Balkan Returns - An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority Repatriation: Special Reports: Publications: U.S. Institute of Peace

 

Complete List of 

Institute Reports 

Release Date: 

21 December 

1999 

CONTENTS

Introduction

Refugee Returns 

in the Former 

Yugoslavia

Majority Returns 

and Minority Flights

Improving Security

The Way Forward: 

Security, 

Governance, 

Accountability

Appendices

USIP Library 

Resources

About the United 

States Institute of 

Peace

About the Report

SPECIAL REPORT 57

Balkan Returns 

An Overview of Refugee Returns and 

Minority Repatriation

A family in the Stenkovec I refugee camp. 

19 May 1999. (UN Photo #ESD247)

Briefly...

● In spite of the 

provisions 

spelled out in 

the peace 

agreements 

that concluded 

the Yugoslav 

wars, the 

number of 

minority 

returns 

throughout the 

former 

Yugoslavia is 

still low, 

indicating that there are considerable barriers to repatriation. The 

failure to draw refugees back to their towns and villages threatens the 

reconstruction of civic life, hinders the process of reconciliation and 

postpones the permanent conclusion of hostilities. 

● The return of minorities is a regional matter. Minorities often occupy 

houses that belong to others (e.g., in Republika Srpska and Sarajevo) 

and may strain resources in the places where they have taken refuge 

(e.g. in Republika Srpska, Montenegro, and Serbia). Minority returns 

will alleviate tensions in vulnerable states that cannot properly absorb 

refugees (e.g. Montenegro and Bosnia). 

● The most successful returns have taken place in regions where 

security is no longer a major issue. Removal of war criminals and 

paramilitary forces is a critical step toward increasing the number of 

minority returns. 

● Unresolved property rights issues are a second major impediment to 

minority returns. 

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● To promote minority returns, local leaders and the international 

community must work to improve governance and accountability. 

● Refugee resettlement cannot take place without reconstruction. In 

order to draw refugees back home, the international community must 

recognize the need for active reconstruction and development 

initiatives and act in a timely manner. 

● The situation in Kosovo is unique. Kosovo has witnessed massive 

"spontaneous returns" of the majority Kosovar Albanians, who have 

come back without the assistance of the international community. 

These returns are largely due to the removal of Yugoslav police and 

military units from the province.

Introduction

The return of refugees, especially minorities, is essential to the reconstruction 

of multiethnic existence and the permanent conclusion of hostilities between 

the republics and peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Returns also relieve a 

burden on host states, many of which cannot properly absorb newcomers. The 

degree to which refugee returns may alleviate tensions in vulnerable states, 

and states truly at risk of political and social unrest, such as Montenegro, is 

not to be underestimated. The issue of refugee repatriation thus takes on 

regional proportions since returns facilitate the reintegration of ethnic 

minorities and may prevent further conflict in neighboring areas.

Four major agreements that provide for freedom of movement and settlement 

spell out the legal basis for refugees to return. These include the Washington 

Agreement, which created the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia; the Erdut 

Agreement on Eastern Slavonia; the Dayton Accords; and the most recent, 

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo. While these texts identify the 

rights of citizens of the former Yugoslavia, they have yet to be fully 

implemented. Consequently, few refugees have taken the bold step of 

returning to regions from which they were expelled or fled in anticipation of 

conflict. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 

estimates that more than a million refugees have returned to the region as a 

whole. Around 600,000 refugees and internally displaced persons have 

returned to Bosnia and Croatia since 1995 and 760,000 Kosovars have 

returned to their homes since June 1999.

This report examines the reasons why refugees choose to return and the 

conditions that facilitate their repatriation. The following cases present a range 

of accounts, from Croatia, the most successful site of minority returns, to 

Bosnia and the FRY and Macedonia, where the situation is much bleaker and 

there are still considerable refugee problems. It emphasizes the importance of 

security and identifies practices, both administrative and political, that have 

impeded the return of refugees, especially minorities. In this context, the 

challenge for the international community is not only to improve physical 

security but to provide confidence in the process. This entails working to 

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eliminate the climate of fear produced during the war that was not immediately 

corrected by the postwar settlements in some republics, especially Croatia 

and Bosnia. Understandably, citizens who were ethnically cleansed are 

unlikely to return to their towns and villages while their attackers remain on the 

scene and pose the threat of further acts of terror. Providing security continues 

to be a daunting task for the international community, in spite of the significant 

troop deployment in Bosnia and Kosovo and the many rhetorical statements 

made by political leaders in the West. With this security problem in mind, this 

report also evaluates the role of the international institutions that have led the 

law enforcement efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and identifies mechanisms for 

their improvement.

Refugee Returns in the Former Yugoslavia

Croatia

While far from perfect, Croatia's record on securing the return of refugees, 

primarily to the Danube region, has improved. UNHCR credits the Croatian 

government's political will and "actions taken to create and support a receptive 

and positive environment for free and unhindered return." The Croatian 

government's Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees reports that since 

1991 approximately 27,000 Serb refugees have returned to other parts of 

Croatia from the Danube region, while nearly 40,000 displaced persons have 

returned to the Danube region. In addition, some 33,000 Croatian Serb 

refugees have returned from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal 

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Government estimates focus on the success of 

reintegrating minorities in the Danube region and put the number of Croatian 

Serbs who have returned at 25 per cent of the prewar population. Beyond the 

Danube region, the situation is normalizing and, according to UNHCR, 

Croatian Serbs have been returning from the FRY both in an organized 

manner and without the assistance of the international community. The fact 

that refugees have been returning in both an organized and spontaneous 

manner suggests that not only are the Croatian government and international 

community creating positive conditions for return, but refugees also feel that 

conditions are sufficiently safe for them to arrive on their own.

In spite of these positive developments, there are still considerable barriers to 

return and reconciliation. Few young Serbs have returned. UNHCR reports 

that more than 80 per cent of returnees are over sixty years old, which means 

that the prospects of sustaining a mixed community are low. For its part, the 

Croatian government's Commission on Return has been slow to act and has 

not communicated with the Return Coordination Committee and Housing 

Commission run by the international community to settle questions of 

restitution, alternative accommodation, property damage, etc. Decisions on 

illegal occupancy are not enforced. In addition, there are problems with the 

practice of clearing refugees to return. Often individual family members will 

receive clearance, while others who require medical treatment are not allowed 

to return and join their family members; there are even cases of war criminals 

having been cleared to return. Then, there are the bureaucratic problems: the 

state has been slow to issue permits and has yet to exempt refugees' personal 

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belongings from customs fees.

Unlike the situation in Bosnia, security is not a major problem, but isolated 

incidents still take place and include harassment of minorities. Many of these 

incidents are related to property disputes. It is discouraging to note that the 

Croatian government has allocated more resources to the reconstruction of 

homes for returning Croats than for returning Serbs. Over the next year, the 

increased tension in the FRY may unsettle the situation in the Danube region; 

there is a need for continued monitoring. There is also a need for more 

reconciliation efforts and the correction of Croatian voting laws that, in effect, 

disenfranchise Croatian Serbs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

During the war in Bosnia, over one million people were expelled or fled 

abroad. Bosnia's multiethnic tapestry was reconfigured after more than three 

years of war and ethnic cleansing. Since then, the problem of convincing 

refugees to return has been central to the Dayton Accords implementation 

effort. In addition, Bosnia has become a host state for thousands of refugees 

from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The Republika Srpska currently 

harbors thousands of Croatian Serbs who fled following Operation Storm -- the 

1995 Croatian Army offensive in the Krajina. In addition, Bosnia has received 

tens of thousands of refugees from Sandjak and Kosovo as a result of the 

1999 crisis. The Kosovo conflict also brought an additional 30,000 Serbs to 

the Republika Srpska. This number includes returning Bosnian Serb refugees 

and Croatian Serbs who arrived following a secondary displacement from the 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords identifies conditions conducive to the return of 

refugees and records the importance of minority returns to the future of 

Bosnia. The Annex outlines various interventions, including legislative reform, 

the provision of multisectoral assistance to areas that are prepared to promote 

returns, and other initiatives aimed at the sustainable reintegration of 

minorities. Specific efforts by the international community include: UNHCR 

Open Cities Initiative, which encourages municipalities to promote minority 

returns by rewarding cooperating towns with aid; the Reconstruction and 

Return Task Forces (RRTF), which work on the national, regional, and local 

levels and are part of the Office of the High Representative (OHR); the Return 

of Qualified Nationals program, organized by the International Labor 

Organization; the Return Framework Group which includes the UNHCR and 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Missions in both 

Bosnia and Croatia; the Returnee and Displaced Persons Framework, which 

is designed to share agency resources in investigating and pressing returnrelated issues; and the Sarajevo Housing Commission, established to monitor 

the Sarajevo Declaration to increase the flow of minority returns to the capital. 

In addition, the UN agencies work with the World Bank to provide income 

generation grants, vocational training, and micro-credit loans to encourage 

returns and promote sustainable repatriation.

In spite of these provisions, few Bosnians have returned to areas where they 

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are a minority. The OSCE estimates that in 1998 over 140,000 returns took 

place of which some 35,000-40,000 were to minority areas. The low number of 

minority returns casts doubt on the policies and procedures established with 

the creation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Indeed, there is little confidence in 

the Dayton model, which has only compounded the ethnic polarization brought 

on by war. According to U.S. Information Agency data, in 1998 an 

overwhelming percentage of Bosnian Serbs (92 percent) and Croats (74 

percent) believed that Bosnia could not survive as a state and should be 

dismantled on ethnic lines so that the entities could join with their ethnic 

parents next door. Given this situation, it is understandable why many 

refugees would be discouraged from returning to areas where they would exist 

as members of a minority group and in communities that reject the ideal of 

multiethnicity.

The reason for so few returns is not however limited to a lack of confidence in 

the postwar settlement. To date, the international community's efforts have 

largely focused on the removal of barriers, but the sense of fear and distrust 

shared by most Bosnians persists. Where the international community has 

actively sought to protect minorities and secured the cooperation of local 

leaders, there has been some progress. The International Crisis Group has 

documented both the barriers and facilitating conditions for return in two towns 

that had been ethnically homogenized as a result of the expulsions and 

conflict between Muslims and Croats. It records that between 1996 and mid1998 some 1,000 Croats returned to Bugojno and 140 Bosniacs to ProzorRama, and argues that the repatriation of these few citizens was facilitated by 

the presence of effective RRTF structures.

In some cases, local leaders have permitted returns in exchange for economic 

concessions from the international community--concessions that bolster their 

political standing. For example, in Zvornik, the town in Republik Srpska that 

has seen the largest number of returns, 1,000 Bosnian Muslims returned to its 

outer villages. These returns came about only when the ruling Sloga coalition 

distanced itself from the nationalist Serb DemocraticParty (SDS). In light of 

this practice, and the few minority returns that have resulted from such 

pressure tactics, the High Representative for Bosnia issued a number of 

decisions to provide the authorities in both the Muslim-Croat Federation and 

Republika Srpska with detailed instructions on the correct implementation of 

property laws. On October 27, 1999, the High Representative instructed the 

cantonal, municipal, and city authorities in both entities to establish functioning 

and efficient Housing Offices, free from political manipulation.

The following problems still prevent the return of minorities.

● lack of political will and commitment by the local authorities and the 

international community to the idea of returns; 

● continued threats to the safety of returnees by members of the ethnic 

majority; 

● intimidation, harassment, or inaction by the local police, officials, or the 

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judiciary, which may lead to evictions, fines, and other disincentives to 

return; 

● inadequate legal and administrative framework conducive to safe 

return, especially in the areas of citizenship and amnesty; 

● major difficulties in implementing key legislation, in particular property 

laws; 

● absence of an effective human rights protection regime; 

● refusal by local authorities to issue ID cards to returning refugees so 

that they can claim benefits, including pensions; 

● ethnicity-based discrimination in employment; 

● levying of illegal war taxes at the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 

and 

● levying of residency taxes. 

Serbia and Montenegro

The FRY now houses more refugees and IDPs than any of the neighboring 

republics. UNHCR estimates that there are 480,000 from the wars in Croatia 

and Bosnia, as well as an additional 240,000 from Kosovo. Many of the 

displaced have been subject to multiple migrations and expulsions within the 

FRY and are undeniably victims of President Slobodan Milosevic's 

unsuccessful wars. In 1999, tens of thousands of Serbian refugees from the 

Krajina, who had been settled in Kosovo following Operation Storm, were 

dispersed for a second time within Serbia proper, where they received a 

particularly unwelcome reception. Kosovo's Serbs, currently taking refuge in 

Serbia, are a reminder of Serbia's defeat in Kosovo. The refugees are 

considered an embarrassment in the FRY. They receive poor treatment, 

especially regarding social services, increasing the prospect of unrest. 

UNHCR estimates that no more than 20 per cent of the children of Kosovo 

Serb refugees are now enrolled in school.

While Montenegro has not seen fighting on its territory, it has become home to 

tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons of all ethnic 

backgrounds. The demographics of several towns in Montenegro have 

changed substantially, and this has added to the pressure faced on local 

authorities seeking to maintain control. For example, official Montenegrin 

sources claim that the populations in the city of Tivat and the towns around 

Bar consist of more than 25 per cent of refugees and IDPs. Although 

Montenegro has recently accepted refugees from Kosovo and Sandjak, 

Montenegrin authorities are concerned about the demographic shifts and 

would like to see the refugees return.

Macedonia

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While Macedonia has been able to avoid being drawn into conflict with its 

neighbors, it has not escaped the influx of 244,500 refugees, who arrived 

following the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99. According to UNHCR, 3,000 Roma 

arrived in Macedonia in August and an additional 15,000 are expected by 

December, 1999. This is in addition to the 20,000 Kosovars who remain.

Majority Returns and Minority Flight

Kosovo

There are now two immediate problems in Kosovo: 1) how to provide shelter 

to hundreds of thousands of Kosovars who are not minorities, but who have 

returned to their homeland as refugees; 2) how to protect the Serbian and 

other non-Albanian minorities who are under threat from vengeful Kosovars.

Just ninety days after the conclusion of fighting, some 800,000 Kosovar 

Albanians had returned home. At the peak of repatriation, 50,000 were 

returning each day, before the international community could set up its 

operations, clear landmines, and deliver critical supplies. At first sight, Pristina 

appears to offer the trappings of "normal life." Cafes and shops are full; people 

gather in the streets and marketplaces. However, these images do not reflect 

the reality of daily existence in Kosovo and mask the great challenge facing 

hundreds of thousands of Kosovars: the race against winter and the struggle 

for tolerance in the recently liberated province.

In the aftermath of Milosevic's campaign in Kosovo, over 100,000 homes are 

seriously damaged and 50,000 are uninhabitable. An extensive survey 

conducted by humanitarian agencies in Kosovo estimated damage in 

categories ranging from one--not damaged--to five, which translates to no roof 

and structural damage to remaining walls. The UNHCR estimates that up to 

350,000 people will need alternative accommodation as winter approaches. It 

should be noted that the damage is not comprehensive but dispersed through 

the province. Some districts in cities like Pec and the Old Town of Djakovica 

were almost completely destroyed as a result of shelling, tank fire, grenades, 

gas explosions, and fire. Others, including Pristina and Prizren, suffered 

limited structural damage even though vandalism and looting were prevalent. 

In addition to the damage to housing, thousands of wells were contaminated, 

affecting hundreds of thousands of Kosovars who live in rural areas.

In light of this situation, the provision of shelter and proper winterization 

remains the major preoccupation for the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo 

(UNMIK) and the international community in Kosovo. Expectations are high 

among the local population and international media about the speed of the 

reconstruction process, but humanitarian agencies on the ground note that 

there is not sufficient time for a major rebuilding program before winter sets in. 

Consequently, UNHCR and other agencies are setting up temporary shelters 

and supporting host families. The reconnection of electricity is crucial to get 

people through the winter. Even though a British energy consortium has been 

contracted to repair Kosovo's energy sector, alternative fuel systems will be 

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necessary. Some humanitarian agencies argue that the strategy for shelter 

was not adequately prepared. It was not until June that the main humanitarian 

agencies understood the scope of the emergency--shelter needed for nearly 

one million refugees. At the time of writing, the United Nations and its 

implementing agencies have been working to place Kosovar refugees in a 

combination of all-weather tents and basic shelters.

In addition to the material destruction, lawlessness and violence against 

minority groups have accompanied the end of the Kosovo crisis. In spite of 

KFOR's efforts and achievements, the security situation within Kosovo 

remains precarious. Revenge attacks, murders, abductions and other acts of 

violence continue with remarkable frequency. Returning refugees, angered by 

mass killings and expulsions conducted by Milosevic's forces, have sought 

retribution for the crimes of the Yugoslav regime by attacking individual 

Kosovar Serbs. The Serbian Orthodox Church reports that over 350 Serbs 

have been killed since the end of the war, and more than 450 have been 

abducted. On top of this, churches and other religious sites have been 

attacked, increasing the tension between the two main ethnic communities. 

These attacks have precipitated a new refugee exodus and left thousands of 

elderly Serbs without effective community support in Kosovo while their 

houses were looted, occupied, and often burned. Most distressing is that in 

some cases, children unconstrained by their elders have been the 

perpetrators. The Albanian leadership has not yet sufficiently pressured its 

citizens to resist committing acts of revenge and lawlessness.

Property questions are central to the issue of minority returns in Kosovo. It is 

unclear who owns major production facilities as well as many apartments. It 

may take years to answer these questions. How they are settled in the interim 

will affect economic development, demographic patterns, and political 

relations among Kosovo's ethnic groups.

Improving Security

Security is the primary determining factor influencing minority returns. As the 

above report from Croatia demonstrates, where the situation is secure, 

refugees will return, even to areas under the control of different ethnic groups. 

However, the international military's role in the protection of refugees has been 

mixed. Institutions such as SFOR and KFOR have only been indirectly 

involved in the return of refugees in Bosnia and Kosovo. They have relied on 

patrols and an increased presence to promote security, but overall they have 

refused to implement critical provisions of the Dayton and Kosovo agreements 

regarding security. SFOR has not arrested the most prominent indicted war 

criminals, including Radovan Karadzic, and instead has promoted a "soft 

approach" to refugee returns based on improved public relations and the use 

of targeted aid. SFOR has tried to increase contacts with village heads and 

cantonal leaders to encourage a more positive atmosphere conducive to 

returns within Bosnia and has channeled foreign aid through commanders on 

the ground. The military's efforts have been linked to the "Open Cities" 

initiatives, where funds are used to repair schools, build health clinics, and 

rehabilitate community structures.

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The role of police training is a complicated matter. Training has been 

entrusted to the United Nations, which is responsible for the International 

Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and the International Police Force (IPF) in 

Kosovo. U.S. participation in the police program is coordinated by the U.S. 

Department of Justice, which organizes training of local police, and the State 

Department, which is responsible for recruiting the U.S. contingents of the 

IPTF and IPF and interfacing with the United Nations. Since there was initially 

no indigenous police force in Kosovo, the United Nations employed the IPF to 

implement a modified version of Yugoslav law until a police force is 

established. Through the OSCE, U.S. Department of Justice officials have 

recently begun training officers of the new Kosovo Police Service and have 

created a new police academy in Kosovo. The aim is to create an effective 

multiethnic police force that will protect minorities. In October, the first class of 

the Kosovo Police Service graduated from the new police academy.

In spite of the presence of the military and various peace-implementing 

agencies, considerable problems resulting from insufficient security 

arrangements still exist. In Bosnia, citizens distrust the repatriation process 

and are wary of returning to regions under the control of ethnic purists. In 

Kosovo, KFOR has been unable to address the latest violence directed 

against Serbian individuals and has yet to stabilize the situation. In response 

to the violence, the military has argued that it is not trained to deal with 

refugee returns and is hesitant to broaden its mission. For their part, the 

civilian agencies overseeing the IPF, which will consist of 3,000 armed 

members with full executive authority, have yet to use their enforcement 

capacity to deter further acts of violence with any degree of success. The 

IPF's incomplete deployment, in addition to the multiple levels of bureaucracy 

between the UN, UNMIK, OSCE, and KFOR, has frustrated the task of 

improving security and rooting out lawlessness in Kosovo.

The Way Forward: Security, Governance, Accountability

The task for the international community and the local authorities in the 

Yugoslav republics is threefold. To promote minority returns, they must work 

to improve security, governance, and accountability. The most significant effort 

the international community could undertake to improve security and promote 

minority returns is the arrest of people indicted for war crimes. Radovan 

Karadzic must be tried at The Hague and, if convicted, permanently removed 

from Bosnian life if the politics of ethnic purity and the seeds of the last war 

are to be finally laid to rest and some reconciliation found for Bosnia's citizens. 

The inherently corrupt political and economic systems that Karadzic continues 

to administer at the local level prevent citizens from participating in any form of 

democratic political system.

In addition, the international community should:

● recognize that the returns are pivotal to the reconciliation process; 

● hold local leaders accountable for acts of vengeance within their 

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locality; 

● monitor the local police, officials, and the judiciary and insist that they 

implement the law to build citizens' confidence in the return process; 

● provide adequate legal and administrative frameworks for all citizens to 

exercise their rights equally; 

● implement key legislation, in particular property laws; and 

● criminalize discrimination used to deny minorities employment, social 

benefits, and settlement in certain areas. 

Finally, it is important to note that the international community must prepare in 

advance of conflicts if it is to be in a position to assist refugees and facilitate 

their eventual return. Experts record that the political backing for NATO's 

action in Kosovo was not matched by a commitment to support humanitarian 

and UN-implementing agencies working to rebuild civic institutions. While the 

situation in Kosovo is far better than that in Bosnia in terms of the immediate 

postwar physical infrastructure, it is important that Kosovo not fall victim to the 

practices that have prevented the prompt reconstruction of Bosnian life. 

Humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction are different services, 

and resettlement cannot take place without reconstruction. To draw refugees 

back home, the international community must recognize the need for active 

reconstruction and development initiatives and act in a timely manner.

Appendices

Country Profile of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro)

The situation of refugees and IDPs in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(FRY) has radically deteriorated during the first half of 1999. The population of 

concern to UNHCR as of 30 June 1999 was:

● 508,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 

● 770,000 returnees to Kosovo plus an estimated 500,000 affected 

"remainees" 

● 200,000 mostly Serb, Montenegrin and Roma IDPs from Kosovo in the 

rest of FRY 

● 7,700 mostly ethnic Albanian IDPs from Kosovo in Montenegro (down 

from a peak figure of 69,700) 

● 30 mandate refugees from countries outside former Yugoslavia

Source: UNHCR Country Profiles, World Map: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 

(Serbia and Montenegro), UNHCmR, September 1999 

http://www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/fryugo.htm

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OHR Press Release (excerpt)

A Comprehensive Strategy for a Just and Efficient Returns Process in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina

Sarajevo, 27 October 1999 • http://www.ohr.int/press/p991027a.htm

Today, the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, has issued Decisions 

that amend in both Entities the laws that deal with property rights, and provide 

instructions on their application.

These Decisions harmonize the RS legislation with the Federation legislation 

and thus create equal rights and remedies for all refugees and displaced 

persons across Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with Annex 7 of the 

Dayton Peace Agreement. The Decisions also provide the authorities in both 

Entities with detailed instructions on the application of the property and 

housing legislation, removing ambiguities in the laws and making them 

workable in practice.

Four years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, hundreds of thousands of 

refugees and displaced persons still do not have access to their apartments, 

houses, business premises and land. The implementation of the property and 

housing laws has not produced the desired results in either Entity. Today's 

Decisions create a consistent and fully applicable legal framework in the two 

Entities. It is now the duty of the authorities at all levels to provide their citizens 

with the service of governance to which they are entitled under every 

democratic and lawful administration, and to actively implement their rights to 

their homes and property. These rights are individual, fundamental and 

universal. They are enshrined in the Dayton Peace Agreement, the 

Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and many international declarations, 

such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which applies in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina.

Today's legislative reform package will allow both the leaders and the citizens 

of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take ownership of the democratization process 

in the field of return and property rights. It provides the authorities - the 

housing administrations and judiciaries - with clear legal guidelines on how to 

protect and implement these rights. At the same time, the new legal provisions 

specify for the refugees and displaced people which rights they have and can 

demand from their authorities.

Table 1 

Refugees Remaining Abroad in 1998

Table 2 

IDPS in 1998

Country Number of Refugees Country Number of IDPS

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Bosnia 424,000 Bosnia 836,000

Croatia 309,000 Croatia 61,000

FRY 145,000 FRY 257,000

Source: US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 1999.

USIP Library Resources

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About the United States Institute of Peace

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal 

institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training 

on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the 

Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, 

including research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, 

conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other 

educational activities. The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by the 

President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

About the Report

This report focuses on the question of refugee and in particular minority 

returns in the former Yugoslavia. Minority returns are described as the return 

of refugees and displaced persons to areas currently under control of a 

different ethnic group. Minority returns are a regional issue: Croatia, Bosnia 

and Kosovo are the principal recipients of minority returns; Serbia, Bosnia, 

Montenegro, and Macedonia are harboring minorities from elsewhere.

This report, written by Program Officer Brad K. Blitz, is based on information 

presented at two meetings of the Balkans Working Group in September 1999. 

The Balkans Working Group is a policy forum convened by the United States 

Institute of Peace to facilitate discussion between regional specialists, 

government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working 

on the Balkans.

See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do 

not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which 

does not advocate specific policies.

December 21, 1999

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Balkan Returns - An Overview of Refugee Returns and Minority Repatriation: Special Reports: Publications: U.S. Institute of Peace

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