a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate

May 2004 HOMELAND 

SECURITY

DHS Needs a Strategy 

to Use DOE’s 

Laboratories for 

Research on Nuclear, 

Biological, and 

Chemical Detection 

and Response 

Technologies

GAO-04-653
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-653.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-653, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging 

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

May 2004

HOMELAND SECURITY

DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's 

Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, 

Biological, and Chemical Detection and 

Response Technologies 

DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals, 

objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies, and 

some gaps remain in its coordination with other federal agencies. According 

to DHS officials, the department has not completed a research strategic plan 

because it has spent much of the time since its March 2003 creation 

organizing the Science and Technology Directorate, developing policies and 

procedures, and hiring necessary staff. DHS has worked with some 

interagency R&D groups and has signed a memorandum of agreement with 

DOE establishing policies for resolving priority conflicts at DOE’s 

laboratories, but gaps remain in its efforts to coordinate and establish 

partnerships with other agencies conducting homeland security R&D. 

Failure to complete a strategic plan and to fully coordinate its research 

efforts may limit DHS’s ability to leverage resources and could increase the 

potential for duplication of research. 

DHS’s research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE 

laboratories. These five laboratories—Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence 

Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories—

received over 96 percent of the $57 million DHS invested in research at 

DOE’s laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90 percent of 

the $201 million for fiscal year 2004. At the time of our review, the remaining 

DOE laboratories would receive DHS R&D funding primarily through 

competition with the private sector and academia. Although federal 

acquisition regulations generally prohibit DOE’s laboratories from 

competing with the private sector and academia for federal funding, some 

competition can occur under specific circumstances. For example, DOE’s 

laboratories can respond to R&D solicitations with the private sector and 

academia for broad scientific study for advancing the state of the art or for 

increasing knowledge. Some DOE laboratory officials feel that if DHS 

focuses on short-term, applied research, their laboratories’ ability to attract 

and retain top scientific talent and build and maintain laboratory facilities 

may be threatened. In response to concerns from Members of Congress and 

officials from DOE’s laboratories, DHS announced in March 2004 that it 

would review its policies for working with DOE’s laboratories. DHS officials 

have also agreed that it is necessary to make long-term investments in 

laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring R&D complex for 

homeland security. 

DHS is making progress developing the project management tools it will use 

to monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. Monthly reports will 

discuss project accomplishments and concerns that could affect the 

execution of the project. Quantitative performance metrics are also being 

developed for these monthly reports to gauge differences between budgeted 

and actual cost and schedules of R&D work performed. Also, DHS plans to 

conduct regular peer reviews of projects to assess how technical approaches 

being followed by R&D projects match DHS’s requirements. 

Success in the war against 

terrorism requires the United 

States to effectively research, 

develop, and deploy technologies 

to detect and respond to the use of 

nuclear, biological, and chemical 

weapons. The Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 gave the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) the 

ability to use laboratories owned 

by the Department of Energy 

(DOE) to conduct research and 

development (R&D) of these 

advanced technologies. GAO was 

asked to determine (1) whether 

DHS has completed a strategic 

R&D plan and coordinated its 

efforts with other federal agencies, 

(2) how DHS plans to use DOE’s 

laboratories to carry out its R&D, 

and (3) what controls DHS is 

establishing to monitor projects at 

DOE’s laboratories. 

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security (1) 

complete a strategic R&D plan, (2) 

ensure that this plan is integrated 

with homeland security R&D 

conducted by other federal 

agencies, (3) develop criteria for 

distributing annual funding and for 

making long-term investments in 

laboratory capabilities, and (4) 

develop guidelines that detail how 

DOE’s laboratories would compete 

for funding with private sector and 

academic entities. In commenting 

on the report, DHS agreed with our 

recommendation to complete a 

strategic R&D plan, but did not 

explicitly agree or disagree with 

our remaining recommendations. 
Page i GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 6

DHS Has Not Completed a Strategic Plan to Determine Its R&D 

Priorities, and Gaps Remain in Its Efforts to Coordinate with 

Other Federal Agencies 8

DHS Faces Challenges Using DOE’s Laboratories 13

DHS Is Making Progress in Developing Controls to Manage Its 

Research Efforts at DOE’s Laboratories 20

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 23

Appendixes

Appendix I: NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project Management Controls 27

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 33

Appendix IV: Comments from the National Nuclear Security 

Administration 38

Tables Table 1: DHS’s Research Portfolios 10

Table 2: DHS R&D Funding Distribution, Fiscal Years 2003-2005 11

Table 3: DHS R&D Funding Distribution to DOE’s Laboratories, 

Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 15
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Abbreviations

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOE Department of Energy

GAO General Accounting Office

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

PART Program Assessment Rating Tool

R&D research and development

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Page 1 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

May 24, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Pat Roberts

Chairman

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Success in the war against terrorism requires the United States to 

effectively research, develop, and deploy advanced technologies—or 

countermeasures—to detect and respond to the use of weapons of mass 

destruction. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—through its 

Science and Technology Directorate—conducts research, development, 

testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen 

the United States’ ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, biological, and 

chemical attacks. Created by Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

the Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for, among other 

things, preparing a strategic plan for developing countermeasures to 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist 

threats. In addition, the act requires DHS to coordinate the federal 

government’s efforts to identify and develop these countermeasures.

Before DHS was created in March 2003, much of the R&D of nuclear, 

radiological, biological, and chemical countermeasures was managed by 

the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Nonproliferation 

and Verification Research and Development Program.1

 In August 2002, we 

reported that NNSA’s program faced challenges balancing the short-term 

needs of the users of these technologies and looking beyond the horizon at 

advanced technologies.2

 Specifically, we noted that some users of 

technologies developed by NNSA’s program were concerned that the 

1

NNSA was created under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2000 as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy. It is responsible for 

enhancing the safety, reliability, and performance of the nation’s nuclear weapons; 

maintaining the nation’s ability to design, produce, and test nuclear weapons; preventing the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and designing, building, and maintaining 

naval nuclear propulsion systems.

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops 

Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened, GAO-02-904

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
Page 2 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

program’s focus was on long-term research, potentially ignoring immediate 

technology needs for the war on terrorism. We also reported that NNSA’s 

program did not have adequate information on milestones, costs, and 

deliverables to monitor projects’ progress. The Homeland Security Act of 

2002 transferred the chemical and biological R&D work of NNSA’s program 

to DHS, along with some of NNSA’s nuclear smuggling R&D.3

 NNSA retains 

responsibility for R&D on remote sensing and other technologies that 

analyze the global spread of nuclear weapons and technology. Similarly, 

NNSA is responsible for R&D on space- and ground-based sensors that 

defense and intelligence agencies use to verify and monitor arms control 

treaties.

Much of the R&D work previously managed by NNSA and now managed by 

DHS occurs at laboratories owned by the Department of Energy (DOE). 

DOE is responsible for the world’s largest laboratory system of its kind. 

The mission of these 22 government-owned and contractor-operated 

laboratories has evolved.4

 Originally created to design and build atomic 

bombs, DOE’s laboratory system has since expanded to conduct basic and 

applied research in many disciplines, from high-energy physics to advanced 

computing. While federal, state, local, and private entities traditionally 

could use the capabilities of DOE’s laboratories, DOE research had the 

highest priority. However, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the 

right to use DOE’s laboratories, and the laboratories the right to accept and 

perform work for DHS, on an equal priority with DOE research. This parity 

has led to questions about how DOE and DHS will resolve conflicting 

priorities, if any, in the use of laboratory staff and resources for R&D.

Other federal agencies also conduct R&D related to homeland security. The 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) carries out basic and 

applied research on bioterrorism countermeasures through the National 

Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

The Department of Defense conducts research on biological and chemical 

3

In addition, the act transferred DOE’s Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the 

advanced scientific computing research program and activities at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center of the Department 

of Defense, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center of the Department of Agriculture to 

DHS.

4

Nine of DOE’s laboratories are large, multiprogram national laboratories that dominate 

DOE’s science and technology activities. DOE also manages several other, generally smaller, 

laboratories that conduct specialized research in a particular program area or were created 

to pursue a single issue.
Page 3 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

countermeasures, primarily for protection of military forces. The Technical 

Support Working Group, jointly operated by the departments of State and 

Defense, oversees an interagency R&D program to rapidly develop and 

deploy counterterrorism technologies for use by federal, state, and local 

agencies.

This report examines (1) whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan 

and coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting 

homeland security R&D; (2) how DHS plans to use DOE’s laboratories to 

carry out its responsibilities for R&D on nuclear, biological, and chemical 

detection and response technologies; and (3) what controls DHS is 

establishing to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D 

conducted at DOE’s laboratories. In addition, you asked us to report on 

how NNSA’s program has changed its project management controls since 

our August 2002 report. NNSA has made several improvements to its 

project management controls as a result of our August 2002 report. 

Information on these improvements is presented in appendix I.

Because DHS was undergoing its initial organization at the time of our 

review and still developing plans, policies, and procedures, our 

examination of DHS’s strategic planning and coordination activities 

focused on interviews with officials from DHS, NNSA, and DOE’s 

laboratories on their R&D activities and their interactions with one 

another. To determine how DHS plans to use DOE’s laboratories, we 

obtained the R&D proposal guidance that DHS provided to DOE’s 

laboratories and the criteria that DHS used to review these proposals. We 

also obtained the results of a DHS-sponsored peer review of DOE 

laboratory proposals. We reviewed federal acquisition regulations and 

statutory requirements governing the operation of DOE’s laboratories. To 

obtain DOE’s laboratories’ views of DHS’s plans, we conducted focus 

groups with program managers and researchers at seven DOE laboratories. 

We selected five DOE laboratories—Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence 

Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories—

because they accounted for most of the funding DHS distributed to DOE 

laboratories. We selected the remaining two laboratories—Argonne and 

Brookhaven National Laboratories—because they also conduct homeland 

security R&D for DHS, NNSA, or other federal agencies. Appendix II 

presents our scope and methodology in more detail. We conducted our 

review from August 2003 through April 2004 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards.
Page 4 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Results in Brief DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to identify priorities, goals, 

objectives, and policies for the R&D of homeland security technologies, 

and gaps remain in its efforts to coordinate with other federal agencies that 

conduct homeland security R&D. Specifically:

• According to DHS officials, since its March 2003 creation, the 

department has not completed a strategic plan for R&D because it has 

spent much of the time organizing the Science and Technology 

Directorate, developing policies and procedures, and hiring necessary 

staff. When DHS was first organized, many of the staff in the Science 

and Technology Directorate were personnel temporarily detailed from 

other executive branch agencies and from DOE’s laboratories. 

According to DHS officials, they needed time to bring more permanent 

staff on board. In the absence of a strategic plan, DHS obligated money 

for R&D on nuclear, biological, and chemical countermeasures for fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004 and developed a budget request for fiscal year 2005 

based on funding priorities established by DHS program managers, who 

relied on their knowledge of current threats and capabilities. DHS 

officials acknowledge that developing the department’s plan for R&D is 

important for ensuring strategic direction and told us that information 

developed through their strategic planning process will be used to 

develop DHS’s annual budget requests to the Congress.

• DHS has worked with some interagency R&D groups and has signed a 

memorandum of agreement with DOE establishing policies for resolving 

priority conflicts at DOE’s laboratories, but gaps remain in its efforts to 

coordinate and establish partnerships with agencies such as NNSA, 

HHS, and the Department of Defense. For example, NNSA officials 

provided DHS with copies of the fiscal year 2004 project proposals that 

NNSA received from DOE’s laboratories to develop radiological and 

nuclear countermeasures. However, DHS officials awarded 2003 and 

2004 funding to DOE’s laboratories without taking similar steps to 

coordinate with NNSA officials because they had limited time after the 

department’s organization in March 2003 in which to decide on project 

funding. In some cases, DHS and NNSA may rely on the same 

capabilities at DOE’s laboratories to conduct similar work on nuclear 

and radiological countermeasures. Consequently, failure to coordinate 

efforts may limit the agencies’ ability to leverage resources and could 

increase the potential for duplicative research efforts. Furthermore, 

DHS officials told us the department needs closer partnerships with 

HHS agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Page 5 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

and the National Institutes of Health. These agencies are responsible for 

much of the basic biological research that DHS will depend upon to 

develop its technologies, especially biological countermeasures. The 

Department of Defense’s programs to develop biological and chemical 

countermeasures may also be applicable to DHS’s efforts. 

We are recommending that DHS ensure that it completes its strategic plan 

and appropriately integrates the plan with research efforts conducted by 

other federal agencies so that governmentwide priorities can be 

established, gaps can be identified, duplication can be avoided, and 

resources can be leveraged.

DHS’s research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE 

laboratories. These five laboratories—Los Alamos, Sandia, Lawrence 

Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National Laboratories—

received over 96 percent of the $57 million DHS invested in research at 

DOE’s laboratories in fiscal year 2003 and will receive almost 90 percent of 

the $201 million for research at DOE’s laboratories for fiscal year 2004. At 

the time of our review, the remaining DOE laboratories were to receive 

R&D funding from DHS primarily through competition with companies and 

academia. Although federal acquisition regulations generally prohibit 

DOE’s laboratories from competing with companies and academia for 

federal funding, some competition can occur under specific circumstances. 

For example, DOE’s laboratories can respond to R&D solicitations with 

companies and academia for broad scientific study for advancing the state 

of the art or increasing knowledge. According to officials from some of 

DOE’s laboratories, the relationship between their laboratories and DHS 

has been strained because of inadequate communication and DHS’s lack of 

clear and well-defined criteria for designating the five DOE laboratories 

that receive most of DHS’s funding. In response to these concerns, DHS’s 

Under Secretary for Science and Technology stated in a March 2004 letter 

that DHS would conduct an internal review and convene an external panel 

to reconsider its policies surrounding DHS’s interactions with DOE’s 

laboratories. At the time of our review, it was unclear to what extent these 

reviews would affect DHS’s policies for using DOE’s laboratories. Like 

NNSA, DHS faces the challenge of balancing the immediate needs of users 

of homeland security technologies with R&D on advanced technologies for 

the future. DHS intends to focus much of its R&D efforts on short-term, 

applied research projects, although it will dedicate some funds to long-term 

advanced concepts research. Some DOE laboratory officials believe that a 

focus on short-term, applied research may threaten their long-term ability 

to attract and retain top scientific talent, build and maintain laboratory 
Page 6 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

facilities, and develop effective technologies. Furthermore, they are 

concerned that many of the successes in developing technologies in the 

short term at DOE’s laboratories have relied upon substantial investments 

in facilities, personnel, and advanced concepts research over the long term. 

DHS officials agreed that it is necessary to make long-term investments in 

certain laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring complex for 

homeland security R&D. We are recommending that DHS develop clear and 

well-defined criteria for distributing funding for long-term investments in 

laboratory capabilities and develop specific guidelines that detail the 

circumstances under which DOE’s laboratories would compete for funding 

with private sector and academic entities.

DHS is making progress in developing the project management tools it will 

use to monitor project costs, milestones, and deliverables. DHS officials 

have told us that each laboratory will complete a monthly report for each of 

its R&D portfolios—such as nuclear and radiological countermeasures, 

chemical countermeasures, and biological countermeasures. These reports 

are to contain (1) data on project cost, schedule, and scope and (2) 

discussions of project accomplishments and concerns that could affect the 

execution of the project. DHS is developing quantitative performance 

metrics for these monthly reports to gauge differences between budgeted 

and actual cost and schedules of R&D work performed. DHS also plans to 

conduct regular scientific peer reviews of projects to assess how the 

technical approaches being followed by R&D projects match DHS’s 

requirements.

We presented a draft of this report to DHS, NNSA, and the Department of 

Defense for comment. With regard to our recommendation to complete a 

strategic R&D plan, DHS agreed that such a plan is critical to the success of 

the department. DHS did not explicitly agree or disagree with our 

remaining recommendations, but provided additional information on its 

strategic planning and coordination activities and on its relationship with 

DOE’s laboratories. NNSA had no comment on the draft report, but noted 

that it is in contact with DHS to assist the department in its coordination 

efforts related to the use of DOE’s laboratories. The Department of Defense 

had no comments on the report.

Background Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established a Directorate of 

Science and Technology within DHS that is headed by an Under Secretary 

for Science and Technology. Among other things, the directorate is 

responsible for:
Page 7 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

• developing, in consultation with other appropriate agencies, a national 

policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals, objectives, and 

policies for, and coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts to 

identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats;

• establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting national 

basic and applied research, development, testing, evaluation, and 

procurement of technology and systems for, among other things, 

detecting and responding to terrorist attacks; and

• developing and overseeing the administration of guidelines for merit 

review of R&D projects throughout DHS.

The act requires the directorate to conduct its basic and applied research, 

development, testing, and evaluation through both “extramural” and 

“intramural” programs. Extramural programs consist of R&D activities 

conducted through grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts between 

DHS and colleges, universities, private research institutes, and/or 

companies. Intramural programs draw upon the expertise of federal 

laboratories. Under the act, the Secretary of Homeland Security may 

establish or contract with any federally funded research and development 

center. In addition, DHS may use the capabilities of DOE’s laboratories 

through a joint sponsorship agreement between DHS and DOE, a direct 

contract between DHS and DOE’s laboratory, a “work for others” basis,5

 or 

any other method provided by law. However, unlike a traditional “work for 

others” arrangement whereby DOE’s laboratories can accept work only if it 

does not interfere with DOE missions, DOE’s laboratories are authorized to 

accept and perform work for DHS on an equal basis with the laboratories’ 

other missions.

In February 2003, DOE and DHS issued a memorandum of agreement that, 

among other things, (1) detailed the procedures under which DHS work 

would be conducted at DOE laboratories and sites, (2) specified that DHS 

will not pay more than DOE pays for administrative or personnel charges 

5

“Work for others” is the performance of work, on a reimbursable basis, for non-DOE 

entities by a DOE facility and/or DOE or contractor personnel. Work for others is intended, 

among other things, to provide assistance to other federal agencies and nonfederal entities 

in accomplishing goals that may otherwise be unattainable, to avoid the possible duplication 

of effort at federal facilities, and to provide access for non-DOE entities to highly specialized 

or unique DOE technical expertise.
Page 8 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

for the work the laboratories conduct, (3) stated that DHS and DOE will 

establish appropriate mechanisms to resolve any issues relating to setting 

priorities when conflicts might arise at the site, and (4) stipulated that both 

departments would jointly determine what long-term arrangements best 

serve the needs of both departments with respect to DOE’s laboratories.

DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate is organized into the following 

four offices:

• Office of Plans, Programs, and Budgets. Establishes overall priorities, 

oversees R&D activities across the Science and Technology Directorate, 

and provides policy guidance for how the Science and Technology 

Directorate will interact with other DHS entities, such as Customs and 

Border Protection, the Coast Guard, and the Secret Service.

• Office of Research and Development. Manages and executes DHS’s 

intramural R&D programs.

• Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA). 

Manages and executes DHS’s extramural R&D programs through 

competitive, merit-reviewed grants, cooperative agreements, or 

contracts with public or private entities.

• Office of System Engineering and Development. Takes technologies 

developed by the Office of Research and Development or HSARPA and 

prepares deployment strategies to transfer technologies to federal, 

state, and/or local governmental users.

DHS Has Not 

Completed a Strategic 

Plan to Determine Its 

R&D Priorities, and 

Gaps Remain in Its 

Efforts to Coordinate 

with Other Federal 

Agencies

DHS has not completed a strategic plan to identify its research priorities for 

the R&D of homeland security technologies. Instead, to fund projects, DHS 

has relied upon its managers to set priorities based upon their knowledge 

of current threats and capabilities. In addition, gaps remain in DHS’s efforts 

to coordinate with other federal agencies conducting homeland security 

R&D. Lack of coordination could increase the potential for duplication of 

research efforts and limit DHS's ability to leverage resources with other 

federal R&D activities.
Page 9 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

DHS Is Still Developing Its 

Research Strategy

At the time of our review, DHS was still developing a strategic plan to 

identify priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for the R&D of 

countermeasures to nuclear, biological, chemical, and other emerging 

terrorist threats. According to DHS officials, this strategic plan will 

establish R&D priorities within and across federal programs and identify 

opportunities to leverage the R&D efforts of other agencies.

Completion of this strategic plan has been delayed because, these officials 

said, much of the time since DHS’s March 2003 creation has been spent 

organizing the Science and Technology Directorate, developing policies 

and procedures, and hiring necessary staff. Unlike other parts of DHS, such 

as the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Secret Service, the Science and 

Technology Directorate did not obtain staff from outside of the department 

when DHS was created. According to senior DHS officials, a team of only 

12 federal employees was initially responsible for organizing the Science 

and Technology Directorate. As a result, the directorate initially relied on 

personnel temporarily detailed from other executive branch agencies and 

from DOE’s laboratories to carry out day-to-day operations. As of January 

2004, the Science and Technology Directorate had grown to a total of 212 

staff: 100 DHS employees, 6 Public Health Service Officers, 59 contractors, 

and 57 employees temporarily detailed from other federal agencies and 

from DOE’s laboratories.

The Science and Technology Directorate has organized its R&D around a 

number of research portfolios: four respond to specific terrorist threats, 

four address cross-cutting threats, and four support DHS’s operational 

units. (See table 1.) In addition, DHS supports other R&D related activities, 

including a program that provides fellowships to university students 

pursuing careers in scientific research essential to homeland security and a 

program to develop capabilities to protect commercial aircraft against 

portable anti-aircraft missiles.
Page 10 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Table 1: DHS’s Research Portfolios

Source: DHS.

Note: In addition to these research portfolios, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate provides 

funding for university and fellowship programs and for research to counter portable anti-aircraft 

missiles.

In the absence of a strategic research plan, DHS obligated money for fiscal 

year 2003 and 2004 and developed a budget request for fiscal year 2005 

based on the personal judgment of managers of each of the research 

portfolios from the Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of Plans, 

Programs, and Budgets. (See table 2.) According to DHS officials, research 

portfolio managers are experts in their respective fields and relied on their 

knowledge of current threats and capabilities to independently determine 

priorities for research needs. In the future, these officials said, portfolio 

managers will team with staff from the Science and Technology 

Directorate’s Office of Research and Development, HSARPA, and Office of 

System Engineering and Development to identify research needs, 

determine priorities, and help decide where the appropriate expertise 

resides to develop each technology—that is, within DOE’s laboratories, 

companies, or academia. Within each research portfolio, a team will 

analyze current threats using information from intelligence assessments, 

identify gaps in available technology, and consider how DHS can take 

advantage of the R&D efforts of other federal agencies. The Science and 

Technology Directorate’s senior management will ultimately set priorities 

for R&D needs across research portfolios and make final funding decisions.

Research portfolios 

focused on specific 

terrorist threats

Research portfolios 

focused on cross-cutting 

threats

Research portfolios 

supporting DHS 

operational units

Biological Countermeasures

Chemical Countermeasures

High Explosives

 Countermeasures

Radiological and Nuclear

 Countermeasures

Threat and Vulnerability

 Testing and Assessment

Standards

Emerging Threats

Rapid Prototyping

Border and Transportation

 Security

Emergency Preparedness

 and Response

U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. Secret Service
Page 11 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Table 2: DHS R&D Funding Distribution, Fiscal Years 2003-2005

Source: GAO presentation of DHS data.

a

As a result of a requirement in the fiscal year 2004 homeland security appropriations act, DHS’s fiscal 

year 2005 budget request transfers $24.1 million from R&D activities conducted by other DHS entities, 

such as the Coast Guard, and consolidates these R&D activities within the Science and Technology 

Directorate.

Notes: In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, DHS spent $44.2 million and $52.6 million, 

respectively, on employee salaries and overhead expenses.

This table is presented for background purposes only; therefore, we did not assess the reliability of 

these data.

DHS Has Coordinated Its 

R&D with Other Federal 

Agencies, but Gaps Remain

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to coordinate its research 

efforts with other federal agencies conducting homeland security R&D. 

DHS has coordinated with some interagency groups, including the National 

Security Council’s Policy Coordinating Committee for Counterterrorism 

and National Preparedness. DHS also cochairs a standing committee on 

Homeland and National Security in the White House’s Office of Science and 

Technology Policy. This committee identifies key areas requiring 

interagency coordination in the formulation of R&D agendas. DHS has also 

worked with the Technical Support Working Group—an interagency 

Dollars in millions

Research portfolio 2003 2004 2005 (requested)

Biological countermeasures $362.6 $285.0 $407.0

Radiological and nuclear 

countermeasures 75.0 126.3 129.3

Chemical countermeasures 7.0 52.0 53.0

High explosives countermeasures 0.0 9.5 9.7

Threat and vulnerability testing and 

assessment 36.1 100.1 101.9

Rapid prototyping 33.0 73.0 76.0

Standards 20.0 39.0 39.7

Emerging threats 16.8 21.0 21.0

R&D conducted for DHS operational 

units (e.g., Coast Guard, Secret 

Service) 0.0 34.0 34.0

Counter portable anti-aircraft missiles 0.0 60.0 61.0

University and fellowship programs 3.0 68.8 30.0

R&D consolidation transferred fundsa 0.0 0.0 24.1

Total $553.5 $868.7 $986.7
Page 12 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

working group of representatives from over 80 federal agencies that is 

jointly overseen by the departments of State and Defense. The Technical 

Support Working Group’s mission is to facilitate interagency R&D for 

combating terrorism, primarily through rapid research, development, and 

prototyping. The Technical Support Working Group managed DHS’s initial 

round of solicitations to private and academic researchers seeking 

proposals for chemical, biological, and radiological countermeasures. 

DHS has also coordinated some of its R&D projects with other federal 

agencies. For example, DHS is now responsible for BioWatch, a federal 

program that monitors about 30 major cities for chemical and biological 

threats. BioWatch is executed jointly by DHS, DOE’s laboratories, the 

Environmental Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention. According to DHS officials, DHS has also coordinated with the 

Department of Defense on BioNet, a federal program that links U.S. 

military installations with local communities in efforts to detect and 

respond to the use of biological agents. DOE and DHS have signed a 

memorandum of agreement that provides a framework for DHS to access 

the capabilities of DOE’s laboratories and establishes policies for resolving 

conflicts over research priorities. DHS officials also noted that the Science 

and Technology Directorate has a liaison to DOE who worked for DOE and 

NNSA for over 20 years and is familiar with their programs.

Although coordination has occurred, gaps remain. The relationship 

between DHS and NNSA illustrates the potential gaps in coordination. 

NNSA officials provided DHS with copies of the fiscal year 2004 project 

proposals it received from DOE’s laboratories to develop radiological and 

nuclear countermeasures. However, DHS officials did not provide NNSA 

with any feedback on these proposals, and it is unclear how they used this 

information during their own processes for reviewing and funding research 

proposals. Moreover, DHS officials awarded fiscal year 2003 and 2004 

funding to DOE’s laboratories without taking similar steps to coordinate 

and share proposal information with NNSA officials. Senior DHS officials 

told us that early efforts to coordinate and share information with NNSA 

were constrained because they had limited time after the department’s 

organization in March 2003 in which to make project funding decisions. 

According to NNSA and DHS officials, although DHS’s mission focuses on 

counterterrorism and NNSA concentrates more on nonproliferation, it is 

important that the two agencies collaborate and share information. 

Because both agencies may rely on the same capabilities of DOE’s 

laboratories to conduct similar work, especially on radiological and 

nuclear countermeasures, the agencies need a stronger partnership in 
Page 13 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

order to leverage resources and minimize the potential for duplication of 

research efforts. In a May 12, 2004, letter commenting on our draft report, 

DHS noted that DHS and NNSA staff have had numerous meetings to 

discuss joint interests in various R&D topics and that NNSA staff 

participated in a meeting on DHS’s fiscal year 2004 radiological and nuclear 

countermeasures program.

DHS still needs to establish formal partnerships with other federal agencies 

that conduct homeland security R&D, and DHS officials acknowledge the 

importance of coordinating and developing partnerships with these federal 

agencies, as well. For example, DHS officials told us that they will need to 

communicate with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the 

National Institutes of Health, which will conduct basic research on 

biological agents in order to develop biological countermeasures. In its 

May 2004 letter to us, DHS stated that DHS biological countermeasures 

officials are coordinating with HHS’s Office of Emergency Preparedness. 

Other R&D projects conducted by the Department of Defense—especially 

by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency—to develop biological and chemical 

countermeasures and force protection technologies may also be applicable 

to DHS’s efforts. In its May 2004 comments on our draft report, DHS noted 

that the Science and Technology Directorate works closely with the 

Department of Defense and other federal agencies to coordinate 

biodefense research efforts and critical biocontainment laboratory 

infrastructure at the National Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort 

Detrick, Maryland.

DHS Faces Challenges 

Using DOE’s 

Laboratories

DHS’s research program has concentrated on funding projects at five DOE 

laboratories. At the time of our review, the remaining DOE laboratories 

were to receive DHS R&D funding primarily through competition with 

companies and academia. According to officials from some of DOE’s 

laboratories, the relationship between their laboratory and DHS has been 

strained because of inadequate communication and the lack of clear and 

well-defined criteria for designating the five DOE laboratories that have 

received the majority of DHS’s R&D funding. DHS also faces the challenge 

of balancing the immediate needs of users of homeland security 

technologies with the need to conduct R&D on advanced technologies for 

the future. DHS intends to focus much of its R&D efforts on short-term, 

applied research projects, although some funds will be dedicated to longterm advanced concepts research. Some laboratory officials believe that if 

DHS focuses on short-term, applied research, their laboratories’ long-term 
Page 14 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

ability to attract and retain top scientific talent, build and maintain 

laboratory facilities, and develop effective technologies may be 

jeopardized.

DHS’s Intramural R&D 

Efforts Are Concentrated at 

Five DOE National 

Laboratories

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 allows DHS to use any of DOE’s 

laboratories; DHS’s R&D program has focused on funding homeland 

security R&D projects at five “intramural” DOE laboratories: Los Alamos, 

Sandia, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National 

Laboratories. The intramural program is designed to draw upon the 

resources of the federal government to conduct work that is inherently the 

federal government’s responsibility. Such work includes threat 

characterization and analysis using classified intelligence information and 

R&D work using special nuclear materials such as plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium. In these areas of inherent federal responsibility, the 

private sector lacks the interest or capability to perform certain R&D tasks.

The five intramural laboratories received over 96 percent of the $57 million 

DHS invested in homeland security research at DOE’s laboratories in fiscal 

year 2003 and will receive almost 90 percent of the $201 million for fiscal 

year 2004. (See table 3.) 
Page 15 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Table 3: DHS R&D Funding Distribution to DOE’s Laboratories, Fiscal Years 2003 

and 2004

Source: GAO presentation of DHS data.

Note: Total for fiscal year 2004 based on $233,300,000 available. As of February 10, 2004, 

$32,200,000 had not been obligated to any laboratory.

The Office of Research and Development is responsible for managing 

DHS’s intramural program and will coordinate all work that DHS conducts 

at DOE’s laboratories. DHS officials told us that, in the future, R&D with 

the intramural laboratories would be primarily focused on scientific-based 

threat and vulnerability characterizations, in addition to analysis and 

design of integrated technology systems. For example, intramural 

laboratories may conduct R&D on tools to assist the intelligence 

community develop and identify information on emerging threats. An 

intramural laboratory may also help identify gaps in current detection and 

response technologies and provide information that DHS and other 

agencies can incorporate into their R&D programs. DHS officials told us 

that they also intend to use the intramural laboratories as technical 

advisers to assist with internal strategic planning and program 

development. As a result, intramural laboratories will have access to, and 

may help shape, internal DHS planning documents. In an effort to guard 

against organizational conflicts of interest and inappropriate use of insider 

information, the intramural laboratories will be prohibited from responding 

to any competitive solicitations that DHS may sponsor.

DOE laboratory Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2004

Argonne National Laboratory $1,324,185 $2,000,000

Brookhaven National Laboratory 400,000 1,400,000

Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory 0 1,750,000

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 0 2,300,000

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 18,300,000 89,500,000

Los Alamos National Laboratory 17,100,000 35,200,000

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 13,100,000 6,900,000

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 2,300,000 12,200,000

Remote Sensing Laboratory (Bechtel 

Nevada) 0 13,000,000

Sandia National Laboratories 4,900,000 36,400,000

Savannah River Technology Center 200,000 500,000

Total $57,624,175 $201,150,000
Page 16 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

DHS designed its extramural program primarily to capitalize on the 

strengths of the nonfederal sector. HSARPA and the Office of System 

Engineering and Development will manage DHS’s extramural R&D efforts 

through competitive solicitations. DHS’s original plans called for the 

remaining DOE laboratories to compete with companies and academia for 

contracts under DHS’s extramural R&D program. However, federal 

acquisition regulations generally prohibit federally funded research and 

development centers, such as DOE’s laboratories, from competing with the 

private sector for federal contracts. According to DOE laboratory officials, 

when DHS decided to include some DOE laboratories in its extramural 

program, it initially did not provide guidance to the laboratories that 

detailed the restrictions on them competing with the private sector for DHS 

R&D contracts. However, in a March 2004 letter to DOE’s laboratories, DHS 

stated that federal acquisition regulations prohibiting DOE laboratories 

from competing with companies and academia will apply to DHS’s 

extramural program. Accordingly, DOE laboratories are not permitted to 

directly respond to or participate as a team member in response to a 

request for proposals.

Nonetheless, DHS noted that the laboratories will have opportunities to 

participate in its R&D efforts. In its March 2004 letter, DHS stated that 

federal regulations do allow DOE laboratories to respond to certain kinds 

of R&D solicitations—known as broad agency announcements. Under 

federal acquisition regulations, agencies may use broad agency 

announcements to fulfill their requirements for scientific study and 

experimentation directed toward advancing the state of the art or 

increasing knowledge, rather than focusing on a specific system or 

hardware solution to a particular need. DHS officials told us that the 

majority of solicitations through the extramural program would be 

conducted through broad agency announcements, thereby allowing DOE 

and other federal laboratories to participate. DOE’s laboratories, as well as 

other federal laboratories, companies, and academia typically respond to 

broad agency announcements with “white papers” that detail a specific 

research proposal. DHS would then competitively evaluate these white 

papers and determine whether DOE’s laboratory, a company, or academia 

best fulfills a specific R&D need.

Some extramural DOE laboratory officials we spoke with expressed 

concern with DHS’s decision to split DOE’s laboratories into intramural and 

extramural groups. Extramural DOE laboratory officials warned that their 

laboratories may not be able to maintain certain research capabilities that 

could contribute to homeland security R&D if they could not receive 
Page 17 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

intramural funding. In addition, the officials were concerned that 

competition with the private sector could result in their laboratories 

receiving limited homeland security R&D funding. Laboratory officials also 

said that their particular laboratories should have been included in the 

intramural program because of their unique capabilities and history of 

successfully developing national security technologies that could be 

applied to DHS’s missions. Moreover, DHS failed to provide them with any 

well-defined criteria that it used to determine which laboratories would 

participate in the intramural program. Laboratory officials questioned 

whether DHS officials’ decisions were influenced by personnel temporarily 

detailed from DOE’s laboratories, pointing out that the laboratories that 

sent most of the personnel temporarily detailed to the Science and 

Technology Directorate during DHS’s initial organization were the same 

laboratories that were later selected to participate in the intramural 

program.

DHS officials we spoke with disagreed with these views, stating that the 

presence of employees from certain laboratories had no bearing on the 

selection of those laboratories for the intramural program. Instead, 

decisions regarding which laboratories would become part of the 

intramural program were made based on DHS’s understanding of each DOE 

laboratory’s core competencies and the laboratory’s ability to help meet the 

intramural program’s mission requirements. DHS officials told us that they 

also considered R&D project proposals that a number of DOE laboratories 

submitted based on the laboratories’ initial understanding of DHS’s needs 

and program requirements. DHS officials added that the decision to split 

DOE’s laboratories into intramural and extramural groups was a natural 

choice, given the relative capabilities and expertise of some laboratories 

over others. Finally, DHS officials told us that the extramural laboratories 

may receive direct funding for certain tasks or projects if DHS determines 

that the laboratory has a critical or unique expertise or capability that 

fulfills a specific R&D need. For example, Brookhaven National Laboratory 

received $1.4 million from DHS in fiscal year 2004 primarily for R&D on 

radiological and nuclear countermeasures even though it is an extramural 

laboratory.

In letters to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Members of Congress 

from Idaho and New York—states where two extramural laboratories 

(Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and 

Brookhaven National Laboratory) are located—expressed concern that 

DHS’s plan to exclude these laboratories from its intramural R&D activities 

would not effectively use each of the laboratories’ particular capabilities in 
Page 18 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

developing homeland security technologies. In response to the these 

concerns, DHS’s Under Secretary for Science and Technology indicated in a 

March 4, 2004, letter to a Member of Congress that DHS would allow each 

DOE laboratory to choose whether it wished to be designated as an 

intramural or extramural laboratory. In addition, DHS would conduct an 

internal and external review of its policies for working with DOE’s 

laboratories. DHS recently conducted, in conjunction with DOE, an 

internal review of these policies. Additionally, the newly created Homeland 

Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, consisting of 

experts in homeland security issues, is assessing these policies. At the time 

of our review, it was unclear to what extent these reviews would affect 

DHS’s policies for using DOE’s laboratories and whether any of DOE’s 

laboratories would choose to change their designation as an intramural or 

an extramural laboratory.

Some Laboratory Officials 

Believe that a Focus on 

Short-Term, Applied 

Research May Threaten the 

Development of 

Technologies Over the Long 

Term

To effectively use DOE’s laboratories, DHS has to balance the immediate 

needs of users of homeland security technologies with the future needs for 

advanced technologies. DHS officials acknowledged that their initial 

efforts have focused on near-term applied R&D and helping homeland 

security end users (e.g., state and local first responders and federal 

agencies such as the Coast Guard) receive existing technologies in a timely 

manner. DHS has directed most of its support for long-term R&D through 

investments in university programs and fellowships to university students 

to increase their interest in pursuing careers in homeland security R&D. 

According to senior DHS officials, much of the Science and Technology 

Directorate’s funding for homeland security R&D will be channeled 

through HSARPA and the Office of System Engineering and Development. 

Both of these offices intend to focus their efforts on short-term applied 

R&D and testing and evaluation of technologies. HSARPA plans to spend 

up to 10 percent of its R&D funds supporting revolutionary advanced 

concepts research devoted to developing breakthrough homeland security 

technologies, with the rest of its funding dedicated to developing 

prototypes of homeland security technologies with a 6-month to 2-year 

development horizon. The Office of Research and Development will 

conduct both short- and long-term R&D under its intramural program. 

However, even long-term projects will be required to provide short- and 

medium-term status reports that can be used to assess a project’s progress.

DOE laboratory officials pointed out that, traditionally, DOE’s laboratories 

have specialized in higher risk, longer-term work. They were concerned 

that DHS is focusing on a short- to medium-term development schedule, 
Page 19 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

which some of DOE’s laboratories are not accustomed to. Some 

laboratories, especially those in DHS’s extramural program, which will 

work primarily with HSARPA, may find it challenging to meet these shorter 

time frames for R&D.

Some laboratory officials are also concerned with what they believe is 

DHS’s focus on short-term applied research. These officials believe that a 

short-term focus may threaten their long-term ability to attract and retain 

top scientific talent, build and maintain laboratory facilities, and develop 

effective homeland security technologies. These officials said that as DHS 

implements its R&D strategy, it must recognize the need to make long-term 

investments at DOE’s laboratories. Furthermore, many of their 

laboratories’ past successes in developing technologies in the short term 

have relied upon substantial investments in facilities, personnel, and 

advanced concepts research over the long term. These officials pointed out 

that reaching a scientific breakthrough has often required many years of 

funding to develop, test, and refine technologies. In addition, their success 

in attracting top scientific talent has depended on their laboratory’s ability 

to provide for job sustainability, sufficient research resources, 

sophisticated research facilities, and opportunities to do ground-breaking 

science over the long term. They are therefore concerned that if DHS is 

focusing on short-term research, this could jeopardize their ability to create 

an attractive work environment for recruiting and retaining top talent to 

work on homeland security R&D. Some laboratory officials pointed out 

that it is expensive to maintain facilities to conduct homeland security 

R&D, especially for chemical countermeasures. They warned that without 

adequate investment from DHS, their laboratories may need to focus on 

other activities and perform work for other agencies in order to support 

their laboratory capabilities and personnel, perhaps reducing the personnel 

and facilities available for DHS R&D projects. 

DHS officials agreed that it is necessary to make long-term investments in 

certain laboratory capabilities in order to create an enduring R&D complex 

for federal homeland security. Officials from the Office of Research and 

Development told us that they intend to use up to 20 percent of their 

intramural program funds to make long-term investments at DOE and other 

federal laboratories. Through targeted investments in personnel and 

research facilities, they hope to create an intellectual base dedicated to 

homeland security R&D that the nation can depend upon. DHS recently 

created the Office of Enduring Stewardship within the Science and 

Technology Directorate to consider DHS’s long-term investments 

throughout DOE’s laboratory complex. According to DHS officials, this 
Page 20 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

office will help determine which capabilities at DOE’s laboratories will 

require long-term stewardship from DHS.

DHS Is Making 

Progress in Developing 

Controls to Manage Its 

Research Efforts at 

DOE’s Laboratories

To determine whether a project’s goals are being met and resources are 

being used effectively and efficiently, standards for internal control in the 

federal government require that program managers have access to relevant, 

reliable, and timely operational and financial data. For example, managers 

need (1) operational data to determine whether an agency is in compliance 

with various laws and regulations and (2) financial information to develop 

financial statements for periodic external reporting, and, on a day-to-day 

basis, to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate 

resources. Internal control standards require such operational and 

financial information to be identified, captured, and distributed in a form 

and time frame that permits staff to perform their duties efficiently.

In this context, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate is developing 

management tools to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables 

for its R&D projects. Using standards developed by the Project 

Management Institute,6

 DHS’s objectives for these project management 

tools are to, among other things,

• inform DHS managers and other stakeholders of the status of R&D 

projects during their execution;

• provide a standard, regular channel of communications between DHS 

and researchers in such a way as to establish trust and transparency 

between them;

• facilitate DHS’s and researchers’ ability to anticipate and manage 

change;

• contribute to DHS’s assessment of the overall performance of 

researchers; and

• serve as a formal mechanism to ensure effective and efficient use of 

taxpayer funds.

6

See Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(Newtown Square, Pa.: 2000). This guide has been approved by the American National 

Standards Institute.
Page 21 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Each laboratory conducting R&D for DHS will complete a monthly report 

for each research portfolio in which it is engaged. For example, a 

laboratory conducting research in the research portfolios for both nuclear 

and radiological and chemical countermeasures would produce two 

separate monthly reports. In addition, an overall report for all of a 

laboratory’s efforts will be produced. DHS is providing funding to organize 

Centers for Homeland Security that will house administrative support 

personnel at DOE’s laboratories to help researchers track their projects.

The monthly reports are to contain summary information on a project’s 

costs, schedule, and scope. While the exact form this summary information 

will take is still being developed, DHS officials told us that one way the 

information could be portrayed is as a red/yellow/green traffic light for 

cost, schedule, and scope status. For example, costs would be portrayed as 

(1) green, if the laboratory’s estimate of the project’s total cost is less than 

or equal to the project’s total budget, (2) yellow, if the laboratory’s estimate 

of the project’s total cost is greater than the project’s budget and a 

corrective action plan has been approved and implemented, and (3) red, if 

the project’s estimated total cost is greater than its budget and no 

corrective action plan has been approved. Similar status designations 

would be made for project schedule and scope.

Quantitative performance metrics are also being developed in a number of 

areas and will be used in reports to track differences between the budgeted 

and actual costs of the R&D work performed and will measure schedule 

variances. In addition, the reports are to describe (1) the reasons for cost, 

schedule, and/or scope variances and any corrective actions underway; (2) 

important accomplishments during the reporting period; and (3) issues that 

could affect the execution of a project.

DHS plans to conduct regular merit reviews on a portfolio-by-portfolio 

basis—initially twice a year and eventually once a year. For each review, 

DHS will charter a panel that will include the cognizant portfolio manager 

as well as others, such as members of the Homeland Security Science and 

Technology Advisory Committee that was created by the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002. These review panels will assess how the technical 

approach being followed by R&D projects matches the research portfolio’s 

requirements, the projects’ progress to date, and remaining risk and ways 

of mitigating any identified risk.
Page 22 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Conclusions The creation of DHS represents the largest reorganization of the federal 

government in more than 50 years. While we acknowledge DHS officials’ 

concerns that they have had limited time since the department’s initial 

organization in March 2003, it is important for DHS to complete its strategic 

plan and identify and set priorities for its R&D efforts as required by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act also requires that DHS coordinate 

the federal government’s homeland security R&D efforts. More effective 

integration of research efforts between DHS, NNSA, and other agencies 

during DHS’s strategic planning and its annual selection and setting of 

priorities for R&D projects could increase opportunities to leverage 

research efforts and identify gaps in the federal government’s efforts to 

develop appropriate homeland security technologies. Effective integration 

is especially important for chemical and biological countermeasures, 

where DHS will depend upon basic research conducted by the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, and 

others. Effective coordination between DHS and DOE is all the more 

critical because the departments must share the capabilities of the 

extensive DOE laboratory complex equally, and their mechanism for 

resolving priority conflicts at the laboratories has yet to be tested.

We are concerned that DHS’s approach to funding R&D efforts may hinder 

its ability to use the full capabilities of the entire DOE laboratory system. 

Although DHS’s decision to target its long-term investments towards a 

limited group of DOE laboratories has been explained as a strategic 

decision to maximize limited resources, we believe that annual project 

funding decisions and long-term investments in laboratory capabilities 

should be based on using and supporting the best science available. These 

funding decisions should be made using well-defined criteria that are 

clearly communicated to every potential contributor. In addition, while 

DHS has made clear that DOE’s laboratories are allowed to compete for 

funding with private and academic researchers under specific 

circumstances, the laboratories may need additional guidance that details 

how they can comply with federal acquisition regulations and other 

restrictions that generally prohibit competition between federal and private 

research entities. We are encouraged by DHS’s March 2004 decision to 

review its policies for working with DOE’s laboratories, but the extent to 

which these reviews will affect DHS’s R&D activities remains unclear.
Page 23 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure that DHS appropriately integrates its R&D of homeland security 

technologies with complementary R&D efforts conducted across the 

federal government and that the extensive capabilities of DOE’s 

laboratories can be brought to bear on the R&D of nuclear, biological, and 

chemical countermeasures, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security direct the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to take the 

following four actions:

• Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, complete a strategic 

R&D plan that identifies priorities, goals, and objectives to identify and 

develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and other emerging terrorist threats.

• Ensure that this strategic plan is integrated with homeland security R&D 

efforts conducted by other federal agencies, such as NNSA, HHS, and 

the Department of Defense. This integrated strategic plan should detail 

how DHS will work with these agencies to establish governmentwide 

priorities, identify research gaps, avoid duplication of effort, and 

leverage resources.

• Develop and communicate to DOE’s laboratories and other potential 

contributors to homeland security R&D efforts well-defined criteria for 

distributing annual project funding and for making long-term 

investments in laboratory capabilities for homeland security R&D.

• Develop, in cooperation with DOE, specific guidelines that detail the 

circumstances under which DOE laboratories and other federal R&D 

programs would compete for contracts with private sector and 

academic entities. These guidelines should describe the criteria used to 

select proposals, detail the method of evaluation, and contain 

procedures DOE’s laboratories should use to ensure compliance with 

federal acquisition regulations and statutory requirements.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided NNSA, the Department of Defense, and DHS with draft copies 

of this report for their review and comment. DHS’s written comments are 

presented as appendix III. NNSA had no comments on the draft report, but 

noted that NNSA is in contact with DHS to assist it in its coordination 

efforts related to the use of DOE’s laboratories. NNSA’s letter is presented 

as appendix IV. The Department of Defense had no comments on the draft 

report.
Page 24 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

DHS agreed with our recommendation to create a strategic R&D plan and 

noted that such a plan is critical to the success of the department. DHS 

stated that its Science and Technology Directorate has launched a formal, 

structured strategic planning process that will determine specific goals for 

the next 5 years, threats and vulnerabilities, and a list of prioritized 

deliverables for fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010. DHS stated that it 

expected this plan to be completed in the early summer of 2004 and that the 

plan will be reviewed and updated annually.

DHS did not explicitly agree or disagree with our recommendation that this 

plan be integrated with homeland security R&D conducted by other 

agencies. However, DHS did provide information on the ongoing 

development of a national plan for homeland security science and 

technology by the Homeland Security Council, the National Security 

Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and DHS. According 

to DHS, this national plan will highlight the high-priority areas for 

homeland security in the short-, mid-, and long-term, as well as lay out the 

roles and responsibilities for each federal department and agency with 

homeland security R&D programs. DHS also provided additional 

information on its interactions with NNSA, HHS, and the Department of 

Defense that we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We are 

encouraged that DHS is taking steps to work with other federal agencies 

and interagency groups to develop an integrated national plan for 

homeland security R&D.

DHS also provided information on its strategic planning for long-term 

investments in DOE’s laboratories. For example, as was stated in our draft 

report, DHS noted that it requested that the newly formed Homeland 

Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee review DHS’s 

policies for using DOE’s laboratories and make recommendations on the 

most effective long-term policy. However, DHS did not respond directly to 

our recommendation that DHS should develop and communicate to DOE’s 

laboratories well-defined criteria for distributing annual project funding. 

We continue to believe that communicating the criteria that will be used to 

make funding decisions to DOE’s laboratories and other potential 

contributors to homeland security R&D efforts would assist them in 

developing proposals that would best meet DHS’s requirements.

Finally, DHS did not agree or disagree with our recommendation to develop 

guidelines that detail how DOE’s laboratories would compete for contracts 

with private sector and academic entities. As our draft report stated, DHS 

noted that it asked each laboratory to decide whether to participate in the 
Page 25 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Science and Technology Directorate’s strategic planning and program 

development processes as an intramural laboratory or to respond to broad 

agency announcements open to the private sector as an extramural 

laboratory. According to DHS, Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel 

Nevada, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories have 

since decided to participate in DHS R&D activities as intramural 

laboratories. DHS stated in its comments that current regulations cover 

inclusion of the remaining DOE laboratories and other federal laboratories 

in normal solicitation processes. We agree with DHS, and our draft report 

stated, that federal acquisition regulations permit DOE and other federal 

laboratories to respond to broad agency announcements. However, 

laboratory officials told us throughout our review that they have little 

experience responding to these types of solicitations. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that specific guidelines detailing how the laboratories 

should respond to DHS’s broad agency announcements would help ensure 

that regulatory requirements governing competition between federal 

laboratories and private sector researchers are met.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; 

the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, 

NNSA; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; appropriate 

congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 26 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report were Ryan T. Coles, 

Jonathan G. Nash, F. James Shafer, Jr., and Ann M. Ulrich.

Sincerely yours,

Gene Aloise

Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 27 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Appendix I

NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project Apendxies

Management Controls ApendxiI

This appendix discusses changes the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and 

Development Program has made to the controls it uses to monitor project 

milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D conducted at the Department 

of Energy’s (DOE) laboratories since our August 2002 report.1

The mission of NNSA’s program is to conduct needs-driven research, 

development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended 

to strengthen the United States’ ability to detect and analyze the global 

spread of nuclear weapons and technology. DOE’s laboratories carry out 

most of the program’s research, while officials at NNSA’s headquarters and 

operations offices provide general oversight and contracting support and 

serve as liaisons to users of the technologies developed. The program 

manages R&D of space- and ground-based remote sensing and other 

technologies used by defense and intelligence agencies to verify and 

monitor arms control treaties.

The program is currently divided into two specific research areas:

• Nuclear Explosion Monitoring. Develops and manufactures groundand satellite-based sensors and computer software for detecting, 

locating, identifying, and characterizing nuclear explosions when they 

occur underground, underwater, in the atmosphere, or in space.

• Proliferation Detection. Develops, demonstrates, and delivers long- and 

short-range sensor technologies to detect the spread of nuclear, 

chemical, and biological weapons, materials, and technologies 

worldwide.

NNSA and its R&D program are key players in the United States’ 

nonproliferation efforts. NNSA derives its important role from its unique 

understanding and expertise related to nuclear weapons and nuclear 

power, based in large measure on the world-class research, design, and 

engineering capabilities found at DOE’s laboratories. Some examples of 

successful research projects conducted by NNSA’s Nonproliferation and 

Verification R&D Program include:

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops 

Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened, GAO-02-904

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
Appendix I

NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project 

Management Controls

Page 28 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

• The development of ground-based technology for detecting in real time 

short-lived radioactive gases released during nuclear explosions and 

satellite-based sensors that are sensitive to x-ray, gamma-ray, and 

neutron emissions.

• Detection equipment that was fitted into an aircraft and flown over the 

World Trade Center site following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks to monitor air samples for hazardous chemicals.

• A decontamination formulation that was used to assist the cleanup of 

congressional office buildings contaminated with anthrax and 

equipment to detect the presence of chemical agents in the Washington, 

D.C., Metro subway system.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the chemical and biological 

R&D work of NNSA’s program to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), along with some of NNSA’s counter-nuclear smuggling R&D.

To monitor the progress of NNSA R&D projects by headquarters program 

managers, participating laboratories are required to submit, on an annual 

basis, project life-cycle plans. These plans are to contain detailed 

statements of work that describe the project’s contributions to overall 

program goals, scientific and technical merit, and the specific tasks to be 

accomplished. In addition, laboratories are required to submit quarterly 

reports that indicate all projects’ progress to date, issues and problems 

encountered, milestones and schedules, and cost data. However, we 

reported in August 2002 that plans and reports were often missing these 

data, and the program management information system used by the 

program was not designed to track whether projects are on time or within 

budget, eliminating an important tool that could be used to track projects, 

improve communications across the program, and provide transparency to 

other agencies and to the Congress.

Since our August 2002 report, NNSA has improved the controls it uses to 

provide the operational and financial data that its managers use to monitor 

project costs, milestones, and deliverables. The program has implemented 

a Web-based project management information system that is designed to 

contain the information needed for proposal evaluation, budget planning, 

funding decisions, preparation of work authorizations, responses to 

congressional inquiries, and other reports on the status and costs of R&D 

projects managed by the program. In addition, the program has emphasized 

the importance of performance metrics and the use of the Office of 
Appendix I

NNSA Has Strengthened Its Project 

Management Controls

Page 29 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Management and Budget’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). PART 

is a series of diagnostic questions designed to provide a consistent 

approach to rating federal programs. Drawing upon available performance 

and evaluation information, the PART questionnaire attempts to determine 

the strengths and weaknesses of federal programs with a particular focus 

on individual program results. PART asks, for example, whether a 

program’s long-term goals are specific, ambitious, and focused on 

outcomes, and whether annual goals demonstrate progress toward 

achieving long-term goals.2

NNSA’s R&D program is also making increased use of project reviews. 

Program managers and potential users of technologies developed by the 

program conduct regular reviews of each project before key decisions are 

made, such as whether to proceed from exploratory research into product 

development. The reviews examine how well the project is linked to user 

needs, the strength of the researchers’ scientific or technical approach, and 

the researchers’ ability to carry out the project effectively and efficiently. 

The reviews also involve outside experts from the academic or private 

sector communities with a strong relevant science background.

DOE is in the process of developing a departmentwide project management 

system called the E-Government Corporate R&D Electronic Portfolio 

Management Environment. This system will, according to DOE, 

consolidate information currently contained in a myriad of existing 

program management systems and provide critical project proposal, fund 

distribution, and performance data to track research projects from 

proposal submission to project closeout. By the end of fiscal year 2004, 

DOE plans to deploy a module of the project management system that will 

allow DOE’s laboratories to electronically submit proposals for new and 

ongoing R&D. This module will also give DOE managers the ability to 

receive, review, and respond to those proposals electronically. The 

remaining module of the project management system that will provide for, 

among other things, electronic merit reviews; project tracking and 

reporting; and program planning, analysis, and evaluation is scheduled to 

be deployed by the end of fiscal year 2006.

2

For more information on PART, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Performance 

Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool for the 

Fiscal Year 2004 Budget, GAO-04-174 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004).
Page 30 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiI

This report examines (1) whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan 

and coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting 

homeland security R&D; (2) how DHS plans to use DOE’s laboratories to 

carry out its responsibilities for R&D on nuclear, biological, and chemical 

detection and response technologies; and (3) what controls DHS is 

establishing to monitor project milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D 

conducted at DOE’s laboratories. In addition, we report on how NNSA’s 

Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development program has 

changed its project management controls since our August 2002 report.1

To determine whether DHS has completed a strategic R&D plan and 

coordinated its efforts with other federal agencies conducting homeland 

security R&D, we interviewed officials from DHS, DOE, and NNSA. We also 

received written responses to questions provided to the Office of Science 

and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President. Because 

DHS was undergoing its initial organization at the time of our review, and 

documented plans, policies, and procedures were still being developed, our 

examination of DHS’s strategic planning and coordination activities 

focused on interviews with agency officials and reviewing DHS’s 

preliminary planning documents. When officials provided their views and 

opinions on various issues as representatives for their agencies, we 

attempted to corroborate the information with other agency officials. In 

addition, we considered testimony and statements made by several senior 

DHS officials during congressional hearings on the status of DHS’s R&D 

programs. We reviewed the relevant sections of the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 that established the responsibilities of the Directorate of Science 

and Technology. To better understand DHS’s relationship with DOE, we 

reviewed a memorandum of agreement between the two agencies and 

other documentation that governs DHS’s access to DOE’s laboratories. We 

also interviewed Department of State officials overseeing the Technology 

Support Working Group to better understand DHS’s relationship and 

coordination with this interagency group.

To determine how DHS plans to use DOE’s laboratories, we obtained R&D 

proposal guidance that DHS provided to DOE’s laboratories and the criteria 

that DHS used to review these proposals. We also obtained the results of a 

DHS-sponsored peer review of DOE laboratory proposals. We reviewed 

1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA’s Program Develops 

Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened, GAO-02-904

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2002).
Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 31 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

federal acquisition regulations and statutory requirements governing the 

operation of DOE’s laboratories to determine the laboratories’ ability to 

engage in openly competitive solicitations with companies and academia. 

We collected and analyzed documents and correspondence between 

Science and Technology Directorate officials and DOE’s laboratories that 

detailed DHS’s plans for using DOE’s laboratories. Additionally, we 

obtained correspondence between Members of Congress and senior DHS 

staff concerning the DHS use of DOE’s laboratories. We examined budget 

information for the Science and Technology Directorate’s R&D portfolios 

for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and its budget request for fiscal year 2005. 

Additionally, we analyzed the amount of funding each DOE laboratory 

received from DHS for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. To assess the reliability 

of the budgetary information used in this report, we obtained responses 

from key DHS database officials to a series of questions focused on data 

reliability, covering issues such as data entry access, internal control 

procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We added 

follow-up questions whenever necessary. We also corroborated the 

budgetary data with other sources, such as congressional testimony from 

DHS officials, whenever possible. We found no discrepancies with the data 

DHS provided. Based on our work, we determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To obtain the views of DOE’s laboratories on DHS’s plans, we conducted 

focus groups with program managers and individual project researchers at 

seven DOE laboratories. We selected five DOE laboratories—Sandia, Los 

Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Pacific Northwest, and Oak Ridge National 

Laboratories—because they received the majority of all funding DHS 

distributed to DOE laboratories and were designated by DHS to participate 

in its intramural program. We selected the remaining two laboratories—

Argonne and Brookhaven National Laboratories—because they also 

conduct homeland security R&D for DHS, NNSA, or other federal agencies 

and, at the time of our review, were designated by DHS to participate in its 

extramural program. For the focus groups with the program managers, we 

selected laboratory officials responsible for overseeing R&D on chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures for NNSA, DHS, and 

other agencies. We relied upon laboratory directors and program managers 

to help identify appropriate individuals to participate in our focus groups 

with researchers. Those selected to participate in the focus groups tended 

to be senior principal project investigators responsible for developing 

homeland security and nonproliferation technologies at their laboratories. 

During each focus group, we asked targeted questions in order to generate 

discussion on various issues related to this review, including questions on 
Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 32 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

the laboratory proposal development processes, the means of obtaining 

user input to the R&D process, short-term versus long-term research, and 

researchers’ views on appropriate levels of 

monitoring/oversight/coordination between the laboratories, DHS, and 

NNSA. In order to solicit open and candid responses to our questions, we 

conducted the focus groups for the researchers separately from the focus 

groups with the program managers. More than 90 individuals participated 

in these focus groups.

To determine what controls DHS is establishing to monitor project 

milestones, costs, and deliverables for R&D, we examined documents that 

outline DHS’s plans to oversee R&D conducted at DOE’s laboratories. We 

compared these plans to standards laid out in GAO’s Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, 

November 1999). We analyzed DHS’s guidelines for developing R&D 

execution plans and related documentation on DHS’s proposed use of 

quantitative performance metrics and merit reviews. To determine how 

NNSA’s program has changed its project management controls since our 

August 2002 report, we interviewed NNSA officials and examined various 

polices, procedures, and documents related to NNSA’s project management 

systems. We considered how NNSA has incorporated the use of 

performance metrics and the Office of Management and Budget’s Program 

Assessment Rating Tool. In addition, we examined NNSA’s plans to use 

DOE’s departmentwide project management system—the E-Government 

Corporate R&D Electronic Portfolio Management Environment.

We conducted our review from August 2003 through April 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 33 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 34 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 35 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 36 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 37 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D
Page 38 GAO-04-653 Homeland Security R&D

Appendix IV

Comments from the National Nuclear Security 

Administration ApendxiIV

(360376)
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