J-S32021-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JEAN EVELYN LANE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1694 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 28, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-08-CR-0000056-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT, J. *

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED DECEMBER 18, 2018

Appellant Jean Evelyn Lane appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after she pled guilty to two counts of delivery of a controlled 

substance and one count of driving under the influence (DUI).

1

 Appellant’s 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), and its Pennsylvania counterpart, Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

On July 6, 2017, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to the 

aforementioned offenses. On September 28, 2017, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to one to two years’ incarceration for each drug offense and one to 

five years’ incarceration for DUI. See Sentencing Order, 10/4/17, at 1. The 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2), respectively. The 

instant DUI offense was Appellant’s third in ten years. 
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sentences were structured consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence 

of three to nine years’ incarceration. Id.

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration on 

October 5, 2017. Appellant requested that the trial court impose a shorter 

term of incarceration because she “had undergone drug and alcohol treatment 

while awaiting sentencing, applied for Treatment Court, but was denied, and 

was willing to complete the [State Intermediate Punishment] program if given 

that opportunity.” Post-Sentence Mot., 10/5/17. The trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion on October 19, 2017. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 2, 2017. Both the 

trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, counsel 

filed an Anders/Santiago brief.

On August 14, 2018, this Court remanded the case for Appellant’s 

counsel to file a proper petition to withdraw from representation or an 

advocate’s brief. See Commonwealth v. Lane, 1694 MDA 2017, at 1. 

Counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file his brief, which we granted 

on September 17, 2018. 

On September 28, 2018, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and an 

Anders/Santiago brief.2 Counsel included a certificate of service indicating 

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2 We note that counsel did not file a separate petition to withdraw, but rather, 

included his request in the Anders/Santiago brief. As a panel of this Court 

explained in Commonwealth v. Fischetti, 669 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super. 1995), 
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that he furnished to Appellant both the Anders/Santiago brief and a letter 

explaining her appellate rights. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 18.

Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief identifies the following issues on 

appeal:

1. Whether the Appellant should have received a Treatment Court 

or similar alternative sentence.

2. Whether the sentence of the court was excessive.

Id. at 4. Appellant has not filed a pro se brief or a counseled brief with new, 

privately retained counsel.

Because counsel has filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to 

Anders/Santiago, we must first address counsel’s petition before reviewing 

the merits of the appeal. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). To be permitted to withdraw, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he 

or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional 

arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s 

attention. 

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[a]lthough we believe the more desirable practice would be to 

submit a separate withdrawal request to the court, we . . . treat 

counsel’s [request] in the brief itself as such a request. 

Consequently, we find that counsel’s motion is properly before this 

Court for review[.] 

Id. at 400 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, 

we will treat counsel’s petition to withdraw as properly filed.
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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted).

Here, counsel stated that after a conscientious examination of the 

record, he believes the appeal would be frivolous. See Pet. to Withdraw, 

9/28/18, at ¶ 2. Counsel furnished a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief to 

Appellant, as well as a letter advising Appellant of her right to “present [her]

own arguments to [this Court herself] or through privately retained counsel.” 

Ltr. to Appellant, 9/28/18. Therefore, we conclude that counsel’s petition to 

withdraw complies with the procedural dictates of Anders.

We next address whether counsel’s brief meets the requirements 

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must: 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Here, counsel has provided a summary of the procedural history and the 

relevant facts with appropriate citations to the record. Anders/Santiago

Brief at 5-7. Counsel’s brief also refers to the issues that he believes could 

arguably support the appeal. Id. at 8-14. Counsel’s brief states that he 

conducted a thorough review of the record and determined that any appeal 

would be frivolous, and sets forth his reasons for that conclusion. Id. 
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Accordingly, counsel has substantially complied with the requirements of 

Anders and Santiago.

In his Anders/Santiago brief, counsel identifies two issues relating to 

the discretionary aspects of sentencing. First, counsel raises Appellant’s

intended claim that the trial court should have imposed a reduced sentence 

or an alternative sentence, such as treatment court or intermediate 

punishment, to allow Appellant to continue her efforts towards sobriety and 

rehabilitation. Id. at 8. 

Counsel also raises Appellant’s intended claim that her sentence is 

excessive. Id. at 14. Appellant argues that the court failed to give sufficient 

weight to her statement of remorse, or impose a sentence that would 

adequately address her drug and alcohol problem. Id. Moreover, Appellant

asserts that her sentence is too harsh given the nature of the offenses. Id.

Before addressing the merits of a challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of sentencing, we must determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant 

preserved his [or her] issue; (3) whether [a]ppellant’s brief 

includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under the 

[S]entencing [C]ode.

Commonwealth v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 543 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted).
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The determination of whether there is a substantial question is made on 

a case-by-case basis. Id. at 543. “A substantial question exists where a 

defendant raises a plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision 

of the sentencing code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the 

sentencing process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We have held that an excessive sentence claim, in conjunction with an 

assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a 

substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 

A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (finding a substantial question 

where the appellant challenged his sentence as unduly excessive in addition 

to the claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs). 

Instantly, Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal and a postsentence motion. Appellant’s counsel did not include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal in his brief. 

However, where counsel has filed an Anders/Santiago brief, “we do not 

consider counsel’s failure to submit a Rule 2119(f) statement as precluding 

review of whether [an a]ppellant’s issue is frivolous.” Commonwealth v. 

Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 2015). Appellant has also raised a 

substantial question for our review. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770.

“Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial court 

and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Rush, 162 

A.3d at 544 (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion requires the trial court 

to have acted with manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, 
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or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation 

omitted). “A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its 

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in 

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s 

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Moreover, “where a sentence is within the standard range of the 

guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. 

Super. 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 

545-46 (Pa. Super. 1995), (holding that the combination of a pre-sentence 

investigation report (PSI) and standard range sentence, absent more, cannot 

be considered excessive or unreasonable). Where “the sentencing judge had 

the benefit of a [PSI], it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. 

Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). 

Here, the trial court relied on a PSI report in fashioning Appellant’s

sentence. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 9/28/17, at 7. The court noted that 

Appellant had a “history of poor supervision” while on both probation and 

parole. Id. at 9. Although the trial court acknowledged that Appellant 

suffered from addiction issues, it ultimately agreed with the Commonwealth’s 
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argument that because Appellant was a drug dealer,

3 “the Treatment Court 

program and their policies is not appropriate in this case.” Id. at 9. 

Additionally, the trial court considered Appellant’s prior record score, along 

with the Sentencing Guidelines, and sentenced Appellant within the standard 

range for each offense. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/25/18, at 1.

Therefore, there is no support in the record or law to support Appellant’s 

claim that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence or that it failed to 

consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Accordingly, the identified claims 

are frivolous.

Lastly, our independent review of the record does not reveal any 

additional, non-frivolous issues in this appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015). Accordingly, we grant 

Appellant’s counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of 

sentence. 

Petition for leave to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence 

affirmed.

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3 The trial court noted that Appellant was found with fourteen grams of 

methamphetamine, fourteen grams of marijuana, and one thousand three 

hundred dollars. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 9/28/17, at 9. Appellant is 

unemployed, and her sole source of income is social security, from which she 

receives a total of seven hundred and twenty-one dollars per month. See id.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/18/2018