The United States Army in 

1992-1994 
CM H Pub 70-81-1 

Cover: On the Town, Jeffrey T Manuszak. 1994 
Introduction 

The United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian 

relief. No such operation has proven as costly or shocking, however, as 

that undertaken in Somalia from August 1992 to March 1994. Greeted 

initially by Somalis happy to be saved from starvation, U.S. troops 

were slowly drawn into interclan power struggles and ill-defined 

"nation-building" missions. The American people woke up one day in 

early October 1993 to news reports of dozens of our soldiers killed or 

wounded in fierce fighting in the streets of the capital city, Mogadishu. 

These disturbing events of a decade ago have taken on increasing 

meaning after the horrific attacks of 11 September 200 I. 

The Army began by assisting in relief operations in Somalia, but 

by December 1992 it was deeply engaged on the ground in Operation 

RESTORE HOPE in that chaotic African country. In the spring of the following year, the initial crisis of imminent starvation seemed to be over, 

and the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNlTAF) turned over the mission to the United Nations, leaving only a small logistical, aviation, 

and quick reaction force behind to assist. The American public seemed 

to forget about Somalia. That sense of "mission accomplished" made 

the events of 3-4 October 1993 more startling, as Americans reacted 

to the spectacle of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets 

by cheering Somali mobs- the very people Americans thought they 

had rescued from starvation. 

This brochure, prepared to honor the tenth anniversary of 

Operation RESTORE HOPE beginning on 8 December, places the events 

of the firefight of 3-4 October 1993 into tbe wider context of the U.S. 

humanitarian, political, and military operation to rescue a people and a 

state from anarchy and chaos. The dedication and sacrifices made by 

U.S. soldiers, airmen, and marines in that war-torn country provide a 

lesson in heroism that remains compelling a decade later. 

This brochure was prepared in. the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History by Dr. Richard W. Stewart, Chief of the Histories Division and 

a veteran of Somalia. We hope that his absorbing account- with its 

list of further readings- will stimulate further interest in and study of 

this extraordinarily important U.S. operation. 

JOHN S. BROWN 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 

The United States Army in Somalia 

1992-1994 

Americans consider themselves to be a compassionate people, and 

the United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief operations both within and outside the continental United States. Never has 

this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in 

1992 when the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of 

an ongoing civil war in the east African country of Somalia. Ultimately 

hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended 

involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the 

impression of chaos and disaster. How could a mission that had accomplished so much have ended in such unhappy circumstances? 

The Army's humanitarian relief efforts have generally been less 

complicated and more successfuL Soldiers provided vital support to 

the stricken city of San Francisco in 1906 as it struggled to recover 

from the great earthquake and subsequent fires. National Guard units 

in communities across the nation frequently rush to the scene of communities hit by hurricanes, tornados, fires, or floods. Jn 1992, soldiers 

from the XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, deployed 

to restore order and bring in supplies in the wake of Hurricane 

Andrew, which destroyed large sections of Miami, Florida. U.S. Army 

personnel have also been involved in many overseas disaster relief and 

humanitarian operations, generaftly as part of joint task forces. In 

Operation SEA ANGEL in 1991 , American soldiers assisted rei ief 

efforts in Bangladesh as it recovered from a disastrous cyclone. 

During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, also in 1991, U.S. Army special 

operations soldiers rescued almost 400,000 Kurds from imminent starvation in the mountains of northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. The 

national impulse to intervene- to help- is a powerful one, and the 

U.S. military forces are uniquely suited to bringing to bear their skill, 

manpower, and logistical power anywhere in the world. 

Strategic Setting 

American interest in the Horn of Africa region dates back to the 

Cold War when both the Soviet Union and the United States competed 

to gain allies and influence throughout the world. In the early 1960s 

5 
the United States established a presence, including communications 

listening posts, in the northern part of Ethiopia and backed the traditional regime of Emperor Haile Selassie . The Soviets, on the other 

hand, replaced the weakened Ita lian influence in neighboring Somalia 

a nd suppo rte d the authoritarian regime of Somali strongman 

Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power in 1969. (Map I) 

After Siad Barre precipitated a disastrous war against Ethiopia over 

the status of the Ogaden region in 1977, the situation in Somalia grew 

worse. Western aid dried up, and Barre was forced to grow ever more 

repressive to maintain his grip on power. He began a policy of systematic kidnapping and murder against rival c lan leaders that increased in 

ferocity over time. Finally, antigovernment riots led to overreaction on 

the part of Siad Barre's bodyg uards, who killed 65 civilians and seriously injured over 300 in 1990. His legitimacy in shambles, the army 

and the people turned against him in a prolonged series of riots, political maneuvers, and violence. Siad Barre was forced to Ace the country 

in January 1991 with some of bis closest supporters. Almost immediately, a resurgence of clan violence led to the virtual destruction of any 

central government and to economic chaos. 

As Somalia lapsed into sectarian and ethnic warfare, regional warlords drew upon clan loyalty to establish independent power bases. 

This situation led to a struggle over food supplies with each clan raiding the storehouses and depots of the others. Coupled with a drought, 

these actions brought famine to hundreds of thousands of the nation's 

poor. Although private and voltmteer relief organizations established 

refugee camps to try to prevent widespread deaths from starvation, 

they could not handle the massive amounts of aid and the requisite 

security structure that were needed. International relief organizations 

paid protection money to the warlords as they tried to distribute what 

donated food supplies did arrive. More often than not, such supplies 

never reached the hands of those who needed them but instead were 

confiscated by the warlords who distributed or sold them to enhance 

their own power and prestige. The general misery was only compounded by the bruta lity of the Somali clans toward their rivals and 

the sporadic outbreaks of actual fighting. The most visible elements of 

the suffering- pictures of starving, fly-covered chi ldren- appeared 

nig htly on American television screens. Fresh from its triumph in 

Operation DESERT STORM, the administration of President George H. 

W. Bush felt it could not ignore the situation, despite the obvious risks 

of intervening in a country still at war with itself. 

The United Nations reacted to the worsening plight of Somalia in 

early 1992. On 24 April it approved Resolution 75 1, which authorized 

6 
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humanitarian relief operations in the stricken country and established 

the United Nations Operations in Somalia, or UNOSOM. Almost 

immediately, a small group of peacekeepers deployed to the country 

and tried to sott out the confusing array of clans, private armies, and 

relief organizations, all competing over the distribution of food reli ef 

supplies. While some progress was made in the major cities, it was 

apparent that significant amounts of the supplies destined for the interior were being hijacked by the armies of the clans or by the relief 

organizations' security guards, hired by the UN and the reli ef agencies 

to guard the convoys of food. Since UN and private volunteer organizations were generally prohibited from hiring armed security forces, 

they instead hired local tribesmen as technical assistants hence the 

nickname "technicals." The technicals were armed bodyguards, often 

driving pick-up trucks or land cruisers with machines guns or other 

heavy weapons mounted. 

Operations 

U.S. Relief ~fforts 

In response to the worsening famine, the United States decided to 

assist the relief efforts by airlifting food from nearby Kenya to remote 

airfields in the interior of Somalia for distribution, thus bypassing congested ports and reducing the need to send out easily looted convoys. 

For this purpose, the United States launched Operation PROVIDE 

RELJEI~ on 15 August 1992. The actual ground distribution continued 

to be accomplished by the international relief organizations already 

established in the country. PROVII)E RELIEF was thus a limited attempt 

to use U.S. expertise in logistics to he lp the relief effort without engaging American military forces on the ground. 

Problems of distribution within the country continued to hamper 

the relief effort. In the countryside, lawless gangs seized relief supplies and used them to buy local loyalties while letting thousands 

starve. In the cities, the warring political factions, supported by their 

private armies, amassed food stockpiles as bargaining chips and signs 

of their power. These rival entities, often barely controlled by their 

clan leaders, terrorized the international organizations, stea ling food 

and killing whoever did not pay protection money. 

Because of the increasingly chaotic situation on the ground, as a 

security measure U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers from the 5th 

Specia l Forces Group (Airborne) from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 

accompanied many of the relief flights. ln the process they assessed 

the dangers of various regions, conducted a low-key reconnaissance of 

8 
the airfields, and gathered basic information that would be useful for 

any possible future U.S. ground involvement. 

That involvement was not long in coming. Unable to explain to the 

world why the United States, the "sole remaining superpower" and 

leader of the "new world order," was not able to stop the starvation, 

President Bush ordered U.S. forces to deploy to Somalia. Their mission was to ensure that relief supplies reached the people who needed 

them and thus to "break the cycle" of starvation and save lives. 

RI:'STOR£ HOPE 

The operation, code-named RESTOR!~ HorE, began on 8 December 

1992 under the direction of a Unified Task Force, or UNITAF. The I 

Marine Expeditionary force from Camp Pendleton, California, formed 

the bulk of the headquarters, with augmentation from all the services. 

Commanded by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, UN ITAF included U.S. and allied troops working together in one task force, but under 

U.S. and not UN direction. And, like a ll modern humanitarian operations, it was a joint, combined, and interagency effort. The role of the 

U.S. State Department was critical. Once Ambassador Robert B. 

Oakley was appointed as President Bush's special envoy to Somalia, 

he and General Johnston moved quickly to establish a close working 

relationship. Although the United Nations continued to play an important part in the politics within the country, especially in the delicate 

negotiations between rival Somali factions, its role was soon overshadowed by U.S. m ilitary and diplomatic power. Securit y Co uncil 

Reso lution 794, passed on 3 December, endorsed the U.S.- led operation and gave it its international flavor and legitimacy, but the UN simply Jacked the logistics, command and control, or intelligence capabilities to undertake such a complex mission. 

Marine Corps and Navy special operations elements moved into 

Somalia in the early morning hours of 9 December, with the first 1,300 

marines coming in by helicopter directly to Mogadishu airport. 

Emerging fi·om the ocean surf in the predawn hours, the Navy Seals 

were immediately hit with the blazing lights of forewarned media crews. 

Luckily, the diplomatic groundwork had been laid for U.S. troops to 

arrive with no Somali resistance. Thereafter, Somali warlords quickly 

agreed to cooperate with each other (at least for a time) and work with 

the U.S. troops to establish a relatively benign and secure environment. 

The tcchnicals and all Somali heavy weapons began to be moved into 

cantonment areas by the end of the month, and by mid-February most 

heavy weapons were either in such secure cantonment areas or moved 

out of Mogadishu and hidden to avoid confiscation or destruction. 

9 
The U.S. Army component of UNITAF was Task Force 

Mounta in, initia ll y commanded by Brig. Gen. Lawson William 

Magruder 111, the Assistant Division Commander. Maneuver, of the 

I Oth Mountain Division, based at Fort Drum, New York. lie 

remained in command until 22 December when the division commander, Maj. Gen. Steven L. Arnold, replaced him. TF Mountain 

was built around the 2cl Brigade, I Oth Mountain Division, and at its 

peak consisted of approximately 10,000 soldiers including two 

infantry battalions, an aviation brigade, and division artillery and 

support assets. It was a si/able and efTective military force that overawed the poorly armed Somali militia. 

Coa lition forces including large components from France, Italy, 

Belgium, Morocco, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Canada soon 

joined U.S. forces. During the course of RESTOR!: I lOPE, some 38,000 

soldiers from 23 different nations and representatives from 49 di fTerent humanitarian relief operations worked together to put food into the 

mouths of the starving people of Somalia. 

The main cha llenge to the smooth flow of relief suppli es continued to be the rivalry between feuding warlords, particularly between 

the forces of General Muhammed Farah Aideed of the Habr Gidr 

subclan and Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Abgal subclan in 

Mogadishu. Aideed, previously a general in dictator Siad Barre's 

army and a former ambassador to India, now headed the Somali 

National Alliance (SNA) with pretensions to ruling the entire country. His opponent, Ali Mahdi, was a former businessman and farmer 

with little military experience and only an ad hoc militia. Their feud 

had led to open conflict fi·om November 1991 to February 1992 and 

only added to the tragedy of Somal ia by killing thousands of innocent Mogadishu citizens. Backed by overwhelming U.S. and allied 

power, Ambassador Oakley effectively established a cease-fire 

between the two forces as a precondition to establishing a military 

and rei icf presence in the interior of the country. llowever, it was not 

in the UN charter, nor in the U.S. mission guidance, to disarm or 

attack either faction. Ostensibly, the UNITAF forces were neutral 

and there only to ensure that relief supplies flowed. They achieved 

this mission by late December, as the port and the airport reopened 

and relief supplies began moving quickly ashore. Over 40,000 tons 

of gra in were off-loaded by the end of December along with 6,668 

vehic les and 96 helicopters for the military forces. 

While Mogadishu maintained an uneasy calm, UNfTAF forces 

began to move into the countryside. To aid in coordination, the southern part of the country, the area most marked by drought and famine, 

10 
was divided into nine humanitarian relief sectors (I-IRS). U.S. Marine 

Forces (MARFOR) concentrated on Baardhcerc (Bardera) 1 and parts 

of Mogadishu while the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) of UNITAF 

focused on providing security, often in conjunction with allied forces, 

in four sectors: HRS Baidoa, I-IRS Bal li Doogle (Baledogle), HRS 

Merca (Marka), and IIRS Kismaayo. (Map 2) 

Movement of U.S. units into their sectors occurred in a variety of 

ways. Some US. Army units tlew first into Mogadishu and then moved 

out to their assigned relief sectors. On 28 December, TF 2- 87, an 

inf~1ntry battalion task force, conducted a combined air assault operation with the I st Canadian Airborne Battle Group from the ir base in 

Mogad ishu into the town of Beleclweyne (Belet Uen), some I 80 1niles 

north. Other units, such as TF 3- 14, another infantry battalion task 

force, flew directly from the United States to the main airport in its sector, in this case Kismaayo, 250 miles southwest of Mogadishu. Rapid 

changes in plans and missions caused many delays in deployment, 

shifts in the airflow, and last minute modifications to aircraft load plans 

as units added, deleted, and changed types of equipment and quantities 

of supplies. However, by early January most of UNITAF was in place 

and conducting security operations throughout the nine relief sectors. 

While conventional forces concentrated on major cities and 

regions, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) moved quickly to 

establish a presence in the rest of the countryside, place liaison cells 

with allied forces, and conduct civil affairs (CA) and psychological 

operations (PSYOP). In early January, Special Operations Command 

Central, a major subordinate unit of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), deployed a small element to Mogadishu to assume command 

and control of all specia l operations forces in theater. This headquarters, known as Joint Special Operations Forces- Somalia or JSOFOR, 

was responsible for planning and conducting special operations in 

Somalia in support of all UN!TAF humanitarian relief efforts, not just 

those in the U.S. sector. The main operational objectives of SOF in 

Somali a were to make initial contact with indigenous factions and 

leaders, provide information to UNITAF on potentially hostile forces 

to aid in force protection, and provide area assessments to assist with 

planning for future re i ief and security operations. 

The JSOFOR was initially task organized with its headquarters in 

Mogadishu, five Operational Detachment A (ODA) teams from the 

1 Place names in this pamphlet rellect the Board of Geographic Names preferred 

spellings. Equivalent British spellings, which were carried on I :250,000 maps widely 

used during the operation. are provided in parentheses at first mention. 

J I 
<( 

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UJ 

HRS 

\. 

UNITAF 

Area of Operatio ns 

February 1993 

ARFORArea 

Humanitarian Relief Soc tors 

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100 Kilometors 

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(Bardoro) 

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MAP2 

• Me rca IMarl<a) 

N D 

0 C E 

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. DuS3 Marteb 

A N 

A N 
5th Special Forces Group (Airbmne) each consisting of approximate ly twelve cross-trained Special Forces soldiers in Beledweyne 

(the Canadian sector), and another detachment in Baardeheere (the 

U.S. Marine Forces sector), 200 miles to the west of Mogadishu. By 

late February three additional detachments were in Kismaayo (the 

U.S. Army sector) and one in Baidoa (the shared Australian-U.S. 

Army sector). 

Army civil affairs and PSYOP forces, other elements of the special 

operations team, also provided critical support to U.S. relief operations 

during RESTORF HOPE. The 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) deployed a 

civil affairs tactical support team and six CA direct support teams that 

provided support to both Army and Marine forces. They interacted 

with numerous international and private aid organ izations, staffed 

humanitarian operations centers throughout Somalia, conducted medical and engineer assessments of local facilities, and coordinated medical and engineer civic action projects. 

Psychological operations were also used extensively to support 

operations in Somalia. UNITAF established a Joint PSYOP Task Force 

made up primarily of clements of the 4th Psychological Operations 

Group (Airborne) from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to ensure that 

information operations were effectively integrated into all plans and 

operations in theater. PSYOP troops ran a local newspaper (called 

Rt{jo- the truth) and set up a radio broadcasting system. They also 

provided tactical loudspeaker teams to U.S. and international forces. In 

addition, the task force designed, printed, and distributed more than 7 

million copies of 49 different leaflets, posters, and handbills. 

On the whole, the relief" mission proceeded well, with few incidents of violence from February to May 1993. It seemed that life was 

assuming some measure of normalcy. Markets reopened, travel 

became more common, and there was even some hope of restarting a 

Somali national police force with promising initial results. However, 

clan rivalry and U.S. reluctance to engage in long-term "nation-building" operations soon doomed the effort. 

Daily soldier life settled into a routine. Troops conducted mounted 

and dismounted patrols throughout the cities in their sectors with 

occasional brushes with bandits and unruly crowds. Carefully written 

UN ITAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited their responses by 

reminding the soldiers that this was not a wartime environment, that 

all persons were to be treated with dignity and respect, and that only 

the minimum force necessary for the mission was authorized. These 

ROE did not in any way, however, interfere with the right to defend 

oneself or one's unit. In one instance a noncommissioned officer shot 

13 
Over 7 million PSYOP le<if!ets were distributed during RESTO!IH HOPE. 

and killed a young Somali who ran up to his vehicle carrying a small 

box that the sergea nt believed might be a bomb. Despite the tragic 

nature of the event, charges against the soldier were dismissed under 

legitimate self-defense g rounds. However, in another instance, a 

sergeant shot and killed an individual who had stolen his sunglasses. 

His claim of self-defense was rejected, and he was convicted at a genera l court-martial. On the whole, however, U.S. Army soldiers behaved 

with care and restraint. By April the situation had stabilized enough 

that the U.S. adm inistration determined that it was time to turn the 

mission over to the United Nations entirely. 

Despite some setbacks and incidents, Operation RESTORE HOPE 

succeeded in its goal of bringing an end to mass starvation. The heavily armed UNITAF units quickly established security in their sectors, 

and an uneasy truce kept the peace between the factions. There were 

some warning signs on the hori.zon, however, as UN diplomats began 

to press for a more active role of the military in confiscating weapons 

and in forcing some kind of political settlement. "Mission creep" 

began to enter the vocabulary of those serving in Somalia, and soon 

after the Un ited States turned over the mission complete ly to the 

United Nations in May, the situation began to unravel. 

14 
UNOSOM II: Operation CONTINUE' HOPE' 

While U.S. and allied forces maintained the peace in Soma lia, U.S. 

leaders were working hard to push the Un ited Nations into establishing 

a new mission in Soma lia to take over the majority of the responsibilities for running the relief effort while allowing the United States to 

reduce the size of its committed forces and hand le only limited aspects 

of security and logistics. On 26 March 1993, the United Nations 

passed Resolution 814 which considerably broadened its mandate to 

intervene in another country's affairs. The UN was now intervening 

militarily in a peacemaking role under Chapter VH of its charter. The 

more frequently used Chapter VI addressed only the deployment of 

peacekeeping troops to reinforce a previously agreed upon settlement 

between warring parties. But Chapter VII dea lt with peace enforcement and not merely peacekeeping. The resolution underlined the 

charters of the first UNOSOM mission and Operation RESTORE HOPE 

and that of the new mission, UNOSOM II. 

Turk ish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the 

UNOSOM fl force, with U.S . Army Maj. Gen. Thomas M. 

Montgomery as his deputy. General Montgomery also retained his 

position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) 

under Marine Corps General Joseph P. Hoar, CENTCOM commander 

in chief. Thus the U.S. forces retained their own national chain of 

command while inserting themselves into the UN structu re. Only if 

the forces were committed to any combat operation would U.S. units 

fall under the tactical control (TACON) of the United Nations. Even in 

those circumstances, however, with the deputy commander of the UN 

force an American, U.S. national interests wou ld remain protected. By 

October 1993 UNOSOM ll consisted of over I 6,000 peacekeepers 

from 21 nations. This number would jump to 29,732 soldiers from 29 

nations by mid-November with the arriva l of over 17,000 add itional 

U.S. personnel as part of a U.S. joint task force. 

The slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties with little time to plan for an orderly transition, set for 4 May. It 

took time to fill the UN positions for the new force and, by all accounts, 

the handover of the mission was poorly done with only 30 percent of 

the UN staff in place on the date of transfer. However, despite the challenges of transition, General Bir assumed command of forces in 

Somalia on 4 May 1993 as UNOSOM U assumed the mission. In support of UNOSOM 11, the United States provided a substantial logistics 

structure (consisting of about 2,600 troops) and a small special operations element. The U.S. military also provided a 1, I 00-soldier ground15 
based quick reaction force (QRF) for UNOSOM II, consisting of a 

brigade-level headquarters from the I Oth Mountain Division from Fort 

Drum. Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. admiral, was appointed the new 

UN envoy to Somalia with wide-ranging powers. 

It quickly became apparent that Aideed had little respect for the 

new organization, the UN, or Admiral Howe. On 5 June J 993, his 

Somal ia National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani 

soldiers assigned to UNOSOM II. Another 44 were wounded. The following day, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 

837 adopting a more aggressive military stance toward Aideed and 

asking member states for more troops and equipment. In Mogadishu, 

Pakistani and Italian forces conducted heavy armored patrols throughout the city, concentrating on the areas near the ambush site. Also on 6 

June, General Hoar asked the Joint Staff to send four Air Force 

AC 130 gunships, specia l C 130 cargo planes modified tor direct 

ground support, to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. The gunships deployed on 7 June and remained until 14 July, flying a total of 

thirty-two interdiction, reconna issance, and PSYOP missions in support of UNOSOM H. Eight of those missions were combat sorties 

flown over the streets of Mogadishu between II and 17 .June. As part 

of the initial strike against Aideed, three gunships flew over 

Mogadishu on 11 - 12 June and used their I 05-rnm. and 40-mm. cannons to demolish two weapons storage facilities and cripple Radio 

Mogadishu, Aidced's propaganda station, by destroying its transmission capability. On 13, 14, and 17 June several additional AC 130 

missions concentrated on destroying weapons storage areas and vehic le compounds belonging to 1\ideed and his key supporters. On 17 

June Admiral Howe issued a warrant for Aidecd's arrest and authorized a $25,000 reward. This only served to harden the political lines 

in Mogadishu. Skirmishing between UN and U.S. c lements and 

Aidccd's Habr Gidr subclan continued, and on 12 July, in a direct challenge to Aidced's leadership, the American QRF attacked a major 

Aidecd compound with helicopter gunships. After the raid, a hostile 

crowd ncar the compound killed four western journalists covering the 

action, displaying their bodies for the world to sec. 

Immediately, UNOSOM II Force Command focused its intelligence and operational capability on locating, capturing, and arresting 

Aidccd and any of his supporters whom it deemed responsible for the 

attacks of June and July. U.S. Task Force 3- 25 Aviation was designated the command and control clement and established three teams to 

conduct operations to capture Aidccd: Team Attack, Team Snatch, and 

Team Secure. Composed of auack, scout, and cargo helicopters with 

16 
On the Alert, Jeffi·ey Manuszak, 1994 

snipers and a scout platoon, they were to conduct continuous intelligence survei I lance of Aideed, leading to an attack on his escort convoy 

when he was traveling around the city and most vul nerable . Team 

Attack would destroy the lead and trail vehicles, Team Snatch wou ld 

then capture Aideed, and Team Secure would provide ground security 

by occupying blocking positions to prevent civilians from entering 

while keeping targeted indi viduals in the ambush site. However, 

despite several alerts, Aideed began lowering his profile in the city and 

was se ldom noted moving around. 

Aideed did not take this personal threat to him lying down. On 8 

August his forces detonated a mine under a passing U.S. Military 

Police (MP) vehicle on Jialle-Siaad Street in Mogadishu killing four 

U.S. MPs. As the military situation worsened, the UN Secretary 

General Boutros Boutros-Ghal i asked the new U.S. administration of 

President William J. Clinton to assist him in capturing Aideed. 

On 22 August I 993, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, 

directed the de ployment of a joint special operations task force 

(JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by Aideed supporters 

upon American and UNOSOM forces and installations. The JSOTF, 

17 
named Task Force Ranger, had the mission of capturing Aidccd and 

his key lieutenants and turning them over to UNOSOM II forces. The 

task would prove extraordinarily difficult, for Aidced had gone underground after the AC- 130 air raids and ground assaults on his strongholds in June and July. 

The command and control structure of TF Ranger evolved during 

its time in theater. It eventually was a carefully worked out arrangement that ensured coordination of American clements on the ground 

without compromising its security or U.S. national interests. In accord 

with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the unified 

commander (in this case, General lloar) had command and control 

over all U.S. military resources in theater, including the units supporting UNOSOM IT and TF Ranger. I lowever, TF Ranger did not report 

to General Montgomery, the U.S. commander on the ground in 

Somalia who was dual-hatted as the UNOSOM II deputy commander. 

Instead, General Hoar had the TF Ranger commander, Maj. Gen. 

William F. Garrison, report to him directly. Thus, TF Ranger, as a 

strategic U.S. asset, did not fall under the UNOSOM II commander 

but rather remained strictly under American operational command and 

control. For his part, after an initial misstep during a poorly coordinated mission that hit a UN compound, General Garrison worked to 

ensure that he coordinated all TF Ranger operations with General 

Montgomery. He also closely tied in his force to the U.S. QRF by 

exchanging liaison officers. 

All major elements of TF Ranger were in Somalia by 28 August. 

The task force consisted of' special operations ground forces, special 

operations helicopters, U.S. Air Force special tactics personnel, and 

U.S. Navy Seals. During August and September 1993, the task force 

conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes, although in one instance the task force members mistakenly 

raided an unlisted UN facility and temporarily restrained some UN 

employees. The raids were launched by day and night and used both 

hcl icoptcrs and vehicles to reach their targets. During one of these 

operations, a raid near Digfcr 11ospital on 21 September, Osman Atto, 

one of Aideed's closest advisers and his chief financial aide, was captured. The operation went smoothly, but for the first time the U.S. 

Rangers received massed rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire from 

nearby Somali mi litia. Although Aideed himself remained free, the 

cumulative result of these efforts was to severely hamper his movements and effectiveness. However, his forces were also showing a 

greater willingness to engage TF Ranger elements with heavy small 

arms and rocket fire. 

18 
The situation in Mogadishu worsened even as the raids continued. 

In one of the most violent and costly incidents, on 8 September U.S. 

and Pakistani soldiers were clearing roadblocks ncar a site known as 

the Cigarette Factory when they were attacked by Somali militia using 

I 06-mm. recoilless rifles, RPGs, and small arms. It took extensive 

fires from ground and aviation units to suppress the enemy fire. Later 

that same day, near an abandoned allied checkpoint, the same clearing 

clement was again attacked by militiamen, this time joined by a mob 

or approximately 1,000 Somali civil ians. Six UNOSOM II soldiers 

were injured. On 16 and 21 September two roadblock-clearing teams 

were attacked on 21 October Road. The team attacked on 21 

September was a Pakistani clement, and it lost an armored personnel 

carrier and suffered nine casualties, including two killed. On 25 

September a U.S. Black llawk helicopter was shot down and tlu·cc soldiers killed: one from the 25th Aviation Regiment, Fort Drum, and two 

from the I 0 I st Aviation Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. U.S. and 

Pakistani forces secured the area and evacuated the casualties under 

!ire. Particularly unsettling was the fact that the Somalis shot down the 

helicopter using simple R PGs, normally used to attack armored vehicles. This fact did not bode well for the helicopter raids ofTF Ranger. 

On 3 October TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time 

into Aideed's stronghold in the so-called Black Sea slum district, ncar 

the Bakara Market to capture two of his key lieutenants. Helicopters 

carrying assault and blocking forces launched around 1530 from the 

task force compound at the western end of Mogadishu airport, with a 

ground convoy moving out three minutes later. By 1542 the ground 

forces had arrived at the target location, ncar the Olympic Hotel. (Map 

3) The blocking force quickly established perimeter positions while the 

assault force searched the compound for Aideed's supporters. Both 

came under increasingly heavy enemy fire, more intense than during 

previous raids. The assault team captured twenty-four Somalis and was 

about to load them onto the convoy trucks when a circling Mil 60 

Black Hawk was hit by an RPG and crashed about three blocks from 

the target location. Almost immediately, one six-man clement of the 

blocking force, as well as a small MH- 6 assault helicopter and a modified MH- 60 Black Hawk carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, went to the scene. The M H- 6 crew arrived first, 

landed in a narrow alley in the middle of a fircfight, and evacuated two 

wounded soldiers to a mil itary field hospital. Next, the six-man Ranger 

blocking element arrived on foot, followed by the CSAR helicopter. As 

the last two members of the search and rescue team were sliding down 

the fast ropes to the crash site, their helicopter was also hit by an RPG, 

19 
MAP3 

MOGADISHU 

3- 4 October 1993 

1 Kilomotor 
but somehow the pilot kept the helicopter steady until the two reached 

the ground safely and then nursed the helicopter back to the airport. 

The situation now worsened. Ground fire struck two more 

MH- 60s, with one goi ng down less than a mile south of the first 

destroyed helicopter while the other limped to safety at the airport. A 

Somali mob overran this second crash site and, despite a heroic 

defense, killed everyone except one of the pilots, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders at this location, M. Sgt. Gary Gordon and Sfc. 

Randall Shughart, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor 

for their sacrifice. 

Meanwhile, after loading the detainees on the ground convoy 

trucks, the remai11ing assault and blocking forces moved on foot to the 

first crash area, passing through heavy fire that wounded a number of 

soldiers, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed 

helicopter. There they established defensive positions, laying down 

suppressive fire to hold the Somalis at bay, and treated their wounded 

while working to free the pilot's body from the wreckage. Taking a different route, the ground convoy force with the detainees loaded in 

trucks attempted to reach the first crash site from the north. Unable to 

fi11d it among the narrow, winding a ll eyways, they came under withering sma ll arms and RPG fire. Finally, after suffering numerous casualties, losing two 5-ton trucks, and sustaining substantial damage to the 

other vehicles, the convoy commander decided to return to the airfield. 

On the way, the returning convoy encountered a second convoy 

consisting of the task force's internal quick reaction element. This 

pick-up force of Ranger and Special Forces support personnel had 

left the airport in hopes of reaching the site of the second crash. This 

e lement loaded some of the casualties of the first convoy onto its 

vehicles and both returned to base. About this time, the U.S. QRF for 

the UN, a company of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, I Oth Mountain 

Division, also tried to reach the second crash site, but the soldiers 

were pinned down by Somali fire. After a tough, dismounted firefight near the K- 4 traffic circle, the QRF commander, Lt. Col. 

Wi lliam C. David, was compelled to move his small and outgunned 

force back to the safety of the airport to regroup and work with task 

force personnel on a coordinated rescue plan. 

While these elements moved back and forth through the suddenly 

lethal streets of Mogadishu, the TF Ranger soldiers at the first crash 

site were running short of critical supplies. They received a resupply 

of water and ammunition from a helicopter that evening, but that 

MH- 60 was also hit with RPGs and barely managed to power back to 

the airport before breaking down completely. 

21 
Sergecmts Gordo11 a11d Sl111ghart 

The relief column was slowly being formed first at the airport and 

then at the New Port area of the city. It took some time to assemble 

tanks and armored vehicles from the Pakistani and Malaysian forces 

nearby, explain the plan to them, and integrate their forces with the 

2- 14th rnfantry elements. The time spent in coordination was vital, 

however, for such a complex, multinational force operation. Armor was 

essential as well, given the numerous roadblocks and RPGs flying across 

the streets of the city.2 Finally, after hours of planning and collecting 

forces, the sixty-plus vehicle convoy of the I Oth Mountain Division and 

attached e lements moved out of the New Port area north to National 

Street, the Pakistani tanks in the lead. Closely fo llowed by circling 

AH- 1 Cobra gunships, command and control Ul I 60s, and reconnaissance OH- 58A he licopters, the convoy moved in fits and starts along 

National Street toward the c rash sites. Accide ntally, two of the 

Malaysian armored personnel carriers with soldiers from the 2d Platoon, 

2 General Montgomery had discussed additional mechanized and armored units 

with CINCCENT in August and had formally requested a mechanized inlimtry team 

with a platoon of tanks and an artillery battery in early September. However, CINCCENT deleted the artillery before forwarding the request to the chainnan of the Joint 

Chiefs and, despite the chairman's recommendat ion for approval, Secretary of 

Defense Aspin disapproved the request in late September. 

22 
Company A, 2- 14th Infantry, turned south off Nati onal and were 

ambushed. The soldiers moved quickly into the cover of nearby buildings. It would be four hours before they were rescued. The rest of the 

convoy continued up National and turned north on Shalalawi Street past 

the Olympic Hotel toward the first crash site. The I Oth Mountain 

"Lightfighters" in the Malaysian armored personnel carriers broke 

through to the site at 0155 on 4 October. The combined Ranger- Special 

Forces- mountain infantry force worked until dawn to free the pilot's 

body, receiving grenade and small arms fire throughout the night. Close 

fire support by AH- 6 and AH- 1 attack helicopters, in some instances 

firing 2.75-inch rockets, helped keep the enemy at bay during those long 

hours of darkness. Company A, 2- l4th Infantry, less its second platoon, 

reached the second crash site, but no trace could be found of the lost soldiers and aviators. As dawn broke, all the casualties from the first site 

were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers; the remainder of the 

force moved rapidly on foot south along Shalalawi Street to National 

Street in what became known as the Mogadishu Mile. 

With the armored personnel carriers providing rolling cover, the 

run-and-gun movement began at 0542 on 4 October. Soma lis continued firing at the convoy while U.S. helicopter gunships raked the cross 

streets with fi1·e to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the so-called Pakistani Stadium in the northeast section 

of the city by around 0630. Medica l personnel gave emergency treatment to the wounded, and all personnel were prepared for movement 

to the hospital or the airfield. Thus ended one of the bloodiest and 

fiercest urban firefights si nce the Vietnam War. 

Casualties were heavy. TF Ranger lost 16 soldiers on 3-4 October 

and had another 57 wounded, with I other ki lied and 12 wounded on 6 

October by a mortar attack on their hangar complex at the airport. The 

2- 14th infantry suffered 2 Americans killed and 22 wounded while 

the Malaysian coalition partners had 2 killed and 7 wounded and the 

Pakistanis suffered 2 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casuallies between 500 and I ,500. 

The battles of 3-4 October were a watershed in U.S. involvement 

in Somalia. The already complex mission and difficult environment 

took a dramatic turn with those events. The situation required constant 

innovation and rapid decisions from all the troops and commanders 

involved, under conditions that did not allow the American soldiers to 

take advantage of their great technological superiority. Experi ence, 

common sense, group cohesion, and superior tactical training were the 

virtues that made survival in the new environment possible as the decision-makers in Washington grappled with what to do next. 

23 
The Withdrawal from Somalia 

In the aftermath of the 3-4 October battle, U.S. military presence 

in Somalia increased significantly, although temporarily. A company 

from the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was immediately dispatched from Fort Stewart, Georgia, with Bradley fighting vehicles 

along with an attached platoon of MJ Abrams tanks. They were soon 

joined by the lst Battalion, 64th Armor, with additional support assets. 

Another unit of the I Oth Mountain Division- the 2d Battalion, 22d 

Infantry- arrived in Somalia soon after, along with a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) and additional spec ial operations personnel 

including more AC- 130 gunships. These forces were organized under 

a new Joint Task Force Somalia under the command of Maj. Gen. Carl 

F. Ernst who was placed under General Montgomery's tactical control 

but remained under the operational control of the theater commander, 

General I !oar. 

However, it soon became clear that the Clinton administration was 

focused on using those forces to faci litate the withdrawal of U.S. troops 

rather than use them to punish Aideed. General Montgomery had clear 

guidance: protect the force, protect the UN, and bring the force out 

with a minimum of casualties. In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October, the president directed the 

acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David G. 

Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aideed except those 

required in self-defense. He also reappointed Ambassador Oakley as 

special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and 

then announced that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Somalia no 

later than 3 I March 1994. Shortly thereafter Secretary Aspin stepped 

down, taking much of the blame for what was deemed a failed policy. 

For all intents and purposes, the United States was now determined to 

withdraw from Somalia as quickly as possible. All additional forces 

sent would be used solely for self-defense of U.S. soldiers rather than 

for further offensive operations. 

Ambassador Oakley arrived in Mogadishu on 9 October, determined to obtain the release of U.S. helicopter pilot CW2 Michael 

Durant, captured at the second crash site by Somali forces loyal to 

Aideed. After intense negotiations, Aideed agreed to release the 

wounded Durant and a previously captured Nigerian soldier on 14 

October as a "goodwi ll gesture." Despite this gesture and a unilateral 

cease-fire declared by Aideed, it quickly became apparent that the U.S. 

role in Somalia was ending and that the UN would receive no substantive cooperation from the warlord and his clan. 

24 
Soldiers of Task Force Ranger take cover and retum.fire 

during the 3-4 October ball/e. 

After several months of comparatively limited activity and few 

further instances of violence, US. forces began withdrawing. Most of 

the American troops were out of Somalia by 25 March 1994, ending 

Operation CONTINUE HOPE, the follow-on mission to RESTORE HOT>£. 

Only a few hundred marines remained offshore to assist with any noncombatant evacuation mission that might occur in the event violence 

broke out that necessitated the removal of the over I ,000 U.S. civilians 

and military advisers remaining as part of the U.S. liaison mission. All 

UN and U.S. personnel were finally withdrawn almost a year later in 

March 1995. 

All attempts to reconci le the Somali factions had proven futile, 

and the international community gradua lly lost its patience with the 

total lack of political results. Operation UNITED SHIELD, the final UN 

withdrawal from Somalia, was completed on 3 March 1995. The 

United States, as part of the international community, had made major 

contributions to the Somalia humanitarian operations for over two 

years. Starvation had been stopped and hundreds of thousands of lives 

saved. The U.S. had accompLished much in the initial stages of the 

operation, but the politica l situation had unraveled even as the food 

supplies increased, allowing Somalia to slide backwards into disorder 

and anarchy. 

25 
Analysis 

The United States entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the 

imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it 

succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhapPY land bogged down U.S. and allied forces in what became, in effect, 

a poorly organized United Nations nation-building operation. In a 

country where the United States, perhaps naively, expected some measure of gratitude for its help, its forces received increasing hostility as 

they became more deeply embroiled into trying to establish a stable 

government. The military and diplomatic effort to bring together all 

the clans and political entities was doomed to failure as each subelement continued to attempt to out-jockey the others for supreme power. 

The Somali people were the main victims of their own leaders, but 

forty-two Americans died and dozens more were wounded before the 

United States and the United Nations capitulated to events and withdrew. American military power had established the conditions for 

peace in the midst of a famine and civil war, but, unli ke later in 

Bosnia, the factions were not exhausted from the fighting and were not 

yet willing to stop killing each other and anyone caught in the middle. 

There was no peace to keep. The American soldier had, as always, 

done his best under difficult circumstances to perform a complex and 

often confusing mission. But the best soldiers in the world can only 

lay the foundation for peace; they cannot create peace itself. 

26 
Additional Readings 

Allard, Kenneth. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington, 

D.C.: Nationa l Defense University Press, 1995. 

Bowden, Mark. Black Hawk Down: A Stmy of Modern Wm: New 

York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. 

Casper, Lawrence E. Falcon Brigade, Combat and Command in 

Somalia and Haiti. Boulder, Colo., and London: Ly11ne Rienner, 

2001. 

DeLong, Kent, and Tuckey, Steven. Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy. 

Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger Publishers, 1994. 

Hirsch, John L., and Oakley, Robe rt B. Somalia and Operation 

Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. 

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. 

Resource Guide Unified Task Force Somalia, December 1992- May 

1993, Operation Restore Hope. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 

Center of Military History, 1994. 

USSOCOM History Office. Un ited States Special Operations 

Command HistOJy. Tampa, Fla., 1998. 

27 
PIN : 080256-000