........................................................................................................ i 

MAPS OF 1995 CLOSIJKES AND REALIGNMENTS ...................................................................................... V 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ ix 

CONTENTS xvii 

CHAPTER 1 : COMMISSIOV FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INTRODUCTION 1-1 

.................................................................................................................................... 

....................................................................................................................... 

AKMY ................................................................................................................................... 1-1 

NAVY . ......................................................................................................................... 1-39 

AIR FORCE .......................................................................................................................... 1-83 

DEFENSE AGENCIES ............................................................................................................. 1-114 

CHAPTER 2: LIFE AFTER BASE CLOSURE ............................................................................................. 2-1 

........ 2-1 

KEY ELEMENTS ................................................................................................................. 2-1 

FEDERAL AGENCIES AND REUSE ........................................................................................... 2-2 

LEGKATIVF . AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING REUSE ACTIVITIES ................................ 2-3 

HEARINGS AND Sm VISITS ...................................................................................................... 2-4 

FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................... 2-4 

RECOMMENDATIOKS ................................................................................................... 

CHAPTER 3: ISSIJES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION ............................................................................... 3-1 

THE FUTURE OF THE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS .................................................. 3-1 

MILITARY HOSPITALS ............................................................................................................... 3-2 

PRIVATIZATIOY OF DoD INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES ................................................ 3-3 

CROSS SERVICING WITIIIN TIE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE .............................................................. 3-4 

MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING ...................................................................................................... 3-4 

ENGINEERING FIELD Acnvnr (EFA) WEST, SAN BRUNO, CA ..................................................... 3-4 

AKALYSIS OFECONOMIC IMPACT ............................................................................................... 3-6 

CHAPTER 4: PREVIOUS BASE CLOSURE ROUNDS .................................................................................. 4-1 

HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE ....................................................................................... 

THE 1988 COMMISSION .................................................................................................... 4-2 

CHANGING WORLD SITUATION ............................................................................................ 4-3 

P.L. 100-510: THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 ........................ 4-3 

THE 1991 COMMISSION .................................................................................................... 4-4 

THE 1993 COMMISSION .................................................................................................... 4-5 

OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT RE~JSE PROCESS ............................................................. 

RETURN ON INVESTMENT .......................................................................................................... 3-5 
CHAFER 5: THE 1995 PROCESS AND PROCEDURES ............................................................................. 5-1 

COMPOSITION OF THE 1995 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION ..................... 5-1 

THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE PROCESS .......................................................................................... 5-1 

KEY PKOVISIONS OF THE LAW ............................................................................................. 5-1 

AND DEFENSE AGENCIES .......................................................................................................... 5-2 

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................ 5-3 

THE ARMY PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 5-3 

THE NAVY PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 5-4 

THE AIR FORCE PROCESS ................................................................................................... 5-5 

THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PROCESS .......................................................................... 5-6 

THE DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE PROCESS ..................................................................... 5-7 

OSD/JCS REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 5-8 

COMMISSION REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 5-8 

CRITERIA 1-4: MILITARY VALUE .......................................................................................... 5-8 

CRITERIA 5-8: COSTS, SAVINGS, AND IMPACTS ....................................................................... 5-9 

CRITERION 5: RETURN ON INVESTMENT ................................................................................ 5-9 

CRITERION 6: ECONOMIC IMPACT ........................................................................................ 5-9 

CRITERION 7: COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE ....................................................................... 5-10 

CRITERION 8: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ............................................................................... 5-11 

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) ........................................................ 5-12 

TI-IE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY DEPARThIENTS 

APPENDIX .......................................................................................................................................... 

ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................ A- 1 

DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................... B- 1 

1988 CHARTER: DEFENSE SECRETARY’S COMMISSION ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE ........ D-1 

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT (P.L. 100-526) ........................................................ E-1 

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 (P.L. 101-510, AS AMENDED) .......... F-1 

FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN ................................................................................................... G-1 

FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA ................................................................................................ H-1 

SECKETARY OF DEFENSE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS: ‘75, ‘93 & ‘71 .......... 1-1 

BASES ADDED BY COMMISSION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION: ‘95, ‘93 & ‘91 J-1 

REDIRECT RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESULTS: ‘95, ‘73, & ‘91 ................................................ K-1 

CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS BYTATE: ‘88, ‘91, ‘93, & ‘95 ............................................... 1-1 

SECTION 2687. TITLE 10. UNITED STATES CODE ................................................................. C-1 

......................... 

CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS BY SERVICE BRANCH: ‘95, ‘93, ‘91, & ‘88 ............................... M-1 

DoD RECOMMENDATIONS MODIFIED OR REJECTED BY COMMISSIONS: ‘95, ‘93 & ‘91 ............... N-1 

HEARINGS HELD BY THE ‘95, ‘93 & ‘91 COMMISSIONS ......................................................... 0-1 

COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BASE VISITS FOR THE ‘95, ‘93 & ‘91 ROUNDS ............................... P-1 

COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES Q-1 ............................................................................................. 

STAFF .............................................................................................................................. R- 1 

INDEX BY BASE .............................................................................................................................. 5-1 

INDEX BY STATE ............................................................................................................................. T-1 
COM~MISSION FINDINGS 

AND F~ECOM~MENDATIONS 

The Secretary of Defense, in compliance with 

Public Law 101-510, as amended, officially transmitted his recommendations for base closures and 

realignments to the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission on February 28, 1775. 

The Commission held 13 investigative hearings, 

conducted 206 fact-finding visits to 167 military 

installations and activities, held 16 regional hearings nationwide, listened to hundreds of Members 

of Congress, and received hundreds of thousands 

of letters from concerned citizens from across the 

country. By June 22, 1995, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission had completed 

its review and analysis of the Secretary’s recommendations, and began its final, two days of deliberations, all in public. This chapter contains a 

summary of the Commission’s findings and its 

recommendations for closures and realignments. 

Information on each of the Commission’s base closure and realignment decisions is presented below. 

The paragraphs entitled “Secretary of Defense 

Recommendations” and “Secretary of Defense Justifications” were taken verbatim from the Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Report dated March 1995. The paragraphs entitled 

“Community Concerns“ provide a brief summary 

of arguments presented to the Commission by local 

communities; they are not all-inclusive. Where applicable, substantial deviations from the application 

of the force-stnicture plan and final criteria are 

identified. 

Department of the Army 

Fort McClellan, Alabama 

Category: Training Schools 

Mission: Fort McClellan is home to the US. Army 

Chemical School, US. Army Military Police 

School, and the DoD Polygraph Institute, 

and the site of the nation’s only Chemical 

Defense Training Facility 

One-time Cost: $231.0 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $-109.5 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2005 (6 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component 

enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical 

demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot. 

Relocate the U. S. Army Chemical and Military 

Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, 

upon receipt of the required permits. Relocate the 

Defense Polygraph Institute (DODI’I) to Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range 

and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army 

National Guard. 

Annual: $40.6 million 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This closure recommendation is based upon the 

assumption that requisite permits can be granted 

to allow operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The 

Governor of the State of Missouri has indicated 

that an expeditious review of the permit application can he accomplished. 

Collocation allows the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. 

The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are: coordination, employment, 

and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along 

main supply routes; and counter-drug operations. 

The missions of the three branches will be more 

effectively integrated. 

This recommendation differs froin the Army’s 

prior closure recommendations submitted to the 

1991 and 1973 Commissions. The Army will relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility 

(CDTF) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By relo- 
cating the CDTF, the Army can continue providing 

live-agent training to all levels of command. The 

Army is the only service that conducts live agent 

training, and it will continue this training at Fort 

Leonard Wood. 

The Army has considered the use of some Fort 

McClellan assets for support of the chemical demilitarization mission at Anniston Army Depot. The 

Army will use the best available assets to provide 

the necessary support to Anniston’s demilitarization mission. 

Community Concerns 

The Fort McClellan community believes that DoD 

failed to comply with the 1993 Commission’s direction to pursue permits prior to recommendation. 

They further argue the issued permits may be 

invalid, and obtaining a hazardous waste permit 

may delay completion of a Chemical Defense 

Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort Leonard Wood 

beyond 6 years. The community estimates the cost 

of a new CDTF at up to $70 million, and the cost 

of environmental remediation of the existing site 

at $50 million. The community claims that building a new CDTF risks the loss of live-agent chemical training should environmental litigation at Fort 

Leonard Wood prevail following closure of Fort 

McClellan. The recommended move, the community argues, also risks turbulence in chemical and 

military police training at a time when those specialties have been identified as particularly essential to the services’ missions. The community also 

sees a risk in reducing the Chemical School to a 

department of a larger school, costing the Chemical School the influence and prominence needed 

to carry out its national and international role. The 

Fort McClellan community claims that environmental restrictions on smoke training at Fort 

Leonard Wood would imperil the training mission. 

The community notes the economic impact of this 

proposal was the highest for any Army closure, 

and the National Guard enclave and environmental cleanup sites would leave little of the pt 

available for community reuse. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Department of the 

Army complied to the extent possible with the 

1W3 Commission’s directive to pursue all necessary environmental permits before submitting a 

recommendation to close Fort McClellan. Accordingly, the Army prepared the applications and 

submitted them concurrently with the recommendation on March 1, 1995. 

The Commission found determining the validity of 

individual state-issued permits was beyond the 

Commission’s charter; other avenues of appeal 

exist to determine their validity. The Comnission 

concurred, however, with the finding that a hazardous waste permit, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, was not required for 

operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility, as evidenced by the successful operation of 

the Fort McClellan CDTF without such a permit, 

and information supplied by the Army to the State 

of Missouri. The Commission found that all permits issued by the State of Missouri conformed to 

the Army’s requests. The Commission further 

found permits, once issued, were vested as property rights of Fort Leonard Wood, making revocation difficult. The Commission found the Army’s 

projected construction cost of a new CDTF to 

be reasonable. 

With regard to the support provided by the Army 

to the chemical demilitarization operation at 

Anniston Army Depot, the Commission found the 

Army accounted for the costs of such support, but 

did not specrfy the assets to be used. The Commission further found the Army’s commitment was 

to supply particular capabilities, independent of 

where those capabilities were stationed. 

The economic impact on the Anniston, Alabama, 

area was found to be significant. 

Minimizing turbulence when moving the Chemical 

School to Fort Leonard Wood was found to be a 

challenge to Army management. To ensure the 

capability for live-agent training was maintained, 

however, the Commission revised the DoD recommendation to require that the Fort McClellan 

CDTF not be closed until a similar facility was 

operational at Fort Leonard Wood. 

Commission Recommendution 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 2. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort McClellan, except minimum 

essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave, minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the 

chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston 

Army Depot, Alabama, and the Chemical Defense 

1-2 CHAPTER 1 
Training lacility (CDTF). The CIITF will operate at 

Fort McClellan until such time as the capability 

to operate a replacement at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. is achieved. Relocate the U.S. Army Military Police School and the U.S. Army Chemical 

School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Relocate 

the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort 

Jackson, South Carolina. License I’elham Range 

and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army 

National Guard. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Fort Greely, Alaska 

Category: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Provide administrative and logistical 

support to the Northern Warfare Training 

Center and the Cold Regions Test Activity; 

assist milita y organizations and units 

in their training 

One-time Cost: $23.1 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $38.7 million 

Annual: $1 7.9 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region 

Test Activity (CKTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Fort Greely currently supports two tenant activities 

(CKTA and NWTC) and manages training areas for 

maneuver and range firing. Over 662,000 acres of 

range and training areas are used by both the 

Army and the Air Force. These valuable training 

lands will be retained. 

The Army has recently reduced the NWTC by over 

half its original size and transferred oversight 

responsibilities to the US. Army, Pacific. The garrison staff will reduce in size and continue to 

support the important testing and training missions. The Army intends to use Fort Wainwright as 

the base of operations (107 miles away) for these 

activities. and ”safari” them to Fort Greely, as necessary. This allows the Army to reduce its presence at Fort Greely, reduce excess capacity and 

perform essential missions at a much lower cost. 

The Army intends to retain facilities at Bolio Lake 

(for CRTA), Black Rapids (for NWTC), Allen Army 

Airfield, and minimal necessary garrison fa 

maintain the installation for contingency missions. 

Community Concerns 

Residents of the Delta Junction community have 

expressed strong opposition to the DoD recommendation based upon Fort Greely‘s military value 

as a major training area, its unique location in the 

Cold Triangle, which kicilitates almost year-round 

testing by the Cold Regions Test Activity, and the 

severe economic impact that the area would suffer 

upon realignment. Community leaders and citizens emphasized that with no other economic 

base, the recommendation could have ;I devastating impact on the area, and diminish the size of 

the local school population by half. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army plans to continue its actual arctic testing and arctic training 

activities at Fort Greely. Fort Greely is in the most 

suitable location, the North American Cold Triangle, to conduct arctic activities. The Commission 

found the realignment to Fort Wainwright of those 

personnel and functions not required to support 

the Cold Regions Test Activity and the Northern 

Warfare Training Center at Fort Greely is operationally sound and will generate significant savings. 

The Commission also found increased Iiase operating efficiencies would occur if the headquarters 

and support elements for the Cold Kegions Test 

Activity and Northern Warfare Training Center 

move to Fort Wainwright. The Cornmission found 

that personnel can travel to Fort Greely’s Bolio 

Lake and Black Rapids training facilities to perform their mission, when NWTC courses or CKTA 

testing is required. While the Commission found 

the economic impact on Delta Junction, Alaska, 

and its local school system will be serious, these 

factors were outweighed by Iioth the military 

value and significant savings that will result from 

implementation of the Secretary’s Recommendation. To lessen the economic impact and to facilitate community planning for the future, the 

Commission further found the execution phase of 

the recommendation should not begin earlier than 

July 1997, the latest date permitted by Public Law 

101-510 to begin a move, and should not be completed before July 200 1, the latest date permitted 

to complete a move. The Army is encouraged to 

ensure that buildings and facilities at Fort Greely 

which do become non-essential as a result of the 

realignment shall be maintained in good working 

condition to maximize future reuse possibilities. 

C 1-3 OMMISSION FINDINGS AN) RECOMMENDATIONS 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 

5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: realign Fort Greely by relocating the 

Cold Regions Test Activity (CRTA) and the Northern Warfare Training Center (“K) to Fort 

Wainwright, Alaska, but begin the move no earlier 

than July 1997. The move should not be completed earlier than July 2001. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas 

Category: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Support active Army and Reserve 

Component training 

One-time Cost: $9.6 million 

Savings: 139G2001: $38.2 million 

Annual: $13.4 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential 

buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component 

(RC) training as an enclave. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In the past ten years, the Army has significantly 

reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army 

must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future 

requirements. 

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint 

Readiness Training Center URTC). In 1991, the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC’s relocation to Fort Polk, 

LA. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post 

is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, 

although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants. 

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when 

compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by 

the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training 

for Reserve Component units which now use Fort 

Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in 

the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort 

Sill. The Army intends to license required land 

and facilities to the Army National Guard. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes that the military value 

was improperly assessed, dropping from fifth of 

ten in 1993, to last among the same ten installations in 1995. The Arkansas Army and Air National 

Guard are concerned about thc future USC of both 

maneuver acreage and the Razorback Range aerial 

bombing and strafing course, and wish to retain 

the ranges and most of the maneuver areas. They 

contend that stopping Reserve Component annual 

training at Fort Chaffee, and traveling out of state, 

will cause the quality of training and readiness 

to suffer severely. Additionally, they believe the 

increased costs and time required to travel greater 

distances will result in no significant overall savings. The community further argued DoD should 

not close Fort Chaffee so that current tenant activities could remain. Finally, concern was expressed 

that employer support for the Reserve Components may dwindle if additional time away from 

work is required by employees to get to and from 

more distant training locations. 

commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army evaluated all its 

major training area installations equally. The Commission also found the Army’s process of integrating a quantitative installation assessment with 

a qualitative operational blueprint, based upon 

operational and stationing requirements of the 

Army Stationing Strategy, is a sound approach to 

develop a military value assessment (MVA) for 

each installation in this category. 

The Commission carefully considered the change 

in Fort Chaffee’s military value assessment from 

1993 to 1995, validating the ranking that resulted 

from changes in the attributes and weights, and 

found them equally applied to all installations in 

this category. The Commission found the Army’s 

original recommendation, which omitted any reference to training land remaining in the enclave, 

was a legitimate concern of the National Guard 

and other Reserve Component units, as it 

decreased their ability to meet training requirements. Therefore, the Commission found the 

remaining enclave, after closure, must contain sufficient maneuver and artillery training areas to 

meet the needs of the Guard and Reserve. 

Because of potential problems with increased 

travel times to more distant installations, the Commission found the National Guard and other RC 

14 CHAPTER 1 
units must have access to the training area for 

both individual and annual training purposes. 

Commission Reco m m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Fort 

Chaffee, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component 

training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 

Lompoc, California 

Catego y: Minor Installation 

Mission: Currently bas no military mission 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretu y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Branch US. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), 

Lompoc, CA. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Branch USDB, Lompoc consists of approximately 

4,000 acres and 812,000 square feet of detention 

facilities. It is permitted to and operated by the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army 

activities on USDB, Lompoc. Accordingly, it is excess 

to the Army's requirements. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Com m issio n Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recornmendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: close Branch US. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, California. 

East Fort Baker, California 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provides facilities and housing 

One-time Cost: $1 1.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $-7.6 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2009 (I 1 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $1.3 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenmts to other 

installations that meet mission requirements. 

Return all real property to the Golden Gate 

National Recreation Area. 

Secretary of Defense Justificution 

East Fort Baker is at the north end of the Golden 

Gate Bridge in Marin County, CA. The post consists of approximately 347 acres and 390,000 

square feet of facilities. It provides facilities and 

housing for the Headquarters. 9lst Training Division (U.S. Army Reserve) and the 6th Recruiting 

Brigade, Army Recruiting Command. 'I'he 91st 

Training Division has a requirement to remain in 

the San Francisco Bay area, while the 6th Recruiting Brigade has a regional mission associated with 

the western United States. Both the 6th Recruiting 

Brigade and the 91st Training Division can easily 

relocate to other installations. The 9lst Training 

Division will relocate to Parks Reserve Forces 

Training Area, where it hetter aligns with its training 

mission. Closing East Fort Baker saves opet;itions and 

support costs by consolidating tenants to other 

military installations without major construction. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Cornmission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Sccretaty of Defense 

did not deviate sulxtantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close East 

Fort Baker. Relocate :ill tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all 

real property to the Golclen Gate National liecreation Area. 

~~ 

COMMIS5IOh FINDIYGS AND RECOMMENDATIOUS 1-5 
Fort Hunter Liggett, California 

Category: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Home of the Test and Experimentation 

Command Ejcperimentation Center and the 

major maneuver training area for the 

California Army National Guard and 

western United States Army Reserve forces 

One-time Cost: $6.7 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $12.5 million 

Annual: $5.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. 

Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate 

the Active Component mission. Retain minimum 

essential fxilities and training area as an enclave 

to support the Reserve Components (RC). 

Semetury of Defense Justvieation 

Fort Hunter Liggett is low in military value compared to other major training area installations and 

has few Active Component tenants. Relocation of 

the Test and Experimentation Center optimizes the 

unique test capabilities afforded by Fort Bliss and 

White Sands Missile Range. 

Fort Hunter Liggett’s maneuver space is key to 

Reserve Component training requirements. Since it 

is a primary maneuver area for mechanized units 

in the western United States, retention of its 

unique training lands is essential. 

Community Concerns 

Local and state officials are concerned with the 

cumulative economic impact of previous base closure and realignment actions, coupled with recent 

major fires and floods in this sparsely populated 

area. Residents do not want the Test and Experimentation Command’s Experimentation Center to 

move to Fort Bliss, Texas. They maintain that Fort 

Hunter Liggett, with its varied terrain, a natural 

bowl surrounded by hills, which permits non-eyesafe laser testing, low artificial light, and no radio 

frequency interference, is the premier location for 

operational testing. They believe that possible frequency interference, arid desert conditions, and 

proximity to the large city of El Paso, make Fort 

Bliss undesirable as a test site. Some believe Fort 

Hunter Liggett should have been evaluated as a 

proving ground or an operational test facility, instead 

of as a major training area. The California Army 

National Guard is keenly interested in training at 

the installation and retaining access to ranges and 

training areas. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army properly evaluated Fort Hunter Ligget as a major training area 

and found no basis to change the installation’s 

category. The realignment of this installation ends 

the Active Component presence while preserving 

the U. S. Army Reserve Command garrison. The 

Army will license the training facilities and training area to the California National Guard as part 

of the realignment. 

The Commission examined the community’s claim 

that Fort Hunter Ligget is ideal for TEC’s location 

and found them to be accurate. The community 

believed relocation of TEC to Fort Bliss would be 

unwise, unworkable, and too expensive. The 

Commission examined each issue raised by advocates of keeping TEC in California and found noneye-safe laser testing within a 360-degree area is 

not required for most tests, the frequency conflict 

between White Sands Missile Range and TEC telemetry can be resolved by coordination of future 

tests, and the Army has plans to digitize required 

areas of Fort Bliss. The Commission found 

although Fort Hunter Ligget is suited to its current 

mission, the mission can be relocated to Fort Bliss 

without disruption, and the Army will achieve 

substantial savings as a result. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army 

Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions 

and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the 

Active Component mission. Retain minimum 

essential facilities and training area as an enclave 

to support the Reserve Components (RC). 

Oakland Army Base, California 

Category: Ports 

Mission: Manage movement of LloD cargo 

throughout the westm US and Pacijiic; 

manage port operations on the West 

Coast and at Pacvic locations 

One-time Cost: $365 million 

1-6 CHAPTER 1 
Savings: 1996-2001: $22.9 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $15.9 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues Oakland Army Base provides 

a critical capability during any major regional contingency. Without Oakland, significant combat 

forces deploying from Continental United States 

(CONUS) will not arrive in time to meet the theater commander’s required delivery dates. Further, 

Oakland can efficiently ship overweight, oversized, and non-container military cargo that commercial ports have difficulty handling. The 

community contends Oakland’s availability on 

short notice and its secure operating environment 

offer vital flexibility to military planners. Commercial facilities are becoming increasingly unwilling 

to guarantee staging and berthing space, within 48 

hours, to military cargo. Because comniercial facilities are operating near capacity, they are hesitant 

to disrupt normal traffic, fearing damage to customer 

relationships and their long term profitability. 

Com m ission Findings 

The Commission found the normal workload of 

Oakland Army Base does not justify its continued 

operation as a military terminal. Oakland’s role in 

a west region contingency is based on transportation feasibility analysis that models an obsolete 

force structure and stationing plan. To date, DoD 

has not conducted analysis of Oakland’s requirements from a ten division Army viewpoint. The 

Commission observed DoD transportation engineers list six commercial ports on the West Coast 

capable of deploying a mechanized infantry division. Further, the Commission acknowledged at 

least two other military ports on the West Coast 

handled military cargo in support of Desert Storm. 

The Commission addressed the growing resistance 

by commercial operators to disrupt commercial 

traffic to give priority to military needs. They 

noted the Maritime Administration (MARAD), 

Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking two 

initiatives to address the issue. The Commission 

recognized legal means exist under the National 

Shipping Authority Service Priorit). Orders to obtain 

priority for military cargo in contingency situations. Based on deliberations, the Commission 

found the Secretary of Ikfense h:id deviated sibstantially from operational hlueprint criteria hy not 

recommending closure of Oakland Army Hase. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. ‘I’herefore, the Commission reconitnends the following: 

close Oakland Army Base, California. Relocate 

Military Traffic Management Corninand-Western 

Area and 1302nd Major Port Command to locations 

to be determined. Enclakz Army Reserve elements. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Formerly supported an 

Army Reserve watercrajt unit 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.6 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $0.1 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Rio Visra Army Reserve Center. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army 

Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center. it is 

excess to the Army‘s rquirenients. Closing liio 

Vista will save base operations and m:iintenance 

funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recoinmendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

COMMISSION Frm~cs AND RECOMMENDATIOYS 1-7 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Rio 

Vista Army Reserve Center. 

Sierra Army Depot, California 

Category: Ammunition Storage Installations 

Mission: Receive, store, maintain, issue, demilitarize, and calibrate special weapons, conventional ammunition, and general supplies; 

store Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution 

Operational Project and Water Support 

Equipment Project for the Army 

One-time Cost: $10.0 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $40.8 million 

Annual: $18.5 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a 

depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage 

of ores. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

This recommendation is supported by the Army’s 

long range operational assessment. The Army has 

adopted a “tiered” ammunition depot concept to 

reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required 

ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army 

to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot 

concept reduces the number of active storage sites 

and makes efficiencies possible: 

(1) Tier 1-Active Core Depots. These installations 

will support a nornd/full-up activity level with a 

stockage configuration of primarily required 

stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring 

demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily 

receiptdissues of training stocks, storage of war 

reserve stocks required in contingency operations 

and additional war reserve stocks to augment 

lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will 

receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization. 

(2) Tier 2-Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war 

reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on 

maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have 

minimal staffs unless a contingency arises. 

(3) Tier +Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store 

stocks no longer required until demilitarized or 

relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at 

these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army 

Depot is a Tier 3 Depot. 

Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is 

the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational 

Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of: Force Provider (550-man tent city), Inland Petroleum 

Distribution System; and Water Support System. It 

also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile 

maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for 

helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational 

Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues the Army military value 

assessment undervalues or overlooks Sierra’s demilitarization mission. They point out Sierra has over 

40 percent of the Army’s open detonation capability, without which Army demilitarization goals 

cannot be met. The community notes conflicts 

between the Army’s goals expressed in the 

Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program and criteria weighting factors in the military value analysis have not been resolved, and inclusion of the 

ammunition tiering plan in the operational blueprint short-circuits the military value analysis process. They contend due to a data error, the 

recommendation would cut only 125 direct positions, not 305, and reduce expected savings. Savings would also be reduced by the $38 to $91 

million dollar cost of moving ammunition, and by 

having to ship ammunition in wartime from installations farther from west coast ports. The community contends Siem received no credit for its 

almost complete ammunition surveillance facility 

or its missile maintenance and test facilities, and 

was undercounted by 88 percent in demilitarization capability. It also states the depot’s desert 

location, with dry outdoor storage, was scored the 

same as less-desirable locations. In addition, the 

community states the 839 jobs projected to be lost 

would constitute an 8.8 percent increase in county 

1-8 CHAPTER 1 
unemployment, resulting in total unemployment 

of 20.7 percent. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found conventional ammunition 

demilitarization, one of Sierra’s principal missions, 

was undervalued, as no measure of demilitarization capacity was included in the installation assessment. While the operational blueprint 

considered long-term demilitarization capacity, the 

recommendation’s effect on near- to mid-term capacity was not considered. The Commission also 

found the recommendation conflicted with the 

Army operational blueprint by overcommitting demilitarization capacity. In addition, the Commission found the ammunition tiering plan should 

not have been used for BRAC purposes, as it 

prevented installations in the category from being 

fairly compared against each other, did not use 

certified data, and had several other flaws. 

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense’s 

alternative recommendation preserved essential 

demilitarization capacity and necessary covered 

and outdoor storage, reduced the original 

recommendation’s significant economic impact, 

and avoided substantial ammunition moving costs. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

realign Sierra Army Depot by reducing the conventional ammunition mission to the level necessary to support the conventional ammunition 

demilitarization mission. Retain a conventional 

ammunition demilitarization capability and an enclave for the Operational Project Stocks mission 

and the static storage of ores. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado 

Categoty: Medical Centers 

Mission: Provide medical services, train 

One-time Cost: $1 05.3 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $4.6 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

providers, and perform medical research 

Annual: $36.4 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), 

except for Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate the Medical Equipment and Optical 

School and Optical Fabrication Lalioratory to Fort 

Sam Houston, TX. Relocate Civilian Health and 

Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 

(CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space. 

Relocate other tenants to other installations. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

FAMC is low in military value compared to other 

medical centers. This recommendation avoids 

anticipated need for estimated $245 million construction to replace FAMC while preserving health 

care services through other more cost-effective 

means. This action will offset any loss of medical 

services through: phased-in CHAMPUS and Managed Care Support contracts; increased services at 

Fort Carson and US. Air Force Academy; and redistribution of Medical Center patient load from Region Eight to other Medical Centers. FAMC is not 

collocated with a sizable active component population. Its elimination does not jeopardize the 

Army’s capability to surge to support two nearsimultaneous major regional contingencies, or 

limit the Army’s capability to provide wartime 

medical support in the theater of operations. Closure of this medical center allows redistribution of 

medical military personnel to other medical tenters to absorb the diverted medical center patient 

load. These realignments avoid a significant cost 

of continuing to operate and maintain facilities at 

this stand-alone medical center. DoD’s Joint CrossService Group for Military Treatment Facilities 

supports the closure of Fitzsimons. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues the installation assessment 

criteria employed by the Army to measure 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center were inappropriate and it was unfair to limit the comparison to 

only the three stand-alone Army medical centers. 

In particular, the community points to the use of 

size as a comparative measure in several criteria, 

saying larger hospitals do not necessarily mean 

better or more efficient hospitals. They also 01)- 

serve the Army assessment criteria differed significantly from the criteria measured by the Medical 

Joint Cross Service Group. In addition, the comnunity points out what they considered to be rnany 

inconsistencies and mistakes in the Army’s scoring. 

COMMISSIOV FIVDIUGS AND RECOMMENDATIOM 1-9 
The community also argues closure of the hospital 

would have substantial negative impacts on the 

health and financial security of the large retired 

community in the Denver area. They say closing 

the hospital would break the promise of “free 

health care for life” that many feel was made to 

military retirees. They note the medical center’s 

mission as a regional referral center for a 14-state 

region and the lack of any other tertiary care hospitals in the region. Further, the community questions the readiness impact of closing the medical 

center and eliminating the civilian personnel positions, as well as the readiness impact of losing its 

satellite communications capability. 

The community also argues the economic impact 

on the City of Aurora would be extremely high. 

They say the area has already been badly hurt by 

previous base closures, and closure of Fitzsimons 

Army Medical Center would mean more direct and 

indirect job losses than reported by the Army. 

Finally, they question the one-time costs in the 

Army’s analysis, the increased cost of transporting 

referral patients to other hospitals if the medical 

center closes, and the impact of the closure on 

DoD-Indian Health Service sharing agreements. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army’s recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center is in 

line with the Army’s stationing strategy that military hospitals should primarily support active duty 

military personnel and their families. Fitzsimons 

does not primarily support a nearby active duty 

population, and its closure permits the Army to 

redirect medical personnel and resources to other 

hospitals that do. The Commission also found the 

medical center’s referral mission can be economically absorbed by other facilities. The Commission 

agreed with the community that closure of 

Fitzsimons will create disruptions and raise costs 

for retirees seeking health care, but noted other 

government programs-CHAMPU.5, Tricare, Medicare, and continued pharmacy benefits-will help 

to mitigate these impacts. The Commission found 

DoD’s evaluation of joint service training consolidation alternatives could result in a decision to 

relocate tenants elsewhere; hence, it agreed to the 

request of the Secretary of Defense to not specify 

gaining locations. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except 

Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate 

other tenants to other installations. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut 

Catego y: Industrial Facilities 

Mission: Engine production 

One-time Cost: $6. G miUion 

Savings: 19962001: $20.5 million 

Annual: $6.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Stratford Army Engine Plant. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Stratford facility has produced engines for 

heavy armor vehicles and rotary wing aircraft. 

Reduced production requirements and the Army’s 

increased capability for rebuild and repair have 

eliminated the need for the Stratford Army Engine 

Plant. There is no requirement for use of the installation by either the Active or Reserve Components. 

The Army has an extensive capability to repair 

engines at Anniston and Corpus Christi Army 

Depots. The current inventory for these engines 

meets projected operational requirements. During 

mobilization, the capability to rebuild engines can 

be increased at both depots. In the event of an 

extended national emergency that would deplete 

stocks, the depots could reconfigure to assemble 

new engines from parts provided by the manufacturer until mothballed facilities become operational. Prior to closing the facility, the contractor 

will complete all existing contracts. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends closing Stratford Army 

Engine Plant will result in loss of the Army’s only 

capability to produce turbine engines for tanks. 

The loss of this capability and the associated technical and engineering support, in the community’s 

view, will have significant readiness impact. 

Another concern is the loss of 1600 contractor 

jobs from the local economy. The community 

claims a study, under Corps of Engineers direction, 

requires $17 million in environmental stabilization 

1-10 CHAPTER 1 
costs to close Stratford Army Engine Plant. The 

community questions whether or not the Army's 

recommendation complies with a Defense Science 

Board Tank Engine Industrial Base Task Force 

recommendation. The community challenges the 

Army's economic impact estimates and cost analysis. The community contends the Army is underestimating costs for equipment movement or disposal, military construction at gaining installations, 

and personnel. They also point out the Army 

analysis does not account for loss of $2 million in 

rental income from the contractor. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army can sustain the 

tank engine and helicopter turbine engine base 

through Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas. With the decreasing need for new engines and technological 

capabilities currently available in the private industrial sector, retention of Stratford Army Engine 

Plant was not necessary. The Commission found 

the Army estimates on the costs of this recommendation were iinderstated. Recognition of the costs 

associated with movement of Defense Contract 

Management Personnel and movement of equipment necessary to future production of spares for 

engine rebuild changed the return on investment 

to one year instead of immediate. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Stratford Army Engine Plant. 

Big Coppett Key, Florida 

Catego y: Minor Installation 

Mission: Formerly provided 

communication support to 

the US. Army 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.05 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $0.01 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Big Coppett Key. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Big Coppett Key, an island near Key West, consists of approximately five acres and 3,000 square 

feet of facilities. Big Coppett Key formerly provided communications support to United States 

Army. Since the Army no longer uses Big Coppett 

Key, it is excess and to Army requirements. Closing Rig Coppett Key will save base operations and 

maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community . 

Corn m ission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recom m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Big 

Coppett Key. 

Price Support Center, Illinois 

Categoy: Command, Control and 

Administration 

Mission: Administrative and logistics support 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-01: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recornmendation 

Close Charles Melvin Price Support Center, except 

a srnall reserve enclave and a storage area. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides area 

support and military housing to the Army and 

other Federal activities in the St. Louis, MO, area. 

It is low in military value compared to similar 

installations. Its tenants, including a recruiting 

company and a criminal investigative unit, can 

easily relocate. 

This recommendation is related to the Army's recommendation to relocate Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM) from St. Louis, MO, to other 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-11 
locations. A reduction in the Army’s presence in 

the area warrants a corresponding reduction in 

Charles Melvin Price Support Center. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the military value was 

understated because it did not adequately consider logistical value of the Price Support Center. 

The Army Center provides most of its support to 

other DoD organizations, and only limited support 

to the Aviation-Troop Command. The community 

argued the Army’s savings were overstated 

because housing allowance costs were not considered, and closure costs were understated because 

the Army did not include costs to relocate the 

various DoD tenants. Finally, the community 

believes adequate housing is not available in the 

local market. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army did not include 

housing allowances for all personnel remaining in 

the St. Louis area. The Commission analysis shows 

the Army will save only $77,000 annually by paying housing allowances rather than operating and 

maintaining the family housing at Price Support 

Center. The Commission found the housing has 

no deferred maintenance, primarily because 100 

of the 164 units were built during 1988/90 time 

frame. In addition, the Commission noted 257 personnel are already in off-base housing that is 

deemed unacceptable due to cost and distance 

from their work location. The Commission found 

the tenant activities do not have to be relocated, 

since the enclave includes all the warehouse and 

storage space. Finally, the Commission found the 

relocation of the Aviation-Troop Command has 

minimal effect on the Price Support Center. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Charles Melvin Price Support Center will 

remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois 

Categoy: Ammunition Storage Installations 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue conventional 

ammunition and critical strategic material; 

Technical Center for Explosives Safety; US. 

Army Defense Ammunition Center and School 

One-time Cost: $66 6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $41.6 million (Cost) 

Annual: $12. I million 

Return on Investment: 2006 (5 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secreta y of Defme Recommendation 

Close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition 

Center and School (USADACS) to McAIester Army 

Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This recommendation is supported by the Army’s 

long range operational assessment. The Army has 

adopted a “tiered” ammunition depot concept to 

reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required 

ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army 

to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot 

concept reduces the number of active storage sites 

and makes efficiencies possible: 

(1) Tier 1-Active Core Depots. These installations 

will support a normal/full-up activity level with a 

stockage configuration of primarily required 

stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring 

demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily 

receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war 

reserve stocks required in contingency operations 

and additional war reserve stocks to augment 

lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will 

receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization. 

(2) Tier 24adre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war 

reserve requirements. Daily activity will he minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on 

maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have 

minimal staffs unless a contingency arises. 

(3) Tier 3-Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store 

stocks no longer required until demilitarized or 

relocated. The Army plans to eliminate its stocks 

at these sites no later than year 2001. Savanna 

Army Depot Activity is a Tier 3 depot. 

USADACS performs the following basic functions: 

munitions training, logistics engineering, explosive 

safety, demilitarization research and development, 

technical assistance, and career management. 

1-12 CHAPTER 1 
Relocation of USADACS to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (UP) allows it to collocate with 

an active ammunition storage and production 

operation. McAlester AAP, a Tier 1 depot, is the 

best for providing the needed capabilities. 

Community Concerns 

The community claims an Army study concluded 

all indoor Army ammunition storage would be full 

in Fiscal Year 95, arguing no such facilities can be 

closed. In addition, they argue costs of moving 

ammunition and personnel, as well as building 

a new facility to house the United States Army 

Defense Ammunition Center and School 

(USADACS) are understated. The Savanna community also alleges facilities identified to house 

USADACS at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, 

Oklahoma, are inadequate. The community contends the explosive waste incinerator and depleted uranium demilitarization facilities on site at 

Savanna are essential to achieving Army demilitarization goals. Local officials note the unemployment resulting from a closure would reach 10.6 

percent in Carroll and Jo Daviess counties, and 

increased unemployment would have extra impact 

on their rural area. They project 914 million in 

extra costs due to DoD’s obligation to buy unsold 

homes, given the poor local real estate market. 

The community also notes reuse of Savanna 

would lie inhibited by buried ammunition from its 

years as an artillery range. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found facilities at McAlester 

Army Ammunition Plant will be adequate to house 

USADACS when construction is complete, and the 

community’s estimate of $50 million in facilities 

costs was not documented. The economic impact 

in Carroll and Jo Daviess Counties was judged to 

be significant. 

The Commission found the ammunition tiering 

plan used as an input to the Army’s operational 

blueprint was not intended for HRAC purposes, 

and contained both internal inconsistencies and 

flaws arising from its use in the BRAC context. 

Because of the inclusion of the tiering plan, bases 

in different tiers could not lie fairly evaluated 

against each other. Don’s estimated cost of moving 

residual ammunition was at the low end of the cost 

range established by Industrial Operations Conunand. 

Also, the Commission agreed with the Department 

that it was Inore economical to store depleted 

uranium munitions than to demilitarize them. 

The Cornmission found no significant excess 

capacity existed in the Army ammunition storage 

system. ‘The Commission, however, also found 

retention of the demilitarization capability at Sierra 

Army Depot left enough demilitarization capacity 

to create excess storage capacity equal to two 

installations over the next six years if demilitarization of existing ammunition stored outdoors is 

deferred. Given that ability, the Commission ultimately decided Savanna could he closed. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substanti:illy from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the 

United States Army Defense Ammunition Center 

and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma. 

Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland 

Category: Leases 

Mission: Independent studies 

One-time Gost: $2.7 million 

Savings: 1996-01: $0.1 million 

Annual: $0.9 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (4 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to 

Fort Belvoir, VA. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In 1993, the Commission suggested that Don direct the Services to include a separate category for 

leased facilities to ensure a tiotton-up review of 

leased space. The Army has conducted a review 

of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. 

Because of the cost of leasing, the Army’s goal is 

to minimize leased space when feasible, and 

maximize the use of government-owned space. 

Since Army studies indicate that space is available 

at Fort Helvoir, the Concepts Analysis Agency can 

easily relocate with limited renovation. The annual 

cost of the current lease is $1.5 million. 

Cornmunigj Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

~ ~~~ 

1-13 COMMrSSION FINDINGS ANT) RECOMMENDATIONS 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close by 

relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia. 

Fort Holabird, Maryland 

Catego y: Miscellaneous 

Mission: Provide support to tenant activities 

One-time Cost: * 

Savings: 19962001: * 

Annual: * 

Return on Investment: * 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

* Costs and savings for this recommendation 

are included in the Defense Investigative 

Service recommendation. 

Secreta ry of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations 

submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

The Community supports closure of Fort Holabird 

after the relocation of the last remaining tenantthe Investigation Control & Automation Directorate of the Defense Investigative Service. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found Fort Holabird to be excess 

to the needs of the Army. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

close Fort Holabird. Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and 

Automation Directorate (IC&AD) to Fort Meade, 

Maryland. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan 

and final criteria. 

Fort Meade, Maryland 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Provide base operations support to the 

National Security Agency and other tenants 

One-time Cost: $1.6 million 

Savings: 19962001: $1 6.4 million 

Annual: $3.5 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year) 

FINAL AmON: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army 

Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This recommendation, suggested by the Joint 

Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort 

Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at 

Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient 

care would be provided by other military medical 

activities and private facilities through Civilian 

Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 

Services (CHAMPUS). 

Community Concerns 

The community contends the net effect of the 

Army's recommendation would be increased 

costs, not savings. They argue current hospital 

inpatient workload would go to CHAMPUS at 

rates higher than the Army estimates, and the cost 

of workload moving to Walter Reed Army Medical 

Center would be higher than the cost of the same 

workload at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. The community also believes there could be 

negative impacts on the 57 tenant activities on 

Fort hleade and the 778 Fort Meade families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program. 

Finally, the community contends there would be 

negative cost and access implications for current 

hospital users, especially retirees. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found realignment of Kimbrough 

Army Community Hospital, to an outpatient clinic, 

will reduce costs by eliminating excess acute care 

hospital beds in an area with a number of other 

militaiy hospitals. The Commission recognized 

current hospital users will have to travel to Walter 

Reed .Army Medical Center or to civilian hospitals 

in order to receive needed inpatient services. 

1-14 CHAPTER 1 
While the Commission found this recommendation will save the government money, the Commission acknowledges the inconvenience some 

current Kimhrough users, particularly families 

enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Prograin and some members of the retired community, will experience. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Fort Made by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient 

services. 

Fort Ritchie, Maryland 

Catego y: Command and Control 

Mission: Provides base operations and real 

property maintenance for the garrison 

installation, the National Military 

Command Center Facility Site R, 

satellite activities, and other tenants 

(including Camp David) 

One-time Cost: $69.9 rrzillion 

Savings: 1996-2001: $23.3 million 

Annual: $26 1 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, 

MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering 

Command elements to Fort Huachuca. AZ. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This recommendation assumes that base support 

for Defense Intelligence Agency and other 

National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. 

Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to 

Fort Detrick will: (a> maintain operational mission 

support to geographically unique Sites R and C 

(National Military Command Center) for the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff; (11) capitalize on existing facilities 

at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of 

Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; 

(d) collocate signal units that were previously 

separated at two different garrisons; (el consolidate 

major portion of Inforination Systems Engineering 

Command-CONUS with main headquarters of 

Information Systems Engineering Command to 

improve synergy of information system operations; and (0 provide a direct support East Coast 

Information Systems Engineering Command field 

element to respond to regional requirements. 

These relocations, collocations and consolidations 

allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie’s garrison and 

avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support Facilities at a small installation. 

Community Concerns 

The comniunity argues Fort Ritchie provides vital 

joint service support of high military value within 

the National Capital Region. As such, the installation met the Army’s operational blueprint for ;I 

critical facility and should have been excluded 

from closure consideration. In the community’s 

view, Fort Ritchie provides critical support to the 

Alternate Joint Command and Control Site R. Relocation of [hat support to Fort Detrick, Maryland, 

would unacceptably degrade emergency response 

time to Site R. The comniunity maintains the DoD 

recommendation to close Fort Ritchie misses an 

opportunity to achieve synergy by not consolidating disparate Defense Information Systems Agency 

-Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) elements at Fort Ritchie. They also note the primary 

customer blase for numerous tenants is located in 

the National Capital Region (NCK). Relocation of 

those tenants to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, would 

result in increased operating costs not captured in 

the DoD cost estimates. The community further 

contends existing water shortages at Fort 

Huachuca .will be exacerbated by relocating elements from Fort Ritchie. 

The community argues that initial Army cost estimates were fatally flawed. Personnel strength figures and family housing operations were 

erroneous, and cost estimates failed to consider 

the requirement for continued on-site garrison 

activities at Site R. From the community’s perspective, the flawed estimates invalidate the foundation of the closure recommendation. The 

community also notes the impact of closing Fort 

Ritchie will be a severe economic blow to the 

surrounding Northern Marylandhouthern Pennsylvania area where the unemployment rate is consistently greater than state and national averages. 

COMMISSION FINIXNGS AND KECO~MENIIATIONS 1-15 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found support to the Alternate 

National Military Command Center (Site R) is a 

vital requirement, and that response time from 

Fort Detrick, Maryland, is 45 minutes or more 

longer than from Fort Ritchie. The Chairman, Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, however, accepts the lengthened 

response time, and thus the Commission found 

this recommendation does not adversely impact 

operation of Site R. 

The Commission noted the Defense Information 

Systems Agency-Western Hemisphere (DISAWESTHEM) performs valuable oversight of 

Defense Department automated management 

database links. The Commission found DISAWESTHEM’S mission is not location dependent. It 

can be accomplished anywhere appropriate communication nodes exist. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Ritchie except for a National 

Guard enclave. Relocate the 11 11 th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, 

Maryland. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Publications Distribution Center, 

Baltimore, Maryland 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Publications distribution 

One-time Cost: $7.0 million 

Savings: 19962001: $27.3 million 

Annual: $7.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1938 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close by relocating the US. Army Publications 

Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army 

Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis, combines the wholesale 

and retail distribution functions of publication 

distribution into one location. The consolidation 

eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in 

favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and 

creates efficiencies in the oven11 distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one 

less costly lease. 

Community Concerns 

The community expressed concern that greater 

savings would be achieved by consolidating all of 

the DoD Publications Centers into the Baltimore 

and St. Louis Centers. They argue because both 

are DoD’s most sophisticated publications centers, 

the lesser, more manual facilities throughout DoD 

should be consolidated into the two best. The 

community expressed concern the Baltimore Center was classified as a manual operation when in 

fact it is a highly automated facility. Despite the 

fact that forklift operators are still required to store 

and retrieve stock, the rest of the facility is highly 

automated. The community expressed concern if 

the Baltimore Center closed, the St. Louis Center 

would be required to lease additional warehouse 

space in St. Louis because they do not possess the 

space required to absorb Baltimore’s stock. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found although the Department 

of Defense is currently studying the consolidation 

of all DoD publication distribution centers, no 

such consolidation is expected to involve the Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore. The Commission found Publications Distribution Center, 

Baltimore is an automated facility despite the Secretary of the Army’s assertion that it is a manual 

facility. Additionally, the Commission found the 

Army will be using warehouse space on an Armyowned installation during the transition period 

involving the consolidation of the two Army publications distributions centers. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close by 

relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution 

Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications 

Center St. Louis, Missouri. 

1-16 CHAPTE~~ 1 
Tri-Service Project Reliance 

(Fort Detrick, Maryland) 

Catego y: Commodity 

Mission: Provide facilities and 

services to tenant activities 

One-time Cost: $0.3 million 

Savings: 19962001: $4.5 million 

Annual: $0.03 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon 

disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical 

Research Development Laboratory (USABIIDL) at 

Fort Detrick, MU, do not collocate environmental 

and occupational toxicology research with the 

Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, OH. Instead relocate the health advisories environrnental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental 

Quality Research Branch to tlie U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, MD, and maintain the remaining 

functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity 

assessment models and on-site biomonitoring 

research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort 

Detrick as part of Headquarters. US. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There are no operational advantages that accrue 

by relocating this activity to Wright-Patterson AFB. 

Substantial resoiirces were expended over the last 

15 years to develop this unique laboratory currently used by researchers from across the DoD, 

other federal agencies, and the academic community. No fxdities are available at Wright-I’atterson 

to accommodate this unique aquatic research 

activity, which supports environmental quality 

R&D initiatives developing cost effective alternatives to the use of mammalian species in toxicity 

testing. The Commission found necessar): significant new construction would lie required at 

Wright-Patterson to duplicate facilities at Fort 

Detrick to continue this critical research. No construction is required at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

however. Furthermore, the quality of water 

required for the culture of aquatic animals used in 

this research is not adequate at Wright-Patterson. 

The Commission found to maintain the water 

quality it would necessitate additional construction 

and result in either several years of costly overlapping research in h/latyl:ind and Ohio. or the loss of 

over 10 years experience bvith the unique la11 

colonies used at Fort [letrick. ‘I’he N:ivy mcl the 

Air Forc’e agree that true research synergy is possible without executing the planned relocation. 

Commzin ity Concerns 

There \vex no formal 

community. 

Comm i.ssion Findings 

The Commission found 

expressions from the 

this rec~oni mend;^ t ion 

would permit Don to avoid the cost mcl disruption of relocating 21 unique facility without conipromising tlie cross-servicing goals of the 

Tri-Service Project Reliance Study. Therefore, the 

Commission found this recommendation does not 

deviate from the 1991 Commission’s intention to 

consolidate biomedical research functions. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcr-structure plari :id final criteria. Therefore. the Cornmission recommends the follcnving: clinnge the 

recommtndation of the 1991 Commission reg:ircling Tri-Service Project Rehnce. Ilpon clisestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical 

Research Development Laboratory (L1SABRL)L) at 

Fort Detrick, Maryland, clo not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research u.ith 

the Armstrong Laboratoiy at Wriglit-l-’;itterson Air 

Force Base, Ohio. Instead relocate the health ad\+ 

sories environmental fate research and niilitxy criteria research functions of the Environment:il 

Quality Research Branch to the LJ.S. Army Environmenta.1 Hygiene Agency (AH IA), Abertleen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, and maint;iin tlie remaining functions of conducting non-iiinmmalian 

toxicity assessment models and on-site 

bioinonitoring research of the Kese:uch Methods 

Branch at Fort Detrick 21s part of F-leadqu;irters, 

US. Army Medical Research and Materiel Commantl. 

Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts 

Catego y: Minor Installatiori 

Mission: Currently has no mission 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.8 inillion 

Return ow Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annuar‘: $0.2 million 
Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Hingham Cohasset. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Hingham Cohasset, formerly a U.S. Army Reserve 

Center, is essentially vacant and is excess to the 

Army’s requirements. The site consists of approximately 125 acres and 150,000 square feet of facilities. Closing Hingham Cohasset will save base 

operations and maintenance funds and provide 

reuse opportunities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no forinal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Hingham Cohasset. 

Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provide storage facilities 

for various DoD activities 

One-time Cost: $0.8 million 

Savings: 19962001: $-0. I million (Cost) 

Annual: $0. I million 

Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Sudbury Training Annex. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Sudbury Training Annex, outside Boston, consists 

of approximately 2,000 acres and 200,000 square 

feet of facilities. The primary mission of Sudbury 

Training Annex is to provide storage facilities for 

various Department of Defense activities. Sudbury 

Training Annex is excess to the Army’s requirements. Closing the annex will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse 

opportunities for approximately 2,000 acres. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Sudbury Training Annex. 

Detroit Arsenal, Michigan 

Catego y: Commodity 

Mission: Tank Production 

One-time Cost: $1.4 million 

Savings: 19962001: $7.9 million 

Annual: $3.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Detroit Arsenal by closing and disposing 

of the Detroit Army Tank Plant. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Detroit Tank Plant, located on Detroit Arsenal, is 

one of two Army Government-owned, contractoroperated tank production facilities. A second facility is located at Lima, Ohio, (Lima Army Tank 

Plant). The Detroit plant is not as technologically 

advanced as the Liina facility and is not configured for the latest tank production. Moreover, 

retaining the plant as a “rebuild” facility is not 

practical since Anniston Army Depot is capable of 

rebuilding and repairing the M1 Tank and its principal components. Accordingly, the Detroit Tank 

Plant is excess to Army requirements. 

Community Concerns 

The community expresses concern over the loss 

of approximately 150 civilian contractor employees. While the impact is less than one percent of 

the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area, the community argues the loss of these jobs should be 

included in the Army’s analysis of the Detroit 

Arsenal recommendation. Additionally, the community challenges transfer of gun mount produc1-18 CHAPTER 1 
tion to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, arguing 

Detroit Arsenal could produce gun mounts of better quality at lower cost. They further state movement of gun mount production from a 

Government-owned, contractor-operated facility 

(Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant) to a Governmentowned, Government-operated facility (Rock Island 

Arsenal) is in conflict with guidance in Office of 

Management and Budget Circular A-76. The community believes there are inaccuracies in the 

Army's cost analysis of the recommendation. They 

fault the Army for not recognizing the need to 

relocate 40 Defense Contract Management Office 

personnel located at the plant and for not including costs for equipment movement and military 

construction at gaining installations in its economic analysis. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found omission of contract joh 

losses had no significant bearing on the overall 

recommendation or the local community. The total impact is less than one percent of the Detroit 

Metropolitan Statistical Area. Input from the Army 

indicated that Rock Island Arsenal and Lima Army 

Tank Plant can accept transfer of production 

requirements without additional equipment or 

construction. The Commission found consolidating gun mount production at Rock Island would 

result in unit cost reduction to approximately 

$38,000 from the current $53.000. There was no 

indication quality at either location varies; therefore, it is not a significant issue. In addition, there 

was no indication the Secretary of Defense's recommendation conflicted with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. Finally, the 

Commission found Defense Contracting Management Office personnel would move to other space 

on Detroit Arsenal. 

Commission Reco m m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Detroit 

Arsenal by closing and disposing of the Detroit 

Army Tank Plant. 

Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan 

Catego y: Command, Control and Adrninistration 

Mission: Installation and logistical support 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-01: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close US. Army Garrison, Selfridge. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Closing Selfridge eliminates an installation that 

exists primarily to provide housing for activities 

(predominantly Detroit Arsenal) located in the immediate area although such support can be provided through a less costly alternative. Sufficient 

commercial housing is available on the local 

economy for military personnel using Variable 

Housing Allowance/Rasic Allowance for Quarters. 

Closure avoids the cost of continued operation 

and tnaintenance of unnecessary support facilities. 

This recommendation will not degrade local military activities. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the base has high military value since it is a model of joint operations. 

The community argued the savings are significantly overstated because the Army, (1) did not 

include h'ousing allowance costs for a11 personnel 

residing in the Family housing, and, (2) overstated 

the cost of family housing operations. Furthermore, the community contends suitable housing is 

not available in the local market. Because no 

other DOT) activities are relocating, the community 

contends the base operations savings are overstated and these activities will have t<) increase 

their funding. 

Com in ission Findings 

The Commission found the savings from closing 

family housing were overstated. The Commission 

analysis shows the Army will save $500,000 annually by paying housing allowances rather than 

operating and maintaining the family housing at 

Selfridge, because the Army did not include the 

cost of housing allowances for all personnel 

remaining in the area. The Cornmission found the 

housing allowances are adequate for the area 

rents, but a two percent vacancy rate may make it 

difficult to find housing. The Commission found 

the 765 active units meet current Don standards 

and there is $150,000 in deferred maintenance. 

Finally, the Commission found another service 

would have to increase its base operations funding, which would reduce the estiinated savings. 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission Gnds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: U.S. Army Garrison, Selfridge will remain 

open. The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Aviation-Troop Command, Missouri 

Categoty: Leases 

Mission: Logistics support 

One-time Cost: $152.1 million 

Savings: 199601: $31.3 million 

Annual: $560 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), 

and close by relocating its missions/functions 

as follows: 

Relocate Aviation Research, Development Sr 

Engineering Center; Aviation Management; 

and Aviation Program Executive Offices to 

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, to form 

the Aviation & Missile Command. 

Relocate functions related to soldier systems 

to Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center, MA, to align with the Soldier 

Systems Command. 

Relocate functions related to materiel management of communications-electronics to 

Fort Monmouth, NJ, to align with Communications-Electronics Command. 

functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI, to align with 

Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. 

Relocate automotive materiel management 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct 

the Services to include a separate category for 

leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of 

leased space. The Army has conducted a review 

of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. 

Because of the cost of leasing, the Army’s goal is 

to minimize leased space, when feasible, and 

maximize the use of government-owned facilities. 

In 1991, the Commission approved the merger of 

Aviation Systems Command and Troop Systems 

Corninand (ATCOM). It also recommended that 

the Arniy evaluate the relocation of these activities 

from leased space to government-owned facilities 

and provide appropriate recommendations to a 

subsequent Commission. In 1993, the Army studied 

the possibility of relocating ATCOM to a military 

installation and concluded it would be too costly. 

It is evident that restructuring ATCOM now provides 

a financially attractive opportunity to relocate. 

Significant functional efficiencies are also possible 

by separating aviation and troop support commodities and relocating these functions to military 

installations. The aviation support functions realign 

to Redstone Arsenal to form a new Aviation & 

Missiles Command. The troop support functions 

realign to Natick, MA to align with the new Soldier Systems Command. 

This recommendation preserves crucial research 

and development functions while optimizing operational efficiencies. Moving elements of ATCOM 

to Natick and Redstone Arsenal improves the synergistic effect of research, development and engineering, by facilitating the interaction between the 

medic:il, academic, and industrial communities 

already present in these regions. Vacating the St. 

Louis lease will collocate/consolidate similar life 

cycle functions at military installations for improved efficiencies and effectiveness. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends the Army did not conduct a military value assessment of leased facilities, which is a substantial deviation from DoD 

policy. The community believes the civilian personnel eliminations were overscated because, (1) 

too many mission support positions were eliminated, (2) positions required for area support in 

St. Louis were eliminated, (3) the number of base 

operation support positions at the gaining installations is understated, and (4) the Army counted 

force structure reductions as savings. The community also believes the Army failed to comply with 

its Stationing Strategy which states consolidations 

should increase efficiency and reduce overhead. 

According to the community, transfer of ATCOM’s 

functions to the proposed receiving bases would 

increase the Army’s overhead costs. The community believes the Army could achieve significant 

savings if they moved activities from leased 

space in Huntsville, Alabama to Redstone Arsenal. 

The community also argued the cost to establish 

Soldier System Command should have been 

1-20 CHAPTER 1 
included. Finally, the General Services Administration contends the recommendation would significantly increase the cost to the government, 

because they would have to close the St. Louis 

facility and relocate the remaining tenants. 

Commission Findings 

The Conimission found the Army did a military 

value assessment of the Aviation-Troop Coinmand, and, although the process was different 

than the one used for the other installation categories, all leased facilities were analyzed equally. 

The Commission found the personnel savings 

were not overstated to the degree stated by the 

community, although the Commission did reduce 

the number of civilian position eliminations for 

planned force-structure changes. The personnel 

savings represent a 21 percent reduction in personnel, which can be achieved by merging Aviation-Troop Command and Missile Command. The 

Commission found the community incorrectly 

counted force-structure reductions in the Program 

Executive Office-Aviation and Systems Integrated 

Management Activity as base closure savings. 

The Commission found disestablishing AviationTroop Command, and realigning its functions, to 

military organizations with similar life-cycle functions is consistent with the Army's Stationing Strategy. The Commission found the recommendation 

will reduce base operating costs by $7.4 million. 

ion also found the savings from 

realigning ATCOM are much greater than moving 

activities from leased space in Huntsville, Alabama, onto Kedstone Arsenal. The Army is moving some activities in leased space in Huntsville 

onto existing space at Kedstone Arsenal, as well as 

consolidating into fewer leased facilities. These 

actions will save $2.1 million annually. 

Finally, the Commission found the Army did not 

consider the total cost to the government from 

relocating ATCOM. According to General Services 

Administration (GSA) officials, they can not backfill the 700,000 square feet of space, so the 

remaining tenants will be relocated. GSA estimated it will cost $11.1 million to relocate the 

tenants, and they will incur rent increase of $3.8 

million annually. Even when these costs are included, and total cost to the government is considered, the Commission found the recommendation 

of the Secretary of Defense still provided significant savings, 

Commission Reco m mendu ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the fo 11 owing : 

disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), 

and close by relocating its missiom'functions as 

follows: relocate Aviation Research, Development 

& Engineering Center; Aviation Management; and 

Aviation Program Executive Offices to Redstone 

Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, to form the Aviation 

& Missile Command. Relocate functions related to 

soldier systems to Natick Research, Development, 

Engineering Center, Massachusetts, to align with 

the Soldier Systems Command. Relocate functions 

related to materiel management of communications-electronics to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 

to align with Communications-Electronics Command. Relocate automotive inateriel management 

functions to Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, to align 

with Tank-Automotive and Arindments Command. 

Fort Missoula, Montana 

Catego y: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provides administration, 

maintenance, and logistics support 

to Reserve Components 

One-time Cost: $0.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.6 million 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort Missoukd, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the 

Reserve Component units. 

Secreta y of Defense.ustijicution 

Fort Missoula consists of approxiinately 35 acres 

and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It provides 

administration, supply, training, maintenance, 

logistics support to Reserve Component forces. 

The post also provides facilities for the United 

States Forest Service. Fort Missoula has land and 

facilities excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Fort Missoula will save base operations and 

maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 25 acres. The Army intends 

to continue to license buildings and land currently 

occupied by the Army Kational Guard. 
Community Concerns 

The Rocky Mountain Heritage Group has 

expressed interest in property. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation to close Fort Missoula reduces unnecessary 

infrastructure; however, there is a need to maintain minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Components. 

Commission Recommendution 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Fort 

Missoula, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Component units. 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, 

New Jersey 

Category: Ports 

Mission: Manage movement of DoD cargo 

throughout the eastern US and Atlantic; 

manage port operations on the East Coast and 

at Atlantic locations in support of European, 

Afdcan, Mediterranean, and South American 

Theaters of Operations 

One-time Cost: $79.7 million 

Savings: 19962001: $-23.9 million (Cost) 

Annual: $I 7. I million 

Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. Relocate 

the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 

1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey. Retain an enclave for the Navy Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, and Navy Resale 

and Fashion Distribution Center. 

Secretav of Defense Justification 

This recommendation is supported by the Army’s 

long range operational assessment. The primary 

mission of Bayonne is the shipment of general 

bulk cargo. It has no capability to ship bulk munitions. There are sufficient commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts to support power 

projection requirements with a minimal loss to 

operational capability. Bayonne provides the 

Army with few military capabilities that cannot be 

accomplished at commercial ports. 

Community Concerns 

The community states Army ownership of 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal (MOT) provides 

a vital capability unavailable through use of commercial port facilities. Bayonne offers a secure environment and the flexibility to stage and 

reconfigure equipment. The communities argue 

staging and temporary storage is extremely limited 

at area commercial ports. Some commercial automobile cargo is staging on Bayonne MOT property due to lack of commercial holding space. The 

community also pointed out commercial facilities 

generally lack the reinforced pavement necessary 

to handle certain heavy military vehicles. Additionally, commercial ports are not configured to 

handle most military cargo efficiently. (Military 

cargo is characterized as outsized, overweight, 

and non-container.) Further, the specialized contract work force at Bayonne provides skill in handling military cargo that is not available at area 

commercial ports. 

The community argues New York area commercial ports are operating near or above capacity. 

While commercial port operators are willing to 

work with military planners to augment military 

terminal capacity, they are not willing to guarantee meeting all crisis military staging and berthing 

requirements within the 48 hour period specified 

by Port Planning Orders. Abrupt disruption to 

their commercial business could prove damaging 

to their long-term workload and profitability. They 

note that 12-14 days was a more appropriate time 

frame to clear staging and berthing facilities for 

priority military cargo. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission acknowledged the request of the 

Secretary of Defense to modify the DoD recommendation to allow relocation of tenants to a nonspecific destination. The Commission found the 

normal workload did not justify continued military 

operation of the installation. Further, the Commission found commercial ports could handle military 

cargo requirements. The Commission also noted 

six commercial ports capable of deploying an 

infantry division exist within one day’s rail movement of Bayonne. The Commission observed the 

growth in commercial port workload has resulted 

1-22 CHAPTER 1 
in port operators tiecoming increasingly unwilling 

to guarantee priority to military cargo within the 

48-hour period required by Port Planning Orders 

(PPO). In some cases they desire 12-14 days to 

clear staging and berthing Facilities for military 

deployments. The Commission acknowledged the 

Maritime Administration (MARAD). Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking initiatives to 

address the commercial port concerns. Further, 

the Commission noted legal means exist through 

the Maritime Administration for compelling commercial operators to give priority to military 

deployments during contingency situations. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterki 1 and 3. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close I3ayonne Military Ocean Terminal. 

Relocate the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 

1301st Major Port Command to a location to be 

determined. Move the Navy Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, and Navy Resale and Fashion Distribution Center to a location to be determined. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Camp Kher, New Jersey 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provides administration, maintenance, 

and logistical support to Reserve Components 

One-time Cost: $0.1 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1.0 million 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Camp Kilmer, except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve 

Components. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Camp Kilrner consists of approximately 75 acres 

and 331,000 square feet of facilities. The camp 

provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of the site is excess 

to the Army’s requirements. Closing Camp Kilmer 

will save hase operations and maintenance funds 

and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 

56 acres. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Secretary’s recoinmendation to close Camp Kilmer, New Jersey reduces 

unnecessary infrastructure; however, there is a 

need to maintain minimum necessary facilities to 

support current and future requirements of the 

Reserve Components. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Cominission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: close Camp Kilmer, 

except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve Components. 

Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provides administration, maintenance, 

and logistical support to Reserve Components 

One-time Cost: $0.1 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1.8 million 

Annual: $0.4 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Camp Pedricktown, except the SieversSandberg Reserve Center. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Camp Pedricktown consists of approximately 82 

acres and 260,000 square feet of facilities. Its primary mission is to provide administration, supply, 

training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of 

Camp Pedricktown’s land and facilities are excess 

to Army requirements. Closing it will save base 

operations and maintenance funds and provide 

reuse opportunities for approximately 60 acres. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Secretary’s recommendation to close Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey 

reduces unnecessary infrastructure; however, 

there is a need to maintain the Sievers-Sandberg 

Reserve Center. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Camp Pedricktown, except the Sievers-Sandberg 

Reserve Center. 

Caven Point Army Reserve Center, 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provides administration and 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Caven Point U. S. Army Reserve Center. 

Relocate its reserve activities to the Fort Hamilton, 

NY, provided the recommendation to realign Fort 

Hamilton is approved. 

New Jersey 

logistical support to Reserve Components 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center (USARC) is 

located near Jersey City, NJ, and consists of approximately 45,000 square feet of administrative and 

maintenance facilities on 35 acres. It is overcrowded and in generally poor condition. The primary mission of Caven Point USARC is to provide 

administrative, logistics and maintenance support 

to the Army Reserve. The consolidation of tenants 

from Caven Point USAKC with Reserve Component activities remaining on Fort Hamilton will 

achieve savings in operations costs. 

Community Concerns 

The City of Jersey City has expressed concern 

they have an agreement to lease land that runs 

through Caven Point for the purpose of extending 

a highway and want to ensure the BRAC process 

will not jeopardize that arrangement. 

Commission Findings 

As stated by the Secretary of Defense’s letter dated 

June 14th, 1995 and upon independent evaluation, 

the Commission found the closure of Caven Point 

U.S. Army Reserve Center is no longer viable. 

While planning to implement the closure and relocation of this facility to Fort Hamilton, New York, 

the Commission found new construction ($10.5 

million) is required to execute the move. The minor savings ($29 thousand annually) did not justify the expense. Furthermore, this new facility 

requires a larger area than is available for construction at Fort Hamilton. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center will remain 

open. The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Fort Dh, New Jersey 

Category: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Support active Army and Reserve 

One-time Cost: $I 1.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $27.9 million 

Annual: $12.2 million 

Return on Investment 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Component training 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U.S. Army Reserve garrison. 

Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and 

training areas required for Reserve Component 

(RC) training as an enclave. 

Semtaty of Defense Justification 

In the past ten years, the Army has significantly 

reduced its active and re.serve forces. The Army 

must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the 

needs of the future. 

This proposal retains facilities and training areas 

essential to support Army National Guard and U.S. 

Army Reserve units in the Mid-Atlantic states. 

However, it reduces base operations and real 

property maintenance costs by eliminating excess 

facilities. Additionally, this reshaping will truly 

1-24 CHAPTER 1 
move Fort Dix into a preferred role of RC support, It retains an Army Resene garrison to manage Fort nix and provides a base to support RC 

logistical requirements. The Army intends to continue the Army National Guard's current license 

of buildings. 

Various LJS. Army Nation;il Guard and U.S. Army 

Resewe activities regularly train at Fort Dix. The 

post liouses the National Guard High Technology 

Training Center, a unique facility providing stateof-the-art training devices for guardsmen and 

reservists in a 12-state ma. Fort nix's geographic 

proximity to a large portion of the nation's KC 

forces and the air and seaports of embarkation 

make it one of the most suitable RC Major Training Areas in the IJnited States. This recommendation is consistent with the decision of the 1991 

Commission, but better aligns the operation of the 

installation with its users. 

Community Concerns 

Members of the Fort llix community and 

Rurlington County expressed strong support for 

keeping Fort Dix open in accordance with the 

realignment recommendation. Earlier concerns 

that enough personnel would not be retained in 

the workforce to support Reserve Component 

training in the region were allayed when the Army 

agreed that 700-750 einployees would be required 

for this support. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the recommendation of 

the Secretary of Defense for the realignment of 

the Active Army garrison to an Army Reserve 

Command garrison was both reasonable and wellsuited to enhancing this installation as a model for 

supporting Reserve Component (RC) training in 

the region. The efficiencies gained, and savings 

generated. will permit greater support for KC 

forces as the installation garrison focuses on carrying out its primary mission. The Commission 

found the community's concern that enough garrison staff lie ret:iined to support the RC training 

mission was valid, and noted the Army's agreement to provide adequate personnel to do so. 

Co m rn ission Recom m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Coinmission reconirnentls the following: realign 

Fort nix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U.S. Army Iieserve garrison. Ketain 

minimum essential ranges. facilities. and training 

areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave. 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York 

Catego y: Minor Installation 

Mission: Maintenance and logistical support 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $2.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $0.3 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Bellmore Logistics Activity. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, l(:icated on Long Island, 

consists of approximately 17 acres and 180,000 

square feet of facilities. It formerly provided maintenance and logistical support to Reserve Component units. Since Reserve Components no longer 

use Bellmore Logistics Activity, it is excess to the 

Army's requirements. Closing Ikllmore Logistics 

Activity will save base oper:itions md maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no fornial expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Ilefense 

did not deviate sul)stantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Thereforc. the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Bellmore Logistics Activity. 

Fort Hamilton, New York 

Catego y: Command and Control 

Mission: Provide administrative and logistical 

support for Army and DoD agencies in the 

New York metropolitan area; serue as headquarters for sub-installation-Fort Totten 

One-time Cost: None 
Savings: 19962001: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Annual: None 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Hamilton. Dispose of all family housing. Retain minimum essential land and Facilities 

for existing Army units and activities. Relocate all 

Army Reserve units from Caven Point, New Jersey, 

to Fort Hamilton. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Fort Hamilton is low in military value compared to 

the other command and control/administrative 

support installations. The post has limited capacity 

for additional growth or military development. No 

new or additional missions are planned. 

This proposal reduces the size of Fort Hamilton 

by about one-third to support necessary military 

missions in the most cost effective manner. The 

New York Area Command, which includes protocol support to the United Nations, will remain at 

Fort Hamilton. Another installation will assume 

the area support currently provided to the New 

York area. 

The Armed Forces Reserve Center at Caven Point 

was built in 1941. Its sole mission is to support 

reserve component units. The buildings on the 35- 

acre parcel are in poor condition. Relocating to 

Fort Hamilton will allow the Army Reserve to 

eliminate operating expenses in excess of $100 

thousand per year. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues adoption of the DoD recommendation would close family housing, force 

military families onto the economy, and yield only 

minor cost savings to the government. They also 

maintain the combined military entitlements of 

Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable 

Housing Allowance (VHA) are $200-$500 per 

month less than the cost of area rentals. Further 

the availability of local rentals is very low. Access 

to the tight rental market is further compounded 

by culturally cohesive neighborhoods, where 

long-term residency is the norm. The community 

asked the Commission to give the recent military 

housing privatization initiative a chance to mature 

through the legislative process and reject the DoD 

recommendation to close Fort Hamilton’s family 

housing. The community believes Fort Hamilton is 

a highly cost efficient installation providing vital 

services to military elements and retirees in the 

New York area. The Army has a historic presence 

in New York City dating back to the Revolution. 

Adoption of the DoD recommendation would 

effectively terminate the last active Army facility in 

the New York City area. 

Corn mission Findings 

The Commission found the age and condition 

of housing is generally comparable to the local 

market, even though a significant backlog of 

unfunded maintenance exists. The Commission 

noted local housing is expensive, and vacancies 

are limited due to culturally cohesive neighborhoods where long term residency is normal. Rentals cornparable to family housing would exceed 

military quarters entitlements by $200-$500 per 

month. The Commission found adoption of the 

DoD recommendation would result in shifting 

an unwarranted cost burden onto a Family housing population composed of relatively junior 

enlisted military Families (currently 37.5 percent 

E-5 and below). 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 

5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: Fort Hamilton will remain open. Anny 

Reserve units at Caven Point, New Jersey will 

remain in place. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Fort Totten, New York 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: As a sub-post of Fort Hamilton 

andpart of the New York Area Command, 

provides support to active duty and retired 

personnel within the local area; serves 

as host to Headquarters, 77th US. Army 

Reserve Command 

Onetime Cost: $1.0 million 

Savings: 19362001: $1.5 million 

Annual: $0.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort Totten, except an enclave for the U. S. 

Army Reserve. Dispose of family housing. 

1-26 CHAPTEK 1 
/’ 

Secretary of Defense Justifcation 

Fort Totten, 21 suh-insVallation of Fort Hamilton, 

provides administrative and logistical support to 

Army Kesene units in the New York City metropolitan area. 

Fort Totten is low in military value compared to 

other command and controlPadministrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for 

growth or further military development. 

Fort Totten is home to the Ernie Pyle U.S. Army 

Reserve Center. the largest in the country. Realignment of the Center to nearby Fort Hamilton is not 

possible since Fort Hamilton has little available 

space. Therefore, the Army decided to retain this 

facility as a reserve enclave. 

Community Coszcerns 

The community believes Fort Totten constitutes a 

highly cost-effective operation. Costs associated 

with programs, facilities. and military services provided to active and reserve armed forces members 

woulcl increase substantially if they were drawn 

from the local economy. While quarters are early 

1960s standards approaching the end of their useful life span, they are commensurate with units 

available in the local area. All local rentals are 

expensive and difficult to find. Most rentals 

require three months advance rent, a security 

deposit and a broker’s fee for start-up costs. Combined military entitlements for Basic Allowance for 

Quarters (BAQ) and Vx-iable Housing Allowance 

(VHA) are $200-$500 per month less than the cost 

of area rentals. In addition, there are very few 

local rentals available. Access to the tight rental 

inarket is further compounded by culturally cohesive neighborhoods, where long-term residency 

is the norm. The community also notes that Old 

Fort Totten, an unofficial historic site and 

museum, has an historic legacy and artifacts dating back to the Revolutionary War. Any potential 

development at Fort Totten would pose a threat to 

historic preservation. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the DoD recommendation 

to close Fort Totten pertains priniarily to family 

housing. The Ernie Pyle Reserve Center and 77th 

Army Reserve Command are not at issue in the 

recommendation. 

The Commission acknowledged family housing 

had :i significant backlog of deferred maintenance 

requirements. At least 24 units were inactive due 

to unsatisfied rehabilitation needs, and occupied 

units contained limited amenities. The Commission also noted the area around Fort ’rotten was 

an upscale community where rentals :ire expensive, and vacancies are limited. 13y Commission 

cost estimates. moving Fort Totten’s military families on the economy would result in ;i total out-ofpocket expense of $0.5 million to family housing 

members. Alternatively, the draft Army plan to 

rehabilitate quarters at the Navy’s Mitchell Field, 

Long Island housing area is financially unattractive. The Commission found, however, a sufficient 

number of vacant quarters exist at Fort Hamilton 

to satisfy Fort Totten’s military family housing 

requirements. The Commission found :iccept:ince 

of the Don recommendation woulcl result in a 

reduction of excess infrastructure. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substanti:illy from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore. the 

Commission recommends the following: close Fort 

Totten, except an enclave for the [J.S. Army 

Reserve. Dispose of family housing. 

Seneca Army Depot, New York 

Category: Ammunition Storage Installations 

Mission: Receive, store, issue, maintain and 

demilitarize conventional munitions; receive, 

store, and issue general supplies, including 

hazardous materials and prepositioned 

reserve stocks 

One-time Cost: $29.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $12.9 million 

Annual: $19.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to 

store hazardous material and ores. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This recommendation is supported by the Army’s 

long range operational assessment. The Army has 

adopted a “tiered” ammunition depot concept to 

reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required 

ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements. increase efficiencies and permit the Army 

to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot 
concept reduces the number of active storage sites 

and makes efficiencies possible: 

(1 1 Tier l-Active Core Depots. These installations 

will support a noimal/full-up activity level with a 

stockage configuration of primarily required 

stocks and minimal non-requirecl stocks requiring 

demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily 

receiptdissues of training stocks, storage of war 

reserve stocks required in contingency operations 

and additional war reserve stocks to augment 

lower level tier installation power projecrion capabilities. Installations at this activity level will 

receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization. 

(2) Tier 2-Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war 

reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on 

maintenance, surveillance, inventory and denilitarization operations. These installations will have 

minimal staffs unless a contingency arises. 

(3) Tier Maretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store 

stocks no longer required until demilitarized or 

relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at 

these sites no later than year 2001. Seneca Army 

Depot is a Tier 3 depot. 

Community Concerns 

The Seneca community contends Seneca should 

be a Tier 1 instead of a Tier 3 installation due to 

its power projection capabilities. They note Seneca received no credit for its on-post airfield and 

missile maintenance facilities, and received insufficient value for its conforniing small-arms warehouses. They contend the tiering plan further used 

irrelevant measures for location, storage, and 

power projection, and inclusion of the ammunition tiering plan in the stationing strategy negates 

the military value analysis. The community also 

argues all other Army ammunition storage is full, 

so there would be nowhere for Seneca's amniunition to go. They believe the Department would 

rave more money by closing Letterkenny and 

transferring the missile maintenance mission to 

existing facilities at Seneca. 

Comm ision Findings 

The Commission found the ammunition tiering 

plan used as an input to the Army's operational 

blueprint was not intended for BRAC purposes, 

and contained both internal inconsistencies and 

flaws arising from its use in the RRAC context. Its 

inclusion caused Seneca to lose one position (3rd 

to 4th) in military value ranking. Because of the 

inclusion of the tiering plan, bases in different 

tiers could not be fairly evaluated against each other. 

The Commission found no significant excess capacity existed in the Army ammunition storage system. The Conunission also found, however, with 

the retention of demilitarization capability at Sierra 

Army Depot, the system contained enough demilitarization capacity to create excess storage space 

equal to two installations over the next six years if 

demilitarization of existing ammunition stored outdoors was deferred. 

The Commission also found Seneca was particularly hurt by the choice of square feet as a storage 

metric, and Seneca was not given proper credit 

for its airfield and conforming small-arms warehouses. Given the ability to reduce ammunition 

storage by two installation equivalents, however, 

the Commission found Seneca could be closed. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

commission recommends the following: close 

Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to store 

hazardous material and ores. 

Recreation Center #2, North Carolina 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Currently leased to City of Fayetteville, 

North Carolina 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: I996 (Immediate) 

FIN& ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Recreatim Center "2, Fayetteville, NC. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Recreation Center +2 consists of approximately 

four acres and 17,000 square feet of community 

facilities. Recreation Center "2 is currently being 

leased to the city of Fayetteville, NC, and is excess 

to the Army's requirements. Closing Recreation 

Center #2 will provide reuse opportunities. 

1-28 CHAJ'TER 1 
Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Com m issio n Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Recreation Center ~2, Fayettevik, North Carolina. 

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania 

Catego y: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Support active Army and 

Reserve Component training 

One-time Cost: $8.5 million 

Savings: 19962001: $74.8 million 

Annual: $18.4 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recom menda ti0 n 

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced 

its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce 

excess infrastructure to meet future requirements. 

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. 

Although inanaged by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. 

Annual training for Reserve Component units 

which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum. 

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. 

Army through 2040 for $1. The government can 

terminate the lease with one year’s written notice. 

Facilities erected during the duration of the lease 

are the property of the [J.S. and may be disposed 

of, provided the premises are restored to their 

natural condition. 

Com m u n ity Concerns 

Members of the surrounding communities in the 

Lebanon Valley. as well as officials of the l’ennsylvania National Guard, believe the tr:iining and 

readiness of Reserve Component units within the 

state will suffer as a result of the recommendation. 

The recommendation made by the Secretary of 

Defense would require travel out of state for annual 

training. The community wwuld like to continue 

the current level of daily operations and training 

on the installation with the support and funding 

provided by having an active Army garrison. The 

Pennsylvania National Guard pointed to several 

inaccuracies in the original data calls to The Army 

Basing Study, which resulted in the Cost of Base 

Realignment Actions (COBRA) being recomputed 

and showing lower savings from closing the installation than first estimated. With the various tenant 

activities and daily work and training sites dispersed throughout the base, advocates of keeping 

the post open pointed out that any “enclave” 

would contain virtually the entire installation. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army’s recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap to be reasonable in view of the cost of maintaining the large 

amount of aging infrastructure. The Commission 

carefully examined other installations in the region and found adequate locations exist with sufficient capacity for Reserve Component annual 

training, without Fort Indiantown Gap, but scheduling of such training would be more difficult, 

especially during peak training load periods. The 

Commission also found National Guard and other 

RC units required continued access to Fort 

Indiantown Gap for both individual and annual 

training. 

Claims by elected officials, the Pennsylvania 

National Guard, and community members that the 

Army’s COBRA analysis was flawed were carefully 

reviewed by Commission Staff, the Army Audit 

Agency, and the General Accounting Office. Each 

review supported the Army‘s COBRA. 

The Commission found the Army’s analysis objective and an accurate projection of future, substantial savings. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

COMMISSION FINDINGS ilN1) RECO~IMENIIATIONS 1-20 
plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Fort 

Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential 

ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve 

Component training enclave to permit the conduct 

of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania 

Category: Command, Control and 

Mission: Administrative and logistics support 

One-time Cost: $0.3 million 

Savings: 199601: $2.1 million 

Annual: $0.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Administration 

Secreta y of Defense Recornmendation 

Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating 

Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. 

Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate 

the Army Reserve’s leased maintenance acrivity in 

Valley Grove, WV, to the Kelly Support Center. 

Secwtary of Defense Justification 

Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort 

Drum, NY, provides administrative and logistical 

support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property. 

The Kelly Support Center is last in military value 

compared to other command and controlhdministrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills. It possesses no 

permanent facilities or mobilization capability. 

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, 

approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet 

of semi-permanent structures, from the Army’s 

inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels 

for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group 

Pittsburgh. 

Relocating the Army’s Reserve activity from Valley 

Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, 

to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with 

its parent unit and saves $28,000 per year in 

lease costs. 

Community Concerns 

Based on current staffing and reimbursable positions, the community contends the personnel 

savings are overstated. The community also argued 

the personnel savings appear questionable since 

the implementation plan indicates 70 percent of 

the current workforce would be retained to support the recently designated Reserve Support 

Command. Finally, the community believes no 

lease savings will be realized, because a new 

maintenance facility is being constructed in West 

Virginia for the Valley Grove unit. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the revised Army cost 

analysis keeps the area support mission at the 

Kelly Support Center with a majority of the existing workforce. In addition, the Secretary of 

Defense informed the Commission on June 14, 

1995, it was no longer viable to relocate the Valley Grove maintenance activity to the Kelly Support Center because a new facility is being built 

for the unit in West Virginia. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating 

Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. 

Dispose of the remaining two parcels. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent 

with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania 

Category: Depots 

Mission: Depot maintenance 

One-time Cost: $49.6 million 

Savings: 19962001: $2265 million 

Annual: $76.0 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate) 

FINAI, ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring 

the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot. Retain an enclave 

for conventional ammunition storage and tactical 

missile disassembly and storage. Change the 193 

Commission’s decision regarding the consolidating 

of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by 

transferring missile guidance system workload to 

Tobyhanna Army Depot. 

1-30 CHAPTER 1 
Secretary of Defense Justification 

Letterkenny Army Depot is one of the Army’s five 

maintenance depots and one of three ground 

vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of 

the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River 

performs similar work on infantry fighting 

vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible 

for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as 

DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other 

Army depots, Letterkenny receives, stores, and 

ships all types of ammunition items. A review of 

long range operational requirements supports 

a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a 

single depot. 

The ground maintenance capacity of the three 

depots currently exceeds programmed work 

requirements by the equivalent of one to two 

depots. The heavy combat vehicle mission from 

Anniston cannot be absorbed at Letterkenny without major construction and facility renovations. 

Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and 

Tobyhanna makes the realigning Letterkenny to 

the two depots the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of 

Letterkenny is supported by the Joint CrossService Group for Depot Maintenance. 

The Army’s recommendation to transfer missile 

workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot preserves 

Letterkenny’s missile disassembly and storage mission. It capitalizes on Tobyhanna’s electronics focus 

and retains DoD missile system repair at a single 

Army depot. 

Community Concerns 

The community was critical of DoD’s proposal 

to change the 193 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission’s recommendation 

which consolidated DoD’s tactical missile maintenance work at Letterkenny Army Depot. The community believes Letterkenny was recommended 

for realignment as a result of what they believed 

to be the Army’s flawed military value analysis. 

The community argued the military value analysis 

inappropriately gave more weight to (1) depot 

capacity, which is based on the number of workstations, (2) the average age of depot buildings, 

and (3) hourly base operating costs. The community believes the military value should have 

placed more weight on a comparative analysis of 

relative depot size, including expandable acres 

and building square footage. If the Army had 

done so, the community believes Letterkenny 

would not have been targeted for closure or 

realignment. The community further stated the 

Army’s military value analysis did not consider 

current and future missions, including ongoing efforts to consolidate interserviced tactical missile 

maintenance, and benefits gained from current 

and future public and private depot teaming 

arrangements. They suggested the public and private partnership arrangements should be continued to make more efficient use of available 

infrastructure. The community also voiced concerns about the Army’s Failure to consider above 

core workload in its initial COBRA estimates. 

Finally, the community argued the one-time cost 

to realign Letterkenny’s workload to the Anniston 

and Tobyhanna Army Depots was significantly understated and the return on investment 

would exceed 90 years, compared to the Don 

estimate which calculated an immediate return on 

investment. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army treated all of its 

depots equally. The Army’s military value rating 

process was driven by the Army’s desire to eliminate excess capacity within its depot infrastructure. Higher overhead expenses, coupled with a 

lower direct labor hour base, resulted in 

Letterkenny’s lower military value rating. The 

Commission found Letterkenny’s forecast future 

workload was not sufficient to maintain a cost 

efficient depot. 

The Commission carefully examined the Army’s 

one-time cost for realigning the Letterkenny Army 

Depot and found some uncertainties. The Commission found the Army failed to include in its 

COBRA analysis, construction costs of approximately $5.7 million and personnel training costs of 

approximately $10 million. These oversights 

would raise the one-time costs to approximately 

$65 million, but do not change the projected annual savings. The estimated one-time costs support the transfer of 450 personnel to Tobyhanna 

Army Depot and 392 tenant personnel to Base X. 

In making its final decisions, the Conmission considered these instances where costs could ultimately be other than what DoD has projected. 

The Commission adopted the DoD recommendation, and the DoD cost projections while recognizing the uncertainties associated with these costs. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-31 
The 1993 Commission assigned Letterkenny 

responsibility for the interservice repair and overhaul of DoD’s tactical missiles and related support 

equipment. The Letterkenny personnel have made 

excellent progress in their efforts to implement the 

1993 Commission’s recommendation. The 1995 

Commission notes that the Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces 

suggested the eventual privatization of depot 

maintenance activities. The consolidated tactical 

missile repair program is a likely candidate for 

future privatization. In response to community 

concerns about the Army’s failure to consider 

above core tactical missile maintenance workload 

in its original COBRA analysis, the Army Materiel 

Command changed its assumptions to reflect retention of an additional 310 personnel to work in the 

enclaved tactical missile area of Letterkenny. The 

Commission suggests the Department of Defense 

explore options for transferring workload to the 

private sector, as appropriate. 

The Commission found using Letterkenny facilities 

for Paladin weapon system upgrades was highly 

efficient and cost effective. The Commission further recognizes OSD policy generally dictates that 

future weapon system upgrades should be accomplished within the private sector. For this reason, 

the Commission finds the Department of Defense 

should make every effort to dispose of 

Letterkenny’s combat vehicle shops as an intact, 

complete and useable facility that could be used 

by the private sector for future weapon system 

upgrades. This would afford the community a better opportunity of recovering from the economic 

effects that may occur following the realignment 

of the Letterkenny installation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 4, 

and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: realign Letterkenny Army Depot by 

transferring the towed and self-propelled combat 

vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and 

storage. Change the 1993 Commission’s decision 

regarding the consolidation of tactical missile 

maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile 

guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army 

Depot, Pennsylvania or private sector commercial 

activities. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico 

Catego y: Command and Control 

Mission: Coordinate and support mobilization 

of Reserve Component forces, and provide 

base operations and other support to 

government activities in Puerto Rico 

and the US. Virgin Islands 

One-time Cost: $7.0 million 

Savings: 19962001: $23.3 million 

Annual: $8.9 million 

Return on Investment: I999 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recom m enda ti0 n 

Realign Fort Buchanan by reducing garrison 

management functions and disposing of family 

housing. RetJin an enclave for the reserve coinponents, Army and Air Force Exchange Service 

(AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort 

McPherson, provides administrative, logistical and 

mobilization support to Army units and activities 

in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region. Tenants 

include a U.S. Army Reserve headquarters, AAFES 

and a DoD-operated school complex. Although 

the post is managed by an active component garrison, it supports relatively few active component 

tenants. The family housing will close. The activities providing area support will relocate to 

Roosevelt Roads Navy Base and other sites. The 

Army intends to license buildings to the Army 

National Guard, that they currently occupy. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes Fort Buchanan‘s strategic 

and historic value were incorrectly assessed during the assessment/selection process. It is the last 

active Army presence in the Caribbean and soon 

to be the last in Latin America, a legacy dating 

back to 1898. The community maintains the 

manpower impact of the DoD recommendation is 

underestimated and that actual job losses will 

exceed 500 personnel. The community believes 

Army cost estimates understate closure costs and 

operating costs. Thus, savings from adoption of 

the DoD recommendation are inaccurate. The 

community contends Kooseveh Roads, while only 

42 road miles from Fort Buchanan, is an unacceptable alternative for family housing. Travel 

between the two installations routinely takes up 

1-32 CHAPTER 1 
to two hours. Further, Roosevelt Roads already 

has a 400 unit family housing deficit and the San 

Juan housing rental market is very tight and 

expensive. Lastly, the community notes Fort 

Buchanan’s closure would be a severe blow to the 

15,000 plus retired community, and would be devastating to the already depressed Puerto Rican 

economy. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission reviewed information concerning 

the current state and cost of Fort Buchanan’s fanily housing, deferred maintenance, and the status 

of the installation’s utility infrastructure. The Commission noted while family housing was generally 

well maintained, units are old, amenities limited, 

and the supporting installation utility infrastructure is old. The Commission found closure of 

family housing results in savings to DoD, signrficant cost avoidance, and the reduction of excess 

infrastructure. 

The Commission discussed the range of installation missions. Mobilization support is important, 

and its support is best fulfilled by a resident active 

component garrison. The Commission found the 

concept to disestablish the installation garrison 

exceeded the scope of the DoD recommendation 

to realign Fort Buchanan. The Commission 

reviewed cost estimates to maintain a garrison 

capable of supporting mobilization and the 

enclaved tenant units. Although savings are 

reduced from the DoD estimates, the Commission 

recommendation reduces infrastntcture and retains 

an active presence in Puerto Rico while still providing savings. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 4, 

and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends 

the following: realign Fort Buchanan. Dispose of 

family housing. Retain garrison facilities as necessary to fulfill mobilization missions and requirements, and enclave support functions. Retain an 

enclave for the Reserve Components, Army and 

Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the 

Antilles Consolidated School. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Red River Army Depot, Texas 

Catego y: Depots 

Mission: Depot maintenance 

One-time Cost: $7.2 million 

Savings: 19962001: $83.9 million 

Annual: $20.0 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Red River Army Depot. Transfer the ammunition storage mission, intern training center, and 

civilian training education to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Transfer the light combat vehicle 

maintenance mission to Anniston Army Depot. 

Transfer the Rubber Production Facility to Lone 

Star. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Red River Army Depot is one of the Army’s five 

maintenance depots and one of three ground 

vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of 

the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River 

performs similar work on infantry fighting 

vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible 

for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as 

DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other 

Army depots, Red River receives, stores, and ships 

all types of ammunition items. A review of long 

range operational requirements supports a reduction of‘ Army depots, specifically the consolidation 

of ground combat workload at a single depot. 

The ground maintenance capacity of the three 

depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. 

Without considerable and costly modifications, 

Red Rwer cannot assume the heavy combat vehicle 

mission from Anniston. Red River cannot assume 

the DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation program 

from Letterkenny without major construction. 

Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and 

Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Red River 

into Anniston the most logical in terms of military 

value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Red River 

is consistent with the recommendations of the 

Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues closure of Red River Army 

Depot will destroy the special efficiencies that 

result from collocation of the Red River Army 

Depot with the Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Depot, Red River. They claim DoD substantially deviated from the final selection criteria by 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-33 
not conducting a combined value assessment of 

the two. They also believe closing Red River Army 

Depot will overload Anniston Army Depot, limit 

surge capaliility. and jeopardize readiness. Retention of only one niaintenance depot for ground 

combat vehicles will severely limit the Army’s ability to respond to national emergencies. The community also believes that the Army understated 

the costs associated with the recommendation. 

Additionally, the community claims the Army 

analysis is fla~ved hy omitting significant mission 

requirements, such as the Missile Recertification 

Office, and by including non-BRAC personnel savings. The comniimity also believes the Army understated unemployment costs in their economic 

analysis. The community proposes retention of 

Red River Army Depot and Anniston Army Depot, 

re:ilignment of Letterkenny Army Depot to 

Anniston and Red River and downsizing of both 

to core. To fill vacant infrastructure, the community recommends teaming with industry. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army has treated all 

its depots equally. The Army‘s recommendations 

were an aggressive approach to minimize depot 

infrastructure, maintaining the minimal capacity to 

support Army peacetime and wartime requirements. In addition, the Army recommendations 

supported its stationing strategy and the operational lilueprint. The Army’s operational blueprint, 

however, assumecl too great a risk in readiness in 

the attempt to reduce infrastructure costs. While 

Anniston Army Depot, Alahama, has the capacity 

to accept the ground combat vehicle depot maintenance workload from Red River, the Commission found placing all this workload into a single 

facility places too much risk on readiness. Retention of both Anniston Army and Red River Army 

Depots keeps the Army’s top-rated ground combat 

depots and presenw future readine 

Commission Recomm enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

realign Red Kiver Army Depot by moving all 

maintenance missions, except for that related to 

the Bradley Fighting Veliicle Series, to other depot 

maintenance activities, including the private sector. 

Retain conventional ammunition storage, intern 

training center, Ruliber Production Facility, and 

civilian training education at Red River. The Commission finds this recomniendation is consistent 

with the force-structure plan and final criterki. 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah 

Catego y: Proving Ground 

Mission: Test and Evaluation 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Realign Dugway Proving Ground by rclocating the 

smoke and obscurant mission to Yuma I’roving 

Ground, AZ. and some elements of chemicalibiological research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

MD. Dispose of English Village and retain test and 

experimentation facilities necessary to support 

Army and DoD missions. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

D~igway is low in military value compared to 

other proving grounds. Its test facilities conduct 

Imth open air and laboratory chemicalibiological 

testing in support of various Army and Do[) missions. The testing is important as :ire associated 

security and safety requirements. Howevcr. this 

recommendation enables the Army to continue 

these important missions and also reduce costly 

overhead at Dugway. 

Yuma can assume Dugway’s programmed smoke 

and obscurant testing. Aberdeen Proving Ground 

can accept the laboratory research and development portion of the chemical/biological mission 

from Dugway, since it is currently performing 

chemical and biological research in facilities that 

carry equivalent bioisafety levels. Open air :incl 

simulant testing missions will remain at llugwiy. 

The State of Utah has expressed an interest in 

using English Village and associated firing and 

training ranges at Dugway for the National Guard, 

including the establishment of an artillery training 

facility. 

Cornmunip Concerns 

The niajor community concern at Dugway is the 

Army’s planned closure of English Village and the 

resultant impact on the military value of Dug\v:ay 

Proving Ground. Two thousand residents and 

employees of Dugmap 1k.e at English Village. 

1-34 
There is no nearby housing available and, according to the community, the loss of productivity in 

making long commutes, often during inclement 

weather, would be staggering. The 592 housing 

units that comprise English Village cost the Army 

$1.5 million annually. The community believes 

that English Village should be kept open to support Dugway’s vital missions and quality of life. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found closure of English Village 

would significantly impact Dugway’s testing mission and the residents’ quality of life. The Commission found permitting problems at Yuma and 

Aberdeen Proving Grounds, the planned receiver 

sites for part of Dugway’s mission, made the move 

virtually impossible. On June 14, 1995, the Secretary of Defense asked that the recommendation 

on Dugway Proving Ground be set aside. The 

Secretary said testing must remain at Dugway, and 

because of facility restrictions and permitting 

requirements, the base operating support, including English Village, should remain open. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 8. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Dugway Proving Ground, including English 

Village, will remain open. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Fort Lee, Virginia 

Category: Training Schools 

Mission: Provide facilities and services to 

the US. Army Combined Am Support 

Command, the Quartermaster Center and 

School, the Army Logistics Management 

College, and other tenants 

One-time Cost: $2.1 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $15.5 million 

Annual: $3.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year) 

FINM ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient 

services. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This recommendation, suggested by the Joint 

Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort 

Lee, VA by eliminating inpatient services at 

Kcnncr Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care 

would be provided by other nearby military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian 

Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 

Services (CHAMPUS). 

Community Concerns 

The community contends the Army recommendation would decrease staff at the facility below the 

level needed to support adequately an outpatient 

clinic. They argue these staff reductions and elimination of inpatient care services would mean the 

loss of critical medical support to Fort Lee’s mission, as well as diminished access and increased 

costs for beneficiaries in and beyond the hospital 

catchment area. In addition, they say these reductions would result in half of the hospital’s current 

demand for outpatient workload falling to outside 

providers, thus greatly increasing the Army’s predicted cost of the recommendation. The community also argues DoD would lose the ability to 

manage CHAMPUS costs in the Fort Lee area, further increasing the cost of the program beyond 

the Army’s estimate. Finally, the community points 

out the Joint Cross-Service Group’s functional 

value score for Kenner Army Community Hospital 

was higher than many other hospitals not recommended for realignment. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the realignment of Kenner 

Army Community Hospital, to an adequately 

staffed and resourced outpatient clinic, will eliminate excess acute care inpatient beds and reduce 

costs, without compromising the mission effectiveness of Fort Lee. The Commission recognized 

the validity of the community’s concern that a 

poorly staffed clinic could potentially impair 

Fort Lee’s important training and other missions. 

While the Commission found the adequacy of 

clinic resources is an Army responsibility and will 

be resolved during the implementation of this 

recommendation, it urges the Army to pay close 

attention to ensure continued, adequate, outpatient care to beneficiaries. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-35 
Corn rn issio n Reco m m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Fort Lee. by reducing Kenner Army Community 

Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services. 

Fort Pickett, Virginia 

Categov: Major Training Areas 

Mission: Regional training center that 

supports active Army and Reserve 

Components and other DoD activities 

Onetime Cost: $25.3 million 

Sauings: 1996-2001: $46.7 million 

Annual: $21.8 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Fort I’ickett, except minimum essential 

training areas and facilities as an enclave for 

the Reserve Coinponents. Kelocate the Petroleum 

Training Facility to Fort Ilix, NJ. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In the past ten years. the Army has reduced its 

active and reserve forces considerably. The Army 

must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the 

needs of the future. 

Fort I’ickett is very low in military value compared 

to other major training area installations. It has 

virtually no Acti\.e Component tenants. Annual 

training for rcsene units that now use Fort Pickett 

can lie conclucted easily at other installations in 

the region, including Fort Bragg, Fort A.P. Hill 

and C:imp Datvson. The Army intends to license 

required facilities and training areas to the Army 

National G iiard. 

Community Concerns 

Memhers of thc rural community strongly support 

keeping Fort Pickett open, stressing what they 

Ixlieve is its high military value and the employment opportunities it provides. Residents of the 

town of Hlackstone and employees on the installation have hot11 stressed the long-term, outstanding 

tiiilitar?l-communit). relations that exist, and cited 

the lack of environmental impediments to training 

that exist :it other military bases. Community 

groups lxlieve the Army’s analysis was flawed, 

and f:rilecl to take into account the training conducted at Fort Pickett hy the other services’ active 

and reserve components, as well as increased 

active duty Marine and Army training occurring 

there due to training congestion at installations 

such as Camp Lejeune and Fort Hragg, North 

Carolina. 

Corn m ission Findings 

The Cornmission found the Army evaluated all its 

major training area installations equally. The Commission also found the Army’s process of integrating a quantitative installation assessment with 

a qualitative operational blueprint. based upon 

operational and stationing requirements of the 

Army Stationing Strategy, is a sound approach to 

develop a military value assessment (MVA) for 

each installation in this category. 

The Commission examined all of the issues presented by the local community and elected officials, especially with regard to the military value 

of Fort Pickett as a major training area. The Commission found members of all components from 

all the armed forces train at Fort Pickett. In evaluating the future access to the training facilities and 

training area of the installation, especially hy 

members of the Reserve Component (RC), the 

Commission was satisfied that such access can 

continue. The Commission found adequate training locations existed in the region to handle additional RC annual training requirements, without 

Fort Pickett, but scheduling of such training would 

be more difficult, especially during peak training 

load periods. The Commission also found the 

National Guard and other KC units required continued access to Fort Pickett for 110th individual 

and annual training. 

Finally, the Commission found closing Fort 

Pickett, and preserving an enclave for training for 

the Reserve Components, would reduce excess 

infrastructure and generate substantial savings. 

Com m issio n Recorn m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close Fort 

Pickett, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component 

training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 
Information Systems Software Center 

Category: Leases 

Mission: Software support 

One-time Cost: $9.0 million 

Savings: 199601: $4.9 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2007 (9 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

(ISSC), Virginia 

Annual: $1.2 million 

Secreta ry of Defme Recommendation 

Close by relocating Information Systems Software 

Center to Fort Meade, MD. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

In 1993, the Commission suggested DoD direct 

the Services to include a separate category for 

leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of 

leased space. The Army has conducted a review 

of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. 

Because of the cost of leasing, the Army’s goal is 

to minimize leased space, when feasible, and 

maximize the use of government-owned facilities. 

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. 

The annual cost of the current lease is $2 million. 

Community Concm 

Even though the lease on the facility occupied by 

the Information Systems Software Center expires 

in 2000, the community contends there would be 

no savings to the government, as a result of the 

recommendation because the General Services 

Administration must continue to pay the rent. The 

community argued there is no existing space to 

renovate at Fort Meade, so the Army must construct a new building. They noted the return on 

investment for new construction is 18 years versus 

9 years under the renovation option. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Army plans to backfill the leased space occupied by the Information 

Systems Software Center (ISSC) with activities currently in less desirable leased space. The Commission found the lease savings should be 

comparable because the lease costs for the activities under consideration are approximately the 

same as ISSC’s lease cost. The Commission found 

the recommendation is consistent with the Army’s 

Stationing Strategy to reduce leased space and 

move into government-owned space where economically feasible. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close by 

relocating Information Systems Software Center 

to Fort Meade, Maryland. 

Camp Bonneville, Washington 

Categv: Minor Installation 

Mission: Provide training fm‘lities for active 

Onetime Cost: $0.04 million 

Savings: 19962001: $0.8 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Army and Reserve Component units 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Camp Bonneville. 

Secretary of Defme Just@cution 

Camp Bonneville consists of approximately 4,000 

acres and 178,000 square feet of facilities. The 

primary mission of Camp Bonneville is to provide 

training facilities for Active and Reserve units. 

Training currently conducted at Camp Bonneville 

will be shifted to Fort Lewis, Washington. Accordingly, Camp Bonneville is excess to the Army’s 

requirements. Closing the camp will save base operations and inaintenance funds and provide reuse 

opportunities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal 

community. 

Commission Findings 

expressions from the 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Camp Bonneville. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-37 
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support 

Activity, West Virginia 

Category: Minor Installation 

Mission: Maintenance support to Army 

Reserve activities 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support 

Activity (AMSA). Relocate reserve activity to 

the Kelly Support Center, PA, provided the 

recommendation to realign Kelly Support Center 

is approved. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Valley Grove AMSA, located in Valley Grove, WV, 

consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of 

leased maintenance facilities. Its primary mission 

is to provide maintenance support to Army 

Reserve activities. Consolidating tenants from Valley Grove AMSA with the Reserve Component 

activities remaining on Kelly Support Center will 

reduce the cost of operation. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Com m issio n Findings 

As stated by the Secretary of Defense’s letter dated 

June 14th, 1995 and upon further evaluation, the 

Commission found the closure and relocation of 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity 

to Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania is no longer 

viable. The Commission found Congress added 

a construction project ($6.8 million) to build a 

new maintenance shop at Wheeling-Ohio County 

Airport. The project is now underway, obviating 

the need to move to a new facility at Kelly Support Center. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially frotn final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity 

(AMSA) will remain open. The Commission finds 

this recornmendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 
Department of the Navy 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska 

Catego y: Operational Air Stations 

Mission: Support for Anti-Submarine Warfare 

Onetime Cost: $9.4 million 

Savings: 19962001: $108.8 million 

Annual: $260 miMion 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Surveillance Mission 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska. 

Secretary of Lkfme Justification 

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of 

base closure and realignments, since DON force 

structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. 

In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to 

retain only that infrastructure necessary to support 

the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In 

the case of Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska, the 

Navy’s anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires these facilities to base or 

support its aircraft. Closure of this activity reduces 

excess capacity by eliminating unnecessary capabilities and can be accomplished with no loss in 

mission effectiveness. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions of concern 

from the local community. The U.S. Coast Guard, 

however, expressed concern about the closing of 

NAF Adak because of its use as a support base for 

their law enforcement, search and rescue, and 

navigation aid maintenance operations. Without 

NAF Adak’s support facilities, the Coast Guard 

would be forced to obtain support for their operations at a greater distance from their patrol areas 

which would increase their overall operating 

costs. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

The closing of NAF Adak, however, caused the 

Coast Guard to voice concern about losing a base 

from which they can stage some of their operations. The Commission recognizes that the use of 

NAF Adak is important to the Coast Guard’s missions of law enforcement and search and rescue. 

This operational need, however, is not sufficient 

to justifjr keeping the facility open. 

Commission Recomm-tion 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska. 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Oakland, California 

Category: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers 

Mission: Supply Support 

Onetime Cost: $23.0 million 

Savings: 19962001: $29.7 million 

Annual: $12.6 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

FISC is located in three jurisdictions: Oakland, 

Alameda, and Richmond, California. Aldmeda and 

Richmond would like to have the land in their 

cities closed under base closure rules, which 

would expedite the land transfer. Initially, Oakland was concerned that any base closure action 

would prevent implementation of special legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to sign 

long-term leases with the City of Oakland, the 

Port of Oakland and the City of Alameda for $1. 

The Port of Oakland and the Navy recently signed 

leases for two parcels of FISC land. The Port was 

originally concerned that closure of FISC as a 

BRAC action would delay their large port development plan. The Port recognized that closure would allow the Port to acquire the land 

and would not interfere or prevent ongoing lease 

negotiations. 

~ 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-39 
Commission Findings 

The Secretary of the Navy removed FISC Oakland 

from the list of recommendations presented to 

him because of excessive job losses in California. 

The Commission added FISC Oakland for consideration. The Commission found employment levels and workload at FISC decreasing as the bases 

it supported were closed. FISC’s primary function 

would be to operate office space for Government 

tenants. 

The Commission agreed with the Richmond and 

Ahmeda communities that the closure of FISC 

land in their communities would facilitate transfer 

of the land. To clarify that these were distinct 

parcels of land the Commission addressed these 

parcels in a separate closure motion. The Commission and the Oakland community ultimately 

agreed that the closure of the main FISC compound in Oakland would not interfere with their 

ongoing lease negotiations or previously signed 

leases, and would facilitate transfer of the property. The proposed closure actions received 

the endorsement of the Port of Oakland and 

the mayors of Oakland, Alameda, and Richmond. 

The Commission also found that additional savings would result if the two major tenants at 

FIX, Military Sealift Command and Defense 

Finance and Accounting Service, move to other 

Government-owned space. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Comrnission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 5 and 6. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center. Oakland. Close Point Molate Naval Refueling Station, Richmond, California. Close Navy Supply Annex, Alameda, California. The Commission 

finds this rccomnienclation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Commission Recommendation 11 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 5 and 6. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center. Oakland. Kelocate Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service and Military Sealift Command 

to Government-owned space. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, 

California, and Marine Corps 

Air Station, Tustin, California 

Category: Operational Air Stations 

Mission: Support Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $90.2 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $293.0 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect @mended) 

Annual: $6.9 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving sites for “squadrons and 

related activities at NAS Miramar” specified by the 

1773 Commission (1773 Commission Report, at 

page 1-18) from “NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon” 

to “other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, 

Virginia, N,4S North Island, California, and NAS 

Fallon, Nevada.” Change the receiving sites for 

MCAS Tustin, California, specified by the 1993 

Commission from “NAS North Island, NAS 

Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton” to “other 

naval air stations. primarily MCAS New Kiver, 

North Carolina; MCB Hawaii (MCAF Kaneohe 

Bay); MCAS Camp Pendleton, California; and NAS 

Miramar. California.” 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

This recommendation furthers the restructuring 

initiatives of operational bases commenced in 

BRAC 93 and also recognizes that the FY 2001 

Force Structure Plan further reduced force levels 

from those in the FY 1979 Force Structure Plan 

applicable to BRAC 73. These force level recluctions required the Department of the Navy not 

only to eliminate additional excess capacity Ixit to 

do so in a way that retained only the infrastructure necessary to support future force levels 

and did not impede operational flexibility for the 

cleployment of that force. Full implementation 

of the BR4C 93 recommendations relating to 

operational air stations would require the construction of substantial new capacity at installations on both coasts, which only exacerbates the 

level of excess capacity in this subcategory of 

installations. Revising the receiving sites for assets 

from these installations in this and other air station 

recommendations eliminates the need for this construction of new capacity, such that the total savings are equivalent to the replxement plant value 

of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. 
Further, within the context of the FY 2001 Force 

Structure Plan, the mix of operational air stations 

and the assets they support resulting from these 

recommendations provides substantial operational 

flexibility. For instance, the single siting of F-14s 

at Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, fully utilizes 

that installation’s capacity and avoids the need to 

provide support on both coasts for this aircraft 

series which is scheduled to leave the active inventory. This recommendation also permits the relocation of Marine Corps helicopter squadrons in the 

manner best able to meet operational imperatives. 

Community Concerns 

The MCAS El Toro, MCAS Tustin, California redirect affects numerous communities, several of 

which expressed concerns. There were no formal 

expressions, however, from the communities near 

the following bases: MCAF Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii; 

NAS North Island, California; NAS Fallon, Nevada; 

NAS Miramar, California; MCAS Camp Pendleton, 

California; and NAS Lemoore, California. 

The NAS Oceana community is willing to accept 

the F-14 aircraft. An airport zoning ordinance was 

passed preventing certain types of incompatible 

development, and thus helping the NAS Oceana 

preserve their AICUZ (air installation compatible 

use zones). Approximately $25 million has been 

slated by the local government to move two 

schools away from the air station, and out of the 

accident potential zones. The community believes 

overcrowding is not an issue for the air station 

and that the actual levels of aircraft assigned after 

the redirects will be less than were assigned in 1991. 

The March AFB, California community, although 

not involved in the DoD recommendation, submitted a proposal to move the Marine helicopter assets to March AFB. They cite savings for DoD and 

operational improvements as the major reason for 

their desire to have the helicopter assets assigned 

to their base. March AFB is located in Rverside 

County, California. The community asserts the 

cost of living is less than that in the San Diego, 

California area and the Marines could use the over 

700 family housing units available at March. The 

community also asserts that location of helicopters 

away from fixed wing aircraft offers more training 

opportunities for the helicopters. In addition, the 

community believes separate basing of helicopters 

and fixed wing aircraft eliminates safety and operational concerns. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that redirecting the F-14 and E-2C aircraft 

from NAS Lemoore to other naval air stations 

eliminates the need for $345 million in construction costs at NAS Lemoore. Additionally, the 

Secretary’s recommendation takes advantage of 

already existing capacity at NAS Oceana. 

During fmal deliberations, the Commission debated 

other receiving sites for the Marine Corps helicopter squadrons, including March AFB, California. 

Although relocating helicopters to March AFB 

might be operationally attractive, operating costs, 

according to the Marine Corps, would be significantly more expensive. The Comniission was 

assured that the collocation of fixed wing and 

rotary wing aircraft at NAS Miramar can be safely 

accomplished through careful base and flight 

operations planning. The Commission believes, 

however, that the recommendation for redirect to 

specific airfields may restrict the service to a location that may not be desirable after detailed 

implementation planning. Therefore, the Commission recommended the language be changed to 

“other air stations” to allow greater operational 

flexibility including the ability to locate the helicopter squadrons at March AFB or other locations 

if appropriate. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2 and 3. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving sites for “squadrons 

and related activities at NAS Miramar” specified by 

the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, 

at page 1-18> from “NAS Lemoore and NAS 

Fallon” to “other naval air stations, prirnarily NAS 

Oceana, Virginia, NAS North Island, California, 

and NAS Fallon, Nevada.” Change the receiving 

sites for MCAS Tustin, California, specified by the 

1993 Commission from “NAS North Island, NAS 

Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton” to “other air 

stations consistent with operational requirements.” 

The Commission finds this recommendation 

is consistent with the force-structure plan and 

final criteria. 

Naval Air Station, Alameda, California 

Categoty: Operational Air Stations 

Mission: Support Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: None 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 141 
Savings: 1996-2001: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Annual: None 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission for the closure of Naval Air Station, 

Alameda, California (1993 Commission Report, at 

page 1-35) for “aircraft along with the dedicated 

personnel, equipment and support” and “reserve 

aviation assets” from “NAS North Island“ and 

“NASA Ames/Moffett Field,” respectively, to “other 

naval air stations, primarily the Naval Air Facility, Corpus Christi, Texas, to support the Mine 

Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station, 

Ingleside, Texas.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The decision to collocate all mine warfare assets, 

including air assets, at the Mine Warfare Center of 

Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas, 

coupled with the lack of existing facilities at Naval 

Air Station, North Island, support this movement 

of mine warfare helicopter assets to Texas. With 

this collocation of assets, the Navy can conduct 

training and operations with the full spectrum of 

mine warfare assets from one location, significantly enhancing its mine warfare countermeasures capability. This action is also consistent with 

the Department’s approach for other naval air 

stations of eliminating capacity by not building 

nen7 capacity. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Com m ission Findings 

The Commission found that locating mine warfare aviation assets to NAS Corpus Christi 

enhances training hy collocating the full spectrum 

of mine warfare assets near the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence in nearby Ingleside, Texas. The 

Commission also found that directing Marine 

Reserve aviation assets to other naval air stations, 

affords the operational commander more flexibility in placing these assets. Because all costs and 

savings were realized in the original recommendation, no additional savings are claimed in this 

redirect. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission for the closure of Naval Air Station, Alameda, 

California (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-35) 

for “aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, 

equipment and support” and “reserve aviation 

assets” from WAS North Island” and “NASA Ames/ 

Moffett Field,” respectively. to ”other naval air stations, primarily the Naval Air Station, Corpus 

Christi, Texas, to support the Mine Warfare Center 

of Excellence, Naval Station, Ingleside. Texas.“ 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering West Coast Division, 

San Diego, California 

Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories 

Mission: Electronic In-Service Engineering 

One-time Cost: $1.8 milliori 

Savings: 1996-2001: $19.3 million 

Annual: $4.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the In-Service Engineering West Coast 

Division (NISE West), San Diego, California, of the 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center (NCCOSC), including the Taylor Street Special Use Area, and consolidate necessary functions 

and personnel with the Naval Command. Control 

and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDTM Division, 

either in the NCCOSC RI)T&E Division spaces at 

Point Loina, California, or in current NIX West 

spaces in San Diego, California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in ciperation:il forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, Ixmuse these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

142 Cl IAI”I’ER 1 
of activities wherever practicable. This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in 

improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced 

excess capacity. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that personnel efficiencies could be realized through elimination of duplicative workload 

between NCCOSC’s R&D and in-service engineering divisions. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

C o mni i s s i o n recommends the f o 1 low ing : 

disestablish the In-Service Engineering West Coast 

Division (NlSE West), San Diego, California, of 

the NCCOSC, including the Taylor Street Special 

Use Area, and consolidate necessary functions 

and personnel with the NCCOSC RDT&E Division, 

either in the NCCOSC RDT&E Division spaces at 

Point bma, California, or in current NISE West 

spaces in San Diego, California. 

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, 

Category: Technical Centers and Laboratories 

Mission: Biomedical Research 

One-time Cost None 

Savings: 199G2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION;. Remain Open 

California 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Naval Health Research Center 

(NHRC), San Diego, California, and relocate 

necessary functions, personnel and equipment 

to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) at 

Memphis, Tennessee. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001, Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closurehealignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. This activity 

performs research and modeling and maintains 

databases in a number of personnel health and 

performance areas, and its consolidation with the 

Bureau of Naval Personnel not only reduces 

excess capacity but also aligns this activity with 

the DON’S principal organization responsible for 

military personnel and the primary user of its 

products. The resulting synergy enhances the discharge of this responsibility while achieving necessary economies. 

Community Concerns 

The community asserts that the Naval Health 

Research Center (NHRC) should be located in 

close proximity to a fleet concentration in order to 

have a ready source of test subjects. It argued that 

realigning NHRC to Memphis would seriously 

affect NHRC’s ability to perform its mission, and 

would result in inordinate travel costs to bring 

subjects to the Center or to send researchers out 

to the field. An attendant concern was expressed 

that NHRC was identified in a joint study to 

become an armed forces research unit under the 

auspices of a new agency, the Armed Forces 

Medical Research and Development Agency 

(AFMRDA). The community contends that NHRC’s 

utility to AFMRDA is based upon its proximity to 

test subjects as well as its potential status as the 

only research unit located on the west coast of the 

United States. The community raised questions 

about the suitability of realigning a medical command with a personnel administration command. 

Finally, the community maintained that the vast 

majority of NHRC’s work is biomedical, and while 

some of NHRC’s research may see applications in 

personnel programs, it should remain in a medical 

chain of command for tasking and funding. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that NHRC’s work is overwhelmingly biomedical, not personnel research. 

The Commission was concerned that placing 

NHRC under the Bureau of Naval Personnel 

~ ~~ ~ 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 143 
(BUPERS) pursuant to the recornmendation of the 

Secretary of Defense would have a detrimental 

effect on its biomedical research. NHRC has been 

chosen to become ;I research unit under Armed 

Forces Medical Research and Development 

Agency (AFMRDA). If NHRC were moved to 

BUPERS, its access to the medical research cornmunity would be curtailed and its utility to 

AFMRDA would be questionable. The Commission 

found, therefore, that NHRC should remain within 

the chain of command of the Hureau of Medicine 

and Surgery, and at its present location. Severing 

well-established operational research ties in San 

Diego would have a deleterious affect on NHRC's 

mission performance not sufficiently offset liy the 

proposed savings. 

Cornmission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1, Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC), San 

Iliego remains open ;ind is not disestablished. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Personnel Research 

and Development Center, 

San Diego, California 

Catego y: Technical Centers and Laboratories 

Mission: Personnel Research 

Onetime Cost: $7.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $-4.3 million (Cost) 

Annual: $1.9 million 

Return on Investment: 2004 (4 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Reco m rn enda ti0 n 

Disestablish Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California, and relocate its functions, and appropriate personnel, 

equipment, :ind support to the Bureau of Naval 

Personnel, Memphis, Tennessee, and Naval Air 

Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, Orlando. Florida. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, liecause these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to :I recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. 

Disestablishment of this technical center not only 

eliminates excess capacity hut also collocates its 

functions with the primary user of its products. 

This recommendation permits the consolidation of 

appropriate functions at the new headquarters 

concentration for the Bureau of Naval Personnel 

in Memphis, Tennessee, and at the technical concentration for training systems and devices in 

Orlando, producing economies and efficiencies in 

the management of these functions. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the Naval Personnel 

Research and Development Center should lie in 

close proximity to a fleet concentrxion in order to 

have a ready source of test subjects. It argued that 

realigning NPKDC to Memphis would seriously 

affect NPRDC's ability to perform its mission, and 

would result in inordinate travel costs to bring 

subjects to the Center or to send researchers out 

to the field. Concerns were also expressed over 

the number of personnel positions that DoD 

claims would be eliminated in the realignment. 

The community claimed some positions were 

eliminated through force level reductions and 

would have occurred regardless of whether 

NPRDC relocated. The relative operating costs at 

Memphis and San Diego were also questioned, 

and the community contends that those at Memphis are too low. Finally, the community believes 

that military construction costs at Memphis were 

arbitrarily rt:duced in DoD's analysis. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission :qqxxd with the Secretary of 

Defense that NPKDC is the Navy's manpower and 

training research latioratory and should be collocated with the Navy's personnel headquarters. the 

primary user of NPRIX products. While access to 

a concentration of ready test subjects in San Diego 

is certainly convenient, the central location of 

Memphis provides access to an equally large number of test subjects. Although the Navy underestimated construction costs at Memphis, the 

Commission found relocation of NPRIIC to Memphis was still cost effective. 

1-44 CI 1.41'T1:K 1 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California, and relocate its functions, and appropriate personnel, 

equipment, and support to the Bureau of Naval 

Personnel, Memphis, Tennessee, and Naval Air 

Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, 

Orlando, Florida. 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, 

Category: Admin&trative Activities 

Mission: Personnel Support 

One-time Cost: $0.3 million 

Savings: 19962001: $0.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defme Recommendation 

Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting 

District, San Diego, California, specified by the 

1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at 

page 1-39) from “Naval Air Station North Island 

to “other government-owned space in San Diego, 

California.” 

California 

Annual: None 

Secreta y of Defme Jmtzji’cation 

The North Island site is somewhat isolated and 

not necessarily conducive to the discharge of a 

recruiting mission. Moving this activity to government-owned space in a more central and accessible location enhances its operations. 

Additionally, with the additional assets being 

placed in NAS North Island in this round of 

closures and realignments, there is a need for the 

space previously allocated to this activity. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of the 

Navy that relocating Naval Recruiting District from 

a remote location at NAS North Island to a more 

centrally located site in San Diego would enhance 

its ability to attract new recruits. This redirect will 

create space to accommodate the relocation of 

other commands to NAS North Island, resulting 

from other Commission recommendations. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the 

receiving site for the Naval Recruiting District, San 

Diego, California, specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) from 

“Naval Ar Station North Island” to “other Government-owned space in San Diego, California.” 

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California 

Gztegory: Naval Shipyards 

Mission: Repair and Maintenance of Naval Ships 

One-time Cost: $74.5 million 

Savings: 19962001: $725.6 million 

Annual: $130.6 million 

Return on Investment: 1337 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Semtary of mfme Recommendution 

Close the Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California, 

except retain the sonar dome government-owned, 

contractor-operated facility and those family housing units needed to Mil Department of the Navy 

requirements, particularly those at Naval Weapons 

Station, Seal Beach, California. Relocate necessary 

personnel to other naval activities as appropriate, 

primarily Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach and 

naval activities in the San Diego, California, area. 

Semta y of Defme Justijication 

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to 

decline, there is additional excess capacity that 

needs to be eliminated. Force structure reductions 

by the year 2001 eliminate the requirement for the 

Department of the Navy to retain this facility, 

including its largedeck drydocking capability. As 

a result of BRAC 91, the adjoining Naval Station 

Long Beach was closed, and some of its assets 

were transferred to the naval shipyard for “ship 

support functions.” Of those transferred assets, 

only those housing units required to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements in the local commuting area will be retained after closure of the 

naval shipyard. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 145 
Com munity Concerns 

The community argues that closing Long Beach 

reduces the least amount of excess capacity and 

does not acldress the 37?h excess nuclear capacity 

estimated to remain. The community maintains 

that the Navy capacity analysis is based solely on 

peacetime workload, with no consideration of 

drydock capacity for contingency, mobilization, 

and future force requirements. They believe the 

N:ivy closure process, with respect to drydock 

facilities, is not in conformance with llnited States 

Code Title 10. Section 2464, which requires DoD 

activities to maintain a logistics capability to 

respond to a mobilization or national emergency. 

The community questioned this process, noting 

the high percentage of drydock usage throughout 

the Ilepartment of the Navy. The community also 

maintains that the Nay process did not properly 

consider tlie current or future force-structure with 

regard to large-deck vessels in the Pacific Fleet. 

The community argued that Long Beach could 

support homeporting of up to three nuclear carriers at less cost to the N:wy than San Diego. Alternatively, they argue homeporting at least one 

carrier, and making Long Beach Naval Shipyard a 

detachment of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 

\vould reduce overhead, maintain the large 

drydock, and eliminate some of the expense of 

homeporting ships in San Diego. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Department of 

Defense that the Navy has excess shipyard capacity. The Commission found that although the 

number of large-deck ships has not decreased, a 

general decrease in force structure has resulted in 

an increased flexibility to accommodate unschedulecl maintenance. The Commission acknowledged closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard, and 

closure of Drydock 1, is not without some risk, 

but concluded that the risk is manageable. given 

the :ivailability of the carrier-capable drydocks at 

Puget Sound and Pearl IIarbor Naval Shipyards. 

The Commission agreed with the Navy’s contention that tlie closure of the Long Beach Shipyard 

would benefit west coast private shipyards. The 

Commission found that the swings and return on 

investment resulting from closure supported the 

Department of Defense recommendation, even 

with an increase in the original cost to close estimate. Although the community asked the Conmission to pursue the possibility of homeporting 

cxriers at Long Beach. the Commission believes 

the assignment of ships to horneports is an operational, not base closure issue, and thus not appropriate for inclusion in its recommenclation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Cornmission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California, except 

retain the son a r do me G ove r nni e n t - o w n e d , 

contractor-operated facility and those family housing units needed to fulfill Department of the Navy 

requirements, particularly those at Naval Weapons 

Station, Seal Beach, California. Relocate necessary 

personnel to other naval activities ;IS appropriate, 

primarily Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach and 

naval activities in the San Diego, California area. 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion 

Catego y: Supervisors of Shipbuilding, 

Mission: Administration of DON shipbuilding, 

and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California 

Conversion, and Repair 

conversion, modernization and maintenance 

contracts with the private sector 

One-time Cost: $0.3 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.8 million 

Annual: $0.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Disestablish the Supervisor of Shipbuilcling, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California. 

Relocate certain functions, personnel and equipment to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion 

and Repair. USN, San Diego, California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Because of reductions in the fiscal year 2001 

Force-Structure Plan and resource levels, naval 

requirements for private sector shipbuilding, conversion, modernization and repair are expected to 

decrease significantly. The combined capacity of 

the current thirteen SLJPSHIP activities meaningfully exceeds the DON requirement over that 

Force Structure Plan. Additionally, with the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the future 

requirement for this work in this region is anticipated to lie quite nominal. The predicted 

workload can he efficiently dxorl-xl by SUPSHIP 

San Diego. 
Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the closure of Long Beach 

Naval Station in 1991, and the relocation of the 

homeported ships had significantly decreased the 

need to overhaul ships in privately owned shipyards in Long Beach. The Commission found closure consistent with the Navy’s decreased needs. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California. 

Relocate certain functions, personnel and equipment to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion 

and Repair, USN, San Diego, California. 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport 

Division, New London Detachment, 

New London, Connecticut 

Category: Technical Centers / Laboratories 

Mission: Research, Development, Test and 

One-time Cost: $23.4 million 

Savings: 19962001: $14.3 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Evaluation 

Annual: $8.1 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Newport Division, New London Detachment, New 

London, Connecticut, and relocate necessary functions with associated personnel, equipment, and 

support to Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island. Close the 

NUWC New London facility, except retain Pier 7 

which is transferred to the Navy Submarine Base 

New London. The site presently occupied by the 

U.S. Coast Guard Station, New London, will be 

transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy 

Submarine Base, New London, Magnetic Silencing 

Facility will remain in its present location as a 

tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Naval reserve 

units will relocate to other naval activities, primarily NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, and Navy Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which lead5 to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. The closure of 

this activity completes the undersea warfare tenter consolidation begun in BRAC 91. It not only 

reduces excess capacity, but, by consolidating certain functions at NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, 

achieves efficiencies and economies in management, thus reducing costs. 

Cornmuniiy Concerns 

The community believes the Secretary’s closure 

recommendation is significantly flawed, and 

asserts: (1) military value is compromised, (2) 

costs are understated, and (3) savings are overstated. The community’s primary concerns relate 

to the rationale and costs associated with the 

BRAC 91 recommendation to close the New London Detachment. Overall, the community contends the 1991 realignment has significantly 

overrun estimated one-time costs and, as a result, 

the payback period now exceeds 100 years. The 

community believes because of inaccuracies and 

discrepancies in data submitted in 1991, the Commission should stop the 1991 decision, and reject 

the 1995 recommendation to complete the relocation of the New London Detachment to Newport, 

mode Island. 

Commission Findings 

Closure of the New London Detachment completes the undersea warfare center consolidation 

begun in BRAC 91. The Commission found that 

closure of this activity reduces excess capacity, 

consolidates research and development functions, 

and reduces cost. The Commission found that no 

significant losses in technical capabilities or delays 

in ongoing research, development, test and evaluation would result from this action. Buildings at 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 147 
the receiving site are suitable to host equipment 

moved from New London. Furthermore, the Commission found the Navy adequately supported its 

cost and savings estimates. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Newport Division, New London Detachment, New 

London, Connecticut, and relocate necessary functions with associated personnel, equipment, and 

support to Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island. Close the 

NUWC New London Facility, except retain Pier 7 

which is transferred to the Navy Submarine Base 

New London. The site presently occupied by the 

US. Coast Guard Station, New London, will be 

transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy 

Submarine Base, New London, Magnetic Silencing 

Facility will remain it its present location as a 

tenant of the US. Coast Guard. Naval reserve 

units will relocate to other naval activities, primarily NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, and Navy Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut. 

Naval Recruiting Command 

Mission: Personnel Support 

One-time Cost: $ 65 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $ 1.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Washington, D.C. 

Annual: None 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda tio n 

Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting 

Command, Washington, D.C., specified by the 

1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at 

page 1-59) from “Naval Training Center, Great 

Lakes, Illinois” to “Naval Support Activity, Memphis, Tennessee.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

This relocation permits the single-siting of the 

Department’s personnel recruiting and personnel 

management headquarters-level activities, enhancing their close coordination, and supporting the 

Department’s policy of maximizing the use of government-owned space. It also reduces the requirement to effect new construction, and reduces resulting potential building congestion, at NTC 

Great Lakes. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that changing the relocation site for NRC 

from NTC Great Lakes to the Naval Support Activity, Memphis would avoid military construction 

costs at the already congested NTC Great Lakes. 

The Commission found that the recommendation 

increases the efficiency of the NRC hy collocating 

the Navy’s recruiting and personnel management 

commands. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Cornmission recommends the following: change 

the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C., specified by the 1973 

Commission (1773 Commission Report, at page 

1-59) from “Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, 

Illinois” to “Naval Support Activity, Memphis, 

Tennessee.” 

Naval Security Group Command 

Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C 

Catego y: Naval Security Group Actiuities 

Mission: Space Surveillance 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: 1976 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving site for the Naval Security 

Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C., from “National Security Agency, Ft. 

Meade, Maryland” specified by the 1973 Commission (1973 Commission Keport, at page 1-57) to 

“Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The mission of this activity requires that it be 

collocated with space sundance hardware. This 
can most effectively be accomplished by housing 

this activity at the Naval Research Laboratory. By 

this redirect, the cost of moving this activity to 

Fort Meade can be avoided. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that permitting the Naval Security Group 

Command Detachment Potomac to remain in its 

present location at the Navy Research Laboratory 

incurs no additional cost and preserves the 

command’s access to space surveillance equipment essential to mission performance. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving site for the Naval Security Group 

Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, 

D.C., from “National Security Agency, Fort Meade, 

Maryland” specified by the 1993 Commission 

(1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) to “Naval 

Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.” 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida 

Catego y: Operational Air Station 

Mission: Support Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $66 6 million 

Savings: 19962001: $303.6 million 

Annual: $11.5 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

20) from “Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, 

North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, 

South Carolina” to “other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine 

Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval 

Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air 

Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine 

Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and 

support infrastructure.” In addition, add the following: “To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target 

complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area.” 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of 

base closure and realignment, since DON force 

structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to he additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In 

evaluating operational bases, the goal was to 

retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding 

operational flexibility for deployment of that 

force. This recommended redirect achieves several 

important aims in furtherance of current Departmental policy and operational needs. First, it 

avoids the substantial new construction at MCAS 

Cherry Point that would be required if the F/A-18s 

from NAS Cecil Field were relocated there, which 

would add to existing excess capacity, and utilizes 

existing capacity at NAS Oceana. This avoidance 

and similar actions taken regarding other air stations are equivalent to the replacement plant 

value of an existing tactical aviation naval air spation. Second, it permits collocation of all fixed 

wing carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 

air assets in the Atlantic Fleet with the other aviation ASW assets at NAS Jacksonville and NAVSTA 

Mayport and support for those assets. Third, it 

permits recognition of the superior demographics 

for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta, Georgia. 

Community Concerns 

The MCAS Cherry Point community feels the DoD 

recommendation for the redirect of F/A-18 assets 

originally based at NAS Cecil Field is flawed. They 

contend the costs used for the redirect to NAS 

Oceana, Virginia were based on a significantly 

smaller number of aircraft than was used for the 

1993 DoD recommendation. Therefore, the figures 

should be adjusted to account for the current 

force structure and construction standards. Since 

the 1993 commission report was released, the 

Cherry Point community claims that significant 

money has been spent in and around the base to 

accommodate the additional aircraft. New schools 

have been built and the private sector has 

invested in community services anticipating 

execution of the 1993 Commission recommendaCOMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-43 
tion. The community also believes this redirect 

would eliminate inter-servicing of aircraft at 

Cherry Point. The community believes Cherry 

Point is a better area for these additional aircraft 

because it is less populated, and can accommodate an additional 60 aircraft with little or no construction. The community asserts there are no 

environmental problems at Cherry Point, and severe 

water and air quality issues at Oceana. The community believes that the redirect was prepared to 

keep Oceana from king closed. They feel that 

this action is a deviation from the selection criteria. 

The NAS Oceana community strongly supports the 

redirect. An airport zoning ordinance was passed 

preventing certain types of incompatible development and thus, helping NAS Oceana protect their 

AICUZ (air installation compatible use zones). 

Approximately $25 million has been slated by the 

local government to move two schools away from 

the air station and out of the accident potential 

zones. The community believes overcrowding is 

not an issue for the air station and the actual 

levels of aircraft assigned after the redirects will 

be less than were assigned in 1991. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the accelerated retirement of the A-6E 

aircraft at NAS Oceana creates a vacancy in existing facilities. This redirect uses this capacity and 

avoids substantial new construction at MCAS 

Cherry Point, North Carolina. The recommendation also provides several operational advantages 

including the collocation of carrier-based antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft with land-based 

ASW aircraft at NAS Jacksonville. It also bases 

active duty Navy carrier based jets with similar 

Marine Corps units at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, and sends two reserve squadrons of F/A-18’s 

to NAS Atlanta. In addition, the Commission 

agreed with the need to retain OLF Whitehouse, 

the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow 

Water family housing area to support NAS Jacksonville. The Cornmission believed that MCAS 

Cherry Point should be considered for additional 

missions in the future. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from 

“Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North 

Carolina; Naval Air Slation, Oceana. Virginia; and 

Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort. South Carolina” to “other naval air stations, primarily Naval 

Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air 

Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, 

Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps 

Air Stations with the nece ry capacity and support infrastructure.” In addition, add the following: 

“To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain 

OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, 

and the Yellow Water faniily housing area.” 

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida 

Category: Operational Air Stations 

Mission: Support for aviation training 

One-time Cost: $0.4 million 

Savings: 19962001: $8.2 million 

Annual: $1.8 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realignment 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida, to 21 

Naval Air Facility and dispose of certain portions 

of Truman Annex and Trumbo Point (including 

piers, wharves and buildings). 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of 

base closure and realignment, since DON force 

structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to he additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In 

evaluating operational bases, the god was to retain 

only that infrastructure necessary to support the 

future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In 

the case of NAS Key West, its key importance 

derives from its airspace and training ranges, particularly in view of other aviation consolidations. 

Full access to those can be accomplished by retaining a downsized Naval Air Facility rather than a 

large naval air station. This realignment disposes 

of the waterfront assets of this Facility and retains 

both the airspace and the ranges under its control 

for continued use by the Fleet for operations and 

training. 
Community Concerns 

There were no formal 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed 

expressions from the 

with the Secretarv of 

Defense that the proposed realignment of NAS 

Key West will allow the Navy to continue to access 

needed airspace and ranges while at the same 

time reduce excess infrastructure. The original recommendation was changed to reflect the Navy’s 

request to allow them the option to divest additional property. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

realign Naval Air Station, Key West to a Naval Air 

Facility and dispose of all property not required to 

support operational commitments, including certain portions of Truman Annex and Trumbo Point 

(including piers, wharves and buildings). The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida 

Category: Naval Aviation Depots 

Mission: Aviatfon Maintenance 

Onetime Cost: $1.5 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $2.4 million 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL AC27ON: Redirect 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-42/43) 

by striking the following: “In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and 

dynamic components facility be moved to Cherry 

Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the 

private sector, in lieu of the Navy’s plan to retain 

these operations in a stand-alone facility at 

NADEP Pensacola.” 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to 

decline, there is additional excess capacity that 

needs to be eliminated. Naval Aviation Depot, 

Pensacola, was closed in BRAC 93, except for the 

whirl tower and dynamic components facility. 

Subsequent to that decision, no requirement for 

the facility has been identified within either the 

Army or the Navy, and insufficient private sector 

interest in that facility has been expressed. Additionally, the Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-DM) examined these functions 

in response to Congressional interest in reexamining the BRAC 93 action. The JCSG-DM determined 

that the Pensacola facilities could not independently fulfill the entire future DoD requirement, 

but that the Army facilities at Corpus Christi Army 

Depot, combined with the Navy facilities at 

NADEP Cherry Point, could. This recommendation 

will allow the disposal of the whirl tower and the 

rehabilitation of the dynamic components facility 

buildings for use by the Naval Air Technical Training Center. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation of the 1993 Commission 

(1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-42/43) by 

striking the following: “In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and 

dynamic components facility be moved to Cherry 

Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the 

private sector, in lieu of the Navy’s plan to retain 

these operations in a stand-alone facility at 

NADEI) Pensacola.” 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater 

Sound Reference Detachment, 

Orlando, Florida 

Category: Navy Researcb Lab 

Mission: Sets standards and Calibrations 

for underwater sound measurements 

One-Time costs: $8.4 million 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-51 
Savings: 19962001: $3.7 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Annual: $2.8 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Naval Research Laboratory, 

Undenvater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL 

UWSKD), Orlando, Florida. Relocate the calibration and standards function with associated personnel, equipment, and support to the Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island, except for the Anechoic Tank 

Facility I, which will be excessed. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and of the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. The disestablishment of this laboratory reduces excess 

capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant 

capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on alternative lakes that exist in the DON 

inventory. By consolidating necessary functions at 

NUWC Newport, Khode Island, this recommendation achieves efficiencies and economies. 

Com m u n ity Concerns 

The Orlando community expressed the concern 

that the cost to move this facility from Orlando to 

Newport, Rhode Island would be prohibitively 

high, and the mission’s operations would be jeopardized. In addition, the community maintained 

the Lab utilizes a nearby lake that has unique 

properties that would tie difficult to duplicate, and 

there could lie a large cost associated with accommodating calihrations at different locations. Moreover, the community maintained the Navy did not 

fully consider consolidation of similar test facilities 

in Orlando. The community lxlieves that the professional staff at Orlando will not move to Newport. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the Secretary’s recoinmendation. The Commission 

found that while this facility has a long history 

and a unique lake nearby, advances in technology 

have obviated the need for the Lab. 

Commission Reco rn menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the fo 11 owing : 

disestablish the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater S o u n d Refer e n c e L) eta c h m e n t ( N RL 

UWSRD), Orlando, Florida. Relocate the calibration and standards function with associated personnel, equipment, and support to the Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island, except for the Anechoic Tank 

Facility I, which will be excessed. 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion 

Training Center, Naval Training 

Center, Orlando, Florida 

Catego y: Naval Training Center 

Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted 

One-time Cost: $146.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $41.5 million 

Annual: $8.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Reco m menda ti0 n 

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

38) for the “Nuclear Power School” (or the Navy 

Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center) from 

‘&the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine 

Base (NSB), New London” to “Naval Weapons Spation, Charleston, South Carolina.“ 

Personnel 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The decision of the 1993 Commission to retain the 

submarine piers at Naval Submarine Base New 

London, Connecticut, meant that some of the facilities designated for occupancy by the Navy 

Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center were 

no longer available. Locating this school with the 

Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit of the Naval 

1-52 CFIAIWX 1 
Weapons Station, Charleston achieves an enhanced 

training capability, provides ready access to the 

moored training ships now at the Weapons Station, and avoids the significant costs of buildiig 

and/or renovating facilities at New London. 

Community Concerns 

Community concerns were received from both 

New London, Connecticut and Orlando, Florida. 

The New London community expressed concern 

over whether they were fairly evaluated. The community argued the cost estimates for New London 

construction were greater than in Charleston because the projected student load used was higher 

for New London. Additionally, the community asserted the Navy added unnecessary costs for the 

school in general when they decided to move the 

school to a new location. The New London community questioned the decision to create new 

infrastructure in Charleston, and also questioned 

whether the Charleston cost estimates included all 

new infrastructure expenses. Finally, the New 

London community believes synergy would be 

lost between the Nuclear Power- School students 

and the Sub School in New London if the redirect 

was accepted. 

The Orlando community expressed concern that 

the Navy had not considered retaining the school 

in Orlando following a change in the situation that 

necessitated the redirect in the first place. The 

Orlando community argued no large military construction costs would be necessary to keep the 

school in Orlando and that this represented the 

best scenario for the Department of the Navy. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that even after considering 

possible variances in the original cost estimates, 

the final analysis still supported the recommendation to redirect the training center from New London to Charleston. The Commission found the 

recurring savings associated with the Charleston 

site overcame cost avoidance and cost of construction at the New London and Orlando sites. 

The recurring cost savings at Charleston derived 

from both lower base operating costs and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) cost avoidances. 

The PCS savings occur because the Navy Nuclear 

Prototype Trainer, a follow-on school attended 

by one half of each graduating class, is already 

located in Charleston. Other causes of cost variance 

reviewed by the Commission included updated 

bachelor housing requirements which raised the 

amount of space per person from the original standard and student base loading which 

decreased from the 1993 recommendation 

baseline. The Commission also found that there 

was sufficient room for development at the 

Charleston site without encroaching on any wetlands or explosive arcs from the Naval Magazine. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving site specified by the 193 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) for 

the “Nuclear Power School” (or the Navy Nuclear 

Power Propulsion Training Center) from “the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base 

(NSB), New London” to “Naval Weapons Station, 

Charleston, South Carolina.” 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam 

Category: Supply Center 

Mission: Supply Support 

One-time Cost: $I 7.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $128.8 million 

Annual: $27.8 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center, Guam. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) are follower activities whose existence depends upon 

active fleet units in their homeport area. Prior and 

current BRAC actions closing both Naval Air Station, Guam and a portion of Naval Activities, 

Guam have significantly reduced this activity’s 

customer base. The remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other activities on Guam or 

by other FISCs. 

Community Concerns 

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval Activities Guam section, Guam’s community 

expressed concern that the he1 farm the Fleet and 

Industrial Supply Center (FISC) owns and operates 

~ ~ 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-53 
could not lie turned over to a private organization 

because of its age, as well as a possible requirement to store Don fuels. Additionally, the coin 

munity expressed concern the language in the 

recommendation was not specific enough for 

Guam to be assured it would he able to reuse the 

facilities for economic revitalization. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the requirement for the 

Fleet and Inclustrial Supply Center (FISC) was tied 

to the location of its largest customer, the Military 

Sealift Cotnmand (MSC) vessels. If the MSC ships 

remain on Guam, a supply center would have to 

be retained hy the Navy. Retention of the FISC 

would eliminate most of the savings projected by 

the Navy and the Commission. 

The Commission agreed with the Comniander in 

Chief United States Forces, Pacific that appropriate 

assets, the fuel farm and associated facilities 

should be retained given the strategic location of 

Guam. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

(FISC), Guam. Retain appropriate assets and the 

FISC fuel facilities, including piers D and E, tank 

farms, and associated pipelines and pumping systems, under Don operational control to support 

military service fuel requirements. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Activities, Guam 

Catego y: Naval Station 

Mission: Support Homeported Ships 

One-time Cost : $93. I million 

Savings: 19962001: $662 million 

Annual: $42.5 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (I year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Naval Activities Guam. Relocate all aniiniinition vessels and associated personnel and support to Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii. 

Relocate all other combat logistics force ships and 

associated personnel and support to Naval Station, 

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Kelocate Military Sealift 

Command personnel and Diego Garcia support 

functions to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor. Hawaii. 

Disestablish the Navd Pacific Meteorology and 

Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except for the 

Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which relocates to 

the Raval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic 

Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the 

Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. All other Department of Defense activities that are presently on 

Guam may reiiiain either :is :I tenant of Naval 

Activities, Guam or other appropriate naval activity. 

Retain waterfront assets for support. mobilization. 

and contingencies and to support the afloat tender. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of 

base closure and realignment, since DON force 

structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent hy the year 2001, there continues to he additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In 

evaluating operational bases. the goal was to retain 

only that infrastnicture necessary to support the 

future forct. structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. 

Shifting deployment patterns in the Pacific Fleet 

reduce the need for a fully functional naval station. Operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam. However, since no 

conihatant ships are hoineported there, elimination of the naval station facilities which are not 

required to support mobilization and/or contingency operations allows reinoval of excess capacity while retaining this necessary access. 

Corn m tin it y Concerns 

The Guam community expressed concern on a 

variety of issues. Foremost was the issue of reuse. 

The community helieves it should lie given every 

opportunity for full use of the Facilities and property for economic revitalization. The community 

believes this is essential in light of the unique 

difficulties Guam has experienced since the end 

of World War 11. 

The Guam community argued two other related 

scenarios should be looked at inste:id of the proposed recommendations: First, the reference to the 

receiving site should he removed from all recommendations. This would give the Navy more flexibility in properly stationing the :issets to meet 

operational requirements. 

1-54 CHAPTER 1 
Second, all accepted recommendations should be 

executed on the last day of the two year implementation period. This would allow a two year 

transitional period and permit more time for economic revitalization planning. 

In addition to the alternative scenarios, the community voiced concern over the land disposition 

process. During the turnover process associated 

with Guam Land Use Plan 1977 (GLUP 771, lands 

were tied up in legal proceedings for decades, 

thus removing any chance for revitalization. The 

community asked that all lands marked as excess 

during GLUP 77 and 94, which had not been 

turned over for reuse, be included in the 

Commission’s recommendation. 

The community also asked the Commission to 

direct the Navy to bring to full, efficient, working order any facilities that were to be closed 

before being turned over to the community. This 

included Piti Power plant, fuel farms and any 

piers damaged by the last earthquake. 

Finally, the Guam community asked the Commission to close the Naval Magazine and that its associated water reservoir be turned over to the 

Government of Guam. The magazine would then 

be consoljdated with the magazine at Andersen 

Air Force Base, Guam. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the key to all of the Guam 

recommendations was the disposition of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. The Commission concurred with the Secretary of Defense’s 

position that shifting deployment patterns in the 

Western Pacific (WESTPAC) have lessened the 

requirement for the MSC ships to be stationed out 

of Guam. This changing requirement impacts the 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) mission 

and HC-5 helicopter squadron because this support needs to be located wherever the MSC vessels are to be stationed. Concurrently, the 

Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense 

that Guam would continue to be of strategic importance and require continued access to the facilities and harbor. 

The Commission also agreed with the request of 

the operational commander to allow flexibility in 

locating the Military Sealift Command vessels and 

their support. If a decision is made to retain the 

MSC vessels on Guam, then most of the savings 

projected in the above figures will not occur. 

The Commission reviewed the 1!9!94 Guam Land 

Use Plan (GLUP) implementation process at the 

community’s request. The commission found 

including the release of GLUP lands in the 

Commission’s recommendation would allow a 

more rapid transfer of lands and property. The 

Commission also analyzed the possibility of closing the Naval Magazine on Guam or consolidating 

it with the magazine on Andersen Air Force Base 

(AAFB). With the assistance of the Navy, the Commission found closing or consolidating the magazine was uneconomical, unsafe, and would mean 

the loss of irreplaceable training capabilities. 

Finally, the Commission found that it was in the 

best interests of both the Navy and the community 

to work together for economic revitalization. The 

Commission supports the Navy’s position, as 

stated in Assistant Secretary of the Navy Pirie’s 

April 21, 1995 letter to Delegate Robert A. 

Underwood of Guam. 

It is our objective to corwey, through 

long-term leases, outright transfers, or 

any other mutually agreeable arrangement, as much of the land and facilities 

as possible from the afsected activities 

on Guam so as to stimulate local economic growth while, at the same time, 

providing us [the US. Nay] with the strategicflexibility to maintain the mmaly 

operational acces to Guam port facilities. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

realign Naval Activities, Guam. Locate all Military 

Sealift Command assets and related personnel and 

support at available DoD activities or in rented 

facilities as required to support operational commitments. Disestablish the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except 

for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which 

relocates to the Naval Pacific Meteorology and 

Oceanographic Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 

Disestablish the Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. 

All other Department of Defense activities that are 

presently on Naval Activities may remain either as 

a tenant of Naval Activities or other appropriate 

naval activity. Retain waterfront assets for support, 

mobilization, contingencies, to support the afloat 

tender, and to support shared use of these assets 

consistent with operational requirements if approCOMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-55 
priate. Dispose of property owned by Naval 

Activities declared releasable under the 1994 

Guam Land Use Plan with appropriate restrictions. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam 

Catego ry: Naval Air Station 

Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations 

One-time Cost: $43.8 million 

Savings: 19962001: $213.8 million 

Annual: $21.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

21) for “the aircraft, personnel, and associated 

equipment” from the closing Naval Air Station, 

Agana, Guam from “Andersen AFB, Guam” to 

“other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental 

United States and Hawaii.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Other BRAC 95 actions recommended the partial 

closure of Naval Activities, Guam, with retention 

of the waterfront assets, and the relocation of 

all of the vessels currently homeported at Naval 

Activities, Guam to Hawaii. Among the aircraft at 

Naval Activities, Guam is a squadron of helicopters performing logistics functions in support of 

these vessels. This redirect would collocate these 

helicopters with the vessels they support. Similarly, regarding the other aircraft at the closing 

Naval Air Station, the Fleet Commander-in-Chief 

desires operational synergies for his surveillance 

aircraft, which results in movement away from 

Guam. This redirect more centrally collocates 

those aircraft with similar assets in Hawaii and on 

the West Coast, while avoiding the new construction costs required in order to house these aircraft 

at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, consistent 

with the Department’s approach of eliminating 

capacity by not building new capacity. 

Community Concerns 

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval 

Activities Guam section, Guam’s community 

expressed concern that while the redirect of the 

VQ-1 and VQ-5 squadrons is understandable, the 

redirect of the HC-5 helicopter squadron would 

leave Guam with no organic Search and Rescue 

(SARI capability. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the fixed wing air squadrons originally planned for relocation from NAS Agana to 

Anderson Air Force Base are more appropriately 

located at other locations. The Commission found 

the HC-5 helicopter squadron should be located 

near the homeport of the Military Sealift Cornmand ships currently on Guam. Movement of 

HC-5 aircraft off the island will eliminate the only 

current helicopter Search and Rescue (SAR) capability on Guam. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Cornmission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

21) for “the aircraft, personnel, and associated 

equipment” from the closing Naval Air Station, 

Agana, Guam from “Anderson AFB, Guam” to 

“other naval or DoD air stations.” The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Public Works Center, Guam 

Category: Public Works Centers 

Mission: Public Works Support 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval 

Activities Guam section, the community expressed 

concern over the proposal to retain the officer 

housing at the former Naval Air Station (NAS) 

Agana, Guam, and over the status of the Piti 

1-56 CHAPTER 1 
Power Plant. The community believes the officer 

housing should be turned over to the community 

because it is the only part of the former NAS that 

was retained. In addition, the community believes 

that because the housing is in a separate area, 

retaining it would not be consistent with the 

Guam Land Use Plan (GLUP), which stated consolidation of facilities was a primary goal. The 

community further believes there is sufficient 

housing available for military officers. The cornmunity is worried that the Navy would not maintain the Piti Power Plant prior to turning it over to 

the Government of Guam. Additionally, the cornmunity believes that because the closings or 

realignments will not reduce any PWC functions, 

closing it would not make sense. 

Co mrn ission Findings 

The Commission found it was not economical to 

entirely close the Public Works Center but the 

Navy should be allowed to reduce workforce and 

facilities as workload decreases. The Commission 

also found, there was no need to retain the officer 

housing on the former Naval Air Station Agana, 

Guam, because the number of officers on Guam 

has been reduced. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds that the Secretary of 

Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Public Works Center, Guam, to match 

assigned workload. Close the officer housing at 

the former Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Ship Repair Facility, Guam 

Category: Naval Shipyards 

Mission: Maintenance and Repair of Naval Ships 

One-time Cost: $8.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1 71.9 million 

Annual: $3 7.8 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, 

except transfer appropriate assets, including the 

piers, the floating drydock, its typhoon basin 

anchorage, the recompression chamber, and the 

floating crane, to Naval Activities, Guam. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base 

closure evolutions, as force levels continue to 

decline, there is additional excess capacity that 

needs to be eliminated. While operational and forward basing considerations require access to 

Guam, a fully functional ship repair facility is not 

required. The workload of SRF Guam can be 

entirely met by other Department of the Navy 

facilities. However, retention of the waterfront 

assets provides the DON with the ability to meet 

voyage repair and emergent requirements that 

may arise in the Western Pacific. 

Community Concerns 

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval 

Activities Guam section, the community expressed 

concern Guam was being penalized under the 

Navy’s interpretation of 10 U.S.C. 7309, which has 

prohibited performance of any non-voyage repair 

work on U.S. Navy vessels other than those 

homeported in Guam. If Guam is prohibited from 

bidding on U.S. ship repair work, then a major 

potential source of income would be excluded 

from any economic revitalization efforts. The community also argued the best way for the facilities 

and equipment to be maintained at the SRF would 

be for them to be used by the private sector 

because the high humidity and heat would deteriorate the equipment if it were left idle. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that large reductions in workload, present 

excess capacity at the facility, and the possible 

departure of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) 

ships from Guam, justified closure. The Commission also found that if the MSC ships remain on 

Guam, then a private sector ship repair capability 

must be developed. The Commission was concerned about a current Navy policy which does 

not allow Guam repair facilities to bid on certain 

U.S. ship repair work. The Commission believes 

that this policy should be modified to allow more 

work at private repair facilities on Guam. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-57 
Naval Ship Repair Facility (SKF), Guam, except 

transfer appropriate assets, including the piers, the 

floating drydock, its typhoon basin anchorage, the 

recompression chamber, and the floating crane, to 

Naval Activities, Guam. 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii 

Category. Naval Air Stations 

Mission: None; Base Closed 

One-time Cost: $ .04 million 

Savings: 19962001: $I 7.6 million 

Annual: $0.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items excepted from the closure of 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii (1993 

Commission, at page 1-19) from “Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use” to 

“Retain the family housing as needed for multiservice LM, including the following family housing support facilities: commissary facilities, Public 

Works Center compound with its sanitary landfill, 

and beach recreational areas, known as Nimitz 

Beach and White Plains Beach.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

While specific mention was made of retention of 

family housing in the RKAC 93 recomniendation 

relating to NAS Barbers Point, certain aspects conducive to supporting personnel in family housing 

were not specifically mentioned, which is required 

for their retention. Quality of life interests require 

either that these facilities be retained or that new 

ones be built to provide these services. Another 

advantage of retaining these facilities to support 

multi-service use is the avoidance of the costs of 

closing the existing landfill and either developing 

another one on other property on the island of 

Oahu or incurring the costs of shipping waste to a 

site off-island. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Corn rn ission Findings 

The Commission found retaining the requested 

portions of the Naval Air Station would avoid 

costs in developing replaceiiients and would 

improve Quality of Life issues in the affected area. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation of the 1993 Commission 

regarding items excepted from the closure of 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii (1993 

Commission, at page 1-19) from “Retain the fainily housing as needed for multi-service use” to 

“Retain the family housing as needed for multiservice use, including the following family housing support facilities: commissary facilities, Public 

Works Center compound with its sanitary landfill, 

and beach recreational areas, known as Nimitz 

Beach and White Plains Beach.” 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Division, Indianapolis, Indiana 

Category: Navy Technical Center 

Mission: In-Service Engineering for 

Avionics and Electronics 

One-time Cost: $77.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $7.7 million 

Annual: $39.2 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (I year) 

FINAL ACT.ION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana. Relocate necessary functions along with associated personnel, 

equipment and support to other naval technical 

activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Crane, Indiana; Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Division, Patuxent River, Maryland; and Naval Air 

Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, 

California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a rec1-58 CHAPTER 1 
ognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. This recommended closure results in the closure of a major 

technical center and the relocation of its principal 

functions to three other technical centers, realizing 

both a reduction in excess capacity and significant 

economies while raising aggregate military value. 

Community Concerns 

The Indianapolis community believes that the 

military value calculation performed by the Navy 

for integrated capabilities does not accurately 

reflect the integrated value of the installation. 

They also expressed concern that many more 

employees than projected would not transfer to 

the receiving locations with the workload. The 

City of Indianapolis has proposed a public-private 

partnership as an alternative reuse of the installation if the recommendation to close is approved. 

The community is concerned that a recommendation not interfere with its proposal. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the Navy excluded 

$8.6 million in costs for a duplicative EP-3/ES-3 

system capability that would have jeopardized 

fleet support during the estimated moving time to 

NAWC China Lake, California. The Commission 

also found that the Navy excluded $38.6 million 

in closure related moving costs. The Commission 

believes that these exclusions could raise the onetime closure cost to $125 million. The Commission 

found that the Navy under-evaluated the military 

value for the integrated capabilities that currently 

exist at NAWC Indianapolis. The Commission 

found that the avionics and electronics systems 

engineering functions at Indianapolis are consistent with operational requirements, and that collocation of these engineering functions, with the 

prototyping functions performed at the facility, 

has contributed substantially to the effectiveness 

of the facility in serving the Department of the 

Navy. These integrated engineering and 

prototyping capabilities, along with NAWC 

Indianapolis’s consistent level of $330 million in 

reimbursable funding, lead the Commission to 

conclude that the NAWC Indianapolis is a prime 

candidate for privatization. The Commission 

strongly urges the Department of the Navy to 

allow privatization of these assets. 

The Commission found that if the Community proposal for privatization of NAWC Indianapolis is 

successful, the costs and savings estimated by 

DoD could be different. As a result of this uncertainty, and because the Commission is prohibited 

from considering reuse planning when nuking its 

recommendations, the Commission has accepted 

and used the DoD cost and savings data in its 

deliberations. The Commission has also identified 

uncertainties in the Navy’s cost to close but these 

are speculative. The Commission adopted the 

DoD costs in making its final recommendation. 

The Commission also adopted the DoD recommendation to close NAWC Indianapolis, but provided the Navy discretionary authority to 

implement fully the Community’s proposal. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis. Transfer workload, 

equipment and facilities to the private sector or 

local jurisdiction as appropriate if the private sector can accommodate the workload onsite; or 

relocate necessary functions along with necessary 

personnel, equipment and support to other naval 

technical activities, primarily the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana; Naval Air Warfare 

Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland; and Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons 

Division, China Lake, California. To the extent that 

workload is moved to the private sector, such 

personnel as are necessary should remain in place 

to assist with transfer to the private sector; to 

perform functions compatible with private sector 

workload, or are necessary to sustain or support 

the private sector workload, and to carryout any 

transition activities. The Commission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Crane Division Detachment, 

Louisville, Kentucky 

Category: Navy Maintenance Depot 

Mission: Support for Naval gun systems 

One-time Cost: $1 03.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $-39.4 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2003 (3 years) 

FINM ACTION: Close 

Annual: $28.6 million 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-59 
Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane 

Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky. Relocate 

appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and 

support to other naval activities, primarily the 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia; the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, California; and the 

Naval Surface Wdrfare Center, Crane, Indiana. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with 

tlie Department of the Naky’s efforts to remove 

depot level maintenance workload from technical 

centers and return it to depot industrial activities, 

this action consolidates ships’ systems (guns) 

depot and general industrial workload at NSYD 

Norfolk, which has many of the required facilities 

in place. lhe functional distribution of workload 

in this manner offers an opportunity for crossservicing part of the gun plating workload to the 

Watervliet Arsenal in New York. System integration engineering will relocate to NSWC Port 

Hueneme, with the remainder of the engineering 

workload and Close-in-Weapons System (CIWS) 

depot maintenance functions relocating to NSWC 

Crane. The closure of this activity not only 

reduces excess capacity, but relocation of functional workload to activities performing similar 

work will result in additional efficiencies and 

economies in tlie management of those functions. 

Community Concerns 

The Louisville community believes that $240 million 

of closure related costs were improperly excluded 

from the onetime closure costs by the Navy. The 

community is concerned about the economic impact 

and has made a proposal for a public-private partnership involving two private companies, the 

Nay, and the City of Louisville. This proposal 

would be implemented as an alternative reuse of the 

closed facility. The community is concerned that a 

recommendation not interfere with its proposal. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the Navy did not estimate the necessary Technical Repair Standard 

(TRS) costs at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and 

that implementation of this transferring workload 

could require an additional $18 million in TRS 

costs. The Commission also found that tlie Navy 

did not include $13.4 million in closure related 

moving costs. The Commission found that these 

additional costs could increase the one-time cost 

to close to $136 million. A Naval Audit Service 

Report was conducted as a result of allegations 

about improper handling of data call information 

from Louisville to the Base Structure Analysis 

Team. The Commission found that the Naval Audit 

Service Report would liave no impact on the 

Navy’s decision to recommend closure of NSWC 

Louisville. The Commission found that the gun 

systems engineering functions at Louisville are 

consistent with operational requirements, and that 

collocation of these engineering functions with 

the maintenance and overhaul functions performed at the facility has contributed substantially 

to the effectiveness of the facility in serving the 

Department of the Navy. These integrated engineering, maintenance and overhaul capabilities, 

along with NSWC Louisville’s plating facility, led 

the Commission to strongly urge the Department 

of the Navy to allow privatization of these assets. 

The Commission found that if the Community proposal for privatization of NSWC Louisville is successful, the costs and savings estimated by Don 

could be different. As a result of this uncertainty, 

and because the Commission is prohibited from 

considering reuse planning a7hen making its recommendations, the Commission accepted and 

used the Do11 cost and savings data in its deliberations. The Commission has also identified 

uncertainties in the Navy’s cost to close but these 

are speculative. The Conirni on adopted the 

DoD costs in making its final recommendation. 

The Commission adopted the DoD recommendation to close NSWC Louisville, but provided tlie 

Navy discretionary authority to implement fully 

the Community’s proposal. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Crane Division Detachment, Louisville. Transfer 

workload, equipment and facilities to the private 

1-60 CHAPTER 1 
sector or local jurisdiction as appropriate if the 

private sector can accommodate the workload 

onsite; or relocate necessary functions along with 

necessary personnel, equipment and support to 

other naval technical activities, primarily the Naval 

Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Surface Warfare 

Center, Hueneme, California; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Crane, Indiana. To the extent 

that workload is moved to the private sector, such 

personnel as are necessary should remain in place 

to assist with transfer to the private sector; to 

perform functions compatible with private sector 

workload, or are necessary to sustain or support 

the private sector workload, and to carryout any 

transition activities. The Cornmission finds this 

recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

Category: Nay Research Lab 

Mission: Conducts biomedical research on the 

One-time costs: $0.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $14.1 million 

Annual: $2.9 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Biodynarnics Laboratory, New 

Orleans, Louisiana, and relocate necessary personnel to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, 

Ohio, and Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida. 

effect of motion on militay personnel 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignnient or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this 

laboratory reduces this excess capacity and fosters 

joint synergism. It also provides the opportunity 

for the transfer of its equipment and facilities to 

the public educational or commercial sector, thus 

maintaining access to its capabilities on an asneeded hasis. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the Secretary's recommendation or justification. 

The Commission understands this capability will 

not be lost and will be assumed by the University 

of New Orleans. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval I3iodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, and relocate necessary personnel to 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, 

and Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory, 

Pensacola, Florida. 

Naval Medical Research Institute, 

Category: Navy Research Lab 

Mission: Conducts biomedical research in 

support of combat forces 

One-time Cost: $3.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $19.0 million 

Annual: $9.5 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year) 

FZNAL ACTZON: Close 

Bethesda, Maryland 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Medical Research Institute 

(NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland. Consolidate the personnel of the Diving Medicine Program with the 

Experimental Diving Unit, Naval Surface Warfare 

Center, Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. Relocate the Infectious 

Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational 

Medicine programs along with necessary personnel and equipment to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

COMMISSIo1 FINIXUGS ANT) RECOMMENDA'I'IONS 141 
FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and of the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. This closure and 

realignment achieves a principal objective of the 

DoD by cross-servicing part of this laboratory's 

workload and Furthers the BRAC 91 Tri-Service 

Project Reliance Study decision by collocating 

medical research with the Army. Other portions of 

that workload can be assumed by another Navy 

installation with only a transfer of certain personnel, achieving both a reduction in excess capacity 

and a cost savings by eliminating a redundant 

capability in the area of diving research. 

Community Concerns 

The Maryland community generally supports the 

recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, with 

the exception of the part that concerned the Diving Medicine Facility. The community supported 

cantonment of the Diving Medicine Facility, because of its unique facilities and research. The 

community believes the COBRA data were flawed 

and the cost to move understated. In addition, the 

community expressed a concern that the hyperbaric chambers used for animal research, not just 

the "manned" facilities, should be retained for 

future studies. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the Department of Defense recommendation or 

justification. The movement of all but the Diving 

Medicine Facility to Walter Reed had been 

planned before the Secretary's recommendations 

were submitted to the Commission, and has the 

universal support of all parties concerned. The 

Commission found this part of the recommendation consistent with the DoD-wide goal of 

interservicing . 

While the Diving Medicine Facility at Bethesda 

has a long history in its field, the Commission 

found the Navy Experimental Diving Unit in 

Panama City, Florida was well-equipped to include this mission in its large spectrum of activity. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), 

Bethesda, Maryland. Consolidate the personnel of 

the Diving Medicine Program with the Experimental Diving Unit, Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, 

Panama City, Florida. Relocate the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational 

Medicine programs along with necessary personnel and equipment to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland. 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock Division Detachment, 

Annapolis, Maryland 

Category: Technical Centers/hboratories 

Mission: RDTGE Fleet Support 

One-time Cost: $24.6 million 

Savings: 19962001: $23.8 million 

Annual: $1 1.7 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years) 

FINAL AC"Z0N: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, 

Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval 

Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate 

functions, personnel, equipment and support to 

other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, 

Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a 

DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with 

other components of the Center in the local area 

as appropriate. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the Department of the 

Navy budget through 2001. Specific reductions 

162 CHAPTER 1 
for technicd centers are difficult to determine 

because these activities are supported through 

customer orders. However, the level of forces and 

the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines 

in technical center workload through 2001, which 

leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these 

activities. This excess and the imbalance in force 

and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or 

consolidation of activities wherever practicable. 

The total closure of this technical center reduces 

over:i11 excess capacity in this category of installations, as well as excess capacity specific to this 

particular installation. It results in synergistic efficiencies tiy eliminating a major site and collocating technical personnel at the two primary 

remaining sites involved in hull, machinery, and 

equipment associated with naval vessels. It allows 

the movement of work to other Navy, DoD, academic and private industry facilities, and the 

excessing of some facilities not in continuous 

use. It also collocates KDT&E efforts with the InService Engineering work and facilities, to incorporate lessons learned from fleet operations and 

to increase the technical response pool to solve 

immediate problems. 

Community Concerns 

The community expressed concern and believes 

the Navy iinderestimated costs related to base 

overhead, facility moving, alternative testing procedures, tenant relocation, and loss of skilled staff. 

The community believes that the proposal would 

eliminate two major test facilities and would 

require the sulxtitution of extensive live testing at 

greatly increased costs or risk to personnel. They 

pointed out that other vital projects would be delayed, perhaps unacceptably. For example, the 

community identified a delay in testing systems, 

which might make them unavailable for installation on the lead ships in their respective classes. 

More serious, the community identified a potential 

delay in the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) replacement program. The Clean Air Act and an international treaty, the Montreal Protocol, halt all U. S. 

production of CFCs by the year 2000. Production 

of the materials used by the Navy has already 

ceased. The community also noted that NSWC 

Annapolis is surrounded by water, as well as 

Naval Station Annapolis, which is not closing. 

Thus, overhead costs would remain and reuse of 

the land would be highly problematic. 

The community expressed concerns about the 

movement of much of their Ii&D mission to 

NSWC Philadelphia which has in-service engineering, not research, as its prinlary function. They 

pointed out significant differences between 

research experience and educational levels of the 

employee populations at the t\vo cotimands. 

They suggested that the number of positions the 

Navy said could lie eliminated \vas questiondile 

and that the scenario eliminated, instead of relocating, some critical personnel, such ;is those conducting CFC work. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that closing NSWC Annapolis and relocating key facilities and personnel would achieve 

cost savings through the elimination of overhead 

and efficiencies associated with the collocation of 

K&D with In-Service Engineering. The Coininission accepted the Navy’s position that it \xis willing to assume the risk associated with the closure 

of two research facilities in Annapolis. The Commission found that even after considering possible 

increases in the origixil cost estim:ites relating to 

moving costs, facility closing “ate, and elimination 

of billets, the savings from the recommendation 

remain attractive. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Cornmission recornmencis the following: close the 

Naval Sirface Warfare Center. Carderock Division 

Detachment, Annapolis. Maryland. including the 

NIKE Site, Rayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water 

treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to 

support the US. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Kelocate appropriate functions, personnel, 

equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, 

Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the 

Naval Research Labor:ltory, Washington, D.C. The 

Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, 

will be relocated with other components of the 

Center in the local area as appropriate. 

- 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-63 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Dahlgren Division Detachment, 

White Oak, Maryland 

and Laboratories 

Testing, and Evaluation Support 

Category: Technical Centers 

Mission: Research, Development, 

One-time Cost: $2.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $28.7 million 

Annual: $6.0 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACITON: Close 

Semta y of &fme Recommendation 

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the functions, personnel and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D 

Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics 

research and development to the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. 

Semta y of &fme Justajication 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closurehealignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Closure of the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Detachment, White Oak, Maryland, reduces this 

excess capacity, and its consolidation with two 

other major technical centers that already have 

capability will result in further economies and efficiencies. This closure also eliminates unnecessary 

capabilities, since a few Navy facilities were left at 

NSWC White Oak only because Naval Sea Systems 

Command was relocating there as a result of 

BRAC 93. However, those facilities can be 

excessed, and the Naval Sea Systems Command 

can be easily accommodated at the Washington 

Navy Yard. 

Comnaunity Concerns 

The community expressed concern that the DoD 

recommendation makes no provision for the continued operation of a number of facilities at NSWC 

White Oak, which the community believes are 

critical national assets. These assets, the community arkwes, see joint, interagency, and commercial 

use. Two facilities were of the greatest concern: 

the Nuclear Weapons Effect Test Facility and the 

Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel. The community felt 

there is a clear ongoing need for these facilities, 

and because no comparable assets exist elsewhere, they must remain operable. The community believes any savings from the closure of 

NSWC White Oak would evaporate when the 

costs to continue to operate these facilities, to 

move them, or to duplicate them in another location are added to the analysis. 

Comm.Mon Findings 

The Commission’s primary concern regarding this 

recommendation was the final disposition of the 

technic:al facilities located at White Oak, especially 

the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel and the Nuclear 

Weapons Effect Facility. The recommendation of 

the Secretary of Defense contended that these 

facilities were no longer critical, however, there 

was ample data that pointed to a continuing need. 

The Commission concurred with the Secretary of 

Defense that if a sponsor desired to continue to 

operate the facilities, they could acquire them in 

the reuse process. In its analysis, the Commission 

was unable to identlfy a potential DoD user willing to take over the facilities. The Commission 

found that the facilities were excess to the 

Department’s needs, and thus the White Oak 

detachment could close with no adverse impact 

on DoD operational requirements. 

Commission Recommendution 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the 

functions, personnel and equipment associated 

with Ship Magnetic Signature Control RtkD Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics 

research and development to the Naval Surface 

Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia. 

1-64 CHAPTER 1 
Naval Air Station, 

South Weymouth, Massachusetts 

Catego y: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Reserve Units 

One-time Cost: $1 7.3 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $50.8 million 

Annual: $27.4 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air 

Station, Brunswick, Maine. Relocate the Marine 

Corps Reserve support squadrons to another facility in the local area or to NAS Brunswick. Reestablish Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, 

and change the receiving site specified by the 

1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at 

page 1-64) for consolidation of Navy and Marine 

Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; 

Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; 

and Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, 

from “NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts” to 

“Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

As a result of the Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission’s actions in BKAC 93, the Department 

of the Navy retained several naval air stations 

north of the major fleet concentration in Norfolk. 

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during BRAC 93, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing 

decline in force levels from that governing BRAC 

93, and thus there is additional excess capacity 

that must be eliminated. The major thrust of the 

evaluation of operational bases was to retain only 

that infrastructure necessary to support future 

force levels while, at the same time, not impeding 

operational flexibility for the deployment of that 

force. In that latter context, the Commanderin-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), 

expressed an operational desire to have as fullycapable an air station as possible north of Norfolk 

with the closest geographic proximity to support 

operational deployments. Satisfaction of these 

needs both to further reduce excess capacity and 

to honor CINCLANTFLT‘s operational imperative 

can be accomplished best by the retention of the 

most fully capable air station in this geographic 

area, Naval Air Station. Bninswick, Maine, in lieu 

of the reserve air station at South Weymouth. 

Unlike BRAC 93, where assets from Naval Air Station, South Weymouth were proposed to be relocated to three receiving sites, two of which were 

geographically quite remote, and where the perceived adverse impact on reserve demographics 

was considered unacceptabk by the Commission, 

this BRAC 95 recommendation moves all of the 

assets and supporting personnel and equipment 

less than 150 miles away, thus providing most 

acceptable reserve demographics. Further, the 

consolidation of several reserve centers at the 

Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, 

provides demographics consideration for surface 

reserve assets. In addition, this recommendation 

furthers the Departmental preference to collocate 

active and reserve assets and personnel wherever 

possible to enhance the readiness of both. 

Community Concerns 

NAS South Weymouth is the only operational Naval 

Air Reserve activity in the New EnglancVNew York 

area. The community believes closure would preclude active participation by aviation qualified 

Naval Reservists in the northeastern United States, 

because reservists are geographically connected to 

their homes and civilian occupations. The community noted the Navy ranked NAS South Weymouth 

fourth of six in military value, well ahead of NAS 

Ft. Worth and NAS Atlanta. The community emphasized that the highly educated technical workforce 

and large population of qualified veterans in the 

Boston area support recruitment for both the current mission and any expanded role. 

The community questioned the Navy‘s recommendation to close South Weymouth despite the continued high value as borne out by the Navy’s 

military value matrix. Further, the community 

believes the decision to close South Weymouth, 

which links a reserve facility with an active facility, is without analytical support. In addition, the 

community believes the operational requirement 

expressed by the Navy for a fully capable base 

north of Norfolk represents a last minute methodological shift on the part of the Navy. 

The community conducted own independent 

analysis of the distance of Naval Air Reserve Stations to the nearest major population centers. The 

community argues that relocation of South 

Weymouth reserve units to Brunswick, Maine 

would place them more than twice as far from 

a major population center as any of the other 

Keserve Air Station. The cornmunity believes 

~ 

COMMISSION FIhDIhGS AND RECOLIMENDAI IOh5 1-65 
when the increased distance required for reservists to commute is coupled with a sparse population base from which reservists can be recruited, 

the result will be understaffed units that are not 

ready to perform their missions. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found closing NAS South 

Weymouth will alleviate excess capacity at both a 

reserve air station and an active duty air station. In 

addition, closing NAS South Weymouth will generate substantial savings. The Commission considered several options to closing NAS South 

Weymouth, however, they were less cost effective 

than the South Weymouth closure. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, 

equipment and support to Naval Air Station, 

Brunswick, Maine. Relocate the Marine Corps 

Reserve support squadrons to another facility in 

the local area or to NAS Brunswick. Reestablish 

Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, and 

change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

64) for consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps 

Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; Naval 

Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; and 

Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, 

from “NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts” to 

“Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts.” 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan 

Catego y: Reserve Air Station 

Mission: Support for Marine Corps Reserve Unil 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: $9.4 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

25) for the Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps 

Reserve Center, including MWSG-47 and supporting units, from “Marine Corps Reserve Center, 

Annual: None 

Twin Cities, Minnesota” to “Air National Guard 

Base, Selfridge, Michigan.” 

Secretary of Defense Justificution 

In addition to avoiding the costs of relocating the 

reserve unit from this reserve center to Minnesota, 

this redirect maintains a Marine Corps recruiting 

presence in the Detroit area, which is a demographically rich recruiting area, and realizes a 

principal objective of the Department of Defense 

to effect multi-service use of facilities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the 

receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission 

(1993 Commission Report, at page 1-25) for the 

Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center, including MWSG-47 and supporting units, 

from “Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, 

Minnesota” to “Air National Guard Base, Selfridge, 

Michigan.” 

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi 

Category: Training Air Station 

Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi, except retain the Regional Counterdrug Training 

Academy facilities which are transferred to the 

Academy. Relocate the undergraduate strike pilot 

training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Kingsville, 

Texas. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, will close, and its training functions 
will he relocated to other training activities, primarily the Na\y Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, 

Newport, Rhode Island. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The 1003 Commission recommended that Naval 

Air Station, Meridian remain open because it 

found that the then-current and future pilot training rate (PTK) required that there be two fullstrike training Ixises, Naval Air Station, Kingsville, 

Texas, and Naval Air Station, Meridian. In the period between 1793 and the present, two factors 

emerged that required the Department of the 

Navy again to review the requirement for two 

such installations. First, the current force -stnicture 

plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air 

wings) so that Navy strike training could be 

handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of 

the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training he consolidated. The training 

conducted at Nmal Air Station, Meridian is similar 

to that conducted at Naval Air Station, Kingsville, 

which has a higher military value, presently 

houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy’s 

new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure. and has ready access to 

larger amounts of air space, including over-water 

air space if such is required. Also, the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group 

included the closure of Naval Air Station, Meridian 

in each of its closure/realignment alternatives. The 

separate recommendation for the consolidation of 

the Naml Technical Training Center functions at 

two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these 

training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is 

being provided to officers. 

Corn m u n ity Concerns 

The community argued the Navy‘s training plan 

did not provide enough capacity to accomplish 

needed strike pilot training without NAS Meridian. 

The community believes NAS Meridian is needed 

to meet the requirement. The community also 

claimed the Yavy’s military value ranking of NAS 

Meridian was too low. It argued Naval training 

requires priniarily “over-ground” airspace, but the 

Navy’s mikary value matrix was heavily weighted 

for “over-water” airspace. Since Meridian has considerable “over-ground” airspace but no “overwater” air,space, the community lxlieves its military value ranking was unfairly diminished. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found excess capacity existed in 

the Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training (IJPT) 

base category. The Commission, however, 

reviewed the specific capacity requirements for 

carrier-basNed aircraft pilot training when considering this facility. The pilot tmining rate WTR) for 

the strike pilot training subcategory was increased 

by the Navy in May 1995, above the level used for 

the closure analysis, because of a new mission 

and additional planned squadrons. In addition, if 

the requirement to train all carrier airplane pilots 

using the Navy-proposed single-sited T-45 trainer 

is implemented, the PTK would increase further. If 

the Navy’s 20% surge requirement is added to the 

increased PTR, the Commission found the Navy 

could not meet its UPT training requirements, 

without N AS Meridian. The Commission recognized that keeping a second strike pilot training 

base open resulted in excess UI’T capacity, hut 

found the risk associated with having only one 

UPT strike pilot training base to lie unacceptable. 

The Chief ‘of Naval Operations also expressed his 

personal concern about the difficulties of meeting 

this surge based requirement with only one strike 

pilot training base. 

The Commission believes that the Secretary of 

Defense’s decision not to base its recommendations for the UPT category on a cross-service 

analysis significantly limited opportunities for 

more effici’ent usage of pilot training bases. The 

Commissioii urges the Secretary of Defense to 

pursue joint training opportunities in the f~iture. 

See the separate discussion concerning Naval 

Technical Training Center (NTTC) Meridian. 

Cornmissiton Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secrerary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 3. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Air Station, Meridian remains open. 

Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training 

Center, also remains open. The Commission finds 

this recornmendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 
Naval Technical Training Center, 

Category: Naval Training Center 

Mission: Training of Enlisted Personnel 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINM ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi, and relocate the training functions 

to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval 

Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode 

Island. 

Meridian, Mississippi 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Projected manpower reductions contained in the 

DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial 

decrease in training-related infrastructure consistent with the policy of collocating training hnctions at fleet concentration centers when feasible. 

Consolidation of the Naval Technical Training 

Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of the these training functions and aligns 

certain enlisted personnel training to sites where 

similar training is being provided to officers. 

Community Concerns 

The Meridian community expressed concern the 

Naval Technical Training Center (N'ITC) was 

being included in the Naval Air Station, Meridian 

closure recommendation and was not evaluated 

on its own merits. They felt the surge capability 

the school provided, as well as its modem facilities, demonstrated the need to keep the school at 

its present location. Additionally, the Meridian 

community argued it would be more cost effective 

to keep the school at its present location and 

avoid the one-time costs at the gaining facilities. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found when the Naval Technical 

Training Center (NIX) Meridian was analyzed 

separately from NAS Meridian, the economic 

results of closure were not favorable. The modern 

facilities, a need for large military construction at 

receiving locations and the Commission recommendation not to close NAS Meridian contributed 

to the Commission finding that the "ITC Meridian 

should also be left open. 

Comm.ission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian 

remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Naval ,Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Division, Lakehast, New Jersey 

Category: Navy Tecbnical Center 

Mission: Research, Development, Test & 

Evaluution, and In-Service Engineering 

for carrier catapult and related functions 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAI. ACTION: Remain Open 

Semtarry of Defme Recommendation 

Close Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Lakehurst, New Jersey, except transfer in place 

certain facilities and equipment to the Naval Air 

Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, 

Maryland. Relocate other functions and associated 

personnel and equipment to the Naval Air Warfare 

Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River. Maryland, arid the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, 

Florida. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training 

Center Detachment, Lakehurst, to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. Relocate Naval Mobile 

Construction Battalion 21, the U.S. Army CECOM 

Airborne Engineering Evaluation Support Activity, 

and the Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Office to other government-owned spaces. 

Semtary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a slharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are diffilcult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicatoirs of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

1-68 CHAPTER 1 
levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicahle. The closure and 

realignment of this activity permits the elimination 

of the command and support structure of this 

activity and the consolidation of its most critical 

functions at ;I major technical center, allowing 

synergism with its parent command and more 

fully utilizing ;milable capabilities at major depot 

activities. This recommendation retains at 

Lakehurst only those facilities and personnel 

essential to conducting catapult and arresting gear 

testing and fleet support. 

Community Concerns 

The Lakehurst community is concerned that costs 

to close were exclided improperly from the DoD 

recommendation. They identified problems with 

the capabilities of the recommended receiving 

installations, to accomnmdate the incoming missions for the costs used in the COBRA analysis. 

The community also expressed concern that by 

splintering the inter-dependent catapult RDTBE, 

prototype manufacturing, and support capabilities, 

the performance level of fleet responses would 

decrease. The community further argued that 

Lakehurst should not be closed, so that the current tenant activities may remain. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the DoD’s recornmendation will dismantle inter-dependent functions at 

NAWC Lakehurst and relocate them to other naval 

facilities. The Commission found this recommendation, by splintering these interdependent functions would result in a loss in industrial, economic 

and performance advantages. The Commission 

found that the catapult research, development, 

and test and evaluation functions depend upon 

collocation with prototyping and manufacturing 

functions. The Commission found splitting these 

interdependent functions would increase the time 

needed to respond to carrier fleet emergencies 

because of the travel time for parts and personnel 

between NAWC Lakehurst and NADEP Jacksonville. The Commission found overall response 

time to carrier catapult emergencies would be unacceptable if the DoD recommendation was 

implemented, and efficiencies resulting from collocation would he lost. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated suhstantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Lakehurst remains open. The Commission fintls 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Category: Technical Cen ters/Labo rato ries 

Mission: Technical Publication Support 

One-time Cost: $5.7 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1.5 million 

Annual: $ 2.2 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility 

(NATSF), Philadelphia, Pennsylvanla, and consolldate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, 

California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this 

facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island and achieves the 

synergy from having the cirawings and manuals 

collocated with an in-service maintenance activity 

at a major fleet concentration. Additionally, it 

enables the elimination of the NATSF detachinent 

already at North Island and results in a reduction 

of costs. 

Community Concerns 

The Philadelphia community helieves its ties to 

Aviation Supply Office (ASO) are stronger than 

those with Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North 

Island. NA’I‘SF already has a Memoranda of 

Understanding to reduce overhead costs hy hav- 
ing personnel, computer, mail, and other services 

provided to it by ASO. The community pointed 

out its employees did not travel to NADEP North 

Island in 1994, and only a relatively small percentage of its work supports the NADEP. They also 

cite evidence which suggests they may be moved 

to a San Diego location other than the NADEP. 

The community stressed that in 1993, the Commission “found compelling the potential cost savings 

and reduction in workload among the Services of 

establishing a joint organization under the auspices of NATSF.” There were no indications, however, that this concept has been pursued. 

The community also asserted the significant difference in housing costs between Philadelphia and 

San Diego, and thus, most employees will be unable to afford to make the move, and few will 

actually move. 

The community also asserted there is more commonality with ASO, and that more positions can 

be eliminated by leaving NATSF in Philadelphia. 

Finally, the community maintained that substantial travel to Naval Air Systems Command would 

be required, greatly increasing per diem and personnel costs. They also asserted that moving from 

a fully loaded urban base in Philadelphia to 

another well loaded base will not generate substantial savings. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that NATSF is a Naval Air Systems Cominand (NAVAIR) activity and that moving to 

NADEP, North Island, California will facilitate the 

implementation of NAVAIRs reorganization of its 

field activities. The Commission recognized that 

NATSF had very strong ties to ASO, where NATSF 

is a tenant, but concluded its relationship with 

NAVAIR is more important. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF), 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with 

the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California. 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Category: Technical Centers/LaDoratories 

Mission: Research, Development, Test 

One-time Cost: $8.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $33. 1 million 

Annual: $7.6 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINM ACTION: Close 

Secretla y of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and 

support to other technical activities, primarily the 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Patuxelit River, Matyland. 

Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania 

and Evaluation 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a .sharp decline in the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are diflicult to determine because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

worklo,ad through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closurehealignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever prdCtiCable. The closure of 

this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the consolidation of the relocated functions with its parent 

command at the new receiving site. Additionally, 

it completes the process of realignment initiated in 

BRAC ‘91, based on a clearer understanding of 

what is now required to be retained in-house. 

Closure and excessing of the Human Centrifuge/ 

Dynamic Flight Simulator Facility further reduces 

excess capacity and provides the opportunity for 

the transfer of this facility to the public educational tor commercial sectors, thus maintaining 

access on an as-needed basis. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

1-70 CHAPTER 1 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate 

functions, personnel, equipment, and support to 

other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air 

Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, I’atuxent River, 

Maryland. 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Division, Open Water Test Facility, 

Oreland, Pennsylvania 

Catego y: Test and Evaluation 

Mission: Test and Evaluation 

One-time Cost : $0.05 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.03 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $0.02 million 

Secretary of Defense Recom m enda ti0 n 

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the Idget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this 

facility reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on other lakes that 

exist in the DON inventory. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recoinmendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Com mission Recoin mend at ion 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Ilefense 

did not deviate substantially froin the forcestructure plan snd final criterh Therefore. the 

Commission recorninends the following: close the 

Naval Air \X/arfare Center, Aircraft Division. Open 

Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania. 

Naval Avi,ation Engineering Service Unit, 

Category: Technical CenteWLabomtories 

Mission: Azdation Field Engineering Assistance 

One-time Cost: $2.9 million 

Sauings: 1996-2001: $5.3 inillion 

Annual: $2.4 million 

Return on Jnvestment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Aviation lngineering Service Unit 

(NAESU), Philadelphia, I’ennsylvania. and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), 

North Island. California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON hidget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, hecause these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However. 

the level of forces and the budget are relia1,lc 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leacls to ;I recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignnient or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this 

facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory hy using available capacity at NADE P North Island. Additionally, it enahles 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND KECOMhlEN1).4TIONb 1-71 
the consolidation of necessary functions with a 

depot activity performing similar work and results 

in a reduction of costs. 

Community Concerns 

The Philadelphia community believes its ties to 

Aviation Supply Office (AS01 and Naval Aviation 

Technical Services Facility (NATSF), (an AS0 tenant), are stronger than those with NADEP North 

Island. NAESU is presently negotiating a Memoranda of Understanding to reduce overhead costs 

that resulted from its June, 1995 move from the 

closed Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to the AS0 

compound. The community pointed out that the 

employees rarely traveled to NADEP North Island 

in 1994, and only a relatively small percentage of 

NAESU work supports the NADEP. They also cite 

evidence that they say suggests they may be 

moved to a San Diego location other than the 

NADEP. 

The community pointed out the significant difference in housing costs between Philadelphia and 

San Diego. Most employees will be unable to afford to make the move, and thus, they believe 

fewer than 10% of the employees will actually 

move. 

The community also asserts there is more commonality with NATSF and ASO, and that more 

positions can be eliminated by leaving NAESU in 

Philadelphia. The community believes the closure 

scenario would eliminate fewer jobs than reflected 

in the Navy position. Finally, the community 

pointed out that substantial travel to Naval Air 

Systems Command (NAVAIR) would be required, 

greatly increasing travel, per diem, and personnel 

costs. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the NAESU’s strongest ties are to 

NAVAIR. The Commission recognized that NAESU 

can be situated in Philadelphia as readily as in San 

Diego, but concluded its relationship with 

NAVAIR is more important. The Commission also 

concluded that the personnel movements were not 

correctly presented in the Navy’s COBRA due to 

issues relating to NAESU’s San Diego detachments. 

The Commission found that the DoD costs and 

savings are uncertain; savings may have been overestimated and costs underestimated. In making its 

recommendation, however, the Commission adopted 

the DoD costs while recognizing the uncertainties. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did riot deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU), 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with 

the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island, 

California. 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Sum-ce Center, RDTH Division 

Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania 

Catego y: Technical Centers/Laboratories 

Mission: Research, Development, Test 

One-time Cost: $8.4 million * 

Savings: 19962001: $33.1 million * 

Annual: $ 7.6 million * 

Retunr on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAI: ACTION: Close 

and Evaluation 

* Combined with Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA. 

Semtary of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, 

Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support 

to other technical activities, primarily the Naval 

Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California; and 

the N,aval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, 

Mississippi. 

Semtary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 20131. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through I;y 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. The closure of 

this activity reduces excess capacity with the 

resultant efficiencies and economies in the management of the relocated functions at the new 

1-72 CHAPTER 1 
receiving sites. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on 

a clearer understanding of what is now required 

to he retained in-house. Closure and excessing of 

the Inertial Navigational Facility further reduces 

excess capacity and provides the opportunity for 

the transfer of these facilities to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining 

access on an as-needed basis. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Some employees of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania detachment of Naval Command, Control and 

Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) in San 

Diego, California told the Commission they report 

to a different NCCOSC organization not specifically mentioned in the recommendation of the 

Secretary of Defense and therefore should not be 

included in the recommendation. Navy provided 

information indicating it was their intention to 

move the Philadelphia detachment to San Diego 

in accordance with an organizational restructuring 

begun in 1991 with the closure of the Philadelphia 

Naval Shipyard. The Commission accepted the 

Navy‘s explanation that the Philadelphia Detachment is appropriately part of the planned move to 

San Diego. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, 

Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical 

activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control 

and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, 

San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, 

Catego y: Naval Shipyards 

Mission: Repair and Maintenance of Naval Ships 

One-time Cost: $0.03 million 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Savings: 1’996-2001: $51.9 million 

Annual: $8.8 million 

Return oli! Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FZNAL ACTZON: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Reco m rnenda ti0 ns 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Phikadelphia 

Naval Shipyard (1991 Commission Report, at page 

5-28) to delete “and preservation” (line 5) and “for 

emergent requirements”(1ines 6-7). 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to 

decline, there is additional excess capacity that 

needs to be eliminated. The contingency seen in 

1991 for which the facilities at this closed shipyard 

were being retained no longer exists, and their 

continued retention is neither necessary nor consistent witlh the DON objective to divest itself of 

unnecessaiy infrastructure. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Corn m ission Findings 

The 1991 Commission closed the Philadelphia 

Naval Shipyard, a non-nuclear capable yard. At 

the Navy’s request, the Commission retained the 

propeller shop and deep-draft drydocks and associated facilities as surge assets. The Navy also 

retained facilities to accommodate two tenants. 

Given the private sector’s ability to meet surge 

workload and the existing excess capacity within 

the remaining active naval shipyards, the Navy 

recommended closure of the retained drydocks 

and associated facilities. The Commission found 

the recommendation consistent with the Navy’s 

goal to divest itself of unnecessary infrastructure. 

Commission Reco rn m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation of the 1991 Commission 

relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval 

Shipyard (1991 Commission Report, at page 5-28) 

to delete ‘and preservation” (line 5) and “for 

emergent requirements” (line 6-7). 

1-73 COMMI5sIOh FI~DING~ AUD RECOMMENDATIONS 
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Catego y: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers 

Mission: Supply Support 

Onetime Cost: $2.3 million 

Savings: 19962001: $2.3 million 

Annual: $0.9 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Charleston, South Carolina 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Charleston, South Carolina. 

Secretary of Oefense Justqication 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers are follower 

activities whose existence depends upon active 

fleet units in their homeport area. Prior BRAC 

actions closed or realigned most of this activity’s 

customer base, and most of its personnel have 

already transferred to the Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering, East Coast Division, Charleston, 

South Carolina. Further, in accordance with the Ey 

2001 Force Structure Plan, force structure reductions through the year 2001 erode the requirement 

for support of active forces even further. This 

remaining workload can efficiently be handled by 

other FISCs or other naval activities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, 

South Carolina. 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas 

Category: Training Air Station 

Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training 

One-time Cost: $13.0 million 

Savings: 19962001: $61.1 million 

Annual: $5.1 million 

Retuwi on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FIN&, ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, 

as a Naval Air Facility, and relocate the undergraduate pilot training function and associated 

personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air 

Station, Pensacola, Florida, and Naval Air Station, 

Whiting Field, Florida. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Reduclions in force structure have led to decreases in pilot training rates. This reduction has 

allowed the Navy to consolidate maritime and primary fixed wing training in the Pensacola-Whiting 

complex while retaining the airfield anci airspace 

at Corpus Christi to support the consolidation of 

strike training at the Kingsville-Corpus Christi 

complex. The Corpus Christi Naval Air Facility is 

also being retained to accept mine warfare helicopter assets in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, and 

to provide the opportunity for the movement of 

additional aviation assets to the NAF as operational considerations dictate. This NAF will continue to support its current group of DoD and 

Federal agency tenants and their aviation-intensive 

needs, as well as other regional Navy air operations as needed. 

Community Concerns 

The N,4S Corpus Christi community would like the 

base retained as a major shore command, Naval 

Air Station status, rather than reduced to a Naval 

Air Facility. The community agrees with the 

Navy’s recommendations to single site T-45 training aircraft at NAS Kingsville, T-34 training aircraft 

at NAS Whiting Field, and the redirect of MH-53 

mine warfare helicopters to NAS Corpus Christi. 

The community, however, opposes the transfer of 

T44 maritime aircraft training to NAS Pensacola, 

claiming that NAS Corpus Christi has the capacity 

to accept T-45 operations as well as continue 

maritirne training. Although the community would 

like to retain the Chief of Naval Aviation Training 

(CNATRA) Headquarters at NAS Corpus Christi, 

they realize that the recommendation to relocate 

CNATRA to NAS Pensacola is an internal Navy 

decision and they support that decision. 

1-74 CHAPTEK 1 
Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that sufficient capacity exists to accommodate the NAS Corpus Christi pilot training mission at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. 

The Commission did not believe, however, the 

receiving sites specified offered sufficient flexibility to accommodate future training requirements. 

Therefore, the specified training sites were 

removed from the recornmendation. The Commission found that the Navy must move training functions to achieve the cost benefits of this 

recommendation. The Commission also found that 

the Navy had the authority to realign the Naval Air 

Station to a Naval Air Facility without the requirement for action hy the Commission. 

Commission Reco m menda tion 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2 and 3. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi 

retnains open and realigns as necessary. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering East Coast Detachment, 

Norfolk, Virginia 

Category: Navy Technical Center 

Mission: In-Service Engineering 

for Naval Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers 

and Intelligence functions 

One-time Cost: $4.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $0.1 million 

Annual: $2.1 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretmy of Defense Recommendation 

Close the In-Service Engineering East Coast 

Detachment, St. Juliens Creek Annex, Norfolk, Virginia, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, except retain in place the 

transmit and receive equipment and antennas currently at the St. Juliens Creek Annex. Relocate 

functions, necessary personnel and equipment to 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operation:iI forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON tiudget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess arid the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. The closure of 

this activity and the relocation of its principal 

functions achieves improved efficiencies and a 

reduction of excess capacity by aligning its functions with other fleet support provided by the 

shipyard. 

Com m u n ity Concerns 

The Norfolk community is concerned aliout the 

mission clisniption of NISE East caused by the 

BRAC 93 transfer of personnel and functions to 

Charleston, South Carolina, and the BRAC 95 recommende'd transfer of personnel and functions 

to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The community 

believes that the savings of $2 million does not 

justify the potential disruption to the mission. 

Com m ission Findings 

The Commission found that after implementation 

of the 1993 Commission recommendation was 

complete, there would be an excess of 130,000 

square feet at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard's St 

Juliens Creek Annex. The relocation of Naval 

Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center 

In-Service Engineering, East Coast Iletachment to 

28,100 square feet of space within the Norfolk 

Naval Shipyard would result in a recurring savings 

of $2.1 million for the Department of the Navy. 

Commission Recornmendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close the 

In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, 

St. Juliens Creek Annex, Norfolk, Virginia, of the 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, except retain in place the transmit and 

receive equipment and antennas currently at the 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDAT 1-75 IONS 
St. Juliens Creek Annex. Relocate functions, necessary personnel and equipment to Norfolk Naval 

Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia. 

Naval Information Systems Management 

Center, Arlington, Virginia 

Category: Administrative Activities 

Mission: Information Management 

One-time Cosfi $0.1 million 

Savings: 19962001: $.3 million 

Annual: $0.1 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Relocate 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Relocate the Naval Information Systems Management 

Center from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to 

the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 

Secretary of Defmse Justif3ation 

The resource levels of administrative activities are 

dependent upon the level of forces they support. 

The continuing decline in force levels shown in 

the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the 

effects of the National Performance Review result 

in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. This relocation reduces excess capacity and achieves savings by the movement 

from leased space to government-owned space, 

and furthers the Department's policy decision to 

merge this activity with the Information Technology Acquisition Center which is already housed in 

the Navy Yard. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that moving the Naval Information Systems Management Center from leased space to the 

Washington Navy Yard saves money and furthers 

the overall effort to move military commands in 

the National Capital Region to Government-owned 

space. In addition, it permits consolidation with a 

similar command, the Information Technology 

Acquisition Center, already located at the Navy Yard. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the 

Naval Information Systems Management Center 

from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to the 

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 

Naval Management Systems Support 

Office, Chesapeake, Vii 

Category: Technical Facilities/Laboratories 

Mission: Infomation Systems Support 

One-time Cost: $2.2 million 

Savings: 19962001: $9.0 million 

Annual: $2.7 million 

RetuwL on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of &fme Recommendation 

Disestablish the Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia, and relocate its 

functions and necessary personnel and equipment 

as a detachment of Naval Command, Control and 

Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, California, 

in govemment-owned spaces in Norfolk, Virginia. 

Secretary of Dqfme Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are relkdbk 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The 

disestablishment of this activity permits the elimination of the command and support structure of 

this activity and the consolidation of certain functions with a major technical center. This recommendation also provides for the movement out of 

leased space into government-owned space, a 

move which had been intended to occur as part 

of the DON BRAC 93 recommended consolidation 

of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Centers in Portsmouth, which the 1993 Commission 

disapproved. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

1-76 CHAPTER 1 
Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the recommendation 

of the Secretary of Defense that NAVMASSO 

should relocate from leased to Governmentowned space. The Commission was concerned, 

however, that appropriate Government-owned 

space in Norfolk might not be available. Accordingly, with the concurrence of the Navy, the Commission modified the recommendation to expand 

the receiving location to the entire Tidewater, Virginia :ma. The Commission found no other reason to disagree with the recommenclation of the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Corn rn ission Recom m enda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Naval Management Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO), Chesapeake, Virginia, 

and relocate its functions and necessary personnel 

and equipment as a detachment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San 

Diego, California, in Government-owned spaces in 

the Tidewater, Virginia area. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Naval Sea Systems Command, 

Arlington, Virginia 

Category: Administrative Activities 

Mission: Systerns Command Headquarters 

One-time Cost: $I 60.6 million 

Savings: 19962001: $50.6 million 

Annual: $10.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL AaION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1- 

59) for the relocation of the Naval Sea Systems 

Command, including the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (SEA 081, the Human Resources Office 

supporting the Naval Sea Systems Command, and 

associated PEOs and IIRPMs, from “the Navy 

Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy 

Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, 

Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White 

Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland” to “the 

Washington Navy Yard, washington, D.C. or other 

government-owned property in the metropolitan 

Washington, D.C. area.” 

Secretaiy of Defense Justification 

The resource levels of administrative activities are 

dependent upon the level of forces they support. 

The coni:inuing decline in force levels shown in 

the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the 

effects of the National Performance Review result 

in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. As a result, the capacity at the 

White Oak facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, or at 

the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia is no longer 

required to meet DON administrative space needs. 

This change in receiving sites eliminates suhstantial expenditures otherwise required to rehabilitate 

both White Oak and the Navy Annex. The net 

effect of rhis and the White Oak recomnienclation 

is a decrease of excess administrative space by 

more than 1,000,000 square feet. 

Community Concerns 

The comrnunity expressed a number of concerns 

regarding this redirect, all of which centered on 

the relative cost to move the Naval Sea Systems 

Command to either White Oak or the Washington 

Navy Yard. Independent analysis of the certified 

data was conducted by the community. Based 

upon this analysis, the community believes military construction costs were not accurate. The 

community felt that the estimates for White Oak 

were overstated and those for the Navy Yard were 

understated. Relative square footage numbers, ;is 

well as construction costs per unit, were questioned. The community also felt that site-specific 

costs to build at the Navy Yard had not heen 

accounted for in the DoD analysis. Foremost 

among these costs were floodplain considerations 

and historical preservation requirements. Additionally, the community contends that improvements 

needed to convert the Navy Yard from an industrial to an administrative facility had not ken included in the Navy’s costs. The community felt 

that the costs of facility improvements, other than 

office space, should be included in the analysis. 

These costs, outlined in a Master Plan, are 

designed to enable the Navy Yard to support a 

base population of ten thousand. Finally, the community voiced a concern over quality of life 

issues. White Oak, it claimed, offered a far superior working environment. 

1-77 COMMISSION FINIIINGS ASD IIECOMRIEND.4TIONS 
Commission Findings 

The overriding concern of the Commission was 

the cost of this recommendation. The Commission 

compared construction costs at NSWC White Oak 

to those at the Washington Navy Yard. At White 

Oak, costs were based on a project which had 

already been extensively engineered. At the Navy 

Yard, costs were based upon similar projects 

already completed at the Navy Yard. The Commission concluded that the costs projected by the 

Navy were accurate. Although the military construction COSLS were higher at the Navy Yard, the 

Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense 

that the higher construction cost was offset by 

personnel eliminations and lower overhead costs. 

The Commission also examined the ability of the 

Washington Navy Yard infrastructure to accommodate an influx of over four thousand people. The 

Cornmission found that the existing facilities and 

planned improvements would allow the Navy 

Yard to support the added population. The availability of parking also concerned the Commission, 

but the planned parking allowance was found to 

be sufficient for an installation located in an urban 

setting with good access to public transportation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) for 

the relocation of the Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (SEA 081, the Human Resources Office 

supporting the Naval Sea Systems Command, and 

associated PEOs and DRPMs, from “the Navy 

Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy 

Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, 

Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White 

Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland” to “the 

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other 

Government-owned property in the metropolitan 

Washington, D.C. area.” 

Office of Naval Research, 

Arlington, Virginia 

Category: Technical Centers and Laboratories 

Mission: Research, Development, Testing, 

and Evaluation 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $5.2 million 

Annual: $-1.4 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: Never 

FINAL ACZ7ON: Redirect 

Semtary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-59/60) 

by deleting the Office of Naval Research from the 

list of National Capital Region activities to relocate 

from leased space to Government-owned space 

within the NCR. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Because of other BRAC 95 actions, space designated for this activity pursuant to the BRAC 93 

decision is no longer available. Other Navyowned space in the NCR would require substantial new construction in order to house this 

activity. Permitting the Office of Naval Research to 

remain in its present location not only avoids this 

new construction, but also realizes the synergy 

obtained by having the activity located in proximity to the Advanced Research Projects Agency 

and the National Science Foundation. Further, this 

action provides the opportunity for future collocation of like activities from the other Military 

Departments, with the attendant joint synergies 

which could be realized. While this action results 

in a recurring cost, the cost is minimal in light of the 

importance of these two significant opportunities. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Coinmission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that some benefits accrue from ONR’s 

present location in close proximity to the National 

Science Foundation and the Advanced Research 

Projects Agency. In addition, the Commission 

found the recurring cost associated with remaining 

in leased space is outweighed by the potential 

advantage of coordinated research efforts that 

would result from the collocation of all of the 

Services’ research offices with ONK. If ONK were 

to move to the Navy Yard, there would be insufficient space to accommodate the other research 

offices. 

1-78 CHAP’I’EK 1
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation of the 1993 Commission 

(1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-59/60) by 

deleting the Office of Naval Research from the list 

of National Capital Region [NCRI activities to relocate from leased space to Government-owned 

space within the NCR. 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command, Arlington, Virginia 

Catego y: Administrative Activities 

Mission: Systems Command Headquarters 

One-time Cost: $24.0 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $120.0 million 

Annual: $25.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation for the Space and 

Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, at page 1-59) from “[rlelocate ... from 

leased space to Government-owned space within 

the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, 

Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, 

D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 

Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland” to “Relocate.. .from leased 

space to Government-owned space in San Diego, 

California, to allow consolidation of the Naval 

Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command 

headquarters. This relocation does not include 

SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at NRL, or the 

Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will 

remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region.” 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The resource levels of administrative activities are 

dependent upon the level of forces they support. 

The continuing decline in force levels shown in 

the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the 

effects of the National Performance Review result 

in further reductions in administrative activities. 

Space available in San Diego resulting from personnel changes and work consolidation permits 

further consolidation of the SPAWAR command 

structure and the elimination of levels of command structure. This consolidation will achieve 

not only significant savings from elimination of 

unnecessary command structure but also efficiencies and economies of operation. In addition, by 

relocating to San Diego instead of the NCR, there 

will be sufficient readily available space in the 

Washington Navy Yard for the Naval Sea Systems 

Command. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the proposal does not 

reflect the significance of a Washington location 

to their mission performance. Most of the other 

organizations that Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) works with are either 

in the local area or in easily reached East Coast 

locations. The community believes the very small 

staff proposed for retention in Washington would 

not be able to continue their current activities. 

The community believes this would result in major increases in travel costs and lost staff time that 

were not included in the Navy analysis. They also 

stated that equivalent personnel savings could be 

made without a move through reorganization 

of the subordinate commands currently in San 

Diego, and elimination of excess overhead personnel at SPAWAR Headquarters, possibly through 

consolidation with Naval Sea Systems Command. 

The conimunity also noted that the cost of renovating office space in San Diego was not included 

in the N;ivy’s cost estimates for this proposal. 

Commission Findings 

The Coinmission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the movement of SPAWAR to San 

Diego would enable the Navy to eliminate management layers and to enhance productivity by 

collocating headquarters with the majority of its 

subordinate staff. The Commission was concerned 

about the small size of the staff retained in Washington to maintain contact with the many organizations regularly interacting with SPAWAR, and 

with the absence of office renovation costs in San 

Diego. The Commission found, however, that 

even if the Washington-based staff were substantially increased and renovation costs added, the 

savings from the recommendation remain attrac- 

~~ 

1-79 COMMISSION FINIIINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
tive. The Commission also agreed that increased 

travel costs could be minimized through the use 

of modem communication methods such as computer networks and teleconferencing. 

The Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group recommended consideration of a joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 

(C4I) acquisition organization. The Commission 

found that the implementation of a joint C41 organization was incompatible with the Secretary of 

Defense’s recommendation to relocate SPAWAR 

headquarters to San Diego. Because the Secretary 

of Defense did not submit any recommendations in support of a joint C41 organization, the 

Commission concluded that implementing this 

recommendation was consistent with the 

Department’s plans. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation for the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, 

at page 1-59) from “[rlelocate ... from leased space 

to Government-owned space within the NCR 

[National Capital Region], to include the Navy 

Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy 

Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, 

Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White 

Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland” to 

“Relocate.. .from leased space to Governmentowned space in San Diego, California, to allow 

consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and 

Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and 

Naval Warfare Command headquarters. This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which 

is located at NRL [National Research Laboratory], 

or the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who 

will remain in Navy-owned space in the National 

Capital Region.” 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Keyport, Washington 

Category: Technical Centers 

Mission: Test, evaluation, in-service engineering, 

maintenance and repair and industrial base 

support for undersea warfare systems 

One-time Cost: $2. I million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $9.8 million 

Annual: $2.1 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defwe Recommendation 

Realign Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, 

Washington, by moving its ships’ combat systems 

console refurbishment depot maintenance and 

general industrial workload to Naval Shipyard, 

Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

There is an overall reduction in operational forces 

and a sharp decline of the DON budget through 

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers 

are difficult to determine, because these activities 

are supported through customer orders. However, 

the level of forces and the budget are reliable 

indicators of sharp declines in technical center 

workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This 

excess and the imbalance in force and resource 

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation 

of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with 

the Department of the Navy’s efforts to remove 

depot level maintenance workload from technical 

centers and return it to depot industrial activities, 

this action consolidates ship combat systems 

workload at NSYD Puget Sound, but retains electronic test and repair equipments at NUWC 

Keyport, as well as torpedo depot maintenance, 

thereby removing the need to replicate facilities. 

The workload redistribution also furthers the Pacific Northwest Regional Maintenance Center initiatives, more fully utilizes the capacity at the 

shipyard, and will achieve greater productivity 

efficiencies within the shipyard. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the realignment was 

consistent with the Navy’s goal to reduce infrastructure and to shift depot-level maintenance 

from technical centers to depot industrial activities. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Com1-80 CHAPTEK 1 
mission recommends the following: realign Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center. Keyport, Washington, 

by moving its ships’ combat systems console refurbishment depot maintenance and general industrial workload to Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, 

Bremerton, Washington. 

Naval Training Centers (Orlando, Florida 

Catego y: Naval Training Centers 

Mission: Training of Officer and 

One-time Cost: $5.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $24.8 million 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Return on Investment: I996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

and San Diego, California) 

Enlisted Personnel 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, 

Orlando, Florida, hy deleting all references to Service School Command from the list of major tenants. Change the recommendation of the 1993 

Commission (1993 Conmission Report, at page 1-39) 

concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, 

San Diego, California, by deleting all references to 

Service School Command, including Service 

School Command (Electronic Warfare) and Service School Command (Surface), from the list of 

major tenants. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Service School Command is a major component 

command reporting directly to the Commanding 

Officer, Naval Training Center, and, as such, is not 

a tenant of the Naval Training Center. Its relocation and that of its component courses can and 

should be accomplished in a manner ”consistent 

with training requirements,” as specified by the 

1993 Commission recommendation language for 

the major elements of the Naval Training Centers. 

For instance, while the command structure of the 

Service School Command at Naval Training Center, Orlando Florida, is relocating to the Naval 

Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, the 

Torpedoman “C” School can be relocated to available facilities at the Naval Underwater Weapons 

Center, Keyport, Washington, and thus be adjacent to the facility that supports the type of 

weapon that is the suhject of the training. Similarly, since the Integrated Voice Communication 

School at the Naval Training Center, San Diego, 

California, uses contract instructors, placing it at 

Fleet Training Center, San Diego, necessitates only 

the local movement of equipment at a savings in 

the cost otherwise to be incurred to move such 

equipment to the Naval Training Center, Great 

Lakes, Illinois. Likewise, the relocation of the 

Messman “A” School at Naval Training Center, San 

Diego, to Lackland Air Force Base results in consolidation of the same type of training for all services at one location, consistent with Department 

goals, and avoids military construction costs at 

Naval Air Station, Pensacola. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the coinmunity. 

Com m issio n Findings 

The Commission found economic and operational 

advantages in collocating certain component 

schools of the Service School Cornmanci with existing facilities or with similar schools of other 

military branches. 

Commission Reco m menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Conmission recommends the following: change the 

recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 

Commission Report, at page 1-38) concerning the 

closure of Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, 

by deleting all references to Service School Cornmand from the list of major tenants. Change the 

recommendation of the 1993 Commission ( 1993 

Commission Report, at page 1-39) concerning the 

closure of Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, by deleting all references to Service School 

Command, including Service School Command 

(Electronic Warfare) and Service School Comniand 

(Surface), from the list of major tenants. 

Reserve CenterslCommands 

Catego y: Reserve Activities 

Mission: Reserve Support 

One-time Cost: $1.6 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $43.0 million 

Annual: $8.5 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND KECOhlrLIENI>ATIOKS 1-81 
Recommendation 

Close the following Naval Reserve Centers: 

Stockton, California 

Pomona, California 

Santa Ana, Irvine, California 

Laredo, Texas 

Sheboygan, Wisconsin 

Cadillac, Michigan 

Staten Island, New York 

Huntsville, Alabama 

Close the following Naval Air Reserve Center: 

Olathe, Kansas 

Close the following Naval Reserve 

Readiness Commands: 

Region Seven-Charleston, South Carolina 

Region Ten-New Orleans, Louisiana 

Secretary of Defense Justijiication 

Existing capacity in support of the Reserve component continues to be in excess of the force 

structure requirements for the year 2001. These 

Reserve Centers scored low in military value, 

among other things, because there were a fewer 

number of drilling reservists than the number of 

billets available (suggesting a lesser demographic 

pool from which to recruit sailors), or because 

there was a poor use of facilities (for instance, 

only one drill weekend per month). Readiness 

Command (REDCOM) 7 has management responsibility for the fewest number of Reserve Centers 

of the thirteen REDCOMs, while REDCOM 10 has 

management responsibility for the fewest number 

of Selected Reservists. In 1994, nearly threefourths of the authorized SELRES billets at 

REDCOM 10 were unfilled, suggesting a demographic shortfall. In addition, both REDCOMs 

have high ratios of active duty personnel when 

compared to SELRES supported. The declining 

Reserve force structure necessitates more effective 

utilization of resources and therefore justifies closing these two REDCOMs. In arriving at the recommendation to close these Reserve Centers/ 

Commands, specific analysis was conducted to 

ensure that there was either an alternate location 

available to accommodate the affected Reserve 

population or demographic support for purpose 

of force recruiting in the areas to which units were 

being relocated. This specific analysis, verified by 

the COBRA analysis, supports these closures. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the data presented by 

DoD in justlfying the recommendation for the Naval 

Reserve Center Laredo, Texas closure is unconvincing, and that travel costs incurred by reservists 

in the event of closure would exceed the operating costs of the center. There were no formal 

expressions from the other communities. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of 

Defense that the recommended Reserve Center 

closures would reduce excess capacity and preserve reserve support and effective recruiting 

demographics. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Naval Reserve Centers at Stockton, California; 

Pomona, California; Santa Ana, Irvine, California; 

Laredo, Texas; Sheboygan, Wisconsin; Cadillac, 

Michigan; Staten Island, New York; and Huntsville, Alabama. Close Naval Air Reserve Center, 

Olathe, Kansas. Close Naval Reserve Readiness 

Command, Region Seven, Charleston, South Carolina. Close Naval Reserve Readiness Command, 

Region Ten, New Orleans, Louisiana. 

1-82 CHAPTER I 
Department of the Air Force 

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona 

Category: Air Force Installation 

Mission: Aircrew Training and Research Facility 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: $18.4 million 

Annual: $0.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Reco m rnenda ti0 n 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Conimission regarding the relocation of Williams AFB's 

Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research 

Facility to Orlando, Florida, as follows: The 

Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research 

Facility at Mesa, Arizona, will remain at its present 

location as a stand-alone activity. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission recommended that the Armstrong 

Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility 

located at Williams AFB, Arizona, be relocated to 

Orlando, Florida. This recommendation, was 

based on assumptions regarding Navy training 

activities and the availability of facilities. Subsequent to that Commission's report, it was discovered that the facilities were not available at the 

estimated cost. In addition, Navy actions in the 

1993 BKAC reduced the pilot resources necessary 

for this facility's work. 

In light of these changes, the Air Force recommends 

the activity remain at its current location. First, it is 

largely a civilian operation that is well-suited to 

remain in a stand-alone configuration. It has operated in that capacity since the closure of the rest 

of Williams AFH in September 1993. Second, its 

proximity to Luke AFB provides a ready source of 

fighter aircraft pilots who can support the research 

activities as consultants and subjects. Third, the 

present facilities are consolidated and well-suited 

to the research activities, including a large secure 

facility. Finally, the activities are consistent with 

the community's plans for redevelopment of the 

Williams AFB property, including a university and 

research park. 

Community Concerns 

The Phoenix community expressed strong support 

to retain the Armstrong Lab's Aircrew Training 

Research Facility, located on the former Willianis 

AFB, as a stand-alone facility, according to the 

current DoD recornmendation. If this is not possible, the community supported moving the Lab to 

Luke AFB, just west of Phoenix, where it already 

conducts part of its mission. 

The community has established a strong University consortium, focused on aviation, at the former 

Williams. The community maintained the Williams-Luke relationship has a long history, and that 

Williams relies upon fighter pilots from Luke for 

its simulation studies. The Orlando community 

expressed support for moving this facility to 

Orlando, which was the recommendation of the 

1991 Commission. It maintained the Lab should 

be collocated with other Army and Navy flight 

simulation centers in the Orlando area. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission reviewed the recommendation of 

the 1991 Commission, which was to move the 

Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training and 

Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, and found 

the justification put forth by the Secretary of 

Defense to reverse this 1991 decision was sound 

and cost-effective. The Air Force Base Closure 

Executive Group estimated the cost to move this 

facility to Florida would be approximately $15 

million. As a result of a number of changes since 

the 1991 Commission, there is no longer a ready 

source of fighter pilots within 250 miles of 

Orlando. Fighter pilots are essential to the Lab's 

mission. 'The Lab maintains a small liaison staff in 

Orkando that interacts with the Army and Navy 

Facilities there. The Lab also performs cooperative 

combat simulation studies and research routinely 

with the Orlando facilities through electronic 

means. This capability did not exist in 1991, and 

obviates the need to niove the facility to Florida. 

The relationship between Williams/Armstrong 

Laboratory and nearby Luke AFH is an important 

factor in the Commission decision to retain the 

facility at its present location. A portion of the 

Williams Facility is located at Luke. The Cornniission found that an option the Air Force may 

wish to consider strongly in the future is moving 

the Williams portion of the facility to Luke AFB. 

Estimates reveal this could be done for approximately half the cost of moving anywhere but Luke 

if existing excess space at Luke is renovated. The 

simulators at Luke are overcrowded, and Luke 

would benefit from the substantial opportunity for 

researcher access at a relatively small cost. The 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND ~ECOhI,ZlEYDAl'ION4 1-83 
community has a strong re-use plan in effect at 

the former Williams AFB that includes the 

Armstrong Lab as a stand-alone facility. However, 

the Lab is only a small part of a very strong plan, 

and the Commission found this plan will continue 

implementation whether the Lab is actually on the 

Williams property or located at nearby Luke. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the 

relocation of Williams Air Force Base’s Armstrong 

Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility to 

Orlando, Florida, as follows: the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Mesa, 

Arizona, will remain at its present location as a 

stand-alone activity. 

McCleUan Air Force Base, California 

Category: Industrial/Technical Support: Depots 

Mission: Provide depot maintenance 

and materiel management support 

to the Air Force 

One-time Cost: $409.8 million 

Savings: 19962001: $45.1 million 

Annual: $159.7 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure and realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

Environmental concerns are of paramount importance to the Sacramento Community. The community believes that the environmental condition of 

McClellan Air Force Base is dire. According to the 

community, if the installation were to close, the 

cost to clean up the base would rise significantly, 

because of the need to accelerate the clean-up 

schedule. The community believes that sufficient 

environmental funds would not be made available 

to meet the accelerated schedule. Further, it 

would be very difficult to attract new businesses 

to the base because of liability concerns. 

The Community believes the Air Force and the DoD 

Joint Cross Service Group improperly assessed the 

functional value of the McClellan depot. The Community calculated the McClellan depot to be the 

highest functional value DoD depot. In addition, 

the Community states that the McClellan depot 

does five times more interservicing than any other 

DoD depot. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the significant excess 

capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot 

system requires closure of McClellan Air Force 

Base. The Air Force recommendation to downsize 

all five Air Logistics Center depots through 

mothballing excess space would reduce the 

amount of space utilized by the depot, but would 

not eliminate infrastructure and overhead costs. 

Downsizing would result in elimination of depot 

direct labor personnel, but not overhead personnel. The Commission found that closure of 

McClellan AFB permits significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces DoD 

operating costs. 

The low military value “tier” assigned by the Air 

Force was among the factors considered in the 

determination to close McClellan Air Force base 

(at the request of the Air Force, the Joint Cross 

Service Group used the tier system as a proxy for 

military value). The Air Force tier system uses 

rankings of I through I11 with tier 111 being the 

lowest rank. McClellan AFB and the depot at the 

Sacramento ALC received tier I11 and tier I1 

rankings, respectively. The Commission found that 

the determination of military value is complex and 

difficult to translate into easily auditable numbers. 

The tier is an appropriate description of the collective military judgment of the officials on the Air 

Force Base Closure Executive Group. 

The Commission questioned the community’s 

method for calculating depot military value. The 

Sacramento community simply summed the values 

for each of the commodity groupings reported to 

the DoD Joint Cross Service Group. The commodity groupings describe the types of depot Inaintenance work performed by the ALC. For example, 

the Sacramento ALC performs hydraulic, instrument, avionics and ground communication maintenance work. A summation of scores indicates 

the variety of work performed but does not reflect 

quality or relative importance of core capabilities. 

1-84 CHAPTER 1 
The reduced mission needs for McClellan AFB 

was also a consideration in the determination to 

close McClellan AFB. In addition, the Commission 

found the McClellan AFB closure costs to be less 

than the costs estimated hy DoD and the annual 

savings significantly greater than DoD’s estimate. 

The differences in cost and savings estimates are 

based on differing closure assumptions of the Air 

Force and Commission. The Commission assumed 

that a depot closure and consolidation of work 

would permit a personnel reduction of 15% of 

selected ALC personnel and a 50% reduction of 

management overhead personnel. The Air Force 

did not reflect any direct labor personnel savings 

due to a closure and reflected a 20% reduction in 

overhead personnel. The Commission assumed 

that closure would occur over a five year period, 

and the Air Force assumed six years. Another 

significant factor explaining the difference 

between savings estimates is that Air Force 

assumed all personnel savings would occur in the 

last year of implementation; the Commission 

assumed that personnel eliminations would be 

evenly phased over the last four years. The Commission also did not agree with a number of onetime costs that the Air Force considered to be 

directly related to closure. 

The Commission found that McClellan AFB has 

extensive environmental contamination, but that 

pursuant to Doll guidance, environmental restoration costs should not be considered in cost of 

closure. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is 

closed or remains open. Similarly, the availability 

of environmental funding is a concern to all bases, 

whether closing or remaining open, and therefore 

is not a closure decision factor. The Commission 

notes the Air Force could lease structures and 

property while cleanup continues, thereby allowing reuse to begin. The DoD, pursuant to Public 

Law 102-484 indemnifies future owners and users of 

DoD property from liability resulting from hazardous 

substances remaining on the property as a result 

of DoD activities. Indemnification should help to 

allay the community’s concern about liability. 

The Commission found that the DoD should be 

allowed to retain the Nuclear Radiation Center for 

dual-use and/or research, or close it as appropriate. 

The Commission believes closure of McClellan 

presents an opportunity for cross-servicing and 

thus, directs the Defense Depot Maintenance 

Council to determine and direct the appropriate 

distribution of the work to other DoD depots or to 

the private sector. The Commission directs that all 

McClellan common-use ground communication/ 

electronics maintenance work, as categorized by 

the DoD Joint Cross Service Group for Depot 

Maintenance, be transferred to the Tobyhanna 

Army Depot, Pennsylvania. The common-use 

ground communication/electronics workload categories include: radar, radio communications, wire 

communications, electronic warfare, navigation 

aids, electro-optic and night vision, satellite control/space sensors, and cryptographic/cornmunications security. 

Each of the Air Logistics Centers operated by the 

Air Force are excellent organizations. The Sacramento community is clearly supportive of the military and McClellan Air Force Base. The decision to 

close the McClellan Air Force Base is a difficult 

one; but given the significant amount of excess 

depot capacity and limited Defense resources, closure is a necessity. The McClellan AFB closure will 

permit improved utilization of the remaining ALCs 

and substantially reduce DoD operating costs. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

McClellan Air Force Base including the Air Logistics Center. Disestablish the Defense Distribution 

Depot, Sacramento. Move the common-use 

ground-communication electronics to Tobyhanna 

Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Retain the Radiation 

Center and make it available for dual-use and/or 

research, or close as appropriate. Consolidate the 

remaining workloads to other DoD depots or to 

private sector commercial activities as determined 

by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council. Move 

the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving locations. All other activities 

and facilities at the base will close. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with 

the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Moffett Federal Airfield Air 

Guard Station, California 

Category: Air National Guard 

Mission: Combat Rescue 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-85 
Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station. 

Relocate the 129th Rescue Group and associated 

aircraft to McClellan AFB, California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

At Moffett Federal Airfield, the 129th Rescue 

Group (RQG) provides manpower for the 

airfield’s crash, fire and rescue, air traffic control, 

and security police services, and pays a portion of 

the total associated costs. The ANG also pays a 

share of other base operating support costs. These 

costs to the ANG have risen significantly since 

NAS Moffett realigned to Moffett Federal Airfield, 

and can be avoided if the unit is moved to an 

active duty airfield. 

Community Concerns 

Community officials are concerned about the 

future viability of Moffett Federal Airfield, in light 

of the critical airfield services the 129th Rescue 

Group provides. Relocation of the unit would 

force National Aeronautical Space Administration 

(NASA)-Ames Research Center to replace those 

services, possibly at a higher cost. These costs 

would be passed onto NASA-Ames in continuing to 

operate Moffett Federal Airfield. The community 

believes higher costs could make it difficult for NASAAmes to attract and retain tenants at the airfield. 

Community officials believe the Air Force’s analysis was flawed because the analysis does not 

consider costs that would be passed on to NASA. 

They assert that costs and savings should be 

calculated government-wide and not just DoDwide. Finally, the community asserts that this recommendation should not have been submitted to 

the Commission for review because, the Guard 

Station does not meet the 300 civilian threshold 

required for recommendations to be submitted to 

the Commission. 

Commission Findings 

The DoD recommendation on Moffett Federal Airfield AGS directed the unit to relocate to 

McClellan AFB, California. Because the Commission recommends closure of McClellan AFB, the 

DoD recommendation can not be implemented. 

Given the cost associated with relocating the unit 

to another Air Force base, the Commission found 

the Guard Station and unit should remain at 

Moffett Federal Airfield. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station will 

remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

North Highlands Air Guard 

Station, California 

Categoiy: Air National Guard 

Mission: Combat Communications 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recomrnmdution 

Close North Highlands Air Guard Station (AGS) 

and relocate the 162nd Combat Communications 

Group (CCG) and the 149th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) to McClellan AFB, California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Relocation of the 162nd CCG and 149th CCS onto 

McClellan AFB will provide a more cost-effective 

basing arrangement than presently exists by 

avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation. Because of the very short 

distance from the unit’s present location in North 

Highlands to McClellan AFB, most of the personnel will remain with the unit. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

coininunity . 

Commission Findings 

The DoD recommendation on North Highlands 

AGS directed the unit to relocate to McClellan 

AFB, California. Because the Commission recommends closure of McClellan AFB, the DoD recommendation can not be implemented. Given the cost 

associated with relocating the unit to another Air 

Force base, the Commission found the Guard Station and unit should remain at North Highlands. 

1-86 CHAPTER 1 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: North Highlands Air Guard Station will 

remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Onizuka Air Station, California 

Categoty: Space 

Mission: Satellite Control 

One-time Cost: $121.3 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: -$78.7 million (Cost) 

Annual: $1 6.1 million 

Return on Investment: 2007 (7 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Realign Onizuka AS. The 750th Space Group will 

inactivate and its functions will relocate to Falcon 

AFB, Colorado. Detachment 2, Space and Missile 

Systems Center (AFMC) will relocate to Falcon 

AFB, Colorado. Some tenants will remain in existing hcilities. All activities and facilities associated 

with the 750th Space Group including family 

housing and the clinic will close. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Air Force has one more satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future 

Air Force satellite control requirements consistent 

with the Department of Defense (DoD’l Force 

Structure Plan. When a11 eight criteria are applied 

to the bases in the Satellite Control subcategory, 

Onizuka AS ranked lower than the other base in 

the subcategory. Among other Factors, Falcon AFB 

has superior protection against current and future 

electronic encroachment, reduced risks associated 

with security and mission-disrupting contingencies, and significantly higher closure costs. 

Community Concerns 

The community expressed concerns about the 

national security implications of closure. In addition, the community is concerned that operational 

requirements of satellite control redundancy (dual 

node versus single node capability) would be 

jeopardized. They note the mission objective 

requires robust, flexible, responsible. and enduring satellite control capability. Back-up resources 

are required to eliminate single failure points and 

provide continuous, uninterrupted control capability in the event of war, natural disaster, or sabotage. In addition, a 11,s. Air Force Space Command 

Backup Satellite Control policy directive dated 

January 30, 1995, requires geographically separated back-up satellite control capability. The 

community argues that the Air Force needs both 

Onizuka Air Station (AS) and Falcon Air Force 

Base (AFB) satellite control nodes. 

Community representatives believe the Air Force 

was not forthcoming regarding the existence of a 

“Single-Node Operations Study” and its cost estimates. The community argues the Air Force misled the Commission in its answers to questions 

about this study. The community suggests the Air 

Force had planned to close Onizuka since 1774. 

They also conclude that all costs associated with 

moving Detachment 2 and the classified tenants 

properly belong in the cost calculations of DoD’s 

recommendation. They argue the total one-time 

costs to close Onizuka AS are $679 million (versus 

DoD’s estimate of $271.3 million) and the return 

on investment is 27.1 years (versus DoD’s calculation of 7 years). Finally, comniunity representatives believe some portion of the costs for a 

communications switching system upgrade should 

be included in DoD’s recommendation. 

The community also qiiestions the Air Force’s 

military value analysis. They argue the analysis is 

unauditable, the Air Force relied on “military judgment,” and the approach was undocumented. 

Community representatives believe the Air Force’s 

analysis is flawed because the Air Force violated 

its guidance and the decision-making process was 

subjective. They note the General Accounting 

Office supports the conclusion that the Onizuka 

AS rating was arbitrary. The community also suggests Air Force savings were shifted as costs to 

other federal agencies. Also, one-time closure 

costs may be overstated at Falcon AFR and understated at Onizuka AS. Finally, the community 

notes Onizuka AS was penalized for air quality 

restrictions, although there is no operational impact on satellite control. 

The cornniunity presented an alternative proposal 

to realign Onizuka AS to Moffett Federal Airfield. 

This proposal would provide commercial utilization of available capacity at Onizuka AS and maintain the integrity of Moffett Federal Airfield. They 

argue realignment of Onizuka AS would jeopardize the whole concept of a federal airfield. Closure of Family housing units; the medical clinic; 

COMMISSION Frmnrcs AND RE(:O~~~IENDATIONS 1-87 
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation program facilities; 

and the Navy Exchange, which is sponsored by 

Onizuka AS, would have a detrimental impact on 

Moffett Federal Airfields ability to provide services to remaining DoD personnel. It also would 

result in the loss of a significant airfield user, 

increased costs to remaining resident agencies, 

and diminished attractiveness to federal agencies. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found backup capability and 

redundancy for controlling individual satellites 

will not be lost with this realignment. The Commission found that, although the United States 

currently has a requirement for satellite control 

redundancy and the U.S. Air Force Space Command Backup Satellite Control policy directive 

requires geographical separation for backup control capabilities and communications, two fully 

operational satellite control nodes are no longer 

required. Back-up capability currently can be provided through payload command and control, 

mission processing facilities, remote satellite tracking stations, mobile assets, andor the use of the 

Onizuka AS assets as required. The Commission 

also found the recommendation to realign 

Onizuka AS will not increase risk associated with 

satellite control or reduce redundancy. Future 

developments will make geographical separation 

unnecessary. Therefore, the Commission found 

that the US. Air Force has one more satellite control installation than it needs to support future Air 

Force satellite control requirements. In addition, 

the Commission found while the Air Force would 

like to close Onizuka AS at some point in the 

future, it must keep it open to support classified 

tenants whose missions will not phase out or 

move until after the BRAC 1995 timeframe (after 

2001). Thus, DoDs recommendation is for realignment and not closure. 

The Commission found the “Single-Node Operations Study” was not part of the BRAC 1995 analysis because it was conducted before the BRAC 

1995 process and its assumptions were fundamentally diierent from DoD’s recommendation. Detachment 2 consists of two components, only one of 

which belongs in the closure cost calculations. 

The Commission included the cost of realigning 

the engineering component in its analysis. Under 

the realignment, only one classified mission is 

required to relocate. The other classified missions 

will remain at Onizuka AS until they complete 

their missions. The cost to realign the one classified mission is $80.2 million and is included in the 

total $121.3 million realignment costs. The Commission found the recommendation for realignment is not connected to on-going multi-year 

research and development efforts to upgrade the 

Air Force Satellite Control Network. These upgrades 

are not the result of the Onizuka AS realignment 

and are required with or without the realignment. 

The Commission found air quality does not have a 

significant impact on current operations, but is a 

major factor affecting realignments and the transfer of additional functions and personnel into the 

area. The Commission also found realignment to 

Moffett Federal Airfield is not a viable alternative. 

Commission Recommeradation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommend5 the following: realign 

Onizuka Air Station. The 750th Space Group will 

inactivate and its functions will relocate to Falcon 

AFB, Colorado. Detachment 2, Space and Missile 

Systems Center (AFMC) will relocate to Falcon, 

AFB, Colorado. Some tenants will remain in existing facilities. All activities and facilities associated 

with the 750th Space Group including family 

housing and the clinic will close. 

Ontario International Airport 

Air Guard Station, California 

Category: Air National Guard 

Mission: Combat Communications and Weather 

One-time Cost : $0.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: -$0.4 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2006 (9 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $0. I million 

Secretary of &fme Recommendation 

Close Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 148th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and the 210th 

Weather Flight to March ARB, California. 

Secretary of Lkfme Justification 

Relocation of the 148th CCS and the 210th 

Weather Flight onto March ARB will provide a 

more cost-effective basing arrangement by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining 

the installation. Because of the short distance from 

1-88 CHAPTER 1 
the unit’s present location on Ontario International Airport AGS, most of the personnel will 

remain with the unit. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Cornmission recommends the following: close 

Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station 

(AGS) and relocate the 148th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and the 210th Weather 

Flight to March AKB, California. 

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado 

Category: Air Force Installation 

Mission: Space Systems Support 

One-time Cost: $2.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $10.2 million 

Annual: $3.0 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the l00lst Space 

Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center as 

follows: Inactivate the 1001st Space Systems 

Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, Space 

Systems Support Group (SSSG). Some Detachment 

1 personnel and equipment will relocate to 

Peterson AFB, Colorado, under the Space Systems 

Support Group while the remainder of the positions will be eliminated. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The 1991 Commission recommended that the 

1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated 

Detachment 1, SSSG, be retained in a cantonment 

area at the Lowry Support Center. Air Force Materiel Command is consolidating space and warning 

systems software support at the SSSG at Peterson 

AFB. The inactivation of Detachment 1, SSSG, and 

movement of its functions will further consolidate 

software support at Peterson AFH, and result in 

the elimination of some personnel positions and 

cost savings. 

Com m un ity Concerns 

The community supports the inactivation of 

Detachment 1, Space Systems Support Group, and 

the closure of all related building structures. It 

also supports acceleration of the closure process. 

The community opposes Air Force retention of the 

hangar for contingency use by the 2nd Space 

Warning Squadron, a continental United States 

Defense Support l’rogram (space early warning) 

ground site located at Ruckley Air National Guard 

(ANG) Base, Colorado. 

Detachment 1 plans to upgrade the cooling capacity for its computers. The Lowry Redevelopment 

Authority requests that the Air Force follow its 

standard policies concerning real and personal 

property when eventually transferring the equipment to Buckley ANG Base. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found DoD’s intent to inactivate 

Detachment 1 was supportable but the recommendation failed to include closure of all related 

facilities at the former Lowry AFB. The Air Force 

subsequently informed the Commission it wants to 

close all related facilities. The community supports 

the inactivation of Detachment 1 and the closure 

of all related building structures. The Commission 

found the Air Force policy to avoid retention of 

“islands of operations” within closed bases, where 

alternatives already exist (for example, at nearby 

Buckley ANG Base), is justified. 

Commission Reco m menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated SLibStantkdlly from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the 1001st 

Space Support Squadron at the Lowry Support 

Center as follows: inactivate the 1001st Space 

Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, 

Space Systems Support Group (SSSG) and close 

all related facilities. Some Detachment 1 personnel 

and equipment will relocate to Peterson AFB, 

Colorado, under the Space Systems Support 

Group while the remainder of the positions will 

be eliminated. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-89 
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 

Catego y: Industrial/Technical Support: 

Mission: Electronic combat test and evaluation 

One-time Cost: $6.1 million 

Savings: 19962001: $63 million 

Annual: $3.7 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (2 Years) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Test and Evaluation 

Semta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Eglin AFB, Florida. The Electromagnetic 

Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of eight 

Electronic Combat (EC) threat simulator systems 

and two EC pod systems will relocate to the 

Nellis AFB Complex, Nevada. Those emitter-only 

systems at the Air Force Development Test Center 

(AFDTC) at Eglin AFB necessary to support Air 

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the 

USAF Air Warfare Center, and Air Force Materiel 

Command ArmamentsNeapons Test and Evaluation activities will be retained. All other activities and 

facilities associated with Eglin will remain open. 

Semta y of Defense Justification 

Air Force EC open air range workload requirements 

can be satisfied by one range. Available capacity 

exists at the Nellis AFB Complex to absorb EMTE’s 

projected EC workload. To ensure the Air Force 

retains the capability to effectively test and realistically train in the ArmamentsNeapons functional 

category, necessary emitter-only threat systems 

will remain at Eglin AFB. This action is consistent 

with Air Force and DoD efforts to consolidate 

workload where possible to achieve cost and mission efficiencies. 

Community Concerns 

The Eglin community has raised the following 

concerns over the movement of electronic combat 

threat simulators and pod systems from Eglin to 

Nellis Air Force Base: (1) congressional committee 

direction requiring DoD to submit a master plan 

to Congress before changing the electronic combat infrastructure has been circumvented by Air 

Force, (2) despite being given the highest rating 

of all electronic combat test ranges by a joint 

service panel, Air Force chose to dismantle Eglin 

and discontinue its role as a leader in electronic 

combat, and (3) the Air Force’s one-time cost to 

move the electronic combat equipment is significantly understated. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission staff‘s predominant analysis was 

performed on a 17 threat simulator-2 pod system 

scenario while the motion, based on the DoD 

recommendation, was for 8 simulators and 2 pods. 

The Commission found an additional $9.6 million 

in military construction costs and an additional annual 

cost of $7.4 million would never net a return on 

investment for the 17 threat simulator-2 pod scenario. 

In making its final decision, however, the Commission accepted the DoD recommendation for 

moving 8 simulators and 2 pod systems, to centralize activities at the Western Test Complex. 

Development of an electronic combat master plan 

is expected to result in cost effective changes to 

DoD’s test and evaluation infrastructure. However, 

the Commission found that DoD has not yet completed the master plan for consolidation of electronic combat assets DoD-wide. The Commission 

recognizes the high military value of the ElectroMagnetic Test Environment at Eglin Air Force 

Base. It was rated as a superior electronic combat 

test and evaluation facility by the independent 

Board of Directors which is comprised of the Services’ Vice Chiefs of Staff. The Commission found 

that the Electronic Combat Master Plan should be 

used to establish the infrastructure for optimum 

asset utilization. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The Electromagnetic 

Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of eight 

Electronic Combat (EC) threat simulator systems 

and two EC pod systems will relocate to the Nellis 

AFB Complex, Nevada. Those emitter-only systems at the Air Force Development Test Center 

(AFDTC) at Eglin AFB necessary to support Air 

Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the 

USAF Air Warfare Center, and Air Force Materiel 

Command Armaments/Weapons Test and Evaluation activities will be retained. All other activities and 

facilities associated with Eglin will remain open. 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) 

Catego y: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Air Force Reserve Rescue Squadron 

One-time Cost: $66 million 

1-90 CHAPTER 1 
Savings: 1996-2001: $4.5 million (Cost) 

Annual: $1.5 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (5 Years) 

FINAL ACTION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead AFB as follows: 

Redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) 

with its associated aircraft to relocate to Patrick 

AFB. Florida. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The 301st Rescue Squadron (RQS) is temporarily 

located at Patrick AFB, pending reconstruction of its 

facilities at Homestead AFB which were destroyed 

by Hurricane Andrew. As part of the initiative to 

have reserve forces assume a greater role in DoD 

peacetime missions, the 301st RQS has assumed 

primary responsibility for Space Shuttle support 

and range clearing operations at Patrick AFB. This 

reduces mission load on the active duty force 

structure. Although the 301st RQS could perform 

this duty from the Homestead Air Reserve Station, 

doing so would require expensive temporary duty 

arrangements, extensive scheduling difficulties, 

and the dislocation of the unit’s mission from 

its beddown site. The redirect will enable the 

Air Force to perform this mission more efficiently 

and at less cost, with less disruption to the unit 

and mission. 

Community Concerns 

Homestead: The Homestead community is in the 

process of converting the base to a municipal airport. The 301s Rescue Squadron (RQS) and the 

482nd Fighter Wing (FW) would be anchor tenants. The community believes south Florida is an 

attractive location from which to recruit for the 

Reserves, and that most reservists in the 301st still 

live in south Florida-anticipating the return of 

the unit to Homestead, as recommended by the 

1993 Commission. The community contends the 

Air Force Reserve has set-up the 301st for a redirect to Patrick by taking several deliberate actions, 

e.g., focusing all recruiting since Hurricane Andrew 

in central Florida, delaying the construction of the 

unit’s facilities at Homestead until 1996, and taking on the Space Shuttle support mission as the 

unit’s primary peacetime function. In addition, the 

Homestead community believes the loss of the 

301st might lead to the closure of the base. Such 

an occurrence would have a much greater economic impact on the sniall Homestead community 

than that shown for the entire Dade County 

Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). The 

redirect would result in the loss of hundreds of 

returning full-time Air Reserve Technicians (ARTS) 

now, and the loss of part-time reservists who 

would relocate to Patrick in the future. The community asserts the base has a high military value, 

having frequently served as the key military facility in support of operations in the Caribbean and 

Latin America, a major responsibility of the 301st 

RQS. Homestead is an excellent site for peacetime 

readiness training and rescue support of the collocated F-16 unit. In addition, the facilities at Homestead are being rebuilt at no cost to the Air Force 

by a Fiscal Year 1992 Hurricane Andrew Supplemental Appropriation. The community believes 

some savings can be achieved if the 301st RQS is 

collocated with the 482nd FW at Homestead 

because the Air Force could eliminate 20 support 

personnel positions. 

Patrick: The Patrick community argues that it is 

an excellent area from which to recruit for the Air 

Force Reserve. Since the evacuation from Homestead following Hurricane Andrew in August, 

1992, most 301st RQS personnel and their families 

now live in the Patrick community. The com 

munity believes most unit members do not want 

to move again. In addition, Patrick is a safe, 

low-cost, area. They also contend that although 

the mission of the 301st RQS is Combat Rescue, 

its primary peacetime function is NASA Space 

Shuttle and spacecraft launch support. They 

believe Patrick is an ideal location to perform 

this mission. The Air Force will save $1 million 

per year in travel costs if the 301st is at Patrick 

instead of Homestead. The community argues 

that at least $7 million additional funding would 

be required at Homestead for military construction, in addition to the funds provided in the Fiscal Year 1992 Hurricane Andrew Supplemental 

Appropriation, to move the unit back to Homestead. Finally, the community points out the central Florida area has never suffered serious 

hurricane problems-one reason for the siting of 

the Kennedy Space Center there-whereas South 

Florida is prone to hurricanes. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the demographics of the 

central Florida location of Patrick AFB sufficient to 

support the recruiting requirements of the 301st 

Rescue Squadron (AFKES). The Commission found 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-91 
Homestead ARB should remain an open installation, given the presence of the 482nd Fighter 

Wing (AFRES), a Florida Air National Guard 

detachment, and other Federal agency tenants. 

Although the unit’s support to the NASA space 

prognm is important, the primary mission of the 

301st remains combat rescue. The Avon Park 

Gunnery Range, located in close proximity of 

Patrick AFB, supports unit readiness training for 

the primary mission. The Commission found the 

Reserves are well suited to the NASA Shuttle 

Support mission because it allows unit personnel 

to meet their duty requirements and not disrupt 

their regular civilian employment. The Commission found retention of the unit at Patrick allows 

the active duty unit to focus exclusively on its 

Combat Rescue mission. Although there is no 

military construction cost avoidance as a result of 

this recommendation, the Commission found the 

$1 million annual travel cost needed to support 

the NASA mission from Homestead make this 

redirect cost effective. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: change 

the recommendation of the 1993 Commission 

regarding Homestead Air Force Base as follows: 

redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with 

its associated aircraft to relocate to Patrick AFB, 

Florida. 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

Category: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Active Component Air Surveillance, 

Command, and Control 

One-time Cost: $7.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1.8 million 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAI; ACTION: Redirect 

726th Air Control Squadron 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead AFB to 

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as follows: Redirect the 

726th ACS to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. 

Semeta y of Defense Justification 

The 726th ACS was permanently assigned to 

Homestead AFB. In the aftermath of Hurricane 

Andrew, the 726th ACS was temporarily moved to 

Shaw AFB, as the first available site for that unit. 

In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended the closure of Homestead AFB and the 

permanent beddown of the 726th ACS at Shaw 

AFB. Since the 1993 Commission agreed with that 

recommendation, experience has shown that 

Shaw AFB does not provide adequate radar coverage of training airspace needed to support the 

training mission and sustained combat readiness. 

Community Concerns 

The Shaw community argues the 726th Air Control 

Squadron (ACS) can adequately perform readiness 

training at Shaw AFB. Moreover, with the recent 

cancellation of the Idaho Range project, the rationale for moving the squadron has been eliminated. 

The community asserts the Air Force is considering options to correct the training deficiencies at 

Shaw. This would include radar and communications links with 726th remote and FAA facilities to 

provide improved radar and radio coverage of the 

surrounding training airspace. The airspace is frequently used by both local and transient units and 

provides 726th personnel ample training opportunities. In addition, Shaw is optimally positioned 

for world-wide deployments to the Persian Gulf 

and Europe via lift resources in Charleston. The 

community also argues that although the Air Force 

plans to shrink the unit from squadron to element-size, the COBRA military construction costs 

at Shaw assume a squadron-sized facility. In contrast, the military construction costs at Mountain 

Home AFB assume an element-size facility. As a 

result, the community believes the $3.5 million 

construction cost avoidance at Shaw is not real. 

Keeping the unit at Shaw would save $1 million in 

moving expenses and $1.4 million in one-time 

unique costs at Mountain Home. The community 

believes remaining at Shaw saves the Air Force 

$2.4 million in up-front-costs, minimizes the benefits of the recurring savings, and avoids any impact on training and readiness. The Shaw 

community points out there will be a sizable economic impact to the Sumter area with the transfer of 

the 726th from Shaw. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found combat readiness training 

for the personnel assigned to the 726th Air Con1-92 CHAPTER 1 
trol Squadron is deficient at Shaw Air Force Base, 

South Carolina. Shaw is far from training airspace, 

thus is unable to provide suitable radar coverage. 

In addition, the Commission found Shaw does not 

offer enough of the needed types of training 

flights. The training options suggested by the 

community are unsatisfactory substitutes for putting the unit where there is adequate radar coverage, suitable airspace, and frequent training 

opportunities. Mountain Home Air Fore Base, 

Idaho, offers all of these features. The recent 

decision to cancel the Idaho Range complex has 

no bearing on airspace. It pertains solely to the 

delivery of ordnance from fighter aircraft onto a 

surface range, and has no effect on the overlying 

airspace. Simulated ordnance delivery in the existing airspace will still occur offering the 726th 

ACS abundant training opportunities. Deployment 

requirements for the 726th ACS are distinct from 

the other units at Shaw. With both European 

and Asia-Pacific taskings, the unit’s deployment 

capability is not impacted by its Mountain Home 

location. The unit is downsizing, so military construction costs at Mountain Home are similar to 

Shaw. The Commission found the cost to move 

the unit is justified because of the increase in 

training opportunities. 

Corn m ission Reco m menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the 

relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron 

(ACS) from Homestead Air Force Base to Shaw 

AFB, South Carolina, as follows: redirect the 726th 

ACS to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 

Catego y: Administrative 

Mission: Support Unified Commands, 

US. Southern Command and US. 

Central Command 

One-Time Cost: None* 

Savings: 19962001: None* 

Return on Investment: None* 

FINAL ACTION Redirect 

Annual: None * 

* Cost and savings for this recommendation 

are included in the Malmstrom Air Force 

Base, Montana recommendation. 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 

Commissions regarding the closure and transfer of 

the MacDill AFB airfield to the Department of Commerce (DOC) as follows: Kedirect the retention of 

the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air 

Force will continue to operate the runway and its 

associated activities. DOC will remain as a tenant. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Since the 1993 Commission, the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff have validated airfield requirements of the 

two Unified Commands at Macnill AFB and the 

Air Force has the responsibility to support those 

requirements. Studies indicate that Tampa International Airport cannot support the Unified Commands’ airfield needs. These validated DoD 

requirements will constitute approximately 95 percent of the planned airfield operations and associated costs. Given the requirement to support the 

vast majority of airfield operations, it is more efficient for the Air Force to operate the airfield from 

the existing active duty support base. Additional 

cost savings will be achieved when the KC-135 

aircraft and associated personnel are relocated 

from Malmstrom AFB in an associated action. 

Community Concerns 

The community fully supports the retention of the 

airfield at MacDill Air Force Rase as an active Air 

Force installation to satisfy the airfield requirements for the United States Central Command and 

the United States Southern Command. In addition, 

the community supports the transfer of 12 KC-1 35 

tanker aircraft from Malmstrom AFR, Montana to 

MacDill. Further, the community notes MacDill has 

the capacity to accommodate more aircraft and 

supports the assignment of additional resources to 

MacDill AFB. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found there is Deputy Secretary 

of Defense direction and Joint Chiefs of Staff UCS) 

support for of an operational airfield at MacDill 

Air Force Base. In addition, the Commission found 

it is the responsibility of the Air Force to provide 

operational airfield support to the joint commands 

located at MacDill AFB. The JCS completed an operational assessment of MacDill support requirements for the deployment of USCENTCOM and 

USSOCOM elements and the Joint CommunicaCOMMlSSION FINDINGS AND RECOR/IMENDATIONS 1-93 
tions Support Element, which were validated by 

the Chairman of the JCS and Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. Studies indicated these deployment 

requirements could not be supported by Tampa 

International Airport. In addition, an economic 

analysis performed by the Air Force determined 

airfield operating costs would be $9-$10 million 

annually whether the Department of Commerce 

or the Department of the Air Force operated the 

airfield. The Commission agrees with the Air 

Force’s position that it would be more efficient 

for them to continue to operate the airfield in 

view of the validated requirements and similar 

costs to the Air Force whether as a tenant or host 

of the installation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the 

recommendation of the 1991 and 1993 Commissions regarding the closure and transfer of MacDill 

Air Force Base airfield to the Department of Commerce (DOC) as follows: redirect the retention of the 

MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air 

Force will continue to operate the runway and its 

associated activities. DOC will remain as a tenant. 

Chicago O’Hare IAP Air 

Catego y: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Tactical Airrift 

One-time Cost: $24. I million 

Savings: 19962001: $53.7 million 

Annual: $I 7.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year) 

FINAL ACUON: Close 

Reserve Station, Illinois 

Secretary of Defme Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure and realignment as a 

proposed change to the list of recommendations 

submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

The community position is not unanimous. The 

Suburban O’Hare Council, Air Force Community 

Council, and Armed Forces Council support retention of the Air Force Reserve installation and all 

reserve forces units at O’Hare International Airport. The City of Chicago desires to acquire the 

Air Force property for additional development. 

The local community support groups argue the 

City of Chicago has no funding identified to pay 

for the proposed relocation of all units at the 

Reserve Air Station as directed by the 1993 Commission and, thus, the reserve units should remain 

at the O’Hare location. Conversely, the City of 

Chicago maintains they are progressing with plans 

to finance relocation of the Air Reserve Component units from OHare pursuant to the 1993 Commission recommendations under the 1993 

recommendation. The City has until July 1, 1995, 

to develop a fmancial plan to pay for the relocation and replacement of facilities of the Air Force 

and Army Reserve activities and Air National 

Guard units at a site acceptable to the Secretary of 

the Air Force. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the costs to operate 

O’Hare International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve 

Station (ARS) and two other Air Force Reserve 

C-130 locations, used by the Air Force were inaccurate. Using corrected costs, the Commission 

found the Air Force operating costs at O’Hare 

were understated in this case. The Commission 

found closure of O’Hare IAP ARS and deactivation 

of the 928th Airlift Wing produced the highest 

savings of any base in this category. In addition, 

the Commission noted the City of Chicago would 

like to acquire the Air Reserve Station property 

for revenue producing development as outlined in 

the Commission’s 1993 recommendation. Before 

the Reserve Station can close, however, the City 

must fund relocation of the Air Force Reserve and 

Air National Guard units from O’Hare to another 

site acceptable to the Air Force and relocation of 

the Army Reserve units to a site acceptable to the 

Secretary of the my. 

The Commission noted the Secretary of the Air 

Force supports the deactivation of the 928th 

Airlift Wing as a substitute for the Department of 

Defense recommendation, and to alleviate the 

expense to the City of Chicago in their compliance with the 1993 recommendation. The Air 

Force also supports relocation of the 126th Air 

Refueling Wing (ANG) to Scott Air Force Base, 

Illinois, and the remaining Air National Guard 

units to other locations within the State. The Commission found it necessary to close one C-130 

Reserve Station. O’Hare provides the opportunity 

to support the Department of Defense efforts to 

1-94 CHAPTER 1 
reduce infrastructure and the City of Chicago's 

desire to acquire O'Ilare IAP ARS property for 

revenue producing ctevelopnient. 

Commission Recoin menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated sulxtantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 

j. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: modify the closure of O'Hare IAP Air 

Reserve Station as recommended by the 1993 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission hy deactivating the 928th Airlift Wing 

(AFKES), rather than relocating the unit, and distribute its C-130 aircraft to Air Force Reserve C-130 

units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia and Peterson AFB, 

Colorado, or as appropriate. Close O'Hare IAP 

Air Keserve Station as proposed by the City of 

Chicago; relocate the 126th Air Refueling Wing 

(ANG) to Scott AFR, Illinois, and relocate the 

remaining assigned Air National Guard units to 

locations acceptable to the Secretary of the Air 

Force provided the City of Chicago can demonstrate that it has financing in place to cover the 

full cost of replacing facilities (except for FAA 

grants for :iirport planning and development that 

would otherwise be eligible for Federal financial 

tance to senre the needs of civil aviation at 

the receiving location), environmental impact 

analyses, moving, and any added costs of environmental cleanup resulting from higher standards or 

a faster schedule than Doll would be obliged to 

meet if the base did not close, without any cost 

whatsoever to the Federal government. If the City 

of Chicago agrees to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, such activity shall 

also be relocated to a mutually acceptable site; 

otherwise it shall remain. Extend the commencement of the closure from the recommendation of 

the 1993 Commission to July, 1996 with a completion date no later than July, 1999. If these conditions are not met, the 126th Air Refueling Wing 

(ANG) and other assigned units will remain at 

O'Hare International Airport. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Mahstrorn Air Force Base, Montana 

Category: Large Aircraft (Missile) 

Mission: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 

One-time Cost: $26.5 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: -$2.4 million (Cost) 

Annual: $4.2 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (5 Years) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secretary of Defense Kecommendution 

Realign Malmstrom AFH. The 43rd Air liefueling 

Group and its KC-135 aircraft uill relocate to 

MacDill AFH. Florida. All fixed-Lving :iirct.aft flying 

operations :it Malmstrom AFB hvill cc;ise and the 

airfield will be closed. A small airfield operational 

area will continue to be avai1,ible to support the 

helicopter operations of the 40th Kescur Flight 

which will remain to support missile wing opew 

tions. All hse activities and facilities Lissociated 

with the 341st Missile Wing will remain. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Although the missile field at M;ilmstrom AFU 

ranked very high. its airfield resources can efficiently support only a small number of tanker 

aircraft. Its ability to support other 1:irgc :iircl.aft 

missions (bomber and airlift) is limited and closure 

of the airfield will generate sul-)stantial sa\rings. 

During the 1995 proce the Air Force malysis 

highlighted a shortage of refueling aircraft in the 

southeastern United States. The OS1j direction to 

support the IJnified Commancls located :it Macllill 

AFB creates an opportunity to relocate ;i tanker 

unit from the greater tanker resources of the 

northwestern United States to the southeast. 

Movement of the refueling unit from Malmstrom 

AFR to MacDill AFB will also maximize the costeffectiveness of that airfield. 

Community Concerns 

The community argued the excess capcity :mi 

modern award winning facilities at Malmstrom Air 

Force Base can accommodate two more squadrons of KC-135 tankers. The crommunity believes 

the Air Force should close Grand Forks AFH, 

North Dakota, and realign ~mm of the tanker 

squadrons to Malmstrom AFH. 'l'his realignment 

would accomplish full closure of :in Air Force 

base, assuming the Grand Forks missile field is 

closed as recornmended by Don, and would 

improve the tanker shortage in the southeastern 

United States. The community also argued the aircraft 

maximum rake-off gross weight limitations impact 

a small percentage of the missions performed from 

Malmstrom AFR. The cotnniiinity argued that liecause 

the Malmstrom missile field is the largest niissile 

field, it must be maintained to meet Commanderin-Chief Strategic Comrriand requirements for a 

500 Minuteman 111 missile forcestructure. 
Commission Findings 

With 70 tankers based at Fairchild Air Force Base, 

Washington, the Commission found a saturation 

of KC-135 tanker support in the northwest continental United States. Also, the Commission found 

basing tankers at Malmstrom exacerbated the 

tanker saturation problem. On the other hand, the 

Commission found a shortfall in tanker capability 

in the southeastern United States. The Commission 

also took into consideration recent Secretary of 

Defense direction to the Air Force to continue to 

support joint command airlift deployment flying 

requirements at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. 

The Commission was concerned about operating 

limitations for the aircraft based at Malmstrom 

which could adversely impact on operational 

mission requirements. Aircraft at Malmstrom are 

unable to take-off fully loaded because of the 

3,500 foot field elevation and 11,000 foot runway 

length. This limitation reduces tanker range and 

the amount of fuel available for receiver aircraft. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: realign Malmstrom Air 

Force Base. The 43rd Air Refueling Group and its 

KC-135 aircraft will relocate to MacDill AFB, 

Florida. A11 fixed-wing aircraft flying operations at 

Malmstrom AFB will cease and the airfield will be 

closed. A small airfield operational area will continue to be available to support the helicopter 

operations of the 40th Rescue Flight which will 

remain to support missile wing operations. All 

base activities and facilities associated with the 

341st Missile Wing will remain. 

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico 

Category: IndusbriaE/Tecbnical Support: 

Product Center 

Mission: Laboratoty 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 199G2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FIN& ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Kirtland AFB. The 58th Special Operations 

Wing will relocate to Holloman AFB, New Mexico. 

The AF Operational Test and Evaluation Center 

(AFOTEC) will relocate to Eglin AFB, Florida. The 

AF Office of Security Police (AFOSP) will relocate 

to Lackland AFB, Texas. The AF Inspection 

Agency and the AF Safety Agency will relocate to 

Kelly AFB, Texas. The Defense Nuclear Agency 

(DNA) will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas (Field 

Command) and Nellis AFB, Nevada (High Explosive Testing). Some DNA personnel (Radiation 

Simulator operations) will remain in place. The 

Phillips Laboratory and the 898th Munitions 

Squadron will remain in cantonment. The AFRES 

and ANG activities will remain in existing facilities. The 377th ABW inactivates and all other 

activities and facilities at Kirtland AFB, including 

family housing will close. Air Force medical activities located in the Veterans Administration Hospital will terminate. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

As an installation, Kirtland AFB rated low relative 

to other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory when all eight selection criteria 

were considered. The Laboratory Joint CrossService Group, however, gave the Phillips Laboratory operation a high functional value. This 

realignment will close most of the base, but retain 

the Phillips Laboratory, which has a high functional value and the 898th Munitions Squadron, 

which is not practical to relocate. Both of these 

activities are capable of operating with minirnal 

military support. Also, the Sandia National Laboratory can be cantoned in its present location. This 

approach reduces infrastructure and produces significant annual savings, while maintaining those 

activities essential to the Air Force and the Department of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

The community argued the cost to close Kirtland 

Air Force Base would be much higher than the 

DoD estimate. The community’s estimate to realign 

Kirtland Air Force Base is $526 million, whereas 

the DoD’s initial estimate to realign Kirtland Air 

Force Base was $275 million. The community also 

states the annual recurring savings that DoD projected of $62 million a year would actually be a 

cost to the United States government of $13 million a year. The community comments that DoD 

used only costs associated with DoD organizations, and that all costs to United States government organizations, such as the Department of 

Energy (DOE), should be considered. The community says that the realignment of Kirtland Air 

14% CHAPTER 1 
Force Base would have a negative impact on 

nuclear surety, and the cohesion between Defense 

Nuclear Agency (DNA) and DOE organizations 

located on Kirtland Air Force Base. The community notes that the 58th Special Operations Wing 

training would be disrupted for a period of six to 

12 months. The community believes Kirtland Air 

Force Base was evaluated unfairly for air quality, 

and asserted that .‘thousands” could move to 

Kirtland Air Force Base without detrimental effects 

on local air quality. After the proposed realignment, the community would have access to only 

5% percent of the installation because the remainder of the installation would be cantoned to support the missions remaining behind. Finally, the 

cornrnunity notes that during previous base closure rounds the Air Force insisted that Kirtland 

was “essential in supporting several irreplaceable 

research and testing facilities essential to IIoD, 

DOE, and other government agencies.” 

Com m ission Findings 

The Cornmission found the DoD recommendation 

to realign Kirtland Air Force Base would be very 

expensive to enact and the savings anticipated from 

the realignment would not be realized. The DoD 

originally estimated the one-time cost to realign 

Kirtland Air Force Base would he $275 million, 

and the annual recurring savings would be $62 

million. After completing site surveys, the Air 

Force revised the estimate to realign Kirtland Air 

Force Base to $538 million, and the annual recurring savings to $33 million. Over and above these 

costs, the DOE presented information to the Commission that DOE would incur a one-time cost of 

$64 million, and an annual recurring cost of $32 

million if the Secretary’s recommendation was 

adopted. When the Commission reviewed the 

total costs to the National Defense Budget, it 

found the one-time cost to enact this proposal to 

be $602 million with an annual recurring savings 

of $2 million. The Commission also found the 

realignment would have a detrimental effect on 

the mission of DNA. The recommendation would 

relocate most of the DNA personnel assigned on 

Kirtland Air Force Base to Kelly Air Force Base 

while leaving a number of DNA facilities at 

Kirtland Air Force Base. Also, because DNA’s mission is intrinsically tied to DOE, if this recommendation was enacted, key synergism between DNA 

and DOE would be lost. The Commission also 

found keeping Kirtland Air Force Base open 

results in better security for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex. Finally, in a 

June 9, 1995, letter to the Commission, the Secretary of Defense stated, “After reviewing the results 

of the site survey, it is my judgment that the recommendation for the realignment of Kirtland AFB 

no longer represents a financially or operationally 

sound scenario.” 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: Kirtland 

Air Force Base will remain open. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 

Category: Air Force Installation 

Mission: N/A 

One-time Cost: $1.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $25.4 million 

Annual: $2.9 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION Redirect 

485th Engineering Installation Group 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) from Griffiss AFB, New 

York, to Hill AFB, Utah, as follows: Inactivate the 

485th EIG. Transfer its engineering functions to 

the 38th EIG at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Transfer 

its installation function to the 838th Electronic 

Installation Squadron (EIS) at Kelly AFB, Texas, 

and to the 938th EIS, McClellan AFB, California. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Reorganization of the installation and engineering 

functions will achieve additional personnel overhead savings by inactivating the 485th EIG and 

redistributing the remaining activities to other 

units. The originally planned receiver site for the 

485th EIG at Hill AFB has proven to require costly 

renovation. This redirect avoids these additional, 

unforeseen costs while providing a more efficient 

allocation of work. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AKD RECOMMENDATIONS 1-97 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found the Department of Defense 

recommendation to inactivate the 485th Engineering Installation Group would save money by 

avoiding military construction and by reducing 

personnel. The Commission has recommended 

closure of McClellan Air Force Base, and, thus, the 

Air Force will be unable to relocate a portion of 

the 485th Engineering Installation Group to that 

base as set out in the recommendation. The Commission found the 485th should move but allowed 

the Department of the Air Force to relocate this 

unit in accordance with operational requirements. 

Commission Recommendution 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) from Griffiss Air 

Force Base to Hill AFB, Utah, as follows: inactivate the 485th EIG. Transfer its engineering and 

installation functions as operational requirements 

dictate in accordance with Department of the Air 

Force policy. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 

Airfield Support for loth Infantry 

(Light) Division 

Category: Air Force Installation 

Mission: N/A 

One-time Cost: $51.5 million 

Savings: 19962001: $-21.4 million (Cost) 

Annual: $9.9 million 

Return on Investment: 2004 (6 years) 

FIN& ACT‘ION: Redirect 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Change the recommendation of the 193 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry (Light) 

Division, Fort Drum, New York, at Griffiss AFB, as 

follows: Close the minimum essential airfield that 

was to be maintained by a contractor at Griffiss 

AFB and provide the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division 

from the Fort Drum airfield. Mission essential 

equipment from the minimum essential airfield at 

Griffiss AFB will transfer to Fort Drum. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Operation of the minimum essential airfield to 

support Fort Drum operations after the closure of 

Griffiss AFB has proven to far exceed earlier cost 

estimates. Significant recurring operations and 

maintenance savings can be achieved by moving 

the mobility/contingency/training support for the 

10th Infantry (Light) Division to Fort Drum and 

closing the minimum essential airfield operation at 

Griffks. This redirect will permit the Air Force to 

meet the mobility/contingency/training support 

requirements of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division 

at a reduced cost to the Air Force. Having airfield 

support at its home location will improve 10th 

Infantry (Light) Division’s response capabilities, 

and will avoid the necessity of traveling significant 

distances, sometimes during winter weather, co its 

mobility support location. Support at Fort Drum 

can be accomplished by improvement of the existing Fort Drum airfield and facilities. 

Community Concern 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The 1993 Commission recommended keeping “a 

minimum essential runway.. .maintained and operated by a contractor.” Since that recommendation, 

the cost to operate the runway has substantially 

exceeded original estimates. The Commission 

found closing the minimum essential runway on 

Griffiss Air Force Base and constructing a new 

runway on Fort Drum, New York, would save 

money and improve the operational capability of 

the 10th Infantry (Light) Division. Locating a runway directly on Fort Dnim increases response 

capability and decreases response time. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the Force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division, Fort 

Drum, New York at Griffiss Air Force Base as 

follows: close the minimum essential airfield that 

was to be maintained by a contractor at Griffiss 

AFB and provide the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division 

from the Fort Drum airfield. Mission essential 

1-98 CHAPTER 1 
equipment from the minimum essential airfield at 

Griffiss AFR will transfer to Fort Dmm. 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer 

Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York 

Category: Industrial/Technical Support: 

Test & Evaluation 

Mission: Air Defense Ground Test 

Simulation Facility 

One-time Cost: $3.7 million 

Sauitigs: 196-2001: $-0. I million (Cost) 

Annual: $0.9 million 

Return on Investment: 2002 (4 Years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Real-Time Digitally Controlled 

Analyzer Processor activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New 

York. Required test activities and necessary support equipment will he relocated to the Air Force 

Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards AFB, California. Any remaining equipment will be disposed of. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group 

UCSG) recorninended that REDCAP’S capabilities 

be relocated to an existing facility at an installation with a Major Range and Test Facility Base 

(MRTFR) open air range. Projected workload for 

REDCAP is only 10 percent of its available capacity. AFFTC has capacity sufficient to absorb 

REIICAP’s workload. REIICAP’s basic hardware-inthe-loop infrastructure is duplicated at other Air 

Force T8E facilities. This action achieves significant cost savings and workload consolidation. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues the REDCAP activity is one 

of unique military value, and remains an effective 

instrument for testing Electronic Combat air defense 

equipment. The community maintains that in order 

to retain the unique test capabilities of the REDCAP activity, the entire mission must be transferred. The estimated cost submitted by the 

community to move the facility, is approximately 

$13.8-$15.6 million. The community claims the 

Department of Defense underestimated both the 

projected workload and customer utilization levels. The community explains that many of these 

test systems were heing upgraded, and could not 

be fully utilized at the time workload estimates 

were being formulated. In addition, the community notes that the operation of particular test systems can inhibit the use of certain other systems. 

Finally, the community asserts they should not 

have been considered under the BFUC process 

because they are below the 300 federal civilian 

employee threshold, set forth in the statute. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that although the cost to 

disestablish the REDCAP activities is higher than 

that included in the recommendation, this action 

continued to result in overall annual savings. The 

Commission found the cost-to-close was significantly below those subniitted by the community. 

The Commission found the Air Force had properly 

assessed the types of test capabilities required to 

be transferred to the receiving site. The Commission also found sufficient capacity existed at the 

receiver site. The Commission found this action 

reduced excess capacity by eliminating excess 

equipment and transfering just the 44 percent of 

the REDCAP test simulation equipment necessary 

for future requirements. The reduction of excess 

capacity, through the consolidation of electronic 

combat activities on military installations with 

Major Range Test Facility Rases (MRTFB), was one 

of the objectives of the Joint Cross-Service Group 

for Test & Evaluation. The Commission concurred 

in this objective. The Commission further found 

the receiver site was sufficiently capable of absorbing the estimated level of projected test workload 

as determined by the Commission. Finally, the 

Commission found the Air Force had jurisdiction 

to include this facility in its recorninendation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: disestablish the RealTime Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor 

Activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York. Required 

test activities and necessary support equipment 

will be relocated to the Air Force Flight Test Center 

(AFFTC) at Edwards AFB, California. Any remaining equipment will be disposed of. 

Rome Laboratory, New York 

Category: Industrial/Technical Support: 

Mission: Research and Development for 

Laborato y and Product Center 

Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers and Intelligence 

COMMISSION FIxDlhcs AUI) RECOMMENDATIONS 
One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19362001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York. Rome 

Laboratory activities will relocate to Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey, and Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Specifically, the Photonics, Electromagnetic & Reliability (except Test Site O&M 

operations), Computer Systems, Radio Communications and Communications Network activities, 

with their share of the Rome Lab staff activities, 

will relocate to Fort Monmouth. The Surveillance, 

Intelligence & Reconnaissance Software Technology, Advanced C2 Concepts, and Space Communications activities, with their share of the Rome 

Laboratory staff activities, will relocate to 

Hanscom AFB. The Test Site (e.g., Stockbridge 

and Newport) 084 operations will remain at its 

present location but will report to Hanscom AFB. 

Secretary of Defense JustzJkation 

The Air Force has more laboratory capacity than 

necessary to support current and projected Air 

Force research requirements. The Laboratory Joint 

Cross-Service Group analysis recommended the 

Air Force consider the closure of Rome Laboratory. Collocation of part of the Rome Laboratory 

with the Army’s Communications Electronics Research Development Evaluation Command at Fort 

Monmouth will reduce excess laboratory capacity 

and increase inter-service cooperation and common C3 research. In addition, Fort Monmouths 

location near unique civilian research activities 

offers potential for shared research activities. 

Those activities relocated to Hanscom AFB will 

strengthen Air Force C31 RDT&E activities by collocating common research efforts. This action 

will result in substantial savings and furthers the 

DoD goal of cross-service utilization of common 

support assets. 

Community Concerns 

The Griffiss AFB community does not believe Rome 

Laboratoly should be closed and relocated as recommended by DoD. The community believes the 

Lab should remain in its existing facilities as a 

stand-alone Air Force laboratory. Rome Laboratory 

has a large civilian work force and it is located in 

adequate and secure facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB, which was 

realigned in 1993. Rome Lab serves as the anchor 

tenant for the community’s Griffiss AFB reuse 

strategy, which includes a research park. The reuse 

plan is based on the Air Force’s May 1993 comment to the Commission that: “the Air Force has no 

plans to close or relocate the Rome Laboratory 

within the next five years.” The Lab is the Air 

Force‘s Tier I Center of Excellence for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). The community believes the Lab’s 

relocation will compromise its military value 

because its essential mission cannot be accomplished at multiple locations. If the DoD recommendation is implemented: (1) The Lab’s activities 

will be split between three locations, which will 

reduce its mission effectiveness, (2) Many scientists and engineers will not relocate to these 

higher cost areas, (3) Classified and other important work will suffer unacceptable delays that customers will not tolerate, and (4) There will be no 

cross-servicing with the Army at Fort Monmouth. 

Moreover, the community believes there will be a 

negative return on investment because there will 

be no savings and costs will be significantly 

higher than stated in the DoD recommendation 

Commission Findings 

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work 

force and is located in adequate facilities that can 

be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB, which 

is closing. For the past year, as a result of the 

Griffiss Air Force Base realignment recommended 

by the 1993 Commission, the community has been 

working to make the lab part of a high technology 

industrial park. The Commission found the costs 

to close Rome Laboratory and relocate its activities 

to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Hanscom 

AFB, Massachusetts, were significantly understated 

and savings overstated. The Commission found 

the Air Force closure costs were ddficult to verify 

with any accuracy. Although difficult to ascertain, 

the Commission found the costs had increased 

substantially from the original. In addition, the 

Commission found that collocation of this facility 

at Ft. Monmouth would not add to the Lab’s capability. While the move would reduce excess laboratory capacity, it would result in an unacceptable 

return on investment. Moreover, these actions 

would seriously degrade the laboratory’s ability to 

meet its current and future mission requirements. 

CHAPTER 1 1-100 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 

5, Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: Kome Laboratory will remain open. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York 

Catego y: Air National Guard 

Mission: Combat Communications 

and Electronics Installation 

One-time Cost: $ 14.2 million 

Savings: 1996-201 1: $9 million 

Return on Inuestment: 1999 (2 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close (conditional) 

Annual: $0.2 million 

Secretary of Defense Reco m m enda ti0 n 

Close Roslyn Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate 

the 21 3th Electronic Installation Squadron (ANG) 

and the 274th Combat Communications Group 

(ANG) to Stewart International Airport AGS, 

Newburg, New York. The 722nd Aeromedical 

Staging Squadron (AFRES) will relocate to suitable 

leased space within the current recruiting area. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Relocation of the 213th Electronic Installation 

Squadron and 274th Combat Communications 

Group to Stewart International Airport AGS will 

produce a more efficient and cost-effective basing 

structure by avoiding some of the costs associated 

with maintaining the installation. 

Community Concerns 

The community is concerned about the loss of community services provided by the Guard Station. 

They also assert the costs of relocating the unit to 

Stewart International Airport are understated. Finally, 

the community has raised doubts as to whether 

the sale of the property for commercial development is realistic, given zoning restrictions. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found personnel and base operating support savings would not exceed the cost 

of relocating of the Roslyn units. The Commission 

found this recommendation was not cost effective. 

The station is located on valuable residentiallyzoned property. If the property can be sold at its 

fair market value, this recommendation IS coat 

effective. The Commission identified no concerns 

ahout the ability to recruit Guardmen at Stewart 

International Airport. 

Com m issio n Reco m menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Koslyn Air Guard Station (AGS) and 

relocate the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron 

and the 274th Combat Communications Group to 

Stewart International Airport AGS. Newhrg, New 

York if the Roslyn Air Guard Station can be sold 

for its Fair market value. The 722nd Aeromedical 

Staging Squadron (AFRES) will relocate to suitable 

leased space within the current recruiting area. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is 

consistent with the force-structure plan and final 

criteria. 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota 

Catego y: Large Aircraft (Missile) 

Mission: Strategic Deterren ce/Strategic Mobility 

One-time Cost : $1 1.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $1 11.7 million * 

Annual: $35.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

* The savings associated with the closure of the 

missile field were previously programmed in 

the Air Force budget. 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Grand Forks AFR. The 32lst Missile 

Group will inactivate, unless prior to Ilecember 

1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the 

need to retain ballistic missile defense (BMD) 

options effectively precludes this action. If the 

Secretary of Defense makes such a determination, 

Minot AFB, North Dakota, will be realigned and 

the 91st Missile Group will inactivate. 

If Grand Forks AFB is realigned, the 321st Missile 

Group will inactivate. Minuteman 111 missiles will 

relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot Facilities. or lie retired. A small 

number of silo launchers at Grand Forks may be 

retained if required. The 319th Air Refueling Wing 

will remain in place. All activities and facilities at 

the base associated with the 319th Air Refueling 

Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open. 

COMMISSIOV FIYIIINGS AND RE(:ORIMENDATIONS 1-101 
If Minot AFB is realigned, the 91st Missile Group 

will inactivate. Minuteman 111 missiles will relocate 

to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at 

depot facilities, or be retired. The 5th Bomb Wing 

will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the 

base associated with the 5th Bomb Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and 

base exchange will remain open. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

A reduction in ICBM force structure requires the 

inactivation of one missile group within the Air 

Force. The missile field at Grand Forks AFB 

ranked lowest due to operational concerns resulting from local geographic, geologic, and facility 

characteristics. Grand Forks AFB also ranked low 

when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the 

large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements and 

maintain consolidated lanker resources. 

If the Secretary of Defense determines that the 

need to retain BMD options effectively precludes 

realigning Grand Forks, then Minot AFB will be 

realigned. The missile field at Minot AFB ranked 

next lowest due to operational concerns resulting 

from spacing, ranging and geological characteristics. Minot AFB ranked in the middle tier when all 

eight criteria are applied to bases in the large 

aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained 

to satisfy operational requirements. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues the Grand Forks missile 

field is the newest in the Air Force. It has always 

been considered fully capable of performing its 

assigned mission, and remains so today according 

to the Base Closure Executive Group. The community contends closing the Grand Forks missile 

field could send a misleading signal to the former 

Soviet Union that the United States intends to 

unilaterally change the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) 

Treaty, and could jeopardize any future treaty 

negotiations with former Soviet republics. They 

believe closing the intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM) field would unduly restrict any future ballistic missile defense options and would require 

the dismantlement and demolition of the existing 

Grand Forks ABM facilities, significantly increasing 

the cost to close the Grand Forks ICBM field. 

The community argues the Air Force erred in 

excluding the Minuteman field at F.E. Warren AFB 

from consideration because the Peacekeeper missiles there are scheduled to complete their retirement in 2003, thus providing an opportunity for 

a complete base closure. They also argue that 

retaining Grand Forks AFB as a multi-mission base 

(ICBMs and tankers), and completely closing 

Malmstrom AFB, would provide significantly 

greater operating efficiencies and savings than the 

DoD proposal to realign the missile group at 

Grand Forks AFB and the tanker group at 

Malmstrom AFB. The community believes the 50 

additional Minuteman missile silos at Malmstrom 

AFB should carry no weight in the analysis, 

because the Nuclear Posture Review specifically 

accepts an ICBM force of 450 or 500 Minuteman 

missiles. The community further argues the Air 

Force and DoD correctly assessed the military 

value of Grand Forks AFB in 1993 when selecting 

it as a core tanker base because of its ideal location, and its capacity, facilities, and infrastructure. 

They believe there is no tanker saturation problem 

in the north central United States because on average 66 percent of the Grand Forks tanker aircraft 

are deployed to forward operating locations. They 

also point out the runway was upgraded to Code 

1 in 1994, there is a direct fuel supply pipeline 

feed to the base, an improved Type 111 hydrant 

system assures rapid and effective aircraft refueling capability, and state and local zoning guarantee no future runway encroachment problems. 

The community notes the evaluation criteria for 

"Facilities Condition: Housing" is bad on the 

number of units needing upgrade to whole house 

standards not current condition. Finally, the community is concerned the University of North 

Dakota is a strong asset in the Grand Forks community and should be taken into account in the 

evaluation process. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found all four Minuteman fields 

were fully capable, but the high water table at 

Grand Forks Air Force Base reduced survivability 

and required an increased level of on-site depot 

support. Total on-site support costs per Minuteman silo over the past three years were higher at 

Grand Forks AFB than at Minot or F.E. Warren 

AFBs, but lower than at Malmstrom AFB. Efforts to 

counter water intrusion accounted for five percent 

of these costs, and were highest at Grand Forks 

AFB. The missile alert rate at Grand Forks AFB 

has been consistently lower than at Minot AFB. 

The Commission agreed with the Air Force's 

decision to exclude F.E. Warren AFB from consid1-102 CHAPTER 1 
eration because of a requirement for Peacekeeper 

missiles beyond the period under which Commission actions would be taken, and because of the 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty 

implications of directing realignment of the only 

Peacekeeper missile base. In addition, the Commission agreed with the Commander-in-Chief of 

United States Strategic Command that retention of 

the Malmstrom AFR missile field was militarily irnportant because of the presence of 50 additional 

Minuteman silos. Thus, retention of the 

Malmstrom AFB missile field took precedence 

over the economies associated with closing 

Malmstrom AFB and retaining a multi-mission 

base at Grand Forks AFB. At the time the recommendation was received from DoD, there was 

uncertainty about whether there were possible 

treaty implications for the Grand Forks antiballistic 

missile (ABM) system and ballistic missile defense 

that would preclude inactivation of the Grand 

Forks AFB Minuteman field. On May 7, 1995, the 

Commission received a letter from the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense stating that representatives of 

DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 

and the National Security Council Staff had determined that ABM treaty considerations would not 

preclude inactivation of the Grand Forks AFR Minuteman field. The letter also stated: "Realignment 

of Minot AFB and inactivation of the 91st Missile 

Group is no longer a necessary alternative." Subsequent correspondence with Doll confirmed that 

inactivation of the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman 

field would not affect the right to retain an ABM 

deployment area at Grand Forks and w-ould not 

require demolition of the existing ABM facilities. 

DoD, however, reiterated the fact that it could be 

necessary to leave a small number of empty Minuteman silos in place at Grand Forks AFR. Finally, 

the Commission found DoD included a one-time 

cost of $5.5 million for housing demolition at 

Grand Forks AFB, thereby increasing recurring 

savings by $3.7 million annually. This appeared to 

be a sound investment strategy that produced substantial savings over time, but was not necessitated by a decision to realign Grand Forks AFB. 

Consequently, the costs and savings associated 

with this action were removed from the decision 

COBRA. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Grand 

Forks Air Force Base. The 321st Missile Group will 

inactivate md Minuteman 111 missiles will relocate 

to Malinstroin AFR, Montana, be maintained at 

depot facilities, or be retired. A small number of silo 

launchers at Grand Forks AFH may be retained if 

required. The 319th Air Kefueling Wing will 

remain in place. All activities :ind facilities at the 

base associated with the 319th Air Kefueling Wing, 

including family housing. the hospital, conimissary, and base exchange will remain open. 

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport 

Air Guard Station, Ohio 

Category: Air National Guard 

Mission: Power Projection and Combat 

Communications 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: .1996-200 1: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air 

Guard Station (AGS) :ind relocate the 178th 

Fighter Group (ANG), the 25lst Combat Conimunications Group (ANG), and the 269th Comlxit 

Communications Squadron (ANG) to WrightPatterson AFB. Ohio. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The 178th Fighter Group provides crash. fire and 

rescue, security police. and other base opemting 

support services for ANG activities at SpringfieldBeckley Municipal Airport. By relocating to 

Wright-Patterson AFB, significant manpower and 

other ravings will he realized by avoiding some of 

the costs associated with the installation. 

Community Concerns 

The community maintains that the quality of facilities and operating environment at SpringfieldBeckley Municipal Airport are superior to those at 

Wright-Patterson AF13. The community is also concerned about the Air National Guard!State share 

of base operating support costs at Wright 

Patterson AFH. Community officials assert th:it the 

savings associated with the proposed relocation 

are overstated because the Air Force analysis did 

not includt: all costs that aould he incurred by 

COMMISSION FINDINGS A~L) RECOMMENDATION 1-103 
basing the unit at Wright-Patterson AFB. The community is concerned about the continued existence of the Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport 

if the Guard unit leaves, as a significant portion of 

airport revenues will be lost. The community is 

also concerned about the economic impact on the 

community if the station closes. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the extended return on 

investment and the inadequacy of facilities at 

Wright-Patterson AFB did not justify relocating the 

unit from its current location. Further, the Commission found the facilities and basing arrangement at Springfield-Beckley ideal for meeting the 

needs of the Air National Guard units. The Commission found the small savings generated by 

closure of the Springfield-Beckley facilities did 

not justify their closure and potential degradation 

to the units. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air 

Guard Station will remain open. The Commission 

finds this recommendation is consistent with the 

force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air 

Category: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Tactical Airlzp 

Onetime Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAI; ACTION: Remain Open 

Reserve Station, Pennsylvania 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station 

(ARS). The 911th Airlift Wing will inactivate and 

its C-130 aircraft will be distributed to Air Force 

Reserve C-130 units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia, and 

Peterson AFB, Colorado. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 operating 

locations than necessary to effectively support the 

Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense 

(DoD) Force Structure Plan. Although Greater 

Pittsburgh ARS is effective at supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria 

supports its closure. Its operating costs are the 

greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations 

at civilian airfields. In addition, its location near a 

number of AFRES and Ar National Guard units provides opportunities for its personnel to transfer 

and continue their service without extended travel. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes the cost analysis of the air 

reserve stations in this category was faulty. Specifically, the base operating support cost experienced by one Air Force Reserve C-130 base was 

used as the cost for two other air reserve locations, as well as Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, resulting in false savings and cost 

information. Further, the community argues the 

Air Force did not consider the 30 acres of additional aircraft parking apron currently being used 

under a memorandum of agreement with Allegheny County. The community disagrees with the 

Air Force color code ranking for the airfield evaluation, facilities condition, and air quality and 

maintains that higher ranking in accordance with 

real conditions would enhance military value. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the costs to operate Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS) and two other Air Force Reserve C-130 

locations were inaccurate. With corrected data applied to the COBRA model, the commission found 

Pittsburgh was one of the least costly installations 

to operate. The Air Force indicated they had 

received the offer of additional acreage at Pittsburgh IAP ARS, but determined it was inappropriate to act on the offer pending the outcome of the 

base closure process. Review of the November 

1994 Airfield Pavement Evaluation substantiated 

the community’s assertions the airfield can accommodate all types of aircraft. Information submitted 

by the community demonstrates Allegheny County 

Bureau of Environmental Quality has applied to the 

US Environmental Protection Agency for air quality 

redesignation to attainment, having met air quality 

standards during 1991-93. The Commission found 

that the low operating costs and expansion opportunities were not fully considered by the Air Force. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5. 

1-104 CHAPTER 1 
Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station 

will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation 

Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas 

Test and Evaluation 

Catego y: Industrial/Technical Support: 

Mission: Electronic Combat Simulation 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) activity in Fort Worth. 

Essential AFEWES capabilities and the required 

test activities will relocate to the Air Force Flight 

Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California. 

Workload and selected equipment from AFEWES 

will be transferred to AFFTC. AFEWES will be 

disestablished and any remaining equipment will 

be disposed of. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group 

UCSG) recommended that AFEWES's capabilities 

be relocated to an existing facility at an installation possessing a Major Range and Test Facility 

Base (MRTFB) open air range. Projected workload 

for AFEWES was only 28 percent of its available 

capacity. Available capacity at AFFTC is sufficient 

to absorb AFEWES's workload. AFEWES's basic 

hardware-in-the-loop infrastructure is duplicated 

at other Air Force Test and Evaluation facilities. 

This action achieves significant cost savings and 

workload consolidation. 

Community Concerns 

The community claims that no factual basis exists 

to support disestablishment and relocation of the 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Simulator Facility to 

Edwards Air Force Base as recommended by the 

Secretary of Defense. The community addressed 

each element of the rationale used by Air Force 

supporting the recommendation as well as the 

actual facts applicable to each issue as viewed by 

the community. Community concerns challenge 

Air Force positions on projected workload, cost 

savings, workload consolidation, infrastructure 

reductions and personnel reductions. Further, the 

community believes the proposed action is in conflict with congressional language in the fiscal year 

report of the Senate Appropriations Committee 

that requires a study addressing datalinking versus consolidation at least 120 days prior to the 

approval of any changes affecting electronic 

combat facilities. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found disestablishment of the Air 

Force Electronic Warfare Simulator Facility is not 

cost effective. The Air Force estimated a cost to 

close of $8.9 million and a return on investment 

of 13 years. The Commission estimated the closure cost was $34.9 million and would result in a 

payback in excess of 100 years. The Commission 

estimated additional costs of $6 million for military 

construction at Edwards Air Force Base and $20 

million for documentation, training and other support costs. The Commission also found that relocating electronic combat testing capabilities poses 

major technical risk because of the system's 

unique ability to evaluate fully aircraft in a dense 

threat environment. The Commission found that 

electronic datalinking is a sound and cost effective 

alternative to collocating Air Force's Electronic 

Warfare Simulator Facility on a major test range. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 

5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the 

following: the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) will remain open. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas 

Catego y: Air Force Reserve 

Mission: Air Force Reserve Base, 

F-16 Fighter Operations 

One-Time Cost: $1 7.4 million 

Savings: 19962001: $75.2 million 

Return on Inuestment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $I 7.8 million 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Close Bergstrom ARB. The 924th Fighter Wing 

(AFRES) will inactivate. The Wing's F-16 aircraft 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-105 
will be redistributed or retire. Headquarters, 10th 

Air Force (AFRES), will relocate to Naval Air 

Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas. 

Secretary of Defense Justtf?uation 

Due to Air Force Reserve fighter force drawdown, 

the Air Force Reserve has an excess of F-16 fighter 

locations. The closure of Bergstrom ARB is the 

most cost effective option for the Air Force 

Reserve. The relocation of Headquarters, 10th Air 

Force to NAS Fort Worth will also collocate the 

unit with one of its major subordinate units. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues there was a commitment 

on the part of the Air Force and both the 1991 

and 1993 Commissions to keep Bergstrom Air 

Reserve Base open, if the community converted 

the base to a municipal airport. In May 1993, 

Austin voters approved a $400 million referendum 

to fund the airport project. The citizens of Austin 

voted for this measure, in part, to keep the 

reserves in Austin. The community claims it has 

upheld its part of the commitment. Beyond that, 

the community stresses its long military tradition 

makes it ideal for recruiting for the Reserves. The 

community argues the base is capable of supporting either F-16 or KC-135 operations. In addition, 

joint training opportunities are enhanced at 

Bergstrom due to its proximity to the Army’s Fort 

Hood. This also enhances the mission of the 

Ground Combat Readiness Center (AFRES), a Security Police training unit. The community informed 

the Commission that several other DoD and Federal government agencies are actively seeking 

space at the base, including the Texas Army National Guard, the Naval Reserves, and a NASA 

flight detachment. The Regional Corrosion Control 

Facility (RCCF) was transferred by the Air Force to 

the Austin Municipal Airport Authority in September 1994. Due to its unique capability, Air Combat 

Command will contract for 100 aircraft per year to 

be processed by the RCCF. The community claims 

it makes economic and operational sense to locate 

the Reserves at Bergstrom to provide transient 

support for aircraft using the facility. Finally, the 

community contends the cost to station the 

Reserves at Bergstrom is much lower than the 

Air Force has stated. The community noted that 

when Austin takes over the airfield in October 

1996, the cost to the Air Force will decrease further, putting Bergstrom at parity with Homestead. 

Commission Findings 

The Air Force overstated the savings for the closure 

of Bergstrom Air Reserve Base due to its failure to 

account for the decrease in base operating support costs, once the Austin city government assumes control of airport operations in 1996. Even 

so, the Commission found that closure of 

Bergstrom remains the most cost effective option 

in the Air Force Reserve F-16 category. Although 

the Reserve has an excess of two F-16 squadrons, 

the Commission found it necessary to close only 

one reserve installation. Additional closures would 

have an adverse impact on recruiting and operational readiness. Although the base has infrastructure in-place to support both F-16 and KC-135 

aircraft, the Commission found that overall excess 

capacity in the Reserve category and cost savings 

factors require closure. The Commission also 

found other Reserve F-16 locations rate higher 

than Bergstrom for facilities, training, and joint 

operations. The RCCF contractor will provide all 

aircraft servicing support as part of its contract 

with Air Combat Command. The Ground Combat 

Readiness Center mission is under review by the 

Air Force; if the mission remains, either Carswell 

or other facilities in the area are satisfactory transfer locations. The Air Force and previous Commission commitments regarding the development of 

the Austin airport at Bergstrom were conditioned 

upon future Air Force force-structure requirements 

remaining stable. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: close Bergstrom Air 

Reserve Base. The 924th Fighter Wing (AFRES) 

will inactivate. The Wing’s F-16 aircraft will be 

redistributed or retire. Headquarters, 10th Air 

Force (AFRES), will relocate to Naval Air Station 

Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas. 

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas 

Category: Industrial7Technical Support: 

Laboratory and Product Center 

Mission: Human systems research and 

product development 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINM ACTION: Remain Open 

1-106 CHAPTER 1 
Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Brooks AFB. The Human Systems Center, 

including the School of Aerospace Medicine and 

Armstrong Laboratory, will relocate to WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio, however, some portion of 

the Manpower and Personnel function, and the 

Air Force Drug Test laboratory, may relocate to 

other locations. The 68th Intelligence Squadron 

will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas. The Air Force 

Center for Environmental Excellence will relocate 

to Tyndall AFH, Florida. The 710th Intelligence 

Flight (AFRES) will relocate to Lackland AFB, 

Texas. The hyperbaric chamber operation, including associated personnel, will relocate to Lackland 

AFB. Texas. All activities and facilities at the 

base including family housing and the medical 

facility will close. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Air Force has more hb0rdtoI-y capacity than 

necessary to support current and projected Air 

Force research requirements. When compared to 

the attributes desirable in laboratory activities, the 

Armstrong Lab and Human Systems Center operations at Brooks AFB contributed less to Air Force 

needs as measured by such areas as workload 

requirements, facilities, and personnel. As an 

installation, Brooks AFB ranked lower than the 

other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center 

subcategory. 

Community Concerns 

The community believes that if Brooks moves, the 

existing synergy within San Antonio’s one-of-akind biomedical community, would be significantly impaired. While the community would 

prefer that Brooks remain open, it has developed 

an alternative plan that would canton most activities at Brooks. Under the community’s cantonment 

plan, the Human Systems Center, Armstrong Laboratory, School of Aerospace Medicine and the 

Center for Environmental Excellence would be 

retained, while the remainder of Brooks would 

close and other tenants would relocate. Specific 

boundaries would be determined by the Air 

Force. Base operation and other support would be 

provided by nearby Lackland or Kelly. The community argues that the cantonment (1) is cost 

effective, (2) offers an immediate return on investment, (3) preserves existing synergy, and (4) 

avoids risk to existing research missions. 

Commission Findings 

The Cornmission found that closing Brooks AFB 

would have required a significant upfront cost of 

at least $211.5 million. Closure of Brooks AFH 

would interrupt critical ongoing research. The 

Commission found that the delays associated with 

re-accreditation of equipment and laboratories at 

the receiving sites were unacceptable. The Coinmission found that the move would also create 

one of two equally unacceptable events-either 

large numbers of people would move, keeping 

the costs high, or large numbers of people would not 

move, interrupting vital research. In a response to 

a survey, more than half the professional staff said 

they probably would not move. In addition, the 

Commission found that if the Brooks’ human systems research mission were relocated, existing 

synergy with the large San Antonio military and 

civilian biomedical communities would be lost. 

While excess capacity exists at Wright-I a tterson 

AFB, Ohio, the primary receiving location, the 

excess is mainly office space and is not currently 

suited to accommodate Brooks’ research activities. 

The Air Force projects it would have to construct 

or renovate nearly 1 million square feet to be able 

to take on the Brooks mission. Brooks currently 

operates in “world-class” facilities. 

The Commission found the community‘s cantonment proposal would have saved, at a minimum, 

the $211.5 million upfront cost to close, would 

have offered additional annual savings of nearly 

$18 million and net present value savings of $248 

million. The cantonment savings were credible, 

and were similar to those shown in Air Force 

certified COBRAS compiled at the request of the 

Commission. In addition, cantonment would have 

preserved existing synergies, allowed portions of 

Brooks to be made available for re-use, and saved 

opportunity costs. 

The Air Force informed the Commission that it 

would prefer to keep Brooks open rather than 

place Brooks into cantonment. The Air Force 

believes cantonment, in general, is awkward and 

llnworkdbk in the long term. The Commission 

found the costs and disruption to research that 

would result from relocation LlndCceptabk. The 

Commission rejected the Air Force’s original recommendation to close Brooks AFB and deferred 

to the Air Force request to have Brooks AFB 

remain open rather than place the mission’s activities into an enclave area. 

COMhlISSION FIRDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-107 
Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from fml criteria 1, 4, and 5. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Brooks Air Force Base will remain open. 

The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Kelly Air Force Base, Texas 

Catego y: Iru€wtrial7Tecbnical Support: Depots 

Mission: Provide depot maintenance and 

One-time Cost: $412.8 million 

Savings: 19962001: $1 06.2 million 

Annual: $1 78.5 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (I year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

materiel management support to tbe Air Force 

Semetary of Defme Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure and realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

The San Antonio Community believes the Air 

Force tiering system was subjective and did not 

recognize the true value of Kelly Air Force Base or 

the San Antonio Air Logistics Center. The community believes the environmental condition was 

misstated by DoD. The community stated that the 

water use issue that resulted in a low environmental score has been corrected, but asserted the Air 

Force failed to revise the base’s environmental 

score. The closure of Kelly Air Force Base would 

have a severe economic impact; it would result in 

a 73 percent increase in San Antonio Hispanic 

unemployment (60% of Kelly employees are 

Hispanic, 45% of Hispanics employed by the Air 

Force are employed at Kelly). Concern was 

expressed that the middle class Hispanic community would be devastated. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that the significant excess 

capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot 

system requires closure of the San Antonio Air 

Logistics Center (ALC). The Air Force recommendation to downsize all five Air Force ALC depots 

through mothballing excess space would reduce 

the amount of space utilized by the depot but 

would not eliminate infrastructure and overhead 

costs. Downsizing would result in the elimination 

of depot direct labor personnel, but not overhead 

personnel. The Commission found that closure of 

the San Antonio ALC, and related activities at 

Kelly AFB, including the distribution depot and 

information processing megacenter, permits significantly improved utilization of the remaining 

depots and reduces DoD operating costs. 

The low military value “tier” assigned by the Air 

Force was second among the factors considered in 

the determination to realign Kelly AFB and the 

San Antonio ALC. The Air Force tier ranking system uses rankings of I through 111 with tier 111 

being the lowest rank. (At the request of the Air 

Force, the DoD Joint Cross Service Group used 

the tiering system as a proxy for military value). 

Kelly AFB and the depot at the San Antonio ALC 

received tier 111 rankings. The Community 

expressed concern the Air Force military value 

was subjective. The Commission agreed that the 

determination of military value is complex and 

difficult to translate into easily auditable numbers. 

The tier is an appropriate description of the collective military judgment of the officials on the Air 

Force Base Closure Executive Group. 

The proximity of Kelly AFB to Lackland Air Force 

Base, Texas was also considered in the determination to realign Kelly AFB. Lackland AFB will be 

able to provide support to a realigned Kelly AFB. 

Through consolidation of support costs, the Commission found the Air Force could achieve substantial savings. 

The Commission found the cost to realign Kelly 

AFB to be less than that estimated by the DoD 

and the annual savings significantly greater the 

DoD’s estimate. The differences in cost and savings estimates are based on differing closure 

assumptions of the Air Force and Commission. 

The commission assumed that a depot closure 

and consolidation of work would permit a personnel reduction of 15% of selected MC personnel 

and a 50% reduction of management overhead 

personnel. The Air Force did not reflect any direct 

labor personnel savings due to a closure and 

reflected a 20% reduction in overhead personnel. 

The Commission assumed that closure would 

occur over a five year period, and the Air Force 

assumed six years. Another significant factor 

explaining the difference between savings estimates is that Air Force assumed all personnel 

savings would occur in the last year of implementation; the Commission assumed that personnel 

1-108 CHAPTER 1 
eliminations would be evenly phased over a four 

year period. The Commission also did not agree 

with a number of onetime costs that the Air Force 

considered to he directly related to closure. 

The level of Hispanic employment at Kelly AFB 

was recognized by the Commission. The Commission took steps to minimize the negative economic impact on the community by cantoning a 

significant portion of the Kelly AFB activities. The 

Commission recommends that the DoD make 

maximum use of the priority placement system 

and take steps to retain the Kelly employees 

within DoD. 

The Commission staff presented data indicating 

large annual savings could be realized by consolidating engine maintenance activities at Tinker Air 

Force Base, Oklahoma. Both Kelly and Tinker are 

operating at less than i0Yo of their engine maintenance capacity. These savings would be in addition to those shown in the Commission’s COBRA 

summaries. The Commission urges the Air Force to 

consolidate engine maintenance activity at Tinker 

to reduce excess capacity. The Commission firmly 

believes that consolidation of engine activities will 

result in lower costs and increased efficiencies. 

Each of the Air Logistics Centers operated by the 

Air Force are excellent organizations. The San 

Antonio community is clearly supportive of the 

military and the ALC. The decision to close the 

San Antonio ALC is a difficult one; but given the 

significant amount of excess depot capacity and 

limited Defense resources, closure is a necessity. 

The Commission’s decision permits closure of the 

San Antonio ALC and related activities without 

disruption of the other military missions on the 

base. The San Antonio ALC closure will permit 

improved utilization of the remaining ALCs and 

substantially reduce Doll operating costs. 

Co m m issio n Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: realign 

Kelly Air Force Base including the Air Logistics 

Center. Disestablish the Defense Distribution 

Depot, San Antonio. Consolidate the workloads to 

other DoD depots or to private sector commercial 

activities as determined by the Defense Depot 

Maintenance Council. Move the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving 

locations. The airfield and all associated support 

activities and facilities will be attached to Lickland 

AFB, Texas as will the following unit\: the Air 

Intelligence Agency including the Cryptologic 

Depot; the 433rd Airlift Wing (AFRES); the 149th 

Fighter Wing (ANG), and; the 1827th Engineering 

Installation Squadron (EIS). The Commission finds 

this recommendation is consistent with the forcestructure plan and final criteria. 

Reese Air Force Base, Texas 

Catego y: Undergraduate Flying Training 

Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training 

One-Time Cost: $46.4 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $95.7 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (2 Years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $32.4 million 

Secretary of Defense Recom m enda ti0 n 

Close Reese AFB. The 64th Flying Training Wing 

will inactivate and its assigned aircraft will be 

redistributed or retired. All activities and facilities 

at the base including family housing and the 110spital will close. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Air Force has more Undergraduate Flying 

Training (UFT) bases than necessary to support 

Air Force pilot training requirements consistent 

with the Department of Defense (Doll) Force 

Structure Plan. When all eight criteria are applied 

to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranks 

low relative to the other bases in the category. 

Reese AFB ranked lower when cornpared to other 

UFT bases when evaluated on such factors as 

weather (e.g., crosswinds, density altitude) and 

airspace availability (e.g., amount of airspace 

available for training, distance to training areas). 

Reese AFB was also recommended for closure in 

each alternative recommended by the IloD Joint 

Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training. 

Community Concerns 

The community argues the Air Force has always 

rated Reese very high in the past. As proof of this, 

they point to the selection of Reese as the first 

specialized undergraduate pilot training site with 

the introduction of the T-1 training aircraft, and 

initiation of the consolidation of unc1ergr:iduate 

pilot training (UPT) with the Navy in a joint primary training program. The community questions 

whether Reese is being downgraded because it 

COMMISSl0.U FINDINGS .AN11 RECOMMENDATIONS 1-109 
lacks actual ownership and control of required 

airspace, even though access to the airspace it 

uses for UPT training activities is unimpeded. 

They question the use of weather attrition factors 

such as icing and crosswinds. Crosswinds were 

used as a limiting factor at Reese but icing was 

not used as a limiting factor at Vance AFB, Oklahoma. The Air Force configures each of its UPT 

bases nearly the same, consequently the community believes the UPT-JCSG (Joint Cross-Service 

Group) analysis is suspect because it shows Reese 

substantially inferior to the other bases. The community argues the Air Force is underestimating 

future pilot training requirements. If these estimates prove to be incorrect, closing Reese will 

result in the loss of needed training capacity. The 

community believes the Air Force is ignoring a 

quality of life indicator: Reese AFB is the number 

one choice of student and instructor pilots in Air 

Education Training Command (AETC) for base of 

assignment; base accessibility is enhanced by its 

proximity to a large international airport served by 

major jet airlines; and Reese offers superior higher 

education opportunities, In addition, because of 

the significantly high quality medical facilities the 

city has made available to the base, the Reese 

Clinic has been able to execute “right-sizing” initiatives. The community believes these factors 

combine to reduce significantly the cost to the Air 

Force of operating Reese AFB. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the decrease in pilot training requirements resulting from the drawdown in 

force structure has created excess capacity in the 

UFT category. After the 1991 round, the Air Force 

did not plan to close another UJT base. Air Force 

evaluations of UPT bases that led to the decision 

to place the T-1 Airlift/Tmker training aircraft at 

Reese AFB first reflected the need to station the 

aircraft at a tme that would allow easy airline 

access for contractor personnel, rather than a 

judgment on the military value of the base. Similarly, joint primary training with the Navy was 

initiated at Reese because it was the only Air 

Force UPT base that had transitioned to the new 

primary training syllabus required for the joint 

program, a direct result of the T-1 introduction. In 

conducting its review of bases for the 1995 round 

of base closures, the Air Force evaluated UPT 

bases on their functional value to perform undergraduate pilot training. The functional value of 

Reese AFB, as determined by the UPT Joint CrossService Group, was initially questioned by the 

Commission as a result of the community’s concerns. After conducting an independent staff 

analysis of functional value, the Commission validated the Air Force ranking. This analysis 

included evaluations of icing and airspace issues, 

concerns expressed by the community. Functional 

value is the primary determinant of military value 

in the UFT category. Quality of life was an issue 

addressed at each UPT base. Commission staff 

conducted interviews with instructors, students, 

and their spouses to determine the quality of life 

at each base. Each community has put programs 

in place to support the military in locating offbase housing, employment, education, and health 

care, and is fully committed to providing the military the highest possible quality of life. The commission found closure of one Air Force UPT base 

contains some risk due to uncertainty about future 

pilot retention rates, airline hiring, and Reserve 

requirements. The Commission found the Air 

Force has many options available to it to meet 

future requirements using the remaining UFT and 

Small Aircraft category bases. The commission 

found any risk to the ability of the Air Force to 

meet its pilot training requirements is acceptable. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission fmds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate Substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: close Reese Air Force 

Base. The 64th Flying Training Wing will inactivate 

and its assigned aircraft will be redistributed or 

retired. All activities and facilities at the base 

including family housing and the hospital will close. 

Hill Air Force Base, Utah 

(Utah Test and Training Range) 

Category: Industrialflechical Support: 

Mission: Test and Evaluation 

One-time Cost: $0.2 million 

Savings: 19962001: $34. I million 

Annual: $6.3 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACT.ION: Realign 

Test and Evaluation 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign Hill AFB, Utah. The permanent Air Force 

Materiel Command (AFMC) test range activity at 

Utah Test and Training Range (UTI‘R) will be 

disestablished. Management responsibility for 

operation of the U’ITR will transfer from AFMC to 

1-110 CHAPTER 1
Air Combat Command (ACC). Personnel, equipment and systems required for use by ACC to 

support the training range will be transferred to 

ACC. Additional AFMC manpower associated with 

operation of the range will be eliminated. Some 

armament/weapons Test and Evaluation (T&E) 

workload will transfer to the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, 

and the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), 

Edwards AFB, California. Note: The Commission 

voted that Hill Air Force Base, UT, currently on 

the list of bases recommended by the Secretary of 

Defense for realignment, be considered by the 

Commission for closure or to increase the extent 

of the realignment. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Most of the current T&E activities can be accomplished at other T&E activities (AFFTC and 

AFDTC). Disestablishing the AFMC test range activities and transferring the range to ACC will reduce 

excess T&E capacity within the Air Force. Retaining the range as a training range will preserve the 

considerable training value offered by the range 

and is consistent with the current 82 percent training use of the range. Retention of the range as a 

training facility will also allow large footprint 

weapons to undergo test and evaluation using 

mobile equipment. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal 

community. 

Commission Findings 

expressions from the 

The Commission found no reason to disagree with 

the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: realign Hill Air Force 

Base, Utah. The permanent Air Force Materiel 

Command (AFMC) test range activity at Utah Test 

and Training Range (U'M'R) will be disestablished. 

Management responsibility for operation of the 

UTTR will transfer from AFMC to Air Combat 

Command (ACC). Personnel, equipment and systems required for use by ACC to support the training range will be transferred to ACC. Additional 

AFMC manpower associated with operation of the 

range will be eliminated. Some armamedweapons Test and Evaluation (T8E) workload will 

transfer to the Air Force Development Test Center 

(AFDTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, and the Air Force 

Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California. 

Air Logistics Centers 

Catergo y: Industrial/Technical Support: Depots 

Mission: Maintenance Depots 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 1996-2001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Rejected 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Realign the Air Logistics Centers (ALC) at Hill AFB, 

Utah; Kelly AFB, Texas; McClellan AFB, California; 

Robins AFB, Georgia; and Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. 

Consolidate the followings workloads at the designated receiver locations: 

Commodity/Workload 

Composites and plastics 

Hydraulics 

Tubing manufacturing 

Airborne electronic 

automatic equipment 

software 

manufacturing 

Sheet metal repair and 

Machining manufacturing 

Foundry operations 

Instruments/displays 

Airborne electronics 

Electronic manufacturing 

(printed wire boards) 

Electrical/mechanical 

support equipment 

Injection molding 

Industrial plant 

Plating 

equipment software 

Receiving Locations 

SM-ALC, McClellan AFB 

SM-ALC, McClellan AFB 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB, 

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, 

00-ALC, Hill AFB 

00-ALC, Hill AFB, 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB 

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB 

SA-ALC, Kelly AFR, 

00-ALC, Hill AFB 

SM-ALC, McClelkan AFB 

(some unique work 

remains at 00-ALC, 

Hill AFB and WR-ALC, 

Robins AFB) 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB, 

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, 

00-ALC, Hill AFB 

WR-ALC. Robins AFB 

SM-ALC, McClellan AFB 

SM-ALC, McClellan AFB 

SA-ALC, Kelly AFB 

OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, 

00-ALC, Hill AFB, 

SA-ALC, Kelly AFB, 

WR-ALC, Robins AFB 

COMMISSION F 1-1 11 INDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Move the required equipment and any required 

personnel to the receiving location. These actions 

will create or strengthen Technical Repair Centers 

at the receiving locations in the respective commodities. Minimal workload in each of the commodities may continue to be performed at the 

other ALCs as required. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Reductions in force structure have resulted in excess 

depot maintenance capacity across Air Force depots, 

The recommended realignments will consolidate 

production lines and move workload to a minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction 

of personnel, infrastructure, and other costs. The 

net effect of the realignments is to transfer 

approximately 3.5 million direct labor hours and 

to eliminate 37 product lines across the five 

depots. These actions will allow the Air Force to 

demolish or mothball facilities, or to make them 

available for use by other agencies. These consolidations will reduce excess capacity, enhance efficiencies, and produce substantial cost savings 

without the extraordinary one-time costs associated with closing a single depot. 

This action is part of a broader Air Force effort to 

downsize, reduce depot capacity and infrastructure, and acheve cost savings in a financially prudent manner consistent with mission requirements. 

Programmed work reductions, downsizing 

through contracting or transfer to other Service 

depots, and the consolidation of workloads recommended above result in the reduction of real 

property infrasmcture equal to 1.5 depots, and a 

reduction in manhour capacity equivalent to about 

two depots. The proposed moves also make available over 25 million cubic feet of space to the 

Defense Logistics Agency for storage and other 

purposes, plus space to accept part of the Defense 

Nuclear Agency and other displaced Air Force 

missions. This approach enhances the cost effectiveness of the overall Department of Defense’s 

closure and realignment recommendations. The 

downsizing of all depots is consistent with DoD 

efforts to reduce excess maintenance capacity, 

reduce cost, improve efficiency of depot management, and increase contractor support for DoD 

requirements. 

TINKER 

Impacts Assuming no economic recovery, this 

recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,040 jobs (1,180 direct jobs and 

1,860 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period 

in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Metropolitan 

Statistical Area, which is 0.5 percent of the economic area’s employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations 

and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic 

area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a 

maximum potential decrease equal to 0.3 percent 

of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and 

ongoing restoration of Tinker AFB will continue. 

ROBINS 

Impacts: Assuming no economic recovery, this 

recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,168 jobs (534 direct jobs and 

634 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in 

the Macon, Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Area, 

which is 0.7 percent of the economic area’s employment. The cumulative economic impact of all 

BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round 

BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994- 

to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.7 percent of employment 

in the economic area. Environmental impact from 

this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of 

Robins AFB will continue. 

KELLY 

Impacts Assuming no economic recovery, this 

recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,446 jobs (555 direct jobs and 

891 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in 

the San Antonio, Texas Metropolitan Statistical 

Area, which is 0.2 percent of the economic area’s 

employment. The cumulative economic impact of 

all BRAC 95 recommendations, including the relocation of some Air Force activities into the San 

Antonio area, and all prior-round BRAC actions in 

the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period 

could result in a maximum potential decrease 

equal to 0.9 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action 

is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue. 

1-112 CHAPTER I 
McCLELLAN and HILL 

Impacts: The recommendations pertaining to 

consolidations of workloads at these two centers 

are not anticipated to result in employment losses 

or significant environmental impact. 

Community Concerns 

Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio 

The Kelly Community has not expressed an 

objection to the DoD plan to downsize all 5 

Air Force depots. 

McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, California 

The original DoD recommendation would result 

in a net gain of 14 personnel. The Air Force 

revised its BRAC recommendations several 

times; the final iteration would result in a loss 

of 521 personnel from the depot. The original 

BRAC recommendation would have singlesited instrument work at McClellan. The 

revised BRAC recommendation would locate 

the instrument work at two other depots. The 

community points out that the revised BRAC 

recommendation is at odds with Air Force 

policy to single site depot work. 

Robins Air Force Base, Macon Georgia 

The Secretary of Defense recommendations 

would result in the reduction of depot workload. 

The community notes that this reduction 

would be in addition to many years of 

downsizing of the Air Force depot system. 

The DoD BRAC recommendation threatens to 

make Robins inefficient and non-competitive 

because overhead costs remain relatively 

unchanged while the amount of depot work 

will be reduced. 

Hill Air Force Base - Ogden, titah 

The community argued that realignment of 

Hill Air Force Base as recoininended Iiy the 

Department of Defense assumes a 15 percent 

savings from reengineering which might be 

difficult to achieve. They questioned how 

mothballing unneeded buildings \vould save 

money. The community strongly believes 

the Ogden Air Logistics Center should be 

considered as a receiver for the consolidated 

tactical missile maintenance workload, in 

the event the Letterkenny Army Depot is 

realigned or closed. 

Tinker Air Force Baser Oklahoma City, Oklahomn 

The community questioned how mothballing 

unneeded buildings, as required by the 

Department of Defense recommendation. 

would save money. The community ~ilso 

objected to Tinker's depot work being 

transfered to lower tiered depots. Tinker 

community officials strongly support transfer of aircraft and engine workload from 

other DoD facilities being studied for closure 

or realignment. 

Commission Findings 

See McClellan AFB, California and Kelly AFH, 

Texas. 

Commission Recommendation 

Commission rejects DoD's downsizing proposal. 

See McClellan AFB, California and Kelly AFH, 

Texas. 

COMMISSIOK FIXDINGS AND R 1-113 ECOMMENDATIONS 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 

Defense Contract Management District 

West (DCMDW), El Segundo, Wornia 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Peqorm contract administration 

services for DOD organizations and 

other US. Government agencies 

Onetime Cost: $10.3 million 

Savings: 19962001: $I 0.9 million 

Annual: $4.2 million 

Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate) 

FINAL AClTON: Redirect 

Secretaly of Defense Recommendation 

This is a redirect of the following BRAC 93 Commission recommendation: “Relocate the Defense 

Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, 

California, or space obtained from exchange of 

land for space between the Navy and the Port 

Authority/City of Long Beach.” The current recommendation is expanded to read: Relocate the 

DCMD, El Segundo, California, (a) to Government 

property in the Los AngeledLong Beach area, or, 

(b) to space obtained from exchange of land 

between the Navy and Port AuthorityKity of Long 

Beach, or (c) to a purchased office building, 

whichever is the most cost-effective for DoD. 

Secretary of Defense Jwtijkation 

The Defense Contract Management District West is 

currently located in GSA-leased administrative 

space in El Segundo, California. The BRAC 93 

Commission found it was cost effective for DCMD 

West to move from leased space to DoD-owned 

property. The Navy has been involved in exploratory discussions on behalf of DLA. However, the 

President’s Five-Point Revitalization Plan, which 

affords communities the opportunity to obtain 

installations without substantial compensation, has 

significantly impacted the Navy’s ability to consummate a land exchange at Long Beach with the 

Port AuthorityKity of Long Beach. The Long 

Beach Naval Shipyard, another option, has been 

placed on the BRAC 95 list for closure. 

In order to attain the significant savings which will 

result by moving the organization into DoD space, 

the BRAC 93 recommendation is revised/ 

expanded. This redirect eliminates the cost of a 

warehouse and reflects the requirement for 

reduced administrative space. This recommendation is consistent with the DCMC Concept of 

Operations and the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found the proposed change in 

the 1993 Commission recommendation involving 

Defense Contract Management District West 

would provide the DLA the flexibility to acquire 

suitable facilities at the least cost to Don. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-stnicture plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: This is a 

redirect of the following BRAC 93 Commission 

recommendation: “Relocate the Defense Contract 

Management District, El Segundo, California, to 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard] Los Angeles, California, or space obtained from exchange of land for 

space between the Navy and the Port Authority/ 

City of Long Beach.” The current recommendation 

is expanded to read: Relocate the DCMD, El 

Segundo, California, (a) to Government property 

in the Los AngeledLong Beach area, or, (b) to 

space obtained from exchange of land between 

the Navy and the Port AuthorityKity of Long 

Beach, or (c) to a purchased office building, 

whichever is the most cost-effective for DoD. 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan 

(DDMC), Sacramento, California 

Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of tbe 

military sewices 

Onetime Cost: $13.6 million * 

Savings: 1996-2001: $30.6 million* 

Annual: $13.4 million* 

Return on Investment: I998 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablisb 

* Also included in McClellan Air Force Base, 

California costs and savings. 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a pro1-114 CHAPTER 1 
posed change to the list of recoininendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

See McClellan Air Force Base, California. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission recommended closing the Sacramento Air Logistics Center. Because the Sacramento 

Air Logistics Center was the principal customer of 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, the Commission found the distribution depot was no 

longer required and should be disestablished. 

Although disestablishment of the distribution 

depot increased the storage shortfall for the DLA, 

the Commission believes that DLA will be able to 

accommodate this shortfall via other public and 

private storage facilities. 

Commission Recommendation 

See McClellan Air Force Base, California. 

Defense Contract Management District 

South (DCMDS), Marietta, Georgia 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Perform contract administration 

services for DoD organizations and other 

US. Government agencies 

One-time Cost: $3.8 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $1 7.9 million 

Annual: $6 1 million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish DCMD South and relocate missions to 

DCMD Northeast and DCMD West. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Contract Management Districts provide command and control, operational support, and management oversight for 90 Defense Contract 

Management Area Operations (DCMAOs) and 

Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) 

located throughout the continental United States. 

Due to the impact of the DoD Force-Structure 

drawdown, budget cuts and the resulting decline 

in acquisition workload, a number of Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices 

have been disestablished thereby reducing the 

span of control responsibility at the Districts. As 

the drawdown continues, the number of Area 

0 p e ra t i ons 0 ff i ce s ;i nd 1’1 ant Rep resent at i ve 

Offices is expected to decline even further. Based 

on the above, the closure of a district and realignment of assigned Area Operations Offices and 

Plant Representative Offices to the remaining two 

districts is feasible with only a moder:ite risk. 

Although the difference between second and third 

place was not sufficiently broad to dictate 21 clear 

decision by itself, DCMD South received the lowest military value score. 

Military judgnient determined that a single contract 

management district presence on each coast is necessary. A west coast district is required because of 

the high dollar value of contracts and the significant weapon-systems related \vorkload located on 

the west coast. 

There is a higher concentration of workload in the 

northeast, in terms of span of control, field personnel provided support services, numhers of 

contractors, and value of contract dollars obligated, than in the south. In addition, the northeast 

district supports its Area Operations Offices and 

Plant Representative Offices with a lower ratio of 

headquarters to field personnel than DCMD South. 

On the east copst, due to the higher concentration 

of workload in DCMD Northeast, as well as its 

significantly higher military value score, there is a 

clear indication that DCMD South is the 

disestablishment candidate. As a result, the BKAC 

Executive Group recommended to the DLA Director, and he approved, the disestablishment of 

DCMD South. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends that the trend is for 

companies to move their operations from northern 

to southern locations. Therefore, closing the Contract Management District in Marietta will result in 

dramatically increased travel costs for the remaining two District Offices in Boston and Los Angeles. They argued that these increased costs were 

not considered by DLA in the cost-to-close computations. The community further contended that 

current information management systems are not 

capable of handling the additional workload of 

the two remaining offices. The community recommended that DLA maintain three snialler and 

leaner Defense Contract Management District 

Offices. The comniunity believes this approach 

would provide better service to the customer. 

COMMISSION FIXDINGS AND RECO~~MENDATIONS 1-115 
Commission Findings 

The Commission found consolidating the Defense 

Contract Management Districts from three to two 

districts was a reasonable approach to increasing 

management efficiencies. The Commission also 

found the quantity of the assigned workloads, 

geographical locations, and other factors analyzed 

supported the Secretary’s recommendation. Once 

the consolidation is completed, DLA will realize 

$6.1 million per year steady-state savings with no 

mission degradation. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish 

DCMD South and relocate missions to DCMD 

Northeast and DCMD West. 

Defense Contract Management Command 

International (DCMCI), Dayton, Ohio 

Category: Command and Control 

Mission: Perform command and control for 

13 overseas Defense Contract Management 

Area Operations oflices outside the 

continental United States 

One-time Cost $3. I million 

Savings: 19962001: $8.7 million 

Annual: $3. I million 

Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year) 

FINAL ACTION: Realign 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign the DCMCI (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, 

and merge its mission into the Defense Contract 

Management Command Headquarters (DCMC HQ), 

Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. 

Secreta y of DefenseJaMjication 

The mission of the DCMCI is to provide command 

and control, including operational and management control and oversight, for 13 overseas Defense 

Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO) 

offices located outside of the continental United 

States. The Command’s mission could be performed from any locality. Military judgment concluded that merging the mission with the 

headquarters affords the opportunity to capitalize 

on operational and management oversight and to 

maximize use of shared overhead with DCMC. It 

also affords the opportunity to take advantage of 

the close proximity to the State Department and 

the international support infrastructure in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. This decision 

is consistent with DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules, 

the DCMC Concept of Operations and the ForceStructure Plan. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found merging Defense Contract 

Management Command International’s mission 

into the Defense Contract Management Command 

Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was an effective method to increase efficiency and reduce 

costs. Moving this Command to Fort Belvoir capitalizes on this location’s close proximity to the 

State Department and the international support 

infrastructure in Washington, D.C., which is vital 

to the Commands mission. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission frnds the Secretary of Defense did 

not deviate substantially from the force-structure 

plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission 

recommends the following: realign the DCMCI 

(Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and merge its mission 

into the Defense Contract Management Command 

Headquarters (DCMC HQ), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus 

(DDCO), Columbus, Ohio 

Category: Distribution DepotsStand-Alone Depots 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of the 

milita y services 

One-time Cost: $7.9 million 

Savings: 19962001: $51.2 million 

Annual: $11.6 million 

Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate) 

FINAL ACl7ON: Realign 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

Realign the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, 

Ohio, and designate it as a storage site for slow 

movindwar reserve material. Active material 

remaining at DDCO at the time of realignment 

will be atuited. Stock replenishment will be stored 

in optimum space within the distribution system. 

1-116 CHAPTER 1 
Secreta y of Defense Justification 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, is a StandAlone Depot that supports the two large east/west 

coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. The decision to realign 

the Columbus depot was based on storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and the 

need to comply with BRAC 95 Decision Rules. 

Columbus ranked sixth of six depots in military 

value for the Stand-Alone Depot category. 

The other Stand-Alone Depots were not considered for realignment for the following reasons. 

The higher military value of both the Susquehanna 

(DDSC) and San Joaquin (DDJC) depots removed 

them from consideration for closure or realignment. The Richmond Depot (DDRV) was not 

selected for realignment because of the large 

amount of conforming hazardous material storage 

space, new construction and mechanization, and 

collocation with supply center, which has the best 

maintained facilities of any in DLA. Both the 

Ogden and Memphis distribution depots were 

selected for closure. 

The decision to realign rather than close the 

Columbus depot was based on the need for inactive storage capacity in the overall system and 

with the long-range intent of minimizing use of 

this site as storage requirements decline. Moving 

highly active stock to San Joaquin and Susquehanna 

will allow DLA to take advantage of economies of 

scale from large distribution operations. The decision was also based on the further consideration 

that Columbus, the highest ranking DIA location 

in the Installation Military Value analysis, will 

remain open and most likely expand its operations, thereby allowing DLA to maximize the use 

of shared overhead and optimize the use of 

retained DLA-operated facilities. In addition, the 

Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems 

(SAILS) model favored the retention of Columbus 

over either Ogden or Memphis. Realigning the 

Columbus depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 

95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of 

Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in 

the best interest of DLA and DoD to realign DDCO. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the 

community. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found realigning the Defense 

Distribution Depot Columbus to a storage site for 

slow moving/war reserve material was costeffective and efficient. Redesignating the distribution depot was consistent with the reduced 

requirement for storage capacity and the need to 

provide a low cost alternative for siting slow moving/war reserve material. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio, and 

designate it as a storage site for slow moving/war 

reserve material. Active material remaining at 

DDCO at the time of realignment will be attrited. 

Stock replenishment will be stored in optimum 

space within the distribution system. 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny 

(DDLP), Chambersburg, Pennsylvania 

Categoty: Distribution Depots - Collocated 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of DLA 

and the military services 

One-time Cost: $44.9 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $-21.2 million (Cost) 

Annual: $12.4 million 

Return on Investment: 2003 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Disestablish 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at 

DDLP at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, 

Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space 

within the DoD Distribution System. 

Secreta y of Defense Justification 

The Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny is 

collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its 

largest customer. While Collocated Depots may 

support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Letterkenny’s 

primary function is to provide rapid response in 

support of the maintenance operation. The Distri- 
bution Concept of Operations states that DLA’s 

distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are 

disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be 

disestablished. 

The recommendation to disestablish the 

Letterkenny depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign Letterkenny Army Depot, 

Letterkenny’s primary customer, and the Agency’s 

need to reduce infrastructure. The Letterkenny depot was rated 3 of 17 in the Collocated Depot 

military value matrix. However, that military value 

ranking was based on support to the maintenance 

missions. With the realignment of the Army’s 

maintenance mission to the Anniston Army Depot 

that value decreases significantly. Other customers 

within the Letterkenny area can be supported 

from nearby distribution depots. Production and 

physical space requirements can also be met by 

fully utdizing other depots in the distribution system. 

Disestablishing DDLP is consistent with both the 

DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution 

Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and 

DoD to disestablish DDLP. 

Community Concerns 

See Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission recommended realigning 

Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed 

and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to 

Anniston Army Depot, Alabama. Because the 

Letterkenny Army Depot was the principal customer of Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, 

the Commission found the distribution depot was 

no longer required and should be disestablished. 

Although disestablishment of the distribution 

depot increased the storage shortfall for DLA, the 

Commission believes that DLA will be able to 

accommodate this shortfall via other public and 

private storage facilities. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission fiids the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: 

disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at 

DDLP at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, 

Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space 

within the DoD Distribution System. 

Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

Catego y: Invent0 y Control Point 

Mission: Provide wholesale support of 

One-time Cost: $55. I million 

Savings: 19962001: $21.2 million 

Annual: $18.4 million 

Return on Investment: 2000 (I year) 

FINAI. ACTION: Disestablish 

industrial type items to the milita y services 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

The Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. Distribute the management of Federal Supply Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA 

Inventory Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for 

the management of troop and general support 

items at the Defense Personnel Support Center 

(DPSC) in Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for 

the management of weapon system-related FSCs 

at the Defense Construction Supply Center 

(DCSC), Columbus, Ohio and the Defense General 

Supply Center (DGSC), hchmond, Virginia. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Four of the five Inventory Control Points manage 

differing mixes of weapon system, troop support, 

and general support items. Troop and general 

support items largely have different industry and 

customer bases than weapon system items. They 

are also more conducive to commercial support, 

and are thus managed differently than weapon 

system items. Consolidating management of items 

by the method of management required will 

improve oversight, streamline the supply management process, increase internal efficiency, and 

reduce overhead. 

DLA manages nearly five times as many weapon 

system items as troop and general support items. 

A single troop and general support ICP is adequate, 

but two weapon system ICPs are necessary. DPSC 

is almost entirely a troop support ICP. No other 

ICP currently manages troop support items. The 

percentage of general support items at other ICPs 

is relatively small. Singling-up troop and general 

support items under DPSC management is the 

most logical course of action. 

1-118 CIIAPTER 1 
DISC had the lowest military value of the three 

hardware ICPs. The Columbus and Richmond tenters are host activities of compounds which house 

a number of DLA and non-DLA activities, conforming to the DLA decision rules concerning 

maximizing the use of shared overhead and tnaking optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities. Both the Kichmontl and Columbus sites have 

high installation military value, and take advantage of the synergy of a Collocated Depot. Both 

also have considerable expmsion capability. The 

facilities at Columbus are the best maintained of 

any in DLA, and Richmond has several new buildings completed or in progress. DISC is ;I tenant on 

a Navy compound. Disestabhhing DISC allows 

the Agency to achieve a substantial cost avoidance 

hy back-filling the space already occupied by 

DISC and substantially reducing the amount of 

conversion required to existing warehouse space. 

Based on the above, military judgment concluded 

that disestablishing DISC is in the best interest of 

DLA and IhD. 

Com m u n ity Concerns 

The Philadelphia community contends disestablishing the Defense Industrial Supply Center 

(DISC) and moving its ueapon system coded 

items to the Defense General Supply Center 

(DGSC) would have a negative impact on military 

readiness. They reasoned that moving 1.4 million 

items over a relatively short period of time would 

substantially degrade performance for customers. 

They cited past experience where moving fewer 

items caused mission degradation. The community 

asserted that during the 1993 round of base closures, DLA determined that a inass movement of 

items would be risky. The community believes 

nothing has happened since BKAC 93 to minimize 

this risk. The community further contended that 

DISC, and not DGSC, should be the weapons 

system Inventory Control Point because DISC 

has a higher percentage of weapon system items 

than DGSC, and is better able to perform the 

complex work involved. 

The community also argued that the cost savings 

were understated because the actual costs to 

move the items and the cost to keep Defense 

Personnel Support Center (DPSC) at its current 

location for an additional two years, while awaiting movement of personnel and items to IIGSC, 

were not included in the COBRA costs. In addition, they believe that the synergy between the 

Navy‘s AvkdtiOn Supply Office and DISC, which 

was recognized by the Navy during BRAC 95, was 

ignored by DLA. Finally, the community was concerned because disestahlishinent of DISC did not 

preserve job retention rights even though DLA 

assured employees in writing that maximum efforts would be exerted to ensure placements in 

the Philadelphia area. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found DLA’s Concept of Operations to consolidate management of weapon system and troop and general support items was a 

rational approach to increase management efficiencies and achieve significant annual savings. 

Moreover, the Commission found that disestablishing DISC allowed DLA to distribute item management responsibility among three geographically 

separated Inventory Control Points, two dedicated 

to weapon system 1nan:igernent and one to troop 

and general support management. Pursuing this 

option also allowed DLA to achieve a substantial 

cost avoidance by back-filling space presently 

occupied by DISC with the new Troop and General Support Inventory Control Point without substantial building modification. In addition, the 

Commission believes DLA should ameliorate job 

losses at DISC by offering displaced employees 

positions at the new Troop and General Support 

Inventory Control Point. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: the 

Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. 

Distribute the management of Federal Supply 

Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA Inventory 

Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for the management of troop and general support items at the 

Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in 

Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for the management of weapon system-related FSCs at the 

Defense Construct ion S u p p 1 y Center ( DC S C ) , 

Columbus, OH and the Defense General Supply 

Center (DGSC), Richmond. VA. 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis 

Category: Distribution Depots - Stand-Alone 

Mission: Receiue, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of the 

militav services 

(DDMT), Memphis, Tennessee 
One-time CosP $85.7 million 

Savings: 199G2001: $14.8 million 

Annual: $23.8 million 

Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee. Material remaining at DDMT at the time of 

closure will be relocated to optimum storage 

space within the DoD Distribution System. As a 

result of the closure of DDMT, all DLA activity will 

cease at this location and DDMT will be excess to 

DLA needs. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, is a StandAlone Depot that supports the two large east and 

west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. It is also 

the host for the Memphis complex. The decision 

to close the Memphis depot was based on declining storage requirements and capacity estimates 

for FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure 

within the Agency. 

Memphts tied for third place out of the six StandAlone Depots in the military value analysis. The 

higher scores for the Susquehanna and San 

Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed 

them from further consideration for closure. The 

variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 

between the third and sixth place depots in the 

military value analysis for this category reinforced 

the importance of military judgment and compliance with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules in the 

decision-making process. 

A further consideration was the Agency’s desire to 

minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure 

of an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce 

infrastructure significantly more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, 

Ohio, and DDRV at Richmond, Virginia). Memphis 

was rated six out of six in the Installation Military 

Value analysis. The Columbus installation ranked 

the highest. The facilities at Richmond are the best 

maintained of any in DLA. Both Columbus and 

Richmond take advantage of the synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. This closure 

action conforms to the Decision Rules to maximize the use of shared overhead and make optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities, 

while closing an installation. 

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated 

Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized systemwide costs for distribution when the Ogden and 

Memphis depots were the two Stand-Alone Depots 

chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage capacity are available in the remaining depots 

to accommodate projected workload and storage 

requirements. Closing DDMT is consistent with 

the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Therefore, military 

judgment determined that it is in the best interest 

of DLA and DoD to close DDMT. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends that DLA should retain 

the Distribution Depot at Memphis because of its 

excellent infrastructure. The Memphis area is 

known as “America’s Distribution Center.” The 

depot is located near major highways, rail, air, 

and shipping facilities, and has never been closed 

due to weather. The community was dismayed 

that weather factors were considered during DLA’s 

BRAC 93 analysis, but not in BRAC 95. Because of 

these factors, the community argued that the 

depot is strategically sited to support any major 

regional conflict. This support would be especially 

vital if support for two simultaneous regional conflicts was required. The community contends that 

closure of both the Memphis and Ogden Depots 

was predetermined when DLA (1) combined the 

Tracy and Sharpe Depots into the San Joaquin, 

California Depot and the New Cumberland and 

Mechanicsburg Depots into the Susquehanna, 

Pennsylvania Depot, effectively removing them 

from further BRAC consideration; (2) determined 

it would maintain a distribution presence at service maintenance facilities; and (3) performed an 

installation military value analysis. The community 

argued that military value had not been properly 

assessed because DLA removed tenant missions, 

all depots were given equal credit for rail and 

surface capabilities, proper consideration was not 

given for consolidated containerization capabilities, and throughput capacity was underestimated. 

Finally, the community argued closure of the 

depot would impact the minority community disproportionately since approximately 80% of the 

Depot’s employees are African-Americans. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that force-structure reductions had resulted in a corresponding decrease in 

DoD’s storage requirements. Moreover, the Com1-120 CHAPTER 1 
mission found the distribution depots designated 

as primary distribution sites on the east and west 

coasts provide sufficient mobilization support. 

Therefore, the Commission found closing Defense 

Distribution Depot Memphis would reduce both 

overall excess capacity and infrastructure within 

the Defense Ilistribution Depot system and, at the 

same time. yield significant cost savings. The 

Commission recognizes the adverse economic 

impact on the Memphis African-American cornmunity. Although closure of the distribution depot 

increases the storage shortfall for the IILA, the 

Commission believes that DLA will be able to 

accommodate this shortfall via other public and 

private storage facilities. The Commission believes 

leasing space in the local area is a viable option for 

accommodating any short or long-term shortfall. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: close 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee. 

Material remaining at DDMT at the time of closure 

will he relocated to optimum storage space within 

the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the 

closure of DDMT, all DLA activity will cease at this 

location and DDMT will be excess to DLA needs. 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River 

Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of the 

military services 

One-time Cost: None 

Savings: 19962001: None 

Annual: None 

Return on Investment: None 

FINAL ACTION: Remain Open 

(DDRT), Texarkana, Texas 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Red 

River, Texas. Material remaining at DDRT at the 

time of disestablishment will be relocated to the 

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama, 

(DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the 

Don Distribution System. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Defense 1)istribution Depot Red River is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its largest customer. While Collocated Ikpots iilay support other nearby customers and provide limited 

world-wide distribution support, Red River's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The 

Distribution Concept of Operations states that 

DLA's distribution system will support the size and 

config-uration of the Defense Depot Maintenance 

System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are 

disestab-lished, Collocated Depots will also be 

disestablished. 

The recommendation to disestablish the Red River 

depot was driven by the Army recommendation to 

realign its Red Kiver Army Depot, lied River's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce 

infrastructure. DDRT was rated 5 of 17 in the 

Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, 

that military value ranking was based on support 

to the maintenance m ions. With the realignment 

of the Army's maintenance mission to Anniston. 

Alabama, that value decreases significantly. Other 

customers within the DDRT xea can be supported 

from nearby distribution depots. I'rotluction and 

physical space requirements can also be met by 

fully utilizing other depots in the clistribution system. 

Disestablishing DDRT is consistent with both the 

DLA RRAC 95 Decision Kules and the Distribution 

Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLL4 and 

DoD to disestablish DDKT. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends that because 85% of the 

depot's mission is to provide support to lxises in 

the central United States rather than the Army 

Depot, Defense Distribution Depot Red Kiver 

should have been evaluated as a Stand-Alone 

Depot. The community argued that elimination of 

the depot would deprive Don of storage facilities 

to accoinniodate surge requirements in times of 

national crisis. They further raised concerns over 

the efficiency and cost effectiveness of niaint:iining only two primary stand-alone distribution 

facilities in San Joaquin, California and 

Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. In addition, the conimunity contended that DLA had overstated the 

savings and understated the costs for this action. 

The community asserted that the cost to relocate 

the vehicles and other material located at the 

depot was $319 million, significantly above DLA's 

figure of $58.9 million. The community's figure 

would make the return on investment for this 

action 22 years, not 2 years as calculated by DLA. 

COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-121 
The community further asserted that the depot’s 

preservation/packaging and support of rubber 

products mission was not considered in DLA’s 

analysis. A storage capability would still be 

required because these missions will remain at 

Red River. Finally, the community argued that 

closing both the Army and the Distribution Depot 

would be economically devastating to the community, because this facility is the largest 

employer in the area. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission recommended that the Red River 

Army Depot be realigned and that maintenance 

missions related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

Series be retained. In addition, the Commission 

recommended retention of the Rubber Production 

Facility and other activities supported by the 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River. The Commission found, therefore, the Defense Distribution 

Depot Red River, which provided principal support to the Red River Army Depot, was required 

and should remain open. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: 

the Defense Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT) 

remains open and is not disestablished. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent 

with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio 

(DDST), San Antonio, Texas 

Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail matenal in support of the 

military services 

Onetime Cost: $22.1 million * 

Savings: 19962001: $32.7 million * 

Annual: $18.5 million* 

Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate) 

FIN& ACTION: L)rj’establish 

* Also included in Kelly Air Force Base, 

Texas costs and savings. 

Secreta y of Defense Recommendation 

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the 

Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense. 

Community Concerns 

See Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission recommended closing the San 

Antonio Air Logistics Center and consolidating its 

maintenance function among the remaining Air 

Logistics Centers or the private sector. Because the 

San Antonio Air Logistics Center was the principal 

customer of Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, the Commission found the distribution depot 

was no longer required and should be 

disestablished. Although disestablishment of the 

distribution depot increases the storage shortfall 

for the DLA, the Commission believes that DLA 

will be able to accommodate this shortfall via 

other public and private storage facilities. 

Commission Recommendation 

See Kelly Air Force Base, Texas. 

Defense Distribution Depot ogden 

(DDOU), Ogden, Utah 

Category: Distribuiion Depots - Stand-Alone 

Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale 

and retail material in support of the 

military services 

One-time Cost: $1 10.8 million 

Savings: 19962001: $-28.0 million (Cost) 

Return on Investment: 2003 (4 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Close 

Annual: $21.3 million 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Close Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah, 

except for a 36,000 square foot cantonment for 

Army Reserve personnel. Material remaining at 

DDOU at the time of closure will be relocated to 

optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDOU, 

all DLA activity will cease at this location and 

DDOU will be excess to DLA needs. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The Defense Distribution Depot Ogden is a StandAlone Depot that supports the two large east and 

west coast depots and is used primarily for stor1-122 CHAPTEK 1 
age capability and local area demand. It is also 

the host for the Ogden complex. The decision to 

close the Ogden depot was based on declining 

storage requirements and capacity estimates for 

FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure 

within the Agency. 

Ogden tied for third place out of the six StandAlone Depots in the military value analysis. The 

higher scores for the Susquehanna and San 

Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed 

them from further consideration for closure. The 

variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 

between the third and sixth place depots in military value ranking for this category reinforced the 

importance of compliance with the DLA RRAC 

95 Decision Kules and military judgment in the 

decision-making process. 

A further consideration was DLA’s desire to minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure of 

an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce 

infrastructure significantly more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, 

Ohio. and DDRV at Richmond, Virginia). The 

Ogden depot was rated five of six in the Military 

Value Installation analy The Columbus installation ranked the highest. The Facilities at Richmond 

are the best maintained of any in DLA. Both 

Columbus and Richmond take advantage of the 

synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. 

This action conforms to the DLA Decision Rules to 

maximize the use of shared overhead and make 

optimum use of retained DLA-operated fac 

while closing an installation. 

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated 

Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized systemwide costs for Distribution when Ogden and 

Memphis were the two Stand-Alone Depots chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage 

capacity are available in the remaining depots to 

accommodate projected workload. Closing the 

Ogden depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 

Decision Kules and the Distribution Concept of 

Operations. Military judgment determined that it is 

in the best interest of DIA and DoD to close DDOU. 

Community Concerns 

The community contends the closure of the 

Ogden Depot was predetermined when DLA combined the Tracy and Sharpe Depots into the San 

Joaquin, California Depot and the New 

Cumberland and Mechanicsburg Depots into the 

Susquehanna, Pennsylvania Depot, and designated then1 both as primary distrihution sites, 

effectively removing them from further RKAC consideration. The community argued th:lt each of the 

depots should have lieen treated separately and 

equally. The community further contended that 

Ogden is DLA’s most cost efficient depot. They 

argued that DLA did not recognize the Ogden 

Depot as the most efficient operation in the DLA 

D i s t r i b u t io n S y s t e 111, The c onini 11 nit y f 11 rt h e r 

asserted that the shipping costs from the Ogden 

Depot are lower than from the San Joaquin, California Depot. In addition, they argued that the 

supplier destination costs would increase as items 

shipped from east coast suppliers would have to 

pass the Ogden area for storage at the San 

Joaquin Depot, only to be reissued to Ii:ises located east of the San Joaquin Depot. The cotiiiiiunity also argued that since any depot can perform 

the functions of a Consolidated Containerization 

Point, no points should have been given for this 

capability. DLA gave such points only to those 

depots currently performing the function (San 

Joaquin and Susquehanna Depots). The community also asserted that DLA underestimated the 

depot‘s throughput capacity. did not consider all 

of its tenants in the installation military value 

analysis, and did not consider the Army’s desire to 

retain the deployable medical systems (IIEPMEDS) 

mission at Ogden. 

Commission Findings 

The Commission found that force-structure reductions had resulted in ;I corresponding decrease in 

DoD’s storage requirements. Moreover, the Commission found the distribution depots designated 

as primary distribution sites on the east and west 

coasts provide sufficient mobilization support. 

Therefore, the Commission found closing Defense 

Distribution Depot Ogden (DDOLJ) would reduce 

both overall excess capacity and infrastructure 

within the Defense Distribution Depot system and. 

at the same time, yield significant cost savings. 

The Commission found, however, that the 

Deployable Medical Systems mission performed 

by DDOU for the Army was essential to military 

readiness and should remain. as requested by the 

Executive Agent (US Army). in the Ogden area. 

Moreover, the Commission found that the Army 

Reserve requirement at DDOU 

the 36,000 sq. ft. identified in the Don recommendation. In fact, the Army Reserve notified the 

Commission that the requirement. although not 

exactly determined , m-a s s 11 Iis t;i n t i ;I 11 y :I Iio ve 
36,000 sq. ft. Although closure of the distribution 

depot increases the storage shortfall for the DLA, 

the Commission believes that DLA will be able to 

accommodate this shortfall via other public and 

private storage facilities. The Commission believes 

leasing space in the local area is a viable option for 

accommodating any short or long-term shortfall. 

Commission Recommendation 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 3. 

Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, 

Utah except for minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave. Material 

remaining at DDOU at the time of closure will be 

relocated to optimum storage space within the 

DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure 

of DDOU, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDOU will be excess to DLA needs. The 

Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria. 

1-124 CHAP’IER 1 
Defense Investigative Service (DIS) 

Investigations Control and Automation 

Directorate, Fort Holabird, 

Baltimore, Maryland 

Category: Investigations Control and 

Automation 

Mission: Receives and controls all requests 

for investigations and maintains all 

investigative records 

One-time Cost: $1 1.1 million 

Savings: 1996-2001: $45 million (Cost) 

Annual: $0.5 million 

Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years) 

FINAL ACTION: Relocate 

Secretary of Defense Recommendation 

Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), 

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate 

(ICUD) from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a new 

facility to he built on Fort Meade, Maryland. This 

proposal is a revision to the 1988 Base Closure 

Commission’s recommendation to retain the 

Defense Investigative Service at Fort Holabird. 

Once DIS vacates the building on Fort Holabird, 

the base will be vacant. 

Secretary of Defense Justification 

The ICMD is located in Building 320, a Korean 

War-era building. The building is in disrepair and 

continues to deteriorate costing over $0.3 million 

in repairs since FY 1991 in addition to the annual 

Interservice Support Agreement cost of approximately $0.4 million. A recent Corps of Engineers 

(COE) Building Analysis indicated that the cost to 

bring the building up to code and to correct the 

environmental deficiencies would cost DIS 

approximately $9.1 million based on current space 

requirements. A military construction project on 

Fort Meade based on 1998 DIS force-structure is 

estimated to cost $9.4 million. 

Community Concerns 

There were no formal expressions from the community. 

Cornmission Findings 

The Commission found it was cost effective to 

move DIS’s Investigations Control and Automation 

Directorate to new facilities on Fort Meade, Maryland, rather than renovate its current facilities on 

Fort Holabird or move into leased space. The 

Commission also found that moving the organization to Fort Meade would improve the work environment, enhance security, and maintain a 

knowledgeable work force. These factors are all 

consistent with DoD policy. 

Commission Reco m menda ti0 n 

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense 

did not deviate substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the 

Commission recommends the following: relocate 

the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (ICMD) 

from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a new facility to 

be built on Fort Meade, Maryland. This proposal is 

a revision to the 1988 Base Closure Commission’s 

recommendation to retain the Defense Investigative Service at Fort Holabird. Once DIS vacates the 

building on Fort Holabird, the base will be vacant. 

COMMlSSIOV FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-125 
ASE CLOSURE ! 

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990 provides the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission the statutory authority to review 

and analyze recommendations from the Secretary 

of Defense for base closures and realignments. After 

six years of base closings (the 1988 round under 

Public Law 100-526, and the 1991 and 1993 rounds 

under the current law), the Commission has 

accumulated much information, heard many 

suggestions, and learned many lessons about 

how the Federal government can more effectively 

assist communities affected by base closures to 

recover from the economic consequences of a 

base closure. 

The Commission believes that in addition to 

making recommendations to close or realign military bases during the 1995 round, it is also appropriate to undertake two other tasks not mandated 

in its charter. These tasks are: 

1) to examine the current status of reuse programs and regulations; and, 

2) to make recommendations to the President, 

Congress, and communities for improving 

the Federal government’s performance in fostering a timely, successful transition of bases 

from military use to civilian reuse. 

This Commission will cease to exist, under current 

law, on December 31, 1995. The disruption visited 

upon hundreds of communities by its decisions, 

however, will continue for many years to come. 

The purpose of this section of the Commission’s 

report is to offer suggestions to improve the interaction among Federal, state, and local officials, as 

well as the private sector, that is so critical to 

economic development. 

OVERVIEW OF THE 

CURRENT REUSE PROCESS 

Key Elements 

In this report, “reuse” refers to the new use of 

a former military base intended for productive 

civilian activities. 

The Local Redevelopment Plan: Critical to the reuse 

process is a comprehensive redevelopment plan 

which contains various options the community 

intends to use to create jobs and effect economic 

recovery. The plan is developed by local community representatives who are recognized by the 

Department of Defense to carry out the redevelopment plan. The plan is also used as the basis for 

a federally required environmental impact analysis. 

Property Disposal Process: Normally, the General 

Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for 

Federal property disposal. Pursuant to statutory 

direction, however, the Administrator of GSA has 

delegated the authority to dispose of military facilities to the Secretary of Defense, who has redelegated the authority to the Secretaries of the 

military departments. 

Once the disposing military department determines it no longer needs to retain real property 

on a closing base, priority claims for use of the 

property go to DoD entities, and then to other 

federal agencies. If no federal agency requests the 

property, it is declared surplus. State and local 

governmental entities, including redevelopment 

authorities, may acquire the property through 

direct sales, public benefit conveyance, or economic development conveyance. 

LIFE AFTER BASE CLOSURE 

1 

.rr* c :. . 

. . .,. 
Transfers of property on those bases that wilI be 

closed under the 1995 Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC) process are exempted from claims 

on behalf of homeless care providers that receive 

priority in other Federal property transfers. Tram- fers of property at bases closed in previous BRAC 

rounds are also eligible for this alternate process if 

the local redevelopment authority opts for it. In 

such cases, a community reuse plan must balance 

the needs of the hlomeless with other community 

and economic development needs. 

Public Bene3t Conveyance IJnder a public benefrt 

conveyance, closing base property may be transferred by the disposing military department in 

conjunction with other Federal agencies, for use 

by the local community at minimal or no cost for 

certain specified purposes. Examples include 

property used for airports, parks, schools, health 

care, ports, or prisons. In many cases, the continued presence of significant public services or1 

former bases can provide an anchor to attract additional development. 

Economic Dmlopmvnt Conveyance. As an incen-. 

tive to provide immediate jobs and to speed up 

economic redevelopment, the disposing military 

department may sell or lease all or portions of the 

real property, eitheir at or below the fair market 

value, to a local redevelopment authority. 

The disposing military department may also negotiate terms and conditions of payment for the 

property with the local redevelopment authority, 

and may transfer the property with or without 

initial payment, or with only partial payment at 

the time of transfer. In addition, the property may 

be transferred for in-kind services, such as environmental restoration, or exchanged for other real 

property. Generally, DoD and the local redevelopment authority share any net profits in cases 

where property is conveyed without an lllitial cost 

and is subsequently Keased or sold. 

Enuimnmental Restoration: Environmental restoration of military bases is often the most difficult 

obstacle to civilian muse. A transfer of real property by deed cannot be made until environmental 

cleanup is completed, or a clean-up remedy is in 

place and operating successfully. As a result of 

this prohibition, leasing base closure property to 

communities and businesses in advance of transfer has become a co~mmon practice. It is a means 

of giving communities and businesses early access 

to the property so that they may begin the economic redevelopment process, 

In preparation for reuse, each major closing base 

has a BRAC cleanup team of experts from the 

DoD, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 

and the state regulatory agencies. The team is 

responsible for expediting and improving environmental response actions in order to facilitate disposal and reuse, while protecting human health 

and the environment. Generally, DoD does not 

accelerate cleanup if the property is not likely to 

be used by the community or another user. The 

team abo solicits public input on cleanup plans 

and on progress of the plans from community 

members of the local Restoration Advisory Boards. 

The DoD BRAC account is the exclusive source of 

funds for environmental restoration at closing 

bases. This account is funded by annual appropriations and by proceeds from the sale of base 

closure properties. According to DoD, as of March 

31, 1995, of the 252 military installations closed in 

the 1988, 1991, and 1993 BRAC rounds, there 

have been 24 negotiated or public sales (adding 

$69.4 million to the account), and three sales via 

economic development (adding $59.2 million to 

the account). 

The issues of air quality and the reduction of air 

pollutants present a unique problem for some 

communities that are impacted by base closures. 

Communities which do not meet Federal standards for air quality are required to reduce air 

emissions in state implementation plans under the 

Clean Air Act. 

Presently, there is no guarantee that the air emission credits available to the closing bases will be 

made available for reuse to the communities. The 

DoD may wish to retain the credits for its other 

installations in the same air district. This raises at 

least one major emission credits issue which continues to be unresolved: should air emission credits be retained for base reuse as personal 

property, or does DoD have priority claims on the 

credits and, therefore, may retain them for its own 

use elsewhere? At this writing, emissions trading 

rules have yet to be issued by DoD. 

Federal Agencies and Reuse 

Many Federal departments and agencies provide 

programs that in some way directly or indirectly 

impact reuse activities. Although not inclusive, the 

following provide some major reuse programs. 

2-2 CHAPTER 2 
The Department uf D#en.se is the primary agency 

for setting overall policies relating to reuse at closing bases. It has delegated the responsibility for 

transferring and leasing base closure properties to 

each of its militaiy departments. Thie DoD is also 

responsible for preparing environmental impact 

analyses, and for cleanup of contaminants at military bases. 

The DoD retains responsibility for cleaning up any 

contamination caused by Don that is d 

subsequent to transfer. It is not responsible, however, for cleanup of contaminants caused by future 

users. Additiona Ily, DoD indemnifies transferees 

(owners or leasees) for any damages caused by 

contamination associated with DoD ;activities. 

The DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) 

offers technical assistance to local communities on 

how to organize for reuse activities. It also provides limited economic development planning 

grants as transiticinal assistance. 

The Department of Commercek (DOC) Economic 

Development ,4dministration (EDA) provides 

grants to help communities implement comprehensive and innovative economic development 

strategies in response to base closures, including 

projects involving architectural and utility renovations, and overa 11 industrial developments. 

The Department cf Education (D0E:d) offers programs to certain former rmlitary and civilian personnel. 

The Department of the Interior (:DO11 ensures 

compliance with the Endangered Species Act. 

Many military bases have extensive wetland areas, 

and niany have wildlife habitats. 

The Department qf Labor (DOL) provides retraining services an’d other readjustment services to 

communities for defense workers, particularly 

civilians at closing bases. 

The Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA) is the 

regulatory agency that oversees DoD’s completion 

of environmental remedial investigations and feasibility studies, s,ets cleanup schedulies, and selects 

environmental riemedies for military bases on the 

National Priority List. The EPA concurs on DoD’s 

identification of uncontaminated ]property, and 

participates as a member of the EIRAC Cleanup 

Team at closing bases. 

The Federal Aviation Administrution (FAA) determines whether military airfield components are 

part of the Natil:inal Airspace System, and if -they 

should be retained within this system. The FAA 

also assists communities with design criteria and 

procedures when converting military airfields to 

civil wiation use. 

The Sm,all Business ,4dnaini.stration (SBA) provides loan guarantees and management and technical assistance to small businesses impacted by 

base closings. 

Leg islati2e and Adm in istn tize Cha rigs 

Affecting Reuse Activities 

In recent years, Congress has passed, and the Executive Branch has implemented, far-reaching 

new laws to assist impacted communities. The 

DoD. EPA, DOL, and other Federal agencies have 

also adopted innovative regulatory and policy 

changes that provide a variety of assistance to 

impacted communities, their workers. and businesses. The most significant of the changes are 

discussed below. 

1) 

2) 

The Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA) was enacted in 1992 to 

release uncontaminated property for early reuse. 

It amends the basic legal framework (Section 

120 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation. and Liability Act or 

CERCLA, also known as the Superfund law) 

for .the identification, restoration, and transfer 

of contaminated military properties. CERFA 

requires that uncontaminated parcds of land 

at closing bases be identified, and allows 

these clean parcels to be transferred while 

long-term cleanup of contaminated parcels 

cont.inues. In addition, CERFA allows the transfer of property by deed when the cleanup 

rem’edy is in place and operating successfully. 

On July 2, 1993, President Clinton announced 

a Five Point Plan to redevelop communities 

affected by base closures and realignments. 

The major goals of the plan are to create 

expeditious Community redevelopment, and 

to foster new jobs in communities facing base 

closings. The plan was designed to offer conimunities: a) jobs-centered property disposal; 

b) larger Federal grants for economic development planning and technical assistance; c) 

on-site base. transition coordinators as commuriity ombudsmen; d) easy access to transition and redevelopment help; and e) fast-track 

envjronmental remediation for base reuse. 

3) In 1993, Congress adopted a series of legislative provisions introduced by Senator l’ryor of 

Arkansas during consideration of the National 

LIFE AITER BASE (:LOX-RE 2-3 
4) 

5) 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1994. These provisions, referred to as the 

Pryor Amendments, incorporate and expand 

the President’s Five Point Plan. The Pryor 

Amendments permit the Secretary of Defensle 

to transfer or lease all or portions of closing 

military bases tto communities at or below fair 

market value or-in some cases-at no cosi , 

and to negotiate terms and conditions of payments for properties. The legislation also permits the military departments to sell a parcel 

of land for the (cost of cleanup or in exchange 

for cleanup at a closing base. In addition, the 

Pryor Amendments allow certain personal 

property-any ]property except land, fixed-inplace buildings, ships and Federal records-to 

be retained at the closing base to facilitate 

reuse, if there is no military need for the 

property. 

The Base Closure Community Redevelopment 

and Homeless Assistance Act, enacted into 

law on October 25, 1994, deleted the Statutory 

requirement of the Stewart B. McKinney 

Homeless Assistmce Act to give priority claims; 

for excess base closure properties to organizations that provide housing and services to the 

homeless. The new law balances local economic and community development needs, 

with needs of the homeless in a way that is 

supportive of overall redevelopment efforts. 

Legislation was included in the National 

Defense Authorization Act of 1995 lo prohibit 

the Pentagon and the Commission, in their 

base closure and realignment decision-making 

processes, from penalizing communities that 

begin early reuse planning for redevelopment. 

In addition, this legislation also permitted 

DoD to provide financial assistance to cornniunities for early reuse planning. 

HEARINGSAND SITEVISITS 

The Commission held two public hearings in 

Washington, D.C. to address reuse issues and 

activities. During the first hearing, the Ctmmksion 

received testimony from Senator David Pryor of 

Arkansas, from loca 1 governmental officials and 

representatives of various organizations involved 

with reuse activities. 

During the second hearing, the Commission 

received testimony from representatives of Executive Branch departments and agencies responsible 

for implementing reuse programs and activities. 

The Commission also received letters, documents, 

and information about the reuse process from a 

variety of other sources, including Members of 

Congress and concerned citizens. Finally, the 

Commission staff conducted three fact-finding site 

visits, made numerous office visits, and maintained an active dialogue with community groups 

and organizations. 

FINDINGS 

1) The Commission believes that the Executive 

Branch has recognized the difficulties communities face when military bases are closed or 

realigned. The Executive Branch and Congress have worked to reform the reuse process, and to provide financial and manpower 

assistance to the affected areas. The Commission found that as a result of the joint efforts, 

major achievements have been accomplished, 

such as the acceleration of cleanup efforts for 

contammated sites on closing military bases, 

and improved local determination for the consideration of needs of the homeless in the 

reuse process. 

2) The Commission found that DoD, through the 

military departments and defense agencies, 

has a continuing responsibility to clean up 

contaminated property at defense facilities. 

This obligation remains the same whether a 

base is closed pursuant to the base closure 

statutes or remains an open base. Federal 

agencies, including DoD, are precluded, however, from transferring property to another 

owner until that property is cleaned up. Specifically, section 120(h) of CERCLA requires 

DoD to include in the deed of sale a covenant 

that “all remedial action necessary to protect 

human health and the environment ... has been 

taken.” To promote interim reuse while 

cleanup continues, DoD needs clear statutory 

authoriry that it can enter into long term 

leases of land that is not suitable for transfer. 

While the land should be leased only if there 

is no threat to public health and safety, long 

term leases are key to beginning the reuse 

process. DoD and EPA have already put into 

place a mechanism to determine when land is 

suitable to lease. However, DoD should be 

provided clear authority to enter into long 

term leases. Without long term leases, financing for redevelopment is difficult to obtain, 

and reuse is delayed. 

- 

2-4 CHAPTER 2 
3) 

4) 

Clearly, envircmniental cleanup is very costly. 

Funding levels for environmental restoration 

prvgrams are declining. This could mean 

inent of environmental cleanup. lireirtkicir difficulties for irnpacted communities. The Commission notes that Congress 

is considering reduced funding levels for 

other Federal programs that are essentiall to 

communities for economic recovery, such as 

the OEA and EDA programs, and job training 

and retraining programs. The Commission 

feels strongly that adequate funding is crucial 

to programs that: a) assist in environmental 

restoration; I?) help communities organize for 

reuse. and offer economic devel~opment planning grants and economic deva,station grants; 

c) provide job training and retraining; and d) 

offer infrastructure and aviation improvements. and overall industrial development. 

A reduction of funding for any of these progr;lms will cause a significanit setback for 

communities that are working to recover from 

base closures. 

Recently. the General Services '4dministration 

issued ;I ruling that would prevent DoD from 

making property available to a local redevelopment authority if the DoD continues to use 

the property, and DoD is interested in leasing 

rather than retaining ownership of the property. In sorrie instances, when .a base closes, 

some tenants remain on the base in an enclave. Oftentimes, these tenants are reserve or 

guard units with strong ties to the community. 

The units are left with the responsibility to 

maintain the small parcel of Felderal property 

that is an island in the middle of the 

community's redevelopment effort. Should the 

DvD tenants decide to move outside of the 

base closure process, the community would 

be unable to acquire the property under the 

base closure statutes and would have to revert 

to acquiring the property under normal prlocedures of the Federal Property Act. The Commission believes that in some limited 

circumstances, it may be in the best interests 

of the communities and the remaining IIoD 

tenants to allow the property to be transferred 

to the reuse authority, which would in turn 

lease the property back to the tenants fix a 

token amount, generally $1 per year. 

5) The Commission received te:itimony from 

many communities that the property disposition process is insensitive to l(~ca1 concerns. 

The communities believe that in some instances, 

properties selected for Federal uses leave 

communities with ;I hodgepodge of disjointed 

parcels unsuitable for the development of any 

cohesive plan. 

The Commission found that achieving sufficient environmental cleanup in a timely fashion presents one of the greatest obstacles in 

the entire reuse process. During the March 16, 

1995, Commission hearing, numerous witnesses 

expressed concern about delay in environmental cleanup at closing bases that hampers 

communities engaged in economic redevelopment. The Commission believes that after 

public health concerns have been adclrt:ssed, 

the most commercially viable properties 

should be given priority for site investigation 

and cleanup. 

The Commission heard testimony that there 

are frequent delays in the formal screening of 

real property at closing bases that have been 

deemed excess to the needs of DoD and surplus to the needs of the Federal government. 

Notwithstanding statutory deadlines for completing the screening process, the system is 

often unnecessarily slow and cumbersome. 

On April 6, 1994, DoD issued an interim final 

rule, and on October 26, 1994, issued an 

amendment to the rule which. together, 

irnplerrient the President's Five Point Plan, the 

Pryor Amendments, and the Homeless Assistance Act Amendments. The interim final rule 

provides guidance to DoD on its authority to 

give priority to early reuse of real and personal properties on closing military bases in 

order to stimulate and encourage community 

reinvestment and speedy job creation. The 

interim final rule amendment clarifies the 

application process and criteria to be used to 

evaluate applications for real properties on the 

bases. The Commission found that as of this 

writing, the final rule to implement essential 

reuse programs has not been promulgated. 

The Commission found that allocating air 

emission credits or planning offsets presents 

probleins for some communities located in 

areas which do not meet Clean Air Act standards lor air quality. Military installations that 

remain open or expand in the same air basin 

may need air credits or planning offsets that 

could be used by communities to attract businesses and revitalize economic activities at 

losing bases. The Commission found the issue 
10) 

11) 

12) 

of who should retain the air emission credits 

or offsets, the community or DoD continues 

to be unresolved. 

Officials of the Environmental Protection 

Agency told the Commission they believe some 

military departments do not retain senior environmental staff throughout the BRAC cleanup 

process. The EI'A testified that its experience 

shows as bases downsize for closure, they often lose the most experienced environmental 

cleanup personnel. According to EPA, an experienced and knowledgeable BRAC Cleanup 

Team is a significant element in the speedy 

environmental cleanup at a closing base. 

Most major closing bases have an on-site Base 

Transition Coordinator (BTC) who works with 

the local community as an ombudsman. Base 

Transition Coordinators often serve as a conduii 

between the community and Federal departments and agencies. The Commission found1 

that, far too often, decisions by BTCs at the local 

level are revoked by higher headquarters. 

The Commission found that while many cornmunities value the importance of advance 

planning for the transition of closed bases to1 

civilian use, a significant number of communities delayed early planning for fear it would 

be counted against them in the base closure 

and realignment decision-making process. 

The Commission found that over the years, 

seminars have been held, information has 

been printed and disseminated, discussions 

have been had, and just last year, legislation 

was enacted, all with the intent to inform the 

public that early planning for base closings is 

a wise decision, and that decision-makers will 

not use their early planning against them. 

Nevertheless, the Commission found that 

many communities continue to delay advance 

reuse planning to avoid a perception that the 

community is preparing for a potential base 

closure or realignment. 

13) Many local officials in areas where major military installations are located believe base closures will result in severe economic disruption 

to their local communities. For many of them, 

the military bases are the largest employers. 

Moreover, the Commission recognizes that 

generally, urban1 areas tend to attract reuse 

activities more easily than rural areas because 

urban areas tend to have a more diverse 

economy and a greater demand for those services and the real estate that a redeveloped 

military base can offer. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO CONGRESS: 

1) The Commission believes certain legislative 

changes to the statutory cleanup process could 

benefit the communities by returning property 

to productive reuse and save money in the 

long run. These changes were suggested initially by DoD, and in some instances, in conjunction with EPA 

a) AUow DoD to take into considemtion the 

long-term, anticipated land use when making cleanup decisions. According to Don, 

this would facilitate the transfer of property and yield better coordinated cleanups 

and reuse plans. 

b) Provide flexibility in the choice of 

remediation methods-permanent solutions may not make sense in all instances. 

c) Provide EPA with discretionary authoritysimilar to that enjoyed by private sitesnot to place closing military bases on the 

National Priority List (NPL) if, in EPA's 

judgment, sufficient progress is being 

made towards cleanup. 

d) Clanfy section 120(h) of CERCLA to allow 

long term lease of contaminated property 

at closing military bases. This would help 

to speed up the return of bases to productive 

reuse, and ensure DoD access to the property to perform the required remediation. 

e) Amend CERFA to clarify that storage of 

hazardous material does not automatically 

prevent a parcel of land from being clean, 

if the amount of material stored was either 

minimal or if there was no release. According to DoD, the current statutory language 

excludes many residential areas from being 

considered clean parcels because domestic 

hazardous materials, such as paint and home 

heating oil, were stored for more than a year. 

2) The Commission recommends that Congress 

provide adequate funding levels to those program that are determined to impact critically 

on community planning and economic development (including the OEA and EDA programs), and job training and retraining 

(various Labor Department programs). 

3) The Commission recommends Congress carefully review and support DoD funding levels to 

meet its environmental obligations to clean up 

contamination and prevent future contamination. 

2-6 CHAPTER 2 
The Commission believes Congress should 

provide adequate funding levels for environmental restoration activities at closing bases. 

4) The Commission recoininends a change in the 

property dis~oosal lam; to allonr all parties 

demonstrating an interest in property at closing bases to come to the table at the same 

time, bringing their needs and requests for 

evaluation. Tlhis would allow for planned reuse decisions that meet the needs of the local 

community, and would retain within the Executive Branch the ability to obtain property for 

beneficial pul~lic uses. The current system 

permits formler military bases to be “picked 

apart” by other Federal agencies. which hive 

first call on the most desirable portions of tlie 

installation. 

TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 

1) The Commissiion recommends DoD clean up 

the most conimercially viable contamina1:ed 

base areas first, and the least desirable contaminated art:as later, as long as the sites .Are 

stabilized and no public health threats are imminent. 

2) The Commission recommends DoD and other 

Fecleral government departments ancl agencies 

adhere to the statutory deadlines for comp leting the screening process of surplus real 

property at closing bases. 

3) The Commission urges the General Services 

Administration to reconsider its interpretat-ion 

of the Federal Property Act to allow the transfer and leaseback of base closure property in 

certain limited circumstances whew there are 

economic advantages to the community and 

to the DoD tenants. If the GSA determines 

that it does not have authority under the Federal Property Act to approve the transfer and 

leaseback of the property. then the Commission urges GSA to pursue a legislative initiativc that would allow this type of transaction. 

4) The Commissim recommends Doll act expeditiously to promulgate the final rules and re<gulations required to implement the I’resideiit’s 

Five Point PI:m to stimulate and encourage 

community reinvestment and speedy job creation. 

5) The Cornmission recommends 11011 act expeditiously to piromulgate an emissions trading 

policy which would clarify who retains air 

emission credits when base closing propenies 

are transferred from military departments to 

communities. 

6) The C,ommission recommends DoD and EPA 

identify factors that will encourage senior 

DoD environmental cleanup personnel to remain at closing bases throughout the cleanup 

process. 

7 j The Commission recommends Rase Transition 

Coordinators (BTC) be given authority to 

make and implement more local decisions in 

a timely fashion. The DoD should establish a 

better working relationship with the BTCs to 

avoid frequent revocations from the Pentagon, 

a prclblem that can be an ohstacle to speedy 

economic development. 

8) Since early corninunity planning is so crucial to 

successful community redevelopment, the 

Commission urges DoD to take a inore proactive role and work more aggressively with 

public and private organizations in developing strategies that will help communities use 

advanced reuse planning as a tool rather than 

seeing it as an obstacle. 

TO COMMUNITIES: 

It is Par easier to identify what legislative and 

policy steps Congress and the Executive Branch 

might take to assist communities in making ;I successful economic transition after base closure than 

it is to direct suggestions to the hundreds of diverse communities. Nonetheless, sonie changes in 

community attitudes and activities can also make 

a large contribution to improving the quality of 

life after Iclosure. 

1) Communities are encouraged to contact the 

various Federal departments and agencies that 

are mentioned earlier in this report for 

tance in the reuse process. As an example, 

DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment ((>FA) 

provides technical assistance and grants to 

communities that wish to do advance reuse 

planning. OEA can help the community form 

a cornmlttee ‘of appropriate public and private 

sector representatives to plan, coordinate, and 

implement economic adjustment efforts. A 

request for ;assistance can be made to the 

Director, Office of Economic Adjustment. 400 

Army Navy Drive. Suite 200, Arlington, Virginia 22202-:!884. OEA can be reached hy 

telephone at 703/604-6020. Corninunities are 

also encouraged to contact the Commerce 

Department’s Office of Economic Conversion 

Inforimation (listed tie1ou.j for a list of successful base closings that can serve as a model. In 

2-7 
addition, both offices can offer other important 

and relevant information about closing bases. 

2) Early organization is crucial to a community. 

Should the community decide to fight to keep 

a base open, the Commission recommends that 

concurrently, the community organize and 

work just as hard toward developing a contingency civilian reuse plan as early as possible, 

and not wait for base closure to occur. 

3) Early formation of a local redevelopment 

authority is critical to early development of a 

comprehensive redevelopment plan. Membership should be kept to a manageable size, 

and should not exclude any key elements of 

the community. This is the body that mu:jt 

develop the base reuse plan. 

4) The local redevelopment authority should be 

well organized and speak as a single body 

from the time of its initial approach to the 

Federal government, and throughout the reuse 

process. Community and jurisdictional disagreements may cause confusion for those 

who have to work and communicate with the 

redevelopment authority, and may prohibit 

the group from reaching its goal of reuse of 

the closing base in a timely fashion. In many 

instances, failure to develop a reuse plan is 

the result of unresolved local disagreements. 

5) The Commission recommends that the IocaJ 

redevelopment authority solicit early support 

for its community reuse plan from surrounding impacted jurisdictions. 

6) It is crucial for the local redevelopment 

authority to identtfy as early as possible all 

real and personal properties it wishes to retain 

for reuse. Additionally, it is crucial for the 

authority to work with the disposing military 

department to resolve issues surrounding the 

properties, such as tenant use of utilities, and 

responsibilities for property maintenance. 

7) It is important for local redevelopment 

authorities to work with the disposing military 

department in developing an effective marketing strategy for reuse of the base. 

8) The Commission recommends the free services 

of the Office of Economic Conversion Information in Washington, D.C. to communities, 

individuals, and businesses who seek information about the Federal reuse process and activities. This is a Federal clearinghouse that is 

cosponsored by the Departments of Commerce 

and Defense. The clearinghouse can be 

reached by telephone at 1-800-345-1222. (Participating Federal Depository Libraries are 

also available at this number.) The hearing 

impaired may access the clearinghouse by 

dialing 1-202-501-0868 TDD. A request for 

information can be made to: The Office of 

Economic Conversion Information, Economic 

Development Administration, Room 7231, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 

20230-0001. 

2-8 CHAPTEK 2 
CHAPTER 3 

ISSUES FOR FURTHER 

CONSIDERATION 

The Future of the Base Closure 

and Realignment Process 

Under current law, this Report of the 1995 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission represents the final opportunity for the Defense Department to close or realign military installations in t.he 

United States under the expedited process esta blished in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. At the completion of the work 

of this Commission, the closure or realignment of 

military installations in the United States will Ibe 

governed by section 2687 of Title 10, United 

States Code. 

Under section 2687, the closure of any military 

installation in the United States with at least 300 

civilian employees, or the realignment of any installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 

civilian employees or of more than 50 percent of 

the installation’s civilian workforce, cannot take 

place until the Slecretary of Defense carries cut 

“an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operatiorial 

consequences of such closure or realignment.” If 

the Secretary concludes as a result of these evaluations that the closure or realignment should proceed, the Secretary must notify Congress of the 

proposed closure or realignment and wait 30 legislative, or 60 calendar, days before proceeding. 

Experience has demonstrated that the process lor 

closing or realigning bases contained in section 

2687 is unworkable. During the decade following 

enactment of this statute in 1977, the Defense 

Department did not close or realign a single major 

military installation in the United States. Changing 

mission requirements and reductions in defense 

spending, however, placed growing pressures on 

both Congress and the Defense Department to 

deal with the prolblem of eliminating unnecessary 

and inefficient facilities and installations. These 

pressures ultimately led Congress and the Executive Branch to set aside the base closure process 

contained in section 2687 and to create the 1988 

Base Closure Commission and then to enact the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. 

Despite four rounds of base closures and realignments, reductions in domestic infrastructure in the 

Defense Dlepartment have not kept pace with reductions in funding and force levels. In the last ten 

years, the defense budget has declined in real 

terms by almost 40 percent. Under current plans, 

defense spending will continue to decline in real 

terms each year through 1999. Overall, the Defense 

Department has reduced the size of the military 

services by 30 percent. I3y the end of this decade, 

the Army will have eliminated 45 percent of its 

divisions, the Air Force 44 percent of its tactical 

fighter wings, and the Navy 37 percent of its ships. 

At the same time, the three previous closure 

rounds (1988, 1991 and 1993) have resulted in a 

decrease jn our domestic base infrastructure of 15 

percent. With the additional reductions proposed 

by this Commission, the cumulative reduction in 

military installations will be approximately 21 percent if accepted by the President and the Congress. 

Secretary of Defense William Perry acknowledged 

to the Commission that the Defense Department 

will still have excess infrastructure after the 1995 

round of closures and realignments. Secretary 

Perry suggested the need for an additional round 

of closures and realignments in 3 to 4 years, after 

the Defense Department has absorbed the effects 

of the cl’osures and realignment from this and 

prior rounds. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also 

testified tl:) the Commission that excess capacity 

would reimain in the Defense Department after 

this clc)sure round. General Shalikashvili agreed 

with Secr’etary Perry on the need for additional 

base closing authority in the future, and said that 

opportunities remain in DOD to increase crossservicing, particularly in the area of joint-use bases 

and training facilities. 
In testimony during the Commission’s final public 

hearing on June 14, 1995, Joshua Gotbaum, the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, 

indicated that “Even after BRAC 95 has been implemented, we will continue to have excess infi-astructure.” Secretary Gotbaum also indicated that 

“Future base closure authority will be necessary.” 

The Commission agrees with these statements. 

The base closure process established in the Base 

Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 has worked 

well. As Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan told 

the Commission, if the defense budget continues 

to decline and additional base closings are necessary, “the only way to do it is to have a BWL 

commission. ’’ 

The Defense Department will be implementing 

the closures and realignments of the 1935 arid 

prior Commissions through the end of this decade. 

The requirement in the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act that all closures be completed 

within 6 years means that the closures from the 

1995 round will not be completed until 2001. For 

that reason, the Commission recommends that the 

Congress authorize another Base Closure Commission for the year 2001 similar to the 1931, 1%)3 

and 1995 Commissions. 

Between now and the time another Commission is 

authorized, all of the military services have 

expressed the need to be able to make changes 10 

the decisions of this and prior Commissions. During the 1995 Commission process, 27 of the 146 

recommendations submitted to the Commission 

by the Secretary of Defense were changes to prior 

Commission decisions. The 1391 and 1993 Conimissions made changes to prior Commission decisions, and it is very likely that modifications or 

changes will be required to other Commission 

decisions in the future. 

The Commission agrees with the Defense Department that the existing authority provided in section 2687 of Title 10 should be revised to allow 

modifications to past base closure Commission 

recommendations between now and the time that 

another base closure round is authorized. Any 

mod~ications under this process to previous closure decisions should be covered by the same 

special statutory anld regulatory provisions addressing the disposal and reuse of military installatiorls 

closed under the 1988 and 1990 base clasure statutes. 

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990 created a Fair, open and objective process 

through which large numbers of excess military 

installations in the United States have been or will 

be closed or realigned. Establishing another Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission in 2001 will 

give the military services time to complete the 

current closures in an orderly fashion, while ensuring that the Defense Department has the opportunity in the future to make further reductions in 

military installations in the United States. 

Milita y Hospitals 

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commissic~n recommended that the Defense Department aggressively pursue military medical consolidation and restructuring, use civilian sector 

resources where doing so would be cost-effective, 

eliminate excess capacity in the direct care system, and maximize the utiliiation of remaining 

resources across the military services. The Medical 

Joint Cross-Service Group, created by DoD for the 

1995 round of base closures, was a valuable first 

step towards accomplishmg these goals. DoD is 

taking another important step in this direction 

with the creation of the Tricare program. This 

program, currently in its initial implementation 

phase, is designed to provide DoD with a systematic way to find the most cost effective means of 

delivering health care services, whether those 

means entail the use of direct care infrastructure, 

civilian providers, or some combination of the two. 

The Joint Gross-Service Group developed a list of 

suggested hospital realignments that represents a 

good first step towards restructuring of the military medical system, although most of the Group’s 

alternatives were not forwarded to the Commission as closure or realignment recommendations. 

DoD officials have stated that they are pursuing 

some of these actions outside of the base closure 

process. The Commission reviewed the Joint 

Cross-Service Group’s recommendations for military medical facilities. During this review, the 

Commission received assurances from senior OSD 

and service officials that they will work together 

and aggressively pursue further consolidation and 

integration of military medical facilities, including 

restructuriing actions across service lines. The 

Comnission urges OSD and the military services 

to work together in this important effort. 

This combination of hospital restructuring initiatives within and outside of the base closure process, however, should be viewed as the beginning 

point of a process and not the end. Even after the 

-- 

3-2 CHAPTER 3 
implementation #of the recommendations of ':his 

Commission and the actions the services are taking 

outside of the base closure process, many opportunities will remain for consolidation of resources 

across service hes and with civilian sector medical resources. 

DoD should aggressively seek out and pursue 

these opportunities. Appropriately targeted reductions in direct care capacity, particularly inpatient 

bed capacity, would likely enhance both the cost 

and mission effectiveness of the military medical 

system. Cost effectiveness would be enhanced 

when DoD provides directly only those services 

that would be more costly to purchase from the 

civilian health care system. Mission effectiveness 

would be enhanced when infrastructure reductions permit the IIoD to focus its direct care assets 

in the most mission critical areas directly related 

to medical care. 

A careful assessinent of requirements and a\ ailable civilian resources is particularly important for 

the small military hospitals located in areas with 

an over-capacity of civilian medical resources. 

Realignment of these hospitals to clinics or subacute care inpat:ient fac es is likely to be cost 

effective without eroding the department's abdity 

to accomplish either the peacetime or warti.me 

missions of the military health services system. 

Finally, no efforts to address DoD medical infrastructure issues, no matter how well designed, .will 

be able to accomplish meaningful, appropriate 

reductions in the size of the military medical :;ystem unless DoD reaches a consensus on the readiness requiremient of that system. Without 

consensus about the size of the medical sysi:em 

needed to support readiness requirements, significant changes to military medical infrastructure .will 

be difficult to achieve. The Defense Departrent 

needs to reach a clear understanding of its wartime 

medical requirements and how it will meet them. 

Privatization of DoD Industrial 

and Commercial Activities 

During the Commission's review of Defense Department recommendations to close the maintenance 

functions at Loujsville and Indianapolis, the local 

communities presented proposals that would all.ow 

a local redevelopment authority to obtain ownership of the closed depot facilities. These facilities 

would then be offered to private companies or 

employee groups for use in proposing bids on 

work previously performed at these installations. 

Acceptance of these proposals is heyond the 

Commission's authority to direct, but they appear 

to be a positive approach to solving the Navy's 

excess infrastructure problem. 

The former government employees would provide 

a skilled labor pool, and, if successful, the local 

communities could transition the excess infrastructure into industrial parks or other businesses. The 

Commission strongly urges innovative approaches 

such as these be developed in partnership with 

local communities as a way to promote use of 

excess iinfrastructure and also reduce costs for 

required functions. 

It would be possible for the communities to 

acquire ithe facilities through the reuse process, 

but only an active partnership with DoD can 

resolve the issues of workload, staff carryover, 

and technology transfer which could make such 

enterprisles both viable and beneficial to the community, employees, and DoD. 

While thiis initiative is in line with the privatization 

goals cited by the recent Commission on Roles 

and Missions of the Armed Forces, it goes one 

step farther by including DoD and the local community as active participants in the process. By 

creating truly cooperative ventures, rather than 

simply divesting an operation to the private sector, DoD can ensure that its requirements are met 

directly, while enjoying the efficiency of private 

opera tion. 

The Commission believes reducing infrastructure 

by expanding privatization to other DoD industrial 

and com~mercial activities will reduce the cost of 

maintahing and operating a ready military force. 

Many industrial and commercial activities now 

performed by military and civilian personnel 

throughout the military services could be operated 

by thk private sector without any loss of military 

capability. Privatization of these functions would 

reduce operating costs, eliminate excess infrastructure, and allow uniformed personnel to focus 

on skills and activities directly related to their military missions. 

The Cornmission received testimony indicating 

that the current statutory requirement that at least 

60 percent of the depot maintenance workload in 

each miliitary service must be done in DoD depots 

may be an impediment to further privatization. 

The Commission urges Congress and the Defense 

Departmlent to review this matter carefully. 

ISSUES FOR FIJRTWER COXSIDERATION 3-3 
Cross-Servicing Within the 

Department oj‘ Defense 

In previous BRAC cycles, the analyses and development of recommendations for closure and realignment actions were conducted solely within the 

military services. In preparation for the 1Wj cycle, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense established five 

Joint Cross-Service Groups to examine the following functional areas: medical; undergraduate pilot 

training; test and evaluation activities; research 

and development laboratories; and depot maintenance. Each group was chaired by a senior executive 

from the Office of the Secretary of Defense arid 

was composed of members from each of the military services. Each of the groups established useful policy objectives to downsize DoD 

infrastructure and encourage cross-servicing of 

workload. The groups also established data call 

procedures which resulted in data that were cornparable between the military services. 

Despite the attempts through the BRAC 1955 

preparation proce:ss, few cross-servicing recommendations were included in the Secretary’s bare 

closure recommendations to the Commission. Thle 

Joint Cross-Service Groups produced a number of 

cross-servicing recommendations. The Depot 

Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group, for example, 

developed two sets of base closure alternatives. 

Both alternatives suggested eight maintenance 

depots for closure and both contained significant 

cross-servicing opportunities. However, rather 

than transmitting their suggestions to the Secretary of Defense fctr inclusion in the DoD BRAC 

recommendations, the Joint Cross-Service Groups 

submitted their suggestions to the military departments for consideration. The military departmenis 

did not include most of the Joint Cross-Service 

Groups suggestions in their BRAC recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. 

The Conunission recommends the Department of 

Defense include eflorts to establish cross-servicing 

during any future lbase closure rounds. The Joint 

Cross-Service Groups should be responsible fclr 

assessing the workload component and the cost 

and savings aspects, of their recommendations. For 

that reason, these Groups and not the military 

services should prepare COBRA analyses to reflect 

the impact of their recommendations. The Group 

leaders should propose cross-servicing recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense far 

review and consideration early in the process of 

developing the Department’s proposals. 

Military Family Housing 

In its mornmendations to the Commission, the Anny 

recommen(ded the disposal of family housing in many 

high-cost and remote areas. The justification for 

these recommendations was that sufficient comercial housing is available on the local economy using 

Basic Allowance for Quarters and Variable Housing Allowance. The Commission viewed this to be 

an erosion of quality of life for the soldier and his 

family and a transfer of DoD’s shortfall in funding 

for family housing operations and maintenance to 

a significant out-of-pocket expense to the soldier. 

The Comnission encourages DoD to expedite its 

effort to draft, and the Congress to enact, legislation 

that will allow the private sector to acquire and 

revitalize military family housing for the Department of Defense. 

Engineering Field Activity @FA) West, 

San Bruno, CA 

The Navy’s Engineering Field Activity @FA) West, 

in San Bruno, California was added for consideration by the commission as a potential closure or 

realignment. Although the Commission did not 

take any action to realign or close this activity, the 

Commission is concerned that the activity occupies a compound much larger than it needs which 

is expensive to operate and maintain. This property is in a location well-suited for more intensive 

commercial development. 

In the past, the Navy held preliminary discussions 

with the city of San Bruno about an exchange of 

property for the construction and conveyance to 

the federal government of a building which would 

reflect the value of any parcel acquired by the 

city. If the Navy retains the property in its current 

configuration, it will continue to pay for unnecessary operaling costs, and it will forfeit the opportunity to locate EFA West, and potentially other 

federal tenants, in modern office space at minimal 

cost. The city will also lose the opportunity to 

obtain the economic benefit from the appropriate 

development of property in their community. The 

Commissioin strongly recommends that the Navy 

pursue the opportunity to maximize the use of the 

EFA West compound for the benefit of the Navy 

and the local community. 

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3-4 CHAPTER 3 
While this discussion refers to one specific base, 

there may be many others that could be more 

effectively used if creative solutions are investigated by the services in consultation with the local 

communities. The Commission encourages the use 

of innovative approaches to the effective utilization of Department of Defense real estate. Implementation of solutions such as the one for E,FA 

West can create significant infrastructure savings 

without base closure actions. 

Return on Inuestment 

Like DoD, the Commission used return on investment as one of the eight criteria in making decisions 

regarding the realignment or closure of an installation. Over the past three rounds, several issues 

regarding the calculation of return on investmnt 

surfaced during 1:he proce This round was no 

exception. The amst signi ant issues to surface 

during this round follow: 

First, even after four rounds, there still 

existed a significant amount of difference 

among the services regarding how they 

conducted their Cost of Base Realignment 

Actions (COBRA) model runs. 

Second, the exclusion of environmental 

cleanup cost:i and locality pay for civilian 

employees continued to be a point of 

contention with many communities. 

Third, the ex’clusion in the calculations of 

some relevant costs and savings tended 

to obscure the actual economic benefit 

to the Don. 

Finally, the largest area of concern was 

the policy of using a yearly revised “cost 

of money” rate as the discount rate used 

to calculate net present value. 

Each service or defense agency was responsible 

for conducting it:j own COBRA runs. This policy 

permitted significant differences aniong the mvices in how they calculated return on investment. 

Even though the GAO and service Inspector Generals audited this process, several differences in 

the methods to generate COBRA runs were not 

captured through these audits. For instance, ):he 

Naby, in several of their COBRA runs, exclucled 

the cost of mission personnel assigned to an installation who provide disassembly, packing, unpalzking, reinstallation and recalibration of specialized 

equipment, while the other services and agencies 

reported a one-time moving cost for these activities. 

This allowed the Navy to avoid showing movlng 

costs associated with a realignment or closure actlon 

that sometimes were significant. Although the 

other services generally did not, the Air Force 

sometimes included a Base Conversion Agency 

cost even though COBRA automatically calculated 

a program planning cost to manage the base 

realignment or closure activity. Finally, the Army 

did not include many of the costs included hy the 

other services because they conducted COBRA 

runs from a macro viewpoint. All of these and 

other differences led to different costs and savings 

estimates. 

A second area of concern was the treatment of 

environmental cleanup costs and locality pay. The 

DoD policy excliicled both of these costs. This 

policy was vigorously challenged by communities. 

Some communities asserted that any closure or 

realignment action would likely result in a change 

in the ovlerall cost to cleanup an installation, either 

by accelerating the cleanup or conducting the 

cleanup with old technologies. DoD policy had 

been able to virtually ignore the impact on environmental restoration costs as a result of the 

realignment or closure action. While this may 

have lieen a valid approach, the policy should be 

reviewed for any future base closure efforts. The 

second cost ignored by DoD was the change in 

locality pay for civilian employees. The COHKA 

captured Variable Housing Allowance for military 

personnel and local construction cost differences 

in a local “Area Cost Factor.” It was therefore 

inconsistent not to consider civilian locality pay 

differences. This concern was especially relevant 

since locality pay is based on federal law and 

was a recognizable cost to I>oI> as a result of an 

action which realigned personnel from a low-cost 

area with no locality pay to one with :i high cost 

of living. 

The next area of concern was the number of legitimate costs and savings which were not included 

in the COBRA calculations. One of these was the 

savings that occurs when greater efficiency is 

achieved by consolidating functions into fewer 

locations. Even though these savings were difficult 

to estimate, it was a legitimate savings due to the 

closure process. Another legitimate and sometimes 

significant savings was the avoidance of future 

capital investment that occurs when a large installation is ‘closed. Most real property has to l~ replaced every forty to fifty years. Therefore, a 

portion of a base’s infrastructure which needs to 

be replaced each year was not captured in military construction budgets or real property maintenance accounts. These very real and significant 

savings were missed in the current execution of 

ISSLJES FOR FURTH~K COYSIDERATION 3-5 
COBRA. ALSO, there were costs for projects that were 

delayed due to a move or realignment that were riot 

captured in the COBRA model. For instance, in 

this round, the Navy sometimes put a program on 

hold while a move was taking place. Even though 

this might incur a significant cost to DoD, it was 

not included in the COBRA. Finally, DoD should 

make every attempt to capture all costs associated 

with the base closure process. Costs such as 

increased CHAMPUS costs, Medicare impacts, and 

active dutyheserve forces cost sharing arrangements have historically been omitted from COBRA 

considerations. 

The last major area of concern involved the use of 

an annually revised cost of money as the discount 

rate. The discount rate was used to calculate the 

present worth of future savings. These savin,gs 

were discounted for the decreased value of 

money in the fume. In 1991, the discount rate 

was 10 percent. In 193, DoD used a 7 percent 

rate and in 1995, a 2.75 percent rate was used. 

These different rates caused a large difference in 

the net present value of future savings. Using a ’LO 

percent rate decreased the savings to a third of 

what they would be if a discount rate of 2.?5 

percent were usedl. Instead of using a rate which 

can vary greatly from year-to-year, a reasonable 

estimate of 5 to 7 percent should be used and n’ot 

changed over time. The General Accounting Office 

recommended the use of a 4.85 percent discount 

rate for the 195 round. Using the same discount 

rate is the only way to compare one round of 

BRAC with another round. 

Analysis of Eccwomic Impact 

Economic analysis of bases identified for closures 

and realignments in the 1995 round improved si:gnificantly from prior base closure rounds. Economic data providled to the Commission from the 

Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) on Economic 

Impact provided a coherent and comprehensive 

analytic approach for estimating the economic 

impact of military base closures. Similarly, the 

1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission’s economic impact computer software 

was far superior it0 economic capabilities available to past Commissions. Despite the ongoing 

improvements in calculating the economic impala 

of a base closure, there were a number of are;is 

that could be improved. 

The primary focus of the JCSG economic impact 

software was to determine the number of military, 

civilian, aind private contractor personnel eliminated or reassigned from a defense establishment 

and to determine the indirect job loss resulting 

from base closures and realignments. Personnel 

may be relocated on paper among several different duty stations before their final destinations are 

determined. Personnel reassigned from their original station to a new station were not efficiently 

tracked by the economic impact software. This 

deficiency resulted in significant reconciliation 

efforts by the Commission’s economic and Cost of 

Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analysts. 

A modific<ation to the economic analysis software 

to automatically account for reassigned military, 

civilian, and private contractor personnel from 

each origin to all destinations would be a significant improvement to the current software. Also, 

the software should be able to account for the 

changes hn the number of military, civilian, and 

private contractors arriving at each destination 

from all origins. These modifications would reduce 

the potential for errors in cost and economic analysis. 

The DoD Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic 

Impact decided that cumulative economic impact 

would include prior BRAC actions if personnel 

losses occurred in 1994 or later. The Group decided that historical government economic trend 

data would capture the actual economic impacts 

of BRAC actions prior to 1994. Therefore, the 195 

Commission economic database did not include 

any closure or realignment personnel actions completed prior to 1994. The 1995 Commission concluded that this approach did not fully 

accommodate the concerns of the communities 

affected. To improve the database as a tool for 

computing cumulative economic impact, all prior 

base closure actions in an economic area should 

be included in the grand totals of the cumulative 

economic impact calculations. 

A job mulltiplier obtained from government economic source material was used in calculations to 

determine the indirect job loss resulting from a 

base closure or realignment. The Commission’s 

review of multipliers found that a number of the 

services’ rnultipliers appeared lower than those 

independently computed by the Commission. Ongoing discussions with the Joint Cross-Service 

Groups clarified multiplier differences. To reduce 

- 

3-6 CHAPTER 3 
conflicting economic analysis based on multipliers, the military services should provide official 

documentstion to the Commission explaining any 

changes in mult!ipliers used to calculate indirect 

job loss. 

Existing unemployment in an area that might be 

affected by a RIUC action was important when 

calculating the total economic impact of a potential base closure or realignment. One method to 

assess the total potential unemployment rate is to 

combine the current unemployment rate with the 

impact computed for BRAC, making sure the 

employment base definition is consistent, i.e., 

does or does not include military personnel 

between each economic area analyzed. 

The Joint Cross-Service Group used the Bureau of 

Economic Analysis (BEA) data for an employment 

data base by economic area. The Commission 

approved the Department of Defense‘s use of BEA 

data which represented a change from relying 

solely on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data 

during previous base closure rounds. The Cornmission agreed t’o use BEA, because unlike BLS, 

the data found in BEA included military personnel. However, historical information on employment and rates of unemployment in the economic 

impact database were published by BLS. Consequently, the use of two data sources on emplsDyment led to confusion. The Commission 

recommends that separate reports Ix generated 

for economic impacts using BEA data and for the 

historical trends using BLS data. 

The Commission also found that the use of 

COBRA personnel summary sheets to alter the 

economic database worksheets led to possible 

errors in economic calculations when personnel 

changes were within the same economic area or 

when the econornic impact was computed from a 

“redirect” action. These errors could be eliminated 

if the services provided the Commission separate 

economic impact data base revisions in the same 

manner as they provide separate COBRA revisions. 
CWAIPTEIR 4 

PREVIO~JS BASE 

CLOSURE ROUNDS 

HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE 

Closing military installations has always beer? a 

difficult process. 'Whether closures are designed to 

reduce military o'verhead, enhance readiness and 

modernization, oir reflect the realities of changing 

international threats, the impact of these decisions 

on local communities can be dramatic and painful. 

Additionally, the decision-making process itself 

has had a controversial history, punctuated with 

accusations of political interference and retribution. 

In the early 1960's, I'resident Kennedy concluded 

that the 1:arge defense base structure developed 

during World War I1 and the Korean conflict was 

no longer necessary. At the President's direction, 

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed 

and implemented a base closure program. The 'criteria governing the selection process were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense, with minimal consultation with the 

military departments or Congress. Hundreds of 

bases closures and realignments took place during 

this period, and more than 60 major bases were 

closed. Despite these accomplishments, char,qes 

that base closures were used by the Executive 

Branch to punisli uncooperative legislators were 

prevalent. 

In 1965, Congress passed legislation setting up 

reporting requirements designed to involve itself in 

any DoD base closure program. The legislation was 

vetoed by I'residlent Johnson, further exacerbating 

the growing confrontation between the Executive 

and Legislative Ehnches of government. Despite 

this antagonistic situation, the Department of 

Defense was able to complete base realignments 

and closures routinely throughout the 1960's. 

During the 1970's, however, DoD found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations due 

to continued attempts by Congress to regulate the 

base closure process and to limit or deny base 

closure funding. In 1976, the Military Construction 

Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 

250 civilian employees until the Department had 

notified Congress of the proposed actions, 

assessed the personnel and economic impacts, 

followed the study provisions of the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine 

months. 'This bill was vetoed by President Ford, 

and the Congressional veto override effort failed. 

An imporpant turning point in the struggle between 

Congress and the Executive Branch occurred in 

1977. In that year, Congress succeeded in enacting 

legislation which severely restricted DoD's ability 

to close military bases. This statute-Title 10, 

United States Code, Section 2687-required the 

Department of Defense to notify Congress if an 

installation became a closure or realignnient candidate. 'The law also subjected all proposed closure 

actions t'o the lengthy environmental evaluation 

requiremjents of the NEPA process, as well as to 

local economic arid strategic consequence reports. 

In addition, DoD was required to wait 60 days for 

Congress to respond to its recommendations. 

These and other procedural requirements established in Section 2687. combined with Congressional reluctance to close military bases, 

effectively halted base closures (Section 2687 

appears in Appendix C of this Report). 

For a decade following the pa 

2687, all attempts at closing major installations 

failed, arid proposed realignments of small military units were often thwarted. At the same time, 

the 1980',s witnessed a dramatic increase in defense 

spending and rapid military expansion, reaching 

its peak in 1985. As the defense budget declined 

in subsequent years, the size of the U.S. armed 

forces changed, yet the base structure remained 

unaltered. As a result, readiness was being threatened as the services struggled to pay the operating costs of unneeded bases and infrastructure. 
THE 1988 COMMISSION 

By 1988, the Defense budget had declined for 

three straight years and was predicted to decline 

further. To ensure that scarce DoD resources 

would be devoted to the most pressing operational and investment needs rather than maintaining unneeded property, facilities, or overhead, 

Secretary of Deferlse Frank Carlucci chartered the 

Defense Secretary s Commission on Base Realignment and Closure on May 3, 1988 (See Appendix 

D). The Commission sought to close obsolete military bases and bring the base structure in line 

with the declining force structure. Enacted into 

law in October, 1988, Public Law 100-526 provided the statutory basis for this one-time 

approach. The law also provided relief from certain statutory impediments to closures, such as a 

partial exemption from NEPA, delegated property 

disposal authority, and an expedited process fix 

Congressional review of BEUC recommendatiotis 

(Pubic Law 100-526 appears in Appendix E). 

The 1988 Commission was co-chaired by former 

Senator Abraham Ribicoff and former Congressman 

Jack Edwards. Other commissioners appointed by 

the Secretary of Defense were Louis W. Cabot; Pa. 

Graham Claytor, Jr.; Donald F. Craib, Jr.; Thomas 

F. Eagleton; Martin R. Hoffmann; Bryce Poe 11; 

William H. Rowden; James C. Smith II; Donn A. 

Starry; and Russell E. Train. The 1988 Commission 

issued its report on December 29, 1988. It reconimended the closure of 86 military facilities and 

the realignment of 59 others, with an estimated 

savings of $693.6 million annually. The 1988 

commission’s recommendations represented a reduction of approximately 3 percent of the domestic 

base structure. The 1988 Commission’s authority 

expired after the submission of its final report (a 

complete list of the 1W recommendations are 

contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, 

and in Appendix M by military service). 

Major base closure and realignment recommendations of the 1988 Commission include: 

16 CLOSURES 

George Air Force Base, CA 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

Norton Air Force Base, CA 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 

Chanute Air Force Elase, IL 

Fort Sheridan, IL 

Jefferson Proving Ground, IN 

Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot, KY 

Naval Station Lake Charles, LA 

Army Material Tech Lab, MA 

Pease Air Force Base, NH 

Naval Station Brooklyn, NY 

Philadelphia Naval Hospital, PA 

Naval Station Galveston, TX 

Fort Douglas, UT 

Cameron Station, VA 

11 REALIGNMENTS 

Fort Huaclhuca, A2 

Pueblo Army Depot, CO 

Fort McPherson, GA 

Fort Devens, MA 

Fort Holabird, MD 

Fort Meade, MD 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Umatilla Army Depot, OR 

Fort Bliss, TX 

Naval Station Puget Sound, WA 

Public Law 100-526 required Secretary Carlucci to 

accept or reject the 1988 Commission’s recommendations in its entirety. In January, 1989, he 

accepted all of the recommendations. The law 

provided Congress with the same accept or reject 

in full option. In May, 1989, the Congressional 

review period expired without the enactment of a 

joint resoliution of disapproval. As a result, the 

Commission’s 1988 recommendations went into 

effect and lhave the force of law. 

Implementation of the 1988 Commission’s recommendations was required to start by January, 1990, 

and to be completed by October, 1995. A5 of 

June, 1995, 14 of the 16 installations recommended for closure have been closed. 

Enactment of P.L. 100-526 constituted a recognition 

that consolidation in the military basing structure 

could be a way to realize savings in the defense 

budget, wlhile not impairing the ability of the 

armed forces to carry out their missions. Although 

designed to break the stalemate and balance the 

prerogatives of the two branches of government, 

the Congressional response was reminiscent of the 

base closing activities of the early 1960’s. Congressional critics claimed that the list unfairly targeted 

districts represented by certain members of Congress. The 1988 Commission was appointed by, 

and reported directly to, the Secretary of Defense. 

- 

4-2 CHAPTER 4 
It generated its own list of recommended closures 

and realignments. All hearings and votes %‘ere 

conducted in closed sessions. Little informal ion 

about how the Commission arrived at its recommendations was made available to the public. 

CHANGING WORLD SITUATION 

The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered 

the international political landscape. The [ate 

1980’s and early 1990’s saw the fall of the Berlin 

Wall, the demise of the Warsaw I’act, and the 

breakup of the Soviet Union. These events (hamatically changed U.S. military requirements. It 

became clear th!at our national defense posrure 

could be strengthened, and costs reduced, 

through a more efficient military base structure. At 

the same time, the rapidly growing national debt 

became an increasingly urgent political issue. 

Thus, base closures and realignments became a 

part of each 1niIita-y department’s budget strategy 

for balancing their base structure with their declining force structure. 

Public Law 100326, however, established a onetime only Commission, which expired on December 31, 1988. Consequently, closing bases was 

once again governed by the procedures mandated 

by Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Codeprocedures that had prevented base closures for 

over a decade. 

To address the problem of excess infrastructure, 

in January, 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard 

Cheney unilaterally proposed the closure of 35 

additional bases and the realignment or reduci.ion 

of forces at more than 20 other bases. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, however, had failed 

to provide specific written guidance to the military 

services and defense agencies on how to evaluate 

bases for possible closure or realignment. The services, consequently, all used different processes to 

come up with heir recommendations. 

As in the past, the 1990 recommendations submitted by Secretary Cheney were met with Congressional protests that the list was politically 

influenced. And, ;is in the past, Congress was criticized for being institutionally incapable of making 

decisions that were good for the country but painful for some congressional districts. Recognizing 

the need to further reduce the defense base structure, and to ensure a fair process, Congress 

passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-5101, 

This law effectively halted all closures l)ased on 

the Secretary’s January, 1990, list and required 

new procedures for closing or realigning Ixises. 

(Title XXIX of P.L. 10 1-510, as anientlecl, appears 

in Appendix F). 

P.L. 101-510: THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSlJRE 

AND REILLIGNMENT COMMISSION 

Signed by President Bush on November 5, 1990, 

P.L. 101-510 created an independent, five-year 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Coininission (PFKRC) with closure rounds in 17713 1793, 

and 19955. The act outlines procedures, roles, and 

time lines for the President, Congr 

of Defense, General ,4ccounting 

Commission to follow. 

The 1990 legislation required that all bases be 

compared equally against the Department of 

Defense’s current force-structure plan and Congressionally approved selection criteria. For each 

of the three DBCRC rounds, the services and DoD 

agencies submit their candidates for closure and 

realignment to the Secretary of Ilefense for his 

review. After reviewing service candiclates, the 

Secretary submits his reconimenclations to III3CKC 

for its review. 

The Commission has four months to scriitinize 

and anallyze the Secretary’s recommendations. In 

addition, the Commission possesses the authority 

to add, delete, or modify the Secretary‘s list. On 

July 1, Ithe Commission submits its report with 

recommendations to the President for his consideration. ’The President has 15 days to either :iccept 

or reject the Commission’s recoinmendatioiis in 

their entirety; if he rejects them, the Commission 

can give the President a revised list of recoinmendations. If the President accepts the Commission’s 

recommendations, he forwards the list to the Congress. The law provides Congress with only two 

options: do nothing and accept the list, or reject it 

in full by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. 

If such a resolution is passed hy Imth Houses of 

Congress, it would be subject to ;I veto I)y the 

President. In the absence of a joint resolution of 

disapproval, the Conmission‘s recommendations 

have the force of law. 

The DBCRC was created “to provide a fair process 

that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United 

States.” htablished as an independent l’resiclential 

Commission, lawmakers intended DRCKC to he ;I 
model of open government. Public Law 101-510 

required each Cornmission to conduct public heirings on the Secretary of Defense’s list of closures 

and realignments and on any proposed changes 

to those recommendations. In addition, its records 

are open to public scrutiny. 

Procedurally, the 1988 DoD Commission and the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

differ substantially. The 1988 Commission, working 

for the Secretary of Defense, generated its own list 

of recommended closures and realignments. Undier 

the current law, Ihe Defense Base Closure arid 

Realignment Commission independently reviews 

and analyzes the Secretary of Defense’s reconimendations and submits its findings and reconimendations directly to the President. To ensure an 

independent process, the law requires the General 

Accounting Office (GAO) to provide the Commission a detailed analysis of the Secretary of 

Defense’s recommendations and selection process. 

The GAO also assists the Commission in its anal![- 

sis of the Secretary’s recommendations. 

The process by which the DBCRC operates is also 

uniquely open and insulated from partisan politics. 

The Commission meets only during the nonelection 

years of 1991, 1993, and 1995. All meetings and 

hearings are open to the public. The DBCRC provides numerous opportunities to receive testimony 

and viewpoints from interested parties, as well as 

community and Congressional leaders. Transcripts of 

hearings, correspondence, and other data received 

by the Commission are available for public review. 

Every major site proposed for closure is visited by 

at least one commissioner, in order to gain a firsthand look at the installations, as well as to provide the public with an opportunity to explain the 

economic and other impacts a closure would have 

on the local community. 

THE 1991 COMMISSION 

As provided in the statute, the DBCRC consists of 

eight members appointed by the President, with 

the advice and consent of the Senate. In selecting 

individuals to be nominated for membership on 

the Commission, the President is duected to consult with the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two 

members, the majority leader of the Senate concern-- 

ing the appointment of an additional two members, 

and the minority leaders of both Chambers for one 

member each. The final two appointments are 

made independently by the President. 

The 1991 Commission was chaired by former Representative Jim Courter. Other commissioners 

were William L. Ball 111; Howard H. Callaway; 

General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (ret.); Arthur 

Levitt, Jr.; James C. Smith 11; Robert D. Stuart, 

Jr.; and Alexander 8. Trowbridge (Commissioner 

Trowbridge resigned from the Commission on 

May 17, 1991). 

The Comnission received Secretary of Defense 

Cheney’s .recommendations on April 12, 1991. It 

held 47 base visits, 14 regional hearings, and 9 

investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. The 

Commission sent its report to the President on 

July 1, 1991, recommending the closure of 34 

bases and the realignment of 48 others. These 

actions generated an estimated FY 1332-1337 net 

savings of $2.3 billion and recurring savings of 

$1.5 billion annually after a one-time cost of $4.1 

billion. This represented a reduction of approximately 5.4 percent of the domestic base structure. 

The President accepted all of the Commission’s 

recommendations on July 11, 1991, and forwarded 

the Commission’s report with his approval to the 

Congress. On July 30, 1991, by a vote of 60 to 

364, the House rejected a resolution of disapproval. Consequently, the recommendations of the 

1991 Commission have the force of law. 

Major base closures and realignments of the 1991 

Commissioin include: 

26 CLOSURE3 

Eaker Air Force Base, AR 

Williams Air Force Base, A2 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

Fort Ord, CA 

Hunters Point Annex, CA 

Moffett Naval Air Station, CA 

Naval Electronic System Engineering 

Center, Sari Diego, CA 

Naval Station Long Beach, CA 

Sacramento Army Depot, CA 

Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Fort Ben Harrison, IN 

Grissom Air Force Base, IN 

England Air Force Base, LA 

Fort Devens, MA 

Loring Air Force Base, ME 

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI 

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO 

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH 

Naval Slation Philadelphia, PA 

- 

4-4 CHAPTER 4 
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA 

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, 7X 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

Chase Field Naval Air Station, ’IX 

Naval Station Puget Sound, WA 

19 REALIGNMEN’lrS 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Beak Air Force Base, CA 

Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA 

Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA 

Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City, FL 

MacDill Air Force Rase, FL 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

Naval Avionics Center, Indianpolis, IN 

Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN 

Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY 

Fort Polk, LA 

Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head. MD 

Naval Surface Weapons Center, White Oaks, MI) 

Aviation Systems Cominand/Troop Support 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA 

Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 

Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ 

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station, 

The 1991 closures and recommendations were 

required to begin in July, 1773 and must be completed by July, 1997. As of June, 1975, 17 of the 26 

major inst:lllations have been closed and two more 

are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995 

(a complete list of the 1771 recommendations is 

contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, 

and in Appendix M by military service). 

Command, MC) 

Keyport, WA 

THE 1993 COMMISSION 

The second Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to operate under P.L. 101-510 

was again chaired by former Kepresentative Jim 

Courter, the 1991 Commission chair. Other commissioners included Captain Peter B. Bowman, 

USN (ret.); Beverly R. Byron; Rebecca G. Cox; 

General EIansfortl T. Johnson, USAF (ret.); Arthur 

Levitt, Jr.; Harry C. Mcl’herson, Jr.; and Kobert D. 

Stuart, Jr. (Commissioner Levitt, who also served as 

a commissioner during the 1971 round, resigned 

from the Commission on May 4, 1773, folloming 

his appointment by President Bill Clinton to be 

Chairnian of the Securities and Exchange Commission). 

The Commission received Secretary of Defense 

Aspin’s recornmendations for base closures and 

realignments on March 12, 1993. The Commission 

held 125 base visits, 17 regional hearings, and 16 

investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. It submitted its report to the President on July 1, 1993, 

recoinmeinding the closure of 130 bases and the 

realignment of 45 others. Estimated FY 1994- 1799 

net savings was approximately $3.8 billion after 

one-time costs of approxiinately $7.43 billion. The 

savings from these actions are estimated to total 

approximately $2.33 billion annually. These approved closures and realignments represent a further reduction of approximately 6.2 percent of the 

domestic base structure. 

Major base closures and realignments of the 1993 

Commission include: 

28 CLOSURES 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Ho’spital Oakland, CA 

Naval Station Treasure Island, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, E’L 

Naval Aviation Depot I’ensacola, FL 

Naval Training Center (Irlando, FL 

Naval Air Station Agana, GU 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Station Glenview, IL 

O’Hare International Airport Air Reserve 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base. MI 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Plattsliurgh Air Force Base, NY 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, OH 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

Defense Clothing Factory, PA 

Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC 

Naval Station Charleston, SC 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Aviation Depot Korfolk, VA 

Vint Hill Farms, \.’A 

Station, IL 

St. Inigoes, MD 
13 REALIGNMENTS 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

March Air Force Base, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren) 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Griffiss Air Force 13ase, NY 

Fort Monmouth, MJ 

Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI 

Naval Air Station Memphis, ’I” 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

The President accepted all of the Commission’s 

recommendations on July 2, 1993, and forwarded 

the Commission’s report with his approval to the 

Congress. On September 20, 1993, by a vote of 

12-83, the Senate rejected a resolution of disapproval of the Commission’s recommendations. 

Consequently, the recommendations of the 1993 

Commission have the force of law. The 1993 recommendations are required to begin by July, 

1995, and must be completed by July, 1999. As (of 

June 1995, four of the 1993 major closures have 

occurred, and another four are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995 (a complete list of the 

1993 Commission’s recommendations are contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, and 

in Appendix M by military service). 

4-6 CHAPTER 4 
CHAPTER 5 

THE 19525 PROCESS 

AND PROCEDURES 

Composition of the 1995 Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission 

The commissioners chosen to serve on the 1095 

round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in 

public service, h’usiness, and the military. In accordance with the enacting statute, two comcnissioners were nominated in consultation with the 

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, two 

in consul.tation with the U.S. Senate Majority 

Leader, arid one commissioner with the advice of 

each of the House and Senate Minority Leaders. 

The two remaining nominations were made independently by the President. 

The Commission staff was drawn from divergent 

backgrounds encompassing government, Lw, 

academia, and the military. In addition to those 

hired directly by the Commission, other staff were 

detailed from the Department of Defense, the 

General .4ccounting Office, the Department of 

Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, 

the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. The expertise 

provided by the detailees from these diverse pvernment agencies contributed significantly to the 

Commission’s independent review and analysis effort. 

The Commission’s review and analysis staff was 

divided into five teams-Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Interagency Issues, and Cross Service. A directhire civilian managed each of the teams in accordance with the amended law which also limits the 

number of Department of Defense analysts to 20 

percent of the total professional analysts. 

THE 1995 BAlSE CLOSURE PROCESS 

KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LAW 

Public Law 101-‘510, as amended, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed 

military base closures and realignments to the 

Commission by March 1, 1975 (see Appendix F). 

In accordance with the statute, these recommendations must be based upon the force-structure 

plan submitted to Congress with the Department 

of Defense budget request for Fiscal Year 1996, 

and upon final criteria developed by the Secretary 

of Defense and approved by Congress. For the 

1995 Commission process, the Secretary of 

Defense announced in December, 1994, that the 

final critt:ria would be identical to those used during the 1991 and 1793 base closure round. 

The Secrletary of Defense based the force-structure 

plan on an assessment of the probable threats to 

national security during the six-year period beginning in 1995, as well as the anticipated levels 

of fiindiing that would be available for national 

defense (see Appendix G). 

The final criteria cover a broad range of military, 

fiscal, arid environmental considerations. The first 

four criteria, which relate to military value, were 

given priority consideration. The remaining four 

criteria, which address return on investment, 

economic impact, community infrastructure, and 

environmental impact, are important factors that 

may miligate against the military value criteria 

(see Appendix H). 

The law requires the Commission to hold public 

hearings on base closure and realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and on 

any cha.nges proposed by the Commission to 

those rt:commendations. The Commission must 

report it:; findings to the President by July 1, 1995, 

based o:n its review and analysis of the Secretary 

of Defense’s recommendations. To change any of 

the Secretary’s recommendations, the Commission 

must find the Secretary deviated substantially from 

the force-structure plan and final selection criteria. 

Once the President receives the Commission’s 

final report, he has until July 15, 1995 to approve 

or disapprove the recommendations in their 
entirety. If approved, the report is sent to the 

Congress, which then has 45 days to reject the 

report by a joint resolution of disapproval; otherwise, the report has the force of law. If the President disapproves the Commission's recommendations in whole or in part, he must transmit 

to the Conmission and the Congress his reasons 

for disapproval. The Commission then has until 

August 15, 1995, to submit a revised list of recornmendations to the President. At that point, the 

President either forwards the revised list to Congress by September 1, 1995, or the 1995 base 

closure process is terminated with no action taken 

to close or realign bases. The law prohibits the 

President or Congress from making any amendments to the recommendations, thereby requiring 

an "all-or-nothing" acceptance or rejection of the 

recommendations. 

The 1995 Commission thoroughly analyzed all of 

the information used by the Secretary of Defense 

to prepare the recommendations. The Commission 

held a total of 13 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. Military Department representatives 

directly responsible for the Secretary's recommendations testified before the Commission. In addirtion, several defense and base closure experts 

from the Federal government and private sector 

testified about the specifics of the base closure 

process, the potential impacts of the Secretary of 

Defense's recommendations, and ways the Federal 

government could better assist communities with 

re-use activities. The commissioners and staff 

members conducted over 206 fact-finding visits to 

military activities recommended by the Secretaqr 

of Defense and considered by the Commission for 

closure or realignment. Further, the Commission 

held 16 regional hearings to hear directly from 

communities nationwide, heard from hundreds of 

Members of Congress who testified before the 

Commission, and received over 200,000 letters 

from concerned citizens across the country. Finally, 

the Commission received input from the General 

Accounting Office, as required by the base closure 

statute, which included a report containing its 

evaluation of DoD's selection process (see Appendix 0 and Appendix PI. 

Based on the information gathered and the analyses performed, alteinatives and further additions 

to the Secretary's list were considered. To perform 

a thorough analysis and consider all reasonable 

options, the commissioners voted on March 7, 

1995, and on May 10, 1995, to add a total of 36 

installations for further consideration as alternatives and additions to the 146 bases recommended 

for closure or realignment by the Secretary of 

Defense. As required by law, the Commission published the required notice on May 17, 1995, in the 

Federal Rqkter to inform communities their bases 

were under consideration by the Commission for 

possible closure or realignment. Public hearings 

were held for each of the installations the Commission added for consideration and each major 

base was visited by at least one Commissioner 

(see Appendix J). 

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

(OSD) GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY 

DEPARTMENTS AND DEFENSE AGENCIES 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the 

policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities 

for base realignment or closure (BRAC) actions by 

memorandum dated January 7, 1994. This policy 

guidance provided the Secretaries of the military 

departments and the directors of the defense 

agencies with the responsibility to provide the 

Secretary of Defense with recommendations for closures and realignments. This policy also required 

the Secretaries of the military departments and 

Directors of the defense agencies to develop recommendations based exclusively upon the forcestructure plan and final selection criteria, consider 

all U.S. military installations (as defined in the 

law) equally, analyze their base structure using 

llke categories of bases, use objective measures 

for the selection criteria wherever possible, and 

allow for the exercise of military judgment in 

selecting bases for closure and realignment. 

The Deputy Secretary also established the BRAC 

95 Review Group and the BRAC 95 Steering Group 

to oversee the entire BRAC process. The BKAC 95 

Review Group was composed of senior level representatives from each of the military departments, 

Chairpersons of the BRAC 95 Steering Group and 

each Joint Cross-Service Group, and other senior 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Joint Staff, and Defense Logistics Agency. It provided oversight and policy for the entire BRAC 

process. The BRAC 95 Steering Group assisted the 

Review Group in exercising its authorities. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic 

Security was given the responsibility to oversee 

the 1995 process, and was delegated authority to 

issue additional instructions. 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued the interim 

force-structure plan, as directed by the Deputy 

- 

5-2 CHAPTER j 
Secretary's January 7, 1974, memorandum. on 

February ;', 1794. The Department issued the final 

selection criteria in the /;ederul Kegistecr on Deccbmher 7, 1074. The Deputy Secretary provided the 

final force-structure plan on January 11, 1995. ?'his 

Plan was updated on Febru:iry 33? 1775, hy the 

Deputy Secretary to reflect budget decisions, ;ind 

was provitrled to (Congress and the Commission on 

the same (lay. 

JOINT CROSS-SERVICE FUNCTIONS 

The 1993 Defenx Hasc Closure anti Kealignment 

Commission recommended that the rlepartment 

develop procedures for considering potential joint 

or cornmon activities among the military departments. For BRAC 95, the Deputy Secretary directed the creation of Joint Cross-Service Gro tips 

UCSGs) to consider these issues in conjunction 

with the military dep.1 r t ments. 

In the January 7. 1794, RKAC policy guidance. :md 

further articulated in BIUC Policy Memoranc,urn 

Number Two (issued on November 2, 1994). the 

Deputy Secretary announced a process invohring 

both JCSGs ancl the individual military departments. This process was designed to establish alternatives for closure and realignment in situations 

involving common support functions for five functional are.as. The five functional areas were: Dt:pot 

Maintenance, Military hledical Treatment Facili:ies, 

Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Pi lot Training, 

and 1,aboratories. Additionally, the Ilepartnient 

created an Economic Impact Group. 

The E,conomic Impact Group included representatives from the military departnients and the Ol'fice 

of the Secxetary of Defense. For a year, the Group 

reviewed metholds for analyzing economic irnpact, 

established common measures and approaches, 

and developed :i computer-based system to facilitate the analysis of economic impact, including 

cumulative economic impact. 

The Ilepartment considered both cumulative economic impact and historical trends of economic 

activity as part of the economic impact criterion. 

In response to concerns raised Iiy the 1973 Defense 

Rase Closure and Realignment Commission and 

the General Accounting Office, DoD analyzed economic impact and cumulative economic impact as 

relative measures for comparing alternatives. IIoD 

did not establish threshold values, above whkh it 

would remove bases from consideration. 

Economic impact was considered at two stages in 

The militaiy departments, in developing their recorumendations. developed and analyzed data reflecting the economic impacts of 

prior BRAC rounds, as well as proposed Department actiions during the current round. Once the 

sewice recommendations were made to the Secretary of Defense, the economic impacts were reviewed again, to determine whether there were 

instances in which separate service actions might 

have affected the same locality. 

Each the Joint Cross-Service Groups developed 

eXceSS Capacity reduction goals, eStdbliShed data 

collection procedures and milestone schedules for 

cross-service analysis of common support functions, and presented alternatives to the military 

departments for their consideration in developing 

recommendations. The JCSGs issued their alternatives to the military departments in November, 

1994, and these alternatives were to be considered 

as part of their ongoing BRAC analysis. 

THE ARMY PROCESS 

The Army grouped all installations into categories 

with sirnihr missions, capabilities, and characteristics. After developing a set of measurable attributes related to Don's four selection criteria for 

military value, the Army then assigned weights to 

reflect the relative importance of each measure. 

The Army then collected data on its installations 

and estimated relative importance, using established quantitative techniques to assemble installaUsing both the installation assessments and its stationing strategy, the Army determined the military 

value of each installation. These appraisals represented the Army's best judgment on the relative 

merit of each installation and were the basis for 

selecting installations that were studied further for 

closure lor realignment. 

Once the list of final study candidates received 

approval by the Secretary of the Army, a variety of 

alternatives were examined in an effort to identify 

the most feasible ancl cost-effective m'ay to close 

or realign. The Army applied Doll's remaining 

four selection criteria by analyzing the financial, 

economic, community. and environmental impacts 

of each alternative using Don's standard models. 

The Army's senior leaders reviewed the results of 

these analyses and discontinued studies of alternatives 

they found financially or operationally unfeasible. 
During the course of the study effort, the Arrny 

Audit Agency performed independent tests and 

evaluations to check mathematical computations 

and emure the accuracy of data and reasonableness of assumptions throughout every step of 

analysis. The General Accounting Office monitored the Army’s process from the very beginning 

and met regularly with the Army’s auditors, ,as 

well as officials from The Army Basing Study 

(TABS) office. 

THE NAVY PROCESS 

The Secretary of the Navy established a Base 

Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC), and a 

Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) to providie 

staff suppoit to the BSEC. The BSEC had eight 

members, consisting of senior Department of the 

Navy (DON) career civilians and Navy flag and 

Marine Corps general officers, who were responsible for developin,g recommendations for closure 

and realignment. 

The BSAT was composed of military and civilian 

analysts who were tasked to collect data and to 

perform analysis for the BSEC. The Naval Audit 

Service reviewed tlhe activities of the BSEC anti 

the BSAT to ensure compliance with the approved 

Internal Control Plan and audited the accuracy 

and reliability of data provided by DON activities. 

The Office of the General Counsel provided seniorlevel legal advice and counsel. 

In compliance withi the Internal Control Plan, a 

Base Structure Data Base (BSDB) was developed. 

Data included in the BSDB had to be certified as 

accurate and complete by the officer or civilian 

employee who initia,lly generated data in response 

to the BSEC request for information, and then at 

each succeeding level of the chain of command. 

In conjunction with the requirement to keep 

records of all meetings that were part of the decision-making process, the BSDB and the certification policy were designed to ensure the accuracy, 

completeness, and integrity of the information upon 

which the DON recommendations were based. 

The BSEC developed five major categories for 

organizing its military installations for analysis and 

evaluation: Operational Support, Industrial Support, Technical Centerslhboratories, Educational/ 

Training, and Personnel Support/Other. These categories were then further divided into 27 subcategories to ensure that like installations were 

compared to one another and to allow identification of total capacity and military value for an 

entire category of installations. Within these 27 

subcategories were 830 individual Navy or Marine 

Corps installations or activities, each of which was 

reviewed during the BRAC 95 process. 

Data calls were issued to these installations, tailored to the subcategory in which the activity was 

grouped, to obtain the relevant certified information relating to capacity and military value. “Conglomerate” activities having more than one 

significant mission received multiple capacity data 

calls and military value analyses relating to those 

missions. The certified responses to these data 

calls were entered into the BSDB and formed the 

sole basis ffor BSEC determinations. 

Capacity analysis compared the present base 

structure to the future force-structure requirement 

for each subcategory of installations to determine 

whether excess base structure capacity existed. If 

total capacity was greater than the future required 

capacity, excess capacity was determined to exist, 

and the mditary value of each installation in a 

subcategory was evaluated. If there was no meaningful excess capacity, no further closure or realignment analysis was conducted. Of the 27 

subcategories, eight of them demonstrated either 

little or no excess capacity. 

The remaining 19 subcategories underwent military value analysis to assess the relative military 

value of installations within a subcategory, using a 

quantitative methodology that was as objective as 

possible. Information from the military value data 

call responses was displayed in a matrix and 

scored by the BSEC according to relative importance for a particular subcategory. A military value 

score for a particular installation was a relative 

measure of military value only within the context 

of the subcategory in which that installation was 

analyzed, in order to compare one installation in a 

subcategory against another installation in that 

category. 

The results of the capacity analyses and military 

value analyses were then subjected to configuration analysis. Multiple solutions were generated 

that would satisfy capacity requirements for the 

future force-structure while maintaining the average military value of the retained installations at a 

level equal to or greater than the average military 

value for all of the installations in the subcategory. 

The configuration analysis solutions were then 

used by the BSEC as the starting point for the 

application of military judgment in the develop- 

- 

5-4 CHAPTER 5 
ment of potential closure and realignment scenarios to undergo return on investment analysis. 

Additionally, the Joint Cross-Service Groups generated numerous alternatives derived from their 

analysis of data and information provided by the 

military departments. As a result of the scenario 

development portion of the process, the BSEC developed 174 scenarios involving 119 activities. 

Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or “COBRA” 

analyses were conducted on all of these scenarios. 

The BSEC used the COBRA algorithms as a tool to 

ensure that its reconunendations were cost effective. 

The impact on the local economic area was calculated using the DoD BRAC 95 Economic Impact 

Data Rase. The EISEC also evaluated the ability of 

the existing local (community infrastructure at potlential receiving installations to support additional 

missions and personnel. The impact of increases 

in base personnel on such infrastructure items as 

off-base housing availability, public and private 

schools, public transportation, fire and police protection, health care facilities, and public utili1:ies 

was assessed. 

Once the BSEC had determined the candidates for 

closure or realignment, an environmental summary was prepared which compared the environmental management efforts at losing and gaining 

sites. Differences in environmental management 

effort were presented as they relate to such programs as threatened or endangered species, wetlands, cultural resources, land use, air quality, 

environmental facilities, and installation restoration sites. The environmental impact analysis permitted the BSE,C to obtain a comprehensive 

picture of the potential environmental impacts 

arising from the recommendations for closure .and 

realignment. 

THE AIR FORCE PROCESS 

The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Ehse 

Closure Executive Group of six general officers 

and seven comparable (Senior Executive Service) 

civilians. Additionally, an Air Staff-level Base Closure Working Group was formed to provide :staff 

support and additional detailed expertise for the 

Executive Group. Plans and Programs General Officers from the Mijor Commands (MAJCOM) met on 

several occasions with the Executive Group to 

provide mission specific expertise and greater 

base-level information. Additionally, other potential 

service impacts were coordinated by a special interservice working group. 

~- 

The Executive Group c~eveloped a Base Closure 

Internal Control Plan that was approved by the 

Secretary of the Air Force. This plan provided 

structure and guidance for all participants in the 

base closure process, including procedures for 

data gathering and certification. 

The Executive Group reviewed all active and Air 

Reserve Component (ARC) installations in the 

United States that met or exceeded the Section 

2687, Title 10 U.S.C. threshold of 300 direct-hire 

civilians authorized to be employed. Data 011 all 

applicable bases were collected via a comprehensive and detailed questionnaire answered at hase 

level with validation by the MAJCOM and Air 

Staff. All data were evaluated and certified in 

accordance with the -4ir Force Internal Control 

Plan. As an additional control measure, the Air 

Force Audit Agency was tasked to continuously 

review the Air Force process for consistency with 

the law ;and Doll policy and to ensure the data 

collection and validation process was adequate. A 

baseline capacity analysis evaluated the physical 

capability of a base to accommodate additional 

force-structure and other activities (excess ctipacity) beyond what was programmed to be stationed 

at the base. 

All data used in the preparation and submission of 

information and recommendations concerning the 

closure or realignment of military installations 

were certified as to its accuracy and completeness 

by appropriate officials at base level, MAJCOM, 

and Air Staff level. In addition, the Executive 

Group and the Secretary of the Air Force certified 

that all information contained in the Air Force 

detailed analysis and all supporting data were 

accurate and coniplete to the hest of their knowledge and belief. 

The Hxecutive Group placed all bases in categories, Ixs’ed on the installation’s predominant mission. When considered by category, the results of 

the baseline capacity analysis represented the 

maximum potential base closures that could he 

achieved within each category. The results of the 

baseline excess capacity analysis were then used 

in conjunction with the approved DoD forcestructure plan in determining base structure 

requirements. Other factors were also considered 

to determine actual capabilities for base reductions. The capacity analysis was also used to identify cost effective opportunities for the beddown 

of activities and aircraft dislocated from bases recommended for closure and realignment. 

THE 1995 PROCESS AND PROCEDLRES 5-5 
Bases deemed militarily or geographically unique 

or missionessential were approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for exclusion from furtlher 

closure consideration. Capacity was analyzed by 

category, based oa a study of current base capacity and the future requirements imposed by the 

force-structure plan. Categories and subcategories 

having no excess capacity were recommended to 

and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for 

exclusion from further study. 

All non-excluded active component bases in the 

remaining categories were individually examined 

on the basis of ad1 eight selection criteria esta.blished by the Secretary of Defense, with over 250 

sub-elements to the grading criteria. These subelements were developed by the Air Force to provide specific data points for each criterion. 

Under Deputy Secretary of Defense direction, the 

Executive Group and the Secretary of the Air 

Force considered and analyzed the results of the 

efforts of Joint Cross-Service Groups in the areas 

of Depot Maintenance, Laboratories, Test artd 

Evaluation, Undergraduate Pilot Training, artd 

Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate 

Medical Education. The Joint Cross-Service Groups 

established data elements, measures of merit, and 

methods of analysis for their functional areas. Thle 

Air Force collected data as requested by the joint 

groups, following ithe Air Force’s Internal Control 

Plan. After receiving data provided by each of the 

Services, the joint groups developed functional 

values and alternatives for the activities under 

their consideration. These alternatives were reported 

to the Military Departments for consideration in 

their processes. 

The ARC category, comprised of Air NationaJ 

Guard and Air Force Reserve bases, warrants further explanation. First, these bases do not readily 

compete against each other, as ARC units enjoy a 

special relationship with their respective states 

and local communities. Under Federal law, relocating Guard units across state boundaries is not 

practical alternative.. In addition, careful consideration must be given to the recruiting needs OF 

these units. Realignment of ARC units onto active 

or civilian, or other ARC installations, however, 

could prove cost effective. Therefore, the ARC category was examined for cost effective relocations 

to other bases. 

THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PROCESS 

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is not directly 

identified in the DoD force-structure plan. Therefore, DLA developed Concepts of Operations to 

translate the effects of the force-structure plan 

within the Agency’s mission planning. 

The DLA Director established a Base Realignment 

and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate senior executives from the Agency’s business and staff areas. The Group included both 

senior level civilian and military personnel, and 

was chaired by the Principal Deputy Director. 

The Executive Group served as senior advisors to 

direct the 1995 study effort and present activity 

realignment and closure candidates for the 

Director’s final recommendation to the Secretary 

of Defense. A BRAC Working Group was also 

established under the direction of the Executive 

Group. The Working Group developed analytical 

tools, collected and analyzed certified data, developed and evaluated alternative scenarios for Executive Group consideration, conducted sensitivity 

analyses, and compiled documentation to support 

the final recommendations. 

The DLA BRAC analysis process ensured that all 

of the Agency’s activities were fully evaluated. 

Formal charters were developed for the Executive 

Group and the Working Group, and audit and 

internal coiitrol plans were developed to document 

the collection and use of accurate certified data. 

The Executive Group aggregated activities into 

categories and subcategories based on similarity 

of mission, capabilities, and attributes. From these, 

the followiing categories were defmed: Distribution Depots, Inventory Control Points, Service/ 

Support, and Command and Control Activities. 

Subcategonies were defined within the categories 

to ensure \hat the activities were evaluated in a 

fair and consistent manner. Where possible, activities were compared to peers of similar function 

and size. Activities identified for closure as a result 

of previous BRAC decisions were not evaluated. 

Comprehensive data calls were designed to support analysis of excess capacity; military value; 

and economic, environmental, and community 

impacts witlh certified data. The data call questionnaires were carefully designed to ensure uniform 

interpretation of questions, level of detail, and 

documentat ion requirements. Sources for the data 

were specified to the greatest extent practical. 

- 

5-6 CHAPTER 5 
DLA conducted an excess capacity analysis for 

each of the BRAC activity categories and subc;.tegories. Where significant amounts of excess capacity were f(iunci, these sites could be considered as 

possible receiver sites in potential realignment 

recommendations. 

The purpose of the military value analysis was to 

determine the relative ranking of each activity 

with respect to other activities in the same category or ,subcategory. OSD provided the military 

departments and the defense agencies with a list 

of selection criteria to be used as part of the 

military value analysis. The Executive Group developed more distinctive measures to assess the military value of DLA activities. The Measures of Merit 

used to develop military value were Mission 

Scope, Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandahility. 

The next step was to identify potential realignment or closure candidates and eliminate the 

remaining activities from further consideration. 

Military value, in conjunction with military ju dgment, was the primary consideration in deterniining prospective realignment or closure candidates. 

Once an a1ternal;ive was conceived, it was evaluated for reasonableness and then either refined or 

abandoned. DLA worked closely with each military department during this process to identify 

and consider potential excess space for joint .~se, 

to evaluate the impact of military department recommendations on its activities, and to ensure that 

the impacts of milital-~.. department recommendations were appropriately factored into the 

Agency's recommendations. 

The IILA BRAC Working Group evaluated potential realignment and closure scenarios using the 

COBRA model. The analysis results were reviewed 

by the HIlAC Working Group and presented to the 

Executive Group for further consideration. 

Each sceriario was considered in terms of its overall 

risk, benefit, and cost to the strategic direction of 

DLA and the interests of DoD. Rased on its review 

and tiest military judgment, the Executive Gro~ip 

made incliviclual recommendations to the Director. 

After the approval of the Director, the recommendations were then returned to the Working Group 

for economic, community infrastructure, and mvironmental impact assessments. The Working 

Group reported its findings to the Executive 

Group for further consideration as appropriate. 

An Internal Control Plan for the collection and 

analysis of data was developed for the HKAC 95 

process. The plm. issued May 23. 1994, m'as 

reviewed and approved by the DoD Inspector 

General and the General Accounting Office 

(GAO ). 

The DolD Inspector General personnel were 

responsible for ctata validation, fully participated 

in the Executive and Working Croup meetings, 

and observed the Working Group analysis process. 

GAO representatives also partjcipated in the DLA 

BRAC 951 process and attended Executive Group 

meetings, observed the Working Group analysis process, and visited selected field activities to 

observe the data collection and data validation 

processe,s. 

Upon completion of the impact assessments. recommendations were returned to the Executive 

Group. The Working Group presented the results 

of the impact analyses and supported additional 

Executive Group deliberations. The Executive 

Group discussed the impact assessments, conducted an extensive rwiew of each recomniendation, and approved selected recominendatioils. 

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE PROCESS 

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) Director 

established a Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate principals 

from headquarters, and chaired by the Deputy 

Director., Resources. The Executive Group acted ;is 

senior advisors to direct the analysis effort and 

present the Director's final recommendations to 

the Secretary of Defense. A BRAC Working Group 

was established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group was comprised of 

four hea.dquarters elements and two investigations 

control and automation elements. An Internal 

Control Plan mw developed to ensure that data 

were consistent and standardized, accurate and 

complete, certifiable, verifiable, auditable by 

external audit and inspection agencies, and 

replicable using documentation developed during 

data collection. 

The seliection process consisted of five steps to 

gather data and conduct analyses (1) collect data, 

(2) analyze military value, (3) develop alternatives, 

(4) perform COBRA analyses, and (5) determine 

impacts. 

~ ~ 

THE 1995 PROCE% AND PROCEDURES 5-7 
Military value criteria were given priority cons rderation Since the DoD Selection Criteria were 

designed specifically with the military services in 

nlind, the Executive Group developed more distinctive measures to assess the military value of 

DIS activities. The Measures of Merit used to 

develop military value were Mission Essentialiiy, 

Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and 

Expanda bility . 

The DIS used the COBRA model to assess die 

relative costs, savimgs, and return on investment 

of the alternatives. Working Group members gathered the necessary data regarding personnel, coilstruction, and renovation. 

The potential economic impact on communities 

was evaluated through the use of the BRAC 95 

Economic Impact Data Base. The ability of the 

potential losing and receiving location’s infrastructure to support each alternative was evaluated bly 

the Executive and Working Groups. Impacts weIe 

also evaluated in terms of readiness, effectiveness, 

and efficiency with regard to the ability of DIS to 

support its customers. The analysis also considered poiential environmental impacts at both the 

losing and gaining .sites for each alternative. 

The COBRA results, community and environmental impacts, and supporting rationale were presented to the Executive Groups for consideration 

and selection of the Agency’s final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/ 

Using certified data., the Secretaries of the military 

departments and Directors of the defense agencies developed their recommendations based on 

the approved final selection criteria and forcestructure plan, and submitted their base closure 

and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. As part 

of the Secretary’s review, the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Economic Security provided for 

Joint Staff and OSD review of the recommendations received from the military departments and 

defense agencies. 

The Joint Staff reviewed the recommendations 

from a warfighting perspective to ensure they 

would not adversely affect the military readiness 

capabilities of the armed services. The Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed all the military 

department and defense agency recommendations 

without oljection. 

JOINT CHIEFS OF s’rm REVIEW 

Key staff elements of the Ofice of the Secretary 

of Defense and the Joint Staff also reviewed the 

recommendations to ensure they would not sacrifice necessary capabilities and resources. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security 

reviewed the recommendations to ensure all eight 

selection criteria were considered and the recommendations were consistent with the forcestructure plan. This review also assured that DoD 

policies and procedures were followed and that 

the analyses were objective and rigorous. 

The Secretary approved the recommendations of the 

military departments and defense agencies and officially transmitted his list of closures and realignments to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignmelnt Commission on February 28, 1995. 

coMMIssIoN REVIEW 

The Commission established five teams within its 

Department of Review and Analysisone team to 

review each respective service application of the 

militaq value criteria to the base closure process, 

an Interagency Issues Team which reviewed the 

Defense Agencies’ application of the military value 

criteria to the base closure process, and a Cross 

Service Team to review the application of military 

value applied to depots, test and evaluation, and 

laboratories. Each team analyzed the services’ 

methodology to ensure general compliance with 

the law, to confirm accuracy of data, and to determine if basespecific recommendations were properly offered by the Secretary of Defense. 

In addition, the Interagency Issues Team analyzed 

the final four criteria-Return on Investment, Economic Impaicts, Community Infrastructure, and Environmental Impacts-across all services. The 

Interagency Issues Team also provided analysis on 

airspace issues when applicable. 

CRITERIA 1-4: MILITARY VALUE 

In accordansce with PL 101-510, as amended, all of 

the information used by the Secretary of Defense 

to prepare recommendations must be sent to Congress, the Commission, and the Comptroller General. Within the Commission, each team began its 

review and analysis with an examination of the 

documents provided by the services. First, teams 

determined whether the recommendations were 

based on the force-structure plan and eight criteria, 

and whether all bases were considered equally. 

Next, the teams considered if categories, subcategories, and base exclusions were reasonable. 

- 

5-8 CHAP’ER 5 
Each of the teanis reviewed the process the xrvices used to assess military value, as well as the 

reasonableness of the data they used. Each team 

examined the capacity analyses performed by the 

services and highlighted installation categories 

that required additional scrutiny. Specific data 

analyses included a review and independent 

of the COBRA input data and military 

construction cost estimates, as well as the capacity 

of receiver installations to accept missions. 

Throughout the review and analysis process, the 

Commission staff maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with base-associated communities 

who made significant contributions to the entire 

process. Staff members also accompanied commissioners on base visits, attended regional hearings, 

and v isittxl closure and realignment candidates 

and receiving installations. 

CRITE.RIA 5-8: COSTS, SAVINGS, AND IMPACTS 

While the first four selection criteria assessed military value and were given priority considerat ion, 

the remaining criteria were also applied in tme 

closure and realignment evaluations. Because 

these criteria were not driven by military considerations specific to a service, the commission’s 

Interagency Issues Team evaluated criteria application across all services to ensure process uniformity and compliance with the legal requirement to 

evaluate recommendations based on the final 

selection criteria. 

CRITERION 5: RETURN ON INVESTMENT 

As prescribed by OSD policy guidance, the COBRA model was used by the services and defense 

agencies to calculate costs, savings, net present 

value, and return on investment for base c1o:iure 

and realignment actions. Return on investment 

was ithe expected payback period in years for 

each proposed base closure or realignment. The 

COBRA input data consisted of standard facors, 

which generally remained constant, and base/scenario factors which were unique. Standard factor 

examples included civilian pay, national median 

home price, discount rates, and costs per mile of 

moving personnel and equipment. Exampki of 

bdse/:icenario factors included the nurnher of aulhorized personnel at a base, the size of the base: the 

number of personnel moving, and construction 

costs required by the move. The output data were 

used by each of the services and defense agencies 

in their decision-making process. 

All of the COBRA runs used by the services and 

defense agencies in formulating their recornmendations were provided to the Commission with 

the Sccretary’s list. Other COBRA runs were submitted by the services and defense agencies upon 

Comrriission request. The Commission thoroughly 

reviewed the services and defense agencies data 

throughout its evaluation process. 

The Commission also generated and ran its own 

COBRA models to evaluate various alternative 

realignment and closure scenarios. In total, including the original DoD submission COBRA runs, 

the staff received or generated nearly 400 COBRA 

runs for evaluation and consideration. Ten percent 

of these COBRA rim were generated by communities and submitted to the Commission for 

evaluation. In a number of these cases, the communities’ analyses identified important cost and 

savings issues. 

Another vital function performed by the Keview 

and Analysis Interagency Issues Team was to track 

the costs and savings estimates of DoD recommendations throughout the review and analysis 

process. During the tinie from February 28, 1995, 

when the list of recommendations was submitted 

to the Commission, until the final deliberations in 

late June, DoD modified the return on investment 

calculations for 64 of the original 146 recornmendations. Several of these revised COBRA runs substantially changed the estimate of the costs and 

savings associated with a particular realignment 

or closure action. In general, DoD originally underestimated the cost of executing realignment or 

closure actions and overestimated their projected 

savings. 

CRITERION 6: ECONOMIC IMPACT 

Two economists of the Commission’s Review and 

Analysis Interagency Issues Team, one detailed 

from the Department of Commerce (DOC) and 

one from the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), validated DoD’s compliance with 

Criterion 6 on economic impact. Their review included (1) analysis of economic procedures provided 

to the Services by DOD’s Joint Cross-Service 

Group on Economic Impact, (2) validation of 

personnel changes resulting from the current 

BRAC action, in particular providing consistency 

in personnel changes between the Economic 

Impact Database (EID) and the COBRA personnel 

summary reports, (3:) validation of employment 

data used in the economic impact equation and 

THE 1995 PROCESS Avn PROCED~JRES 5-9 
historical economic data used to demonstrate actual 

economic activity, (4) a validation of the economic areas assipfled to installations, and (5) an 

analysis of the indirect job multipliers used to 

measure indirect job impacts. 

The services generally complied with the O!iD 

guidance to estimate economic impact, and these 

impacts represented a “worst-case” estimate of job 

loss. Economic procedures used by the services 

complied with commonly used economic practbce 

for measuring regional economic impacts. Personnel changes were consistent, in the majority of 

installations, between EID and COBRA. Where inconsistencies occurred, the Commission directed 

the services to resolve them. Economic data were 

validated by comparing the data in the EID wii:h 

economic reports generated by the services and 

by validating these data from their sourcesDOC’S Bureau of Economic Analysis and Labor 

Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Commission validated assignment of installations to 

appropnate economic areas, consistent with the 

Office of Management and Budget’s Revised Standard for Defining Metropolitan Areas, as appropriate. 

The Conmission, with further assistance of FEMP,, 

assessed indirect job multipliers used by the services to estimate indirect job losses by independently computing imultipliers for 32 major bases 

included on the Secretary’s list. In most cases, the 

multipliers used by the services were greater than 

those estimated by FEMA. Where the FEMA multipliers were greater, the Commission questioned 

DoD’s Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic 

Impact about the apparent discrepancies. The 

Commission found, through these discussions, 

that the lower DoD multipliers were from adjust-. 

ments to standard multipliers to account for lower 

military wages and on-base services for DoD military personnel, compared to that of DoD civilian 

personnel. After this review, the Commission 

believed the indirect job multiplier values used 

by the services were consistent and complied with 

good economic practice. 

CRITERION 7: COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE 

The Commission’s Review and Analysis Interagency Issues Team validated DoD’s compliance 

with Criterion 7, “the ability of both the existing 

and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure 

to support forces, rrussions and personnel.” DoD 

did not provide specific guidance on how the 

services should evaluate this criterion. The services determined their own measures for adequacy of community infrastructure which were 

based as much as possible on existing data 

sources. Each service appeared to address its measures adequately, so that no substantial deviation 

from established criteria was identified. 

Amy: In its report to the Commission, the Army 

stated that Criterion 7 was addressed with Criterion 6 using DoD’s standard model to evaluate 

economic impacts. The Army provided no additional deslcription of its evaluation of community 

infrastructure. Some of the attributes selected for 

the Army’s military value analysis suggested that 

community infrastructure may have been taken 

into account in the analysis. These attributes 

included workforce statistics, cost of living index, 

family housing, health care index, and variable 

housing allowance. 

Nuvy The Navy rated selected aspects of community infrastructure in its military value analysis, 

including on- and off-base housing, child care 

availability, commute distance, access to education and health care, and crime statistics. Community infrastlvcture factors were rated and assigned 

weights for calculation within each installation category. The Navy’s data calls contained comprehensive listings and statistics on workforce 

attributes, spouse employment, education options, 

and ability of local infrastructure to accept growth 

at various levels. 

Air Force: The Air Force quantified and rated several sub-elements: off-base housing, transportation, crime rate, medical care, education, and 

off-base recreation. The Air Force assigned colorcoded ratings to the six sub-elements, which were 

averaged out to a single colorcode assigned for 

community infrastructure. The analysis relied on 

various national, local, and service-specific data 

sources. The Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) 

survey evaluated various cost-related factors for 

individual bases, and was used to derive the VHA 

paid to enlisted personnel. VHA data were used 

by the Air Force to assess off-base housing and 

commute information. It should be noted that the 

objectives of the VHA survey (to measure need for 

VHA) tend to influence survey responders to 

maximize negative responses. Thus, quality of life 

data derived from the VHA survey may appear 

to show a negative bias towards community 

infrastructure. 

- 

5-10 CHAPTER 5 
Defen.se ilgencie,s: The Defense Logistics Agency 

assessed commuinity impact by using data on local 

e c o nc )mi c indicators , transport at i on, u t i 1 it ies , 

workforce availability, housing, education, he.alth 

care, crime, and climate/environment. Data sources included Bureau of the Census, Department of 

Commerce, state agencies, local transit authorities, 

and published business directories. 

CRITERION 8: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 

An environmental analyst detailed to the 

Commission’s Kmeview and Analysis Interagency 

Issues Team from the Environmental Protec1:ion 

Agency validatecl Doll’s compliance with Criterion 

8 on environmental impact. The review included 

(1) review of D’oD guidance to the services and 

defen:ie :igencies. (2) review of each services’ 

analysis and recommendations, (3) review of selected base-specific data calls for each service, 

and (4) interviews with an environmental analyst 

from the BRAC staff of each service to clxify 

interpretation of DoD guidance. 

The 1)epartment required consideration of environmental impacts for closing, realigning, and 

receiving installations. Specifically, seven environmenta 1 attributes were to lie evaluated: threatened 

and endangered species, wetlands, historic and 

archeological sites, pollution control, hazardous 

materialsiwastes, land and air uses, and programrned environmental costs/cost avoidances. 

Guidance was issued in December 1994 which 

addressed environmental restoration and compliance (costs. The policy stated that “[elnvironmental 

restoration costs at closing bases are not to be 

considered for cost of closure calculations,” and 

cited DoD’s legal obligation for environmental restoration at any base, whether or not it closes. 

Environmental compliance costs, however, could 

be a :Factor in a base closure or realignment d.ecision, and were estimated for all facilities. 

The services and defense agencies generally complied with the DoD guidance in their evaluation of 

environmental impacts. The services applied different weighting, factors to environmental criteria, 

and some services selected certain environmental 

criteria to incorporate in their military value analysis. Specific comments follow: 

Army: The Army assessed some environmental impacts in its military value assessment as environmental carrying capacity. which measured ability 

to conduct current missions, receive additional 

units, and expand operations in light of environmental constraints. The Army also assessed environmental impacts and costs in Installation 

Environniental Baseline Summaries. Army documentation indicated that environmental factors did 

not imp& any recommended BRAC action. 

Nauy: The Navy selected certain environmental 

factors to include in most of its military value 

calculations, under “F:nvironnient and Encroachment.” These factors were selected and weighted 

differently for each subcategory of Navy facilities, 

as some environmental criteria were considered 

more significant to certain types of facilities. Of all 

environmental factors measured within military 

value evaluations, air quality was often assigned 

the greatest weight. All required environmental 

attributes and costs were assessed qua1it:itively in 

the base-specific environmental data calls. 

Air Force: The Air Force quantified air quality as 

one of seven sub-elements in its military value 

analysis under Criterion I1 (Availability and Conditions of Land, Facilities, and Associated Airspace). 

The Air Force addressed and weighted all other 

environnnental elements in general in Section VIII 

(Environmental Impact). Additional environmental 

information and costs were summarized in the 

base-specific data calls but were not weighted as 

criteria for comparison. The categories and level 

of detail for compliance costs varied from one 

base to another, and did not allow for effective 

comparison between bases. 

Defense Agencies: The Defense Logistics Agency 

sent environmental questionnaires to installations, 

and sent responses to the Commission. DLA stated 

any environmental factors that would limit an 

installation’s ability to expand were assessed. In 

two castes, Tracy/Sharpe and Ogden, air quality 

nonattaiiiment was viewed as a potential limitation on expansion. The Defense Investigative Service completed an environmental analysis for the 

structure from which it will move. 

General Comments: Air quality presented particular concerns for realigning and receiving candidate 

installations. The RRAC95 was the first round 

which {considered regulations for conformity 

under the 1990 Clean Air Act, which prohibits a 

Federal agency from supporting an action unless it 

determines that it conforms to the air quality 

implementation plan for the area. 

THE 1995 PROCFSS Ann PROCEDURE^ 5-1 1 
The Air Force appeared to assign air quality a 

greater weight than other services as they considered the military value implications. Air Force and 

DLA considered the probability of obtaining conformity determinations in making their recommendations. Although the Navy identified areas where 

conformity might be required, its recommendations assumed that implementation was possible, 

even at significant cost. The Army’s documentation did not indicate that air conformity concenis 

affected closures or realignments. 

THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING 

OFFICE (GAO) 

In compliance with Public Law 101-510, as 

amended, GAO evaluated DoD’s selection process, provided the Commission and Congress a 

report containing its detailed analysis of the process, and testified before the Commission on April 

17, 195. 

The GAO reported to Congress and the COmmksion that the services’ selection processes were 

generally sound, well documented, and should 

result in substantial savings. However, the recommendations and selection processes were not 

without problems and, in some cases, raised questions about the reasonableness of specific recornmendations. At the same time, GAO noted that 

improvements were made to the processes from 

prior rounds, including more precise categorization of bases and activities, resulting in more 

accurate comparisons between like facilities and 

functions, and better analytical capabilities. 

GAO reported that the DoD and its components 

included the requirement to use certified data, i.e., 

information that was accurate and complete to the 

best of the originator’s knowledge and belief. This 

requirement was designed to overcome concern; 

about the consistency and reliability of data used 

in the processes. GAO also found that the services 

improved their C0:jt and savings estimates for 

BRAC95 recommendations. In developing cosl 

estimates, they took steps to develop more current 

and reliable sources of information and placed 

greater reliance, where practicable, on standardized data. Some components sought to minimize 

the costs of base closures by avoiding unnecessary military construction. For example, the Navy 

proposed a number of changes to prior BRAC 

decisions that will further reduce infrastructure 

and avoid some previously planned closure costs. 

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission required DoD to explore opportunities for cross-service use of common support 

assets. For the 1335 round, the Department of 

Defense established cross-service review groups 

to provide the services with alternatives for 

realignments and closures in the areas of depot 

maintenance, laboratories, test and evaluation 

facilities, undergraduate pilot training, and medical treatment facilities. GAO found that DoD’s 

attempt at reducing excess capacity by proposing 

cross-service alternatives yielded some results. 

Agreements for consolidating similar work done 

by two or more of the services were limited, however, and opportunities to achieve additional 

reductions in excess capacity and infrastructure 

were missed. This was particularly true of depot 

maintenance activities and laboratory facilities. 

GAO also found that although the services have 

improved their processes with each succeeding 

BRAC round, some process problems continued to 

be identified. In particular, the Air Force’s process 

remained largely subjective and not well documented; also, it was influenced by preliminary estimates of base closure costs that changed when a 

more focused analysis was made. For these and 

other reasons, GAO questioned a number of the 

Air Force’s recommendations. To a lesser extent, 

some of the services’ decisions affecting specific 

closures and realignments also raised questions. 

For example, GAO found the Secretary of the 

Navy’s decision to exclude certain facilities from 

closure for economic impact reasons was not consistently applied. 

As stated above, GAO reported that, as in the 

past, key aspects of the Air Force’s 1995 process 

remained largely subjective and not well documented. Documentation of the Air Force’s process 

was too limited for GAO to fully substantiate the 

extent of Air Force deliberations and analyses. 

However, GAO determined that initial analytical 

phases of the Air Force process were significantly 

influenced by preliminary estimates of base closure 

costs. For example, some bases were removed 

from initial consideration based on these estimates. 

Also, in some instances, closure costs appeared to 

materially affect how the bases were valued. 

Relative to the Navy, GAO concluded its process 

was generally thorough and well documented. It 

pointed out, however, that the Secretary of the 

Navy excluded four activities in California, and 

- 

5-12 CHAPTEK 5 
one in Guam, from consideration for closure 

because of concerns over the loss of civilian positions. For the activities in California, the Secretary 

based his decision on the cumulative econoinic 

impact of closures from all three prior BRAC 

rounds. But the economic impact of the four California activities, ;IS defined by OSD criteria, is less 

on a locality basis than that for similar activities 

recommended for closure in other states either by 

the Nivy or by other Don components. In !:his 

case, however, OSD did not take exception to the 

inconsistency . 

GAO also found the Army’s process and recommendations to ble generally sound. GAO asserted 

the Army did not fully adhere to its regular process, however, in assessing military value when 

recommending minor and leased facilities for dosure. In selecting 15 minor sites for closure, the 

Army based its decision on the judgment of its 

major conlmands which assessed the sites as excess 

and of low miliitary value. In considering leased 

facilities, the Army relied on its stationing strategy 

and il:s guidancle to reduce leases but did not 

assess the: facilities separately as it did for other 

installations. The decisions were arrived at 

through some departure from the process used for 

installations. 

Regarding the Defense Logisitics Agency, GAO 

reported its process and recommendations mere 

well documented and flowed logically. 

Finally, GAO certified that the Defense Investigative 

Service’s recomrnendation was well documented 

and generally sound. 

THE 1995 PROCESS AND PROCEDURES 5-13 
AAA 

AAI’ 

ABM 

AFAA 

AFB 

AFEWES 

AFMC 

AFRES 

AGB 

AGS 

ALC 

AMSA 

ARB 

ARC 

ARS 

AS 

AS0 

ATCOM 

BEA 

BLS 

BOS 

BRAC 

BSAT 

BSDB 

BSEC 

C41 

CERCLA 

CHAMPLJ S 

CINC 

COBRA 

CONIJS 

DCMiiO 

DCMC 

DCMII 

DCSC 

APPENDIX A 

ABBKEVLATIONS 

Arrny Audit Agency 

Arrny Amunition Plant 

Anti-Ballistic Missile 

Air Force Audit Agency 

Air Force Base 

Air Force Electronic Warfare 

Air Force Materiel Command 

Air Force Reserve 

Air Guard Base 

Air Guard Station 

Air Logistics Center 

Area Maintenance Support Activity 

Air Reserve Rase 

Air Reserve Component 

Air Reserve Station 

Air Station 

Aviation Supply Office 

Aviation Troop Command 

Bureau of Economic Analysis 

Bureau of Labor Statistics 

Base Operating Support 

Base Realignment and Closure 

Base Structure Analysis Team 

Base Structure Data Base 

Base Structure Evaluation Committee 

Command, Control, 

Communications, Computers, 

and Intelligence 

Response, Compensation and 

Liabilities Act 

Civilian Health and Medical Program 

of the Uniformed Services 

Commander-in-Chief 

Cost of Base Realignment Action:i 

Continental United States 

Defense Contract Management Area 

Defense Contract Management 

Defense Contract Management 

Defense Construction Supply Center 

Evaluation Simulator 

Co’mprehensive Environmental 

Operations 

Command 

District 

DDAA 

DDCO 

DDJC 

DDLP 

DDMC 

DDMT 

DDOU 

DDRT 

DDRV 

DDSP 

DDST 

DERA 

DESC 

DFSC 

DGSC 

DIS 

DISC 

DLA 

DLSC 

DOC 

DoD 

DoD IG 

DOE 

DO1 

DON 

DPSC 

DRMS 

DSDC 

EDA 

EFA YW 

EIG 

EPA 

Distribution Depot Anniston, 

Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio 

Distribution Depot San Joaquin, 

Distribution Depot Letterkenny, 

Distribution Depot McClellan, 

Distribution Depot Memphis, 

Distribution Depot Ogden, LJtah 

Distribution Depot Red River, ‘Texas 

Distribution Depot Richmond, 

Distribution Depot Susquehanna, 

Distribution Depot San Antonio, 

Defense Environmental Restoration 

Defense Electronics Supply Center 

Defense Fuel Supply Center 

Defense General Supply Center 

Defense Investigative Service 

Defense Industrial Supply Center 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Logistics Services Center 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Defense 

Department of Defense Inspector 

Department of Energy 

Department of Interior 

Department of Navy 

Defense Personnel Support Center 

Defense Reutilization And Marketing 

DLA Systems Design Center 

Economic Development 

Engineering Field Activity Northwest 

Engineering Installation Group 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Alabama 

California 

Pennsylvania 

California 

Tennessee 

Virginia 

Pennsylvania 

Texas 

Account 

General 

Service 

Administration 
FISC 

FSC 

GAO 

GSA 

IAP 

IC&AD 

ICP 

ISSC 

IUSS 

JPAT 

JCSG 

LANTIRN 

LMI 

MAJCOM 

MAP 

MCAF 

MCAS 

MCB 

MCLB 

MSA 

NADEP 

NAESU 

NAF 

NAS 

NATSF 

NAVAIR 

NAVFAC 

NAVMASSO 

NAVSEA 

NAWC 

NBDL 

NCCOSC 

NCR 

NESEC 

NETC 

NHRC 

NISE 

NISMC 

NMRI 

NPRDC 

NPS 

NPV 

NRC 

NRD 

NRL 

Fleeit and Industrial Supply Center 

Federal Supply Classes 

General Accounting Office 

General Services Administration 

International Airport 

Investigations Control and 

Automation Directorate 

Inventory Control Point 

Information Systems Software 

Integrated Undersea Surveillance 

Joint Process Action Team 

Joint Cross-Service Group 

Low Altitude Navigation and 

Logistics Management Institute 

Major Command 

Municipal Auprt 

Marine Corps Air Facility 

Marine Corps Air Station 

Marine Corps Base 

Marine Corps Logistics Base 

Metropolitan Statistical Area 

Naval Aviation Depot 

Naval Aviation Engineering Service 

Navall Air Facility 

Navall Air Station 

NavaY Air Technical Services Facility 

Naval Air Systems Command 

Naval Facility 

Naval Management Systems 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

Naval Air Warfare Center 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory 

Naval Command, Control, and 

Ocean Surveillance Center 

National Capital Region 

Naval Electronic Systems 

Engineering Center 

Naval Education and Training Center 

Naval Health Research Center 

Naval In-Service Engineering 

Naval Information Systems 

Management Center 

Naval Medical Research Institute 

Navy Personnel Research and 

Nuclear Power School 

Net Present Value 

Naval Reserve Center 

Naval Recruiting District 

Naval Research Laboratory 

Command 

System 

Targeting Infrared System (Night) 

Unit 

Support Office 

Development Center 

NSB 

NSWC 

NSY 

NTC 

NTCC 

NUWC 

Nwm 

NWS 

OEA 

OMB 

ONR 

OSD 

PTR 

PWC 

RC 

R&D 

RDTEkE 

REDCAP 

REDCOM 

ROI 

SAILS 

SDIV 

SIMA 

SIOP 

SPAWAR 

SRF 

SSN 

SUPSHIP 

TC 

UPT 

VHA 

WDIV 

WPSTA 

Naval Submarine Base 

Naval Surface Warfare Center 

Naval Shipyard 

Naval Training Center 

Naval Technical Training Center 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center 

Naval Warfare Assessment Division 

Naval Weapons Station 

Office of Economic Adjustment 

Office of Management and Budget 

Office of Naval Research 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

Pilot Training Rate 

Public Works Center 

Reserve Component 

Research and Development 

Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled 

Analyzer Processor 

Readiness Command 

Return on Investment 

Strategic Analysis of Integrated 

Logistics Systems 

Southern Division 

Shore Intermediate Maintenance 

Single Integrated Operational Plan 

Space and Naval War Systems 

Ship Repair Facility 

Attack Submarine, Nuclear-Powered 

Supervisors of Shipbuilding, 

Conversion and Repair 

Transition Coordinator 

Undergraduate Pilot Training 

Variable Housing Allowance 

Engineering Field Activity West 

Weapons Station 

Activity 

Command 

A-2 APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX I3 

DEFINITTONS 

The Secretary of Defense used the 

following terms in developing the 1.995 

Recommendations to the Commission: 

Close: All missions of the base will cease or be 

relocated. All personnel (military, civilian and, 

contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. 

The entire base will be excessed and the property 

disposed. Note: A, caretaker workforce is possible 

to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or 

relocating) and property disposal, which are separate actions undeir Public Law 101-510. 

Close, Except: The vast majority of the missions 

will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the 

military, civilian, and contractor personnel will 

either be eliminated or relocated. All but a snrall 

portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will 

often be facilitks in an enclave for use by the 

reserve component. Generally, active component 

management of the base will cease. Outlying, 

unmanned ranges or training areas retained for 

reserve component use do not count against the 

“small portion retained.” Again, closure (missions 

ceasing or relocating) and property disposal are 

separate actions under I’ublic Law 101-510. 

Inactive, Disestablish: Terms used to describe 

planned actions which directly affect missions, 

units, or activities. Fighter wings are inactivaied, 

bases ,are closed. 

Mothball, Layazuay: Terms used when retention 

of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or 

contingency needs of Defense. Bases or portions 

of bates .‘mothballed” will not be excessed and 

disposed. It is possible they could be leased for 

interim economic uses. 

Realign: Some missions of the base will cease or 

be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion 

of the base. Onlly a portion of the base will be 

excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public 

Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both 

gaining and losing missions, the base is being 

realigized’ if it will experience a net reduction of 

DoD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is 

possible that no property will be excessed. 

Receiving Base: A base which receives missions, 

units, or activities relocating from a closing or 

realigning base. In cases where the base is both 

gaining and losing missions, the base is a receiving base if it will experience a net increase of 

DoD civilian personnel. 

Relocate: The term used to describe the movement of missions, units, or activities from ;i closing 

or realigning base to another base. Units do not 

realign from a closing or a realigning base to 

another base, they relocate. 

The Rase Closure and Realignment 

Statute defines the following terms: 

Account: The Department of Defense Base Closure 

Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)( 1) of the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. 

Congressional Defense Committees: The Cornmittees on Armed Services and the Committees on 

Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of 

Representatives. 

Commission: The Commission established by 

section 2902 of the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1990. 

Military Instalhtion: A base, camp, post, station, 

yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or 

other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. 

Such terni does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood 

control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense. 
Realignment: Any action which both reduces and 

relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force 

resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances. 

Secretary: The Secretary of Defense. 

United States: The 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the 

Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other 

territory or possession of the United States. 

The Commission uses the following 

terms in this Report: 

BRAC 95 Economic Impact The BRAC 95 economic impact of an installation is the direct and 

indirecl job loss resulting from a 1995 BWiC 

realignment or closure expressed as a percentage 

of the employment base within its economic area. 

CERCLA: The Comprehensive Environmeni al 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, also 

known as the Superfund, is the legal framework 

for the identification, restoration, and transfer of 

contaminated private property. In 1986, CERClA 

was revised to include all federal property, including military installations. 

CEmk The Community Environmental Response 

Facilitation Act. It amends CERCLA and requirtes 

identification of uncontaminated parcels at closing 

bases and allows the clean parcels to be transferred while long-term cleanup of contaminated 

parcels continues. 

Clean Air Act: The Clean Air Act refers to federal 

regulations upon which the nation’s air pollution 

control program is based. The program is carried 

out by the Environmental Protection Agency and 

state regulatory programs. The program is based 

primarily on the 1970 version of the Act. It was 

most recently amended in 1930. 

COBRA: COBRA, or the Cost of Base Realignment 

Actions, is an analytical tool for estimating thLe 

costs and savings associated with the execution of a 

realignment or closure action. The tool calculates 

the one-time cost, annual savings, return on investment, and the net present value of each action. 

Cumulative Economic Impace The cumulative 

economic impact of an installation is the direct 

and indirect job loss expressed as a percentage of 

the employment base resulting from the current 

(1995) BRAC action; other current BRAC actions 

across all Services within the same economic area; 

and prior BRAC actions, across all Services within 

the same economic area, if the personnel losses 

occur in 1994 or after. 

Economic Area: Economic areas for each installation were assigned by the Services and consist of 

either a county, multiple counties, or metropolitan 

statistical areas. These areas generally represent 

personnel commuting patterns and common components of supply and demand. 

Economic Development Administration: 

The EDA, which is a part of the Department of 

Commerce, is to provide economic development 

grants to help communities implement their economic development plans. 

Enclave: A section of a military installation that 

remains intact from that part which is closed or 

realigned and which will continue with its current 

role and functions subject to specific modifications. 

Local Redevelopment Autbority: The DoD 

recognized local organization whose role is to 

coordinate efforts of the community to reuse 

assets of the former military base. 

Ome of Ecmmic Adwtment: The OEA is an 

agency within the DoD that is in charge of helping communities plan for base closures and 

realignments. The Office also provides planning 

grants to impacted communities. 

One-time Cosk The nonrecurring cost to implement the recommendations. 

RCRQr The Resource Conservation and Recovery 

Act which passed in 1976 and amended in 1984. 

RCRA provides “cradle-to-grave” control of hazardous waste by imposing management requirements on the military as generators and 

transporters of hazardous wastes and owners and 

operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. The RCRA covers federal and private sites, 

and applies mainly to active facilities. The military 

can perform environmental cleanup under the 

Corrective Action portion of RCRA. 

Redeveropment Plan.- Contains the various alternatives the local community, through its Local 

Redevelopment Authority, intends to create jobs 

and provide economic recovery. 

Redirect= Recommendation from the Secretary of 

Defense, or a decision of the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Commission, to change a base closure 

or realignment decision made by a prior Commission 

round (1983, 1991, or 1993). Note This term is genenlly used when the receiver installation is changed. 

- 

B-2 APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX: C 

SECTION 2687, TITLE 10, 

UNITED STATES CODE 

$2687. BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENT8S 

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

no action may be taken to effect or implement: 

(1) the closure of any military installation at 

which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed; 

(2) any realignment with respect to any military 

installation referred to in paragraph (1) involving 

a reduction by mOre than 1,000 or by more th.an 

50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel 

authorized to be einployed at such military inst;& 

lation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the 

Secretary of the military department concerned 

notifies the Congress under subsection (b) of the 

Secretaiy’s plan to close or realign such installation; or 

(3) any construction, conversion or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military 

installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) which 

will or may tie required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason 

of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) 

or (2) applies, unless and until the provisions of 

subsection I:b) are complied with. 

(b) No action described in subsection (a) wi.:h 

respect to the closure of, or a realignment wii:h 

respect to, any military installation referred to in 

such subsection may be taken unless and until: 

(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of 

the military department concerned notifies the 

Commitr-ees on Armed Services of the Senate and 

House of Representatives, as part of an annual 

request for authori:ation of appropriations to such 

Committees, of the proposed closing or realignment and submits with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal. local economic, budgetary, 

environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such clwure or realignment; and 

(2) a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar 

days, whichever is longer, expires following the 

day on which the notice and evaluation referred 

to in clau:ie (1) have been sulmiitted to such conimittees, during which period no irrevocable action 

may he taken to effect or implement the decision. 

(c) This section shall not apply to the closure 

of a military installation, or a realignment with 

respect to a military installation, if the I’resiclent 

certifies to the Congress that such closwe or realignment niust be implenierited for reasons of national 

security or a military emergency. 

(d)(l) After the expiration of the period of time 

provided for in subsection (b)(2) m.ith respect to 

the closure or realignment of 3 military installation, 

funds which would otherwise tie availalile to the 

Secretary to effect the closure or realigninent of that 

installation may be ~ised by him for such purpose. 

(2) Nothing in this section restricts the authority 

of the Secretary to obtain architectiiral and tmgineering services under section 2807 of this title. 

(el In this section: 

(1) The term “military installation’’ means a 

base, camp, post, station, yard, center, horneport 

facility for any ship, or other activity under the 

jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, inclutiing any leased facility, which is located within any 

of the several States, the District of Colunibia. the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, 

the Virgin Islands, or Guam. Such term does not 

include any facility used primarily for civil works, 

rivers and harbors projects, or flood control 

projects. 

(2) The term “civilian personnel’’ ineans directhire, pernianent civilian employees of the Ikprtment of Defense. 

(3) The term “realignment” inclucies any action 

which I>oth reduces and relocates functions and 

civilian personnel positions, but does not includc 

a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding le~ds, 

skill imtnlances, or other similar causes. 

(4) The term “legislative day” means ;I clay on 

which either House of Congress is in session. 
APPENDIX D 

1988 CHARTER: DEFENSE 

SECRETARY’S COMMISSION 

ON BASE REALIGNMENT 

AND CLosrm 

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 

App. I>, a Commission on Base Realignment and 

Closure is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Estublishment. 

There is established the Defense Secretary’s Ccmmission on Base Realignment and Closure. The 

CommLssion shall be composed of twelve members appointed or designated by the Secretary of 

Defense. The composition of the Commission 

shall include persons with broad experience in 

government and national defense. The Secretary 

shall designate two Chairpersons from among the 

members of the Commission. 

Section 2. Functions. 

The Commission shall study the issues surrounding military base realignment and closure within 

the United States, it’s commonwealths, territories, 

and possessions. The primary objectives of the 

Commission shall be to: 

A. Determine, by November 15, 1988, the best 

process, including necessary administrative 

changes, for identifying bases to be closed 

or realigned; how to improve and best use 

Federal government incentive programs to 

overcome the negative impact of base closure 

or realignment; and, the criteria for realigning 

and closing bas~es to include at least: 

1. The current and future mission requirements 

and the impact on operational readiness of 

the military departments concerned. 

2. The availability and condition of land and 

facilities at both the existing and potential 

receiving locations. 

3. The potential to accommodate contingency, 

mobilization, and future force requirements 

at receiving locations. 

4. The cost and manpower implications. 

5. The extent and timing of potential cost 

savings, including whether the total cost 

savings realized from the closure or realignment of the base will, by the end of the 6- year period beginning with the date of the 

completion of the closure or realignment of 

the base, exceed the amount expended to 

close or realign the base. 

6. The economic impact on the community in 

which the base to be closed or realigned is 

located. 

locations. 

7. The community support at the receiving 

8. The environmental impact. 

9. The implementation process involved 

B. Review the current and planned military base 

structure in light of force structure assumptions, 

and the process and criteria developed pursuant 

to subparagraph A, and identify which bases 

should be closed or realigned. 

C. Report its findings and recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense by December 31, 1988. 

Section 3. Administration. 

Members of the Commission shall serve without 

compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among 

private citizens may be allowed travel expenses, 

including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in 
the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-57071, to 

the full extent funds are available. The Secretary 

of Defense shall provide the commission with 

such administrative services, facilities, staff, and 

other support services as may be necessary. Any 

expenses of the Commission shall be paid from 

such funds as may be available to the Secretary 

of Defense. 

The Commission shall be in place and operating as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, the 

Commission shall brief the Secretary of Defense 

on the Commission’s plan of action. Tlhe 

Commission’s final report shall include recommendations to realign and close bases only upon a 

vote of a majority of members of the Commission. 

The Commission should complete its work by 

December 31, 1988. 

Secretary of Defense 

The Pentagon 

Miay 3, 1988 

(as revised November 3, 1988) 
APPENDIX E 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

AMENDME~NTS AND BASE 

Am OF lSW3 <POL. 100-526) 

CLOSUFE AND REALIGNMENT 

Enacted October 24, 1988 

A5 amended by 1 he National Defense Authorization Acts for Fid Years 1971 (F.L. 101-5101, 

1774 (P.L. 103-1601, and 1775 (P.L. 103-3371, and 

the Rase Closure Community Redevelopment and 

Homeless Assistance Act of 1774 (P.L. 103-421) 

1772/1993 (P.L. 102-190), 1773 (P.L 102-4841, 

SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE 

This Act may be cited as the “Defense .Authorization 

Amendments and Ehse Closure and Realignment Act”. 

TITLE II-CL,OSURE AND 

REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY 

INSTALLATIONS 

SEC. 201. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT 

OF MILITARY INSTALIATIONS 

The Secretary shall- 

(1) close all military installations recornmended for closure by the Commission on 

Base Realignment and Closure in the report 

transmitted to the Secretary pursuant to the 

charter establishing such commission; 

(2 ) realign all military installations recornmended for realignment by such commission in 

such report; and 

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than September 30, 1771, and 

complete all closures and realignments no later 

than September 30, 1775, except that no such 

closure or realignment may be initiated before 

January 1, 1770. 

SEC. 202. CONDITIONS 

(a) IN GENERAL.-’rhe Secretary may not carry 

out any closure or realignment of a military installation under this title unless- 

(1) no later than January 16, 1789, the Secretary transmits to the Committees on Armed 

Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report containing a statement that 

the Secretary has approved, and the Department of Defense will implement, all of the military installation closures and realignments 

recommended by the Commission in the report 

referred to in section 201(1); 

(21 the Commission has recommended, in 

the report referred to in section 201(1), the 

closure or realignment, as the case may be, of 

the installation, and has transmitted to the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 

and the House of Representatives a copy of 

such report and the statement required by section 203(b)(2); and 

(3) the Secretary of Defense has trdnsmitted to the Commission the study required by 

section 206(b). 

(b) .JOINT REsoLunoN.-The Secretary may not 

carry out any closure lor realignment under this title 

if, within the 45-day period beginning on March 1, 

1787, a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance 

with the provisions of section 208, disapproving 

the recommendations of the Commission. The 

days on which either House of Congress is not in 

session because of an adjournment of more than 

3 days to a day certain shall be excluded in the 

computation of such 45-day period. 
(c) TEBMINATION OF Aurrlto~nr.-(l) Except as 

provided in paragraph (21, the authority of the 

Secretary to carry out any closure or realignment 

under this title shall terminate on October 1, 1995. 

(2) The termination of authority set forth in 

paragraph (1) shall not apply to the authority of 

the Secretary to carry out environmental restoration and waste management at, or disposal of prop 

erty of, military installations closed or maligned 

under this title. 

SEC. 203. Tf3E COMMISSION 

12 members appointed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(a) Mmmiww.-The Commission shall consist of 

(b) Dm;.-The Commission shall- 

(1) transmit the report referred to in section 

201(1) to the Secretary no later than December 

31, 1988, and shall include in such report a 

description of the Commission’s recorrmendations of the military installations to which functions will be transferred as a result of the 

closures and realignments recommended by the 

Commission; and 

(2) on the same date on which the Commission transmits such report to the Secretary, 

transmit to Committees on Armed Services of 

the Senate and the House of Representatives- 

(A) a copy of such report; and 

(B) a statement certifying that the Commission has identified the military installations to be closed or realigned by reviewing all military installations inside the United 

States, including all military inst;illations 

under construction and all those planned 

for construction. 

(c) sTAFF.,-Not more than one-half of the pre 

fessional skiff of the Commission shall be individuals wlho have been employed by the 

Department of Defense during calendar year 3988 

in any capacity other than as an employee of the 

Commission. 

SEC. 204. MipLEMENT ATION 

(a) k Gmmu--In closing or realigning a mili- 

(1) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department 

of Defense for use in planning and design, 

minor construction, or operation and maintetary installation under this title, the Secretarynance and the availability of funds in the 

Account, may carry out actions necessary to 

implement such closure or realignment, including the acquisition of such land, the construction 

of such replacement facilities, the performance 

of such activities, and the conduct of such 

advance planning and design as may be required 

to transfer functions from such military installation to another military installation; 

(2) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department 

of Defense for economic adjustment assistance 

or community planning assistance and the availability of funds in the Account, shall provide- 

(A) economic adjustment assistance to 

any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and 

(B) community planning assistance to any 

community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred 

as a result of such closure or realignment, if 

the Secretary determines that the financial 

resources available to the community (by 

grant or otherwise) for such purposes are 

inadequate; and 

(3) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department 

of Defense for environmental restoration and 

the availability of funds in the Account, may 

carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration, including reducing, removing, and recycling hazardous wastes and 

removing unsafe buildings and debris. 

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.^^) 

The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary, with respect to excess and 

surplus real property, facilities, and personal 

property located at a military installation closed or 

realigned under this title- 

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the 

Federal Property and Administrative Services 

Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483); 

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of 

that Act (40 U.S.C. 484); and 

(C) the authority of the Administrator to 

grant approvals and make determinations 

under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act 

of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)). 

E-2 APPENDIX E 
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise authority delegated 

to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in 

accordance with-- 

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of 

the enactment of this title governing utilization of excm property and disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property 

and Administrative Services Act of 1747; and 

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of 

the enactment of this title governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 

1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)). 

(B) ‘The Secretary, after consulting with .:he 

Administrator of General Services, may issue 

regulations that are necessary to carry out i:he 

delegation of authority required by paragraph 

(1). 

((3 The authority required to he delegated 

by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the 

authority to prescribe general policies and 

methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property. 

(I)) Refore any action may be taken with 

respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this title, 

the Secretary shall consult with the Governor of 

the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by 

the local community concerned. 

(El The provisions of this paragraph arid 

paragraph (1) are subject to paragraphs (3) 

through (6). 

(3)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of 

the enactment of the National Defense Authoriz,ation Act for Fiscal Year 1794, the Secretary, :.n 

consultation with the redevelopment authoriry 

with respect to each military installation to be 

closed under this title after such date of enactment, shall-- 

(i) inventory the personal property located 

at the instal1ai:ion; and 

(ii) identify the items (or categories of 

items) of such personal property that the 

Secretary determines to be related to real 

property and anticipates will support the 

implementation of the redevelopment plan 

with respect to the installation. 

(B) If no redevelopment authority referred to 

in subparagraph (A) exists with respect to an 

installation, the Secretary shall consult withCi) the local government in whose jurisdiction the installation is wholly located; or 

(ii) a local government agency or State 

government agency designated for tht. purpose of such consultation by the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation 

is located. 

CC)Ci) Except as provided in subparagraphs 

(E) and (F), the Secretary may not carry out any 

of the activities referred to in clause (ii) with 

respect to an installation referred to in that 

clause until the earlier of- 

(I) one week after the date on which 

the redevelopment plan for the installation is submitted to the Secretary; 

(11) the date on which the redevelopment authority notifies the SecretLiry that 

it will not submit such a plan; 

(111) twenty-four months after the date 

referred to in subparagraph (A); or 

(IV) ninety days before the date of the 

closure of the installation. 

(ii) The activii:ies referred to in clause (i) Lire 

activities relating to the closure of an installation to be closed under this title as follows: 

(I) The transfer from the installation of 

items of personal property at the installation identified in accordance with subparagraph (A). 

(11) The reduction in maintenance and 

repair of facilities or equipment located at 

the installation below the minimum levels 

required to support the use of such fac 

or equipment for nonmilitary purposes. 

(D) Except as provided in paragraph (4, the 

Secretary may not transfer items of personal property located at an installation to be closed under 

this title to another installation, or dispose of such 

items, if such items are identified in the redevelopment plan for the installation as itenis essential to the reuse or redevelopment of the installation. In connection with the development of 

the redevelopment plan for the installation, the 
Secretary shall consult with the entity iesponsible for developing the redevelopment plan to 

identlfy the items of personal property located at 

the installation, if any, that the entity desires to 

be retained at the installation for reuse or reclevelopment of the installation. 

(E) This paragraph shall not apply to any 

related personal property located at an installation to be closed under this title if the property-- 

(i) is required for the operation of a unit, 

function, component, weapon, or weapons 

system at another installation; 

(ii) is uniquely military in character, and 

is likely to have no civilian use (other than 

use for its material content or as a source of 

commonly used components); 

(iii) is not required for the reutilization or 

redevelopment of the installation (as jointly 

determined by the Secretary and the redevelopment authority); 

(iv) is stored at the installation for purpases 

of distribution (including spare parts or stock 

items); or 

(v)(I meets known requirements of an 

authorized program of another Federal 

department or agency for which expenditures 

for similar property would be necessary, and 

(11) is the subject of a written request by the 

head of the department or agency. 

(F) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (CM) 

and (D), the Secretary may carry out any activity referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii) or (D) if 

the Secretary determines that the carrying out 

of such activity is in the national security interest of the United States. 

(4)(A) The Secretary may transfer real property 

and personal property located at a military installation to be closed under this title to the redevelopment authlority with respect to the installation. 

(B)(i)(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), 

the transfer of property under subparagraph 

(A) may be for consideration at or below the 

estimated fair market value of the property 

transferred or without consideration. Such consideration may include consideration in kind 

(including goods and services), real property 

and improvements, or such other consideration 

as the Secretary considers appropriate. The Secretary shall determine the estimated fair market 

value of rhe property to be transferred under 

-~ -- 

E-4 

this subparagraph before carrying out such 

transfer. 

(11) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations that set forth guidelines for determining the amount, if any, of consideration 

required for a transfer under this paragraph. Such regulations shall include a 

requirement that, in the case of each transfer under this paragraph for consideration 

below the estimated fair market value of 

the property transferred, the Secretary 

provide an explanation why the transfer is 

not for the estimated fair market value of 

the property transferred (including an 

explanation why the transfer cannot be 

carried out in accordance with the authority provided to the Secretary pursuant to 

paragraph (1) or (2)). 

(ii) The transfer of property under subparagraph (A) shall be without consideration 

in the case of any installation located in a rurA 

area whose closure under this title will have 

a substantial adverse impact (as determined 

by the Secretary) on the economy of the 

communities in the vicinity of the installation 

and on the prospect for the economic recovery of such communities from such closure. 

The Secretary shall prescribe in the regulations under clause (i)(II) the manner of 

determining whether communities are eligible 

for the transfer of property under this clause. 

(iii) In the case of a transfer under subparagraph (A) for consideration below the 

fair market value of the property transferred, 

the Secretary may recoup from the transferee 

of such property such portion as the Secretary determines appropriate of the amount, if 

any, by which the sale or lease of such prop 

erty by such transferee exceeds the amount of 

consideration paid to the Secretary for such 

property by such transferee. The Secretary 

shall prescribe regulations for determining 

the amount of recoupnient under this clause. 

(C)(i) The transfer of personal property 

under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to 

the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the 

Federal Property and Administrative Services 

Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483, 484) if the Secretary 

determines that the transfer of such property is 

necessary for the effective implementation of a 

redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such property is located. 

APPENDIX E 
(ii) The Secretary may, in lieu of the 

transfer of property referred to in subparagraph (A), transfer personal property sini..lar 

to such property (including property not 

located at the installation) if the Secretq 

determines that the transfer of such sinikar 

property is in the interest of the United States. 

(D) The provisions of section 120(h) of he 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 

9620(h)) shall apply to any transfer of real 

property under this paragraph. 

(13 The Secretary may require any additional 

terms and conditions in connection with a 

transfer under this paragraph as such Secretary 

considers appropriate to protect the interests of 

the llnited Statw 

(S)(A) Except ;is provided in subparagraph (B), 

the Secretary shall take such actions as the Secretary determines nece ry to ensure that final 

determinations uinde aragraph (1) regarding 

whether another department or agent\: of the Federal Government has identified a use'for any portion of a military installation to lie closed 

under this title afi.er the date of the enactment of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1904, or will accept transfer of any portion of 

such installation, are made not later than 6 months 

after such date of Ienactment. 

(€3) The Secretary may, in consultation wth 

the redevelopment authority with respect to an 

installation, postpone making the final determinations referred to in subparagraph (A) WI th 

respect to the installation for such period as the 

Secretary determines appropriate if the Secre- 

(6)(A) Except as provided in this paragraph, 

nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise 

affect the application of the provisions of the 

Stewart €3. McKiriney Homeless Assistance Act 

(42 U.S.C. 11301 et seq.) to military instal1atio:is 

closed under this title. 

@Xi) Not later than the date on which the 

Secretary of Defense completes the determination under paragraph (5) of the transferability 

of any portion of an installation to be closed 

under this title, the Secretary sh&- 

(1) complete any determinations or surveys necessary to determine whether ariy 

building or property referred to in clause 

(ii) is excess property, surplus property, 

or unutilizecl or underutilized property for 

the purpose of the information referred to 

in section SOl(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 

11411Ca)); arid 

(11) submit to the Secretary of Housing 

and Urban Development information on any 

building or property that is so determined. 

(ii) The buildings and property referred to 

in clause (i) are any buildings or property 

located at an installation referred to in that 

clause for which no use is identified, or of 

which no Federal department or agency will 

accept transfer, pursuant to the determination 

of transferability referred to in that c1:iuse. 

(C) Not later tl-ran 60 days after the date on 

which the Secretary of Defense submits information to the Secretary of Housing and 1 Jrlm Development under subparagraph (13)(ii), the Secretary of Housing and 1Jrban Development shall- 

(i) identify the buildings and property 

described in such inforrnation that are suitable for use to ;mist the homeless; 

(ii) notify the Secretary of Defense of the 

buildings and property that are so identified; 

(iii) publish in the Federal Register a list 

of the buildings and property that are so 

identified, including with respect to each 

building or property the inforination referred 

to in section iOl(c)(l )(B) of such Act; and 

(iv) make available with respect to each 

building and property the inforrnation referred 

to in section 501(c)(l)(C) of such Act in 

accordance with such section 501 (cN 1)(C). 

(I)) Any buildings and property includtd in 

a list published under subparagr:iph (CXiii) 

shall be treated as property available for application for use to a,ssist the homeless under section 501(d) of such[ Act. 

(El The Secretary of Defense shall make 

available in accordance with section iOl(f1 of 

such Act any buildings or property referred to 

in subparagraph (Dl for which- 

(i) a written notice of an intent to use 

such liuildings or property to assist the 

homeless is received by the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services in accordmce 

with section j01(d)(2) of such Act; 

~ ~~ 

BASE CLOSIIHE AN) &ALIGNMENT ACT OF 1988 E-5 
(ii) an application for use of such buildings or property for such purpose is submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services in accordance with section 501(eX2) 

of such Act; and 

(iii) the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services- 

(I,) completes all actions on the application in accordance with section 501(eX3) 

of such Act; and 

(11) approves the application under 

section 501(e) of such Act. 

(F)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a redevellopment 

authority may express in writing an intlerest in 

using buildings and property referred to in 

subparagraph (D), and buildings and property 

referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) which have 

not been identified as suitable for use to assist 

the homel~ess under subparagraph (C), or use 

such builidings and property, in accordance 

with the redevelopment plan with respect to 

the installation at which such buildings and 

property are located as follows: 

(I’) If no written notice of an intent to 

use such buildings or property to assist 1 he 

homeless is received by the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services in accordance 

with section 501(dX2) of such Act dunng 

the 6May period beginning on the date of 

the publication of the buildings and property under subparagraph (CXiii). 

(11) In the case of buildings anti property for which such notice is so received, 

if no completed application for use of the 

buildings or property for such purpose is 

received by the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services in accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act during the 00- 

day period beginning on the date of the 

receipt of such notice. 

(111) In the case of building and property 

for which such application is so received, if 

the Secretary of Health and Human krvices 

rejects the application under section 50l(e) 

of SU& Act. 

(ii) Buildings and property shall be available only for the purpose of permitting a 

redevelopment authority to express in writing an interest in the use of such buildings 

and property, or to use such buildings and 

property, under clause (i) as follows: 

(I) hi the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (NO, during the 

one-year period beginning on the first 

day aker the 60-day period referred to in 

that clause. 

(11) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (iXII), during the 

one-year period beginning on the first 

day after the 90-day period referred to in 

that clause. 

(111) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(III), during 

the one-year period beginning on the 

date of the rejection of the application 

referred to in that clause. 

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall express an interest in the use of buildings and 

property under this subparagraph by notifying the Secretary of Defense, in writing, of 

such an interest. 

(G)(i) Buildings and property available for a 

redevelopment authority under subparagraph 

(F) shall not be available for use to assist the 

homeless under section 501 of such Act while 

so available for a redevelopment authority. 

(ii) If a redevelopment authority does not 

express an interest in the use of buildings or 

property, or commence the use of buildings 

or property, under subparagraph (F) within 

the applicable time periods specified in 

clause (ii) of such subparagraph, such buildings or property shall be treated as property 

available for use to assist the homeless 

under section 501(a) of such Act. 

(7XA) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) 

or (0, all proceed<+-- 

(i) from the transfer under paragraphs (3) 

through (6); and 

(ii) from the transfer or disposal of any 

other property or facility made as 3 result of 

a closure or realignment under this title, 

shall be deposited into the Account established by section 207(a)(l). 

(B) In any case in which the General Services Administration is involved in the management or disposal of such property or facility, 

the Secretary shall reimburse the Administrator 

of General Services from the proceeds of such 

E-6 APPENDIX E 
disposal, in accordance with section 153’5 of 

title 31, United States Code, for any expenses 

incurred in such activities. 

(C)(i) If any real property or facility acquired, 

constructed, 01- improved (in whole or in part) 

with commissary store funds or nonappropriated 

funds is transferred or disposed of in connection 

with the closure or realignment of a military 

installation under this title, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited in a 

reserve account established in the Treasury to be 

administered hy the Secretary. The Secretary 

may use amounts in the account (in such an 

aggregate amount as is provided in advanc’e in 

appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, 

constructing, and improving- 

(I) commissary stores; and 

(11) real property and facilities for 

nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, 

(ii) The amount deposited under clause 

(i) shall be equal to the depreciated value of 

the investment made with such funds in the 

acquisition, construction, or improvement of 

that particular real property or facility. ‘The 

depreciated value of the investment shall be 

computed in accordance with regulations 

prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(iii) As used in this subparagraph: 

(1) The term “commissary store funds” 

means funds received from the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at 

commissary stores fixed under section 

2685 of title 10, United States Code. 

(11) The term “nonappropriated funcls” 

means funds received from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality. 

(111) The term “nonappropriated fund 

instrumentality” means an instrumentality 

of the United States under the jurisdiction 

of the Armed Forces (including the Army 

and Air €orce Exchange Service, the Navy 

Resale and Services Support Office, and 

the Marine Corps exchanges) which is 

conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces. 

(8)(A) Subject to subparagraph (0, the Secretary may contract. with local governments for t.he 

provision of police services, fire protection services, 

airfield operation services, or other community 

services by such governments at military installations to be closed under this title if the Secretary 

determines that the provision of such services 

under such contracts is in the best interests of the 

Department of Defense. 

(H) The Secretary may exercise the authority 

provided under this paragraph without regnrd 

to the provisions of chapter 146 of title 10, 

United States Code. 

(C) The Secretary may not exercise the xithority under subparagraph (A) with respect to an 

installation earlier than 180 days before the 

date on which the installation is to be closed. 

(D) The Secretary shall include in a contract 

for services entered into with a local government 

under this paragraph a clause that requires the 

use of professio.nals to furnish the services to 

the extent that professionals are ~d:~l~le in th 

area under the jurisdiction of such government. 

(c) APPLICABI~ OF OTHER LAw.41) The provisions of the Nation:al EnvironInental Policy Act of 

1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply ttr 

(A) the actions of the Commission, including 

selecting the mlilitary installations which tlie 

Cominission recommends for closure or realignment under this title, recoInniending any military installation to receive functions frcm an 

installation to be closed or realigned, and tnaking its report to the Secretary and the conmiittees under section 203(b); and 

(B) the actions of tlie Secretary in estalilishing the Commission, in determining whether to 

accept the recommendations of the Commission, 

in selecting any military installation to receive 

functions from an installation to be closed or 

realigned, and in transmitting tlie report to the 

Committees referred to in section 202(a)(l). 

(2) The provisions of the National Environmental Poky Act of 1969 shall apply to the actions of 

the Secretary (A) during the process of tlie closing 

or realigning of a military installation after such 

military installation has been selected for closure 

or realignment but hlefore the installation is closed 

or realigned and the functions relocated, and (13) 

during the process of the relocating of functions 

from a military installation being closed or realigned 

to another military installation after the receiving 

installation has been selected but hefore the functions are relocated. In applying tlie provisions of such 

Act, the Secretary shall not have to consider-- 

E-7 BASE CLOSLJRE AYD KEALIGNMENT ACT OF 1988 
(i) the need for closing or realigning ihe 

military installation whch has been selecl ed 

for closure or realignment by the Commission; 

(ii) the need for transferring functions to 

mother military installation which has been 

selected as the receiving installation; or 

(iii) alternative military installations to 

those selected. 

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect 

to any requirement of the National Environmental 

Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act i:j applicable under ]paragraph (2), or with respect to any 

requirement d the Commission made by this title, 

of any action or failure to act by the Secretary 

during the closing, realigning, or relocating referred to in clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph (21, 

or of any action or failure to act by the Comtrdssion under this title, may not be brought later thlan 

the 60th day after the date of such action or failure to act. 

(d) TRANSFER Aur~om IN CONNECTION Wrm PAYSubject to paragraph (2) of this subsection and 

section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 

1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the Secretary may enter 

into an agreement to transfer by deed real 

property or facilities referred to in subparagraph 

(B) with any person who agrees to perform all 

environmental restoration, waste management, 

and environrnental compliance activities that are 

required for the property or facilities under Federal and State laws, administrative decisions, 

agreements (including schedules and milestones), 

and concurrences. 

(B) The real property and facilities referred 

to in subparagraph (A) are the real property 

and facilities located at an installation closed or 

to be closed under this title that are available 

exclusively for the use, or expression of an 

interest in a use, of a redevelopment authority 

under subsection (b)(b)(F) during the period 

provided for that use, or expression of interest 

in use, under that subsection. 

(C) The Secretary may require any additional 

terms and conditions in connection with an 

agreement authorized by subparagraph (A) as 

the Secretary considers appropriate to protect 

the interests of the United States. 

MENT OF ENMRONhlnvrAt REMEDIATION COSTS.--(l)(A) 

(2) A transfer of real property or facilities may 

be made under paragraph (I) only if the Secretary 

certifies to Congress that- 

(A) the costs of all environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental 

compliance activities to be paid by the recipient of the property or facilities are equal to or 

greater than the fair market value of the property or facilities to be transferred, as determined by the Secretary; or 

(B) if such costs are lower than the fair 

market value of the property or facilities, the 

recipient of the property or facilities agrees to 

pay the difference between the fair market 

value and such costs. 

(3) As part of an agreement under paragraph 

(11, the Secretary shall disclose to the person to 

whom the property or facilities will be transferred 

any information of the Secretary regarding the 

environmental restoration, waste management, 

and environmental compliance activities described 

in paragraph (3,) that relate to the property or 

facilities. The Secretary shall provide such information before entering into the agreement. 

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to modify, alter, or amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) or the 

Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.). 

(5) Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102484; 

10 U.S.C. 2687 note) shall not apply to any transfer under this subsection to persons or entities 

described in subsection (a)(2) of such section 330. 

(6) The Secretary may not enter into an agreement to transfer property or facilities under this 

subsection after the expiration of the five-year 

period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1994. 

' 

SEC. 205. WAIVER 

The Secretary of Defense may carry out this title 

without regard to- 

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of 

funds for closing or realigning military installations 

included in any appropriation or authorization 

Act; and 

E-8 APPENDIX E 
(2) the procedures set forth in sections 2662 

and 2687 of title 10, United States Code. 

SEC. 206. REPORTS 

(a) IN GENERAI..-AS part of each annual budget 

request for the Department of Defense, the Sesretary shall transmit to the appropriate conimittees 

of Congress- 

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment 

actions to be carried out under this title in the 

fiscal year for which the request is made and an 

estimate of the total expenditures required .md 

cost savings to be achieved by each such clomre 

and realignment and of the time period in which 

these savings are to be achieved In each c;~. 

together with the Secretary's asses,sment of the 

environmental effects of such actions; and 

(2) a description of the military installations, 

including those under construction and those 

planned fix construction, to which functions are to 

be transferred as a result of such closures .ad 

realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers. 

(b) Snmy.4'1) The Secretary shall conduct a 

study of the military installations of the United 

States outside the United States to determine if efficiencies can be realized through closure or realignment of the overseas base structure of the United 

States. Not later .than October 15, 1988, the Saxetary shall transmit a report of the findings and 

conclusions of such study to the Comniission and 

to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In developing its recommendations to the Secretary iincler 

this title, the Commission shall consider the 

Secretary's study. 

(2) Upon request of the Commission. the Secretary shall provide the Commission with such information about overseas bases as may be helpful to 

the Commission in its deliberations. 

(3) The Commission, based on its analysis of 

military installatitons in the United States and its 

review of the Secretary's study of the overseas 

base structure, inay provide the Secretary with 

such comments and suggestions as it considers 

appropriate rega rding the Secretary's study of the 

overseas base structure. 

SEC. 207. FUNDING 

(a] ACCOUNT.-(^) There is hereby established 

on the books of the Treasury an account to be 

known as the "Department of Defense Hase 

Closure Account" which shall be administered by 

the Secretary as a si:ngle account. 

(2) There shall he deposited into the A 

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to 

the. Account with respect to fiscal year 1990 

and fiscal years heginning thereafter; 

(€3) any funds that the Secretary may, subject 

to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to 

the Account from funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense for any purpose, except 

that such funds may be transferred only after 

the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer 

to the appropriate committees of Congre 

(C) proceeds described in section 

204(b)(4)(A). 

(3)(A) The Secrel:ary may use the funds in the 

Account only for the purposes described in section 204(a). 

(B) When a decision is made to use funds in 

the Account to carry out a construction project 

under section 204(a)(1) and the cost of the 

project will exceed the maximum amount 

authorized by law for a minor construction 

project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the 

appropriate committees of Congress of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the 

amount of expenditures for such project. Any 

such construction project may be carried out 

without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, 

United States Cock. 

(4) No later than 60 days after the end of each 

fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this title, the Secretary shall transmit a 

report to the appro.priate committees of Congress 

of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and 

the expenditures from, the Account during such 

fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other 

expenditures made 13ursuant to section 204(a ) during such fiscal year. 

(9 (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 

unobligated funds which remain in the Account 

after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under 

BASE CLOSLXE AND REALIGMIENT ACT OF 1988 E-9 
this title shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the appropriate committees of 

Congress receive the report transmitted under 

paragraph (6). 

(B) ’The Secretary may, after the termination of 

authority referred to in subparagraph (A), use any 

unobligated funds referred to in that subparagraph 

that are not transferred in accordance with that subparagraph to carry out environmental restoration 

and waste management at, or disposal of property 

of, military installations closed or realigned under 

this title. 

(6) No later than 60 days after the termination 

of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a 

closure or realignment under this title, the Secretary 

shall transmit to the appropriate committees of 

Congress a report containing an accounting of- 

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended 

from the Account or otherwise expended under 

this title; and 

(€3) any amount remaining in the Account. 

(7) Proceeds received after September 30, 1995, 

from the transfer or disposal of any property at a 

military installation closed or realigned under this 

title shall be deposited directly into the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 

established by section 2906(a) of the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A 

of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 

2687 note). 

(b) BASE Cmsm Accm TO BE Exmsm Yiouacx 

No funds appropriated to the Department of 

Defense may be used for purposes described in 

section 204(a:)(3) except funds that have been 

authorized for and appropriated to the Account. 

The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires 

upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under 

this title. [Section 207 (b) does not apply with 

respect to the availability of funds appropriated 

before November 5, 1990.1 

OF FUNDS FOR E~hThfENTM mRATXON hOflKXS.-- 

SEC. 208. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERAT[ON 

OF COMMISSION REPORT 

(a) TERMS OIF THE REso~ON.-FOr purpo!ies of 

section 202(b), the term “joint resolution” means 

only a joint resolution which is introduced before 

March 15, 1989, and- 

(1) which does not have a preamble; 

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of 

which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves 

the recommendations of the Commission on Base 

Realignment and Closure established by the Secretary of Defense as submitted to the Secretary of 

Defense on ”, the blank space being 

appropriately filled in; and 

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the 

Commission on Rase Realignment and Closure.” 

(b) --A resolution described in subsection (a), introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on 

Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A 

resolution described in subsection (a) introduced 

in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee 

on Armed Services of the Senate. 

(c) DISCHARGE.-If the committee to which a 

resolution described in subsection (a) is referred 

has not reported such resolution (or an identical 

resolution) before March 15, 1989, such committee 

shall be, as of March 15, 1989, discharged from 

further consideralion of such resolution, and such 

resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved. 

(d) CQNSDEKAXION.~~) On or after the third day 

after the date on. which the committee to which 

such a resolution is referred has reported, or has 

been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in 

order (even though a previous motion to the same 

effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of 

the respective House to move to proceed to the 

consideration of the resolution (but only on the 

day after the calendar day on which such Member 

announces to the House concerned the Member’s 

intention to do so). All points of order against the 

resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. ‘The motion is highly privileged in 

the House of Representatives and is privileged in 

the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not 

subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, 

or to a motion tci proceed to the consideration of 

other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by 

which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall 

not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the 

consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the 

respective House shall immediately proceed to 

considemtion of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the 

resolution shall remain the unfinished business of 

the respective House until disposed of. 

~~ __ ~~ 

E-10 APPENDIX E 
(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions an’d appeals in connection therewith. 

shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which 

shall be divided equally between those favclring 

and those 0ppo:iing the resolution. An amendrnent 

to the resolution is not in order. A motion further 

to limit debate is in order and not debatabk. A 

motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the 

consideration of other business, or a motion to 

recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion 

to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is 

agreed to or disagreed to is not in order. 

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the 

debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) 

and a single qusonim call at the coriclusion of‘ the 

debate if reqimted in accordance with the rules 

of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resohtion shall occur. 

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair 

relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the Ho~i:ie of Representatives. as the case 

may be. to the procedure relating 1.0 a resolution 

described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. 

(e) CONSIDERMION BY OTHER HOUSE.^^) If, before the passage by one House of ;i resolution of 

that House described in subsection (a). that House 

receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply: 

(A) The resolution of the other House :jhall 

not be referred to a committee and may not be 

considered in the House receiving it except in 

the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii). 

(B) With respect to a resolution described 

in subsection (a) of the House receiving the 

resolutionCi) the procedure in that House shall be the 

sanie as if no resolution had been received 

from the other House; but 

the resolution of the other House. 

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on 

(2:) Upon disposition of the resolution received 

from the other House, it shall no longer be in 

order to consider the resolution that originated in 

the receiving House. 

(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.-This section 

is enacted by Congress- 

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 

Senate and House of Representatives, respectively. 

and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of 

each House, respectively, but applicable only with 

respect to the pro’cedure to be followed in that 

House in the case of a resolution described in 

subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to 

the extent that it is iinconsistent with such rules; and 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional 

right of either House to change the rules (so far as 

relating to the procedure of that House) at any 

time, in the same manner, and to the same extent 

as in the case of any other rule of that House. 

SEC. 209. DEFINITIONS 

In this title: 

(1) The term “Account” means the Department 

of Defense Base Closure Account established by 

section 207(a)( 1). 

(2) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committees on Armed Services 

and the Committee,s on Appropriations of the Senate and of the Hou:se of Representatives. 

(3) The terms “Commission on Base Realignment 

and Closure” and “Commission” mean the Commission established by the Secretary of Defense in 

the charter signed by the Secretary on May 3, 

1988, and as altered thereafter with respect to the 

membership and voting. 

(4) The term “charter establishing such Commission” means the charter referred to in pardgraph (3). 

(5) The term “initiate” includes any action reducing functions or civilian personnel positions but 

does not include studies, planning, or similar activities carried out before there is a reduction of such 

functions or positions. 

(6) The term “military installation” means a base, 

camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility 

for any ship, or ol:her activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department. 

(7) The term “rt:alignment” includes any action 

which both reduces and relocates functions and 

civilian personnel positions. 

(8) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of 

Defense. 

(9) The term “.United States” means the 50 

States, the Districl: of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Flico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, 

BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1988 E-1 I 
American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, 

territory, or possession of the United States. 

(10) The term “redevelopment authority”, in thle 

case of an installation to be closed under this title, 

means any entity (including an entity established 

by a State or llocal government) recognized by the 

Secretary of Defense as the entity responsible for 

developing the redevelopment plan with respect 

to the installation or for directing the implennentation of such plan. 

(11) The tem “redevelopment plan” in the case 

of an installalion to be closed under this title, 

means 3 plan 1 hat- 

(A) is agreed to by the redevelopment authoirify with respect to the installation; and 

(B) provides for the reuse or redevelopment 

of the real property and personal property of 

the installation that is available for such reuse 

or redevelopment as a result of the closure of 

the installation. 

E-12 APPENDIX E 
APPENDIX F 

DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE m~ 

PUBLIC LAW 101-510, 

10 TJ.S,.C. 2687 NOTE 

REALIGNMENT’ Acr OF 1990 

Enacted November 5, 1990 

As amended by the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Year5 1992/1993 (P.L. 102-311), 

1993 (P.L. 102-484), 1994 (P.L. 103-1061, 1995 (P.L. 

103-337), and the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 

(P.L. 103-4211. 

TITLE xxn(r - DEFENSE BASE 

CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS 

PARTA-DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND 

REALIGIVMENT tTOMMISSION 

SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE 

(a) SHORT TIim.-This part may be cited ai the 

“Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990”. 

(b) PURPosE.-The purpose of this part is to1 

provide a fair process that will result in the timely 

closure and realignment of military installations, 

inside the United States. 

SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION 

(a) EsTmLIsmEm-There is established an in&-- 

pendent commission to be known ;IS the “Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission”. 

(b) DunEs.--The Commission :<hall carq ou1: 

the duties specjfied for it in this part. 

(c) APPOINTMENT.-( 1)(A) The Commission shall 

be composed of eight members appointed by the 

President, by and with the advise and consent of 

the Senate. 

(H) The President shall transmit to the Senate the 

nominations for appointment to the Commission- 

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the 

ca.se of members of the Commission whose 

terms will expire at the end of the first session 

of the 102nd Congress; 

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993. in the 

case of members of the Comm 

terms will expire at the end of the first session 

of the l03rd Congress; and 

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995. in the 

case of members of the Commission whose 

terms will expirle at the end of the first session 

of the 104th Congress. 

(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominations for appointment to the 

Commission on 01: before the date specified for 

1993, in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 1995 

in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process 

by which military jnstallations may be selected for 

closure or realignment under this part with respect 

to that year shall be terminated. 

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for 

appointments to the Commission, the President 

should consult with- 

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives 

concerning the appointment of two members; 

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members; 

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one 

member; and 

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member. 

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Coinrnission for 

each session of Congress referred to in paragraph 

(1 )(131, the President shall designate one such 
~~ 

individual who shall serve as Chairman of the 

Commission. 

(d) TERMS.--(~) Except as provided in paragraph (21, each member of the Commission shall 

serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die 

for the session during which the member was 

appointed to the Commission. 

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall 

serve until the confirmation of a successor. 

(e) Ma.41) The Commission shall meet 

only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1595. 

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other 

than meetings in which classified information is to 

be discussed, shall be open to the public. 

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon 

request, to the following: 

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority 

party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustairiability, and Support of the Com 

mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, or 

such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority 

party member. 

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority 

party member of the Subcommittee on Military. 

Installations and Facilities of the Committee on 

Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking 

minority party member. 

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority 

party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Commitrees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of 

Representatives, or such other members of the 

Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen 

or ranking minority party members. 

(0 VACANCIIS.-A vacancy in the Commission 

shall be filled in the same manner as the original 

appointment, but the individual appointed to fill 

the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired 

portion of the term for which the individual’s predecessor was appointed. 

(g) PAY rn TRAVEL ExPENsEs.--(~)(A) flach 

member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at 

a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level N 

of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 

title 5, United States Code, for each day (including 

travel time) during which the member is engaged 

in the actual performance of duties vested in the 

Conxnission. 

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day 

referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to 

the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate 

of hasic pay payable for level 111 of the Executive 

Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United 

States Code. 

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance 

with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United 

States Code. 

(h) DIRECTOR CI STm.41) The Commission 

shall, without regard to section 5311cb) of title 5, 

United States Code, appoint a Director who has 

not served on active duty in the Armed Forces 

or as a civilian employee of the Department of 

Defense during the one-year period preceding the 

date of such appomtment. 

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of 

basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive 

Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United 

States Code. 

(i) STm.41) Subject to paragraphs (2) and 

(31, the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional 

personnel. 

(2) The Director may make such appointments 

without regard to the provisions of title 5, United 

States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed 

may be paid without regard to the provisions of 

chapter 51 and sutchapter I11 of chapter 53 of that 

title relating to classification and General Schedule 

pay rates, except that an individual so appointed 

may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate 

of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General 

Schedule. 

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission 

may be on detail from the Department of Defense. 

(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may be 

persons detailed frlom the Department of Defense 

to the Commission. 

(ii) No person detailed from the Department of 

Defense to the Commission may be assigned as 

- 

F-2 APPENDIX F 
the lead professional analyst with respect to a 

military department or defense agen'cy. 

(C) A person may not be detailed from the 

Department of Defense to the Commissiori if, 

within 12 months before the detail is to begin, 

that person participated personally and substantially in any matter within the Department of 

Defense concerning the preparation of recommendations for clo:;LIres or realignments of military 

installations. 

(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no 

officer or employee of the Department of Defense, 

may-- 

(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the performance on the staff of the Comrnission of any 

person detailed from the Department of Def'ense 

to that staff; 

(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or 

(iii) approve or disapprove such a report. 

(4') Upon request of the Director, the head of 

any Fedt:ral department or agency iinay detail any 

of the personnt.1 of that department or agenq to 

the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part. 

(5) The Comptroller General of the United 

States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance m ith an agreement entered into with the 

Commission. 

(6) The following restrictions relating to the 

personnel of the Commission shall apply during 

1992 and 1994: 

(A) There may not be more than 15 persons 

on the staff at any one time. 

(€3) The staff may perform only such fiinctions 3s are nece iry to prepare for the transition to new imembership on the Commission in 

the following year. 

(C) No meinber of the Armed Forces and no 

employee of the Department 01' Defense inay 

serve on the staff. 

(j) OTHER Arrr~om.-(l) The Commission may 

procure by contract. to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of 

experts or consultants pursuant to :section 3109 of 

title 5. United States Code. 

(2\) The Commission inay lease space and acquire 

personal property to the extent funds are av:iil:ible. 

(k) FUN DING.-(^) There are authorized to he 

appropriated to the Commission such funds as are 

necessary to carry out its duties under this part. 

Such funds shall remain available until expended. 

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Comtnission by the end of the second session of the lOlst 

Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer. 

for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from 

the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 

established by section 207 of I'ublic Law 100-526. 

Such funds shall reimain available until expended. 

(1) TERMINATIoN.--The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995. 

(m) PROHIBIIION AGAINST RESTRICTING COMMUNICATiom-Section 1034 of title 10, United States 

Code, shall apply with respect to communications 

with the Commission. 

SEC. 2903. PROCEiDURE FOR MAKING 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURE 

AND REALIGNMENTS 

(A) FORCE-STRUCIW pLAN.41) As part of the 

budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department 

of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1794, 

and 1996, the Secretary shall include a forcestructure plan for ithe Armed Forces based on an 

assessment by the Secretary of the probable 

threats to the naticinal security during the six-year 

period beginning with the fiscal year for which 

the budget request is made and of the anticipated 

levels of funding that will he available for national 

defense purposes during such period. 

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations 

inside the United States that may be closed or 

realigned under such plan- 

(A) a description of the assessment referred 

to in paragraph (1); 

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force 

structure during, and at the end of each such 

period for each military department (with 

specifications of the number and type of units 

in the active and reserve forces of each such 

department), and Cii) of the units that will need 

to be forwardl based (with a justification 

thereof) during and at the end of each such 

period; and 
(C) a description of the anticipated implernentation of such force-structure plan. 

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of 

each such force-structure plan to the Commission:. 

(b) SELECTION Cm.41) The Secretary shall, 

by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in 

the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria propo.sed to 

be used by the Department of Defense in nlaking 

recommendations for the closure or realignment 

of military installations inside the United States 

under this part. The Secretary shall provide an 

opportunity far public comment on the proposed 

criteria for a period of at least 30 days andl shall 

include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence. 

(.2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February IS, 1991., publish in the Federal Register and 

transmit to the congressional defense committees 

the final criteria to be used in making reconimertdations for the closure or realignment of m.ilitary 

installations inside the United States under this 

part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), 

such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, 

along with the force-structure plan referred to in 

subsection (a), in making such recommendations 

unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991. 

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but 

such amendments may not become effective until 

they have been published in the Federal Register, 

opened to public comment for at least 30 days, 

and then transmitted to the congressional defense 

committees in final form by no later than Ja.nuary 

15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria 

shall be the final criteria to be used, along with 

the force-struci:ure plan referred to in subsection 

(a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted 

on or before February 15 of the year concern'ed. 

(c:) DoD RECOMMENDATIONS.-(~) The Secretary 

may, by no later than April 15, 1991, March 15, 

1993 and March 1, 1995, publish in the Federal 

Register and transmit to the congressional defense 

committees and to the Commission a list of the 

military installations inside the United States that 

the 15ecretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and 

the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2:) 

that are applicable to the year concerned. 

(2) The Secretary shall include:, with the list 

of recommendations published and transmitted 

pursuant to paragraph (11, a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation 

for each installation, including a justification for 

each recommendlation. The Secretary shall transmit the matters referred to in the preceding sentence not later than 7 days after the date of the 

transmittal to the congressional defense committees and the Commission of the list referred to in 

paragraph (1). 

(3)(A) In considering military installations for 

closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United 

States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the 

Department. 

( B) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take 

into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or 

realignment of an installation. 

(C) For purposes of subparagraph (B), in the 

case of a commiunity anticipating the economic 

effects of a closure or realignment of a military 

installation, advance conversion planning- 

(i) shall include community adjustment and 

economic diversification planning undertaken 

by the community before an anticipated selection of a military installation in or near the 

community for closure or realignment; and 

(ii) may include the development of contingency redevelopment plans, plans for economic development and diversification, and 

plans for the joint use (including civilian and 

military use, public and private use, civilian 

dual use, and civilian shared use) of the property or facilities of the installation after the anticipated closure or realignment. 

(4) In addition to making all information used 

by he Secretary to prepare the recommendations 

under this subsection available to Congress 

(including any ciommittee or member of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such infomation available to the Commission and the 

Comptroller General of the United States. 

(5)(A) Each person referred to in subparagraph 

(B), when submitting information to the Secretary 

of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall 

certify that such information is accurate and 

F-4 APPENDIX F 
complete to the best of that person’s knowledge 

and bclief. 

(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following 

persons: 

(i) The Secretaries of the military departmerits. 

(ii) The heads of the Defense Agencies. 

(iii) Each person who is in a position the 

duties of which include personal and subsmtial involvement in the preparation and subtnission of information and recommendations 

concerning the closure or realignment of rnilitary installations, as designated in regulations 

which the Secretary of Defense s’hall prescribe, 

regulations which the Secretary of each military 

department shall prescribe for personnel within 

that military department, or regulatjons which the 

head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe 

for personnel within that Defense Agency. 

(6) Any information provided to the Cornmission 11y a person described in paragraph (5)(B) 

shall also be submitted to the Senate and the 

House of Kepresentatives to be made available to 

the Rllembers of the House concerned in accordance with the rules of that House. The information :<hall be submitted to the Senate and the 

House of Representatives within 24 hours after the 

submission of the information to the Commission. 

(d.) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISsIoN.--(l:) After receiving the recommendat Lens 

from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for 

any jar, the Commission shall conduct public 

hearings on the recommendations. All testimony 

hefore the Commission at a public hearing conducted under this paragraph shall be presented 

under oath. 

(2”) The Commission shall, by no later I.han 

July 3 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommenclations to it pursuanl. to subsection 

(c), transmit to the President a report containing 

the Commission’s findings and conclusions based 

on a review and analysis of the recommendations 

made by the Secretary, together with the 

Commission’s recommendations for closures and 

realignments of military installations inside the 

Unite’d States. 

B) Subject to subparagraph (0, in making its 

recommendations, the Commission may make 

changes in any of the recommendations made by 

the Secretary if the Commission determines that 

the Secretary deviated substantially from the forcestructure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(l) in malting recommendations. 

(C> In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommenclations made by 

the Secretary, the Commission may make the 

change only if the Conmission- 

(i) inakes the determination required hy subparagraph (HI; 

(ii) determines that the change is consistent 

with the force-structure plan and final criteria 

referred to in subsection (c)(l); 

(iii) pub1ishe:s ;1 notice of the proposed 

chinge in the Federal Register not less tkan 45 

days before transmitting its recommendations 

to the President pursuant to paragraph (2; and 

(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change. 

(D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change 

by the Commission in the Secretary‘s recornmendations that would-- 

(i) add a militaiy installation to the list of 

military installations recommended by the Secretary for closure; 

(ii) add a military instalkition to the list of 

military installations recommended by the Secretary for realignment; or 

(iii) increase the extent of a realignment of a 

particular military installation recornmended by 

the Secretary. 

(E) In making recommendations under this 

paragraph, the Commission may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion 

planning undertaken hy an affected community 

with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of a military installation. 

(3 ) The Comniission shall explain and justify in 

its report submitted to the President pursuant to 

paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the 

Commission that is different from the recoinmendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection I:c>. The Cornmission shall transmit a copy of 

such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its 

recommendations to the President under pusgraph (2). 

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Coinmission transmits recommendations to the I’resident under this subsection, the Commission shall 

DEFENSE 13ASE CLOSURE .4ND REALIGNMEW ACT 0: 1990 F-5 
promptly provide, upon request, to any Member 

of Congress information used by the Commission 

in making its recommendations. 

(5) The Comptroller General! of the United 

States shall- 

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent 

requested, in the Commission’s review and 

analysis of the recommendations made by the 

!Secretary pursuant to subsection (C); and 

(U) by no later than April 15 of each year in 

which the Secretary makes such recomniendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Cornmission a report containing a detailed analysis 

of the Secretary’s recommendations and selection process. 

(e) REVIEW BY THE PRESDENT.-(~) The President 

shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in 

which the Commission makes n-commenclations 

under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission 

and to the Congress a report containing the 

President’s approval or disapproval cd the 

Cornmission’s recommendations. 

(2) If the President approves all the recornmendations of the Commission, the President shad 

transmit a copy of such recommendations to the 

Congress, together with a certification of such 

approval. 

(3) If the President disapproves the reconmendations of the Commission, in whole or in1 part, 

the President shall transmit to the Commksion 

and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. 

The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the yeair coricerned, a revised list of recommendations fix the 

closure and realignment of military installations. 

(I) If the President approves all of the revised 

recommendations of the Commission transmitted 

to the President under paragraph (31, the President shall transmit a copy of such revised ~YTOITLmeridations to the Congress, together with a 

cemfication of such approval. 

(‘3) If the President does not transmit to the 

Congress an approval and certification described 

in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any 

year in which 1 he Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, 

the process by which military installations may be 

selected for closure or realignment under this paIt 

with respect to that year shall be terminated. 

SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF 

MILITARY INST.ALLATIONS 

Secretary sha11- 

(a) In General.-Subject to subsection (b), the 

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each 

report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e); 

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission 

in each such report; 

(3) initiate ail such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on 

which the President transmits a report to the 

Congress pursuant to section 2303(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or 

realignments; and 

(4) comp1er.e all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year 

period beginning on the date on which the 

President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations 

for such closures or realignments. 

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DIsAppRovAL----(l) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment 

recommended by the Commission in a report 

transmitted from the President pursuant to section 

2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the 

Commission before the earlier of- 

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning 

on the date on which the President transmits 

such report; or 

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die 

for the session during which such report is 

transmitted. 

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsmiom (a) and (c) of section 

2908, the days on which either House of Congress 

is not in session because of an adjournment of 

more than three days to a day certain shall be 

excluded in the computation of a period. 

SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION 

(a) 1” GENERAL^^) In closing or realigning 

any military installation under this part, the Secretary may- 

- 

F-6 APPENDIX F 
(A) take such actions as may be necessary to 

close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement fiicilities, the 

perforirance of such activities, and the con3uct 

of such advance planning and design as may 

be required to transfer functions from a military 

instal1:ition being closed or realigned to another 

military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Ilepartment of Defense for use in 

planning and design, minor construction, or 

operation and maintenance; 

(B) provide- 

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any 

community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and 

community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as 

a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation, if the Secretary of Defense 

determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and 

may use for such purposes funds in the 

Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment 

assistance or community planning assistance: 

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of 

environmental restoration and mitigation at any 

such installation, and shall use for such purposes funds in the Account; 

(D 1 provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of 

Defense at military installations being closed or 

realigned, and may use for such purpose funds 

in the Account or funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and 

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for 

actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in 

the Account or funds appropriated to the 

Department of Defense and available for ,such 

purpose. 

(2:) In carrying out any closure lor realignment 

under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that 

environmental restoration of any property nude 

exce~ tothe needs of the Departm'ent of Defense 

(ii) community planning a 

as a result of such closure or realignment tie carried lout as soon a:; possible with funds available 

for such purpose. 

(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.^^) 

The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to 

excess and surphj real property, facilities, and 

personal property located at a military installation 

closed or realigned under this part- 

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the 

Federal Property and Administrative Services 

Act of 1949 (40 1J.S.C. 483); 

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of 

that Act (40 U.S.C. 484); 

(C) the authority of the Administr 'Ltor to 

grant approvals ;and make determinations under 

section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 

1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)>; and 

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real 

property for wildlife conservation purposes in 

accordance with1 the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 

U.S.C. 667b). 

(2)(A) Subject tlo subparagraph (C) and paragraphs (31, (41, (51, and (61, the Secretary of 

Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to 

the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with- 

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the 

enactment of this Act governing the utilization 

of excess property and the disposal of surplus 

property under the Federal Property and -4dministrative Services Act of 1949; and 

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the 

enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and dispo'sal of property under section 

13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 

U.S.C. App. 162;!(g)). 

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation 

of authority required by paragraph (1). 

(0 The authority required to be delegated by 

paragraph (1) to th'e Secretary by the Administrator 

of General Services shall not include the authority 

to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus 

property. 
(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real 

property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this pant, with 

or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a monappropriated 

fund instrumentality) within the Department of 

Defense or the Coast Guard. 

(E) Before any action may be taken with aespelcf 

to the disposal of any surplus real property or 

facility located at any military installation to be 

closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary 

of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the 

State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan 

for the use of such property by the local community concerned. 

(.))(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of 

approval of the closure of a military installation 

under this part, the Secretary, in consultation with 

the redevelopment authority with respect to the 

installations shall- 

(i) inventory the personal property located at 

the installation; and 

(ii) identify the items (or categories of items) 

of such personal property that the Secretary 

determines to be related to real property and 

anticipates will support the implemenlatioii 

of the redevelopment plan with respect to the 

installation. 

(13) If no redevelopment authority referred to in 

subparagraph (A) exists with respect to an installation, the Secretary shall consult with- 

(i) the local government in whose jurisdiction the installation is wholly located; or 

(ii) a local government agency or State government agency designated for the purpose of 

such consultation by the chief executive olfficer 

of the State in which the installalion is located. 

((Xi) Except as provided in subparagraphs (El 

and (F), the Secretary may not carry out any of 

the activities referred to in clause (ii) with respect 

to an installation referred to in that clause until 

the earlier of- 

(I) one week after the date on which the 

redevelopment plan for the installation is sub-. 

mitted to the Secretary; 

(11) the date on which the redevelopment 

authority notifies the Secretary that it will not 

submit such a plan; 

(111) twenty-four months after the date of 

approval of the closure of the installation; or 

(IV) ninety days before the date of the closure of the insttallation. 

(ii) The activities referred to in clause (i) are 

activities relating to the closure of an installation to be closed under this part as follows: 

(I) The transfer from the installation of items 

of personal property at the installation identified in accordance with subparagraph (A). 

(11) The reduction in maintenance and repair 

of facilities or equipment located at the installation below the minimum levels required to support the use olf such facilities or equipment for 

nonmilitary purposes. 

(D) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the 

Secretary may not transfer items of personal property located at an installation to be closed under 

this part to another installation, or dispose of such 

items, if such items are identified in the redevelopment plan for ithe installation as items essential 

to the reuse or redevelopment of the installation. 

In connection with the development of the redevelopment plan for the installation, the Secretary 

shall consult with the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan to identify the 

items of pers0~1 property located at the installation, if any, that the entity desires to be retained at 

the installation foir reuse or redevelopment of the 

installation. 

(El This paragraph shall not apply to any personal property located at an installation to be 

closed under this part if the property- 

(i) is required for the operation of a unit, 

function, component, weapon, or weapons system at another installation; 

(ii) is uniquely military in character, and is 

likely to have no civilian use (other than use 

for its material content or as a source of commonly used components); 

(iii) is not required for the reutilization or 

redevelopment of the insrallation (as jointly determined by the Secretary and the redevelopment 

authority); 

(iv) is stored at the installation for purposes 

of distribution (including spare parts or stock 

items); or 

(vXI) meets known requirements of an authorized program of another Federal department or 

F-8 APPENDIX P 
agency for which expenditures for similar property would lie necessary, and (11) is the suliject 

of ;I written request tiy the head (.if the department or agency. 

(F) Notwithstanding subparagraplis (C)(i) ;ind 

(D), the Secretary may carry out any activity 

referred to in subparagraph (CXii) or (IN if tlie 

Secretxy determines that the carrying out of such 

activity is in the national security interest of the 

United States. 

(4)(A) The Secretary may transfer real property 

and plersonal property located at a military installation to lie closed under this part to the redevelopment authority with respect to the installation 

(€3)1:i)(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), the 

transfer of property under subparagraph (A) rnay 

lie for consideration at or lielow tlie estimated fair 

market value of the property transferred or without consideration. Such consideration may include 

consickration in kind (including goods and services). real property and improvements, or such 

other consideration as the Secretary considers 

appropriate. The Secretary shall determine the 

estimated fair market value of the property to be 

transferred under this subparagraph before carrying out such transfer. 

(11) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations 

that set forth giiiclelines for determining the 

amount, if any, of consideration required far a 

transfer under this paragraph. Such regulations 

shall include a requirement that, in the cast' of 

each transfer under this paragraph for consideration I:ielow the estimated fair market value of the 

propei-ty transferred, the Secretary provide an explanation why the transfer is not for the estimated 

fair market value of the property to be transferred 

(including an explanation why the transfer cannot 

tie carried out in accordance with the authority 

provided to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph 

(1) or (2);). 

(ii) The transfer of property under subparagraph (A) shall be without consideration in the 

case iif my installation located in a rural area 

whose closure under this part will have a substantial adverse impact (as determined by the Secretary) on the economy of the communities in the 

vicinity of the installation and on the prospect for 

the economic recovery of such communities from 

such closure. The Secretary shall prescribe in the 

regulations under clause (i)(II) the miinner of determining whether communities are eligible for the 

transfer of property under this clause. 

(iii) In the case of a transfer under sulip:imgraph (A) for consickration beloa the hit- market 

value of the property transferred. the Secretary 

may i"mp from the transferee of such property 

such portion as the Secret:ir)r determines appropriate of the amount, if any, hy ukicli thc sde or 

lease of such property by such transferee exceeds 

the amount of consickxition p:iicl to the Secretaiy 

for such property I-iy such transferee. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for determining the 

(C)(i) The transfer of personal property under 

subparagraph (A) shall not lie sihject to the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 

U.S.C. 483, 484) if the Secretary determines that 

the transfer of such property is nece 

effective itnp1ement;ition of ;I redevel 

with respect to tlie installation at rvhicli such 

property is located. 

(ii) The Secretary mny, in lieu of the transfer of 

property referred to1 in subparagraph (A), transfer 

property similar to :jucli property (including property not located at the installation) if the Secretary 

determines that the transfer of such similar property is in the interest of the United States. 

(I)) The provisions of section 12O(h) of the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response. Con - 

pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (41 LJ.S.C. 

9602(h) shall apply to any tl.:insfer of real property 

under this paragraph. 

(E) The Secretary may require any additional 

terms and conditions in connection \vith :I transfer 

under this paragraph as such Secretary consiclers 

appropriate to protect the interests of the United 

States. 

(i)(A) Except as provided in suliparagraph (U), 

the Secretary shall t ich ;ictions ah the Secrctary determines nc ry to ensure that final 

determinations under paragraph ( 1) regarding 

whether another department or agency of the 

Federal Government has identified a use for any 

portion of a military installation to be closed under this part, or will accept transfer of any portion 

of such installation, are made not later than 6 

months after the date of approval of closure of 

that iiistallation. 

(B) The Secretary may, in consultation with the 

redevelopment authority with respect to an installation. postpone making the final determinations 

referred to in subparqqqdi (A) uith respect to 

amount of recoupment iincler this cl,i ' use. 
-~ 

the installation for such period as the Secretary 

determines appropriate if the Secretary detetmines 

that such postponement is in the best interests of 

the communities affected by the closure of the 

installation. 

(6)(A) Except as provided in this paragraph, 

nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise 

affect the application of the provisions of the 

Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 

U.S.C. 11301 et seq.) to military installations 

closed under this part. For procetlures relating ro 

the use to assist the homeless of buildings and 

property at installations closed under this part 

after the date of the enactment of this sentence, 

see paragraph (7). 

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the 

Secretary of Defense completes the determination 

under paragraph (5) of the transferability of any 

portion of an installation to be closed under this 

part, the Secretary shall- 

(I) complete any determinations or surveys 

riecessary to determine whether any building or 

property referred to in clause (ii) is excess 

property, surplus property, or unutilized or 

underutilized property for the purpose of the 

information referred to in section 501(a) of 

such Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(a)); and 

(11) submit to the Secretary of Housing and 

IJrban Development information on any building or property that is so determined. 

(ii) The buildings and property referred to in 

clause (i) are any buildings or property located at 

an installation referred to in that clause for which 

no use is identified, or of which no Federal department or agency will accept transfer, pursuant to 

the determination of transferability referred to in 

that clause. 

(0 Not later than 60 days after the date on 

which the Secretary of Defense submits information to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Ikvelopnient under subparagraph (B)(ii), the Secretary 

of Housing and Urban Development shall- 

(i) identrfy the buildings and property described in such information that are suitabL for 

use to assist the homeless; 

(ii) notify the Secretary of Defense of the 

buildings and property that are so identified; 

(iii) publish in the Federal Register a list of 

the buildings and property that are so identified, including with respect to cach building or 

property the information referred to in section 

501(c)(l)(B) of such Act; and 

(iv) make available with respect to each 

building and property the information referred 

to in section SOl(cXl)(C) of such Act in accordance with such section 50l(c)(l)(C). 

(D) Any buildings and property included in a 

list published under subparagraph (C)(iii) shall be 

treated as property available for application for 

use to assist the homeless under section 501(d) of 

such Act. 

(E) The Secretary of Defense shall make available in accordance with section 501(D of such Act 

any buildings or property referred to in subparagraph (D) for which- 

(i) a written notice of an intent to use such 

buildings or property to assist the homeless is 

received by the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) 

of such Act; 

(ii) an application for use of such buildings 

or property for such purpose is submitted to 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services in 

accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act; 

and 

(iii) The Secretary of Health and Human 

Services- 

(I) completes all actions on the application in accordance with section 501(e)(3) 

of such Act; and 

(11) approves the application under section 501(e) of such Act. 

(F)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a redevelopment 

authority may express in writing an interest in 

using buildings and property referred to subparagraph (D), and buildings and property referred to 

in subparagraph (BXii) which have not been identSed as suitable for use to assist the homeless 

under subparagraph (C), or use such buildings 

and property, in accordance with the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which 

such buildings and property are located as follows: 

(I) If no written notice of an intent to use 

such buildings and property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services in accordance with section 

501(d)(2) of such Act during the 60-day period 

beginning on the date of publication of the 

buildings and property under subparagraph 

(C)(iii). 

F-10 API’ENDIX F 
(11) In the case of buildings and property for 

which such notice is so received, if no completed application for use of the buildings or 

property for such purpose is received by the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services in 

accordance with section 501(e)(2:) of such Act 

during the 90-day period beginning on the date 

of the receipt of such notice. 

(111) In the case of buildings and propt:rty 

for which such application is so received, if the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services rejects 

the application under section (501Xe) of such 

Act. 

(ii) Buildings and property shall be available 

only for the purpose of permitting a redevelopment authority to express in writing an interest in 

the use of such buildings and property, or to use 

such liuildings and property, under clause (i) as 

follows: 

(I) In the case of buildings and property 

referred to in clause (XI), during the one-year 

period beginning on the first day after the 60- 

day period referred to in that clau:je. 

(11) In the case of buildings and property 

referred to in clause (i)(II), during the one-year 

period beginning on the first day after the 90- 

day period referred to in that cla11:ie. 

(111:) In the case of buildings and property 

referred to in clause (i)(III), during the oneyear period beginning on the date of rejecrion 

of the application referred to in that clause. 

(iii:l A redevelopment authority shall express an 

interest in the use of buildings and property under 

this subparagraph by notifying the Secretary of 

Defense, in writing, of such an interest. 

(GXi) Buildings and property available fcir a 

redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F) 

shall not be available for use to assist the homeless under section 501 of such Act while so available fix a redevelopment authority. 

(ii) If a redevelopment authority does not 

express an interest in the use of buildings or 

property, or commence the use of buildings or 

property, under subparagraph (F) within the applicalde time periods specified in clause (iil of 

such subparagraph, such buildings and property 

shall be treated as property available for use to 

assist the homeless under section 501(a) of such Act. 

(7)(A) Determinations of the ust: to assist the 

homeless of buildings and property located at 

installations approved for closure under this part 

after the date of the enactment of this pxagraph 

shall be determined under this paragraph rather 

than paragraph (6). 

(B)(i) Not later that the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the final determinations referred to in paragraph (5) relating to the 

use or transferability of any portion of an installation covered by this paragraph, the Secretary 

shall-- 

(I) identify the buildings and property at the 

insdlation for which the Department of Defense 

has a use, for which another department or 

agency of the Federal Government has identified a use, or of which another department or 

agency will accept a transfer; 

identify any builcling or property at the installation not identified under subclause (I) that is 

excess property or surplus property; 

(111) submit to the Secretary of Housing and 

Urban Development and to the redevelopment 

authority for the mstallation (or the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation 

is located if there is no redevelopment authority for the installation at the completion of the 

determination described in the stein of this senterm) information on any building or property 

that is identified under subclause (11); and 

(IV) publish in the Federal Register and in a 

newspaper of gencral circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation information on the buildings and property identified 

under subclause (III. 

(ii) Upon the recognition of a redevelopment 

authority for an installation covered by this paragraph., the Secretary of Defense shall publish in 

the Federal Register and in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity 

of the installation information on the redevelopment authority. 

(C )(i) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties 

located in the com.munities in the vicinity of an 

installation covered by this paragraph shall submit 

to the redevelopment authority for the installation 

a notice of the interest, if any, of such governments, representatives, and parties in the buildings or property, or any portion thereof, at the 

installation that are identified under subparagraph 

(B)(i)(II). A notice of interest under this clause 

1:II) take such actions as are nece 

DEFENSE E~ASE C1,OSIJKE AKD REALIGNMENT ACT 01; 1990 F-11 
shall describe the need of the government, representative, or party concerned for the buildings or 

property covered by the notice. 

(ii) The redevelopment authority for an installation shall assist the governments, representatives, 

and parties referred to in clause (i) in evaluating 

buildings and property at the installation for purposes of this subparagraph. 

(iii) tn providing assistance under clause (ii), a 

redevelopment authority shall- 

(I) consult with representatives of the homeless in the communities in the vicinity of the 

installation concerned and 

(11) undertake outreach efforts to provide 

information on the buildings and property to 

representatives of the homeless, and to other 

persons or entities interested in assisting the 

homeless, in such communities. 

(iv) It is the sense of Congress that redevelopment authorities should begin to conduct outreach 

efforts under clause (iii)(II) with respect to an 

installation as soon as is practicable after the date 

of approval of closure of the installation. 

(DXi) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties 

shall submit a notice of interest to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) noi later 

than the date specified for such notice by the 

redevelopment authority. 

(ii) The date specified under clause (i) shall 

be-- 

(I) in the case of an installation for which a 

redevelopment authority has been recognized 

as of the date of the completion of the deiterminations referred to in paragraph(5), not earlier 

than 3 months and not later than 6 months 

after that date; and 

(11) in case of an installation for which a 

redevelopment authority is not recognized as of 

such date, not earlier than 3 months and not later 

than 6 months after the date of the recognition 

of a redevelopment authority for the installation. 

(iii) Upon speclfying a date for an installation 

under this subparagraph, the redevelopment authority for the installation shall- 

(I) publish the date specified in a newslpaper 

of general circulation in the conmunities in the 

vicinity of the installation concerned; and 

(11) notlfy the Secretary of Defense of the date. 

(E)(i) In submitting to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) a notice of interest in 

the use of buildings or property at an installation 

to assist the homeless, a representative of the 

homeless shall submit the following: 

(I) A description of the homeless assistance 

program that the representative proposes to 

carry out at the installation. 

(I0 An assessment of the need for the program. 

(111) A description of the extent to which the 

program is or will be coordinated with other 

homeless assistance programs in the communities in the vicinity of the installation. 

(IV) A description of the buildings and property at the installation that are necessary in order 

to carry out the program. 

(V) A description of the financial plan, the 

organization, and the organizational capacity of 

the representative to carry out the program. 

(VI) An assessment of the time required in 

order to commence carrying out the program. 

(ii) A redevelopment authority may not release 

to the pubic any information submitted to the 

redevelopment authority under clause (i)(V) without the consent of the representative of the homeless concerned unless such release is authorized 

under Federal law and under the law of the State 

and communities in which the installation concerned is located. 

(F)(i) The redevelopment authority for each 

installation covered by this paragraph shall prepare a redevelopment plan for the installation. 

The redevelopment authority shall, in preparing 

the plan, consider the interests in the use to assist 

the homeless of the buildings and property at the 

installation that aire expressed in the notices submitted to the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C). 

(iiXI) In connection with a redevelopment plan 

for an installation, a redevelopment authority and 

representatives of ihe homeless shall prepare legally 

binding agreements that provide for the use to 

assist the homeless of buildings and property, 

resources, and assistance on or off the installation. 

The implementation of such agreements shall be 

contingent upon the approval of the redevelopment plan by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development under subparagraph (H) or 0). 

- 

F-12 APPENDIX F 
(11) Agreements under this clause shall provide 

for the reversion to the redevelopment authority 

concerned, or to such other entity or entities as 

the agreements shall provide, of buildings and 

property that are made available under this paragraph for use to assist the homeless in the event 

that such buildings and property cease being imd 

for that purpose. 

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall provide 

oppori:unity for public comment on a redevel'qrnent plan before submission of the plan to the 

Secretxy of Defense and the Secretary of Ilousing 

and 1 Jrban Development under subparagraph ((31, 

(iv 1 A redevelopment authority slhall complete 

preparation of 21 redevelopment plan for an installation and submit the plan under suliparagraph 

(G) not later than 9 months after the date specified by the redevelopment authority for the installation under subparagraph (D). 

(G Xi) IJpon completion of a redevelopment 

plan under subparagraph (F), a redevelopment 

authority shall submit an application containing 

the plan to the Secretary of Defense and to the 

Secrttiry of Housing and Urban Development. 

(ii) A redevelopment authority shall include in 

an application under clause (i) the fodlowing: 

(I) A copy of the redevelopment plan, includin;? a summary of any public comments on the 

pl;~ n received by the redevelopment authority 

under subparagraph @)(iii). 

(11) A copy of each notice of interest of use 

of huilthgs and property to assist the homeless 

thx; was submitted to the redevelopment authorit), under subparagraph (0, together with a 

dtb>cription of the manner, if any, in which the 

plan addresses the interest expressed in each 

such notice and, if the plan does not address 

such an interest, an explanation why the plan 

does not address the interest. 

CIII) A summary of the outreach undertaken 

ti), the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C)(iii)(II) in preparing the plan. 

1 IV) A statement identifying the representati\m of the homeless and the homeless assistance planning boards. if any. with which the 

redevelopment authority consulted in preparing 

the plan, and the results of such consultations. 

1:V) An assessment of the manner in which 

the reclevelopment plan balances the expressed 

needs of the homeless and the need of the 

communities in the vicinity of the installation for 

economic redevelopment and other development. 

(VI) Copies of the agreements that the redevelopment authority proposes to enter into under 

subparagraph (F)( ii). 

(H)(i) Not later than 60 days after receiving a 

redevelopment plan under suhparagraph (G 1, the 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 

shall complete a review of the plan. The purpose 

of the review is to determine whether the plan, 

with respect to the expressed interest and requests 

of representatives of the homeless- 

(I) takes into consideration the size and nature 

of the homeless population in the communities 

in the vicinity of the installation, the :ivailability 

of existing services in such communities to 

meet the needs of the homeless in such coinmunities, and the suitability of the buildings 

and property covered by the plan for the use 

and needs of the homeless in such communities; 

(11) takes into consideration any economic 

impact of homeless assistance under the plan on 

the communities in the vicinity of the installation; 

(111) balances in an appropriate manner the 

needs of the communities in the vicinity of the 

installation for economic redevelopment and 

other development with the needs of the 

homeless in such communities; 

(IV) was developed in consultation with representatives of the homeless and the homeless 

assistance planning boards, if any, in the conmunities in the vicinity of the installation; and 

(V) specifies the manner in which lxiildings 

and property, resources and assistance on or 

off the installation will be made available for 

homeless assistance purposes. 

(ii) It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary 

of Housing and Urban Development shall, in completing the review of a plan under this subparagraph, take into consideration and lie receptive to 

the predominant views on the plan of the communities in the vicinity of the installation covered hy 

the plan. 

(iii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may engage in negotiations and consultations with a redevelopment authority before or 

during the course of a review under clause (i) 

with a view toward resolving any preliminary determination of the Secretary that the redevelopment 

plan does not meet a requirement set forth in that 

DEFENSE BASE CI.OSI!KE AND REALIGNRENT ACT OF 1990 F-13 
clause. The redevelopment authority may rnodify 

the redevelopment plan as a result of such negotiations and consultations. 

(iv) Upon completion of a review of a redevelopment plan under clause (i), the Secretary of 

Housing and Urban Development shall notify the 

Secretary of Defense and the redevelopment 

authority concerned of the determination of the 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 

under that clause. 

(v) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban IDevelopment determines as a result of such a review 

that a redevelopment plan does not meet the 

requirements set forth in clause (il, a notice under 

clause (iv) shall include- 

(I) an explanation of that determination; and 

(11) a statement of the actions that the redevelopment authority must undertake in order to 

address that determination. 

(I)(i) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(iv) of a determination that a redevelopment plan does not meet a requirement sei forth 

in subparagraph (H)(i), a redevebpment authority 

shall have the opportunity tc- 

(I) revise the plan in order to addre-rs the 

determination; and 

(11) submit the revised plan to the Secretary 

of Housing and Urban Development. 

Cii) A redevelopment authority shall submit a 

revised plan under this subparagraph to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, if at all, 

not later than 90 days after the date on which the 

redevelopment authority receives the notice 

referred to in clause(i). 

(J>(i> Not later than 30 days after receiving a 

revised redevelopment plan under subparagraph 

(I), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop 

ment shall review the revised plan and determine 

if the plan meets the requirements set forth in 

subparagraph (H)(i). 

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall note the Secretary of Defense and 

the redevelopment authority concerned cd the 

determination of the Secretary of Housing and 

Urban Development under this subparagraph. 

(K) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(vi) or (J)(ii) of the determination (of the 

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development that 

a redevelopment plan for an installation meets the 

requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), 

the Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the 

buildings and property located at the installation 

that are identified in the plan as available for use 

to assist the homeless in accordance with the provisions of the plan. The Secretary of Defense may 

dispose of such buildings or property directly to 

the representatives of the homeless concerned or 

to the redevelopment authority concerned. The 

Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings 

and property under this subparagraph without 

consideration. 

(L)(i) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban 

Development determines under subparagraph (J) 

that a revised redevelopment plan for an installation does not meet the requirements set forth in 

subparagraph (H)(i), or if no revised plan is so 

submitted, that Secretary shall- 

(I) review the original redevelopment plan 

submitted to that Secretary under Subparagraph 

(G), including the notice or notices of representatives of the homeless referred to in clause 

(ii)(II) of that subparagraph; 

(11) consult with the representatives referred 

to in subclause(I), if any, for purposes of evaluating the continuing interest of such representatives in the use of buildings or property at the 

installation to assist the homeless; 

(111) request that each such representative 

submit to that Secretary the items described in 

clause (ii); and 

(IV) based on the actions of that Secretary 

under subclauses (I) and (111, and on any information obtained by that Secretary as a result of 

such actions, indicate to the Secretary of 

Defense the buildings and property at the 

installation that meet the requirements set forth 

in subparagraph (H)(i). 

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may request under clause (i)(III) that a 

representative of the homeless submit to that 

Secretary the following: 

(I) A description of the program of such 

representative to assist the homeless. 

(11) A description of the manner in which 

the buildings and property that the representative proposes to use for such purpose will 

assist the homeless. 

(111) Such information as that Secretary requires 

in order to determine the financial capacity of 

F-14 APPENDIX F 
the representative to carry out the program and 

to ensure that the program will be carried out 

in compliance with Federal envirclnmental law 

and Federal law against discrimination. 

(IV) A certification that police services, fire 

protection services, and water and sewer services available in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned are adeqiute 

for the program. 

(iii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall indicate to the Secretary of Defense 

and to the redevelopment authority concerned 

that buildings and property at an instadlation under 

clause (i)W to lie disposed of not later than 90 

days after the date of a receipt of a revised plan 

for the ins1:allation under subparagraph 0). 

(iv) The Secretary of Defense shall dispose of 1 he 

buildings ;md property at an installation referred 

to in clause (iii) to entities indicated by the Secretary of Housing and [Jrban Development or by 

transfer to the redevelopment authority concerned 

for transfer to such entities. Such disposal shall be 

in accordance with the indications of the Secretary 

of Housing and Urban Development urider clause (i) 

(IV). Such disposal shall be without consideration. 

(M)(i) In the event of the disposal of buildings 

and property of an installation pursuant to subparagraph (K), the redevelopment authority for 

the installation shall be responsible for the implementation of and compliance with agreements 

under the redevelopment plan described in that 

subparagraph for the installation. 

(ii) If a building or property reverts to a redevelopment authority under such an agreement, 1.he 

redevelopment authority shall take appropriate 

actions to secure, to the maximum extent pralzticable, the utilization of the building, or property 

by other homeless representatives to assist ):he 

A redevelopment authority may not be 

required to utilize the building or property to 

assist the homeless. 

(N) The Secretary of Defense may postpone or 

extend any deadline provided for under this paragraph in the case of an installation covered by 

this paragraph for such period as the Secretary 

considers appropriate if the Secretary determines 

that such postponement is in the interests of the 

communities affected by the closure of the installations. The Secretary shall make such determinations in consultation with the redevelopment 

authority concerned and, in the case of deadlilies 

provided for under this paragraph with respect to 

the Secretary of Housing and LJrhan I>evelopment, 

in consultation with the Secretary of Housing and 

Urban Development. 

(0) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 

"communities in the vicinity of the installiltion", in 

the case of an installation, means the communities 

that constitute the political jurisdictions (other 

than the State in which the installation is located) 

that comprise the redevelopment authority for the 

installation. 

(8)(A) Subject to subparagraph (0, the Secretary may contract with local governments for the 

provisions of police services, fire protection services, airfield operation services, or other coinniiinity services by such governments at military 

installations to be closed under this part if the 

Secretary determines that the provision of such 

services under such contracts is in the best interests of the Department of Defense. 

(B) The Secretary may exercise the authority 

provided under this paragraph without regard to 

the provisions of chapter 146 of title 10, llnited 

States Code. 

(C) The Secretary may not exercise the authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to iin 

installation earlier than 180 clays before the date 

on which the installation is to be closed. 

(D) The Secretary shall include in a contract for 

services entered into with a local government under this paragraph a clause that requires the use 

of professionals to furnish the services to the 

extent that professionals are available in the area 

under the jurisdiction of such government. 

(c) APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 

POLICY ACT OF 1969.-(1) The provisions of the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 

U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions 

of the President, the Commission, and, except as 

provided in paragraph (21, the Department of 

Defense in carrying out this part. 

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1967 shall apply to 'cIT' ions 

of the Department of Defense under this part (i) 

during the process of property disposal, and (ii) 

during the process of relocating functions from a 

military installation being closed or realigned to 

another military installation after the receiving 

installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated. 

DEFEME B~SE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 F- 15 
(B) In applying the provisions' of the National 

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the precesses 

referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secrel.ary of 

Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider-- 

Ci) the need for closing or realigning the 

military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission; 

Cii) the need for transferring functions to any 

military installation which has been selected as 

the receiving installation; or 

(iii) military installations alternative to those 

recommended or selected. 

(3) 11 civil action for judicial review, with respect 

to any requirement of the Nationid Environimental 

Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (21, of any act or failure to 

act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred 

to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may 

not be brought more than 60 days after the date 

of such act or failure to act. 

(d) Wm-The Secretary of Defense may 

close or realign military installations under this 

part without regard to- 

(1) any provision of law restricting the use 

of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorimion Act; and 

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United 

States Code. 

(e) TRANSFER AUTHORITY IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF ENWRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS.-<~)(A) 

Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection and 

section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 

1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the Secretary may enter 

into an agreement to transfer by deed real property or facilities referred to in subparagraph (B) 

with any person who agrees to perform all environmental restoration, waste managemen1 , and 

environmental compliance activities that are 

required for the property or facilities under Federal and State laws, administrative decisions, 

agreements (including schedules and milestones), 

and concurrences. 

(B) The real property and facilities referred to 

in subparagraph (A) are the real property and 

facilities located at an installation closed or to be 

closed under this part that are available exclusively for the use, or expression of an interest in a 

use, of a redevelopment authority under subsection (b)(b)(F) during the period provided for that 

use, or expression of interest in use, under that 

subsection. 

(C) The Secretary may require any additional 

terms and conditions in connection with an agreement authorized by subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the 

interests of the United States. 

(2) A transfer of real property or facilities may 

be made under paragraph (1) only if the Secretary 

certifies to Congress that- 

(A) the costs of all environmental restoration, waste management, environmental compliance activities to be paid by the recipient of 

the property or facilities are equal to or greater 

than the fair market value of the property or 

facilities to be transferred, as determined by the 

Secretary; or 

(B) if such costs are lower than the fair market value of the property or facilities, the recipient of the property or facilities agrees to pay 

the difference between the fair market value 

and such costs. 

(3) As part of an agreement under paragraph 

(l), the Secretary shall disclose to the person to 

whom the property or facilities will be transferred 

any information of the Secretary regarding the environmental restoration, waste management, and 

environmental compliance activities described 

in paragraph (1) that relate to the property or 

facilities. The Secretary shall provide such information before entering into the agreement. 

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to modify, alter, or amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) or the 

Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.). 

(5) Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FkA Year 1993 (Public Law 1024%; 

10 U.S.C. 2687 note) shall not apply to any transfer under this subsection to persons or entities 

described in subsection (a)(2) of such section 330. 

(6) The Secretary may not enter into an agreement to transfer property or facilities under this 

subsection after the expiration of the five-year 

period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 1994. 

F-16 APPENDIX F 
SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT 

(a) IN GENERAL.^^) There is hereby established 

on the books of the Treasury an account to be 

known as the “Department of Defense Base Cllosure Account 1990“ which shall be administered 

by the Secretary as a single account. 

(2) There shill be deposited into the Accounr- 

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to 

the Account; 

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject 

to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to 

the Account from funds appropriated to ]:he 

Department of Defense for any puirpose, except 

that such funds may be transferred only after 

the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer 

to the congressional defense committees; and 

(C) except as provided in subsection (d), 

proceeds received from the transfer or dispasal 

of any property at a military installlation closed 

or realigned under this part; and 

(U) proceeds received after September 30, 

1995, from the transfer or disposal of any property at ;i military installation closed or realigned 

under title I1 of the Defense Authorization 

Amendments and Base Closure and. Realignment 

Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). 

(b) USE OF FuNDs.-(~) The Secretary may use 

the funds in the Account only for the purpo:jes 

described in section 2905 or, after September 30, 

1995, for environmental restoration md property 

management and disposal at installations closed 

or realigned under title I1 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Rase Closure and Realignment Act (l’ublic Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note). 

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in 

the Account to carry out a construction proj’ect 

under section 2905(a) and the cost of the proj’ect 

will exceed the maximum amount authorized by 

law for a minor military construction project, the 

Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional 

defense committees of the nature of, and justifilzation for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction 

project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code. 

(c) REPORTS.-(~)(A) No later than 60 days after 

the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary 

carries out activities under this part. the Secretary 

shall transmit a report to the congressional defense 

committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account 

during such fiscal year and of the mount and 

section 2905(a) during such fiscal year. 

following: 

nature of other expenditures macle pursu’i ‘ Ilt to 

(€5’) The report for ;i fiscal year shall include the 

(i) The obligations and expenditures from 

the Account during the fiscal year, identified l)y 

subaccount, for each military depxtment and 

Defense Agency. 

Cii) The fiscal year in which appropriations 

for such expenditures were ~nade and the fiscal 

year in which funds were obligated for such 

expenditures. 

(iii) Each military construction project for 

which such obligLitions and expenditures were 

made, identified by instal1:ition and project title. 

(iv) A description and exp1:ination of the 

extent, if any. to which expenditures for military construction projects for the fiscal year differed from proposals for projects and funding 

levels that were included in the jurisdiction 

transmitted to Congress under section 2907(1), 

or otherwise, for the funding proposals for the 

Account for such fiscal year, including an explanation of- 

(I ) any failure to carry out militaT constniction projects that were so proposed: and 

(11) any expenditures for military construction projects that were not so proposed. 

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the 

Account after the termination of the authority of 

the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment 

under this part shall be held in the Account until 

transferred by law after the congressional defense 

committees receive the report transmitted under 

paragraph (3). 

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination 

of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a 

closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense 

committees a report containing :in accounting of- 

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended 

under this part; and 

(B) my amount remaining in the Account. 

DEFENSE RASE CL0Sl:RE ANL) REALIGKME-~~T ACT OF 1990 I:-17 
(d) DISPOSAL OR TRANSFER OF COMMISSARY !STORES 

AND PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPMATED 

FuNDs.-(~) If any real property or facility 

acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or 

in part) with commissary store funds or 

nonappropriated funds is transferred or disposed 

of in connection with the closure or realignment 

of a military installation under thili part, a portion 

of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of 

property on that installation shall be deposited in 

the reserve account established under section 

204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (10 

U.S.C. 2687 note). 

(2) The amount so deposited shall be equal to 

the depreciated value of the investment made 

with such funds in the acquisition, construction, 

or improvement of that particular real property or 

facility. The depreciated value of the investment 

shall be computed in accordance with regulations 

prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. 

(3) The Secretary may use amounts in the 

account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance in appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving- 

(A) commissary stores; and 

(13) real property and facilities for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. 

(4) As used in this subsection: 

(A) The term “commissary store funds” 

means funds received from the adjustment of, 

or surcharge on, selling price:; at comnlissary 

stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, 

United States Code. 

(U> The term “nonappropriated funds” 

means funds received from a nonappropriated 

fund instrumentality. 

(C) The term “nonappropria.ted fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the 

United States under the jurisdiction of the 

Armed Forces (including the Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and 

Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps 

exchanges) which is conducted for the ccdort, 

pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental 

improvement of members of the Armed Forces. 

(E) ACCOUNT EXCLUSIVE SOURCE 01: FUNDS FOR ENVI- RONMENTAL RESTORATION PRoJEcrs.-Except for funds 

deposited into the Account under subsection (a), 

funds appropriated to the Department of Dlefense 

may not be used for purposes described in section 

2905(a)( l)(C). The prohibition in this subsection 

shall expire upon the termination of the authority 

of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part. 

SEC. 2907. REPORTS 

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 

1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the 

Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of 

Congree 

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part 

in the fiscal year for which the request is made 

and an estimate of the total expenditures 

required and cost savings to tie achieved by 

each such closure and realignment and of the 

time period in which these savings are to be 

achieved in each case, together with the 

Secretary’s assessment of the environmental 

effects of such actions; and 

(2) a description of the military installations, 

including those under construction and those 

planned for construction, to which functions 

are to be transferred as a result of such closures 

and realignments, together with the Secretary’s 

assessment of the environmental effects of such 

transfers. 

SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION 

OF COMMISSION REPORT 

(a) TERMS OF THE hsomoN.-For purposes of 

section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means 

only a joint resolution which is introduced within 

the loday period beginning on the date on which 

the President transmits the report to the Congress 

under section 2903(e), and- 

(1) which does not have a preamble; 

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of 

which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission as 

submitted by the President on -”, the blank 

space being fded in with the appropriate date; 

and 

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint 

resolution disapproving the recommendations 

of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commission.”. 

F-18 APPENDIX F 
(b) REFERRAL.-A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of 

Representatives shall be referred to the Committee 

on Armed Services of the House of Repre5,entatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) 

introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the 

Cornmittee on Armed Services of the Senate. 

(c) DISCHARGE.-If the committee: to which a 

resolution described in subsection (a) is referred 

has not reported such a resolution (or an identical 

resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transrnits 

the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), 

such committee shall be, at the end of such period, 

discharged from further consideration of such 

resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on 

the appropriate calendar of the House involved. 

(d) CONSIDERATION.-(^) On or after the third 

day after the date on which the 'committee to 

which such a resolution is referred has reported, 

or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) 

from further consideration of, such a resolution, it 

is in order (even though a previous .motion to the 

same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed 

to the consideration of the resolution. A member 

may make the motion only on the day after the 

calendar chy on which the Member announces to 

the House concerned the Member's intention to 

make the motion, except that, in thle case of the 

House of Representatives, the motion may be 

made without such prior announc'ement if the 

motion is made by direction of the committee to 

which the resolution was referred. All points of 

order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is 

highly privileged in the House of Representatives 

and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or 

to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A 

motion to reconsider the vote by which the nnotion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in 

order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration 

of the resolution is agreed to, the respective 

House shall immediately proceed to considerat ion 

of the joint resolution without intervening motion, 

order, or other business, and the resolution shall 

remain the unfinished business of tlne respective 

House until disposed of. 

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions arid appeals in connectison therewith, 

shall be limited to not more than 2 hours. which 

shall be divided equally between those favoring 

and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion 

further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a 

motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. 

A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order. 

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the 

debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) 

and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the 

debate if requested in accordance with the rules 

of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur. 

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair 

relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case 

may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution 

described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate. 

(e) CONSIDERATION BY OIHFX HOUSE.^^) If, before 

the passage by one House of a resolution of that 

House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following 

procedures shall apply: 

(A) The resolution of the other House shall 

not be referred to a committee and may not tie 

considered in the House receiving it except in 

the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii). 

(B) With respect to a resolution described 

in subsection (a) of the House receiving the 

resolution- 

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the 

same as if no resolution had been received 

from the other House; but 

the resolution of the other House. 

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on 

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received 

from the other House, it shall no longer be in 

order to consider the resolution that originated in 

the receiving House. 

is enacted by Congress- 

(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HousE.-This Section 

(1) as an exercise of the ruleinaking power 

of the Senate and House of Representatives, 

DEFENSE RASE CLOSUKE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 F-19 
respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of 

the rules of each House, respectively, but 

applicable only with respect to the procedure 

to be followed in that House in the case of a 

resolution described in subsection (a), and it 

supersedes other rules only to the extent that it 

its inconsistent with such rules; and 

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional 

right of either House to change the rules (so far 

as relating to the procedure of that House) at 

any time, in the same manner, and to the same 

extent as in the case of any other rule of that 

House. 

SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER 

BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY 

(a) IN Gmmu=--Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date 

of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for 

carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States. 

(b) lb.sTRIicnON.-ExCept as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Def‘ense may be used, other than under 

this part, during the period specified in subsection 

(a& 

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the 

Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States als an installation 

to be closed or realigned or as an installation 

under consideration for closure or realignment; or 

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment 

of a military installation insiide the United 

States. 

(c) ExcEmoN.-Nothing in this part affects the 

(1) closures and realignments under title I1 

of Public Law 100-526; and 

(2) closures and realignmenis to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not 

applicable, including closures and realignments 

carried out for reasons of national securicy or a 

military emergency referred to in subsection (c) 

of such section. 

authority of the Secretary to carry outSEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS 

As used in this part: 

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Rase Closure Account 1990 

established by section 2906(a)(1). 

(2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on Armed Services 

and the Committees on Appropriations of the 

Senate and of the House of Representatives. 

(3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902. 

(4) The term “military installation’’ means a 

base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under 

the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, 

including any leased facility. Such term does 

not include any facility used primarily for civil 

works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, 

or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense. 

(5) The term “realignment” includes any action 

which both reduces and relocates functions and 

civilian personnel positions but does not include 

a reduction in force resulting from workload 

adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances. 

(6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary 

of Defense. 

(7) The term “United States” means the 50 

States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rco, Guam, the Virgin Islands, 

American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 

States. 

(8) The term “date of approval”, with respect 

to a closure or realignment of an installation, 

means the date on which the authority of Congress to disapprove a recommendation of closure or realignment, as the case may be, of 

such installation under this part expires. 

(9) The term “redevelopment authority”, in 

the case of an installation to be closed under 

this part, means any entity (including an entity 

established by a State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the entity 

responsible for developing the redevelopment 

plan with respect to the installation or for directing the implementation of such plan. 

F-20 APPENDIX F 
(10) The term “redevelopment plan” in the 

case of an installation to be closed under \.his 

part, means a plan that- 

(A) is agreed to by the local redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and 

(H) provides for the reuse or redevelopment of tlie real property and personal property of tlie installation that is available for 

such reuse and redevelopment as a result of 

the closure of the installation. 

(10) The term “representative of the horneless“ has the meaning given such term in section 

jOl(li)(,4) of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless 

Assistance Act (42 T.J.S.C. 11411(h)(4)). 

SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT 

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, llnited States 

(1) by inserting “homeport facility for any 

ship,” after “center,”; and 

(2) by striking out “under the jurisdiction of 

the Secretary of a military department” and inserting in lieu thereof “under the jurisdiction of 

the Department of Defense, including any 

leased facility.”. 

Code, is amendedPart B-Other Provisions Relating 

to Defense Base Closures and 

Realignments 

SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY 

INSTALLATIONS 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.- It is the sense of the 

(1) the termination of military operations by 

the United States at military installations outs:.de 

the United States should he accomplished at 

the discretion of the Secretary of Dlefense at the 

earliest opportunity; 

(2) in providing for such termination, the 

Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure 

that the United States receives, through dirlxt 

payment or otherwise, consideration equal to 

the fair market value of the improvemeiits 

made by the United States at facilities that will 

be released to host countries: 

Congress that--- 

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through 

the military component commands or the subunified commands to the combatant cominands, 

should be the lead official in negotiations relating 

to determining and receiving such consideration; and 

(4) the determination of the fiir market 

value of such improvements released to host 

countries in whole or in part by the United 

States should be handled on a facility-by-facility 

basis. 

(b) RESIDU~ VALUE.-(^) For each installation 

outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the LJnited States 

on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall 

transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate 

of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1771, an 

estimate of the improvements made by the United 

States at facilities at each such installation. 

(2) For purposes of this section: 

(A) The term “fair market value of the iniprovements” means the value of improvements 

determined by the Secretary on the basis of 

their highest use. 

(B) The term “improvements” includes new 

construction of facilities and all additions, iniprovements, modifications, or renovations 

made to existing fa es or to real property, 

without regard to whether they were carried 

out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds. 

(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.-( 1) 

There is established on the books of the Treasury 

a special account to be known as the “Department 

of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment 

Recovery Account”. Except as provided in suhsection (d), amounts paid to the LJnited States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or 

other international agreement to which the United 

States is a party, for the residual value of real 

property or improvements to real property used 

by civilian or military personnel of the Department 

of Defense shall he deposited into such account. 

(2) Money deposited in the Department of 

Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Kecovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of 

Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of 

Defense in connection withDEFENSE BASE: C120SURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990 F-21 
(A) facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in 

the United States; and 

(B) facility maintenance and repair and compliance with applicable enviroinmental laws at 

military installations outside the United States 

that the Secretary anticipates will be occupied 

by the Armed Forces for a long period. 

(3) Funds in the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Account shall remain 

available until expended. 

(d) AMOUNTS CORRESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF 

PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NQNAPPROPELIATED 

Fu~~s.41) In the case of a payment refenred to 

in subsection (c)(l) for the residual value of real 

property or improvements at an overseas military 

facility, the portion of the payment that is eqlual to 

the depreciated value of the inivestment made 

with nonappropriated funds shall be deposited in 

the reserve account established under section 

204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The 

Secretary may use amounts in ithe account (in 

such an aggregate amount as is provided in 

advance by appropriation Acts) for the purpose of 

acquiring, constructing, or improving commissary 

stores and nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. 

(2) As used in this subsection: 

means funds received from- 

(A) The term “nonappropriated funds” 

(i) the adjustment of, or surcharge on, 

selling prices at commissary stores fixed 

under section 2685 of title 10, United States 

Code; or 

(ii) a nonappropriated fundl instrumentality. 

(B) The term “nonappropria ted fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the 

United States under the jurisdiction of the 

Armed Forces (including the Army and Air 

Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and 

Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps 

exchanges) which is conducted for the calmfort, 

pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental 

improvement of members of the Armed Flxces. 

Before the Secretary of Defense enters into negotiations with a host country regarding the acceptance by the United States of any payment-in-kind 

in connection with the release to the host country 

(e) NEGOTIATIONS FOR PAYMENrS-IN-&ND.-( 1) 

of improvements made by the United States at 

military installations in the host country, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

committees a written notice regarding the intended negotiations. 

(2) The notice shall contain the following: 

(A) A justification for entering into negotiations for payments-in-kind with the host 

country. 

(B) The types of benefit options to be 

pursued by the Secretary in the negotiations. 

(C) A discussion of the adjustments that 

are intended to be made in the future-years 

defense program or in the budget of the 

Department of Defense for the fiscal year in 

which the notice is submitted or the following fiscal year in order to reflect costs that it 

may no longer be necessary for the United 

States to incur as a result of the paymentsin-kind to be sought in the negotiations. 

(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the 

appropriate congressional committees are 

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

Committee on Appropriations, and the Defense 

Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and 

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 

Committee on Appropriations, and the Defense 

Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 

(0 REPORT ON STATUS AND USE OF SPECIAL 

ACCOUNT.- Not later than January 15 of each year, 

the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the operations of the Department of Defense Overseas 

Military Facility Investment Recovery Account during the preceding fiscal year and proposed uses of 

funds in the special account during the next fiscal 

year. The report shall include the following: 

(1) The amount of each deposit in the 

account during the preceding fiscal year, and 

the source of the amount. 

(2) The balance in the account at the end of 

that fiscal year. 

(3) The amounts expended from the account 

by each military department during that fiscal 

year. 

F-22 APPENDIX F 
(4) With respect to each military installation 

for which money was deposited in the account 

as a result of the release of real property or 

improvements of the installatioii to a host 

country during that fiscal year- 

(A) the total amount of the investment 

of the United States in the installation, 

expressed in terms of constant dollars of that 

fiscal year; 

(€3) the depreciated value (a:s determined 

by the Secretary of a military department under regulations to be prescribecl by the SIXretary of Defense) of the real property and 

improvements that were released; and 

(C) the explanation of the Secretary for 

any difference between the bencfits received 

by the United States for the real property 

and improvements and the depreciated 

value (as so determined) of th;zt real property and improvements. 

(5) A list identifying all military installations 

outside the United States for which the Secretary proposes to make expenditures from the 

Department of Defense Overseas, Facility Investment Recovery Account under subsection 

(c)(2)(13) during the next fiscal year and specifying the amount of the proposed expenditu:res 

for each identified military installations. 

(6) A description of the purposes for which 

the expenditures proposed under paragraph 1:5) 

will be made and the need for such expenditures. 

(g) OMB REVIEW OF PROPOSED SE~LEMENTS.--I:~) 

The Secretary of Defense may not enter into an 

agreement of settlement with a host country regarding the release to the host country of improvements made by the United States to facilities 

at an installation located in the host country until 

30 days after the date on which the Secretary 

submits the proposed settlement to the Director of 

the Office of Mmagement and Budget. The prohibition set forth in the preceding sentence shall 

apply only to agreements of settlement for iniprovements having a value in excess of 

$10,000,000. The Director shall evalu;ite the ovlxall equity of the proposed settlement.. In evaluating the proposed settlement, the Director shall 

consider such factors as the extent of the United 

States capital investment in the improvements being released to the host country, the depreciation 

of the improvements, the condition of the improvements, and any applicable requirements for 

environmental remediation or restoration at the 

installation. 

(2) Each year, the Secretary shall submit to the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 

House of Representatives a report on each proposed agreement of settlement that was not submitted by the Secretary to the Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget in the previous 

year under paragraph (1) because the value of the 

improvements to be released pursuant to the proposed agreement did not exceed $10,000,000. 

(H) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENTS-IN- 

 KIND.-(^) Not less than 30 days before concluding an agreement for acceptance of military 

construction or facility improvements as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed 

agreement. Any such notification shall contain the 

following: 

(A) A description of the military construction 

project or facility improvement project, as the 

case may be. 

(B) A certification that the project is needed 

by United States forces. 

(C) An explanation of how the project will 

aid in the achievement of the mission of those 

forces. 

(D) A certification that, if the project were to 

be carried out by the Department of Defense, 

appropriations would be necessary for the 

project and it would be necessary to provide 

for the project in the next future-years defense 

program. 

(2) Not less than 30 days before concluding an 

agreement for acceptance of host nation support 

or host nation payment of operating costs of 

United States forces as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed agreement. Any such 

notification shall contain the following: 

(A) A description of each activity to be covered by the payment-in-kind. 

(B) A certification that the costs to be covered by the payment-in-kind are included in 

the budget of one or more of the military departments or that it will otherwise be necessary 

to provide for payment of such costs in a budget 

of one or more of the military departments. 

DEFENSF RASE c1.041 KL .4N1) KEALIChhlC?;T ACT OF 1990 F-2 3 
(C) A certification that, unless the paymentin-kind is accepted or funds are appropriated 

for payment of such costs, the military mission 

of the United States forces with respect to the 

host nation concerned will be adversely affected. 

SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF 11m co~lmr 

OF BIANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 

ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF 

MILITARY FACIIXI’IES 

(a) USES OF FACILmEs.-seCtiOn 2819(b) of the 

National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal1 Year 

1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 21.19; 10 

U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended- 

(1) in paragraph (21, by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” 

and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock 

incarceration facilities”; 

(2) by striking out “and at the end OF paragraph (3); 

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) a:l paragraph (5); and 

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4): 

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized 01 renovated to meet the needs of States and local 

jurisdictions for confinement or correctional 

facilities; and”. 

(b) EFFEC~ DAm-The amendments m,ade by 

subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the 

first report required to be submitted under :jection 

2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, 

Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990. 

SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMEN’lrAL 

RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS 

SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE 

UNITED STATES 

(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIoNS.--There 

is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the 

Department of Defense Base Closure Accoiunt for 

fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds 

authorized to be appropriated to that account for 

that fiscal year, the sum of $100,000,000. Amounts 

appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activities for the purpose of environmental restoration 

at military installations closed or realigned under 

title I1 of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under 

section 204(a)(3) of that title. 

(b) Exausm SOURCE OF FUN DING.^^) Section 

207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding 

at the end the following: 

[See section 207, post at p. 18241 

(c) TASK FORCE REPORT.-(^) No later than 12 

months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress 

a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning- 

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response 

actions at military installations (or portions of 

installations) that are being closed, or :ire 

scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title I1 of 

the Defense Authorization Amendments and 

Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 

100-526); and 

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, 

within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of 

relevant Federal and State agencies with respect 

to such environmental response actions so as 

to enable those actions to be carried out more 

expeditiously. 

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings 

and recommendations, and to prepare the report, 

required by paragraph (1). The task force shall 

consist of the following (or their designees): 

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be 

(B) The Attorney General. 

(C) The Administrator of the General Ser- 

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency. 

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of 

the Army. 

(F) A representative of a State environmental 

protection agency, appointed by the head of 

the National Governors Association. 

chairman of the task force. 

vices Administration. 

F-24 APPENDIX F 
(G) A representative of a State Attorney 

General’s office, appointed by the head of the 

National Association of Attorney Generals. 

(H) A representative of a public-interest 

environmental organization, appointed by the 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE 

CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND 

REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIOPlJS 

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such 

steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official 

statement from a unit of general locad government 

adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such inmllation. 

SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE 

CLOSURE COMMISSION 

(a) NORTON Am FORCE BASE.-(^) Consistent with 

the recommendations of the Commission on Elase 

Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air 

Force may not. relocate, until after September 30, 

1995, any of the functions that were being carried 

out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air 

Force Base, California, on the date on which the 

Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the 

Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and 

House of Representatives as described in sea:ion 

202(a)(l) of Public Law 100-526. 

(2) This subsection shall take eflfect as of the 

date on which the report referred to in subsecLion 

(a) was transmitted to such Committees. 

(b) GENERAL DmcnvE.-Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, 

the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the 

Secretaries of the military departments to take all 

actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Re;a.lignment and 

Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent 

with such recommendations. 

SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL hOGRAM.-NOt later 

than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 

Act [Nov 5, 19901, the Secretary of Defense ,.hall 

establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmttntal restoration program. 

(b) ADMINISTRATOH OF PRoGw.-The Secretary 

shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secret:iry of 

Defense for Environment as the Administrator of 

the model program referred to in subsection (a). 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the 

Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition. 

(c) APPLIwm.-This section shall apply to 

environmental restoration activities at installations 

selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(l). 

(d) PROGRAM REQumMENTs.-In carrying out the 

model program, the Secretary of Defense shall: 

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense 

Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and 

Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for 

which preliminary assessments, site inspections, 

and Environmental Impact Statements required by 

law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations 

which have satisfied the requirements of section 

204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments 

and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public 

Law 100-526). 

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in 

accordance with the procedures set forth in title 

IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C. 541 et 

seq., as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy 

all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one 

of the two installations under this program shall 

indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages 

caused by (A) the contractor’s breach of any term 

or provision of the contract; and (€3) any negligent 

or willful act or omission of the contractor, its 

employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract. 

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment 

of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 

DEFENSE BASE (,LOSC‘RE AND KEALIGNMIEh?’ ACT OF 1990 F-25 
(42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated 

under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following: 

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such 

proposals shall include provisioris for receiving 

the necessary authorizations or approvals of the 

response action by appropriate Federal, State, or 

local agencies. 

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using 

performance specifications suppliled by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards 

the Secretary deems essential to alvoid confiiict of 

interest. 

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and 

other evaluation criteria. 

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and 

appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, 

make contract awards for response action within 

120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or 

within 120 days after receipt of the necessaiy authorizations or approvals of the 'response action 

by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, 

whichever is later. 

(e) APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCUActivities of the model program shall be carried 

out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, 

section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 lJ.S.C. 

9620). 

(f) EXPEDITED AGmms.-The Secretary shall, 

with the concurrence of the Administrator of the 

Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and 

regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable 

and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and 

concurrences. 

(g) REmRT.-The Secretary of Defense shall 

include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and 

accomplishing the goals of this section within the 

annual report to Congress required by section 

2706 of title 10, United States Code 

(h) APPHCAB~ OF EXKITNG LAW.-Nothing in 

this section affects or modifies, in any way, the 

obligations or liability of any person under other 

Federal or State law, including common law, with 

respect to the disposal or release of hazardous 

substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined 

under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601). 

F-26 APPENDIX F 
FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN 

This appendix is taken verbatim from the 

Department of Defense Base Closure mad 

Realignment Report, March 1995. 

BACKGROUND 

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of 

Defense to submit to the Congress and the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 

1995 through 2001. The force structure plan which 

follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1995 through 2001 

period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises 

three sections: 

The military threat assessment, 

The need for overseas basing, and 

The force structure, including the 

implementation plan. 

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What 

follows is the IJNCLASSIFIED version of the plan. 

SECTION I: 

MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT 

The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic an tagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and 

Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. 

Also the collapse of political order as a result of 

ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the 

former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts 

to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the 

destruction of property, and re-estabhh civil society. 

The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive 

weaponry, including chemical and biological 

weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some 

cases, nuclear weapons. The accekration of regional strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the 

United States to contribute military forces to international peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts. 

The LJnited States faces three types of conflict in the 

coming years: deliberate attacks on 1J.S. allies or 

vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts 

that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests; and conflicts that do not directly threaten 

vital interests, but whose costs in the lives of innocents demand an international response in which 

the United States will play a leading role. 

ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union 

will be a source of major crises in the coming 

years as political-ethnic-religious antagonisms 

weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These 

countries may resort to arms to protect narrow 

political-ethnic interests or maximize their power 

vis-a-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores 

of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly 

increases the potential for these local conflicts to 

spread. Attempts by former Soviet republics to 

transform into democratic states with market 

economies and stable national boundaries may 

prove too difficult or too costly, and could result 

in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war. 

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), 

along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute 

to deteriorating living standards and encourage 

social unrest. 

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate 

from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in 

subversion, propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would 

precipitate US. intervention. 

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq 

could pose a renewed regional threat depending 
on what sanctions remain in place and what success 

Iraq has in circumventing them. Ii-aq continues to 

constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, 

particularly Kuwait. 

ACROSS THE PACIFIC 

The security environment in mo,st of Asia risks 

becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense 

policies to a&dpt to the end of the Cold Wair, the 

collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the 

former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pre:ssures 

upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may 

lead to greater instability and violence. 

Our most active regional security concern in Asia 

remains the military threat posed by North Korea 

to our treaty ally, the Republic of ]Korea. Our concems are intensified by North Korea’s efforts to 

develop weapons of mass destruction and the associated delivery systems. 

China’s military modernization efforts of the last two 

decades will produce a smaller but more capable 

military with modem combat aircraft, includirig the 

Su-27 FLANKER. By the end of the decade China 

will also have improved strategic nuclear forces. 

Japan’s major security concerns will1 focus primarily 

on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea 

armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding 

Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a 

nationalistic Russia. 

In South Asia, the principal threat to US. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict 

between India and Pakistan. The conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded 

by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors. 

THE REST OF THE WORLD 

This broad characterization covers regions not 

addressed above and is not intended to either 

diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe 

and the Pacific. 

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain 

unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences 

and factors that could easily derail it. Vintually 

every country in the region will be victimized by 

drug-associated violence and crime. 

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil 

war will continue throughout the continent. Two 

major kinds of security issues will dominate US. 

relations with the region: noncombatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most 

likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent 

include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, 

international peacekeeping, and logistic support 

for allied military operations. Further, conflict 

resolution efforts will test the growing reputation 

of the United States for negotiation and mediation. 

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that 

would require a significant military response in 

the near-future are those posed by North Korea, 

Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are 

those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in southeastern 

Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 

America. These conflicts would pose unique 

demands on the ability of US. Armed Forces to 

maintain stability and provide the environment for 

politicdl solutions. Finally, there will be a kdrge 

number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage 

demands a U.S. response, probably in concert 

with the United Nations. 

SECTION It 

JUSTTFICATION FOR OVERSEAS BASING 

Although we have reduced overseas presence 

forces, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental role of mobile, combat-ready 

forces in deterring aggression by demonstrating 

our commitment to democratic allies and friends, 

and promoting regional stability through cooperation and constructive interaction. This is achieved 

through peacetime engagement, conflict prevention, and fighting to win. Overseas presence 

activities such as combined exercises, port visits, 

military-to-military contacts, security assistance, 

combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and 

protecting American citizens in crisis areas will 

remain central to our strategy. US. influence will 

be promoted through continuing these overseas operations. 

Over the past 50 years, the day-to-day presence of 

U.S. forces in regions of geostrategic importance 

to [J.S. national interests has been key to averting 

crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout 

the world show our commitment, lend credibility 

to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and 

G-2 APPENDIX G 
provide crises response capability ixhile promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the number of U.S. forces stationed oversleas has been 

significantly reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to any crisis will continue to depend on judicious overseas presence. 

Overseas presence is also vital to the maintenance 

of the collective defense system by which the US. 

works with its friends and allies t'o protect our 

mutual security interests while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms 

competition. 

EUROPE, MIDDLE FAST, SOUTHWEST ASIA 

US. interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, the 

Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia, require 

continuing commitment. We must maintain forces, 

forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the 

Atlantic region and from the United States when 

needed. 

The end of the Cold War significantly reduced the 

requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. -Yet, 

the security of the United States and of Europe 

remain linked, and continued support of the 

evolving Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our long-term 

stake in European security and stability, as well 

as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolil ical 

interests require a continued commitment of U.S. 

military strength. 

Our overseas presence forces in Europe must be 

sized, designed, and postured to preserve US. 

influence and leadership in the Atlantic Alliance 

and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force is a direct respc'nse 

to the uncertainty and instability that remains in 

this region. Forward-deployed forces provide an 

explicit and visible commitment to the security and stability of Europe. Pre-positioned ,and 

afloat equipment supports rapid reintroduction of 

CONUS-based forces should the need arise in 

Europe or elsewhere. 

Persistent Iraqi challenges to Persian Gulf security provide a solid grounding for c'ontinued 1J.S. 

presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime 

deployments, coupled with pre-positioning, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, supported by a European ,and regicnal 

enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, greatly 

enhanced our recent crisis-response force buildup. Our future commitment will incli.ide rotaticinal 

deployments of battalion-sized maneuver forces, 

land-hased tactical aviation units, and five surface 

combatants, reinforced by pre-positioned and 

afloat equipment, access agreements, bilateral 

planning, periodic exercises, deployments of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), Amphihious Ready 

Groups ( ARGs), and Marine Expeditionary Units 

(Special Operations Capable) (MEUs(SOC)), visits 

by senior officials, and security assistance. 

PACIFIC FORCES 

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast 

Asia and the Indian Ocean, also require a continuing commitment. As Asia continues its economic 

and political development, US. overseas presence 

will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence 

and a restraint on potential regional aggression 

and rearmament. 

A strong U.S. naval and landhased presence is 

designed to buttress our interests in the region. A 

carrier and amphibious force, including 1(+) 

CVBG and one Marine Expeditionary Force with 

one MEU(S0C) will be forward-based in this 

region. One Army division, less one brigade, with 

supporting Combat Support (CS)/Combat Service 

Support (CSS) elements, and one Air Force Fighter 

Wing Equivalent (FWE) in South Korea and 1(+) 

FWE in Japan are forward-based in this region. In 

addition, presence in hoth Alaska and Hawaii will 

be maintained. 

ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD 

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important 

other regions of the globe, the United States seeks 

to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social 

strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the 

regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to suli-Saharan Africa 

to the far-flung islands of the world's oceans, 

American military men and women contribute 

daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, seciirity assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect 

and extend our political goodwill and ;iccess to 

foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly 

critical in an era of reduced overseas presence, 

when forces deploying from the llnited States are 

more than ever dependent on enroute and hostnation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining overseas 

presence through combined planning exercises, 

- 

FORCE STRUCTLJRE PLAN G-3 
pre-positioning and service agreements, combined 

warfighting doctrine, and interoperability could 

spell the difference between success and failure in 

defending important regional interests. 

CONTINGENCY FORCES 

U.S. strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of 

spontaneous, often unpredictable, crises requires 

fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly 

deliverable and initially self-sufic ient. In regions 

where no U.S. overseas presence exists, these 

contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first 

into action, and followed if necessary by heavier 

forces and long-term sustainment. Therefore, such 

forces must be drawn primarily from the active 

force structure and tailored into highly effective 

joint task forces that capitalize on the unique 

capabilities of each Service and in the special operations forces. In this regard, the CKNCs must have 

the opportunity to select from a Isroad spectrum 

of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light 

infantry, and rapidly deliverable armor and 

mechanized infantry forces from the Army; the 

entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and longrange conventional bomber forces provided by 

the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the 

striking capability of surface combatants, and the 

covert capabilities of attack submarines frorn the 

Navy; the amphibious combat power and rapid 

response Maritime Prepositioning Forces of the 

Marine Corps , which i nc lu dips on - s t a t io n 

MEU(S0C)s; and the unique capabilities of special 

operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve 

units must be maintained at high readiness to assist 

and augment responding active uniis. Reserve lorces 

perform much of the lift and other vital missions 

from the outset of any contingency operation 

SECTION II. 

THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND 

IMPLEMEmTION PLAN 

IT94 IT97 w99 

Active 13 10 10 

Reserve 8 8 8 

ARMY DMSIONS 

MARINE CORPS DMSIONS 

Active 3 3 3 

Reserve 1 1 1 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 12 11 11 

RESERVE CARRIERS 1 1 

CARRIER AIR WINGS 

Active 11 10 10 

Reserve 2 1 1 

BATnE FORCE SHIPS 387 363 344 

AIR FORCE FIGHTERS 

Active 978 936 936 

Reserve 795 504 504 

AIR FORCE BOMBERS 

Active 139 104 103 

Reserve 12 22 26 

DoD PERSONNEL 

(End Strength in thousanas) 

m94 m97 w99 

hY 543 495 495 

Navy 468 408 394 

Marine Corps 174 174 174 

Air Force 426 385 382 

TOTAL 1,611 1,462 1,445 

ACTIVE DUTY 

--- 

RESERVES AND 997 904 893 

NATIONAL GUARD 

CIVILIANS 913 799 759 

G-4 APPENDIX G 
APPENDIX H 

FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA 

MILITARY VALUE 

(Given o uerall priority co nsidena tio n) 

1. The current and future mission requirements 

and the impact on operational readiness of 

the Department of Defense's total force. 

facilities, and associated airspace at both the 

existing and potential receiving locations. 

3. The ability to accommodate contingency, 

mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential 

receiving locations. 

2. The availability and condition of land, 

4. The cost and manpower implications. 

RETURN ON INVESTMENT 

5.The extent and timing of potential costs 

and savings, including the number of years, 

beginning with the date of completion of 

the closure or realignment, for the savings 

to exceed the costs. 

IMPACTS 

6. The economic impact on communities. 

7. The ability of both the existing and potential 

receiving communities' infrastructure to 

support forces, missions, and personnel. 

8. The environmental impact. 
APPENDIX I 

RETmY OF 

CLOSURE AND 

DEFENSE'S BASE 

REALIGNMENT 

1995 DoD Recommendations 

Base Closures 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Price Support Center, IL 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ 

Seneca Army Depot, NY 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Fort Pickett, VA 

- '. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK 

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA 

Ship Repair Facility, GU 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Indianapolis, IN 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

Detachment, Louisville, KY 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Lakehurst, NJ 

Warminster. PA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA 

Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, CA 

Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY 

Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY 

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, OH 

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX 

Brooks Air Force Base, TX 

Reese Air Force Base, TX 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN 

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT 

Part II: Major Base Realignments 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Hunter Liggett, CA 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Fort Meade, MD 

Detroit Arsenal, MI 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Dugway Proving Ground, UT 

Fort Lee. VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL 

Naval Activities, GU 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Onizuka Air Station, CA 

Eglin Air Force Base, FL 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 
Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT 

Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Kelly Air Force Base, 'IX 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Part III: Smaller Base or 

Activity Closures, Realignments, 

Disestablisbments or Relocations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA 

East Fort Baker, CA 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT 

Big Coppett Key, FL 

Concepts Analysis Agency, MD 

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD 

Hingham Cohasset, MA 

Sudbury Training Annex, MA 

Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), MO 

Fort Missoula, MT 

Camp Kilmer, NJ 

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ 

Camp Pedricktown, NJ 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY 

Fort Totten, NY 

Recreation Center "2, Fayetteville, NC 

Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA 

Camp Bonneville, WA 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity 

(AMSA), WV 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast 

Division, San Diego, CA 

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Personnel Research and Development 

Center, San Diego, CA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and 

Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, 

New London Detachment, New London, CT 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound 

Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA 

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 

Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS 

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, 

Warminster, PA 

Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Information Systems Management Center, 

Arlington, VA 

Naval Management Systems Support Office, 

Chesapeake, VA 

NAVYWNE RESERVE ACTIVITIES 

Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Huntsville, AL 

Stockton, CA 

Santa ha, Irvine, CA 

Pomona, CA 

Cadillac, MI 

Staten Island, NY 

Laredo, TX 

Sheboygan, WI 

Naval Air Reserve Center at: 

Olathe, KS 

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at: 

New Orleans, LA (Region 10) 

Charleston, SC (Region 7) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator 

Activity, Buffalo, NY 

Activity, Fort Worth, TX 

1-2 APPENDIX I 
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District South, 

Defense Contract Management Command 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Marietta, GA 

International, Dayton, OH 

DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE 

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, 

Fort Holabird. MD 

Part Changes to Previously Approved 

BRAC Recommendations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Williams Air Force Base, A2 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

(301st Rescue Squadron) 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

(726th Air Control Squadron) 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

for 10th Infantry [Light] Division) 

(485th Engineering Installation Group) 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District West, 

El Segundo, CA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, 

Fort Detrick, MD 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA 

Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Air Station, Agana, GU 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, 

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC 

Naval Security Group Command Detachment 

Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL 

Philadelphia, PA 

Arlington, VA 

Potomac, Washington, DC 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE’S BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDAnONS 1-3 
1993 DoD Recommendations 

Part k Major Base closures 

DEPAR"T OF THE ARMY 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Vint Hill Farms, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Hospital Oakland, CA 

Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA 

Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

Naval Training Center ortando, FL 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Station Glen-, IL 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station south Weymmch, MA 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Aviation Supply Ofice, Philadelphia, PA 

Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC 

Naval Station Charleston, SC 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA 

st. Inigoes, MD 

DEPARTMENT OF THE hIR FORCE 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve 

Station, Chicago, IL 

DEFENSE LOGI!ZIC!3 AGENCY 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH 

Defense Personnel Suppoit Center, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Part Ik Major Base Realignmen& 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren White 

Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

1st Marine Corps Distria, Garden City, NY 

Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

March Air Force Base, CA 

lwcGuire Air Force Base, NJ 

Griflks Air Force Base, NY 

PartlE:SmaAler Base ordctivity 

CRxzim, Realignments, 

Disestablisbments or Relocations 

DEPARTME" OF THE ARMY 

None 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Civil Enginering Laboratory, 

Nad Facilities Engineerins Command, 

Poa Hueneone, CA 

Western Engineering Field Division, 

san mm, CA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations 

(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA 

Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering 

Naval Hospital Orlando, FL 

Naval Supply Center Pensamla, FL 

cenm, washington, Dc 

1-4 APPENDIX 1 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, 

Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity, 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island 

Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, 

and Procurement, Portsmouth, NH 

Naval ,4ir Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Trenton, NJ 

Department of Defense Family Housing Office, 

Niagara Falls, NY 

Naval .4ir Technical Services Facility, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations 

(Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Charleston, SC 

Naval Hospital Charleston, SC 

Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, VA 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations 

Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (CV), 

Indian Head, MU 

Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA 

Detxhment, Norfolk, VA 

(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

Bremerton, VC'A 

NAVY NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR) 

ACTIVITIES 

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA 

(Including the Office of Military Manpower 

Management, Arlington, VA) 

Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

(Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria, 

VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA) 

Security Group Command, Security Group Station, 

and Security Group Detachment, Potomac, 

Washington, DC 

Alexandria, VA 

Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA 

NAVY/MARINE RESERVE ACTMTIES 

Naval Reserve Centeis at: 

Gadsden, AL 

Montgomery, AL 

Fayetteville, AR 

Fort Smith, AR 

Pacific Grove, CA 

Macon, GA 

Terre Haute, IN 

Hutchinson, KS 

Monroe, LA 

New Bedford, MA 

Pittsfield, MA 

Joplin, MO 

St. Joseph, MO 

Great Falls, MT 

Missoula, MT 

Atlantic City, NJ 

Perth Amboy, NJ 

Jamestown, UY 

Poughkeepsie, NY 

Altoona, PA 

Kingsport, TN 

Memphis, TN 

Ogden, UT 

Staunton, VA 

Parkersburg, WV 

Naval Reserve Facilities at: 

Alexandria, LA 

Midland, TX 

Naty/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at: 

Fort Wayne, IN 

Billings, MT 

Abilene, TX 

Readiness Command Regions at: 

Olathe, KS (Region 18) 

Scotia, NY (Region 2) 

Ravenna, OH (Region 5) 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA 

Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, 

Defense Contract Management District 

Philadelphia, PA 

Northcentral, Chicago, IL 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S BASE CLOSIIRE ANT) REALIGNMENT &COMMENDATIONS 1-5 
Defense Contract Management District West, 

Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC 

Defense Distribution Depot Laekemy, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot oakland, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot PensacOta, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, 

Defense Logistics Services Center, Ebttle Creek, MI 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, 

El Segundo, CA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Battle Creek, MI 

DoD Data Center Consolidation 

ARMY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

None 

NAVY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC 

Enlisted Personnel Management Center, 

Facilities System Office, Port Hueneme, CA 

Fleet Industrial Support Center, San &go, CA 

Naval Air Station, B~nswick, ME 

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL 

Naval Air Station, Mayport, FL 

Naval Air Station, Oceana, VA 

Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Patwrent River, MD 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

China Lake, CA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Point Mugu, CA 

Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance 

Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area 

Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Computer & T4-a- Area 

Master Station, WAC, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Naval Computer & Tekcommunications Station, 

San Diego, CA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications station, 

New Orleans, LA 

Naval Computer & Telecmma- stiltion, 

Pensamla, FL 

New Orleans, LA 

Naval computer & Telecommunications Station, 

Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX 

Navy Recruiting command, Arlington, VA 

Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San 

Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Supply Center, Pad Harbor, HI 

Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA 

Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA 

Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA 

washingtmJ3c 

Francisco, CA 

MARINE CORPS DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA 

Regional Automated Services Center, Camp 

Regional Automated Services Center, Camp 

Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC 

Pendleton, CA 

Lejeune, NC 

AIR FORCE DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, CA 

Air Fm Military Personnel Center, Randolph 

computer Sewice center, San Antonio, TX 

7th Communications Group, Pentagon, 

m, Tx 

Arlington, VA 

DEFENSE IxxIsTIcs AGENCY 

DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI 

Information Processing Center, Philadelphia, PA 

Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT 

Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA 

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY 

(DISA) DATA PROCESSING CENTERS 

Defense Idoxmation Technology Service 

organimtion, lndianapok Information 

processing Center, IN 

Defense Information Technology Service 

organization, Kansas City Information 

processing Center, MO 

Defense Information Techndogy service 

Organizatson, columbus Annex Dayton, OH 

1-6 APPENDM I 
Part l?? Changes to Previously Approved 

BRAC 88/91 Recommendations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

(AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL 

instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

(6th Army relocates to NASA Ames, CA 

vice Fort Carson, CO) 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

(Systems Integration Management ActivityEast remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

vice Rock Island, IL) 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station 

Treasure Island, CA 

(Retain no facilities, dispose/outlease 

all property) 

(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine 

Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin's assets) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, 

San Diego, CA 

(Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems 

Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA into available 

Air Force space vice new construction) 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, 

Yorktown, VA 

(Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA) 

Albuquerque, NM 

(Retain as a tenant of the Air Force) 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

(B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from 

Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 

Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to 

Altus AFB) 

(940th Air Refueling Group redirected from 

McClellan AFB to Beale AFB) 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

(Airfield does not close. 482nd Fighter Wing 

[AFRESI is reassigned from Homestead AFB and 

operates the airfield. Joint Communications 

Support Element stays at MacDill AFB vice 

relocating to Charleston AFB) 

(Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural 

Maintenance training courses from Chanute 

AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS 

Memphis) 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

(Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 

160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment 

area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of WrightPatterson AFB and operate as tenants of the 

Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on the 

"A's airport.) 

(704th Fighter Squadron and 924th Fighter 

Group redirected from Bergstrom AFB to 

Carswell AFB cantonment area) 

(Fabrication function of the 436th Training 

Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to 

Luke AFB, maintenance training function 

redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) 

Chanute Air Force Base, IL 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 1-7 
1991 DoD Recommendations 

Recommended Closures 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Fort Devens, MA 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Ford Ord, CA 

Sacramento Army Depot, CA 

Harry Diamond Lab 

Woodbridge Research Facility, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX 

Davisville Construction Battalion Center, RI 

Hunters Point Annex, CA 

Long Beach Naval Station, CA 

Moffett Field Naval Air Station, CA 

Orlando Naval Training Center, FL 

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA 

Philadelphia Naval Station, PA 

10 RDTS, Engineering and Fleet 

Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval Station, WA 

Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA 

Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA 

Support Activities 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

Eaker Air Force Base, AR 

England Air Force Base, LA 

Grissom Air Force Base, IN 

Loring Air Force Base, ME 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Moody Air Force Base, GA 

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC 

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI 

Recommended Realignments 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA 

Aviation Systems Commandflroop Support 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

Fort Detrick, MD 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Fort Polk, LA 

Harry Diamond Laboratories, MD 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

White Sands Missile Range, NM 

Command, St. Louis, MO 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island 

16 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet 

Support Activities 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

1-8 APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX J 

BASES ADDED BY THE 

COMNIISSION FOR FURTHER 

CONSIDERATION 

1995 Commission 

36 Bases Added 

9 Final Commission Recommendations 

BASES ADDED FOR 

REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE-32 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (4) 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, AL 

Oakland Army Base, CA (Close) 

Fort Holabird, MD (Close) 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (8) 

Youngstown-Warren MAP Air Reserve Station, OH 

Vance Air Force Rase, OK 

Carswell Air Reserve Station, TX 

Laughlin Air Force Base, TX 

General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (6) 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, (;A 

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Hill, UT 

(Disestablish) 

(Disestablish) 

BASES ON THE SECRETARY’S 

LISTADDED FOR FURTHER 

Engineering Field Activity West, San Bruno, CA 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Oakland, CA (Close) 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu, CA 

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and 

Repair, San Francisco, CA 

Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 

Public Works Center, GU (Realign) 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, ME 

REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE-4 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (1) 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (7) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (10) Homestead Air Reserve Station, FI, 

Grand Forks Air Force Rase, ND 

Chicago O’Hare IAP Air Reserve Station, IL 

Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station, MN 

Columbus Air Force Base, MS 

Minot Air Force Rase, ND 

Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station, NY 

Hill Air Force Rase. U’I 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA (Close) 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX (Realign) 

(Close) 

Bold face indicates a final Commission recommendation 
1993 Commission 

72 Bases Added 

17 Final Commission Recommendations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (11) 

Anniston Army Depot, AL (Realign) 

Army Information Processing Center, Huntsville, AL 

Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA (Realign) 

Fort Gillem, GA 

Fort McPherson, GA 

Army Information Processing Center, 

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA (Realign) 

Red River Army Depot, TX (Realign) 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort Monroe, VA 

Chambersburg, PA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (32) 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Air Station Miramar, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA 

Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA (Realign) 

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA 

Naval Air Station Agana, GU (Close) 

Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Ordnance Station Louisville, KY 

Naval Reserve Center Chicopee, MA (Close) 

Naval Reserve Centex Quincy, MA (Close) 

NavaUMarine Corps Reserve Center 

Lawrence, MA (Close) 

Naval Shipyard Pohsmouth, ME/NH 

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS 

Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC 

NavaVMarine Corps Air Facility Johnstown, 

Ships I’arts Control Center Mechanicsburg, PA 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC 

Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

Naval Hospital Millington, TN 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Station Ingleside, TX 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

(Realign) 

PA (Close) 

Bold face indicates a fmal Commission recommendation 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center 

Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA 

Naval Station Everett, WA 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV (Close) 

Portsmouth, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (16) 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA 

Regional Processing Center Warner-Robins Air 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY (Close) 

Gentile Air Force Station, OH (Close) 

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK 

Regional Processing Center Tinker Air Force Base, 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Regional Processing Center Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

@den Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force 

Fairchild Air Force Base, WA 

Force Base, GA 

OK 

-, UT (Realign) 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (10) 

Defense Contract Management District No~theast, MA 

Defense Construction Supply Center Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA 

Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA 

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (3) 

Defense Information Technology services 

organization Cleveland Information 

Processing Center, OH (Close) 

Defense Information Techology Services 

Organization Columbus Information 

Processing Center, OH (Close) 

Defense Information Technology Services Organization Denver Information Processing Center, CO 

5-2 APPENDIX J 
1991 Commission 

35 BasesAdded 

1 Final Commission Recommendations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (1 0) 

Army Corps of Engineers (Realign) 

Fort Richardson, AK 

Fort Drum, NY 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Fort Totten, NY 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Fort A.P. Hill, VA 

Fort Pickett, VA 

Fort McCoy, WI 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (19) 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA 

Marine Corps Recruit Deport, San Diego, CA 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Naval Station Treasure Island, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL 

U.S. Marine Corps Logisitics Base, Albany, GA 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS 

Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX 

Naval Station Ingleside, TX 

Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Station Everett, WA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Portsmouth, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (6) 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX 

Bold face indicates a final Commission recommendation. 

5-3 

BASES ADDED BY THE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
APPENDIX K 

REDIRECTS: CHANGES 

APPROVED CO~/~L~ISSION 

F&CO~/~L~ENDA~ONS 

TO PREVIOUSLY 

Once approved by the President and Congress, the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment 

Commissi’on’s (DBCRC) recommendations have the 

force of law. Changes to any of the preceding 

Commission recommendations can only be accomplished by a suh’sequent Commission action, or by 

a direct Act of Congress. During the 1991 round, 

there were nine approved changes to previous recommendations. By the 1993 round, however, 15 

redirects were approved by the Commission. On 

February 28, 1995, the Secretary proposed 27 

changes to previously approved Commission recommendations. The 1995 Commission approved 27 

redirects. with several modifications in gaining installations. This appendix summarizes all changes, or 

“redirects,” of prior Commission recommendations. 

The 1995 Commission 

Department of the Army 

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, 

Fort Detrick, MD 

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance by 

not collocating environmental and occupational 

toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory 

at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead, 

relocate portions of the Environmental Quality 

Research Branch to the US. Army Environmental 

Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, lvIl3) 

Department of the Navy 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA, and 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

(Change the receiving sites for NAS Miramar specified by the 1993 Commission from “NAS Lemoore 

and NAS Fallon” to “other naval air stations.” 

Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, CA 

specified by the 1993 Commission from “NAS North 

Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton” to 

“other air stations consistent with operational requirements”) 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1773 

Commission from “NAS North Island and NASA 

ArnedMoffett Field” to “other naval air stations, 

primarily Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX to 

support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, 

Naval Station Ingelside, TX”) 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA 

(Change receiver site specified by the 1993 Commission from “Naval Air Station North Island” to 

“other government-owned space in San Diego, 

CA”) 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

and Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by deleting all references to the Service 

School Command) 
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission from “MCAS Cherry Point, NC; NAS 

Oceana, VA; and MCAS Beaufort, SC” to “other 

naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, VA; 

MCAS Beaufort, SC; NAS Jacksonville, FL; and NAS 

Atlanta, GA; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air 

Stations.” In addition, add, “To support NAS Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle 

target complex, and the Yellow Water family 

housing area”) 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacoh, FL 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by striking language regarding whirl 

tower and dynamic components facility) 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training 

Center, Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1393 Commission from New London, CT to Charleston, SC) 

Naval Air Station Agana, GU 

(Change the receiving site for aircraft, personnel, 

and equipment specified by the 1993 Commission 

from “Andersen AFB, GU” to “other naval or DoD 

air stations”) 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items from the closure of Naval 

Air Station Barbers Point, HI from “Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use” to 

“Retain the family housing as needed for multiservice use, including specified support facilities”) 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission from “Marine Corps Reserve Center, 

Twin Cities, MN” to “Air National Guard Base, 

Selfridge, MI”) 

Naval Shipyard, Norfollr Detachment 

Philadelphia, PA 

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Philadelphia 

Naval Shipyard to delete “and preservation“ (line 

5) and “for emergent requirements’Ylines 6-7)) 

Naval Sea Systems Command 

Arlington, VA 

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 

Commission from “the Navy Annex, Arlington, VA; 

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, 

VA; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, MD” to 

“the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or 

other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area”) 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by deleting the Office of Naval Research 

from the list of National Capital Region activities 

to relocate from leased space to Governmentowned space within the NCR) 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command, Arlington, VA 

(Change the recommendation specified by the 

1993 Commission from “relocate.. .from leased 

space to Government-owned space within the 

NCR” to “Relocate ... from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, CA) 

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C. 

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 

Commission from “Naval Training Center Great 

Lakes, IL” to “Naval Support Activity, Memphis, 

m> 

Naval Security Group Command 

Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C. 

(Change the receiving site from “National Security 

Agency, Ft. Meade, MD” specified by the 1993 

Commission to “Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.“) 

Department of the Air Force 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the relocation of Williams AFB’s 

Armstrong Laboratory to Orlando, FL to keep it at 

the AZ location as a stand-alone activity. 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the lOOlst Space 

Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center) 

K-2 APPENDIX K 
Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL 

301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead ARB to redirect the 

301s Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with its associated 

aircraft to remain at Patrick AFB, FL) 

Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL 

726th Air Control Squadron 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air 

Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead ARB, FL 

to Shaw AFB, SC, as follows: Redirect the 726th 

ACS to Mountain Home AFB, ID) 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

(Change the recommendations of the 1991 and 

1993 Commissions as follows: Redirect the retention of the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. 

The Air Force will continue to operate the runway 

and its associated activities. The Department of 

Commerce will remain as a tenant) 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York Airfield 

Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry 

Division Light1 , Fort Dnim, NY at Griffiss AFB, as 

follows: Close the airfield at Griffiss and transfer 

mission essential equipment from the minimum 

essential airfield at Griffiss AFB to Fort Drum) 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

485th Engineering Installation Group 

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of functions from 

Griffiss AFB, NY to sites as required rather than to 

Hill AFB, UT) 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Contract Management District 

West (DCMDW) El Segundo, CA 

(Change the 1993 Commission recommendation 

receiver from “Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los 

Angeles, CA’ to “space which is the most costeffective for DoD“) 

REDIRECTS: CHANCES TO PREVIOLJSLY APPROVED COMhlISSlON RECO,I.~MENDA‘I’IONS K-3 
The 1993 Commission 

Department of the Army 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

(Systems Integration Management Activity - East 

remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA vice Rock 

Island, IL) 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 

(6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco 

instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO) 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

(AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL instead of 

moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

Pueblo Army Depot, CO 

(Redirects supply mission from Defense Distribution Depot Ttmle, UT to new location within the 

Defense Distribution Depot System) 

Department of the Nay 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval 

Station Treasure Island, CA 

(Retain no facilities, dispose/outlease all property) 

Maxine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine 

Corps Air Station 29 Pah as one receiver of Marine 

Corps Air Station Tustin’s assets) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering 

Center, San Diego, CA 

(Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA into available space 

in Air Force Plant #l9, San Diego, vice new 

construction) 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 

Yorktown, VA 

(Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA) 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility 

Albuquerque, NM 

(Retain as a tenant of the Air Force) 

Department of the Air Force 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

(Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB, TX to Luke AFB, 

AZ; maintenance training function redirected from 

Dyess AFB, TX to Hill AFB, UT) 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

(B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from 

Fairchild AFB, WA to Barksdale AFB, LA and KC135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB, WA 

to Altus AFB, OK) 

Chanute Air Force Base, IL 

(Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to 

Sheppard AFB, TX redirected to NAS Memphis, 

TN and then to Pensacola, FL) 

MacDiU Air Force Base, Florida 

(Airfield to be operated by the Department of 

Commerce or another federal agency. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice 

relocating to Charleston AFB, SC) 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

(940th Air Refueling Group redirected from 

McClellan AFB, CA to Beale AFB, CAI 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

(Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air 

Refueling Group in a cantonment area at 

Rickenbacker ANGB instead of realigning to 

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH and operate as tenants 

of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on the 

RPAs airport.) 

K-4 APPENDIX K 
The 1991 Commission 

Department of the Army 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to 

relocate [J.S. Army Recruiting Command from Fort 

Sheridan, IL to Fort Knox, KY rather than Fort 

Benjamin Harrison, IN) 

Fort Devens, MA 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to 

retain HQ Infomiation Systems Command (ISC) at 

Ft. Huachuca, AZ and Ft. Monmouth, NJ; relocate 

selected ISC elements in the National Capital 

Region from Ft. Belvoir, VA to Ft. Ritchie, MD or 

another location) 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to 

realign the Material Readiness Support Activity 

from Lexington-f3luegrass Army Depot, KY, and 

the Logistics Control Activity from the Presidio of 

San Francisco, CA to Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

Army Laboratories (Lab 21 Study) 

Adelphi and Aberdeen, MD 

(Revise the 1988 Commission recommendation by 

establishing the Combat Material Research Lab 

(CMRL) at Adelphi, MD. The Army Materiel Technology Lab (AMTL) in Watertown, MA should not 

be split among Detroit Arsenal, MI; Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; and Fort Belvoir, VA-realign the AMTL to 

Aherdeen Proving Ground, MD. Collocate the 

Structures Element at NASA-Langley Research 

Center, Hampton, VA) 

Tri-Service Project Reliance Study 

Various Locations 

(Change the 1988 Cornmission recommendation 

by disestablishing the Letterman Army Institute of 

Research) 

Department qf the Air Force 

Beale Air Force Base, CA 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to 

realign the Undergraduate Navigator Training and 

the 323rd Flying 'Training Wing from Mather AFB, 

CA to Randolph AFB, TX instead of realigning to 

Beale AFB, CA) 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, 'DL 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to 

realign the fuels training from Chanute AFB, IL to 

Sheppard AFB, TX instead of Goodfellow AFB, 171) 

March Air Force Base, CA 

(Change the 1988 Commission recommenckit ion to 

realign 4 5 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton AFD, CA to the National 

Capitol Region instead of March AFB, CA) 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

(Change the 1788 Commission recommendation 

by leaving the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital 

open as an annex to McClellan AF13. CA instead of 

leaving the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather 

AFB, CA and closing the 323rd Flying Training Wing 

Hospital) 

REDIRECTS: CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY APPROVED Con/rmsroN RECOMMENDATIONS K-5 
~PENDIX L

I~EALIGNMENTS BY STATE 

BASE CLOSURES AND 

ALABAMA 

1988 

1988 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

Alabama Army Ammunition Plant 

Coosa River Storage Annex 

Fort Rucker 

Naval Station Mobile 

Naval Reserve Center Gadsden 

Naval Reserve Center Montgomery 

Anniston Army Depot 

Fort McClellan 

Naval Reserve Center Huntsville 

ALASKA 

1995 Fort Greely 

1995 Naval Air Facility Adak 

ARKANSAS 

1991 Eaker Air Force Base 

1991 Fort Chaffee 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Fayetteville 

1993 

1995 Fort Chaffee 

Naval Reserve Center Fort Smith 

ARIZONA 

1988 Navajo Army Depot Activity 

1991 Williams Air Force Base 

1995 Williams Air Force Base 

CALIFORNLA 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

George Air Force Base 

Hamilton Army Airfield 

Mather Air Force Base 

Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point 

Norton Air Force Base 

Presidio of San Francisco 

Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County 

Beale Air Force Base 

Castle Air Force Base 

Fort Ord 

Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco 

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1991 Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility San Diego CLOSE 

1991 Letterman Army Institute of Research Presidio of San Francisco DISESTAB 

1991 Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activity San Diego REALIGN 
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March Air Force Base 

Mather Air Force Base 

Naval Air Station Moffett Field 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center San Diego 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center Vallejo 

Naval Space Systems Activity Los Angeles 

Naval Station Long Beach 

Naval Weapons Center China Lake 

Pacific Missile Test Center Point Mugu 

Sacrarnento Army Depot 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin 

Castle Air Force Base (B-52 Combat Crew Training 

redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and 

KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild 

AFR to Altus AFB) 

Data Processing Center Marine Corps Air Station El Tor0 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Data Processing Center Naval Command Control & 

Data Processing Center Navy Regional Data Automation 

Defense Contract Management District West El Segundo 

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island 

Weapons Division China Lake 

Weapons Division Point Mugu 

Ocean Surveillance Center San Diego 

Center San Francisco 

(Redirect to dispose of all property in any lawful manner, 

including outlease) 

March Air Force Base 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard 

Marine Corps Air Station El Tor0 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin (Relocate MCAS 

Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island, NAS 

Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton) 

Marine Corps Data Processing Center Regional 

Automated Services Center Camp Pendleton 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow 

Mather Air Force Base (940th Air Refueling 

Naval Air Station Alameda 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center San 

Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB) 

Diego (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems 

Engineering Center Vallejo into available space in 

Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallajo 

(Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Center 

San Diego into available space in Air Force Plant #19, 

San Diego, vice new construction) 

Naval Hospital Oakland 

Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach 

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L-2 APPENDIX L 
1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

Navy Data Processing Center Facilities Systems 

Navy Data Processing Center Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Presidio of Monterey Annex 

Presidio of San Francisco (6th Army remains 

Office, Port Hueneme 

Center, San Diego 

at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA instead of 

moving to Fort Carson, CO) 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western 

Naval Reserve Center Pacific Grove 

Naval Training Center San Diego 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

Center (Surface) Pacific San Francisco 

Naval Public Works Center San Francisco 

Oakland Army Base 

Naval Shipyard Long Beach 

McClellan Air Force Base 

Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan 

Fort Hunter Liggett 

Sierra Army Depot 

Onizuka Air Station 

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks 

East Fort Baker 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland 

Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, 

Naval Reserve Center Stockton 

Naval Reserve Center Santa Ana 

Naval Reserve Center Pomona 

Marine Corps Air Station El Tor0 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin 

Naval Air Station Alameda 

Naval Recruiting District San Diego 

Naval Training Center San Diego 

Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo 

Engineering Field Division, San Bruno 

In-Service Engineering West Coast Division San Diego 

USN, Long Beach 

COLORADO 

1988 

1988 Pueblo Army Depot 

1991 Lowry Air Force Base 

1993 

Bennett Army National Guard Facility, Arapahoe County 

Pueblo Army Depot (Redirects supply mission from 

Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT, to new 

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location within the Defense Distribution Depot System.) REDIRECT 

1995 Fitzsimons Army Medical Center CLOSE 

1995 Lowry Air Force Base REDIRECT 

BASE CI.OSURES AhT) REALIGNMENTS BY STATE 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 L-3 
CONNECTICUT 

1988 Family Housing Ansonia 04 

1988 

1988 Family Housing Fairfield 65 

1988 Family Housing Manchester 25 

1988 Family Housing Middletown 48 

1988 Family Housing Milford 17 

1988 Family Housing New Britain 74 

1988 Family Housing Orange 15 

1988 Family Housing Plainville 67 

1988 Family Housing Portland 36 

1988 Family Housing Westport 73 

1988 Family Housing Shelton 74 

1991 

New London 

1995 Stratford Army Engine Plant 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

1991 

1991 

1993 

1993 

Telecommunications Station 

1993 

Group Station and Security Group Detachment) Potomac 

1993 Naval Electronic Security Systems 

Engineering Center 

1995 Naval Recruiting Command Washington 

1995 

FLORIDA 

Family Housing East Windsor 08 

Naval Underwater Systems Center Detachment 

US Army Institute of Dental Research 

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Microwave 

Data Processing Center Bureau of Naval Personnel 

Data Processing Center Naval Computer & 

Naval Security Group Command (including Security 

Bioeffects Research) 

Naval Security Group Detachment Potomac Washington 

1988 

1988 

1991 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

Cape St. George 

Naval Reserve Center (Coconut Grove) Miami 

MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa 

Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Key West 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Mayport 

Data Processing Center Naval Computer & 

Telecommunications Station, Pensacola 

Homestead Air Force Base 

MacDill Air Force Base (Airfield to be operated by 

the Department of Commerce or another federal 

agency. Joint Communications Support Element 

stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB.) 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola 

Naval Hospital Orlando 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Center) Pensacola 

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola 

Naval Training Center Orlando 

Naval Air Station Key West 

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L-4 APPENDIX L 
1995 Eglin Air Force Base 

1795 Big Coppett Key 

1995 

1995 

1995 Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola 

1795 

1795 Naval Training Center Orlando 

1995 

1795 

1995 MacDill Air Force Base 

1995 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, 

Reference Detachment, Orlando 

Naval Training Center, Orlando 

Homestead Air Force Base (301st Rescue Squadron) 

Homestead Air Force Base (726th Air Control Squadron) 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound 

Reference Detachment, Orlando 

GEORGIA 

1793 

1973 Naval Reserve Center Macon 

1795 

GUAM 

1993 Naval Air Station Agana 

1995 Ship Repair Facility 

1795 Naval Activities 

1995 

1995 Public Works 

1995 Naval Air Station Agana 

Navy Data Processing Center Trident Refit 

Facility Kings Bay 

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

HAWATI 

1988 

1791 

1991 

1993 

Kapalamd Military Reservation Phase I11 

Naval Air Facility Midway Island 

Nah-a1 Ocean Systems Center Detachment, Kanaohe 

Data Processing Center Naval Computer & 

Telecommunications Area Master Station, 

EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor 

1793 

1973 

1973 

1975 

IOWA 

1988 Fort Des Moines 

IDAHO 

1991 

ILLINOIS 

1988 Chanute Air Force Base 

1988 Fort Sheridan 

1988 LJSARC Addison Housing 

1788 Worth Family Housing 

Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Pearl Harbor 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point 

Naval Air Facility Midway Isband 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point 

h!lountain Home Air Force Base 

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BASE CLOSLXES AND KEALIGNMI:NTS DY STATE 1988. 1991, 1993, 1995 1,-5 
1991 

1993 

1993 

193 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

Aramament, Munitions, and Chemical Command 

Chanute Air Force Base (Metals Technology 

Rock Island Arsenal 

and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training 

courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB 

redirected to NAS Memphis) 

Defense Contract Management District 

Northcentral, Chicago 

Naval Air Station Glenview 

O’Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station 

Rock Island Arsenal (AMCCOM remains at Rock 

Island, IL instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

Savanna Army Depot Activity 

Chicago O’Hare International Airport Air Reserve Station 

INDIANA 

1988 Indiana Army Ammunition Plant 

1988 Jefferson Proving Ground 

1991 Fort 13enjamin Harrison, Indianapolis 

1991 Grissom Air Force Base, Peru 

1991 Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis 

1991 Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane 

1993 Defense Information Technology Service Organization, 

Indianapolis Information Processing Center 

1993 Navy,/Marine Corps Reserve Center Fort Wayne 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Terre Haute 

1995 Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis 

KANSAS 

1993 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Hutchinson 

1995 Naval Air Reserve Olathe 

KENTUCKY 

1988 Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot 

1991 Naval Ordnance Station Louisville 

1995 

Readiness Command Region Olathe (Region 18) 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

Detachment, Louisville 

LOUISIANA 

1988 Naval Station Lake Charles 

1988 

1991 England Air Force Base 

1991 Fort Polk 

1993 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Monroe 

1993 Naval Reserve Facility Alexandria 

1993 

1995 

1995 Naval Reserve Readiness Command 

New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal 

Data Processing Center Naval Computer & 

Telecommunications Station, New Orleans 

Navy Data Processing Center Enlisted 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory New Orleans 

Personnel Management Center New Orleans 

New Orleans (Region 10) 

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~~ 

L-6 APPENDIX L 
MAINE 

1991 

1993 

Loring Air Force Base, Caribou 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Bruriswick 

MARYLAND 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

Army Reserve Center Gaithersburg 

Former NIKE site at Aberdeen Proving Ground 

Fort Detrick 

Fort Holabird 

Fort Meade 

NIKE Washington-Baltimore 

U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development 

Laboratory, Fort Detrick 

David Taylor Research Center Detachment Annapolis 

Fuze Development and Production (armament and 

Naval Ordnance Station Indian Head 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment, White Oak 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center St. Inigoes 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren White Oak 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity Indian ]Head 

Fort Ritchie 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Detachment, White Oak 

Fort Meade 

Concepts Analysis Agency 

Fort Holabird 

Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore 

Naval Medical Research Institute Bethesda 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 

Detachment, Annapolis 

Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical 

Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick 

Investigations Control and Autoination 

Directorate. Fort Holabird 

missile-related) Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi 

Aircraft Division, Patuxent River 

Detachment, White Oak 

MASSACHUSETTS 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1991 

Family Housing Bedford 85 

Family Housing Beverly 15 

Family Housing Burlington 84 

Family Housing Hull 36 

Family Housing Nahant 17 

Family Housing Randolph 55 

Family Housing Swansea 29 

Family Housing Topsfield 05 

Family Housing Wakefield 03 

Fort Devens 

Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown 

Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown 

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BASE CLOSJKES AND KEALIGNMEKTS HI’ STATE 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 L-7 
1991 Fort Devens 

1991 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Chicopee 

1993 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Pittsfield 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Quincy 

1993 

1995 

1995 Hingham Cohasset 

1995 Sudbury Training Annex 

MICHIGAN 

1988 Poritiac Storage Facility 

1991 

1991 Wurtsmith Air Force Base 

1993 Naval Air Facility Detroit 

1993 

1993 

1995 Detroit Arsenal 

1995 Naval Reserve Center Cadillac 

1995 Naval Air Facility Detroit 

MISSOURI 

1988 NIKE Kansas City 30 

1988 

1991 

1991 Richard-Gebaur Air Reserve Station 

1993 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Joplin 

1993 

1995 Aviation-Troop Support Command 

MONTANA 

1993 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Missoula 

1995 Malmstrom Air Force Base 

1995 Fort Missoula 

NEW HAMPSHIRE 

1988 Pease Air Force Base 

1993 Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, 

NEW JERSEY 

1988 Fort Dix 

1988 Fort Monmouth 

1988 NIKE NY 54 Housing 

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station Keyport 

Naval Reserve Center New Bedford 

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Center Lawrence 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth 

Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and Applied 

Research, Warren 

Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing 

Center, Battle Creek 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base 

St. Louis Area Support Center Wherry Housing 

Aviation Systems Command and Troop Command 

Support, St. Louis 

Defense Information Technology Service Organization, 

Kansas City Information Processing Center 

Naval Reserve Center St. Joseph 

Naval Reserve Center Great Falls 

and Procurement Portsmouth 

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L-8 APPENDIX L 
1988 NIKE NY 60 Housing 

1988 NIKE NY 79/80 Housing 

1988 NIKE NY 73/94 

1988 NIKE Philadelphia 41/43 

1991 

1991 Fort Dix 

1991 

1991 

1993 Fort Monmouth 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal 

1995 Fort Dix 

1995 Camp Kilmer 

1995 Camp Pedricktown 

NEW MEXICO 

1988 

1991 

Electronic Technology Device Laboratory, Fort Monmouth 

Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst 

Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton 

Naval Reserve Center Atlantic City 

Naval Reserve Center Perth Amboy 

Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton 

Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot 

Battlefield Environmental Effects Element of 

the Atmospheric Science Laboratory, White 

Sands Missile Range 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Albuquerque 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Albuquerque 

1991 

1993 

(retain as a tenant of the Air Force) 

NEWYORK 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

Dry Hill Family Housing 

Manhattan Beach Housing 

Naval Station New York (Brooklyn) 

NIKE NY 01 Housing 

NIKE NY 25 Housing 

NIKE NY 99 Housing 

Griffiss Air Force Base 

Naval Reserve Center Jamestown 

Naval Reserve Center Poughkeepsie 

Naval Station Staten Island 

I’lattsburgh Air Force Base 

Readiness Command Region Scotia (Region 2) 

Department of Defense Family Housing and Family 

Seneca Army Depot 

Roslyn Air Guard Station 

Griffiss Air Force Base (Airfield Support for 

Griffiss Air Force Base (485th Engineering 

Bellmore Logistics Activity 

Fort Totten 

Naval Reserve Center Staten Island 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor 

Housing Office, Niagara Falls 

10th Infantry [Light] Division) 

Installation Group) 

Activity, Buffalo 

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BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS E3Y STATE 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 L-9 
NORTH CAROLINA 

1993 Data Processing Center Marine Corps Air Station 

Cherry Point 

1993 Marine Corps Data Processing Center Regional 

Automated Services Center Camp Lejeune 

1995 Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville 

NORTH DAKOTA 

1995 Grand Forks Air Force Base 

OHIO 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base 

Defense Information Technology Service Organization, 

Defense Information Technology Services Organization, 

Gentile Air Force Station (Defense Electronics 

Newark Air Force Base 

Readiness Command Region Ravenna (Region 5) 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base (Retain 

121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air 

Refueling Group in a cantonment area at 

Rickenbacker ANGB instead of Wright-Patterson 

AFB, OH, and operate as tenants of the Rickenbacker 

Port Authority [RF’AI on the RPA’s airport) 

International, Dayton 

C’olumbus Annex Dayton 

Cleveland 

Supply Center), Dayton 

Defense Contract Management Command 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus 

OREGON 

1988 Umatilla Army Depot 

PENNSYIVANIA 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1988 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

Coraopolis Family Housing Site 71 

Coraopolis Family Housing Site 72 

Irwin Support Detachment Annex 

Naval Hospital Philadelphia 

Pitt 02 Family Housing 

Pitt 03 Family Housing 

Pitt 25 Family Housing 

Pitt 3’7 Family Housing 

Pitt 42 Family Housing 

Pitt 4.3 Family Housing 

Pitt 52 Family Housing 

Tacony Warehouse 

Letterkenny Army Depot 

Naval Air Development Center Warminster 

Naval Station Philadelphia 

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard 

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L-10 APPENDIX L 
1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, Philadelphia 

Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing 

Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility (Joint Aviation 

Letterkenny Army Depot (Systems Integration 

Midatlantic, Philadelphia 

Center, Philadelphia 

Facility) Johnstown 

Management Activity-East remains at Letterkenny 

Army Depot vice Rock Island, IL) 

Naval Reserve Center Altoona 

Navy Data Processing Center Aviation Supply 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

Fort Indiantown Gap 

Charles E. Kelly Support Center 

Letterkenny Army Depot 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny 

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia 

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit Philadelphia 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility Philadelphia 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminister 

Office, Philadelphia 

Center (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland 

RDT8rE Division Detachment, Warminster 

PUERTO RICO 

1995 Fort Buchanan 

MODE ISLAND 

1988 Family Housing Davisville 

1988 Family Housing North Smithfield 99 

1991 Construction Battalion Center Davisville 

1991 Trident Command and Control Systems 

1993 Naval Education and Training Center, Newport 

SOUTH CAROLINA 

1991 

1993 Charleston Naval Shipyard 

1993 

1993 Defense Distribution Depot Charleston 

1993 Naval Station Charleston 

1993 

1995 

1995 

Maintenance Activity, Newport 

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, Myrtle Beach 

Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center, Charleston 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply 

Naval Reserve Readiness Command Charleston 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Charleston 

Center) Charleston 

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BASE CLOSURES AUD REALIGNMENTS BY STATE 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 L-11 
TENNESSEE 

1993 Naval Air Station Memphis 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Kingsport 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Memphis 

195 Defense Distribution Depot Memphis 

TEXAS 

1988 

1988 

1731 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1973 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1994 

195 

Fort Bliss 

Naval Station Galveston 

Bergstrom Air Force Base 

Carswell Air Force Base 

Goodfellow Air Force Base 

Naval Air Station Chase Field 

Air Force Data Processing Center Computer 

Carswell Air Force Base (Fabrication function 

Service Center, San Antonio 

of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from 

Dyess AFB to Luke AFB; maintenance training 

function redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) 

Personnel Center, Randolph AFB 

Facility, Corpus Christi 

Data Processing Center Air Force Military 

Data Processing Center Navy Data Automation 

Naval Air Station Dallas 

Naval Reserve Facility Midland 

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Center Abilene 

Red River Army Depot 

Naval Reserve Center Laredo 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base 

Reese Air Force Base 

Kelly Air Force Base 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio 

Red River Army Depot 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi 

UTAH 

1988 Fort Douglas 

1993 Defense Distribution Depot Tooele 

193 Defense Logistics Agency Information 

Processing Center, Ogden 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Ogden 

1993 Tooele Army Depot 

1995 

1995 Defense Distribution Depot Ogden 

VIRGINIA 

1788 Cameron Station 

1988 

1988 Manassas Family Housing 

1988 NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing 

1988 Woodbridge Housing Site 

1991 Army Research Institute, Alexandria 

Hill ,4ir Force Base (Utah Training and Test Range) 

Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) site, Herndon 

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L-12 APPENDIX L 
1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1991 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

Belvoir Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir 

Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research 

Element of the Center for Night Vision and 

Electro-Optics, Ft. Belvoir 

Harry Diamond Laboratory, Woodbridge 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown 

Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station Norfolk 

Air Force Data Processing Center 7th 

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington 

Communications Group, Pentagon, Arlington 

(Including the Office of Military Manpower 

Management, Arlington) 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Oceana 

Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Norfolk 

Data Processing Center Navy Recruiting 

Defense Logistics Agency Information 

Fort Belvoir 

Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, 

Yorktown (Realign to Panama City, FL 

vice Dam Neck, VA) 

Command, Arlington 

Processing Center, Richmond 

Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington 

Naval Reserve Center, Staunton 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington 

Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington 

(Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria, 

VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA) 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - Port Hueneme, 

Yorktown Detachment, Virginia Beach (Naval 

Mine Warfare Activity) 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center - Norfolk Detachment 

Navy Data Processing Center Naval Computer & 

Telecommunications Area Master Station, 

Atlantic, Norfolk 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver 

Tactical Support Office, Arlington 

Vint Hill Farms 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Portsmouth 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

Office of the General Counsel (Navy) 

Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy) 

Office of the Secretary of the Navy (Legislative Affairs, 

Program Appraisal, Comptroller, Inspector General, 

and Information) 

(Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

Office of Civilian Manpower Management (Navy) 

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BASE CI.OSI1KES AND REALIGNMENTS BY STATE 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995 L-13 
1993 

1993 

1993 

1393 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

1995 

International Programs Office (Navy) 

Combined Civilian Personnel Office (Navy) 

Navy Regional Contracting Center 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service 

Naval Audit Agency 

Strategic Systems Programs Office (Navy) 

Office of Naval Research 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations 

Off'ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower 

Marine Corps Systems Command (Clarendon Office) 

Fort Pickett 

Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance 

& Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps 

8 Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps 

Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast 

Detachment, Norfolk 

Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington 

Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake 

Fort Lee 

Information Systems Software Center (ISSC) 

WASHINGTON 

1 988 

1988 

1988 

1991 

191 

1993 

1993 

1393 

1993 

1995 

1995 

1995 

195 

1995 

Midway Housing Site 

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point) 

Youngs Lake Housing Site 

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point) 

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station Keyport 

Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Whidbey Island 

Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Puget Sound 

Navy Data Processing Center Trident Refit Facility Bangor 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport 

Camp Bonneville 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington 

Office of Naval Research 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington 

Center (CV), Bremerton 

WISCONSIN 

1988 Sun Prairie Family Housing 

1995 Naval Reserve Center Sheboygan 

WEST VIRGINIA 

1993 Naval Air Facility Martinsburg 

1993 Naval Reserve Center Parkersburg 

OTHER CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS 

1991 Army Corps of Engineers 

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L-14 APPENDIX L 
APPENDIX M 

CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS 

BY SERWCE BRANCH 

1995 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission’s Actions 

Part 1:Major Base Closm 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Oakland Army Base, CA 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ 

Seneca Army Depot, NY 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Fort Pickett. VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK 

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA 

Ship Repair Facility, GU 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Indianapolis, IN 

Detachment, Louisville, KY 

Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Warminster. PA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, CA 

Chicago O’Hare International Airport Air Reserve 

Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX 

Reese Air Force Base, TX 

Station, IL 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT 

Part IL Major Base Realignments 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Hunter Liggett, CA 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Fort Meade, MD 

Detroit Arsenal, MI 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Red River Army Depot, ‘IX 

Fort Lee. VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL 

Naval Activities, GU 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Onizuka Air Station, CA 

Eglin Air Force Base, FL 

Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

(Utah Test and Training Range) 
Palt III:Smaller Base or 

Activity Closum, Realignments, 

Disestcrblishments or Relocations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA 

East Fort Baker, CA 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT 

Big Coppett Key, FL 

Concepts Analysis Agency, MD 

Fort Holabird, MD 

Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD 

Hingham Cohasset, MA 

Sudbury Training Annex, MA 

Aviation-Troop Support Command (ATCOM), MO 

Fort Missoula, MT 

Camp Kilmer, NJ 

Camp Pedricktown, NJ 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY 

Fort Totten, NY 

Recreation Center *2, Fayetteville, NC 

Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA 

Camp Bonneville , WA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast 

Division, San Diego, CA 

Naval Personnel Research and Development 

Center, San Diego, CA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and 

Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, 

New London Detachment, New London, CT 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound 

Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU 

Public Works Center, GU 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA 

Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock 

Division Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit 

Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility 

Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division 

Detachment, Warminster, PA 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance 

Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Information Systems Management Center 

Arlington, VA 

Naval Management Systems Support Office 

Chesapeake, VA 

Navy/Marine Reserve Activities 

Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Huntsville, AL 

Stockton, CA 

Santa ha, Irvine, CA 

Pomona, CA 

Cadillac, MI 

Staten Island, NY 

Laredo, TX 

Sheboygan, WI 

Naval Air Reserve Center at: 

Olathe, KS 

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at: 

New Orleans, LA (Region 10) 

Charleston, SC (Region 7) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer 

Processor Activity, Buffalo, NY 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Contract Management Command 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA 

South Marietta, GA 

International, Dayton, OH 

DEFENSE 1”IGATIVE SERVICE 

Investigations Control and Automation 

Directorate, Fort Holabird, MD 

M-2 APPENDIX M 
Part IV Changs to Previous& 

Approved BRAC Recommendations 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical 

Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA 

Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Air Station, Agand, GU 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 

Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC 

Naval Security Group Command Detachment 

Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL 

Philadelphia, PA 

Arlington, VA 

Potomac, Washington, DC 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

(301st Rescue Squadron) 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

(726th Air Control Squadron) 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support 

Griffiss Air Force Rase, NY 

for 10th Infantry [Light] Division) 

(485th Engineering Installation Group) 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Contract Management District West, El 

Segundo, CA 

Part V;. DoD Recommendations 

Rejected by the Commission 

PROPOSED CLOSURES REJECTED 

BY THE COMMISSION 

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA 

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA 

North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA 

Price Support Center, IL 

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division 

Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY 

Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, OH 

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation 

Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, TX 

Brooks Air Force Base, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Lakehurst, NJ 

PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS 

REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS 

REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION 

AT THE REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY 

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ 

Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 

Dugway Proving Ground, UT 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support 

Activity (AMSA), WV 

CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT BY SERVICE BRANCH 1995, 1993, 1991, & 1988 M-3 
1993 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission’s Actions 

CLOSURES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Vint Hill Farms, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory 

Port Hueneme, CA 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western 

Engineering Field Division San Bruno, CA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

(Surface) Pacific San Francisco, CA 

Naval Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Air Station Agana, GU 

Naval Air Facility Midway Island, HI 

Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI 

Naval Air Station Glenview, IL 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis, MD 

Sea Automated Data Systems Activity 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, 

Naval Air Warfare Center-Aircraft Division 

Department of Defense Family Housing Office 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

(Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Station Charleston, SC 

Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC 

Center Washington, DC 

(Naval Supply Center) Pensacola, FL 

(Naval Supply Center) Charlestown, SC 

Indian Head, MD 

and Procurement Portsmouth, NH 

Trenton, NJ 

Niagara Falls, NY 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility Driver, VA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and 

Alterations (Surface) Atlantic Norfolk, VA 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and 

Alterations (CV) Bremerton, WA 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, W 

NavaVMarine Corps Air Facility 

(Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, PA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

St. Inigoes, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak MD 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Hospital Orlando, FL 

Naval Hospital Oakland, FL 

Naval Reserve Centers at: 

Portsmouth, VA 

Gadsden, AL 

Montgomery, AL 

Fayetteville, AR 

Fort Smith, AR 

Pacific Grove, CA 

Macon, GA 

Terre Haute, IN 

Hutchinson, KS 

Monroe, LA 

Parkersburg, WV 

New Bedford, MA 

Pittsfield, MA 

Joplin, MO 

St. Joseph, MO 

Great Falls, MT 

Missoula, MT 

Atlantic City, NJ 

Perth Amboy, NJ 

Jarnestown, NY 

Poughkeepsie, NY 

Kingsport, TN 

Memphis, TN 

Ogden, UT 

Staunton, VA 

Chicopee, MA 

AltOOM, PA 

Quhcy, MA 

Naval Reserve Facilities at: 

Alexandria, LA 

Midland, TX 

M-4 APPENDIX M 
Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at: 

Fort Wayne, IN 

Lawrence, MA 

Abilene, TX 

Readiness Command Regions at: 

Olathe, KS (Region 18) 

Scotia, NY (Region 2) 

Kavenna, OH (Kegion 5) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

O’Hare International Airport Air Reserve 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI 

I’lattsburgh Air Force Base, NY 

Gentile Air Force Station 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

Station, Chicago, IL 

(Defense Electronics Supply Center), OH 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Personnel Support Center 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH 

Defense Distribution Depots 

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC 

Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, IJT 

Service/Support Activities 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, 

Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

DATA CENTER CONSOLIDATION 

Navy Processing Center 

Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Naval Comrnand Control & Ocean Surveillance 

Navy Regional Data Automation Center 

Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Station, Washington, DC 

Naval Air Station Key West, FL 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station 

China Lake, CA 

Point Mugu, CA 

Center, San Diego, CA 

San Francisco, CA 

Pensacola, FL 

Naval Air Station Mayport, FL 

Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area 

Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI 

Enlisted Personnel Management Center 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Air Station Rrunswick, ME 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC 

Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area 

Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA 

Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA 

Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA 

Trident Refit Facility, Rangor, WA 

Marine Corps Data Processing Centers 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Regional Automated Services Center 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC 

Regional Automated Services Center 

Air Force Data Processing Centers 

Air Force Military Personnel Center, 

Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX 

7th Communications Group, Pentagon 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Data Processing Centers 

Information Processing Center, Rattle Creek, MI 

Information Processing Center, Philadelphia. PA 

Information Processing Center, Ogden, LJT 

Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA 

Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA) Data Processing Centers 

Defense Information Technology Service 

Organization, Indianapolis Information 

Processing Center, IN 

Defense Information Technology Service 

Organization, Kansas City Information 

Processing Center, MO 

New Orleans, LA 

Station, New Orleans, LA 

Patuxent River, MD 

Camp Pendleton, CA 

Camp Lejeune, NC 

Randolph AFB, ‘IX 

Arlington, VA 

CLOSURE AND hALIC;\MTUT BY SERVICE RliAhCH 1995, 1993. 1991, & 1988 M-5 
Defense Information Technology Service 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH 

Organization, Cleveland, OH 

REALIGNMENTS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

Changes to Previously Approved 

BRAC 88/91 Recommendations 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army 

remains at the Presidio of San Francisco 

instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO) 

Pueblo Army Depot, CO (Redirects supply 

mission from Defense Distribution Depot 

Tooele, UT, to new location within the 

Defense Distribution Depot System) 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM remains 

at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to 

Redstone Arsenal, AL) 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems 

Integration Management ActivityEast remains at Letterkenny Army 

Depot vice Rock Island, IL) 

DESARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

Naval Security Group Command (Including 

Security Group Station and Security Group 

Detachment Potomac), Washington, D.C. 

Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI 

Naval Air Station Memphs, TN 

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA 

(Including the Office of Military Manpower 

Management, Arlington, VA) 

Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 

Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA 

(Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria, 

VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA) 

Alexandria, VA 

Naval Surface Warfare Center-Port Hueneme, 

Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA 

Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command VA 

Office of the General Counsel (Navy), VA 

Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), VA 

Office of the Secretary of the Navy 

Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA 

(Legislative Affairs, Program Appraisal, 

Comptroller, Inspector General, and 

Information), VA 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, VA 

Office of Civilian Manpower Management 

International Programs Office (Navy), VA 

Combined Civilian Personnel Office (Navy), VA 

Navy Regional Contracting Center, VA 

Naval Criminal Investigative Service, VA 

Naval Audit Agency, VA 

Strategic Systems Programs Office (Navy), VA 

Office of Naval Research, VA 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations 

$t Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps, VA 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower 

& Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps, VA 

Marine Corps Systems Command 

(Clarendon Office), VA 

Changes to Previously Approved 

BRAC 88/91 Recommendations 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure 

Island, CA (Dispose of all property by any 

lawful manner, including outleasing) 

(Relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets 

to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or 

MCAS Camp Pendleton) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center 

San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallejo, 

CA, into available space in Air Force Plant 

#19, San Diego, vice new construction) 

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center 

Vallejo, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics 

Systems Engineering Center San Diego, CA, 

into available space in Air Force Plant #19, 

San Diego, vice new construction) 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, 

Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City, 

FL vice Dam Neck, VA) 

NM (Retain as a tenant of the Air Force) 

(Navy), VA 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque, 

M-6 APPENDIX M 
Presidio of San Francisco (6th Army remains 

at the Presidio of San Francisco instead of 

moving to Ft. Carson, CO) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

March Air Force Base, CA 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 

Recommendations 

Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat 

Crew Training redirected from Fairchild 

AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat 

Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to 

Altus AFB) 

Mather Air Force Rase, CA (940th Air Refueling 

Group redirected from McClellan AFB to 

Beale AFB) 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (Airfield to be 

operated by the Department of Commerce or 

another federal agency. Joint Communications 

Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB.) 

and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training 

courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard 

AFB redirected to NAS Memphis) 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

(Retain 1219 Air Refueling Wing and the 

160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment 

area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of 

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and operate as 

tenants of the Rickenbacker Port Authority 

[RPAI on RPA's airport.) 

function of the 436th Training Squadron 

redirected from Dyes AFB to Luke AFB; 

maintenance training function redirected 

from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB) 

Chanute Air Force Base, IL (Metals Technology 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Regional Headquarters 

Defense Contract Management District West 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Contract Management District 

El Segundo, CA 

Northcentral, Chicago, IL 

Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA 

CLOSURE .4ND REALIGNMENT BY SERVICE BRANCH 1995, 1993, 1991, & 1988 M-7 
1991 Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission’s Actions 

CLOSURES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Fort Ord, CA 

Sacramento Army Depot, CA 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Fort Devens, MA 

Harry Diamond Laboratory, Woodbridge, VA 

US. Army Institute of Dental Research 

Washington, D.C. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco, CA 

Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility 

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, Sunnyvale, CA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Naval Space Systems Activity, Los Angeles, CA 

Naval Station Long Beach, Long Beach, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment 

Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility 

Naval Station Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA 

Construction Battalion Center Davisville, RI 

Naval Air Station Chase Field, Beeville, TX 

Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity 

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point) 

San Diego, CA 

San Diego, CA 

Vallejo, CA 

Kaneohe, HI 

Albuquerque, NM 

Yorktown, VA 

Seattle, WA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Eaker Air Force Base, AR 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Grissom Air Force Base, IN 

England Air Force Base, LA 

Loring Air Force Base, ME 

Wurtsmirh Air Force Base, MI 

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO 

Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH 

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX 

Carswell Air Force Base. TX 

REALIGNMENTS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Fort Rucker, AL 

Letterman Army Institute of Research 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 

Walter Reed Army Institute of 

Research Microwave Bioeffects 

Research, Washington, DC 

Armament, Munitions, and Chemical 

Command, Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

Fort Polk, LA 

Army Materials Technology Laboratory, 

Fuze Development and Production 

Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and 

Aviation Systems Command and Troop Support 

Electronic Technology Device Laboratory, Fort 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Battlefield Environmental Effects Element 

Watertown, MA 

Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, MD 

Applied Research, Warren, MI 

Command, St. Louis, MO 

Monmouth, NJ 

Atmospheric Science Laboratory 

White Sands Missile Range, NM 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA 

Belvoir Research and Development Center 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and 

Applied Research Element of the Center 

for Night Vision and Electro-Optics 

Fort Belvoir, VA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support 

Activity San Diego, CA 

Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA 

Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA 

Naval Underwater Systems Center Detachment 

New London, CT 

M-8 APPENDIX M 
Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City, FL 

Naval Air Facility Midway Island, HI 

Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN 

Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN 

Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY 

Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station, 

David Taylor Research Center Detachment 

Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment 

Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ 

Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ 

Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA 

Trident Command and Control Systems 

Maintenance Activity, Newport, RI 

Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering 

Station Norfolk, VA 

Keyport, WA 

Annapolis, MD 

White Oak, MD 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Beale Air Force Base, Marysville, CA 

March Air Force Base, Riverside, CA 

Mather Air Force Base, Rancho Cordova, CA 

MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL 

Mountain Home Air Force Base, 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, TX 

Mountain Home, ID 

CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT BY SEKVICE BRANCH 1995, 1993, 1991, & 1988 M-9 
1988 Defense Secretary’s 

Commission Base Closure and 

Realignment Actions 

CLOSURES 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Alabama Army Ammunition Plant, AL 

Coosa River Storage Annex, AL 

Navajo Army Depot Activity, AZ 

Hamilton Army Airfield, CA 

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 

Bennett Army National Guard Facility, 

Family Housing Ansonia, CT 04 

Family Housing East Windsor, CT 08 

Family Housing Fairfield, CT 65 

Family Housing Manchester, CT 25 

Family Housing Middletown, CT 48 

Family Housing Milford, CT 17 

Family Housing New Britain, CT 74 

Family Housing Orange, CT 15 

Family Housing Plainville, CT 67 

Family Housing Portland, CT 36 

Family Housing Westport, CT 73 

Family Housing Shelton, C2 74 

Cape St. George, FL 

Kapalama Military Reservation Phase 111, HI 

Fort Des Moines, IA 

Fort Sheridan, IL 

USARC Addison Housing, IL 

Worth Family Housing, IL 

Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, IN 

Jefferson Proving Ground, IN 

Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY 

New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal, LA 

Army Material Technology Laboratory, MA 

Family Housing Bedford, MA 85 

Family Housing Beverly, MA 15 

Family Housing Burlington, MA 84 

Family Housing Hull, MA 36 

Family Housing Nahant, MA 17 

Family Housing Randolph, MA 55 

Family Housing Swansea, MA 29 

Family Housing Topsfield, MA 05 

Family Housing Wakefield, MA 03 

Army Reserve Center Gaithersburg, MD 

Former NIKE site at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 

NIKE Washington-Baltimore, MD 

Pontiac Storage Facility, MI 

Arapahoe County, CO 

NIKE Kansas City 30, MO 

St. Louis Area Support Center Wherry Housing, MO 

NIKE NY 54 Housing, NJ 

NIKE NY 60 Housing, NJ 

NIKE NY 79/80 Housing, NJ 

NIKE NY 93/94, NJ 

NIKE Philadelphia 41/43, NJ 

Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot, NM 

Dry Hill Family Housing, NY 

Manhattan Beach Housing, NY 

NIKE NY 01 Housing, NY 

NIKE NY 25, NY 

NIKE NY 9 Housing, NY 

Coraopolis Family Housing Site 71, PA 

Coraopolis Family Housing Site 72, PA 

Irwin Support Detachment Annex, PA 

Pitt 02 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 03 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 25 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 37 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 43 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 42 Family Housing, PA 

Pitt 52 Family Housing, PA 

Tacony Warehouse, PA 

Family Housing Davisville, RI 

Family Housing North Smithfield 99, RI 

Fort Douglas, UT 

Cameron Station, VA 

Manassas Family Housing, VA 

NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing, VA 

Wdbridge Housing Site, VA 

Midway Housing Site, WA 

Youngs Lake Housing Site, WA 

Sun Prairie Family Housing, WI 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Construction for Naval Station San Francisco 

Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County, CA 

Naval Reserve Center (Coconut Grove) Miami, FL 

Naval Station Lake Charles, LA 

Naval Station New York (Brooklyn), NY 

Naval Hospital Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Station Galveston, TX 

Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), WA 

(Hunters Point), CA 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

George Air Force Base, CA 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

Norton Air Force Base, CA 

Chanute Air Force Base, IL 

Pease Air Force Base, NH 

M-10 APPENDIX M 
INTERSERVICE 

Defense Mapping Agency site, Herndon, VA 

REALIGNMENTS 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Pueblo Army Depot, CO 

Fort Devens, MA 

Fort Detrick, MD 

Fort Holabird, MD 

Fort Meade, MD 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Umatilla A4rmy Depot, OR 

Fort Bliss, TX 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point), CA 

CLOSI-RE AND REALIGNMENT BY SERVICE BKANCH 1995, 1993, 1991, & 1988 M-11 
OmENDAmONS 

Installation 

Army 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Pickett, VA 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI 

Price Support Center, IL 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Kelly Support Center, PA 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Bayonne Military Ocean 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Dugway Proving Ground, UT 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance 

Terminal, NJ 

Support Activity, WV 

Navy 

Naval Activities, Guam 

Fleet and Industrial Supply 

Center, C Juam 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Technical Training Center, 

Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station Corpus 

Christi, 'IX 

Naval Air Station Key West, FL 

Naval Health Research Center, 

San Diego, CA 

Naval Management Systems 

Support Office, Chesapeake, VA 

Recommended Action 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Realign 

Realign 

Close 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Realign 

Close 

Realign 

Close 

Realign 

Disestablish 

Close 

Close 

Realign 

Realign 

Disestablish 

Disestablish 

Commission Action 

Realign (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Open 

Open 

Realign (amended) 

Realign (amended) 

Open 

Realign (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Open (DoD request) 

Realign (amended) 

Realign 

Open (DoD request) 

Open (DoD request) 

Realign (amended) 

Disestablish (amended) 

Open 

Open 

Realign as necessary 

Realign (DoD request) 

Open 

Distestablish (amended) 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Louisville, KY Close 

Division, Indianapolis, IN Close 

Division, Lakehurst, NJ Close 

Air Force 

Rome Laboratory, NY 

Kirtland AFB, NM 

Brooks AFB, TX 

Kelly AFB-ALC, TX 

McClellan AFB-ALC, CA 

Greater Pittsburgh IPA ARS, PA 

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA 

North Highlands AGS, CA 

Grand Forks AFB, ND 

Roslyn AGS, NY 

Springfield-Beckley AGS, OH 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Air Force Electronic Warfare 

Evaluation Simulator Activity, 

Fort Worth, TX 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Realign (Depot) 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Realign (Depot) 

Realign (Depot) 

Disestablish 

Realign (Depot) 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Distribution Depot, 

Red River Distribution Depot, TX 

Ogden, UT Close 

Close 

1995 REDIRECTS 

Changes to Previously Approved 1988 Recommendations -Army 

Fort Holabird, MD Relocate all tenants 

except for Defense 

Investigative Service 

Changes to Previously Approved 1991 Recommendations -Army 

Fort Detrick, MD (Tri-Service 

Project Reliance) 

Wright-Patterson 

AFB received 

toxicology research 

Close (amended) 

Close (amended) 

Open 

Open 

Open (DoD request) 

Open 

Realign (amended) 

Close 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Realign (Amended) 

Close (Amendecl) 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Close (Amended) 

Open 

Close 

Aberdeen Proving 

Ground 

receiver 

Changes to Previously Approved 1993 Recommendations - Navy 

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam 

Marine Corps Air Stations, 

El Tor0 and Tustin, CA 

Andersen AFB is receiver Unspecified receiver 

Specified receivers Unspecified receivers 

Changes to Previously Approved 1993 Recommendations -Air Force 

Griffis AFB, NY (485th EIG) 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

Transfer units to No receiver 

Kelly, McClellan AFBs specified 

Inactivate Close Facilities 

N-2 

~~ 

APPENDIX N 
1993 Commission 

Ins tallation 

Army 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA 

Navy 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV 

Naval Air Facility Johnstown, PA 

Naval Hospital, Charleston, SC 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station South 

Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC 

Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Submarine Base 

New London, CA 

Aviation Supply Office, PA 

Naval Air Technical Services 

Facility, Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Electronic Security Systems 

Engineering Center, Charleston, SC 

Naval Electronic Systems 

Engineering Center, Portsmouth, VA 

Naval Surface Warfare 

Center Carderock Annapolis 

Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Navy and Marine Corps Reserve 

Center, Lawrence, MA 

Naval Reserve Center, 

Chicopee, MA 

Naval Reserve Center, 

Quincy, MA 

Weymouth, MA 

Air Force 

Plattsburgh AFB, NY 

Homestead AFB, FL 

McGuire AFB, NJ 

Gentile AFS, OH 

Ogden ALC, Hill AFB, UT 

Defense Logistics Agency 

Defense Industrial Supply 

Center, PA 

Defense Reutilization & 

Marketing Service, MI 

Defense Personnel Support 

Center, Philadelphia, PA 

Recommended Action 

Close 

Realign 

None 

None 

None 

None 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Disestablish 

Close 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Disestablish 

Receive 

Disestablish 

None 

None 

None 

None 

Close 

Realign 

None 

None 

Relocate 

Disestablish 

Close, Relocate 

Commission Action 

Open 

Open 

Realign 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Realign 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Open 

Close 

Open 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Close 

Realign 

Open 

Close 

Realign 

Open 

Open 

Close, 

amend Relocate 

DOD RECOMMENIMTIONS MODIFIED 011 REJECTED BY COMMISSIONS: 1995, 1993, & 1991 N-3 
Defense Logistics Services 

Center, Battle Creek, MI 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny, PA 

Disestablish 

Close 

1993 REDIRECTS 

Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations - Army 

Presidio of' San Francisco, CA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Send 6th Army to 

Ft Carson 

Send functions to 

Rock Island 

Open 

Open 

Keep 6th Army at 

Presidio of SF 

Realign 

Keep functions 

at Letterkenny 

Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations - Navy 

Marine Corps Air Station, None Realign 

Tustin, CA 

Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations - Air Force 

Bergstrom AFB, TX Close Open 

N-4 APPENDIX N 
1991 Commission 

Army 

Installation 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Army Corps of Engineers 

Navy 

Naval Air Station Whidbey 

Island, WA 

Naval Training Center 

Orlando, FL 

RDT&E & Fleet 

Support Activities 

Air Force 

Moody AFB, GA 

Recommended Action 

Close 

Close 

Close 

None 

Close 

Close 

Close lO/Realign 16 

Close 

Commission Action 

Open 

Realign 

Realign 

Realign 

Open 

Open 

Close 7/Realign 17 

Open 

DOD RECOMMENIIATIONS MODIFIED OR REJECTED BY COMMISSIONS: 1995, 1993, & 1991 N-5 
APPENDIX 0 

HEARINGS HELD BY 

THE COMMISSION 

1995,1993 8L 1991 

1995 Commission 

Washington, D. C. Hearings 

March 1,1995 

Presentation of the Department of Defense 

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry; 

Reconimendat ions 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General John M. Shalikashvili, USA; and 

Deputy Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch 

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

March 1,1995 

Presentation of Department of Defense 

Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

106 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

March 6, 1995 

Presentation of Recommendations and 

Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton; 

Methodology 

(Economic Security) 

Methodology for Services’ Selection Process 

Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval 

Operations; General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; and 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert B. 

Pirie, Jr. (Installations and Environment) 

345 Cannon House Office Building 

March 6,1995 

Presentation of Recommendations and 

Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall; 

Methodology for Services’ Selection Process 

General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force; Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr., 

Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base 

Realignment and Transition; Mr. James 

Boatright, consultant to the Secretary; and 

General Thomas S. Moorman, Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Air Force 

345 Cannon House Office Building 

March 7,1995 

Presentation of Recommendations and 

Methodology for Services’ Selection Process 

Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr.; 

General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, 

Army; Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Installations, Logistics, and Environment) 

Robert M. Walker; and Brigadier General 

James E. Shane, Jr., Director of Management, 

Office of the Chief of Staff, Army 

106 Dirksen Office Building 

March 7, 1995 

Presentation of Recommendations and 

Major General Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF, 

Methodology for Defense Agencies’ Selection 

Principal Deputy Director, Defense Logistics 

Agency; and Mr. John F. Donnelly, Director, 

Defense Investigative Service 

106 Dirksen Office Building 

March 16,1995 

Presentation by Elected Officials and 

Senator David Pryor (D-AR); Mayor Joseph A. 

Private-Sector Groups on Reuse Issues 

Griffo (Rome, NY), The United States Conference of Mayors; Councilmember John Maxwell 

(Myrtle Beach, SC), National League of Cities; 

Commissioner Doug Bovin (Delta County, 

Gladstone, MI), National Association of 

Counties; City Manager Walter V. Graham 

(Vallejo, CAI, International City/County 

Management Association; Mr. Brad Arvin, 

National Association of Instakition 

Developers; and Mr. William Tremayne, 

Ihsiness Executives for National Security 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

March 16,1995 

Presentation of Government Officials 

Testimony on Reuse Issues 
Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Economic Security); Ms. Sherri Goodman, 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security); Mr. Alan K. Olsen, Director of 

Air Force Base Conversion Agency, Department 

of the Air Force; Colonel Dennis C. Cochrane, 

Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Office, 

Department of the Army; Rear Admiral Patrick 

Drennon, Director of Facilities & Engineering 

Division, Department of the Navy; Mr. William 

Ginsberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 

Economic Development; Mr. James Van Erden, 

Administrator, Work-Based Learning, Department of Labor; and Mr. Timothy Fields, Deputy 

Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response, Environmental 

Protection Agency 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

Presentation of GAO Report on the Department 

of Defense Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments 

Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Assistant Comptroller 

General, National Security and International 

Affairs; Mr. David Warren, Director, Defense 

Management and NASA Issues; and Mr. Barry 

W. Holman, Assistant Director, Defense 

Management and NASA Issues 

April 17,1995 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

Presentation of the Department of Defense’s 

Joint Cross-Service Group 

Mr. James Hugh, Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Logistics; Mr. Louis C. Finch, 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Readiness; Edward D. Martin, MD, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs; Mr. Philip E. Coyle, Director, 

Operational Test and Evaluation; Mr. John A. 

Burt, Director, Test, Systems Engineering and 

Evaluation; Dr. Craig Dorman, Deputy Director 

(Laboratory Management); Brigadier General 

James E. Shane, Jr., Director of Management, 

Office of the Chief of Staff, Army; Mr. Charles 

Nemfakos, Vice Chairman, Navy Base Structure 

Evaluation Committee; Major General Jay D. 

Blume, Jr., Special Assistant to the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force for Base Realignment and 

Transition; and Ms. Cathy Kelleher, Defense 

Logistics Agency BRAC Working Group 

April 17,1995 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

May 10,1995 

Commission DeliberationsNotes on Additions to 

the Secretary’s List for Further Consideration 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

June 1213,1995 

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility 

345 Cannon House Office Building (June 12) 

216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 13) 

June 14,1995 

Testimony from Department of Defense Officials 

Regarding the Additional Bases Added to the 

Closure and Realignment List by the Commission on May 10, 1935 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) 

Joshua Gotbaum; Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Installations) Robert E. Bayer; 

Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr.; 

General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Chief of 

Staff, Army; Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Installations and Environment) Robert M. 

Walker; Brigadier General James E. Shane, Jr., 

USA, Director of Management, Office of the 

Chief of Staff, Army; Secretary of the Navy 

John H. Dalton; Admiral Jeremy M. Boor&, 

USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General 

Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; Robert B. Pirie, Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of the Air 

Force Sheila E. Widnall; General Ronald R. 

Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; 

Major General Jay D. Blume, Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Base 

Realignment and Transition; James Boatright, 

Consultant to the Secretary of the Air Force; 

Lieutenant General George T. Babbitt, Jr., 

USAF, Principal Deputy Director, Defense 

Logistics Agency; Ms. Marge V. McMananay, 

BRAC Team Chief, Defense Logistics Agency 

Closures and Realignments 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

June 22-23,1995 

Commission Final Deliberations 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

APPENrjiX 0 0 - 2 
Regional Hearings 

March 29,1995 

Territory of Guam Regional Hearing 

Guam Legislature 

March 30,1995 

Grand Forks, North Dakota, Regional Hearing 

Chester Fritz Auditorium 

University of North Dakota 

March 31,1995 

Great Falls, Montana, Regional Hearing 

Great Falls Civic Center 

April 4,1995 

Birmingham, Alabama, Regional Hearing 

The Boutwell Municipal Auditorium 

April 12,1995 

Chicago, Illinois, Regional Hearing 

The Rosemont Convention Center 

April 19,1995 

Dallas, Texas, Regional Hearing 

Dallas Convention Center 

April 20,1995 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Regional Hearing 

Albuquerque Convention Center 

April 24,1995 

Delta Junction, Alaska, Regional Hearing 

Delta Junction High School 

April 28,1995 

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing 

The Westin Hotel 

May 4,1995 

Baltimore, Maryland, Regional Hearing 

University of Maryland, Baltimore County 

May 5,1995 

New York, New York, Regional Hearing 

USS Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum 

May 25,1995 

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing 

Naval Station, Treasure Island 

May 31,1995 

Chicago, Illinois, Regional Hearing 

The O’Hare Hilton 

June 3,1995 

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing 

The John F. Kennedy Library 

June 9,1995 

Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Hearing 

The Fox Theater 

June 10,1995 

Fort Worth, Texas, Regional Hearing 

Fort Worth/Tarrant County Convention Center 

1993 Commission 

Washington, D. C. Hearings 

March 15,1993 

Presentation of the Secretary’s Recommendations 

2118 Rayburn House Office Building 

March 16,1993 

Policy and Methodology in the Secretary’s 

2212 Rayburn House Office Building 

March 22, 1993 

Environmental Issues, Methodology, and Policy 

334 Cannon House Office Building 

March 29, 1993 

Base Closure Account and Execution, 

Budget Impact and Public Policy 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

Recommendations 

April 5,1993 

Strategic DefenseKhemical Issues, 

Military Family/Retiree Issues 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

April 12,1993 

Economic Issues 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

Presentation of GAO’s Analysis of the Secretary’s 

Recommendations and Selection Process for 

Closures and Realignments 

April 19,1993 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

May 21,1993 

Commission Deliberations/Vote on Additions to 

the Secretary’s List for Further Consideration 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

HEARINGS HELD BY THE COMMISSION 0 - 3 
June 1416,1993 

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility 

Closures and Realignments 

216 Hart Senate Office Building 

June 17-18,1993 

Commission Deliberations 

325 Russell Senate Office Building (June 17) 

216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 18) 

June 2327,1993 

Commission Final Deliberations 

216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 23-24) 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building (June 25) 

G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building (June 26-27) 

Regional Hearings 

April 20-21,1993 

Mid-Atlantic Regional Hearing 

Arlington, Virginia 

Gunston Arts Center 

April 25-26,1993 

Oakland, California, Regional Hearing 

Henry J. Kaiser Convention Center 

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing 

Holiday Inn on the Bay 

Charleston, South Carolina, Regional Hearing 

Gaillard Municipal Auditorium 

Orlando, Florida, Regional Hearing 

Orlando Expo Center 

May 4,1993 

April 27,1993 

May 14,1993 

May 3,1993 

Birmingham, Alabama, Regional Hearing 

Boutwell Municipal Auditorium 

May 9-10,1993 

Newark, New Jersey, Regional Hearing 

Symphony Hall 

May 11,1993 

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing 

State House, Gardner Auditorium 

May 12,1993 

Detroit, Michigan, Regional Hearing 

McGregor Memorial Conference Center 

June 1,1993 

Columbus, Ohio, Regional Hearing 

Whitehall Civic Center 

June 2,1993 

Grand Forks, North Dakota, Regional Hearing 

University of North Dakota 

June 3,1993 

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing 

Holiday Inn on the Bay 

Spokane, Washington, Regional Hearing 

City Council Chambers 

June 6,1993 

Corpus Christi, Texas, Regional Hearing 

Bayfront Plaza Convention Center 

June 8-9,1993 

Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Hearing 

Russell Federal Building 

June 11,1993 

Norfolk, Virginia, Regional Hearing 

Chrysler Hall 

June 12,1993 

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing 

State House, Gardner Auditorium 

June 4,1993 

199 1 Commission 

Wabington, D. C. Hearings 

April 15,1991 

Presentation of Department of Defense 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

April 26,191 

Presentation of Force Structure Plan and 

Department of Defense Methodology 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

May 10,191 

Presentation on Land Value, Environment, 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

Recommendations 

and Economic Impact 

'0-4 APPENDIX 0 
May 17,1991 

Presentation of GAO Report on the Department 

of Defense Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

May 21-22,1991 

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility 

215 Dirksen Senate Office Building 

June 5,1991 

Testimony on the Army Corps of Engineers 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building 

June 67,1991 

Commission Deliberations 

Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington, D.C. 

June 13-14,1991 

Commission Deliberations 

General Services Administration Building 

Washington, D.C. 

Closures and Realignments 

June 27,28,30,1991 

Commission Deliberations 

2167 Rayburn House Office Building 

1100 Longworth House Office Building 

Regional Hearings 

May 6-7, 1991 

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing 

California Palace of the Legion of Honor 

Mays, 1991 

Los Angeles, California, Regional Hearing 

California Museum of Science and History 

May 13,1991 

Denver, Colorado, Regional hearing 

Denver Auditorium 

Kinsey Auditorium 

May 14,1991 

Fort Worth, Texas, Regional Hearing 

Will Rogers Memorial Center 

Jacksonville, Florida, Regional Hearing 

Prime F. Osborn Convention Center 

May 23,1991 

May 24,1991 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Regional Hearing 

Philadelphia Civic Center 

May 28,1991 

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing 

State House, Gardner Auditorium 

May 30,1991 

Indianapolis, Indiana, Regional Hearing 

Indianapolis Convention Center 

June 17,1991 

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing 

Marine Corps Recruit Depot 

June 17,1991 

Washington, D.C., Regional Hearing 

334 Cannon House Office Building 

June 18,1991 

San Angelo, Texas, Regional Hearing 

San Angelo Civic Auditorium 

June 20,1991 

Regional Hearing 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York 

June 21,1991 

Regional Hearing 

Teniple Theatre, Meridian, Mississippi 

June 21,1991 

Regional Hearing 

Kingsville Naval Air Station, Texas 

HEARINGS HELD BY THE COMMISSION 0 - 5 
APPENDIX P 

COMMISSIONER AND STAFF 

BASE VISITS 

1-95!? Commission 

206 Militay Activities Visited 

ARMY 

Fort Greely, AK 

Fort Wainwright, AK 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Redstone Arsenal, AL 

Space and Strategic Defense Command, AL 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

East Fort Baker, CA 

Fort Hunter Liggett, CA 

Oakland Army Base, CA 

Sierra Army Depot, CA 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO 

Fort Carson, CO 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT 

Price Support Center, IL 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL 

Publication Distribution Center, Baltimore, MD 

Concepts and Analysis Agency, MD 

Fort Holabird, MI) 

Fort Mesde. MI) 

Fort Ritchie, MD 

Detroit Arsenal, MI 

Selfridge Army Garrison, MI 

Aviation-Troop Command, MO 

Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

Publication Distribution Center, St. Louis, MO 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ 

Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center, NJ 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Fort Drum, NY 

Fort Hamilton, NY 

Fort Totten, NY 

Seneca Army Depot, NY 

Watervliet Army Arsenal, NY 

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK 

Fort Indiantown Gap, PA 

Kelly Support Center, PA 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA 

Fort Buchanan, PR 

Fort Bliss, TX 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Dugway Proving Ground, UT 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort Pickett, VA 

Information Systems Software Center, VA 

NAVY 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Engineering Field Activity West, CA 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, 

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA 

Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance 

Naval Health Research Center, CA 

Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance 

Engineering, West Coast Division, San Diego, CA 

Naby Personnel R&D Center, CA 

Naval Postgraduate School, CA 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA 

Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme, CA 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London, CT 

Submarine Base New London, CT 

Washington Navy Yard, DC 

Defense Contractor Management Command South, 

Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 

Fleet & Industrial Supply Center, Guam 

Naval Activities, Guam 

Naval Air Station Agana, Guam 

Ship Repair Facility, Guam 

Naval Magazine Lualualei, HI 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

China Lake, CA 

Point Mugu, CA 

Center San Diego, CA 

Center, In-Service 

Repair, San Francisco, CA 

Marietta, GA 

Indianapolis, IN 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Medical Research Institute, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division 

St. Inigoes Naval Command, Control, and Ocean 

Naval Air Station New Brunswick, ME 

Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Lakehurst, NJ 

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility 

Naval Air Warfare Center Warminster, PA 

Naval Command, Control & Ocean Surveillance 

Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, 

Warminster, PA 

Detachment, Philadelphia, PA 

Oreland, PA 

Crane, IN 

Detachment, Louisville, KY 

Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Patuxent River, MD 

Surveillance Center, MD 

Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division 

Naval Air Warfare Center Open Water Test Facility 

Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, PR 

Naval Education and Training Center Newport, RI 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport, RI 

Weapon Station Charleston, SC 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, 'IX 

Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, VA 

Office of Naval Research Arlington, VA 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, 

AIR FORCE 

Luke Air Force Base, AZ 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station, CA 

Onizuka Air Station, CA 

Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA 

Arlington, VA 

Falcon Air Force Base, CO 

Peterson Air Force Base, CO 

Eglin Air Force Base, FL 

Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Patrick Air Force Base, FL 

Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, GA 

Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station, IL 

Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station, MN 

Columbus Air Force Base, MS 

Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

Minot Air Force Base, ND 

Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 

Griffiis Air Force Base/Rome Laboratory, NY 

Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station, NY 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor 

Springfield-Beckley Municipal wort Air Guard 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 

Youngstown-Warren Municipal Airport Air 

Reserve Station, OH 

Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, OK 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Vance Air Force Base, OK 

Greater Pittsburgh International Airport Air 

Reserve Station, PA 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX 

Brooks Air Force Base, TX 

Carswell Air Reserve Station, TX 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Lackland Air Force Base, TX 

Laughlin Air Force Base, TX 

Keese Air Force Base, TX 

San Antonio Air Logistics Center, TX 

Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT 

General Mitchell International Anport Air Reserve 

Activity Buffalo, NY 

Station, OH 

Station, WI 

DEFENSE AGENCIES 

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL 

Defense Contract Management District West, El 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA 

Defense Contract Management District South, 

Segundo, CA 

Marietta, GA 

P-2 APPENDIX P 
Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA 

Defense Investigative Service, Investigations 

Control and Automation Directorate, 

Fort Holabird. MD 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA 

Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Hill, UT 

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT 

ASSESSMENT OF REUSE ACTIVITIES 

Mather Air Force Base, CA 

Sacramento Army Depot, CA 

Charleston Naval Base Complex, SC 

COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BASE VISITS P-3 
1993 Commission 

138 Milita y Activities Visited 

ARMY 

Anniston Army Depot, AL 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Huachuca, A2 

University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 

Presidio of Monterey, CA 

Presidio of Monterey Annex/Fort Ord, CA 

Fort Gillem, GA 

Fort McPherson, GA 

Fort Leonard Wood, MO 

Fort Monmouth, NJ 

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA 

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA 

Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA 

Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX 

Red River Army Depot, TX 

Tooele Army Depot, UT 

Fort Lee, VA 

Fort Monroe, VA 

Vint I-IiII Farms, VA 

NAVY 

Naval Station Mobile, AL 

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure 

Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA 

Naval Air Station Alameda, CA 

Naval Air Station Miramar, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA 

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, 

Naval Hospital Oakland, CA 

Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA 

Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA 

Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA 

Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations 

(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA 

Public Works Center San Francisco, CA 

Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT 

Submarine Base New London, CT 

Island, San Francisco, CA 

Palms, CA 

San Diego, CA 

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL 

Naval Hospital Orlando, FL 

Naval Station Mayport, FL 

Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA 

Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 

Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA 

Naval Air Station Glenview, IL 

Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL 

Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA 

Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI 

Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center St. 

Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center - Carderock, 

Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 

White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, ME 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS 

Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA 

Ships Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, PA 

Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI 

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC 

Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC 

Naval Shipyard Charleston, SC 

CharlestonNaval Station, SC 

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN 

Naval Hospital Millington, TN 

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX 

Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX 

Naval Station Ingleside, TX 

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA 

Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA 

Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center 

Norfolk Naval Shipyard, VA 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk 

Detachment, Norfolk, VA 

Naval Station Everett, WA 

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, WA 

Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV 

Patuxent River, MD 

Inigoes, MD 

Trenton, NJ 

Portsmouth, VA 

P-4 APPENDIX P 
AIR FORCE 

March Air Force Base, CA 

McClellan Air Force Base, CA 

Travis Air Force Base, CA 

Homestead Air Force Base, FL 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA 

Greater Rockford Airport, Rockford, IL 

O’Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve 

K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 

McGuire Air Force Base, NJ 

Griffiss Air Force Base, NY 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY 

Gentile Air Force Station, OH 

Newark Air Force Base, OH 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH 

Tinker Air Force Base, OK 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

Kelly Air Force Base, TX 

Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT 

Fairchild Air Force Base, WA 

Station, Chicago, IL 

DEFENSE INFORMATION 

SYSTEMS AGENCY 

7th Communications Group, Pentagon, 

Washington, DC 

Regional Processing Center, Robins Air Force 

Base, GA 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Cleveland Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Defense Information Technology Services 

Organization, Columbus Information 

Processing Center, OH 

Base, OK 

Chambersburg, PA 

Regional Processing Center, Tinker Air Force 

Army Information Processing Center, 

Computer Services Center, San Antonio, TX 

Regional Processing Center, Kelly Air Force 

Base, TX 

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan Air 

Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA 

Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL 

Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA 

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA 

Defense Contract Management District Northeast, 

Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, MI 

Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service, 

Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC 

Defense Construction Supply Center, 

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH 

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA 

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, 

Defense Personnel Support Center, 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX 

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA 

Force Base, CA 

Boston, MA 

Battle Creek, MI 

Columbus, OH 

Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia, PA 

COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BASE VISITS P-5 
1991 Commission 

4 7 Military Activities Visited 

ARMY 

Fort McClellan, AL 

Fort Chaffee, AR 

Fort Ord, CA 

Sacramento Army Depot, CA 

Rock Island Arsenal, IL 

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 

Fort Devens, MA 

Fort Dix, NJ 

Tobyhdnna Army Depot, PA 

NAVY 

Hunters Point Annex, CA 

Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA 

Marine Corps Recruit Depot, 

Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA 

Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA 

Naval Station Long Beach, CA 

Naval Training Center San Diego, CA 

Naval Underwater System Ctr, New London, CT 

Naval Training Center Orlando, FL 

Naval Station Staten Island, NY 

Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA 

Naval Station Philadelphia, PA 

Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA 

Naval Electronic System Engineering Center, 

Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX 

Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX 

Naval Air Station Meridian, MS 

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA 

Naval Station Sand Point, WA 

San Diego, CA 

Charleston, SC 

AIR FORCE 

Eaker Air Force Base, AR 

Williams Air Force Base, AZ 

Castle Air Force Base, CA 

Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA 

Lowry Air Force Base, CO 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

Moody Air Force Base, GA 

Grissom Air Force Base, IN 

England Air Force Base, LA 

bring Air Force Base, ME 

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI 

Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO 

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, MI 

Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH 

Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC 

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX 

Carswell Air Force Base, TX 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX 

P-6 APPENDIX P 
APPENDIX Q 

CO~ISSIONER 

BIOGRAPHIES 

ALAN J. DMON was confirmed by the US. Senate 

on October 7, 1994, as chairman of the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Commission. 

Dixon, 67, is a senior partner in the corporate and 

business department of the St. Louis-based law 

firm of Bryan Cave, which he joined in 1993 after 

representing Illinois in the U.S. Senate for 12 

years. During his Senate career, Dixon was unanimously elected by his colleagues to be majority 

chief deputy whip. In addition, he held important 

positions on the committees on Armed Services, 

Small Business, and Banking, Housing and Urban 

Affairs. On the Armed Services Committee, he 

chaired the Subcommittee on Readiness, Preparedness, and Sustainability, which oversees 38 

percent of the U.S. defense budget. In 1990, he 

co-authored the legislation that created the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Dixon is a graduate of the University of 

Illinois and holds a law degree from Washington 

University in St. Louis, Missouri. 

ALTON W. CORNELLA is the President of 

Cornella Refrigeration Inc., a Rapid City, South 

Dakota firm specializing in commercial and industrial refrigeration. He is a U.S. Navy veteran with 

service in Vietnam and has been active in military 

issues for over a decade. Cornella has also served 

on a number of boards and commissions in South 

Dakota, including the Rapid City Chamber of 

Commerce. During his tenure with the Chamber, 

he served as Chairman of the Board of Directors 

from 1991-1992 and as Chairman of the Military 

Affairs Committee. In 1992, Mr. Cornella was appointed by former South Dakota Governor George 

Mickelson to serve on the State Commission on 

Hazardous Waste Disposal. Mr. Cornella currently 

serves on the boards of the South Dakota Air and 

Space Foundation and the Rapid City Economic 

Development Loan Fund. 

REBECCA G. COX is currently a Vice President of 

Continental Airlines, Inc. She joined Continental in 

January, 1989. In 1993, she served as a Commissioner on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Before joining Continental, Ms. 

Cox served as Assistant to the President and 

Director of the Office of Public Liaison, President 

Reagan’s primary outreach effort to the private 

sector. She was also appointed by the President to 

serve as Chairman of the Interagency Committee 

for Women’s Business Enterprise. Prior to her 

1987 White House appointment, Ms. Cox had 

served as Assistant Secretary for Governmental 

Affairs at the Department of Transportation. Ms. 

Cox had previously served at the Department of 

Transportation as Counselor to Secretary Elizabeth 

Dole and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Government Affairs. Before coming to the Department 

of Transportation, Ms. Cox worked in the US. 

Senate, first as staff assistant, then legislative 

assistant and, finally, as Chief of Staff to Senator 

Ted Stevens. In 1976, she received a B.A. degree 

from Depauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, 

and a Juris Doctorate degree from the Columbus 

School of Law, Catholic University, Washington, 

D.C., in 1981. 

GENERAL JAMES B. DAVIS, USAF (Ret.) concluded a thirty-five year career with the United 

States Air Force as a combat fighter pilot, commander and strategic planner and programmer in 

August of 1993. General Davis has had numerous 

command positions during his career, including 

command of a Combat Fighter Wing and the U.S. 

Air Force Military Personnel Center. He was also 

the Commander of U.S. Forces, Japan, 5th Air 

Force and Pacific Air Forces while in Japan. His 

last military position was as the Chief of Staff 

Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (NATO). His 

military awards include the Defense Distinguished 
Service Medal, Air Force Distinguished Service 

Medal, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, 

Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, 

Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 10 oak 

leaf clusters, Vietnam Service Medal with silver 

service star, Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross 

with Palm, Order of National Security Merit, 

Gouges Medal-South Korea, Grand Cordon of 

the Order of the Sacred Treasure-Japan, Award 

of Knight Grand Cross with Sash-Thailand, and 

the Order of the Sword, which is the highest 

honor noncommissioned officers can bestow. 

General Davis has a B.S. degree in Engineering 

from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Masters degree in 

Public Administration from Auburn University at 

Montgomery, and has attended multiple professional schools. 

S. LEE KLING of St. Louis, Missouri, serves as 

Chairman of the Board of Kling Rechter 8r Company, a merchant banking firm formed in 1991. 

Additionally, he serves as a Special Advisor and 

Managing Director of Willis Corroon Corp. of Missouri. From 1974 to 1977, Mr. fling served as 

Finance Chairman of the Democratic National 

Committee and a member of its Executive Committee. In 1976, he was Treasurer of the Democratic National Convention. He served as National 

Treasurer of the Carter-Mondale Election Committee, and in 1987-88 Mr. Kling served as National 

Treasurer of the Gephardt for President Committee. Mr. Kling serves on the boards of a number of 

public and private corporations and civic and 

charitable organizations. He attended New York 

Military Academy, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New 

York, and received his B.S.B.A. degree from 

Washington University in St. Louis. From 1950 to 

1952, he served in the Army as a 1st Lieutenant 

and aide-de-camp to General Buy 0. Kurtz. 

REAR ADMIRAL BED@IMIN F. MONTOYA, CEC, 

USN (Ret.), is currently the President and Chief 

Executive Officer of Public Service Company of 

New Mexico, an investor-owned public utility 

serving gas, electricity, and water throughout 

the state. His private-sector career, which began in 

1989 when he retired from the Navy, has included 

the positions of Manager, Vice President, and 

Senior Vice President of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco. Admiral Montoya 

enjoyed a distinguished and decorated US. Navy 

career spanning 31 years, rising to the rank of 

Rear Admiral. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, 

Bronze Star Medal with Combat “V,“ Meritorious 

Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, and 

the Navy Achievement Medal. Admiral Montoya is 

a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He also 

holds a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a 

Master of Science degree in sanitary engineering 

from Georgia Institute of Technology, and a law 

degree from Georgetown University Law School. 

MAJOR GENERAL JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR., 

USA (Ret.), is Senior Vice President, Chief Financial OfficerKorpomte Controller for USAA Financial Services. He directs USAA’s activities in the 

areas of Payroll and Compensation Accounting, 

Accounting Policy, Corpomte Financial Analysis, 

Internal Audit and Taxes. He joined USAA in July 

1994 as Special Assistant to the Chairman after 

retiring from the U.S. Army as a Major General 

after 28 years of service. He received a Bachelor 

of Business Administration degree in Accounting 

from Kent State University in 1972. He also holds 

a Master of Business Administration from Indiana 

State University. General Robles served in a variety of important command and staff positions, culminating in his assignment as Commanding 

General, 1st Infantry Division (Mech) at Fort Riley, 

Kansas. General Robles’ military awards include 

the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf 

Cluster, the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf 

Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf 

Cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak 

Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Good 

Conduct Medal, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge. 

WEND1 L STEELE served as the Senate liaison for 

the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991. She began her career in the 

Reagan Administration, working in the legislative 

affairs offices of both the Office of Management 

and Budget and the White House. Following her 

service in Washington, Mrs. Steele was a congressional and economic analyst for the Defense and 

Space Group of the Boeing Company in Seattle, 

Washington. She returned to D.C. during the Bush 

Administration and worked for the assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs of 

the U.S. Department of Commerce. In 1993, she 

served on the staff of Senator Don Nickles and 

handled issues in the areas of defense, veterans’ 

affairs, foreign policy, and trade. 

Q-2 APPENDIX Q 
APPENDIX R 

COMMISSION STAFF 

David S. Lyles 

Stu f Directo r 

Charles C. Smith, Jr. 

Executive Director/Special Assistant to the Chairman 

Col. Wayne Purser, USAF' 

Milita ry Assistant 

Benton L. Borden 

Director of Reuieul and Analysis 

Edward A. Brown 111 

S. Alexander Yellin 

Francis A. Cirillo, Jr. 

Robert Cook 

James L. Owsley 

Army Team Leader 

Navy Team Leader 

Air Force Team Leader 

hiteragency Issues Team Leader 

Cross Service Team Leader 

Madelyn R. Creedon 

Wade Nelson 

Christopher J. Goode 

CeCe Carman 

General Counsel 

Director of Com 111 iinicat io ns 

Director of Administration 

Director of Congressional & 

Intergovernmental Afairs 

Director of hzformation Service5 

Executive Secretariat 

James K. Phillips 

Jeffrey A. Campbell 

PROFESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 

Stephen M. Ackerman 

Air Force Analyst 

Bond H. Almand 

Executive Secretariat Assistant 

Ziba A. Ayeen 

Travel & Advance Assistant 

LTC Stephen L. Bailey, USA' 

Senior Army Analyst 

Lt Col Merrill L. Reyer 111, IJSAF' 

Senior Air Force Analyst 

Lt Col Robert L. Rivins, IJSAF' 

Interagency Issues-Senior COBRA '4nalyst 

Britta A. Urackney 

Senior Iixecutiw Assistant to the Chairman 

Rick Brown 

Senior Army Analyst 

LtCol James K. Brubaker, USMC' 

Senior Navy Analyst 

Francis X. Cantwell 

Senior Air Force Analyst 

M. Melissa Chalfdnt 

Cristin Ciccone 

Richard A. DiCamillo' 

John 1. Earnhardt 

J. Kent Eckles 

David S. Epstein' 

Lester C. Farrington' 

Jon E. "Ed" Flippen' 

Antonia E. Forkin 

David Fuchs 

Trauel & Advance Assistant 

Congressional Assistant 

Senior Air Force Aizalyst 

Assistant Communications Director 

Travel & Advance Assistant 

Senior Navy Analyst 

Senior Cross Service Analyst 

Interagency Issue+Senior Airspace Aiialyst 

Executive Secretariat Assistant 

Inforniation Systems 
Ray Geller 

Travel &Advance Assistant 

J.J. Gertler 

Senior Army Analyst 

Robert G. Gibson 

Travel &Advance Assistant 

Clark Gyure 

Travel &Advance Assistant 

Craig A. Hall' 

Senior Air Force Analyst 

Paul R. Hegarty 

Travel & Advance Assistant 

Dick Helmer2 

Senior Cross Seruice Analyst 

David K. Henry3 

Interagency IssuesSenior Economic Analyst 

Lawrence Burton Jackson 

Senior Nazy Analyst 

Ralph A. Kaiser 

Counsel 

Brian Kerns 

Cross Seruice Analyst 

Michael Kennedy' 

Senior Amy Analyst 

Shelley F. Kestner 

Director of Travel &Advance 

Elizabeth L. King 

Counsel 

M. Glenn Knoepfle' 

Senior Cross Sauice Analyst 

Robert L. Kress, Jr. 

Review &Analysis Executive Analyst 

James A. Landrith 

Nu y Associate Analyst 

David L. Lewis? 

Senior Amy Analyst 

Tyrone Ligon 

Interagency Issues-Geograpb ical 

Information Specialist 

LCDR Eric J. Lindenbaum, USN' 

Senior Na y Analyst 

LTC Robert M. Miller, USA' 

Senior Army Analyst 

Jeffrey L. Mulliner 

Senior Na y Analyst 

Deirdre M. NurreJ 

Interagency Issues-Senior 

Environmental Analpt 

David L. Olson 

Senior Air Force Analyst 

Charles L. Pizer 

Deputy Communications Director 

Mark A. Pross2 

Senior Air Force Analyst 

Doyle L. Reedy' 

Senior Na y Analyst 

Ann P. Reex' 

Senior Cross Seruice Analyst 

Jim Schufreider 

House Liaison 

Amy Smith 

Staf Assistant 

Walton Northington Smith 111 

Executive Secretariat Assistant 

Christina D. Still 

Executive Assistant to the General Counsel 

Paul A. Stilp 

Chief PmonneUFinancial Officer 

Sylvia Davis Thompson 

Manager Reuse Liaison 

Ty Tripper 

Interagency IssuesAnalyst 

Althnett Turner 

Senior StaffAssistant 

Joseph T. Varallo, Jr. 

Cross Seruice Analyst 

Marilyn K. Waslesk? 

Interagency Issues-Senior Defense 

Agency Analyst 

Howard L. "Chip" Walgren 

State &Local Liaison 

Robert R. Wilson6 

Interagency IssuesSenior Economic Analyst 

Wm Clifford Wooten 

Army Analyst 

1 Detailee from Department of Defense 

2 Detailee from General Accounting Ofke 

3 Detailee from Department of Commerce 

4 Drtailee from Environmental Protection Agency 

5 Detailee from Federal Aviation Adminiswation 

6 Detailee from Federal Emergency Management Agency 

R-2 APPENDIX R 
INDEX 

BY BASE 

A 

Air Force Electronic Warfare 

Evaluation Simulator Activity, 

Fort Worth, Texas ................................ 105 

Air Logistics Centers ................................... 11 1 

B 

Aviation-Troop Command, Missouri ............ 20 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, 

New Jersey ............................................. 22 

Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York ........ 25 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas ............ 105 

Big Coppett Key, Florida .............................. 11 

Lompoc, California ................................. .5 

Branch [J.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 

Brooks Air Force Base, Texas ..................... 106 

C 

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey ............................ 23 

Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey .................. 23 

Camp Bonneville, Washington ..................... 37 

Caven Point Army Reserve Center, 

Chicago O'Hare LAP Air Reserve 

Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland ........... 13 

New Jersey ............................................. 24 

Station, Illinois ....................................... 94 

D 

Defense Contract Management 

Command International (DCMCI), 

Dayton, Ohio ....................................... 116 

District South (DCMDS), 

Marietta, Georgia ................................. 1 15 

District West (DCMDW), 

El Segundo, California .......................... 1 14 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Columbus (DDCO), 

Columbus, Ohio ................................... 116 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Letterkenny (DDLP), 

Chambersburg, Pennsylvania .............. 1 17 

Defense Contract Management 

Defense Contract Management 

Defense Distribution Depot 

McClellan (DDMC), 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Memphis (DDMT), 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Red River (DDRT), 

Defense Distribution Depot 

Sacramento, California ......................... 1 14 

Memphis, Tennessee ........................... 1 19 

Ogden (DDOU), Ogden, Utah ............. 122 

Texarkana, Texas ................................. 1 2 1 

San Antonio, Texas .............................. 122 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania .................. 1 18 

Detroit Arsenal, Michigan ............................. 18 

Dugway Proving Ground, Utah ............ 

E 

East Fort Baker, California .............................. 5 

Eglin Air Force Base, Florida ......................... 90 

F 

San Antonio (DDST), 

Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Colorado ................................................. .9 

Charleston, South Carolina ................... .74 

Guam ..................................................... .53 

Oakland, California ................................ 39 

Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico ......................... 32 

Fort Dix, New Jersey .................................... 24 

Fort Holabird, Maryland ............................... 14 

Fort Chaffee, Arkansas .................................... 4 

Fort Greely, Alaska .......................................... 3 

Fort Hamilton, New York ............................. 25 

Fort Hunter Liggett, California ...................... .6 

Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania ............. 29 

Fort Lee, Virginia .......................................... 35 

Fort Meade, Maryland ................................... 14 

Fort Missoula, Montana .. ......................... 21 

Fort McClellan, Alabama.. ............................... 1 
Fort Pickett, Virginia ..................................... 36 

Fort Ritchie, Maryland .................................. 15 

G 

Fort Totten, New York ................................ .26 

Grand Forks Air Force Base, 

Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, 

GrWiss Air Force Base, New York 

Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 

North Dakota ....................................... 101 

Pennsylvania ........................................ 104 

485th Engineering Installation Group ... 97 

Aifiield Support for 10th Idantry 

(Light) Division ...................................... 98 

H 

Hill Air Force Base, Utah 

(Utah Test and Training Range) ........... 1 10 

Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts ............... 17 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) ........... 90 

726th Air Control Squadron .................. 92 

I 

Information Systems Software Center 

Investigations Control and Automation 

(ISSC), Virginia ....................................... 37 

Directorate, Fort Holabird, 

Baltimore, Maryland ............................. 125 

K 

Kelly Air Force Base, Texas ........................ 108 

Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania ............. 30 

Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico .......... 96 

L 

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania ....... 30 

Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado ................... 89 

M 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida .................... 93 

Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana ............ 95 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, 

California, and Marine Corps 

Air Station, Tustin, California ................ 40 

McClellan Air Force Base, California ............ 84 

Moffett Federal Airfield Air 

Guard Station, California ...................... .85 

N 

Naval Activities, Guam ................................. 54 

Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska .................... 39 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan ............ 66 

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam .................... 56 

Naval Air Station, Alameda, California ......... .4 1 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii ...... 58 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida ........... 49 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas ...... 74 

Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida ............ 50 

Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi ....... 66 

Massachusetts ....................................... .65 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ................... .69 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, 

Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Lakehurst, New Jersey ........................... 68 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, 

Pennsylvania ......................................... .7 1 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, 

Warminster, Pennsylvania .................... .70 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida ... .5 1 

Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ................... .7 1 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, 

New Orleans, Louisiana ........................ .6 1 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering West Coast Division, 

San Diego, California ............................. 42 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, RDT&E 

Division Detachment, 

Warminster, Pennsylvania .................... .72 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering Eest Coast Detachment, 

Norfolk, Virginia ................................... .75 

Naval Health Research Center, 

San Diego, California ............................. 43 

Naval Information Systems Management 

Center, Arlington, Virginia ................... .76 

Naval Management Systems Support 

Office, Chesapeake, Virginia ................ .76 

Naval Medical Research Institute, 

Bethesda, Maryland ................................ 61 

Naval Personnel Research and 

Development Center, 

San Diego, California ............................. 44 

Naval Recruiting Command, 

Washington, D.C .................................... 48 

Naval Recruiting District, 

San Diego, California ............................. 45 

Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater 

Sound Reference Detachment, 

Orlando, Florida ..................................... 5 I 

Indianapolis, Indiana ............................ .58 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

s-2 INDEX 
Naval Sea Systems Command, 

Naval Security Group Command 

Arlington, Virginia ................................ .77 

Detachment Potomac, 

Washington, DC ..................................... 48 

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California ....... 45 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania ................... .73 

Carderock Division Detachment, 

Annapolis, Maryland ............................. .62 

Dahlgren Division Detachment, 

White Oak, Maryland ............................. 64 

Crane Division Detachment, 

Louisville, Kentucky .............................. 59 

Naval Technical Training Center, 

Meridian, Mississippi ............................ .68 

Naval Training Centers 

(Orlando, Florida and San Diego, 

California) ............................................. .81 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Keyport, Washington.. .......................... .80 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Newport Division, New London 

Detachment, New London, 

Connecticut .......................................... .47 

Marine Corps Air Station, 

El Toro, California .................................. 40 

Marine Corps Air Station, 

Tustin, California .................................. .40 

Naval Air Facility, Addk, Alaska .................... 39 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, 

Training Center, Naval training 

Center, Orlando, Florida ........................ 52 

North Highlands Air Guard Station, 

California ............................................... .86 

0 

Oakland Army Base, California ....................... 6 

Office of Naval Research, 

Arlington, Virginia ................................ .78 

Onizuka Air Station, California .................... .87 

Ontario International Airport Air 

Guard Station, California ...................... .88 

P 

Price Support Center, Illinois ....................... 11 

Public Works Center, Guam ......................... 56 

Publications Distribution Center, 

Baltimore, Maryland ............................... 16 

R 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled 

Analyzer Processor Activity, 

Buffalo, New York ......... 

Recreation Center #2, North 

Red River Army Depot, Texas ...................... 33 

Reese Air Force Base, Texas .... 

Reserve Centers/Commands ... 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California .... .7 

Rome Laboratory, New York ........................ 99 

Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York 101 

S 

Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois .......... 12 

Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan .............. 19 

Seneca Army Depot, New Yo 

Sierra Army Depot, Californi 

Space and Naval Warfare Syst 

Command, Arlington, Virginia ............... 79 

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport 

Air Guard Station, Ohio 103 

Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut ... 10 

Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts.. .... 18 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, 

Ship Repair Facility, Guam ... 

Conversion and Repair, USN, 

Long Beach, California ........... 

T 

Tri-Service Project Reliance 

V 

(Fort Detrick, Maryland) ........................ 17 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance 

Support Activity, West Virginia ............. 38 

W 

Williams Air Force Base, Arizona .................. 83 

BY BASE s-3 
INDEX 

BY STATE 

Alabama 

Fort McClellan ................................................ 1 

Alaska 

Fort Greely ...................................................... 3 

Naval Air Facility, Adak ................................. 39 

Arizona 

Williams Air Force Base ................................ 83 

California 

Branch 1J.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc .... 5 

Defense Contract Management District 

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan 

East Fort Baker ................................................ 5 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Oakland ................................................. .39 

Fort Hunter Liggett ......................................... 6 

Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station.. . .85 

Marine Corps Air Station, El Tor0 ................ 40 

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin .................. 40 

McClellan Air Force Base .............................. 84 

Naval Air Station, Alameda ........................... 41 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering West Coast Division, 

San Diego ............................................... 42 

Naval Health Research Center, San Diego.. .. 43 

Naval Training Centers, San Diego ............... 81 

Naval Personnel Research and 

Development Center, San Diego ........... 44 

Naval Recruiting District, San Diego ........... .45 

Naval Shipyard, Long Beach ......................... 45 

Oakland Army Base ......................................... 6 

Onizuka Air Station ....................................... 87 

Ontario International Airport 

Air Guard Station ................................... 88 

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center ...................... 7 

Sierra Army Depot .......................................... 8 

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion 

and Repair, USN, Long Beach ................ 46 

West (DCMDW), El Segundo ............... 114 

(DDMC), Sacramento ........................... 1 14 

North Highlands Air Guard Station .............. 86 

Arkansas 

Fort Chaffee .................................................... 4 

Colorado 

Lowry Air Force Base .................................... 89 

Fitzsimons Army Medical Center .................... 9 

Connecticut 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 

Newport Division, New London 

Detachment, New London .................... 47 

Stratford Army Engine Plant ......................... 10 

District of Columbia 

Naval Recruiting Command.. ....................... .48 

Naval Security Group Command 

Detachment Potomac ............................ 48 

Florida 

Big Coppett Key ........................................... 11 

Eglin Air Force Base 90 

Homestead Air Force Base 

(30lst Rescue Squadron) ....................... 90 

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 

(726th Air Control Squadron) ................ 92 

MacDill Air Force Base .................................. 93 

Naval Air Station, Key West .......................... 50 

Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola .................. 5 1 

Naval Research Laboratory, 

...................................... 

Naval Air Station, Cecil Field ........................ 49 

Underwater Sound Reference 

Detachment, Orlando ............................ 5 1 

Naval Training Centers, Orlando ................. .8 1 

Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion 

Training Center, Naval training 

Center, Orlando ..................................... 52 

Georgia 

Defense Contract Management 

District South, Marietta ........................ 1 15 

Guam 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center ............... 53 

Naval Activities ............................................. 54 

Naval Air Station, Agana ............................... 56 

Public Works Center .................................... 56 
Ship Repair Facility ....................................... 57 

Hawaii 

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point ................... 58 

Illinois 

Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station ...... 94 

Price Support Center .................................... 11 

Savanna Army Depot Activity ....................... 12 

Indiana 

Naval Air Warfare Center. Aircraft 

Division. Indianapolis ............................ 58 

Kansas 

Naval Air Reserve Olathe .............................. 82 

Kentucky 

Naval Surface Warfare Center. Crane 

Division Detachment. Louisville ........... -59 

Louisiana 

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory. 

New Orleans (Region 10) ...................... 61 

Maryland 

Concepts Analysis Agency ............................ 13 

Investigations Control and Automation 

Directorate, Fort Holabird. Baltimore -125 

Fort Holabird ................................................ 14 

Fort Meade .................................................... 14 

Fort Ritchie ................................................... 15 

Naval Medical Research 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgrm 

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock 

Publications Distribution Center, 

Tri-Service Project Reliance 

Institute, Bethesda ................................. 61 

Division Detachment, White Oak .......... 64 

Division Detachment, Annapolis ........... 62 

Baltimore, Maryland ............................... 16 

(Fort Detrick, Maryland) ........................ 17 

Massachusetts 

Sudbury Training Annex ............................... 18 

Michigan 

Hingham Cohasset ........................................ 17 

Naval Air Station, South Weymouth ............. 65 

Detroit Arsenal .............................................. 18 

Naval Air Facility, Detroit ............................. 66 

Selfridge Army Garrison ............................... 19 

Mississippi 

Naval Air Station. Meridian ........................... 66 

Missouri 

Aviation-Troop Command ............................ 20 

Montana 

Fort Missoula ................................................. 21 

Malmstrom Air Force Base ............................ 95 

Naval Technical Training Center. Meridian . 68 

New Jersey 

Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal ................ 22 

Camp Pedricktown ....................................... 23 

Caven Point Army Reserve Center ............... 24 

Fort Dix ......................................................... 24 

Division, Lakehurst ................................ 68 

New Mexico 

Kirtland Air Force Base ................................. 96 

Camp Kilmer ................................................. 23 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

New York 

Bellmore Logistics Activity ........................... 25 

Fort Hamilton ................................................ 25 

Griffiss Air Force Base (485th Engineering 

Installation Group) ................................ 97 

Griffiss Air Force Base (Airfield Support 

for 10th Infantry [Light] Division) ......... 98 

Fort Totten .................................................... 26 

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer 

Processor Activity, Buffalo .................... -99 

Rome Laboratory .......................................... 99 

Roslyn Air Guard Station ............................ 101 

Seneca Army Depot ...................................... 27 

North Carolina 

North Dakota 

Grand Forks Air Force Base ........................ 101 

Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport .... 80 

Ohio 

Recreation Center #2, FayetteviUe ............... 28 

Defense Contract Management Command 

International (DCMCI), Dayton ........... 116 

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus ...... 116 

Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport 

Air Guard Station ................................. 103 

T-2 INDEX 
Pennsylvania 

Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, 

Defense Industrial Supply Center, 

Fort Indiantown Gap ........ 

Greater Pittsburgh LAP 

Air Reserve Station ..... 

Kelly Support Center .................................... 30 

Letterkenny Army Depot ....................... 

Naval Air Technical Services 

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft 

Naval Aviation Engineering Service 

Naval Air Warfare Center, 

Open Water Test Facility, Oreland ........ 71 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, RDTSrE 

Division Detachment, Warminster ....... .72 

Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, 

....................................... 73 

Chambersburg ................ 117 

..................................... 118 

Facility, Philadelphia ............................. .69 

Division, Warminster ........... ........ 70 

Unit, Philadelphia ..... ..................... 71 

Puerto Rice 

Fort Buchdnan ........ .......................... 32 

South Carolina 

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, 

Charleston ............................................. .74 

Tennessee 

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, 

Memphis .............................................. 1 19 

Texas 

Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation 

Simulator Activity, Fort Worth ............ 105 

Bergstrom Air Reserve Base ........................ 105 

Brooks Air Force Base ................................. lo6 

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, 

Texarkana ............................................ 1 2 1 

Defense Distribution Depot 

San Antonio, San Antonio .................... 122 

Kelly Air Force Base .................................... 108 

Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi .................. 74 

Reese Air Force Base .................................. 109 

Red River Army Depot .................................. 33 

Utah 

Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, 

Dugway Proving Ground .............................. 34 

Hill Air Force Base 

(Utah Test and Training Range). .......... 1 10 

Ogden ........................................... 

Virginia 

Fort Lee ......................................................... 35 

Fort Pickett ..................................... 

Information Systems Software Cent 

Naval Command, Control and Ocean 

Surveillance Center, In-Service 

Engineering Eest Coast Detachment, 

Norfolk ..................... 

Naval Information Systems Management 

Naval Management Systems Support 

Office, Chesapeake ................................ 76 

Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington ..... .77 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

........................ 75 

Center, Arlington .................................. .76 

Office of Naval Research, Arlington ............. 78 

Command, Arlington ........... ......... 79 

Washington 

Camp Bonneville .................................... 

West Virginia 

Valley Grove Area Maintenance 

Support Activity ..................................... 38 

BY STATE T-3