This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. A-1-CA-35983 4 SHAWN PARIS, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Lyndy D. Bennett, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Robert E. Tangora 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 for Appellant 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 HANISEE, Judge. 16 {1} Defendant appeals his convictions for criminal sexual penetration in the first 17 degree (Child under 13), and two counts of criminal sexual contact in the third degree 182 (Child under 13). We issued a calendar noti ce proposing to affirm. Defendant has filed 1 a memorandum in opposition. We affirm. 2 {2} Issue 1 : Defendant continues to challenge th e denial of his motion to suppress. 3 [MIO 4] “In reviewing a district court’ s ruling on a motion to suppress, we observe 4 the distinction between factual determinati ons[,] which are subject to a substantial 5 evidence standard of review[,] and applicati on of law to the facts, which is subject to 6 de novo review.” State v. Bravo , 2006-NMCA-019, ¶ 5, 139 N.M. 93, 128 P.3d 1070 7 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Determining whether or 8 not a police interview constitutes a custodial interrogation requires the application of 9 law to the facts.” State v. Nieto , 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442. 10 {3} Here, Defendant was contacted by a detective and asked if he would come to 11 the police station to discuss a report thathis ten-year-old stepdaughter had been 12 sexually abused. [MIO 1; DS 1] Defendant appeared with his attorney, and the 13 detectives advised them that this was a voluntary meeting and Defendant was free to 14 leave. [MIO 1; DS 1] Defendant’s counsel then reiterated to Defe ndant that this was 15 a voluntary visit and he was free to leave. [D S 1] Defendant’s attorney told Detectives 16 that he had informed Defendant of his right s, including the right to remain silent. [RP 17 212] Detectives asked Defendant if he w ould take a polygraph te st and he agreed. 18 [MIO 1; DS 2] At this point Defendant’s attorney left. [MIO 1; DS 2] In the 193 examination room, Defendant was advised of his Mirandarights and he signed a 1 written waiver. [MIO 1-2; DS 2] After the examination Defendant was told that he 2 failed, and was taken to another room where he was questioned for over a two-hour 3 period, during which time he made inculpatory statements that were the subject of the 4 motion to suppress. [MIO 2; DS 2] The di strict court ruled th at Defendant did not 5 need to be Mirandized because there was no custodial interrogation; the court did not 6 address whether Defendant had in fact been sufficiently Mirandized . [RP 213] 7 {4} The district court’s ruling is supported by Bravo , 2006-NMCA-019. In Bravo , 8 the defendant was questioned at a police station after officers asked her if she would 9 be willing to give a second statement following the death of her son. Id . ¶¶ 1, 12. She 10 voluntarily drove to the police station and was interrogated for approximately two 11 hours. Id . ¶¶ 12-13. During the course of the interview, she was not placed in 12 handcuffs. Id . ¶ 13. Despite essentiallyconfessing to the crime of child abuse resulting 13 in death, she was free to leave the station at the conclusion of the interview. Id . This 14 Court found that, given these facts, substan tial evidence supported the district court’s 15 finding that the defendant was not in custody and therefore was not entitled to 16 Miranda warnings. Id

. 17 {5} Similarly here, Defendant had voluntarily come to the police station, and had 18 been told that he was free to go. Cf. State v. Olivas , 2011-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 11-12, 15, 194 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (finding custodial in terrogation where the defendant had 1 agreed to meet with officers, was handc uffed while being transported in a police 2 vehicle—although interrogated without handc uffs—and had never been told that he 3 was free to go). Defendant’s s ubjective belief that he was not free to go is irrelevant 4 to the objective test that governs the custodial interrogation issue. See State v. Munoz , 5 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 40, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847. 6 {6} Even assuming, arguendo, that Defendant had been subject to custodial 7 interrogation after the polygraph test, he had been Mirandized prior to taking the test, 8 and signed a waiver to that effect. [MIO 1-2; DS 2] To the extent Defendant is arguing 9 that he had to be Mirandized a second time after he faile d the polygraph test, repeated 10 Mirandawarnings are not necessary where a de fendant has been made aware of his 11 rights. See State v. Gilbert , 1982-NMSC-095, ¶ 12, 98 N.M. 530, 650 P.2d 814 12 (holding that Mirandawarnings did not have to be given again where a second 13 interview of the defendant ha d taken place hours after he was Mirandized). 14 {7} Issue 2 : Defendant continues to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 15 support his convictions. [MIO 5] A suffici ency of the evidence review involves a 16 two-step process. Initially, the evidence is vi ewed in the light most favorable to the 17 verdict. Then the appellate court must make a legal determination of “whether the 18 evidence viewed in this manner could justif y a finding by any rational trier of fact that 195 each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 1 State v. Apodaca , 1994-NMSC-121, ¶ 6, 118 N.M. 762, 887 P.2d 756 (internal 2 quotation marks and citations omitted). 3 {8} Defendant’s argument is that the State could not rely on his confession because 4 its trustworthiness was not established under the corpus delicti rule. [MIO 5] See State 5 v. Weisser , 2007-NMCA-015, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 93, 150 P.3d 1043 (stating that the 6 corpus delicti rule provides that “unless th e corpus delicti of the offense charged has 7 been otherwise established, a convic tion cannot be sustained solely on the 8 extrajudicial confessions or admissions of the accused” (alteration, internal quotation 9 marks, and citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by State v. 10 Bregar , 2017-NMCA-028, ¶ 49, 390 P.3d 212. Howe ver, in this case the convictions 11 were not based solely on De fendant’s confession. The victim’s statements, through 12 her trial testimony and Child Haven interview, provided independent evidence of the 13 crimes. [RP 122-26] To the extent that Defe ndant is challenging in consistencies in the 14 trial testimony and the interview, it was the roleof the jury to resolve these conflicts. 15 See State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. 16 {9} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. 176 {10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

5 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 6

7 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 8