NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

TONI-RAE MUHAMMAD, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

AAMIR HASIM MUHAMMAD, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0117 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2022-002361

The Honorable Tracey Westerhausen, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Troon Law Group, P.L.L.C., Phoenix

By C. Kirk Di Giacomo

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Aamir Hasim Muhammad, Phoenix

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 11-21-2023
MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Aamir Hasim Muhammad (“Father”) appeals the superior

court’s dissolution decree. For reasons that follow, we affirm in part, and 

vacate and remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Toni-Rae Muhammad (“Mother”) married in 2006

and have two minor children. Father was the primary income earner for the 

family, and Mother primarily ran the household. Both parents earned

master’s degrees.

¶3 Towards the end of 2021, Mother (without the children)

moved out of the family home and in with her parents. In early 2022, 

Mother found temporary employment for a few months. She also filed the 

parties’ 2021 taxes, received a tax refund, and deposited it into her separate 

bank account. Then, in April 2022, Mother petitioned for divorce. 

¶4 Before trial, the parties agreed that each parent could exercise 

parenting time as often as the children and parents agreed—though the 

children made clear they did not wish to visit Mother at the maternal 

grandparents’ home after Mother acted “bizarrely” on one occasion and the 

children felt unsafe. After trial, the court awarded Father sole legal 

decision-making authority for the children. The court also awarded Mother 

spousal maintenance of $1,000 per month for one year and $95 per month 

in child support. The court did not expressly address the parties’ 2021 tax 

refund. 

¶5 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 

-2101(A)(1).
MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

¶6 Father contends the superior court erred by (1) not permitting 

him to testify on his own behalf or cross-examine Mother at trial; (2) failing 

to award him one-half of the parties’ 2021 tax refund; (3) awarding Mother 

spousal maintenance; (4) failing to credit Father for various expenses in 

calculating Mother’s child support award; and (5) failing to expressly rule 

on an adverse inference request. We address each argument in turn.

I. Due Process

¶7 Father contends the superior court denied him due process 

because he was not permitted to testify on his own behalf or cross-examine 

Mother at trial. We review due process challenges de novo, Backstrand v. 

Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 28 (App. 2020), and will reverse a decision 

for a due process violation only if the error prejudices a party, Volk v. Brame, 

235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 2014).

¶8 Due process requires the court to allow litigants to be heard

“at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 

at 346, ¶ 29 (citation omitted). How a trial court does that, including the 

imposition of “reasonable time limits appropriate to the proceeding[],” 

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 22(a), and “the mode and order of examining 

witnesses and presenting evidence,” Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a), is left to the 

court’s broad discretion, see Volk, 235 Ariz. at 468, ¶ 20.

¶9 Despite Father’s argument to the contrary, Father did testify

at trial. Before Father testified, the court explained that it was obligated to 

consider certain statutory factors in rendering its decision. The court then 

systematically went through each factor with Father, allowing Father to 

testify about each. The court also asked Father several follow-up questions.

As for Father’s cross-examination of Mother, once Mother finished 

testifying, the court said to Father: “I haven’t found that it’s worked out 

very well when I let people who are getting a divorce from each other 

cross-examine each other.” The court then asked Father if there were “some 

specific topics that you might like me to ask on your behalf?” Father 

mentioned several topics, and the court then asked Mother questions about 

each of those topics. Father never objected to the court’s approach. On this 

record, Father was not denied due process.

II. Distribution of Property

¶10 Father argues he should be reimbursed for one-half of the 

parties’ 2021 tax refund. Though Father raised the issue at a temporary 
MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD

Decision of the Court

4

orders hearing, he did not raise it at trial, nor did he raise it in his pretrial 

statement filed just before trial or in his proposed divorce resolution 

statement filed months earlier. See, e.g., Ertl v. Ertl, 252 Ariz. 308, 316, ¶ 29

(App. 2021) (waiver of arguments not properly raised before the superior 

court). But even if he had, Mother received the refund before petitioning for 

divorce. 

¶11 Property acquired during marriage is generally presumed to 

be community property. A.R.S. § 25-211(A); see Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 

50, 52 (1979). And, as a general rule, when either spouse expends

community funds, as Mother did here with the tax refund, it is presumed 

to benefit the community. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 44 (1981)

(upholding “general rule that where either spouse incurs an obligation 

during marriage for the benefit of the community, that debt is presumed to 

be a community obligation”). It is true that a spouse may have a claim for 

reimbursement against “abnormal or excessive expenditures” of

community funds by the other spouse upon showing that the community 

funds were “waste[d].” Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 7 (App. 

1998). But Father did not allege or show waste. Mother’s expenditure of the 

community tax refund was presumed to benefit the community. And at the 

temporary orders hearing, Mother testified that the refund was used to pay 

for her living expenses, food for the children, and gas for the car. Father has 

shown no error.

III. Spousal Maintenance

¶12 Father contends Mother was ineligible to receive spousal 

maintenance and that the court’s award failed to consider “all prepared 

testimony and evidence.” We review a spousal maintenance award for an 

abuse of discretion, Leathers v. Leathers, 216 Ariz. 374, 376, ¶ 9 (App. 2007), 

and will affirm an award if there is any reasonable evidence to support it, 

Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 14. To qualify for spousal maintenance, a 

spouse must show eligibility under A.R.S. § 25-319(A) and entitlement

under A.R.S. § 25-319(B). See In re Marriage of Cotter and Podhorez, 245 Ariz. 

82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018).

¶13 Father argues that because the court did not award Mother

temporary spousal maintenance, it should not have awarded her spousal 

maintenance in the final divorce decree. But a temporary order (whether 

awarding spousal maintenance or not) terminates when a final divorce 

decree is entered. A.R.S. § 25-315(A)(2).
MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD

Decision of the Court

5

¶14 After the trial, the court determined that Mother was eligible 

for spousal maintenance because she (1) lacked sufficient property to 

provide for her reasonable needs and (2) significantly reduced her income 

or career opportunities for the benefit of Father. A.R.S. §§ 25–319(A)(1), (4).

Record evidence supports those findings. Mother testified that she had not 

worked during most of the parties’ marriage so she could care for the 

children and that she was having difficulty finding and maintaining a job 

despite her higher education. Mother also testified that, because she 

primarily ran the household, it “prevented [her] from going forward to be 

a doctor” which is what she had hoped to do. 

¶15 The court also considered additional factors under A.R.S.

§ 25–319(B) to determine Mother’s entitlement to an award. Specifically, the 

court noted the 16-year duration of the marriage, Father’s higher earning 

capacity, and Father’s ability to meet his needs while paying spousal 

maintenance. On this record, the court was within its discretion to award 

Mother spousal maintenance.

IV. Child Support

¶16 Father contends the superior court erred in awarding Mother 

$95 per month in child support because the court failed to credit Father for 

various expenses. We agree. 

¶17 When calculating child support, the superior court generally 

considers the parents’ gross income. See Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 

113, ¶ 10 (App. 2016). But the Arizona Child Support Guidelines

(“Guidelines”), A.R.S. § 25-320 app., require the court to deduct from a

parent’s income any court-ordered spousal maintenance and any medical 

insurance for minor children common to the parties. See Guidelines 

§§ II.B.2.a., III.B.3.e. According to the court’s child support worksheet, it 

failed to deduct spousal maintenance or medical insurance premiums (for 

which there was at least some evidence Father pays) from Father’s income.

It is also unclear whether the court attributed as income to Mother the value 

of living with her parents rent-free. See Guidelines §§ II.A.4.d.i.

Consequently, we vacate the child support award and remand for a new 

child support determination.

¶18 We note, for the benefit of the parties on remand, that the 

Guidelines also allow deductions for “any reasonable and necessary 

expenses” a parent expends for their children to attend “private or special 

schools.” Guidelines § III.B.5.a. Father’s financial affidavit listed his $50 

monthly payment for the children’s online homeschooling. Whether those 
MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD

Decision of the Court

6

expenses should be deducted from Father’s income is left to the superior 

court’s sound discretion.

V. Matters Under Advisement

¶19 Lastly, Father contends he “requested an adverse inference” 

from the superior court of Mother’s failure to disclose various bank 

statements, as well as Mother’s criminal history. Though the court did not 

expressly address Father’s adverse inference request in the divorce decree

(suggesting it implicitly denied the same), the decree suggests the court

considered it. The opening lines of the decree state: “[T]he Court has 

considered the evidence which includes where applicable/presented, the 

demeanor of the witnesses, reviewed the exhibits as well as the case history, 

and considered the parties’ arguments and agreements.” (Emphasis added). 

On this issue, Father has shown no error.

VI. Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶20 Mother requests her attorney’s fees and costs under A.R.S. 

§ 25-324. Having considered (to the extent the record provides) the relative 

financial resources of the parties, as well as the reasonableness of the 

parties’ positions on appeal, in our discretion, we deny the request. Because 

each party has been successful in part, each shall bear its own costs.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm the superior court’s decree in all respects except 

regarding child support. On that issue, we vacate the court’s award and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.